28 U.S.C. § 157

Section 157 treats proceedings to avoid and recover preferences and fraudulent conveyances as core proceedings in which a bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment.

Brandt v. Leasing One Corp. (In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc.) · filed 2012-09-28(b)(1), (b)(2)(F), (b)(2)(H)

A bankruptcy judge to whom a case has been referred may enter final judgment on any core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code or arising in a case under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). A proceeding to avoid and recover preferences and fraudulent conveyances arises in a case under title 11 and is specified as a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) &(H). Accordingly, final judgment is within the scope of the court’s authority.

Section 157(b)(3) empowers the bankruptcy court to make the initial determination whether it may enter a final judgment in a proceeding.

Simon v. Lis (In re Graves) · filed 2012-11-08(b)(3)

Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court is fully competent — and, in fact, statutorily empowered, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) — to make the initial determination as to whether it is permitted to enter final judgments in these adversary proceedings, or whether this function instead must be performed by this Court.

Section 157 allocates authority to enter final bankruptcy judgments between bankruptcy courts and district courts; it does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

S & S Food Corp. v. Sherali (In re Sherali) · filed 2013-03-14

From this Court’s perspective, Stem simply clarified bankruptcy courts’ constitutional power, not their subject matter jurisdiction. The Court in Stem discussed this critical distinction at length, 131 S.Ct. at 2606-08, and expressly clarified that 28 U.S.C. § 157 is not jurisdictional.

A bankruptcy judge may finally decide a non-core proceeding related to a bankruptcy case only with all parties’ consent.

First Bank Puerto Rico Inc. v. Foti (In re International Home Products Inc.) · filed 2013-04-30(c)(2)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), a bankruptcy judge with the consent of all the parties may hear and determine a non-core proceeding related to a case under title 11 and enter appropriate orders and judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). The court notes that First Bank has not consented to this court entering a final judgment on the issues before it.

Section 157(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment in a referred core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code or in a title 11 case.

Brandt v. PlainsCapital Leasing, LLC (In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc.) · filed 2013-06-06(b)(1)

A bankruptcy judge to whom a case has been referred may enter final judgment on any core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code or arising in a case under title 11. ... Accordingly, final judgment is within the scope of the court’s authority.

Section 157(b) treats a determination whether a debtor’s beneficial trust interest is estate property as a core proceeding on which the bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment.

Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice) · filed 2013-06-12(b)

I determined that the count that is the subject of Ernest’s present motion — Murphy’s request in Count I for a determination that notwithstanding the spendthrift clause, Ernest’s beneficial interest in the Family Trust is property of his estate — is both a core proceeding and ■within my authority to enter final judgment. Because I resolve that count in favor of Ernest and that resolution renders moot each of the other counts put in issue by Murphy’s motion for summary judgment, I may enter final judgment as to each count that the present motions place in controversy.

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy courts to enter final orders and judgments in core proceedings.

Marvin B. Smith, III v. Atlantic Southern Bank · filed 2013-06-28(b)(1)

Next, the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final decision in the adversary proceeding, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), which provides that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to enter final orders and judgments in core proceedings.

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy courts to determine core proceedings and enter final judgments in them.

Stephens v. Guaranteed Auto, Inc. (In re Stephens) · filed 2013-07-03(b)(1)

Because it is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), and (O), this Court has authority to determine the matter and enter final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment in a referred core proceeding.

Illinois Student Assistance Commission v. Herzog (In re Friedman & Wexler, LLC) · filed 2013-06-19(b)(1)

Statutorily, a bankruptcy judge to whom a case has been referred may enter final judgment on any core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code, or arising in a case under the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). ... Accordingly, final judgment is within the scope of the court’s authority.

Section 157(b)(2) gives a bankruptcy court statutory authority to issue final judgments in core proceedings.

Paradigm Air Carriers, Inc. v. Texas Rangers Baseball Partners (In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners) · filed 2013-07-10(b)(2)

This is a core proceeding in which this court has statutory authority to issue final judgments, pursuant to at least 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), (C) and (H).

In a non-core proceeding, the bankruptcy judge may submit proposed findings to the district court or enter a final order with the parties’ consent; filing a summary judgment motion can show consent.

Adams County Asphalt Co. v. Oldcastle, Inc. (In re Adams County Asphalt Co.) · filed 2013-09-26(c)

I had indicated this is a non-core matter which would allow me to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). The parties may consent to this Court’s entry of a final order. ACA has done so by recent filing. Doc. # 157. I conclude the Defendants have done so by the filing of this summary judgment motion.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a core proceeding, including a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt.

Marina Harbor II Corp. v. Joslin (In re Joslin) · filed 2013-09-30(b)(1), (b)(2)(I)

It is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(I) (a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt is a core proceeding). The bankruptcy court accordingly has authority to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2) treats this preference avoidance proceeding as core, allowing the bankruptcy court to enter a final order.

Burtch v. Masiz (In re Vaso Active Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) · filed 2013-10-15(b)(2)

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) and this Court has the judicial power to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2)(H) classifies fraudulent conveyance actions as core proceedings, for which a bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment when constitutional authority permits.

Paloian v. LaSalle Bank National Ass'n (In re Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, Inc.) · filed 2013-10-04(b)(2)(H)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H), fraudulent conveyance actions are core proceedings, which by statute permit a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the action.

Section 157 allows a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a core proceeding and, with the parties’ consent, in a non-core proceeding.

Flyboy Aviation Properties, LLC v. Franck (In re Flyboy Aviation Properties, LLC) · filed 2013-10-11

Debtor states in its “Response to Defendant’s Motion to Remand” [Doc. No. 13] that the claims in this proceeding constitute core matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (K), and (O), and expressly consents to entry of a final order by this Court. In his “Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Remand Case to Superior Court of Forsyth County” [Doc. No. 9], Defendant agrees that this proceeding is a core matter. Thus, the Court will enter a final order in this proceeding. To the extent the matters herein are non-core, given the agreement of the parties, the Court will enter a final order in this proceeding.

Section 157(b)(2) identifies core proceedings in which a bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

Sass ex rel. American Home Mortgage Plan Trust v. Barclays Bank PLC (In re American Home Mortgage, Holdings, Inc.) · filed 2013-11-08(b)(2)

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). This Court has the judicial power to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final judgment in a referred core proceeding, including a dispute over the scope and effect of the court’s prior confirmation order.

Brown's Chicken & Pasta, Inc. v. Brown's Chicken & Pasta, Inc. · filed 2013-12-16(b)(1)

As allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), a bankruptcy judge to whom a case has been referred may enter final judgment on core proceedings arising in or under the Bankruptcy Code. ... The matters at issue in this proceeding are strikingly similar to those the bankruptcy judge in Lazy Days’ resolved: the scope and effect of its prior confirmation order. This Court has authority to enter a final order herein.

Section 157(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to issue final judgments in core proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code.

In re Branch · filed 2014-01-07(b)(1)

This is a core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code. In this core proceeding Motion, it is for the bankruptcy judge to issue all orders and the final judgment.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) and (K) gives bankruptcy judges core authority to finally adjudicate counterclaims to a proof of claim that determine the extent and validity of liens supporting that claim.

Paloian ex rel. Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank National Ass'n ex rel. Certificate Holders of Asset · filed 2014-01-27(b)(2)(C), (K)

Statutory “core” authority lies under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) and (K) to finally adjudicate those Counts.

Section 157(b)(2)(F) treats preference avoidance actions as core proceedings that bankruptcy courts may resolve by final order.

Colvin v. Amegy Mortgage Co. · filed 2014-03-28(b)(2)(F)

Because Colvin’s avoidance claim was a “core proceeding,” the bankruptcy court was able to exercise full judicial power and enter a final order dismissing the claim.

Section 157(b) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a core proceeding.

Rushton v. Standard Industries, Inc. (In re C.W. Mining Co.) · filed 2014-03-31(b)(2)(F), (H), and (O)

This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F), (H), and (O), and the Court may enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on a turnover count.

García v. González · filed 2014-03-17(b)(1)

Though the bankruptcy judge had authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) to enter a final judgment on the turnover count, we nonetheless find error in the merits of the judgment entered.

Section 157(b) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order on a core claim involving interpretation and implementation of a confirmed plan.

Frisia Hartley, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Talsma) · filed 2014-04-15(b)

As a result, Counts 1 and 6 are core claims as to which the bankruptcy court may issue a final order. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a core proceeding when constitutional requirements are met.

Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins) · filed 2014-04-21(b)(2)

The Court has the authority to enter a final judgment in this adversary proceeding since it constitutes a core proceeding as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E), (F), (H), and/or (O) and meets all constitutional standards for the proper exercise of full judicial power by this Court.

Section 157(b)(2)(I) treats a proceeding to determine whether a debt is dischargeable as a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

Birch Hollow, LLC v. Tardugno (In re Tardugno) · filed 2014-04-30(b)(2)(I)

This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) in which the Court may enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) and (K) gives bankruptcy judges core authority to finally adjudicate estate counterclaims to a creditor’s claim and disputes over the validity and extent of liens supporting that claim.

Paloian v. LaSalle Bank National Ass'n (In re Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, Inc.) · filed 2014-04-10(b)(2)(C) and (K)

Statutory “core” authority lies under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) and (K) to finally adjudicate those Counts.

Section 157(b)(2)(h) authorizes a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a proceeding covered by that subsection.

Andrews v. RBL, L.L.C. (In re Vista Bella, Inc.) · filed 2014-05-02(b)(2)(h)

The Court has the authority to enter a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(h).

Section 157(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter orders in core proceedings arising from a bankruptcy sale.

In re Elk Grove Village Petroleum · filed 2014-05-21(b)(1)

A bankruptcy judge to whom a case has been referred may enter final judgment on any core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code or arising in a case under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Proceedings arising with respect to sales held pursuant to section 368 of the Bankruptcy Code are matters arising in a bankruptcy case, in which the bankruptcy court is empowered to enter orders.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final order in core proceedings involving claim allowance and plan confirmation.

In re Moncree · filed 2014-06-27(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(L)

The Court has the authority to enter a final order as this proceeding involves the allowance of a claim and the confirmation of a plan. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (L).

Section 157(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final orders and judgments in referred core proceedings arising under title 11 or in a bankruptcy case.

Bakst v. Smokemist, Inc. (In re Gladstone) · filed 2014-07-07(b)(1)

The Court has statutory power to enter final orders and judgments in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

Section 157(b)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a core proceeding.

In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc. · filed 2014-07-16(b)(2)

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), and this Court has the judicial power to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2)(J) treats discharge matters as core proceedings in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

Wan Ho Industrial Co. v. Hemken (In re Hemken) · filed 2014-07-16(b)(2)(J)

The Court has the authority to enter a final order as these cases involve the Debt- or’s discharge, a matter which is designated as a “core proceeding” and is at the center of the adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) identifies core bankruptcy proceedings in which the bankruptcy court may enter an appropriate order or judgment.

Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum (In re Birnbaum) · filed 2014-07-29(b)(2)(A)

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). To the extent that Guggenheim’s nondischargeability claim is finally adjudicated on this motion, this Court may enter an appropriate order and judgment.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final ruling on a fraudulent transfer claim when a creditor’s proof of claim cannot be resolved without deciding the transfer issue.

Samson v. Western Capital Partners LLC (In re Blixseth) · filed 2014-08-12(b)(1)

Because this case involves a creditor who filed a proof of claim, and this claim could not be resolved without first ruling on the fraudulent transfer issue, Judge Kirscher had the constitutional authority to issue a final ruling.

Section 157's core proceeding designation does not permit a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on a fraudulent conveyance claim against a party that has not filed a claim against the estate without the parties' express consent; the judge submits proposed findings to the district court instead.

Goodwin v. Custom American Auto Parts, LLC (In re Pigg) · filed 2014-07-25

This Court previously has concluded that its entering a final order or judgment on a fraudulent conveyance cause of action against a party who has not filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate would be inconsistent with Article III of the United States Constitution without the express consent of the parties. ... Defendants have not expressly consented to this Court entering a final judgment, and Plaintiff has not presented legal authority suggesting entry of a judgment by this Court would be consistent with the Constitution. Therefore, this Court will not enter a final judgment but rather submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina for review.

A motion to recover payments made under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan on a disallowed claim is a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

In re Thompson · filed 2014-10-21(b)(2)(B)

The Debtors’ motions are not Stem claims, as they involve the request for a refund of payments made under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan on a disallowed claim, and related relief. The Court concludes that this is a core proceeding in which the Court is authorized to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2) gives bankruptcy courts statutory authority to enter final orders in core proceedings, including claims allowance and lien priority disputes.

In re Cohen · filed 2014-11-13(b)(2)

The issues addressed in this memorandum decision come within the statutory definition of core proceedings, including allowance or disallowance of the IRS claims (28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B)); ... This court therefore has statutory authority to issue a final judgment or order.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits a bankruptcy court to hear and determine fee petitions asserting claims against a bankruptcy estate by final order.

In re Clinkscale · filed 2015-01-14(b)(2)(B)

The Fee Petitions include claims against the various bankruptcy estates, and therefore fall well within the Bankruptcy Court’s authority to “hear and determine” by entry of a final order.

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in core proceedings, subject to district court appellate review.

Lassman v. Sergio (In re Sergio) · filed 2016-06-20(b)(1)

Section 157 of title 28 authorizes bankruptcy courts to enter final orders and judgments in core proceedings, subject to appellate review by the district court.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to issue final decisions in non-core, related-to matters with the parties’ consent.

Stillwater Liquidating LLC v. Net Five at Palm Pointe, LLC (In re Stillwater Asset Backed Offshore Fund Ltd.) · filed 2016-09-02(c)(2)

Matters that are “related to” a debtor’s case are non-core matters, as to which a bankruptcy court may issue final decisions with the parties’ consent. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(b)(1) allows a bankruptcy judge to enter final orders in core proceedings, including matters arising under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In re Elk Grove Village Petroleum, LLC · filed 2016-12-15(b)(1)

A bankruptcy judge to whom a case has been referred may enter final judgment on any core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code or arising in a case under the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Matters arising under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code are matters that may only arise in a bankruptcy case and, thus, the bankruptcy court is empowered to enter final orders with respect to the same.

Section 157 permits bankruptcy judges to enter final orders or judgments in core matters, including matters concerning estate administration.

Trevino v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (In re Trevino) · filed 2017-01-12(b)(2)

Section 157 provides that bankruptcy judges may issue final orders or judgments where the matter is determined to be core, which includes “matters concerning the administration of the estate.”

Section 157(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a core proceeding involving interpretation of its confirmation order.

Mountain Glacier LLC v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc. (In re Mountain Glacier LLC) · filed 2017-01-13(b)(1)

As to the first issue, the district court concluded that interpretation of the Order was a core proceeding. The case law overwhelmingly supports this conclusion. ... Therefore, this court may conduct appropriate proceedings and enter a final order in this matter. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

Section 157(c)(1) limits a bankruptcy court in a non-core proceeding to submitting proposed findings and conclusions when a party has not consented to a final bankruptcy-court order.

In re Thorpe · filed 2017-02-17(c)(1)

As explained below, I have concluded that this is a non-core matter as to which the bankruptcy court lacks authority to enter a final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). Mirarchi has not consented to the entry of a final order by the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, this Memorandum will serve as my proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law pursúant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9033.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final order in a related proceeding with the parties’ consent.

Olick v. House (In re Olick) · filed 2017-03-20(c)(2)

In a related proceeding, I may enter a final order only with the consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). Here, the parties have so consented.

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes a bankruptcy judge to enter a final judgment in a core proceeding.

Maplethorpe v. Citimortgage Inc. (In re Maplethorpe) · filed 2017-06-16(b)(1)

For these reasons, this Court has statutory authority, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), to enter a final judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim in this adversary proceeding.

Section 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to enter final orders in a related proceeding when the parties consent, and that consent may be implied.

Sears v. Sears (In Re AFY, Inc.) · filed 2018-09-06(c)(2)

Under a second approach, however, the parties may consent to the bankruptcy court entering appropriate final orders, and the district court is not involved. Id. § 157(c)(2). For the latter, express consent is not necessary; implied consent may suffice. ... Although there are some conflicting signals in the record, we think the better view is that the plaintiffs impliedly consented to entry of a final order by the bankruptcy court.

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes a bankruptcy court to enter final orders in core proceedings without the parties' consent.

Gordon v. Mcghee Auto Sales, Inc. (In re Goins) · filed 2019-03-18(b)(1)

However, because Plaintiff's claims are core proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code, the Court is authorized to enter final orders and does not require the parties' consent to do so.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) identifies core bankruptcy proceedings in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

Jeffery Lee Taulbee and Ida Mae Taulbee · filed 2020-04-02(b)(2)(A)

This is a core proceeding regarding which the Court may enter a final order.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to hear non-core claims but requires the parties’ consent before it can enter final orders or judgments on them.

Schuessler v. The U.S. Small Business Administration · filed 2020-05-22(c)(1), (c)(2)

Counts I, II, and IV allege violations of the APA and seek mandamus relief. These claims do not originate in the Bankruptcy Code and are non-core. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court may hear them, but cannot issue final orders or judgments without the parties’ consent, which is absent in this case. See 28 U.S.C. §157(c)(1), (2).

Section 157(b) authorizes bankruptcy courts to issue final orders on proofs of claim because allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate is a core proceeding.

Green v. 1900 Capital Trust II, BY U.S. BANK TRUST NewRez LLC · filed 2020-06-25(b)

Bankruptcy courts are authorized by statute to “hear and determine . . . core proceedings,” which include “allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). ... Consequently, the Court concludes that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the Proof of Claim and had the authority to issue a final order on it.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) treats this involuntary bankruptcy matter as a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

Carolina Constructors & Investments, LLC · filed 2020-06-26(b)(2)(A)

This matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and this Court may enter a final order.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to enter final decisions in core matters.

Krystal v. Haynie · filed 2020-06-23

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and all issues before it are core matters on which it may enter final decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on an automatic-stay violation claim as a core matter.

Houck v. Substitute Trustee Services, Inc. · filed 2020-10-06

“[A] stay violation claim is a core matter for which this court can enter a final judgment.”

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes a bankruptcy judge to enter a final order or judgment in a core proceeding.

Foster · filed 2020-10-30(b)(1)

For reasons again set forth within the Remand Opinion,92 the proceeding involving the Subject Claims is core in nature pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). As such, the Court has the authority to enter a final order or judgment on the Subject Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

Section 157(b)(1) allows a bankruptcy court to enter an order on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a core proceeding, even when the underlying claim is non-core.

Lentz v. National Debt Relief, LLC · filed 2021-03-29(b)(1)

Litigation on the merits of the CROA Count would be a non-core proceeding. The Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, is a core proceeding. ... Accordingly, this Court “may enter appropriate orders and judgments,” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), on the Motion to Dismiss.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a non-core proceeding when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent.

RJT Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Davis · filed 2021-04-01(c)(2)

This likewise constitutes knowing and voluntary consent. Therefore, and because neither party has suggested that the Court cannot enter a final order in this proceeding, the foregoing analysis satisfies the Court that it may enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a core proceeding that falls outside Stern’s narrow restriction.

In Re: Mosdos Chofetz Chaim Inc. · filed 2021-12-07(b)(2)

Indeed, Stern “does not impact a bankruptcy court’s ability to enter a final judgment in any other type of core proceeding authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).” In re Peacock, 455 B.R. 810, 812 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). Therefore, because the facts and legal issues of the below adversary proceeding differ mightily from those in Stern, Appellants’ argument that Stern precluded the Bankruptcy Court from entering final judgment is unfounded.

Section 157(c)(1) permits bankruptcy judges to hear non-core proceedings and requires proposed findings for final orders while allowing interlocutory orders without district court submission.

Kane v. PaCap Aviation Finance, LLC · filed 2022-04-20(c)(1)

The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) thus creates a distinction between final and interlocutory orders. While a bankruptcy court must submit the proposed findings and conclusions on matters that necessitate entry of a final order or judgment, it has the authority to enter interlocutory orders without submitting the issue to the district court.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) and (O) covers proceedings concerning estate administration and liquidation of estate assets as core proceedings for which a bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

Dalton Crane, L.C. · filed 2022-06-29(b)(2)(A) and (O)

The pending dispute before this Court is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). Accordingly, this Court concludes that the narrow limitation imposed by Stern does not prohibit this Court from entering a final order here.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) and (G) gives a bankruptcy court authority to enter a final judgment in a proceeding concerning the validity and scope of the automatic stay.

In re: Gary Abrams · filed 2022-07-12(b)(2)(A), (G)

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (G) then gave the bankruptcy court authority to enter a final judgment.

Section 157(b) authorizes a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a core proceeding.

Eichor v. Wyly · filed 2022-09-07(b)

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1) and (b)(2). The bankruptcy court has the power to enter a final judgment in this adversary proceeding, subject to traditional rights of appeal.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) and (O) allows a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a core proceeding concerning review of an attorney’s conduct.

Charles Pernell Prophet and Shirley Ann Prophet · filed 2022-10-06(b)(2)(A) and (O)

As this matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O), the Court may enter a final order.

Section 157(c)(1) allows a bankruptcy judge to hear a related non-core proceeding but, absent consent, limits the judge to recommendations rather than a final judgment.

Enviro-Lite Solutions Inc v. First Class Electrical Services LLC · filed 2022-10-20(c)(1)

Nevertheless, while bankruptcy judges can issue final orders and judgments for core proceedings, absent consent, they can only issue reports and recommendations for non-core proceedings.

Section 157(b)(2)(I) treats determinations of the dischargeability of particular debts as core proceedings that a bankruptcy court may finally decide.

Payne v. Payne · filed 2022-11-23(b)(2)(I)

This is a statutory core proceeding, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(I); thus, the Court has statutory authority to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(1) permits bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in core proceedings arising under or in bankruptcy cases.

Foster v. Aurzada · filed 2023-01-03(b)(1)

“[A] proceeding is core under section 157 if it invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or if it is a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.” ... “As a result, Foster’s argument that the bankruptcy court could not enter final judgment is meritless.”

Section 157(b)(2)(A) identifies matters concerning administration of the bankruptcy estate as core proceedings that may be decided by the bankruptcy court.

In Re Debtor Mark Abbey Slotkin · filed 2023-01-04(b)(2)(A)

Third, the court finds the bankruptcy court did not err in entering a final order because, as noted in the bankruptcy court’s December 21, 2021, ruling, Debtor admitted that the petition was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and consented to the entry of final orders by the bankruptcy court. (ER, Vol. 1 at 15; Vol. 2 at 318, 346.)

Section 157(b)(2)(I) makes a proceeding to determine dischargeability a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

We Sell Restaurants, Inc. v. Maddox · filed 2023-06-07(b)(2)(I)

This is a statutory core proceeding, pursuant to at least 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I); thus, the bankruptcy court has statutory authority to enter a final order.

Section 157(b) authorizes a bankruptcy court to enter final orders in statutory core proceedings.

PIRTEK USA, LLC v. Lager · filed 2023-07-20(b)

This is a statutory core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); thus, the Court has statutory authority to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(1) makes a bankruptcy court’s order dismissing or abstaining under 11 U.S.C. § 305 subject to review under § 158.

In Re Goerg · filed 1991-05-13(b)(1)

Section 157(b)(1) of Title 28 states that "Bankruptcy Judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 ... referred to [them] under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 157(b)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a bankruptcy court's section 305 order, which is a determination of whether to dismiss or abstain from a case under title 11, is subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a).

Section 157(b)(2)(E) and (O) permits a bankruptcy court to decide by final order a core dispute over how a confirmed plan affects claims to property and whether the plan’s injunction applies.

Lawski v. Frontier Ins. Grp., LLC (In re Frontier Ins. Grp., Inc.) · filed 2018-02-15(b)(2)(E) and (O)

This is a "core proceeding" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) and (O) that the Court may determine by a final order under Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 497, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), because, as provided in the Abstention Decision, this Court is deciding only issues limited to core aspects of the adjustment of the debtor/creditor relationship: how did the Plan's confirmation affect the parties' prepetition claims to or interests in Parcels B and C, and does the injunction provided for in § 11.08 of the Plan and ¶ 7 of the Court's December 1, 2005 Order confirming the Plan (the "Confirmation Order"), ... which prevents interference with the Plan or the property covered by the Plan, apply?

Section 157 treats this contested matter as a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court has statutory authority to enter a final order.

Joseph F Langston, Jr · filed 2023-08-07(b)(2)(B) and (E)

This is a statutory core proceeding, pursuant to at least 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (E); thus, the bankruptcy court has statutory authority to enter a final order.

Section 157(c) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a non-core proceeding when all parties consent.

Neal v. United Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 2025-04-15(c)

While this is a “non-core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c), all parties have consented to the entry of final order and judgment by this Court.

Section 157(b) authorizes bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in core proceedings, including proceedings to disallow a claim.

Ellison v. Ditech Financial LLC · filed 2025-05-29(b)

Bankruptcy courts have express statutory authority to enter final judgments on such core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final order in a non-core proceeding with the parties’ consent; without consent, the judge cannot enter a final order.

First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company v. SVB Financial Group · filed 2025-06-25(c)(2)

If a matter brought before the bankruptcy court is non-core, “the parties may consent to entry of a final order or judgment by a bankruptcy judge”—and absent consent, a bankruptcy court may not enter a final order on the matter.

Section 157(c)(1) allows bankruptcy courts to hear non-core related proceedings but limits their authority to enter final orders or judgments.

LPB MHC LLC d/b/a Sam C. Mitchell & Associates v. Farmers State Bank of Alto Pass · filed 2025-06-26(c)(1)

Section 157(c)(1) expressly authorizes bankruptcy courts to hear non-core but related proceedings and limits only the court’s ability to enter final orders or judgment.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) and (H) treats certain bankruptcy matters, including fraudulent-transfer proceedings, as core proceedings in which the bankruptcy court has statutory authority to enter final judgment.

Burns, Chapter 7 Trustee v. GRANDSTAY HOSPITALITY, LLC · filed 2025-07-14(b)(2)(A) and (H)

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (H), so this court has statutory authority to enter a final judgment.

Section 157(b) treats counterclaims to proofs of claim as core matters, but a bankruptcy court may enter final judgment on a private-right counterclaim only with the parties’ consent.

Barlow · filed 2025-10-30(b)

As an “arising in” matter, § 157(b) would make this a core matter over which this Court would have the authority to enter final judgment even absent the consent of the parties. But Stern v. Marshall similarly involved a counterclaim to a proof of claim. The Supreme Court held there that when such a counterclaim is a matter of “private right,” as the contract and equitable claims asserted by the trust against Walmart surely are, the literal application of § 157(b) would deprive the counterclaim defendant of its right to an adjudication before an Article III tribunal.110 The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Wellness, however, holds that the bankruptcy court may enter final judgment in such a matter if all parties consent to it.111 As described above, both parties here have consented to this Court’s entry of final judgment. The Court accordingly has the authority to do so.

Section 157(c) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order on non-core claims when the parties consent.

Ferguson · filed 2026-05-15(c)

Other claims are non-core, and the parties consented on the record at the April 2 trial to this Court entering a final order on the non-core claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c).

Section 157(b) permits bankruptcy courts to hear core proceedings and enter final orders in them.

Apex Oil Co. v. United States Customs Service (In Re Apex Oil Co.) · filed 1990-12-05(b)(1), (b)(2)

This provision is made applicable to the the bankruptcy courts through 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1) and (2), which give such courts jurisdiction over “core proceedings” and allow them to enter final orders.

Section 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments in cases under Title 11 and core proceedings.

Smith Trust & Savings Bank v. Young · filed 2000-04-04(b)(1)

However, this delegation of power is not unlimited; only certain types of cases can be finally decided by bankruptcy courts. ... In the instant case, it is undisputed that the bankruptcy court had the authority to render a final judgment on the bank’s complaint.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order on a non-core claim only with knowing and voluntary consent.

In Re Akhoian Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2021-04-14(c)(2)

In sum, even if the Bankruptcy Court had sua sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim, it erred by doing so without the Akhoians having consented to its authority to enter such an order.

Section 157 is one source of a bankruptcy court’s authority to enforce its orders through civil contempt.

In re Residential Capital, LLC · filed 2017-07-12

This power derives from the inherent power of the court, along with 11 U.S.C. § 105 and 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 157(b)(1) treats an action seeking civil contempt for violating a bankruptcy injunction as a core proceeding because it concerns administration of the estate.

United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In Re McLean Industries, Inc.) · filed 1986-12-29(b)(1)

Although an action seeking civil contempt is not expressly denominated as such in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), it directly concerns the ad ministration of the estate as set forth in § 157(b)(1).

Section 157 does not treat a contempt hearing as a core proceeding; the district court reviews it de novo.

Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom (In Re Continental Air Lines, Inc.) · filed 1986-05-29(b)(2)

This Court concludes that a contempt hearing is not a core proceeding, and that Appellant is entitled to review upon a de novo standard.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final civil contempt order to enforce an earlier order in a core proceeding because the enforcement is part of that proceeding.

In Re L.H. & A. Realty, Inc. · filed 1986-07-10(c)(1)

We now expressly hold that a bankruptcy judge has the authority to issue an order of contempt to coerce compliance with an earlier order in a core proceeding because the finding of contempt is part and parcel of the core proceeding itself.

Section 157(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to hear contempt proceedings for violations of the automatic stay as core proceedings and impose sanctions to end the contempt.

In Re Elegant Concepts, Ltd. · filed 1986-12-15(b)(1)

Therefore, in the view of this Court, a contempt proceeding claiming violation of the automatic stay is also a “core” proceeding and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of this Court. For these reasons, the Court is declining the invitation to certify the contempt it finds present to the district court, and will itself impose sanctions to terminate such contempt. It finds the power to do this in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and specifically in the power given it to enter “appropriate orders and judgments” in all core proceedings.

A reference of a core proceeding under § 157 includes authority for the bankruptcy judge to adjudicate civil contempt arising in that proceeding.

Gibbons v. Haddad (In Re Haddad) · filed 1987-01-16(b)(2)(E)

The adversary proceeding, in which the Trustee sought possession of the Debtor’s home, is a core proceeding which bankruptcy judges may adjudicate. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E). The referral of jurisdiction to adjudicate core proceedings includes the jurisdiction to adjudicate civil contempt arising within the core proceeding.

Section 157's grant of authority over core proceedings does not give bankruptcy judges civil contempt power.

In Re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd., Inc. · filed 1987-09-14(b)(1)

We are not persuaded that in giving bankruptcy judges authority over core proceedings Congress also gave them contempt power in those proceedings.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy judge assigned a bankruptcy case to conduct a show cause hearing about compliance with a turnover order without further district court authorization.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Norman D. REVIE, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1987-12-21(a)

Once the district court provided that a bankruptcy judge would hear Shearn Moody’s case (28 U.S.C. § 157(a)), the bankruptcy judge had authority to hear a proceeding related to the case. A proceeding to show cause why a turnover order had not been obeyed falls within the authority granted in 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 157(b)(2)(I) places enforcement of the bankruptcy discharge injunction within the bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction.

In Re Ryan · filed 1989-06-02(b)(2)(I)

This is a core proceeding over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). ... Enforcement of the discharge injunction of Section 524 must be within the core jurisdiction of this Court.

Section 157 does not treat criminal contempt for violating a bankruptcy court order as a core or related proceeding, so bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to try or sentence it.

In the Matter of Hipp, Inc., Debtor. Thomas J. Griffith, Trustee v. Oles · filed 1990-04-18

We hold that criminal contempts under section 401(3) for violation of bankruptcy court orders are neither core nor related proceedings under section 157, and that bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction to try, or convict and sentence for, such contempts.

Section 157(b)(1) treats civil contempt proceedings arising out of core bankruptcy matters as core proceedings.

In Re Skinner · filed 1990-10-22(b)(1)

Civil contempt proceedings arising out of core matters are themselves core matters.

Section 157, together with 11 U.S.C. § 106, gives bankruptcy courts civil contempt power to enforce discharge orders.

In Re Shafer · filed 1992-09-21

The Tenth Circuit has held that the bankruptcy courts have civil contempt powers as a result of 11 U.S.C. § 106 and 28 U.S.C. § 157 and that this delegation of power does not offend the Constitution. ... The bankruptcy court did not err in concluding it had the power to find a party in civil contempt for violating a discharge order.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention applies to the liquidation or estimation of qualifying claims against the bankruptcy estate.

JA-047 Doe v. Theodore Roosevelt Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America · filed 2023-09-05(b)(4)

The defendants’ argument that their cases fall under the exception to mandatory abstention in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) is not convincing. ... The bankruptcy judge has already determined that these lawsuits are not claims against the Diocese’s estate and that the defendants do not have a viable claim for indemnification against the Diocese, so the exception does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention applies only to the liquidation or estimation of personal injury or wrongful death claims against the bankruptcy estate.

Y.S. v. Queen of the Most Holy Rosary Roman Catholic Church · filed 2023-09-05(b)(4)

The defendants’ argument that their cases fall under the exception to mandatory abstention in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) is not convincing. ... The bankruptcy judge has already determined that these lawsuits are not claims against the Diocese’s estate and that the defendants do not have a viable claim for indemnification against the Diocese, so the exception does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention applies only to the liquidation or estimation of personal injury or wrongful death claims against the bankruptcy estate.

Eaton v. St. Barnabas the Apostle Roman Catholic Church Parish · filed 2023-09-05(b)(4)

The defendants’ argument that their cases fall under the exception to mandatory abstention in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) is not convincing. ... The bankruptcy judge has already determined that these lawsuits are not claims against the Diocese’s estate and that the defendants do not have a viable claim for indemnification against the Diocese, so the exception does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention applies to the liquidation or estimation of personal injury claims against the bankruptcy estate, not claims against other defendants who have no viable indemnification claim against the estate.

Blair v. Roman Catholic Church of SS Cyril and Methodius · filed 2023-09-05(b)(4)

The defendants’ argument that their cases fall under the exception to mandatory abstention in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) is not convincing. ... The bankruptcy judge has already determined that these lawsuits are not claims against the Diocese’s estate and that the defendants do not have a viable claim for indemnification against the Diocese, so the exception does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention applies only to the liquidation or estimation of personal injury or wrongful death claims against the bankruptcy estate.

Morrison v. St. Philip Neri School · filed 2023-09-05(b)(4)

The defendants’ argument that their cases fall under the exception to mandatory abstention in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) is not convincing. ... The bankruptcy judge has already determined that these lawsuits are not claims against the Diocese’s estate and that the defendants do not have a viable claim for indemnification against the Diocese, so the exception does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention applies to the liquidation or estimation of personal injury claims against the bankruptcy estate.

Varnell v. St. Therese of Lisieux Church · filed 2023-09-05(b)(4)

The defendants’ argument that their cases fall under the exception to mandatory abstention in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) is not convincing. ... The bankruptcy judge has already determined that these lawsuits are not claims against the Diocese’s estate and that the defendants do not have a viable claim for indemnification against the Diocese, so the exception does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention does not apply to personal injury claims brought solely against non-debtors.

Nicol v. Our Lady of Lourdes · filed 2023-08-17(b)(4)

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument to the contrary, based on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4), which provides that “[n]on-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of section 1334(c)(2).” The subsection referenced in that provision applies only to “the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Since Plaintiffs have asserted claims solely against non-debtors, this exception to mandatory abstention does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention does not apply to personal injury claims brought solely against nondebtors.

Johnson v. St. Patrick's Church · filed 2023-08-17(b)(4)

Since Plaintiffs have asserted claims solely against non-debtors, this exception to mandatory abstention does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention does not apply to personal injury claims brought solely against non-debtors.

ARK663 Doe v. St. John of God · filed 2023-08-17(b)(4)

Since Plaintiffs have asserted claims solely against non-debtors, this exception to mandatory abstention does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention does not apply to personal injury claims asserted solely against nondebtors.

Hensel v. St. Anthony of Padua Roman Catholic Church · filed 2023-08-17(b)(4)

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument to the contrary, based on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4), which provides that “[n]on-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of section 1334(c)(2).” The subsection referenced in that provision applies only to “the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Since Plaintiffs have asserted claims solely against non-debtors, this exception to mandatory abstention does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention does not apply to personal injury claims brought solely against nondebtors.

PC-50 Doe v. St. Joseph Roman Catholic Church at Babylon in the County of Suffolk in the State of New York · filed 2023-08-17(b)(4)

Since Plaintiffs have asserted claims solely against non-debtors, this exception to mandatory abstention does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention applies to specified personal injury or wrongful death claims against the bankruptcy estate, not claims solely against non-debtors.

Raia v. St. James Parish · filed 2023-08-17(b)(4)

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument to the contrary, based on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4), which provides that “[n]on-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of section 1334(c)(2).” The subsection referenced in that provision applies only to “the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Since Plaintiffs have asserted claims solely against non-debtors, this exception to mandatory abstention does not apply.

Section 157(b)(4)’s exception to mandatory abstention for personal injury claims against a bankruptcy estate does not apply to claims solely against nondebtors.

ARK459 Doe v. Franciscan Brothers of Brooklyn · filed 2023-08-17(b)(4)

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument to the contrary, based on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4), which provides that “[n]on-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of section 1334(c)(2).” ... Since Plaintiffs have asserted claims solely against non-debtors, this exception to mandatory abstention does not apply.

Section 157(b)(5) does not prevent a district court from abstaining under § 1334(c)(1) and leaving wrongful death claims in state court.

Coker v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc. (In Re Pan Am Corp.) · filed 1991-05-06(b)(5)

On the other hand, it is not necessary to transfer the Florida cases to this district under § 157(b)(5) to make possible the bankruptcy court’s effective administration of Pan Am’s Chapter 11 proceedings. ... In the exercise of my discretion, I deny the debtors’ motion under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) for an order of transfer. I do so in the interest of justice, and also in the interest of comity with the Florida state court and respect for Florida law.

Section 157(b)(5) allows a district court to leave personal injury tort claims in the courts where they are pending for liquidation through discretionary abstention.

In Re White Motor Credit, Debtors. Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corporation · filed 1985-04-29(b)(5)

When read in isolation, section 157(b)(5) seems to support the debtor’s contention that the tort claims may not be liquidated in other courts, as the District Court has ordered; but a reading of the entire law in light of its purpose and history leads to the opposite conclusion. ... These sentences from Senator Dole’s remarks, plus the fact that section 157(b)(4) of title 28 removes tort cases from mandatory abstention under section 1334(c)(2) but does not remove discretionary abstention under section 1334(c)(1), convinces us that the district court has the authority to leave tort cases in the courts in which they are pending for liquidation there.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury and wrongful death issues in bankruptcy cases to be tried before a district judge.

Jacobs v. O'Bannon (In Re O'Bannon) · filed 1985-05-03(b)(5)

Personal injury and wrongful death issues must be tried before the District Judge.

Section 157(b)(5) authorizes the district court overseeing a bankruptcy to fix the trial venue of personal injury tort actions against the debtor, regardless of where those actions are pending.

A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin · filed 1986-04-10(b)(5)

We, therefore, have no difficulty in finding that the district judge’s authority to fix venue of personal injury tort actions against the debtor exists under § 157(b)(5), irrespective of the district in which such controversy is pending.

Section 157(b)(5) authorizes the district court handling a bankruptcy case to fix the trial venue for personal injury tort claims against the debtor, regardless of where those claims are pending.

A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin · filed 1986-05-14(b)(5)

We, therefore, have no difficulty in finding that the district judge's authority to fix venue of personal injury tort actions against the debtor exists under Sec. 157(b)(5), irrespective of the district in which such controversy is pending.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) makes estimation of personal injury tort claims for Chapter 11 plan confirmation a core proceeding, while excluding their liquidation or estimation for distribution.

Matter of Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc. · filed 1986-07-30(b)(2)(B)

As to the counts sounding in tort, the plaintiffs are entitled to jury trials in some court for purposes of distribution. The bankruptcy court has the right and duty only to estimate these claims for the purposes of confirming a plan under Chapter 11, and that is a core proceeding.

Section 157(b)(5) requires a motion to transfer personal injury or wrongful death claims for trial to be decided by the district court.

In Re Waterman Steamship Corp. · filed 1986-07-24(b)(5)

Accordingly, the motion under § 157(b)(5) must be and hereby is denied without prejudice to being refiled in the district court.

Section 157(b)(5) does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over personal injury claims already pending before them.

Kinder v. Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. · filed 1986-08-01(b)(5)

This Court, however, upon consideration of the Bankruptcy Act and its legislative history as a whole, concludes that the language should not be construed in accordance with its “plain meaning,” and that § 157(b)(5) should not be read to divest state courts of jurisdiction over personal injury claims already pending before them.

Section 157(b)(5) requires withdrawal to the district court when an implied indemnity proceeding substantially involves personal injury tort or wrongful death issues.

Baggott v. Piper Aircraft Corp. · filed 1986-12-24(b)(5)

Therefore, the issues involved in these adversary proceedings are, in substantial part, identical to personal injury tort and wrongful death claims, and therefore subject to mandatory removal under § 157(b)(5).

Section 157(b)(5) lets the district court where the bankruptcy is pending choose whether to try a personal injury claim there or in the district where the claim arose, without favoring either forum.

In Re UNR Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-02-02(b)(5)

The Act directs the district court to determine whether to try a personal injury claim itself or to transfer the proceedings to the district court in which the claim arose. § 157(b)(5). The section does not favor one forum or set forth guidelines for the court to follow in making the forum determination.

Section 157(b)(5) directs that personal injury tort claims against the estate be tried in district court, but does not apply that direction to a debtor’s personal injury counterclaim against a creditor.

In Re Manning · filed 1987-04-08(b)(5)

It seems obvious that this direction in subsection (b)(5) is otherwise. It was placed in subsection (b) to provide a direction for trying “personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate,” because they are excepted from the type of core proceeding alluded to in subsection (b)(2)(B). This direction serves no discerna-ble policy or purpose if applied to such á claim when asserted by a debtor as a counterclaim to a creditor’s claim.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits bankruptcy judges to estimate personal injury and wrongful death claims for plan confirmation, but excludes their liquidation or estimation for distribution from core jurisdiction.

Matter of Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc. · filed 1987-04-06(b)(2)(B)

However, the 1984 amendments limited the core jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges, in cases referred by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), to the estimation of claims for the purposes of confirming a plan under Chapter 11 or 13. Core jurisdiction does not extend to the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the debtor’s estate for purposes of distribution.

Section 157(b)(5) requires district court trial for personal injury tort and wrongful death claims, but does not apply to other tort claims.

Kenny v. Block (In Re Kenny) · filed 1987-06-17(b)(5)

The tort claims asserted in this proceeding are not personal injury or wrongful death claims, and therefore section 157(b)(5) does not come into play.

Section 157(b)(5)’s reference to a personal injury tort does not cover an FDCPA claim merely because the plaintiff seeks damages for emotional or physical distress.

Littles v. Lieberman (In Re Littles) · filed 1987-07-07(b)(5)

Moreover, we note the unusual wording of § 157(b)(5), which refers to “personal injury tort.” It appears to this Court that such reference must be limited to those torts or causes of action which require proof of damage as an element of the underlying cause of action. This is not necessary in an action for damages under the FDCPA.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) treats estimation of personal injury tort claims for Chapter 11 plan confirmation as a core proceeding.

Grzybowski v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp. (In Re Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp.) · filed 1987-12-18(b)(2)(B)

This case involves a core proceeding. ... The trial court was not liquidating or estimating contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort claims for purposes of distribution, but rather it was only estimating those claims for purposes of confirming a plan under Chapter 11.

Section 157(b)(5) does not independently confer district court jurisdiction over personal injury claims.

Kadel v. Thompson · filed 1988-03-30(b)(5)

This fact, coupled with the legislative history which supports the view that section 157 allows for abstention in personal injury cases, leads this court to hold that section 157(b)(5) was not intended to confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts to hear cases that those courts otherwise do not have the power to hear.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury tort and wrongful death claims to be tried in a district court rather than the bankruptcy court.

In Re Todd Shipyards Corp. · filed 1988-04-19(b)(5)

Wrongful death and personal injury tort claims must be tried in a forum other than this Court. In theory said suits, pursuant to § 157(b)(5), could be tried in the District of New Jersey or in the district court where the claim arose.

Section 157(b)(5) requires a debtor’s personal injury tort claims, including claims for damages under § 1983, to be tried in district court.

Smith v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. (In Re Smith) · filed 1988-06-29(b)(5)

The Court finds the unequivocal and broad language of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), which is silent on who brings the claim, standing alone, to also encompass the instant situation, where a Chapter 7 debtor seeks recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged due process and equal protection violations.

Section 157, together with a district court’s general reference, gives bankruptcy courts authority to decide abstention motions.

In re Reading Tube Corp. · filed 1988-10-18

The bankruptcy courts are vested with abstention power by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 157 and the district court’s order of general reference.

Section 157(b)(5) leaves the district court to choose the trial forum for a personal injury claim based on the facts of the case.

In re NTC of America, Inc. · filed 1988-10-20(b)(5)

In the absence of statutory direction, courts have considered the facts of each case in choosing a forum. ... After considering the interests of both the plaintiffs and of the estate, this court withdraws the reference to the bankruptcy court and transfers plaintiffs’ claim to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

Section 157(b)(4) makes mandatory abstention inapplicable to certain noncore proceedings but leaves discretionary abstention available.

Malone v. Hughes (In Re Hughes) · filed 1988-11-18(b)(4)

The omission of discretionary abstention provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) from the express limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) leads to the logical conclusion similarly reached in White Motor Credit that power remains in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to abstain and have these claims liquidated in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

Section 157(a) permits a bankruptcy court acting under a district court’s standing referral to decide an abstention motion.

Matter of Huddleston · filed 1989-04-12(a)

It should be noted that the Eastern District of Louisiana has the type of standing referral order mentioned in Section 157(a), found in the Appendix to the Rules of the United States District Court. ... This Court, following the cited precedent, concludes that it has jurisdiction to rule on the abstention issue raised by the United States’ Motion.

Section 157(b)(5) assigns decisions about where to try personal injury claims to the district court, but does not prevent a bankruptcy court from granting relief from the automatic stay so the claim can proceed.

Pieklik v. Hudgins (In Re Hudgins) · filed 1989-07-25(b)(5)

28 U.S.C. § 157 makes clear that issues surrounding personal injury and wrongful death claims are excluded from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. ... This Court believes that the issues of jurisdiction to try personal injury actions and abstention from such trials are entirely distinct from determinations regarding relief from stay.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) allows a bankruptcy court to estimate a personal injury tort claim for plan voting without determining ultimate liability or the amount for distribution.

Matter of Federal Press Co. · filed 1989-08-08(b)(2)(B)

The court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), N.D. Ind. Local R. 45(b)(2) and Bankr.R. 3018 grant it the authority to hear the claim presented herein and to determine the weight to be given the claim for purposes of voting on the debtor’s plan of reorganization, and not for the purpose of determining the debtor’s ultimate liability for the claim or the amount of the claim for purposes of distribution.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury tort claims to be tried in district court, but a statutory discrimination claim involving only shame and humiliation does not qualify.

Perino v. Cohen (In Re Cohen) · filed 1989-11-29(b)(5)

This tort claim for a statutory violation of a New York State anti-discrimination law does not fall within the above quoted federal statutory exclusion. This is not a claim for a “personal injury tort” in the traditional, plain-meaning sense of those words, such as a slip and fall, or a psychiatric impairment beyond mere shame and humiliation.

Section 157(b)(5)’s personal injury tort exception is limited to a narrow range of claims involving trauma or bodily injury.

Vinci v. Town of Carmel (In Re Vinci) · filed 1989-12-19(b)(5)

On the other hand, Chief Judge Charles Brieant, in this district, has held that a tort claim for a statutory violation of a New York State anti-discrimination law does not constitute a “personal injury tort” within the restrictive meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) because a claim for a tort without trauma or bodily injury is not within the statutory exception for a personal injury tort. ... The Cohen decision is binding on this court and reflects the view that Congress intended this exception for a “narrow range of claims”. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim within the jurisdiction of this court is denied.

Section 157(b)(5) requires proceedings within its scope to be tried in district court.

Computerware, Inc. v. Micro Design, Inc. (In Re Micro Design, Inc.) · filed 1990-08-03(b)(5)

Any proceeding within the scope of § 157(b)(5) must be tried in the district court and cannot even be heard in the bankruptcy court, as can a non-core proceeding.

Section 157(b)(5) applies to a mental distress claim without physical injury only when that claim is the gravamen of the complaint.

Bertholet v. Harman · filed 1991-04-04(b)(5)

I believe the better rule is that if a mental distress claim does not involve physical injury, then only if the claim is the gravamen of a complaint would § 157(b)(5) be invoked.

Section 157(c)(1) does not authorize bankruptcy judges to decide defenses in personal injury tort suits, even when the suits relate to a reorganization.

Pettibone Corporation v. Easley · filed 1991-06-13(c)(1)

Bankruptcy judges cannot try selected defenses in these tort cases — as Pettibone asked the bankruptcy judge to do with its limitations defenses — on the authority of § 157(c)(1). The whole case, including defenses of all kinds, goes off to the district judge or the state court.

Section 157(b)(5) permits courts to abstain from transferring personal injury and wrongful death claims, but transfer should be the rule and abstention the exception.

Coker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Pan American Corp.) · filed 1991-12-03(b)(5)

In sum, Congress has indicated that courts should not be too quick to abstain from exercising their transfer powers under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). Transfer should be the rule, abstention the exception.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) treats this personal injury tort claim as a non-core, related proceeding.

Wilkins v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. (In Re Pharmakinetics Laboratories, Inc.) · filed 1992-04-13(b)(2)(B)

The instant complaint involves a non-core, related cause of action under Section 157(b)(2)(B), which, while not subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of Section 1334(c)(2), see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4), may be subject to discretionary abstention under Section 1334(c)(1) based upon certain equitable considerations.

Section 157(b)(5) limits a bankruptcy court’s authority to decide state-law tort claims.

Matter of Barker-Fowler Elec. Co. · filed 1992-06-30(b)(5)

This court agrees that a bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to decide tort claims based on state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). Whether DeVore’s actions under state law to preserve the personal injury suit actually tolled the statute of limitations is an issue this court is not authorized, nor does it desire, to resolve.

Section 157(b)(5) precludes bankruptcy courts from hearing personal injury tort actions.

In re Gale · filed 1992-07-30(b)(5)

Bankruptcy courts are precluded from hearing personal injury tort actions.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits estimation of personal injury claims for plan voting and feasibility, but not for distribution or final determination of the claims.

In Re Farley, Inc. · filed 1992-11-02(b)(2)(B)

In the instant proceeding, the Court is not liquidating the personal injury claims, nor is it estimating such claims for purposes of distribution. The estimation procedure was held merely to allow Farley to proceed to confirmation with an estimate of the size of the claims involved here for purposes of voting and determining plan feasibility. This limited purpose is well within the purview of § 157(b)(2)(B). The final determination sought by debtor is not.

Section 157(b)(5) precludes a bankruptcy court from trying a personal injury claim when a jury trial is available.

Scherer v. Carroll · filed 1993-01-04(b)(5)

Thus, even if the bankruptcy court did not exercise abstention in this case, it is statutorily precluded from hearing the case in the event that a jury trial is available.

Section 157(b)(5) prevents a bankruptcy court from trying personal injury tort and wrongful death claims.

Roberts v. Goidel (In Re Goidel) · filed 1993-02-17(b)(5)

In light of the general jurisdictional proscription in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall not be tried in the bankruptcy court, the plaintiff’s tort action for defamation should proceed in the state court to judgment, after which a determination of nondischargeability may be had if the plaintiff obtains a judgment in her favor.

Section 157(b)(5) permits a district court to transfer a personal injury case to the district where the bankruptcy is proceeding without considering a party's plans to relocate the case later.

In Re Pan Am Corporation · filed 1994-02-17(b)(5)

Accordingly, we find that a court may transfer a case under section 157(b)(5) without considering any party's plans to relocate the case in the future.

Section 157(b)(5) permits a court to transfer a personal injury case to the bankruptcy district without considering a party’s plans to seek another venue later.

Murray v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.) · filed 1994-02-17(b)(5)

Accordingly, we find that a court may transfer a case under section 157(b)(5) without considering any party’s plans to relocate the case in the future.

Section 157(b)(5) gives the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending sole authority to fix the trial venue of personal injury claims against the debtor.

In Re Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1995-09-14(b)(5)

The Court also has the sole authority to fix the trial venue for any personal injury trials in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).

Section 157(b)(5) does not require withdrawal of a business malpractice claim merely because the claimant alleges incidental emotional damages.

In Re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg · filed 1995-10-03(b)(5)

Siewert’s malpractice claim is not a non-core personal injury claim subject to withdrawal from the Bankruptcy Court. ... Siewert’s claims of emotional damages are, while not inconsequential to Siewert, incidental and are not sufficient to transform this business tort into a personal injury tort.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury tort claims to be tried in district court, leaving the bankruptcy court to decide dischargeability without trying the injury claim.

Schachter v. Fall (In Re Fall) · filed 1995-11-20(b)(5)

Because section 157(b)(5) of Title 28 provides that personal injury tort claims shall be tried in the United States District Court and not in the bankruptcy court, the only issue before this Court is whether the debt should be excepted from discharge. Therefore, this Court considered only the discharge issue and no evidence was taken with respect to damages for personal injury.