42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(e) does not permit an employer to exclude women from a job they can perform based on a personal preference.

Jordan v. Wilson · filed 1986-11-25(e)

Evidently, the mayor believes that women are capable of performing the necessary job duties, and thus the BFOQ defense is unavailable; the personal preferences of the mayor’s wife simply are not a reasonable or sufficient justification for discriminating against female officers.

Section 2000e-2(e)’s bona fide occupational qualification exception does not allow an employer to exclude female bus drivers because customers prefer male drivers.

Bollenbach v. Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District · filed 1987-05-08(e)

In this case, the BFOQ defense does not apply because driving a bus does not require any special physical characteristics that are possessed by males, but not females. Moreover, the fact that the Hasidic clientele strongly prefer male drivers does not make being male a BFOQ.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits an employer to retain male orderlies during a layoff when patient privacy makes sex a bona fide occupational qualification and no reasonable scheduling alternative protects that privacy.

Jones v. Hinds General Hospital · filed 1987-05-12(e)(1)

The court finds that the defendant has established sex as a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the Hospital, and plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that this was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

A ban on single pregnancies among staff can qualify as a bona fide occupational qualification when it is reasonably necessary to a girls’ club’s role-modeling work.

Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc. · filed 1987-12-03(e)(1)

Thus, we hold that the role model rule qualifies as a bona fide occupational qualification.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a sex-based employment qualification when it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.

Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club · filed 1988-02-25(e)(1)

Thus, we hold that the role model rule qualifies as a bona fide occupational qualification.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits religion-based hiring only when the employer shows that the religious qualification is necessary to the essence of the job.

Rasul v. District of Columbia · filed 1988-03-04(e)(1)

At the risk of repetition, we pause here to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. Our conclusion, simply put, is that defendants have not and cannot demonstrate that at the time Rasul first applied for chaplain vacancies Protestantism was a BFOQ for satisfactorily filling those positions.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) places a heavy burden on an employer claiming a sex-based occupational qualification, which cannot rest on stereotypes about women and men.

Raymond J. Torres, Franklin J. Utz, and Gerald F. Schmit v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, Defendants · filed 1988-04-21(e)(1)

Thus, a defendant bears a heavy burden in attempting to establish a bfoq defense. He or she clearly may not justify a refusal to hire members of one sex merely by pointing to stereotypes about differences between women and men.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits an employer to exclude applicants based on sex only when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to its operation.

Wynn v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District · filed 1988-07-26(e)

Such wholesale exclusion of a class of job applicants based solely on their sex is valid only when the essence of the business would be undermined by not having members of one sex exclusively, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 275, 30 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971), or where the employer can establish some “bona fide occupational qualification” (“BFOQ”) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of its enterprise.

A bona fide occupational qualification must be assessed in relation to the employer's particular business, including its mission and methods.

Raymond J. Torres, Franklin J. Utz, and Gerald F. Schmit v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Defendan · filed 1988-10-17(e)(1)

The validity of a BFOQ can only be ascertained when it is assessed in relationship to the business of the employer. Our first step, therefore, must be to come to an understanding of the employer's business--its mission and the methodologies necessary to fulfill that mission.

An employer asserting a bona fide occupational qualification must prove a factual basis for using sex as a qualification.

Baltzer v. City of Sun Prairie/Police Department · filed 1989-07-26(e)(1)

A defendant asserting a BFOQ bears the burden of proving that a factual basis exists for a gender-based hiring decision. ... Because defendants have not made any attempt to meet this burden in this case, I cannot find that there exists a BFOQ exception with regards to the work shift schedules of female police officers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination against restaurant waiters; a preference for male waiters is not a bona fide occupational qualification.

Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc. · filed 1989-10-04(a)(1)

But the Court does not accept sex as a bfoq (bona fide occupational qualification) for waiters in a high-class restaurant. Such an opinion or practice would frustrate the purpose of the anti-sex discrimination statute.

Section 2000e-2(e)’s bona fide occupational qualification exception is narrowly construed when evaluating gender-based prison officer assignments.

Csizmadia v. Fauver · filed 1990-09-17(e)

The issue at hand is whether such discrimination is permissible under the bona-fide-occupational qualification (“bfoq”) exception of § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The bfoq exception is to be narrowly construed.

A privacy-based sex BFOQ requires a factual basis for excluding one sex and proof that no reasonable alternative protects customer privacy.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sedita · filed 1991-01-31(e)(1)

The court finds that the motion for partial summary judgment must be granted in plaintiff’s favor because the defendants have failed to prove either that a factual basis exists for their discriminatory hiring policies, or that no reasonable alternatives exist to protect their customer’s privacy interests other than sex based hiring.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits religious hiring when religion is a bona fide occupational qualification or a school’s curriculum is directed toward propagating that religion.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate · filed 1991-08-01(e)(1), (e)(2)

The court finds that the “Protestant-only” hiring requirement is a valid BFOQ and exempts KSBE from Title VII. ... KSBE is exempt from Title VII under the “propagation” prong of section 703(e)(2).

When an employer invokes patient privacy to justify sex based staffing under § 2000e-2(e)(1), it must show a factual need, a protected privacy interest, and no reasonable alternative to gender based hiring.

Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 1992-03-16(e)(1)

Because the privacy interests of third parties are asserted as grounds for this BFOQ, this court must reach an affirmative conclusion for each prong of the following test: 1) the OMH has a factual basis for believing that it is necessary to staff at least one SHTA of the same gender on each ward in order to protect the privacy interests of the patients; 2) that the patients’ privacy interest is entitled to protection under the law; and 3) that no reasonable alternatives exist to protect *381 those interests other than the gender based hiring policy.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a privacy-based sex qualification when an employer has a factual basis for believing that privacy intrusions are essential to the job and alternatives to a sex-based policy would undermine the enterprise’s central mission.

Hernandez v. University of St. Thomas · filed 1992-06-16(e)(1)

To establish that sex is a BFOQ because of privacy considerations, a defendant must show a factual basis for believing that an intrusion on legitimate privacy interests is an essential part of the employee’s job and that any alternative to a sex-based policy would undermine the central mission of the enterprise.

Evidence that customers would leave if employees of the other sex performed privacy-sensitive duties can raise a factual issue under the privacy-based bona fide occupational qualification defense.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sedita · filed 1993-03-18(e)(1)

Although the court still questions the probative value of Sedita’s evidence and the petition, when it is coupled with the corroborating affidavits of club managers, the court finds that these submissions create an inference that women will not patronize Women’s Workout World if men are employed there as Instructors, Managers, or Assistant Managers. Thus, defendants have provided a factual basis for their belief that no men can be hired as Managers, Assistant Managers, and Instructors.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not allow race to be treated as a bona fide occupational qualification.

Ray v. University of Arkansas · filed 1994-03-24(e)(1)

Race is conspicuously absent from the statutory exceptions. This was clearly not an oversight. The plain language of the statute thus precludes a race-based bfoq.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) places the burden of pleading and proving a bona fide occupational qualification on the employer.

Carl v. Angelone · filed 1995-04-19(e)(1)

The bfoq exception is an affirmative defense; the burden of pleading and proof it is placed on the defendant.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based staffing when employees of both sexes are reasonably necessary on each shift to provide therapeutic care and protect patient privacy.

Healey v. Southwood · filed 1996-03-18(e)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the essence of Southwood's business would be impaired if it could not staff at least one male and female child care specialist on each shift.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based hiring only when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the business; customer preference alone does not establish that defense.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hi 40 Corp. · filed 1996-10-28(e)(1)

Next is the issue of whether being female is a bona fide occupational qualification for being employed as a counselor for Physicians Weight Loss. The Court concludes it is not. The concept of bona fide occupational qualification is a statutory defense provided by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(e).

A physical job requirement may fail to qualify as a bona fide occupational qualification when the job includes duties that employees with the relevant restriction can perform and the employer applies the requirement selectively.

Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1998-01-06(e)(1)

Because light duties existed within the CSA position, a jury could reasonably conclude that the 75-pound lifting requirement was not a bona fide occupational qualification within the meaning of the statute and was discriminatorily invoked against Mrs. Deneen in an effort to prevent her from having the opportunity to return to work and exercise her earned sick leave benefits.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not allow race as a bona fide occupational qualification.

Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc. · filed 1999-02-26(e)(1)

Although the statutory language allows gender to be a valid BFOQ for hiring an actor or actress where it is necessary for the "purpose of authenticity or genuineness," see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2), Congress specifically rejected race as a BFOQ.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) allows an employer to raise a bona fide occupational qualification defense to a pregnancy discrimination claim.

Richards v. City of Topeka · filed 1999-03-24(e)(1)

Under the PDA, the City can raise a BFOQ as an affirmative defense.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a sex-based shift transfer when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the employer’s operations and no reasonable alternative exists.

Vickie Reed v. County of Casey, Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1999-08-02(e)(1)

In the instant matter, the district court found that Tommy Miller’s decision to place Reed on the third shift was justified as a BFOQ and is therefore exempt under Title VII. ... We agree.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not permit a bona fide occupational qualification defense to race or color discrimination.

Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York · filed 1999-09-17(e)(1)

It only applies to the “hire and employ” of employees and, most significantly, it does not apply to discrimination based on race or color.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a sex-based occupational qualification when it is reasonably necessary to normal operations; convenience alone is insufficient.

In Re Juvenile Detention Officer · filed 2003-12-11(e)

In this regard, Section 703(e) of Title VII requires that the BFOQ must be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business," and not simply a matter of business convenience. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e). ... This is particularly so since the County has amply demonstrated that the direct conflict between the juvenile detainees' interest in minimal privacy and the Union members' equal employment opportunities under federal and state law could not otherwise be avoided by resort to less drastic alternatives.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not permit a blanket ban on male correction officers from female housing posts based on the risk posed by a small number of officers.

Westchester County Corrections v. County of Westchester · filed 2004-11-24(e)(1)

The Defendants have failed to establish that all or substantially all male correction officers pose a risk of inappropriate sexual conduct with female inmates to justify a complete ban.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits female-only staffing of women’s prison housing units when the employer establishes that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for those officer positions.

Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2004-12-03(e)

Because gender is a BFOQ for the positions in question, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not allow an employer to exclude pregnant employees from work for fetal safety when pregnancy does not impair their ability to do the job.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic Healthcare West · filed 2008-01-03(e)(1)

The BFOQ defense allows employers to classify on the basis of sex when such a classification is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l). As a matter of law, Defendant cannot succeed on a BFOQ defense in this case.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits sex-based assignments only when the employer proves they are reasonably necessary to normal operations; merely promoting an essential goal is insufficient.

Henry v. Milwaukee County · filed 2008-08-20(e)

Although reducing the number of opposite-sex staff on the pods may help to promote security, efficient risk management and privacy, Milwaukee County has failed to establish that its policy was reasonably necessary for these goals.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a sex-based employment qualification when it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.

AMBAT v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2010-02-17(e)

A statutory defense to liability under both Title VII and FEHA exists when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) that is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based hiring only when sex is reasonably necessary to the job; unsupported gender stereotypes do not establish that qualification.

Breiner v. Nevada Department of Corrections · filed 2010-07-08(e)(1)

As NDOC’s correctional lieutenant restriction denied promotional opportunities on the basis of sex and was neither “de minimis” nor “reasonably necessary to the normal operation” of SNWFC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1), it violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a faith-specific hiring requirement for chaplains when it is reasonably necessary to perform their religious duties.

McCollum v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2011-06-01(e)(1)

One key exception to Title VII’s prohibition on hiring on the basis of religion is applicable if “a bona fide occupa- tional qualification [‘BFOQ’] reasonably necessary to the nor- mal operation of that particular business or enterprise” exists. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The district court dismissed ... McCollum’s employment claims based on its finding that the paid chaplaincies were permitted under the BFOQ exception. We agree.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based hiring as a bona fide occupational qualification only when the employer makes a strong showing that reasonable alternatives are unavailable.

White v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES · filed 2011-09-30(e)(1)

In the face of potential alternatives, gender-based hiring is only permissible if the defendant makes a strong showing that such alternatives are not reasonable. ... There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether it remained reasonable in 2008 for female officers to serve as OICs and simply delegate strip frisks and urine tests to male officers when the need arose.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based staffing only when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the employer’s operation.

Anderson v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2014-07-02(e)(1)

When moving for summary judgment, the County bears the heavy burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether excluding male deputies because of their sex is a legitimate substitute for excluding them because they are actually unfit to serve in the female housing pods. On the record before us, the County has not made such a showing.

Section 2000e-2(e) requires an employer asserting pregnancy status as a bona fide occupational qualification to show that the status is sufficiently related to an essential job requirement.

Berry v. Great American Dream, Inc. · filed 2015-02-23(e)

Due to the Defendant’s lack of evidence on this issue, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether a dancer’s pregnancy-status is sufficiently related to her sex appeal. Consequently, the Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon its BFOQ defense.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based prison staffing when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the prison’s operation; a reasoned decision by prison administrators receives some deference.

Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Washington Department of Corrections · filed 2015-06-12(e)(1)

The Department’s exhaustive process fits well within the rubric of “reasoned decision making” and is entitled to deference.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits sex-based limits on correctional officers’ shift assignments when reasonably necessary to comply with a prohibition on cross-gender strip searches.

Jones v. Henryville Correctional Facility · filed 2016-11-14(e)

The court finds Henryville met its burden of establishing that the sex-based classification at issue here was reasonably necessary to comply with the IDOC’s prohibition on cross-gender strip searches in non-emergency situations.

Section 2000e-2(e) does not permit an employer to justify reassigning pregnant workers based on fetal safety concerns or stereotypes about their physical abilities.

Everts v. Sushi Brokers LLC · filed 2017-03-27(e)

Concerns for the safety of an unborn fetus, even if such concerns are well-founded and altruistic, are not sufficient to establish sex as a BFOQ. ... The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it is undisputed that non-pregnancy in this case is not a BFOQ.

The bona fide occupational qualification defense applies when an employer claims a protected trait is necessary for the job, not when it claims the employee lacked qualifications for a different position.

U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. PC Iron, Inc. · filed 2018-05-01(e)(1)

PCI is not arguing that Perez's pregnancy or sex precluded her from being qualified for her job or that for other reasons it was permitted to discriminate against her because of her pregnancy or sex. Accordingly, this affirmative defense is dismissed, but once again its dismissal should have little impact on PCI's defense against the EEOC's discrimination claim at trial.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based staffing as a bona fide occupational qualification only when the employer shows it is reasonably necessary and has no reasonable alternative.

Roman v. County of Monroe · filed 2019-12-10(e)(1)

Ultimately, a jury could find that the County has not met its burden of showing no reasonable alternatives to the three-women-per-shift policy.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based prison staffing when the employer establishes a bona fide occupational qualification, including that the policy is reasonably necessary and has no reasonable alternative.

Million v. Warren County Sheriffs Office · filed 2020-02-19(e)(1)

Here, applying the record evidence and relevant law to this framework and giving due deference to Warren County prison officials, see id. at 752, the Court finds Warren County has established these three prongs, and thus the BFOQ defense applies.

A jail’s sex-based staffing policy can qualify for the bona fide occupational qualification defense when it serves inmate privacy and safety and no reasonable alternative exists.

Strozier v. Warren County, Ohio · filed 2020-07-09(e)(1)

For the reasons below, the Court finds that Warren County has established the BFOQ defense.

Male inmates’ privacy during observation or strip searches does not make sex a bona fide occupational qualification for prison guard duties.

Canedy v. Boardman · filed 1992-07-20(e)(1)

I am not prepared to find that observation of male prisoners in various states of undress, even during strip searches, by female prison guards in the performance of their duties is a violation of the prisoners’ right to privacy calling for a bona fide occupational qualification under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a jail to require two female officers per shift when they are needed for strip searches and no reasonable alternative exists.

Shonda Million v. Warren County, Ohio · filed 2021-04-07(e)

Therefore, we agree with the district court that the BFOQ defense applies to Million’s sex-discrimination claim and affirm the dismissal of that claim.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a prison to assign strip searches by sex when necessary to accommodate inmates with sincere religious objections to cross-sex searches.

West v. Radtke · filed 2022-09-16(e)

Sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for perform- ing strip searches of prisoners with sincere religious objec- tions to cross-sex strip searches.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based job requirements only when they are reasonably necessary to the employer’s normal operations.

Wishart v. Lane County Sheriff's Office · filed 2023-06-28(e)(1)

However, because both parties present compelling evidence on a disputed fact material to the resolution of the legal issue in this case—whether the BFOQ overtime policy is necessary for the jail’s essential operations—both parties’ motions for summary judgment must be denied on that issue.

Section 2000e-2(e)'s sex-based BFOQ defense does not require the employer to present the original decisionmaker to testify about the reasons for the qualification.

Nowacki v. Department of Corrections · filed 2023-09-21(e)

None of these cases require the employer to present the actual decisionmaker to testify about his or her motivations while drafting a BFOQ.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar retroactive seniority relief for discrimination that occurred after Title VII became applicable to the employer.

Members of the Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1980-06-11(h)

As noted above, the discrimination in this case occurred after the effective date of the Act, and also after March 1972, the effective date of the amendments making the Act applicable to municipalities. As such, it is subject to remedy by an award of retroactive seniority and such remedy is not barred by § 703(h).

Remedial seniority that changes employees’ work schedules without displacing them does not constitute unlawful discrimination under Title VII.

Moseley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1980-02-21

The Appellees were not displaced, and, thus, there were no acts of discrimination perpetrated against them. Since there were none, Title VII provides no remedy for them.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a departmental seniority system rooted in racial discrimination, even when that discrimination began before Title VII took effect.

Quarles v. Philip Morris, Incorporated · filed 1968-01-04(h)

The court holds a departmental seniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority system.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority or merit system that discriminates on the basis of race.

United States by Clark v. Local 189, United P. & P., Afl-Cio, Clc · filed 1969-06-26(h)

None of the unlawful employment practices described herein result from a bona fide seniority or merit system within the meaning of Sec. 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(h), but rather are the result of a seniority or merit system that discriminates against Negro employees employed by Crown prior to February 14, 1968, on the basis of their race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits a job seniority system that carries past racial discrimination into present employment decisions unless safety or efficiency requires it.

Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States · filed 1969-07-28(a)(2)

We hold that Crown Zellerbaeh’s job seniority system in effect at its Bogalusa Paper Mill prior to February 1, 1968, was unlawful because by carrying forward the effects of former discriminatory practices the system results in present and future discrimination. When a Negro applicant has the qualifications to handle a particular job, the Act requires that Negro seniority be equated with white seniority.

Section 703(h) does not protect a referral seniority system that discriminates on the basis of race or color.

United States v. The Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 36, Afl-Cio · filed 1969-09-16(h)

The referral systems do establish a form of seniority. The trial court's finding that the referral systems did not discriminate on the basis of race or color is, however, without support in the record. The discrimination was, in fact, total. As such, they were not bona fide seniority systems entitled to protection under the Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits a job seniority system that carries forward the effects of past racial discrimination without business necessity.

Local 189 v. United States · filed 1969-10-01(a)(2)

We hold that Crown Zellerbach's job seniority system in effect at its Bogalusa Paper Mill prior to February 1, 1968, was unlawful because by carrying forward the effects of former discriminatory practices the system results in present and future discrimination. When a Negro applicant has the qualifications to handle a particular job, the Act requires that Negro seniority be equated with white seniority.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of past racial discrimination, even if the system serves a valid business purpose.

Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation · filed 1970-03-12(h)

The departmental seniority system here in question does serve a valid business purpose in that a shorter period of training could reasonably be anticipated for persons familiar with operations of their own department. Even so, it must be held an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not exempt a seniority system that perpetuates discrimination when the employer violated Title VII after its effective date.

United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation · filed 1970-04-13(h)

Also "bona fide" as used in the statute should not be read as exempting from adjustment a seniority system based on discriminatory practices where the proof shows a violation of the Act after its effective date and the seniority system perpetuates the effects of the discrimination. Such a system is not bona fide.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system that perpetuates past racial discrimination as a bona fide seniority system.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indust · filed 1970-04-14(h)

The seniority system in the present case is not bona fide because the present structure perpetuates past discriminatory practice.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits bona fide seniority systems that are established, negotiated, and applied without racial discrimination.

United States Ex Rel. Mitchell v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. · filed 1970-05-05(h)

The Court concludes on the basis of all the evidence, and its findings thereon, relating to the establishment, negotiation, and application of the provisions of the seniority systems under agreements between the union defendants and the Company that such seniority systems are bona fide seniority systems within the contemplation of Section 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h), as such section has been interpreted by judicial precedents persuasive to the Court.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a departmental seniority system that preserves the effects of past racial job assignments and denies affected employees equal access to higher paying jobs.

United States v. Continental Can Company · filed 1970-11-03(a)

Title VII of the Act requires that all employees have equal access to higher paying jobs for which they can qualify, without regard to race. Therefore, the departmental seniority system must be replaced with one reflecting the total length of service with the Company, or plant seniority, in all cases where Negro employees have been denied the opportunity to accumulate departmental seniority by the Company’s past discriminatory assignment practices.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a job-seniority system that perpetuates the effects of past racial exclusion from lines of progression.

Long v. Georgia Kraft Company · filed 1971-01-08(a)

Such a seniority system is a “term, condition and privilege of employment” that discriminates against Negro employees on the basis of race in violation of Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employers and unions from using seniority and transfer rules that perpetuate past racial segregation and limit employees’ job opportunities.

Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Company · filed 1970-01-12(a)(2), (c)(2)

The Court finds that .the defendants have intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices by discriminating on the basis of race against Irvin and Lewis, and other Negroes similarly situated. The Court further finds, that this discrimination, embedded in seniority and transfer provisions of collective bargaining agreements, adversely affects the conditions of employment and opportunities for the. advancement of the class.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a seniority system that perpetuates past racial discrimination by disadvantaging qualified employees seeking promotion.

United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Company · filed 1971-05-17(a)

The present effect of this past practice makes those black employees unsuccessful in bidding against white employees for higher paying, formerly all-white jobs and is therefore a “term, condition or privilege of employment” that discriminates against black employees on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system rooted in discriminatory job assignments that perpetuates their effects.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1971-06-21(h)

The statutory exception only applies to a “bona fide” seniority system, and Bethlehem has not appealed from the basic conclusion of the district court that the seniority system did not deserve that description. Even more important, the district court’s determination was, as already indicated, obviously correct.

Section 2000e-2 requires discriminatory job seniority systems to be relaxed to eliminate the continuing effects of past racial discrimination, unless the employer shows that safety or efficiency requires otherwise.

Long v. Georgia Kraft Co. · filed 1971-11-12(a)

The discriminatory job seniority system should be relaxed to the extent not forbidden by considerations of safety and efficiency, the component parts of business necessity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits seniority and transfer practices that preserve the effects of racially segregated job assignments and deny Black employees employment opportunities.

United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. · filed 1971-12-23(a)(2)

Where a company in the past has operated a racially segregated system of employment, by which assignments to particular job classifications were restricted on the basis of race, the continued present reliance on seniority, based on classification or departmental tenure, for purposes of work opportunity, work schedule, layoff and vacation schedule and failure or refusal to provide for transfer to the traditionally white classifications perpetuates the effects of racial segregation and constitutes a present pattern or practice of discrimination against black employees, depriving them of employment opportunities and adversely affecting their status as employees because of their race within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2).

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide seniority system when differences in employment terms do not result from intentional race discrimination.

United States v. NL Industries, Inc. · filed 1972-01-26(h)

From the evidence before the court it appears that defendant National Lead's seniority system is based on a valid business purpose, that is, the functional differences in the duties within each seniority group, and is not a result of discrimination based on race.

Section 2000e-2 can prohibit a facially neutral seniority system that preserves the effects of past race discrimination.

4 Fair empl.prac.cas. 916, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7875 Achee Bailey v. American Tobacco Company · filed 1972-06-16

It is clear that a present nondiscriminatory seniority provision, which has no race discrimination features on its face, may nonetheless be a violation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act if it serves to preserve the longstanding effect of past race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits promotion and seniority rules that perpetuate past racial segregation by blocking employees from opportunities consistent with their ability and plant seniority.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAYES INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1972-02-22(a)

Current promotion practices and other rights granted employees, in so far as they may limit the transfer program by imposing barriers to the incumbent Negroes’ opportunity to achieve their rightful place consistent with their ability and plant seniority, are in themselves Title VII violations.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a departmental seniority system that perpetuates past racial discrimination by blocking employees from higher paying jobs.

Bragg v. ROBERTSHAW CONTROLS CO., FULTON SYLPHON DIV. · filed 1972-03-17(a)

The present effect of this past practice makes plaintiffs unsuccessful in bidding against white employees for higher paying, formerly all-white jobs and is therefore a “term, condition or privilege of employment” that discriminates against plaintiffs on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2 permits nondiscriminatory seniority systems but does not bar relief for employees whose transfer opportunities remain restricted by past racial discrimination.

United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. · filed 1972-12-26(h)

In sum, we find no bar to cross-craft relief in the origins of the craft and departmental seniority systems, in the current collective bargaining agreements, or in the doctrine of business necessity. Accordingly, on remand the district court should enter a decree that will enable black Barney yard brakemen and black Group 3 employees who were hired before the effective date of the Act to bid across craft lines for brakemen and clerical vacancies for which they are qualified, carrying with them their company seniority.

Section 2000e-2(c) imposes on unions a duty to avoid seniority practices that perpetuate past racial discrimination.

Savannah Printing Specialties & Paper Products Local Union 604 v. Union Camp Corp. · filed 1972-11-10(c)

Where there exists a history of racial job assignment patterns, an existing seniority system that perpetuates past discriminatory employment practices must be uprooted and replaced as respects minority employees by a mill-wide or division seniority standard. ... Title VII imposes on unions a corresponding obligation as to non-discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), (1), (2), (3).

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system that returns less senior white employees to preferred jobs over more senior black employees.

Russell v. American Tobacco Company · filed 1973-01-18(h)

The use of “seniority and qualifications” to return white employees with less seniority to preferred jobs in Branch over more senior blacks, did not constitute a “bona fide” seniority system.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar relief allowing qualified employees affected by past racial discrimination to transfer across craft lines with their company seniority.

5 Fair empl.prac.cas. 308, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8090 · filed 1973-04-16(h)

In sum, we find no bar to cross-craft relief in the origins of the craft and departmental seniority systems, in the current collective bargaining agreements, or in the doctrine of business necessity. Accordingly, on remand the district court should enter a decree that will enable black Barney yard brakemen and black Group 3 employees who were hired before the effective date of the Act to bid across craft lines for brakemen and clerical vacancies for which they are qualified, carrying with them their company seniority.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of prior racial discrimination, even if the system was collectively bargained.

Carey v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1973-06-15(a)

And it is no defense that the seniority system, which we find to be in violation of Title VII, is the product of collective bargaining between parties who have fulfilled their obligation of fair representation as imposed by the NLRA.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits a racially neutral seniority system that perpetuates the effects of past discriminatory hiring.

Taylor v. Armco Steel Corporation · filed 1973-09-14(a), (c)

An otherwise racially neutral seniority system predicated upon past hiring racial discrimination is an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and (c).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits transfer and seniority policies that perpetuate past racial discrimination when business necessity does not justify them.

Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 1973-09-27(a)(2)

Thus, the court finds that the continued use of the seniority system to inhibit members of the class from seeking an opportunity to transfer into the road driver position is neither bona fide nor required by a business necessity. Further, the court finds that the defendants’ maintenance of a separate seniority list for road drivers, together with defendant Yellow Freight’s policy of prohibiting transfer into the road driver position by employees in other job classifications serves to perpetuate past discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of an employer’s past racial discrimination in hiring.

Watkins v. UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOC. NO. 2369 · filed 1974-01-14(h)

The defendants here cannot prevail under this standard: the seniority system at the Harvey plant is discriminatory for the same reason that department or job seniority systems in formerly segregated plants are discriminatory —because blacks were in the past denied access to the seniority unit, and were thereby prevented from accumulating relevant seniority.

Section 2000e-2(a) and (c) supports an affirmative duty for employers and unions to devise a seniority system that remedies past racial discrimination.

Miller v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1974-03-18(a), (c)

In the face of these demands, the Railroad had an affirmative duty under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. See. 151 et seq., First and Second, the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec 1981 et seq., particularly 2000e-2(a), (c), and the Constitution to negotiate with the statutory bargaining representatives of these crafts and to devise and implement some seniority system to make up for the past discriminations.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide seniority system based on length of employment even when earlier discrimination affects workers’ relative seniority.

Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co. · filed 1974-08-26(h)

We are of. the view that Wisconsin Steel’s employment seniority system embodying the “last hired, first fired” principle of seniority is not of itself racially discriminatory or does it have the effect of perpetuating prior racial discrimination in violation of the strictures of Title VII. To that end we find the legislative history of Title VII supportive of the claim that an employment seniority system is a “bona fide” seniority system under the Act.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects the differing benefits of a bona fide seniority system even when the employer previously discriminated by refusing to hire applicants.

Harold FRANKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Johnny Lee, Intervenor-Appellant, v. BOWMAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY Et Al., Defendant · filed 1974-09-12(h)

The discrimination which has taken place in a refusal to hire does not affect the bona fides of the seniority system. Thus, the differences in the benefits and conditions of employment which a seniority system accords to older and newer employees is protected as “not an unlawful employment practice.”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits using a seniority system to lay off a qualified employee when past racial discrimination prevented that employee from transferring to a job that would have protected against the layoff.

Cox v. Allied Chemical Corp., Local 216, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1974-09-23(a)

Therefore, it must be shown that the qualified black employee would have transferred into a vacant position “but for” a racially discriminatory system. In other words, the discrimination must be the cause of plaintiffs’ injury.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide, facially neutral company-wide seniority system even when past employment practices cause it to disadvantage women or minority employees.

Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local Unions 327, 749, 1289, 1298, 1303, 1309 & 1314 of the International Brotherhoo · filed 1975-01-30(h)

We thus conclude in light of the legislative history that on balance a facially neutral company-wide seniority system, without more, is a bona fide seniority system and will be sustained even though it may operate to the disadvantage of females and minority groups as a result of past employment practices.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits transfer and seniority policies that perpetuate past discriminatory hiring unless justified by business necessity.

Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight · filed 1974-11-25

It is manifest that the harmful effects of this past discrimination have been transported into the present through ETMF’s facially neutral no-transfer and seniority policies. No compelling business necessity has been offered to justify ETMF’s policies.

Section 2000e-2 permits job progression requirements that perpetuate the effects of past racial discrimination only upon a showing of business necessity.

Rogers v. International Paper Co. · filed 1975-01-07(h)

These seemingly neutral requirements that an employee serve in every job in a line of progression have impeded, in the past, affected class members’ progress toward their rightful place. They may be retained, therefore, only upon a showing of business neeessity.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits different employment terms under a bona fide seniority system, but a departmental or job seniority system rooted in racial discrimination is not bona fide.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Detroit Edison Company · filed 1975-05-16(h)

Permitting black employees to transfer and advance and generally to receive the benefits of plant-wide seniority rather than being limited to departmental or job seniority does not violate Section 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), which permits an employer to maintain different terms of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system. Departmental or job seniority rooted in racial discrimination is not bona fide seniority.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a seniority system governing layoffs and recall when it treats employees equally and does not perpetuate past discrimination against them.

Watkins v. United Steel Workers Of America, Local No. 2369 · filed 1975-07-16(h)

Where each employee, regardless of race, is treated equally under a seniority system which does not have the effect of " locking in" past discrimination as to that employee, the system is a bona fide one which is exempt under § 703(h) from the reaches of Title VII.

A neutral seniority practice that perpetuates past discrimination may be justified by business necessity.

10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1386, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,320 Jessie Stevenson, Etc. v. International Paper Company, Mobile, · filed 1975-07-16(h)

Such a neutral practice, however, may not invalidate a seniority system under Title VII if IP can demonstrate that the practice is justified by business necessity.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits continuing a classification seniority system that perpetuates past racial discrimination without a legitimate business reason.

Patrick T. HAIRSTON Et Al., Appellants, v. McLEAN TRUCKING CO., a Corp. of Winston Salem, North Carolina, Et Al., Appell · filed 1975-08-06

As such, the continuation of classification seniority would itself violate § 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits an employer to use a bona fide seniority system.

Hinton v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1975-09-19(h)

The provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) authorize the use of seniority systems wherein it provides: ... Plaintiffs herein do not contend nor does the Court find that the seniority system which is the subject of the instant dispute is not a bona fide system.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect layoff seniority rules that perpetuate the effects of an employer’s prior exclusion of women from the covered jobs.

Southbridge Plastics Division, W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum · filed 1975-11-03(h)

The issue for the court’s determination on this point reduces to whether, under Title VII, the operation of the seniority system as set forth in the bargaining agreement may be altered to the extent necessary to alleviate the present effects of past illegal discrimination against female job applicants at Southbridge, or whether the seniority system here falls under the protection of the “bona fide” seniority system exemption of § 703(h) of Title VII. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)). The court has concluded that the provisions of the bargaining agreement relating to seniority in the event of layoff does not fall within the protection of the exemption.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.

Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees & Motion Picture Machine Operators · filed 1975-11-05(h)

Where a seniority system perpetuates the effects of past discrimination, such a system is not “bona fide” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits seniority rules that perpetuate past racial job segregation by requiring Black employees to forfeit accumulated seniority when transferring to better jobs.

Sherrill v. JP Stevens and Co., Inc. · filed 1975-11-11(a)

Where, as here, blacks have been excluded from certain jobs and departments, the defendant's continued enforcement of departmental or plant seniority which requires that black employees who desire to transfer to better job positions relinquish their accumulated seniority and start a new seniority date for purposes of promotion, shift bids and lay offs, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. It also constitutes a present pattern or practice of discrimination within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(h) does not shield a facially neutral seniority system that perpetuates past discrimination against the affected employees.

Acha v. Beame · filed 1976-02-19(h)

Until the past discrimination against these particular plaintiffs is remedied by according them the seniority position to which they are entitled, the system cannot be considered “bona fide” and in fact represents a continuation of past intentionally discriminatory practices, and thus falls outside the terms of section 703(h).

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system that perpetuates past intentional segregation.

Patterson v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1976-02-23(h)

There is another reason why the exemption granted in § 2000e-2(h) is not available to American. As we noted in Russell, supra, 528 F.2d at 363, that section contains a proviso that restricts its application to situations where differences in the conditions of employment "are not the result of an intention to discriminate." Past intentional segregation that is perpetuated by a company's seniority system precludes it from claiming that its system is bona fide within the meaning of § 2000e-2(h), Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).

Employees hired from the same labor market generally do not work in different locations under § 2000e-2(h).

Patterson v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1976-02-23(h)

Therefore, employees the company hired from the same labor market would not generally fall within the statutory class of “employees who work in different locations.”

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit seniority provisions that protect employees promoted from the line regardless of sex while excluding supervisors hired from outside the line.

Evans v. Braniff Airways, Inc. · filed 1976-03-08

The seniority protection provisions do not differentiate amongst employees according to an employee’s sex. On the contrary, both line pilots and line flight attendants are covered by similar seniority provisions regardless of their sex.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar seniority relief for applicants who were denied employment through unlawful discrimination.

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. · filed 1976-03-24(h)

We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, § 703 (h) barred the award of seniority relief to the unnamed class 3 members.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits neutral seniority and transfer rules, but discriminatory assignment into the jobs governed by those rules can make their application discriminatory.

Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 1976-07-07(h)

These provisions are discriminatory on racial or sexual grounds only if class members are assigned to seasonal positions on racial or sexual criteria. Since the Court has concluded that class members are often led to seek employment in the Stemmery on the basis of past racial discrimination, it must also conclude that the labor provisions that restrict the seniority, transfer and promotional rights of a seasonal employee so situated are likewise discriminatory. However, such a finding does not require a redrafting of the seniority, transfer, or promotion rules; it is the initial assignment policies that taint the system. The fact that Stemmery employees are more restricted in their transfer rights than permanent employees, without evidence of impermissible discrimination, would represent a justifiable policy. Seasonal employees are adjudged to be poorer workers on the whole and must prove themselves in a permanent capacity before they are given the rights and benefits of permanent workers. See Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).

A facially neutral merit plan is not discriminatory under Section 703(h) merely because it disproportionately affects women.

Wisconsin National Organization for Women v. Wisconsin · filed 1976-07-30(h)

In the light of this remark, I interpret 703(h) to say that the fact that a merit plan, neutral on its face, adversely affects a disproportionate number of women does not in itself render the merit plan discriminatory or not bona fide.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar seniority relief or a seniority override used to remedy employment discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1976-08-23(h)

It is therefore abundantly clear that § 703(h) does not bar seniority relief generally or the use of the seniority override in the instant case to achieve the goals and timetables established by the Consent Decree and the PSO.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect differences in working conditions that perpetuate past intentional discrimination, even when employees work at different locations.

Russell v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1976-04-19(h)

Supported by the reasoning of these cases, we hold that when present differences in working conditions are remnants of past intentional discrimination, the proviso of § 2000e--2(h) bars a company from defending its employment practices on the ground that its employees 'work in different locations.' 17 The company and the union assert that in any event black seasonal employees at Leaf should be denied relief.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar seniority relief or a seniority override used to remedy employment discrimination.

EQUAL EMP. OPP. COM'N v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. · filed 1976-09-15(h)

It is therefore abundantly clear that § 703(h) does not bar seniority relief generally or the use of the seniority override in the instant case to achieve the goals and timetables established by the Consent Decree and the PSO.

A neutral bona fide seniority system remains lawful despite perpetuating discrimination from before Title VII took effect.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States · filed 1977-05-31(h)

Congress did not intend to make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of preAct discriminatees.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide seniority system to reflect a past discriminatory act that is no longer actionable when the system is neutral and was not intentionally designed to discriminate.

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans · filed 1977-05-31(h)

Since respondent does not attack the bona fides of United's seniority system, and since she makes no charge that the system is intentionally designed to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, § 703 (h) provides an additional ground for rejecting her claim.

Title VII does not require an employer to create an exception to a bona fide seniority system to accommodate an employee’s religious practice.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison · filed 1977-06-16(h)

As we have said, TWA was not required by Title VII to carve out a special exception to its seniority system in order to help Hardison to meet his religious obligations.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a neutral, bona fide seniority system even if it perpetuates past discrimination, unless the system is not facially neutral or is used for intentional racial discrimination.

Croker v. Boeing Co.(Vertol Div.) · filed 1977-06-20(h)

He cannot, however, let the statute of limitations run and then file suit based on a “continuing violation” embodied in the seniority system, unless he can show that the seniority system is not facially neutral, or is a means of intentional racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a union’s agreement to a covered seniority system, but does not shield it from liability for other unlawful practices.

Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1977-07-25(h)

On the contrary, the implication of that decision, where the only claim of union liability was based on its agreement as to the seniority system, was that the union would have been liable but for the exclusion by § 703(h). In the case at bar, where many of the claims are outside the protection of that provision, the union cannot so simply escape liability for agreeing to and maintaining any other practices found to be illegal.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system from a Title VII challenge based solely on its perpetuation of discrimination predating the Act’s application to the employer.

Acha v. Beame · filed 1977-07-28(h)

Pre-Act discrimination which is perpetuated by a neutral seniority system is immunized from Title VII attack by reason of section 703(h).

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide, neutrally operated seniority system from a challenge based solely on the continuing effects of past discrimination that was not timely challenged.

Cates v. Trans World Airlines · filed 1977-08-05(h)

Cates and George stand in the same position as Whitehead, and, since the neutral seniority system here was insulated from attack by § 703(h), can only point to the initial refusal to hire as a violation of Title VII.

Section 703(h)'s protection of bona fide seniority systems does not prevent the government from requiring a different seniority system as a condition of federal contracts.

Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Marshall · filed 1977-10-25(h)

But even assuming that the court in Teamsters or T.W.A. discerned a Congressional policy, expressed in § 703(h) of Title VII, in favor of “bona fide seniority plans,” that policy is not inconsistent with a policy of requiring such seniority as a basis for contracting with a federal agency.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system, including job-equity preferences, from liability merely because it perpetuates pre-Act discrimination.

Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers · filed 1977-11-01(h)

Therefore we are obliged to hold that in light of Teamsters, the district court erroneously concluded that the defendants violated Title VII by utilizing a seniority system, including its job equity feature, that perpetuated pre-Act discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar retroactive seniority relief for employees harmed by post-Act discrimination.

15 Fair empl.prac.cas. 827, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7842 Patrick James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Co. · filed 1977-11-18(h)

In this case the plaintiffs have proved that Stockham engaged in post-Act discriminatory employment practices in job allocation, testing, craft training and selection, and promotion. Any black injured by these practices is entitled to relief, including retroactive seniority. The issue whether the seniority system at Stockham is bona fide under section 703(h) of Title VII is relevant to this case only if the district court concludes that the class of black employees represented by the plaintiffs consists of some blacks who suffered only from preAct discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system from being made unlawful under Title VII or penalized under an executive order.

United States v. East Texas Motor Freight System · filed 1977-12-05(h)

The argument cannot be accepted because Congress has declared for a policy that a bona fide seniority system shall be lawful. The Executive may not, in defiance of such policy, make unlawful or penalize a bona fide seniority system. Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-589, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952). This Court, in the recent Nopsi decision (above cited), recognized that an order of the Executive has the force of law only "if it is not in conflict with an express statutory provision" (553 F.2d at 465). Section 703(h) of Title VII is such a provision.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a seniority system from a Title VII challenge when no discriminatory purpose is shown.

Southbridge Plastics Division v. Local 759 · filed 1978-01-09(h)

Teamsters holds that absent a showing of discriminatory purpose in a seniority system, that system is protected by § 703(h) from attack on other Title VII grounds. In this case, there was no showing of any discriminatory purpose inherent in the seniority system. Accordingly, wholesale destruction of this system, as authorized by the conciliation agreement, cannot be permitted.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system, including preferences based on prior job experience, when it was established and maintained without discriminatory intent, even if it perpetuates pre-Act discrimination.

Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735 · filed 1978-01-24(h)

A preference to those with experience in a given occupation is in a sense limited occupational seniority and we see nothing in the statute or in Teamsters to indicate that it should stand on a different footing than traditional plant-wide or departmental seniority. It is a contractual provision neutral on its face and is, in our view, an integral part of Avco's unique but nonetheless bona fide seniority system.

Section 703(h) protects a consistently applied work unit seniority system even when it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. E. I. duPont De Nemours & Co. · filed 1978-01-25(h)

The Court found that while the work unit seniority system did have the effect ascribed to it by the Government, it did not violate Title VII because of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide seniority system to preserve the effects of discrimination that occurred before Title VII took effect.

Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines · filed 1978-05-02(h)

Therefore, Teamsters invalidates our affirmance of the district court's conclusion that the company's seniority system violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide, neutral seniority system even when it perpetuates pre-Act discrimination.

Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 1978-05-02(h)

The union’s conduct in agreeing to the seniority system violated neither Title VII nor § 1981.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide, neutral seniority system even when it preserves the effects of discrimination that occurred before Title VII covered the employer.

Flaum v. Board of Education of the East Ramapo Central School District · filed 1978-05-09(h)

To be sure, all seniority systems are not totally insulated from attack; those currently lacking the bona fide neutrality mandated by Title VII would not be protected from a claim brought by one with standing to complain of the current discriminatory practice. Mrs. Flaum is not such a person. Her pre-1972 loss was not then legally cognizable, and she does not assert that the Board’s post-1972 seniority system operated toward her in other than a neutral manner.

A subjective appraisal system that discriminates against women and is open to abuse does not qualify as a bona fide merit system under subsection (h).

Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1978-05-12(h)

Because the system is largely subjective and open to abuse, it is not and has not been for periods relevant to this action a bona fide merit system under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system adopted without discriminatory intent even if it perpetuates pre-Act discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company · filed 1978-05-24(h)

Since the BRAC seniority system was facially neutral, and since it was instituted in every division of the railroad throughout many states without any intention to discriminate, it is a bona fide system within the meaning of § 703(h).

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide seniority system adopted without intent to discriminate, even if it perpetuates discrimination predating Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company · filed 1978-06-08(h)

Since the BRAC seniority system was facially neutral, and since it was instituted in every division of the railroad throughout many states without any intention to discriminate, it is a bona fide system within the meaning of § 703(h). ... The BRAC seniority system, therefore, is not unlawful simply because it perpetuated the company’s pre-Act discrimination in hiring.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system when it was not adopted or maintained with an intent to discriminate.

Furr v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1978-09-05(h)

Since plaintiffs may not rely on tolling or the “continuing violation” concepts to bring their claims of discrimination arising out of pre-November, 1974 acts (/. e., lost seniority, etc.) before this Court, they must attack TWA’s seniority system itself and prove that it is not a “bona fide” seniority system within the protection of section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~2(h). Based on the facts as found above, we think they have failed to do this.

Section 2000e-2(h) limits retroactive seniority relief under a bona fide seniority system: relief for discrimination after Title VII took effect cannot predate the Act.

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company · filed 1978-07-24(h)

With regard to bona fide seniority systems, discrimination after the effective date of Title VII can no longer engender a remedy involving retroactive seniority which antedates the Act.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system from a Title VII challenge even when it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.

Sledge v. J. P. Stevens & Co. · filed 1978-10-04(h)

Because the plaintiffs here concede that they do not challenge the bona fides of Stevens’ seniority system, the conclusion that the departmental seniority system violated Title VII must be reversed.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects the seniority aspects of a bona fide seniority system, but does not shield an entire promotional system.

Patterson v. American Tobacco Company · filed 1978-10-23(h)

Section 703(h) does not insulate an entire promotional system even if such system is facially neutral. At most, it insulates only the seniority aspects of the promotional system.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects seniority systems from liability, but does not protect a transfer condition separate from the seniority system.

18 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1220, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8709 · filed 1978-11-01(h)

While the rules for bidding for vacancies Within a department are governed by seniority and thus by Teamsters, the ten-day bottom entry requirement is not a seniority rule at all. Rather, it is a condition upon Transfer wholly extraneous to the prevailing seniority system, and, as such, is Not immunized by § 703(h) and Teamsters.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not shield a transfer requirement that is not a seniority rule.

Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. · filed 1978-11-01(h)

Rather, it is a condition upon transfer wholly extraneous to the prevailing seniority system, and, as such, is not immunized by § 703(h) and Teamsters.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a permanent-status rule that does not increase employment rights with length of service.

Bryant v. California Brewers Association · filed 1978-11-03(h)

Accordingly, we hold that section 4(a)(1) is not part of a seniority system, and therefore is not protected by section 703(h) against claims of nonintentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar a disparate impact finding based on how a union operates a referral system when the system itself is not challenged as discriminatory.

Com. of Pa. v. LOCAL U. 542, INTERN. U. · filed 1978-11-30(h)

Adherence to the experience-graded referral system, which on its face resembles a form of seniority division, has been sporadic, leaving much room for arbitrary decisionmaking. Furthermore, § 2000e-2(h) is not infringed by a decision that the union has committed a disparate impact violation of Title VII, because plaintiffs do not now argue that the referral system on its face constitutes a discriminatory practice.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar a disparate impact finding based on a union’s referral practices when the referral system itself is not challenged as discriminatory.

Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1978-11-30(h)

Furthermore, § 2000e-2(h) is not infringed by a decision that the union has committed a disparate impact violation of Title VII, because plaintiffs do not now argue that the referral system on its face constitutes a discriminatory practice.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects bona fide seniority systems from liability based solely on their perpetuation of past discrimination.

Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co. · filed 1979-03-30(h)

Many circuits including the Fifth, had held that seniority systems which “locked” protected minorities into certain jobs or departments were violative of Title VII as perpetuations of past discrimination. After Teamsters, this theory is no longer valid as to the operation of “bona fide” seniority systems.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a seniority system that perpetuates past discrimination if it was neither instituted nor maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Kohne v. Imco Container Co. · filed 1979-06-12(h)

Because, however, the court also has found the system neither to have been instituted nor maintained to serve a discriminatory purpose it falls within the ambit of § 703(h) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), and, therefore, does not violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a neutral seniority system even if it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.

Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. · filed 1979-07-17(h)

Plaintiffs’ inability to retain their Local 1011 bargaining unit seniority after transfer into the Local 6 bargaining unit is not a violation of Title VII. ... In this case, the Local 6 seniority system is totally neutral, both on its face and in its operation, and has been consistently applied to persons of both the white and black races.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects bona fide seniority systems, but does not shield a no-transfer rule that perpetuates past discrimination.

United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight · filed 1979-09-21(h)

Inasmuch then as the no-transfer rule does not constitute a bona fide seniority system, the rule in Griggs is still viable, and hence the effort on the part of Lee Way to undermine it fails.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not prohibit an employer and union from voluntarily modifying a bona fide seniority system to address past racial discrimination.

Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc. · filed 1979-10-25(h)

Similarly, the statutory declaration that the application of an otherwise bona fide seniority system shall not be unlawful does not lead to the conclusion that a voluntary modification of the same system is unlawful.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects layoffs made under a bona fide seniority system.

McGee v. Grand Rapids Press · filed 1980-03-05(h)

Lay offs under a bona fide seniority program are clearly protected under Title VII, section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Consequently, plaintiff’s lay off under the seniority and lay off system established under the contract was not unlawful under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits an employer to apply a bona fide seniority system when the resulting differences are not intended to discriminate.

Victor Rosario CARTAGENA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF the NAVY of the United States, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1980-03-06(h)

First, John Q. Massey was promoted under a facially neutral seniority system: Subchapter 4-3 c(2) of the Federal Personnel Manual. Title VII exempts such systems from constituting discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system that perpetuates past discrimination if it was not established or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Dennis FISHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROCTER & GAMBLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-03-12(h)

Acknowledging that the court’s order was premised on case law then in effect, we reject its finding that the seniority system was not bona fide within the meaning of 703(h) of Title VII. The system is therefore legally valid under the immunity of that provision.

Section 703(h) protects bona fide seniority systems from being challenged under Title VII, but allows employers to agree to change them.

United States v. City of Miami · filed 1980-04-10(h)

To say that a seniority system is immunized from attack means that the employer cannot be forced against its will to modify the system, not that the employer cannot agree to change it.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits restrictive job bidding rules that are part of a bona fide seniority system.

25 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1582, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,908 · filed 1980-05-09(h)

The district court held that the restrictive language in the job bids was "part and parcel of the seniority system in effect at the company" and was "in full accordance with a collective bargaining agreement." Rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the seniority system was not "bona fide," the court concluded that under Teamsters the Act had not been violated. See § 703(h) of Title VII; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). ... We think the district court's analysis was both factually and legally correct.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits job bid restrictions that are part of a bona fide seniority system established by a collective bargaining agreement.

Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co. · filed 1980-05-09(h)

The district court held that the restrictive language in the job bids was “part and parcel of the seniority system in effect at the company” and was “in full accordance with a collective bargaining agreement.” ... See § 703(h) of Title VII; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). ... We think the district court’s analysis was both factually and legally correct.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits the routine application of a bona fide seniority system when differences in treatment do not result from an intent to discriminate because of race.

Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America · filed 1980-05-15(h)

Rather, the unmistakable purpose of § 703(h) was to make it clear that- the routine application of a seniority system, which was in fact “bona fide” and which did not create differences in treatment as the result of an intention to discriminate ... because of race, would not be unlawful under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a bona fide seniority system when there is no evidence it was instituted or maintained for racially discriminatory reasons.

Harris v. Plastics Manufacturing Co. · filed 1980-05-23(h)

There was no testimony indicating that the seniority system was instituted or maintained for racially discriminatory reasons. The seniority system is therefore "bona fide" and not actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects employment decisions made under a bona fide seniority system when the resulting differences are not intentionally discriminatory.

Sanders v. Sherwin Williams Co. · filed 1980-07-18(h)

To the extent that the seniority system in this case has perpetuated any effects of past discrimination (and this court finds that it does not) or to the extent that promotions, transfers, job placement or other employment decisions after September 22,1972 were made pursuant to the seniority system, § 703(h), the parties’ stipulation, and this court’s findings of bona fides, preclude relief.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a hiring system that ranks applicants based on discriminatory examinations as a bona fide merit system.

Guardians Association of New York City Police Department v. Civil Service Commission of New York · filed 1980-07-25(h)

Assuming for present purposes that it does, it is clear that a hiring system that ranks applicants according to their performance on discriminatory examinations cannot claim the status of a "bona fide merit system" within the meaning of the statute.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system when differences in employment terms result from an intent to discriminate because of race.

23 Fair empl.prac.cas. 748, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,186 · filed 1980-08-18(h)

Because we find that the differences in the terms, conditions and standards of employment for black workers and white workers at Pullman-Standard resulted from an intent to discriminate because of race, we hold that the system is not legally valid under section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a seniority system when differences in employment terms result from an intent to discriminate because of race.

Swint v. Pullman-Standard · filed 1980-08-18(h)

Because we find that the differences in the terms, conditions and standards of employment for black workers and white workers at Pullman-Standard resulted from an intent to discriminate because of race, we hold that the system is not legally valid under section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).