Statute Annotations › Federal › 20 C.F.R. § 416.920

20 C.F.R. § 416.920

Evaluation of disability claims: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
2,028
Cited in passing
7,716
Citing cases indexed
18,114
Case dates
1980–2026
Screened through
2026-06-26
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-01
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

9,744 citing cases reviewed of 18,114 in the citation index: 2,028 interpreted the section (annotated below), 7,716 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-26 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1987-06-08 Bowen v. Yuckert upheld the medical-severity step in § 416.920(c), rejecting Moody v. Heckler's ruling that the step exceeds the Social Security Act. Source
  • 1991-02-11 SSA made § 416.920 the adult disability evaluation rule and placed child disability evaluation in separate regulations. Source
  • 2000-12-21 SSA clarified § 416.920(a)'s reference to the separate continuing-disability review process; the five-step adult eligibility rule was unchanged. Source
  • 2003-08-26 SSA expressly placed the residual-functional-capacity assessment between steps three and four and redesignated the former step-four and step-five paragraphs (e) and (f) as (f) and (g). The renumbering alone does not change older notes' rules. Source
  • 2003-11-12 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, reversed the Third Circuit and held that the ability to perform past relevant work can defeat a claim at step four even if that job no longer exists. Source
  • 2012-03-26 SSA added an evidence-development cross-reference to § 416.920(a)(3); this did not alter the five-step test stated in the notes. Source
  • 2012-08-24 SSA added § 416.920(h), allowing an adjudicator with insufficient past-work evidence to proceed to step five and deny a claim without a step-four finding when the claimant can adjust to other work. Source
  • 2017-03-27 For claims filed from this date, § 416.920c replaced the old treating-source opinion framework in § 416.927; the existing notes here do not state that former weight rule. Source
  • 2024-06-22 SSA reduced the past-relevant-work lookback from 15 to five years in the vocational rules governing steps four and five. No note here states the old 15-year limit. Source

Section 416.920 requires the Commissioner to determine disability through a five-step sequential evaluation addressing work, severity, listings, past relevant work, and other work based on the claimant’s age, education, and residual functional capacity.

Zayed v. Barnhart · filed 2003-08-21(a)

The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process in order to determine if an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The sequential evaluation ends if the ALJ, at any step of the process, finds that the claimant is not disabled. Id. The ALJ must inquire: 1) whether the claimant is working and the work is a substantial gainful activity, 2) whether the claimant’s impairment is severe, 3) whether the impairments meet or equal a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1, 4) whether the claimant is able to perform his past relevant work, and 5) whether the claimant’s age, education, and past relevant work experience in reference to his RFC, enables him to do other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f).
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe when it significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.

MATUSKOWITZ v. Barnhart · filed 2004-11-24(c)

An impairment is defined as severe when it significantly limits one’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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Section 416.920(e) requires the ALJ, when a severe impairment prevents resolution based on work activity or medical facts alone, to compare the claimant’s residual functional capacity with the demands of past work; if the claimant can still perform that work, the claimant is not disabled.

Norng v. Shalala · filed 1995-03-03(e)

“When evaluating whether a claimant is able to return to his past work, the ALJ is required to follow the appropriate guidelines. If we cannot make a decision based on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a severe impairment(s), we then review your residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.” Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e)).
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At Step Five, when a claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant can perform other substantial and gainful work based on age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity.

Saulsberry v. Chater · filed 1997-03-11(f)

When the claimant shows an inability to perform past relevant work, a prima facie case of disability is established and, for Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant, based on his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, can perform other substantial and gainful work. ... Accordingly, the Commissioner’s finding, in Step Five, that the plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity is not supported by substantial evidence.
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Subsection (d) requires the ALJ to determine whether a claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.

Makshanoff v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 1997-01-29(d)

The ALJ has a duty to make this determination 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
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Section 416.920 sets out a five-step sequential process for deciding whether a claimant is disabled, beginning with whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity.

Barbara J. STEVENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-01-21

The Commissioner follows a familiar five-step process in determining whether the claimant’s limitations meet this definition, inquiring: (1) whether the claimant is working and whether that work constitutes substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, one that significantly limits her physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or exceeds any of the particular impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which the Commissioner regards as conclusively disabling; (4) whether the claimant’s impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) whether her impairment prevents her from doing other types of work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Wolfe, 997 F.2d at 323.
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Section 416.920 establishes a sequential disability evaluation in which substantial gainful activity and severity are assessed first, followed by further steps including consideration of residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

Fricker v. DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERV. · filed 1992-10-05(b), (c), (f)

Thus, turning to the sequential evaluation, the first step is to determine whether the claimant is engaging in any "substantial gainful activity." If he or she is doing so, benefits are denied. 20 CFR § 416.920(b). However, if the claimant is not engaging in any substantial gainful activity, the decision-maker must proceed to step two, involving an evaluation of whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment. 20 CFR § 416.920(c). If the impairment is not severe, benefits are denied at this step and no further evaluation is necessary. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to step three. ... However, even if a claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, he or she may still be found disabled under steps four or five of the evaluation. Step four involves the determination of whether the claimant can engage in his or her past relevant work. 20 CFR § 415.920(e). If so, the claimant will not be found disabled. If, however, the claimant is found unable to engage in his or her past relevant work, the decision-maker moves to step five involving the determination of the claimant's residual functional capacity and his or her age, education and past work experience, in order to evaluate whether there are other jobs existing in the national economy that the claimant can perform. 20 CFR § 416.920(f).
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequential analysis.

Mazzoni v. State · filed 1997-01-10

Because the hearing officer failed to fully consider the sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1994), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step sequential evaluation for SSI disability claims, including denial at step two when the claimant lacks a medically severe impairment.

Zeytuntsyan v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary, Hhs · filed 1992-07-27(a), (b), (c)

To qualify for SSI disability benefits, a claimant must prove that he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (1991). The Secretary has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether a claimant is "disabled." 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f) (1991); see generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (explaining the five-step evaluation process); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir.1991) (same). At step one, disability benefits are denied if the Secretary determines that the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." § 416.920(b). At step two, the Secretary evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment "which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." § 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, the claimant is not considered to be disabled.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step inquiry for determining disability, including whether the claimant is employed, has a severe impairment, meets a listed impairment, can perform past relevant work, and can perform other work in the economy.

Ruth SCHROETER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1992-10-14(a)

Social Security regulations outline a five-step inquiry to be followed in determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)- This inquiry focuses on (1) whether the claimant is presently employed; (2) whether she has a severe impairment; (3) whether her impairment meets or equals one of the Secretary’s listed impairments; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy.
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Section 416.920 requires the adjudicator to follow a sequential evaluation and, after finding that an impairment does not automatically establish disability, consider whether the claimant can perform past or other work.

Ly v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-04-30(f)

In determining whether an individual meets this definition, the adjudicator follows a five-step procedure outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. ... Under the prescribed analysis, if the claimant fails to demonstrate an impairment of sufficient severity such that the claimant automatically qualifies as disabled, the adjudicator must then consider whether the impairment shown nonetheless prevents the claimant from performing her past work or other work in the national economy.
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Section 416.920(a) requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequence: work activity, severe impairment, listed impairment, past work, and other work.

William HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Etc., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1993-05-05(a)

In making his decision on Hunter’s claims, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation of disability set forth in the Secretary’s regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1992). Under the regulations, the ALJ must consider whether a claimant (1) is working, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment, (4) can return to his past work, and (5) if not, whether he can perform other work.
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Section 416.920 requires the Secretary to determine disability through a five-step sequential inquiry, including whether the claimant is employed, has a severe impairment, meets or equals a listed impairment, can perform past work, and can perform other work in the national economy.

Safranski v. Shalala · filed 1993-11-17(a)

Social Security regulations outline a five-step inquiry to be followed in determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). The Secretary must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether she has a severe impairment; (3) whether her impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national economy.
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Section 416.920 sets out a five-step sequential evaluation for determining disability, including whether the claimant can perform past or other work.

Edlin v. DEPT. OF H & R SERVICES · filed 1994-03-24

Evaluation of a disability claim involves use of a five step sequence derived from 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, and basically entails answering the following questions: ... (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy? ... In this case, as in Fricker v. HRS, 606 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) and Walker v. HRS, 533 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), the hearing officer did not apply the five step sequential evaluation clearly and in sufficient detail to enable us to review the order. ... In the absence of the hearing officer's detailed evaluation of the criteria and questions under the cited regulations, we are unable to provide adequate appellate review of that decision.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step sequential process for determining disability, ending review when a claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step.

Raymond CORRAO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-04-07(a), (c), (d)

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Secretary follows 'a five-step sequential evaluation process. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1993); Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.1990). First, the Secretary must determine whether the claimant is currently performing “substantial gainful activity”; if so, the claimant will be found not disabled “regardless of [his] medical condition or [his] age, education, and work experience.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a) & (b) (1993). If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, the Secretary will determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment. If there is no severe impairment, the Secretary will find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) (1993). If the claimant has an impairment that meets or is equivalent to an impairment listed in the regulations, the claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d) (1993). If the claimant does not have such a listed impairment, the Secretary considers whether the impairment, when considered along with other factors, prevents the claimant from doing past work. The Secretary finally considers whether the claimant can perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e) & (f) (1993). If the Secretary finds that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in this process, the review process is terminated. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1993).
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Section 416.920 uses a five-step disability evaluation and requires a finding of no disability at step two when the claimant has no impairment that significantly limits basic work activities.

Chevalier v. Shalala · filed 1994-12-05(c)

A five step process is to be employed to determine whether the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. If it is determined at any step that the claimant is not disabled, then further review is not necessary. ... Step two specifically provides: You must have a severe impairment. If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520.
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Section 416.920 sets out a five-step sequential evaluation used to determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.

Scordas v. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH · filed 1995-01-31

The findings and conclusions in the final order of the hearings officer are inadequate for a reviewing court to determine whether the order is supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record, whether the hearings officer properly considered the combined impairments of the appellant or whether the hearings officer correctly applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
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Section 416.920(e) requires evaluation of residual functional capacity and vocational factors after no listed impairment is found, and § 416.920(f) governs the resulting determination whether the claimant can perform other work.

Martinez v. Shalala · filed 1996-01-19(e), (f)

Having not found a disability in the severity of the impairment based upon medi*42cal evidence alone, the ALJ proceeded to the next step of analysis and evaluated Ms. Martinez’s residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); Goodermote v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir.1982). ... The ALJ found that Ms. Martinez has no non-exertional limitations that erode the job base analyzed by the grid. This Court affirms that finding and, accordingly, finds that the plaintiff was not disabled beginning January 21,1992, and continuing through the date of this decision, within the meaning of the Social Security Act and for purposes of receiving Title XVI disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).
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Section 416.920 provides that a claimant is found not disabled if the claimant is engaged in, or can engage in, substantial gainful activity.

Dotson v. Sullivan · filed 1992-07-01

Thus, if a claimant is engaged, or can engage, in substantial gainful activity, he will be found to be not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Substantial gainful activity is in turn defined as work which requires significant physical or mental activities and is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972.
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Section 416.920 makes current substantial gainful activity the first step in evaluating a disability claim; if the claimant is engaged in it, the claim ends without considering impairment severity.

Jimmie L. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-04-07

The first is a determination whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is, his claim is rejected without consideration of the severity of his mental or physical impairment or how disabling the impairment is. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
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Section 416.920(b) makes the first step of the SSI disability evaluation whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful employment; if so, the inquiry is satisfied.

Robinson v. Shalala · filed 1994-09-29(b)

The Act and its implementing regulations are very specific regarding the evaluative process to be applied by the Secretary in determining entitlement to SSI benefits. The first step of five in the evaluative process is to determine whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the answer is yes, the inquiry is satisfied. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D); see also, Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451, 1453. ... Based on this record, the Court finds that a reasonable mind could have concluded that the Plaintiff was engaged in substantial gainful employment.
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Section 416.920 makes a claimant ineligible for SSI at the first step if the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, including qualifying illegal activity.

Dotson v. Shalala · filed 1993-08-02(a)-(b)

Pursuant to statutory authority, the Secretary has promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential analysis for determining whether an SSI claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525, 110 S.Ct. 885, 888, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990).1 The first step of the process, and the only one relevant for purposes of this appeal, requires the Secretary to determine whether the claimant is engaging in SGA. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.-920(a). A finding of SGA means that the claimant is ineligible for SSI benefits. Id. at § 416.920(b); Yuekert, 482 U.S. at 140, 107 *575S.Ct. at 2290.
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At the first step of the disability evaluation, a claimant who is performing substantial gainful activity is found not disabled regardless of medical condition, age, education, or work experience.

Byington v. Chater · filed 1996-02-09(a)

First, the Secretary must determine whether the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant will be found not disabled “regardless of [his] medical condition or [his] age, education, and work experience.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a) & (b) (1993). Here, the Secretary and the ALJ found that Byington was engaged in substantial gainful activity and therefore did not complete the five-step evaluation process.
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Section 416.920 requires the agency to determine at the first step whether a claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity and, if so, reject the claim without considering the claimant’s medical condition.

Melinda BELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-10-17(a) (b)

The first step is a determination whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). If she is, her claim is rejected without consideration of her medical condition. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a),(b).
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Section 416.920(e) requires the ALJ to compare the claimant’s residual functional capacity with the physical and mental demands of past relevant work to determine whether the claimant can still perform it.

Halpin v. Sullivan · filed 1992-10-05(e)

In determining whether a claimant is able to return to his past relevant work, the ALJ is required to review the claimant's residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work that the claimant performed in the past. This requires a careful evaluation of the functions performed in the past job and a determination of whether the claimant can still perform the necessary functions in a significant way. Gunnels v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir.1989) (in determining whether claimant can return to past relevant work, the ALJ has the duty to ascertain the demands of past work in order to compare the claimant's present physical capabilities to those demands); Mitchell v. Schweiker, 551 F.Supp. 1084, 1087 (W.D.Mo.1982); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e).
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Section 416.920(e) provides that a claimant who can perform work done in the past is not disabled.

Myers v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-07-15(e)

(4) A person who is able to perform work he has done in the past is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). ... After a thorough review of the medical records and testimony, the Court does find substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's findings that Myers impairment does not prevent him from performing his past relevant work.
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Section 416.920(e) requires the agency to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity and past relevant work only when the claim has not already been resolved by an earlier step; substantial gainful activity can end the sequential evaluation without that inquiry.

Speaks v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1994-03-31(e)

Under the regulations, the fact that plaintiff had previously been working at anything, legal or illegal, that constituted “substantial gainful activity” automatically disqualified her from receiving SSI benefits. ... Accordingly, there is no basis for remanding this case for further proceedings before the ALJ. Even if plaintiff established that she was incapable of earning a living any other way, the record is more than adequate to show that she was engaged in an activity, albeit illegal, that constituted “substantial gainful activity” within the meaning of the Social Security regulations.
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At step four, § 416.920(e) assesses a claimant's physical and mental ability to perform past relevant work, without considering whether that work remains available.

James E. PASS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-09-25(e)

We conclude from an examination of the Social Security statutory and regulatory scheme, as well as the relevant rulings issued by the Social Security Administration, that disability determinations at step four of the five-step inquiry under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 must focus on the physical and mental capabilities of the claimant, rather than on the availability of employment. The question of whether past work continues to exist is therefore not relevant at step four of the disability inquiry under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
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Section 416.920(e) permits an ALJ to find a claimant capable of past relevant work when the claimant retains the ability to perform the occupation's functional demands and duties as generally required in the national economy.

Inez One Star v. Shirley S. Chater, in Her Capacity as Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 1996-03-05(e)

The regulations provide, however, that the ALJ may find the claimant able to perform past relevant work if the claimant retains the ability to perform the "functional demands and job duties of the occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national economy." See Martin v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting Social Security Ruling 82-61); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e).
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Section 416.920(e) provides that a claimant is not disabled at the past-relevant-work step when the claimant's residual functional capacity permits performance of past relevant work, and vocational-expert testimony is not required at that step unless the claimant cannot perform that work.

De La Vega v. Shirley S. Chater, Secretary, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1996-12-16(e)

A claimant will not be found disabled if he or she has sufficient residual functional capability to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e). ... The ALJ found De La Vega not disabled based on her ability to perform her past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The testimony of a vocational expert may be required only after the claimant has been found incapable of performing her past relevant work. ... The ALJ was not required to call a vocational expert at this step in the Social Security disability determination.
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Section 416.920(d) makes an impairment automatically qualifying for disability benefits only when it satisfies the applicable listing requirements.

Williams v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-07-09(d)

The Secretary has established a list of impairments that automatically meet the statutory criteria and thus make an individual eligible for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 12.00-13.00. Somato-form disorder is on the “automatic” list only if the disorder produces symptoms which meet the “listing requirements.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
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At step four, an impairment that meets the duration requirement and meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 establishes disability without considering age, education, or work experience.

Parker v. Wright · filed 1994-06-10(d)

The Department determined that Parker did not have an impairment as listed in Appendix 1 of the SSA regulations and that she did not suffer from an impairment equal to a listed impairment. Because the Department concluded that plaintiff was not working and did not suffer from an impairment as specified under sections 416.920(c) and (d), the Department continued with a consideration of section 416.920(f). Although the analysis utilized in determining eligibility for assistance did not follow the literal sequence of section 416.920, the Department did utilize the significant factors of section 416.920 in its analysis, such that a different result would not have resulted had the exact sequential analysis been followed.
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Sections 416.920(c) and (d) require consideration of combined impairments at step two and when determining at step three whether the claimant meets or equals a listed impairment.

Lillie DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1993-03-09(c), (d)

In sequential evaluation step two, the Secretary determines whether a claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments that causes more than a minimal limitation on a claimant’s ability to function. ... In sequential evaluation step three, the Secretary determines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or equals a disability described in the Listing of Impairments, which describes impairments that are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity. ... Hence, the plain language of the regulations makes it clear that the Secretary must consider the combined effect of a claimant’s alleged impairments in sequential evaluation step two. ... Thus, we must determine only whether the regulations require the Secretary to consider impairments in combination in sequential evaluation step three where the Secretary has found one “severe” impairment in step two. We now hold that the regulations require the Secretary to consider the combined impact of a claimant’s impairments when determining whether the claimant meets or equals the second requirement under section 12.05(C) of the Listing of Impairments, which is defined in terms of functional criteria.
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Section 416.920 places the burden on the claimant to establish a listed impairment and satisfy the duration requirement, then shifts the burden to the Secretary to show the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity once the claimant cannot perform past relevant work.

Roberts v. Shalala · filed 1995-09-14(d), (f)

This burden requires the claimant to make out a case both that she has an impairment listed in the regulations, and that she has met the duration requirement. ... Once a claimant shows that she cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can engage in other substantial gainful activity.
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Section 416.920(d) provides that satisfying the requirements of a listed impairment establishes presumptive disability.

Hamilton v. Chater · filed 1996-10-08(d)

If a claimant satisfies the requirements of any listed impairment, the claimant is presumptively disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
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Section 416.920(a) requires the factfinder to determine disability through a five-step sequential evaluation, including consideration of current work, severity, listed impairments, past work, and other work in the national economy.

Riggins v. Shalala · filed 1995-02-27(a)

Social Security regulations require the factfinder to follow a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). The Seventh Circuit has summarized the test as follows: The Secretary must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether she has a severe impairment; (3) whether her impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national economy. Once the claimant has satisfied Steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her past work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform some other job.
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Section 416.920 sets out a five-step sequential test for disability, with affirmative answers advancing the inquiry or producing a disability finding at steps 3 and 5, while a negative answer generally ends the inquiry.

Logan v. Shalala · filed 1995-03-30

That factual determination is made using a five-step test. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The steps are examined in order as follows: 1. Is the Plaintiff presently unemployed? 2. Is the Plaintiff’s impairment “severe?” 3. Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specified impairments? 4. Is the Plaintiff unable to perform his former occupation? 5. Is the Plaintiff unable to perform any other work within the national economy? An affirmative answer at any step leads either to the next step, or on steps 3 and 5 to a finding that the Plaintiff is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the Plaintiff is not disabled.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step sequential process for determining disability, with the burden shifting to the Secretary to show other available substantial gainful work once the claimant proves inability to perform past relevant work.

Raymond E. ANDREWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-05-01

The Secretary has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. ... 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement to disability benefits. ... If, as in this case, the claimant shows that he is unable to perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.
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The sequential evaluation process places the burden of proof and production on the claimant through the fourth step, which determines whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Trivette v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1996-12-24

Under the sequential evaluation process set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1996), the claimant bears the burden of proof and production through the fourth step of that process: determining whether the claimant is disabled from her past relevant work.
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At step two, the claimant must make at least a minimal showing that an impairment significantly affects the ability to perform basic work activities.

Pham v. Chater · filed 1996-08-23(c)

Although the severity determination at step two requires claimant to make only a minimal showing of an impairment that significantly affects her ability to perform basic work activities, see Williams, 844 F.2d at 751, the record supports the Secretary’s determination that claimant failed to make such a showing in this case.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step process for determining disability eligibility, with the Secretary bearing the burden at step five to show that jobs are available to the claimant considering her residual functional capacity and other factors.

Johnson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-02-01

Substantial evidence exists to support the Secretary's decision. Initially, it is clarified that the Secretary's decision denying benefits was reached at the fifth step of the five-step approach for determining eligibility for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The first four steps are not in issue, i.e., Johnson is not gainfully employed, she is severely impaired, but her impairments do not meet or equal the severity criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and she has no past relevant work experience. At the fifth step, it is the Secretary's burden to show that alternate jobs are available to the claimant in the economy, considering her RFC and other factors.
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Section 416.920, including subsection (b), requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step procedure; after the claimant establishes the threshold requirements through the first four steps, the burden shifts to the government to show that other substantial gainful work exists in the national economy.

Jim ERICKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1993-11-16(b)

HHS regulations require that disability claims be evaluated according to a five-step procedure. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b) to 416.920(f) (1993). In steps one through four, the claimant must demonstrate that he has a severe impairment and that he cannot perform his previous job. Here, the ALJ properly found that Erickson had a severe impairment and that his illness was sufficiently serious as to prevent him from performing his previous job.
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Section 416.920(a) requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled.

Jabczynski v. Shalala · filed 1995-03-31(a)

Social Security regulations require the factfinder to follow a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f).
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Under § 416.920(c), an impairment is severe only if it imposes more than a minimal restriction on a person's ability to engage in basic work activities.

Torres v. Shalala · filed 1996-09-09(c)

To be "severe” an impairment must impose more than a minimal restriction on a person's ability to engage in basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c); Social Security Ruling 88-3c.
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Section 416.920(c) prohibits considering a claimant's age, education, and work experience when determining impairment severity at the initial stage.

Asher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-06-25(c)

The regulations prohibit consideration of a claimant's age, education and work experience in determining severity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). However, this section simply prohibits balancing the severity of an impairment against positive vocational factors, such as youth, to support a finding that the claimant is not disabled at the initial stages of the analysis.
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Section 416.920(f) places the step-five burden on the Secretary to show that a claimant can perform other work, considering residual functional capacity and vocational factors, and requires additional evidence when the grids cannot conclusively establish disability.

Noel v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-07-01(f)

At step five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to establish that the claimant can do other work, considering his residual functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and past work experience. ... However, she cannot rely on the grids conclusively unless the claimant can perform the full range of work at an RFC level on a daily basis and possesses the physical ability to perform most of the jobs in that range. ... Reliance on the grids is inappropriate if nonexertional impairments further limit the range of jobs available to the claimant. ... Absent evidence that plaintiff, despite his impairments, could perform the full range of medium work and qualified for most of the jobs in that RFC category, the Secretary was required to produce expert vocational testimony or other evidence to establish the existence of significant work that plaintiff can perform.
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Section 416.920(d) requires the agency to determine at step three whether a claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; if it does, the claimant is deemed disabled.

Davis v. Shalala · filed 1994-08-30(d)

Under step “three” of the controlling regulations, the Secretary determines whether ... the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, set forth in Appendix 1 of Subpt. P, 20 C.F.R. Part 404 (“the Listing of Impairments”), which are deemed so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity in the future, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s condition, ... or ... combination of conditions, meets or equals the criteria of a Listing, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled, and is therefore entitled to Social Security Benefits without further inquiry.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step disability evaluation that ends when the claimant is found not disabled; at step one, actual engagement in substantial gainful activity means the claimant is not disabled.

Manning v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1992-10-22(a) (b)

The Secretary's regulations promulgated under the Act set forth a five-step process for evaluating whether a person is disabled. See Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir.1988) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920). If at any point in this process the Secretary finds that the person is not disabled, the evaluation ends. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)). At the first step, the Secretary will find that a person is not disabled if she is actually engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Thus, if the Secretary finds that the claimant is actually engaged in substantial gainful activity, any inquiry into her capacity to engage in substantial gainful activity is irrelevant. See Reyes, 845 F.2d at 243. A person who actually engages in substantially gainful activity is not disabled.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step process for evaluating disability claims, including whether a claimant can perform past or other work based on residual functional capacity and vocational factors.

Clauer v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services · filed 1992-12-03

Evaluating a disability claim involves a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Those steps include determining: (1) whether the claimant is working; (2) whether the claimant has impairments that significantly limit his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities; (3) if the claimant satisfies step (2), whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal the "listed impairments," defined as those the Social Security Administration deems so severe that disability is conclusively presumed; (4) if disability is not established under step (3), whether the claimant can return to work performed in the past; and (5) if claimant cannot return to work performed in the past, whether the claimant can perform other work available in the national economy in view of the claimant's RFC, age, education and experience.
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20 C.F.R. § 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated under a five-step procedure.

Bocanegra v. Shalala · filed 1995-05-15

Pertinent regulations require that disability claims be evaluated according to a 5-step procedure. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b) to 416.920(f).
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Section 416.920(a) requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequence, including consideration of other work when the claimant cannot perform past relevant work.

Rivera v. Chater · filed 1996-09-30(a)

Finally, if the claimant is found to be unable to perform his past work than the Commissioner considers whether there is other work the claimant could perform. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir.1982).
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Section 416.920 provides a five-step sequential evaluation for determining whether a claimant is disabled.

Taylor v. Callahan · filed 1997-06-24

The Social Security Administration follows a five step sequential evaluation when determining whether a claimant is disabled.
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to proceed through a five-step sequential analysis, and the steps may not be improperly compressed; an incomplete articulation of each step does not require remand when the record shows the required analysis and no prejudice.

Pratt v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 96-6490 (1998) · filed 1998-02-10

Contrary to the applicant's position, the Hearing Officer here did not terminate the disability inquiry at step two while simultaneously making step five findings so as to import step five of the sequential analysis into step two.3 He instead premised his decision on a five-step analysis, albeit without clearly making specific findings as to each step of the analysis. ... Similarly, in the case at bar, the record establishes that DHS met its step five burden of proving that the applicant is capable of performing sedentary-type work which exists in the economy given his residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience. While it would have been preferable for the Hearing Officer to more clearly delineate his findings as to each tier of the five-step disability analysis, his failure to do so on the state of this record does not constitute legal error warranting a reversal or remand, nor did it prejudice the applicant.
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Section 416.920(a) provides a five-step sequential inquiry for deciding whether a claimant is disabled, with the steps addressed in order.

Griffith v. John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 1998-03-11(a)

The regulations to the Act provide for a five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f) (1995). The five steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimant presently employed? (2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant able to perform her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant able to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f).
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Section 416.920(d) requires a claimant's impairment to meet the duration requirement and be listed or equal a listed impairment for disability at that step.

Nevers v. Callahan · filed 1997-07-03(d)

Section 416.920(d) of the regulations states that a claimant will be found to be disabled if she has an impairment “which meets the duration requirement and is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s) . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d) (emphasis added).
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Section 416.920(d) requires a finding of disability when an impairment meets the duration requirement and meets or equals a listed impairment, without considering age, education, or work experience.

Pamela CLARK, Appellant, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Appellee · filed 1998-06-19(d)

The third step provides that “[i]f you have an impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement and is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we will find you disabled without considering your age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
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Section 416.920 requires the agency to use a five-step analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.

Gagliardi v. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1997-05-07

HRS is required to follow a five-step analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 in making a determination of whether a claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.
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Section 416.920 requires the step-three disability analysis to evaluate whether the claimant's impairments, considered in combination, satisfy the applicable impairment listing.

Snyder v. FLORIDA DEPT. OF CHILDREN · filed 1998-02-23

On remand, the hearing officer shall issue an order evaluating whether a combination of the appellant's impairments satisfies her burden under step three of the analysis of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
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Section 416.920 requires a five-step sequential evaluation of disability: substantial gainful activity, severe impairment, listed impairment, past relevant work, and other work.

Anderson v. Callahan · filed 1997-10-09(b)-(f)

The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520. First, the claimant cannot be engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The Social Security Act defines “severe impairment” as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities ...” Id. If the ALJ “ ‘is unable to determine clearly the effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on the individual’s ability to do basic work activities, the sequential evaluation process should not end with the not severe evaluation step. Rather, it should be continued.” ’ Householder v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 191, 192 n. 1 (8th Cir.1988) (quoting Social Security Ruling 85-28). Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment which meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d) and Part 404, Sub-part P, Appendix 1. If the claimant meets this requirement, then the claimant is per se disabled. Id. Fourth, the impairment must prevent claimant from doing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 404.1520(e). The ALJ will “review [claimant’s] residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work [claimant has] done in the past.” Id. Fifth, the impairment must prevent claimant from doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(f), 404.1520(f). If claimant meets these standards, the ALJ will find the claimant to be disabled.
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At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period.

Pippins v. Callahan · filed 1997-05-30(b)

The first step, and the only one relevant here, requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period.
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Section 416.920(b) treats engagement in substantial gainful activity as disqualifying a claimant from being considered disabled, regardless of whether the activity is illegal.

Charleston v. John J. Callahan, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1997-10-31(b)

A person is riot disabled if he is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). This determination is made without reference to whether the activity is illegal.
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Section 416.920(b) requires a claimant who is performing substantial gainful activity to be found not disabled regardless of the claimant's medical condition.

Hardaway v. Kenneth S. Arpel, Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1998-01-15(b)

Once a claimant is found to be performing substantial gainful activity, he must be found not disabled "regardless of [his] medical condition." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
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At step four, § 416.920(e) requires determining the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work and whether the claimant still has the capacity to meet those demands.

Acosta v. Apfel · filed 1998-01-27(e)

When the ALJ reaches step four of the evaluation process, as he did here, he must determine the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s “past relevant work” and whether the claimant still has the capacity to meet those demands.
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Section 416.920(e) requires a finding of not disabled when a claimant can still perform past relevant work, while § 416.920(f)(1) applies at the later step after the claimant cannot perform that work and the burden shifts to the Commissioner.

Melville v. Apfel · filed 1998-06-04(e), (f)(1)

The regulations clearly provide that if a claimant can still perform her past relevant work, the Commissioner will find that she is not disabled. ... However, this regulation, entitled “Your work experience as a vocational factor,” is triggered at a later step in the five-step analysis — after the ALJ has determined that a claimant cannot perform her past relevant work because of her physical impairment and after the burden has shifted to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is capable of performing “any other work.”
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At this step of the disability evaluation, age, education, and work experience are not considered.

Akbar-Afzali v. Callahan · filed 1997-05-05(c)

The regulations are clear that at this step in the evaluation a plaintiff's "age, education, and work experience” are not considered. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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At step five, once a claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the agency to show that other work exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

Bonner v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1997-08-19(f)

Once the determination was made that Ms. Bonner’s impairments prevent her from doing past relevant work, a prima facie case of disability was established and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to HRS, at step five, to show that there is other work available in the national economy which Ms. Bonner can perform.
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At the severe-impairment step, the ALJ must identify which of the claimant’s impairments are considered severe so the court can meaningfully review the decision.

Haines v. Apfel · filed 1997-12-29(e)

In order for the Court to make a meaningful review, it is necessary to know which of Plaintiffs impairments the ALJ considered to be severe impairments, within the meaning of the “severe impairment” regulation found at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e).
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Section 416.920 requires the Commissioner to determine disability through a five-step sequential evaluation, including whether the claimant can perform other work.

Koenig v. Apfel · filed 1999-08-17(f)

To determine whether a claimant is under a disability, the Commissioner applies a five-step sequential evaluation: (1) whether the claimant is currently working; (2) whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the relevant regulation; (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from continuing his past relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any kind of work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1996).
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At step two, an impairment is severe when it significantly limits the claimant’s ability to perform basic work-related activities, so the sequential evaluation cannot end there when the evidence shows such limitations.

Gilbert v. Apfel · filed 1999-04-13(c)

Although our focus here is on step two, the severe impairment inquiry, the vocational expert’s answers to the ALJ’s hypothetical questions are strong evidence that Ms. Gilbert’s impairments are indeed severe -- the impairments not only “significantly limit her ability to perform basic work-related activities,” the test for severity; in the vocational expert’s opinion, they preclude Ms. Gilbert from working altogether.
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At step two, § 416.920(c) requires a claimant to show that a medically determinable impairment or combination significantly limits the ability to perform basic work activities; vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience are not considered.

Colavito v. Apfel · filed 1999-10-21(c)

The step two severity determination is based solely on medical factors affecting a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities, and does not include consideration of vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience, Id. at 141, 107 S.Ct. 2287 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c)).
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At step five, the regulation requires the ALJ to determine whether, considering age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform work available in significant numbers in the national economy.

Townsend v. Apfel · filed 1999-04-27(f)

Step five requires the ALJ to determine if, considering age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform work available in significant numbers in the national economy.
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At step five, the Commissioner must establish disability status in light of the claimant’s age, education, and residual functional capacity; here, the Commissioner failed to satisfy that step because the evidence showed that no suitable jobs existed.

Stevenson v. Apfel · filed 1999-10-29(f)

Based on this testimony, and the fact that the term “fair,” as defined by the medical assessment form, clearly implies an unsatisfactory ability, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner has failed to satisfy step five (5) of the sequential evaluation and that Plaintiff is disabled.
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Section 416.920(b) provides that a person who is engaging in substantial gainful activity cannot be found disabled, regardless of medical condition, age, education, or work experience.

Alves v. Apfel · filed 1998-09-17(b)

The regulations provide that an individual who is engaging in substantial gainful activities cannot be found disabled, regardless of his medical condition, age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
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Section 416.920(b) requires the disability evaluation to end at step one, without considering medical impairments, when the claimant is engaging in substantial work activity.

Washington v. Apfel · filed 1999-07-23(b)

Under step one, if the Commissioner determines that an individual is engaging in substantial work activity, then that individual’s claim is rejected without consideration of his mental or physical impairments.
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At step one, a claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity is not considered disabled, and the claim is rejected without considering mental or physical impairments.

Smith v. Apfel · filed 1999-11-24(b)

Under step one, if the Commissioner determines that an individual is engaging in substantial gainful activity, then that individual’s claim is rejected without consideration of his mental or physical impairments.
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Section 416.920(e)'s past-relevant-work inquiry can be conclusively established by a prior binding determination, barring relitigation of whether foreign work qualifies as past relevant work.

Azami v. Apfel · filed 1998-10-15(e)

Those prior, binding determinations subsume the finding that plaintiffs past work was substantial, gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.971-416.975. Plaintiff is, accordingly, barred from relitigating the issue of whether his work in Afghanistan qualifies as “past relevant work.”
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At step four, prior work is relevant only if it was substantial gainful activity, which must be assessed by considering the claimant’s duties, performance, the work’s value to the employer, and whether income was tied to productivity.

Melville v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1999-12-20(e)

In sum, as we read the above SSRs and regulations, step four of the sequential process requires an inquiry into the claimant’s ability to do her “past relevant work”; a claimant’s past work experience, especially part-time work, is not “relevant” unless, inter alia, it was “substantial gainful activity”; and a proper assessment of whether past work was substantial gainful activity requires evaluation of, inter alia, how well the claimant performed her duties, whether those duties were minimal and made little or no demand on her, what her work was worth to the employer, and whether her income was tied to her productivity.
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Section 416.920(f) places the step-five burden on the Commissioner to show that a claimant who cannot perform past relevant work can perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, accounting for the claimant’s limitations.

Martinez v. Apfel · filed 1998-08-26(f)

The Commissioner requires a five-step review within the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 to determine whether the claimant is disabled under the Act. ... At step five, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience, the claimant can perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy.
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At step five, § 416.920(f) permits the ALJ to use the medical-vocational grid when the claimant has only exertional impairments, and exclusive grid reliance remains proper when nonexertional impairments do not significantly narrow the available work.

Roman v. Apfel · filed 1998-09-09(f)

If the claimant exhibits only exer-tional impairments, the ALJ can determine whether he is disabled by consulting the grid. ... Where a claimant is unable to perform the full range of sedentary work because of exer-tional and nonexertional impairments, reliance on the grid as the exclusive framework for making a disability determination is inappropriate. ... If the ALJ determines, however, that a claimant’s nonexertional impairments do not preclude him from performing the full range of sedentary work, he may rely exclusively on the grid. ... The court concludes that the ALJ properly relied on the grid to reach a finding that plaintiff was not disabled.
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be decided through a five-step evaluation process.

Ruiz v. Apfel · filed 1998-09-09

Determining whether a claimant is disabled requires a five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
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Section 416.920 sets out a five-step disability evaluation process and, at step five, requires the Commissioner to prove both the claimant’s residual functional capacity for other work and that suitable jobs exist in substantial numbers.

Scott v. Apfel · filed 2000-03-30

In keeping with administrative regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly summarized the five-step disability evaluation process as follows: ... [The Commissioner] determines: ... (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. ... This court finds, however, that Eighth Circuit precedent clearly establishes that the Commissioner’s burden at the fifth step of the disability analysis is “two-fold”: Once a claimant demonstrates that he or she is unable to do past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to prove, first, by medical evidence, that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work, and, second, that other jobs exist in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to do.
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Section 416.920 requires a five-step sequential evaluation of disability claims: current work, severe impairment, listed impairment, past work, and other work.

Gonzalez v. Apfel · filed 1998-09-22(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

Determining whether a claimant is disabled requires a five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. First, the court must determine whether the claimant is currently working. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.910(b), 416.972(b). If the claimant is currently employed, the claim is disallowed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the claimant is not working, as a second step, the agency must make a finding as to the existence of a severe mental or physical impairment; if none exists, the claim is denied. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Once the claimant is found to have a severe impairment, the third step is to compare the claimant’s impairment with those in appendix 1 of the regulations [the “Listings”]. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments in the Listings, the claimant is automatically considered disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir.1982). If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the listed impairments, as a fourth step, he will have to show that he cannot perform his former work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his former work, he must show, as a fifth and final step, that he is prevented from doing any other work. A claimant is entitled to receive disability benefits only if he cannot perform any alternate gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequence: current work, severity, listed impairment, past work, and other work considering residual functional capacity.

Betancourt v. Apfel · filed 1998-10-05(b)

That factual determination is made by using a five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The five-step process is as follows: (1) is the claimant presently unemployed; (2) is the claimant’s impairment “severe”; (3) does the impairment méet or equal one of the specified impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) is the claimant unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) does the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience, in reference to the residual functional capacity, enable her to do other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(f). An affirmative answer at any step leads either to the next step of the test, or, if at the third and fifth step, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir.1984). Other than at step three, a negative answer leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled. Id.
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Section 416.920 requires an ALJ to follow a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled.

Arensman v. Apfel · filed 1999-01-13(b)-(f)

In order to determine whether a claimant is under a disability, the ALJ must follow the five step's set forth in Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir.1988).
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequential analysis, and the agency's application must include sufficient findings and rationale for appellate review.

Howson v. Dept. of Children and Families · filed 1999-08-27

The Department utilizes the five-step analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 to determine whether the claimant is disabled and thus entitled to benefits under the Medically Needy Program. ... The summary conclusions of steps three, four and five are insufficient for our review. In step three, the hearing officer merely states that Howson's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment, either individually or in combination. There is no reference to any factual findings, any evidence in the record, or any rationale for rejecting her claim that she was disabled. Steps four and five do not contain any findings or discussion about Howson's specific impairments other than the fact that she is an attorney, which is considered to be sedentary work. There is also no discussion or analysis as to the jobs Howson could have performed given her condition during the applicable time period.
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to proceed through a five-part inquiry; it does not add a sixth step for determining the materiality of drug or alcohol addiction.

Brown v. Apfel · filed 1999-10-07(b)

Second, the regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 mandate the five part inquiry. Any addition of a sixth step would have to amend these regulations, something that the CAAA did not do.
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Section 416.920(b)-(f) requires a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled, including whether the claimant is working, has a severe impairment, meets a listing, can perform past work, and can perform other work.

Smith v. Apfel · filed 1999-11-02(b)-(f)

The five-step process asks the following questions: (1) is the claimant presently unemployed; (2) is the claimant’s impairment “severe”; (3) does the impairment meet or equal one of the list of specified impairments (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1); (4) is the claimant unable to perform his past relevant work; and (5) does the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience, in reference to the residual functional capacity, preclude him from doing other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(f).
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At step two, an impairment is severe only if it significantly limits a person's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

Bailey v. Apfel · filed 1998-12-08(c)

In order to demonstrate at step two that an impairment is severe, plaintiff must show that it “significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated in the prescribed sequence, but the agency may stop once a step resolves whether the claimant is disabled.

David v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 00-1046 (2001) · filed 2001-01-24

The DHS is obligated to follow a "set order" of steps when evaluating a disability claim.
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Section 416.920(f) requires the ALJ at step five to determine whether, given the claimant’s established limitations, a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

Egas v. Massanari · filed 2001-07-06(f)

The hypothetical question presented to the vocational expert accurately described Egas’ limitations as found by the ALJ. ... The vocational expert accounted for this impairment by considering a hypothetical person who was “limit[ed] to work processes that are simple and repetitive in nature [and] do not involve unusual stress.” ... Moreover, the ALJ made no finding — and the medical evidence did not support a finding — that there was a marked limitation in Egas’ ability to use public transportation or travel to unfamiliar places. ... In sum, the ALJ posed an accurate hypothetical to the vocational expert and we decline Egas’ invitation to re-evaluate the vocational expert’s testimony that a significant number of jobs exist in the Chicago metropolitan area which Egas could perform given the limitations found by the ALJ. Therefore, the ALJ’s determination at step five was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
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Section 416.920 requires a five-step sequential evaluation of disability, with Step 5 asking whether, considering age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the impairment prevents the claimant from doing other work in the national economy.

Rodriguez v. R.I. D.H.S., 00-3586 (2001) · filed 2001-10-09

The federal guidelines set forth a five step sequential evaluation to determine whether an individual is disabled: 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial activity? 2. If not, is the impairment severe? 3. If severe, does it meet or equal an impairment list in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) regulations? 4. If it does not meet or equal SSI regulations, does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work? 5. Considering age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, does the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing other work in the national economy? See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see also Brown v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1987).
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated in a set five-step sequence, and the inquiry ends once a claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step.

Melendez v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 98-2458 (1999) · filed 1999-08-05

DHS is obligated to follow a "set order" of steps when evaluating a disability claim. See C.F.R. § 416.920. In doing so, the inquiry may end before all the steps are applied. "If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at any point in the review, we do not review your claim further." Id.
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Section 416.920 requires the ALJ to use a sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled, including evaluating current work, the severity and listed-equivalence of the impairment, past relevant work, and the ability to perform other work considering the claimant's vocational factors.

Vincent v. Apfel · filed 2001-08-30

The ALJ must apply a sequential analysis to determine if a claimant is disabled, specifically, whether the claimant is not currently working and has a severe impairment; whether this impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; if not, whether the impairment prevents the claimant from returning to his past relevant work; and if so, whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing other work in light of his age, education, and past work experience.
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Section 416.920 requires denial of disability benefits when a claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity and treats a non-severe impairment as insufficient to establish disability.

Cornn v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2001-03-20(b) (c)

If the claimant is working and the work constitutes substantial gainful activity, benefits are automatically denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the claimant is not found to have an impairment which significantly limits his or her ability to work (a severe impairment), then he or she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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Sections 416.920(c) and (d) require a claimant to establish that the impairment meets the criteria for a listed impairment at the listing step of the disability analysis.

Deckard v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2000-06-12(c) and (d)

The medical record does not support Deckard’s claim of a listed impairment because she does not suffer from “marked limitation of motion” and did not require “a series of staged surgical procedures.”
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Section 416.920(f) requires the step-five disability determination to account for all exertional and nonexertional limitations, including medication effects, before deciding whether the claimant can perform other work.

Francois v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2001-03-29(f)

The regulations include a five-step evaluation process for determining whether an impairment prevents a person from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. ... The five-step inquiry terminates if the Commissioner finds at any step that the claimant is or is not disabled. ... Because the Court has concluded that the ALJ’s findings with respect to the claimant’s experience of adverse side effects associated with her prescription drug medications and with respect to the claimant’s credibility lacked an important predicate, the Court must likewise conclude that exclusive reliance on the “Grid Rules” was inappropriate. Whether exertional or nonexertional, the limiting effects, if any, in connection with the claimant’s medical treatment/prescription drug therapy were not considered at step five of the analysis.
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step process addressing substantial gainful activity, severity, listed impairments, past relevant work, and other work.

Kovach v. Apfel · filed 2000-09-28(b), (c), (d), (e), (f)

Under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1529. First, the claimant cannot be engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The Social Security Act defines "severe impairment" as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities...." Id. Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment which meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d) and Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the claimant meets this requirement, then the claimant is per se disabled. Id. Fourth, the impairment must prevent claimant from doing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 404.1520(e). The ALJ will "review [claimants]' residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work [claimant] [has] done in the past." Id. Fifth, the impairment must prevent claimant from doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(f), 416.1520(f). If claimant meets these standards, the ALJ will find the claimant to be disabled.
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Section 416.920 requires the ALJ to apply a five-step disability determination, including deciding at step two whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits basic work activity.

Long v. Apfel · filed 2001-01-09

The ALJ resolves whether the claimant suffers a disability by applying the five-step test set forth in the implementing regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see also Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Svcs., 925 F.2d 146,147-48. First, if a claimant is working and this work amounts to substantial gainful activity, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled, regardless of medical condition. See 20 C.F.R. § 419.920(b). Second, the ALJ must determine if the claimant suffers a severe impairment(s).
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Section 416.920 requires a five-step disability determination and does not itself add a sixth step for assessing whether substance abuse is material to disability.

Doughty v. Apfel · filed 2001-03-28

Second, the regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 mandate a five-step disability determination, and that any addition of a "sixth step," which Doughty implies should be created, would require those regulations to be so amended—"something that the CAAA did not do."
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step process for deciding disability claims, with the claimant bearing the burden through step four and the Commissioner bearing it at step five.

Glenn v. Apfel · filed 2000-06-19

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. ... 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The claimant has the burden of establishing disability at the first four steps. ... At step five, the burden shifts to the commissioner to show the claimant retains the ability to perform other work which exists in the national economy.
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Section 416.920 uses a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled, including evaluating substantial gainful activity, severity, listed impairments, past relevant work, and other work.

Beech v. Apfel · filed 2000-06-20

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven that she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At the first step, the claimant must prove that she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity. At the second step, she must prove that she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If, at the third step, she proves that her impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, she is automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience. If she cannot prevail at the third step, she must proceed to the fourth step where she must prove that she is unable to perform her past relevant work.
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequential process, which the ALJ must use.

Loveless v. Massanari · filed 2001-04-11

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven that he is disabled. ... The ALJ must also evaluate the claimant’s case using this sequential evaluation process.
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At step five of the sequential evaluation, once a claimant proves a severe impairment preventing past relevant work, § 416.920 shifts the burden to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Rotshteyn v. Massanari · filed 2001-05-31(f)

Once a claimant proves she has a severe impairment that precludes her from returning to past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 416.966.
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequential process, including whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Smitherman v. Massanari · filed 2001-06-11

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven that she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1999). The ALJ must also evaluate the claimant’s case using this sequential evaluation process.
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Section 416.920 requires a CFS disability claim to be evaluated under the same five-step framework used for Social Security disability claims.

Mastro v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security, No · filed 2001-07-05

The ruling instructs that, before rejecting a claim based on CFS, the ALJ must first consider the medical evidence and evaluate the condition as any other unlisted impairment. Therefore, the CFS claim is analyzed under the same five step framework applied to every social security disability claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
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Section 416.920(a) requires the Commissioner to use the five-step sequential analysis and stop reviewing a claim once the claimant is found not disabled at any step.

Hippensteel v. Social Security Administration · filed 2001-09-27(a)

The Commissioner is required to use a five-step analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. ... It is necessary for the Commissioner to ascertain: 1) whether the applicant is engaged in a substantial activity; 2) whether the applicant is severely impaired; 3) whether the impairments matches or is equal to the requirements of one of the listed impairments, whereby he qualifies for benefits without further inquiry; 4) whether the claimant can perform his past work; 5) whether the claimant’s impairment together with his age, education, and past work experience also precludes him from doing any other sort of work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-(f); ... If at any point during the sequential five-step analysis it is determined that the claimant is. not disabled then the claim will not be reviewed any further. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a).
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Section 416.920 requires a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits, with the result of each step directing the next step or a disability determination.

Axilrod v. STATE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES · filed 2001-11-14(a)

The Department engages in a five-step analysis contained in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, to determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to benefits. ... An affirmative answer to any of the questions leads to the next question, or, in the case of steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any questions other than to step three leads to the finding of not disabled. See McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f).
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Section 416.920 provides a five-step sequential process for deciding whether a claimant is disabled.

Washington v. Barnhart · filed 2001-12-11

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven that she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1999).
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At step three, meeting a listed impairment establishes disability without regard to the claimant's age, education, or work experience.

Drapeau v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2001-06-12(d)

If plaintiffs impairments meet Listing 11.11, she has satisfied her burden of proving her disability without regard to her age, education, or work experience.
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At Step Five, when a claimant may have a non-exertional impairment that prevents the grids from accurately representing the claimant's limitations, the Commissioner must use vocational-expert testimony to determine whether the claimant can perform other jobs in the national economy.

Bruton v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2001-11-09(f)

Instead, the Commissioner must rely on the testimony of a vocational expert to determine under Step Five of the five-step sequential inquiry whether Bruton remained capable of performing “other jobs that exist in substantial numbers in the national economy.”
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe only when it significantly limits the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities; an impairment with no more than a minimal impact is not severe.

Page v. Comm Social Security · filed 2004-09-02(c)

A “severe impairment” is a condition that the claimant shows significantly limits her mental or physical ability to engage in basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). ... An impairment is not severe if medical evidence establishes that the condition has no more than a minimal impact on the individual’s ability to engage in basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Here, Page has produced no medical evidence indicating that his migraine headaches have more than a minimal impact on his ability to comprehend or carry out simple instructions. Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s finding that Page’s alleged migraine headaches are not a “severe impairment.”
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Ability to do other work

Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe when it significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.

Segal v. Barnhart · filed 2004-10-29(c)

An impairment is defined as severe when it significantly limits one’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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Section 416.920(a) ends the sequential disability evaluation once a claimant is found disabled or not disabled at a step, so a Step Four finding of not disabled ends the inquiry without a Step Five assessment.

Jones v. Barnhart · filed 2002-03-13(a)

The ALJ found the Claimant not to be disabled at Step Four of the evaluation, therefore, she had no obligation to assess the Claimant at Step Five. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (stating if the claimant is found disabled at any point in the review, the claim is not reviewed any further).
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Section 416.920 requires disability adjudicators to use a five-step sequential process, including deciding whether the claimant can perform other work in the national economy.

Borski v. Barnhart · filed 2002-04-05

Here, the ALJ was required to follow the familiar five-step process for determining whether Borski was disabled for either purpose, asking (1) whether the claimant was not presently employed or engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) whether his impairment or combination of impairments was severe, (3) whether he met any of the impairments on the “list” in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (ie. was he entitled to a conclusive presumption of disability), (4) whether he was unable to perform his past relevant work, and (5) whether he was unable to perform any other work within the economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.1997).
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be decided through a five-step sequential evaluation, including whether the claimant can perform other work available in significant numbers in the national economy.

Hendrix v. Barnhart · filed 2004-02-19(f)

To determine whether an individual suffers from a disability under the regulations, the ALJ must conduct a sequential five-step evaluation. ... At step four, it is determined whether the claimant can perform her past work. If the claimant cannot, the evaluation moves to step five, where it is determined whether the claimant can perform other work. The claimant must be found disabled if there is no work that they can perform. ... On the other hand, if there is work which claimant can perform, and such work is available in significant numbers within the national economy, the claimant is not disabled and not eligible for benefits. ... At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the burden shifted to the Commissioner to show the existence of a significant number of jobs in one or more occupations in the national economy that Ms. Hendrix can perform. The burden may be met through the testimony of a vocational expert. Consideration must be given to the claimant’s vocational factors and residual functional capacity.
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Section 416.920 establishes a five-step sequential process for determining whether a claimant is disabled, which the ALJ must apply to the claim.

Lipson v. Barnhart · filed 2004-06-16

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven that he is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1999). ... Based on the ALJ’s findings, Lipson survives step one and step two of the sequential evaluation process, because she has not engaged in any substantial gainful activities since her amended disability onset date and she has severe impairments (R. 15). However, she does not survive step three, because her severe impairments, when considered individually and/or in combination with others, do not meet the equivalent of a listed impairment (R. 15).
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At the fifth step, a claimant is not disabled if, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity and vocational factors, the claimant can adjust to other work.

Coots v. Social Security Administration · filed 2005-01-31(a)(4)(v)

Because there was substantial evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that Coots could “make an adjustment to other work,”3 the Administrative Law Judge did not err in denying Coots disability benefits.
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At step five, a claimant is entitled to benefits only if she cannot perform other work in the national economy given her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

Ward v. Commissioner Social Security · filed 2019-10-15(f)

A claimant is entitled to benefits only if unable to perform other work.
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Section 416.920(a)(4)(v) requires assessing whether a claimant can adjust to other work based on the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

Greggs v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-05-31(a)(4)(v)

A VE is not called upon to testify on a claimant’s medical condition, but rather to assess whether a claimant “can make an adjustment to other work” based on his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
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At step five, § 416.920(a)(4)(v) treats a claimant as not disabled when the claimant can adjust to other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Green v. O'Malley · filed 2024-03-26(a)(4)(v)

Given that RFC finding and other factors in the record, if the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, the Commissioner finds the claimant not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). Here, the ALJ noted that at least two categories of work remained available to Green despite his limitations: retail clerk (DOT 299.677-010), featuring approximately 400,000 jobs available nationally, and dining room attendant (DOT 311.677-010), featuring approximately 430,000 jobs available nationally. Tr. 29-30. Those categories and figures come directly from the testimony of a vocational expert, who appeared at Green’s hearing before the ALJ and explained that Green remained able to perform work in at least those two categories. Tr. 59-64; see also Tr. 263-64 (describing the vocational expert’s qualifications). Because Green remained able to perform that kind of work, the ALJ found that Green did not qualify as disabled and therefore did not qualify for disability-insurance benefits. Tr. 29-30. The vocational expert’s testimony provides substantial evidence for that conclusion.
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At step five, a claimant is not disabled if an impairment does not prevent the claimant from doing other work; inaudible portions of vocational testimony do not require remand when the remaining testimony supports that finding.

Drejka v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2003-01-28(f)

Even if we were to agree with Drejka that the ALJ’s finding that she was not disabled under step four was not supported by substantial evidence, we must turn to the ALJ’s application of step five. This step provides that a claimant is not disabled unless suffering from an impairment that prevents him or her from doing any other work. ... Drejka argues that because the testimony of the vocational expert contains numerous inaudibles, we must, at a minimum, remand. We do not agree.
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Severity requirement

Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated through five sequential steps, ending with whether the claimant can perform other available work, and the inquiry stops once disability is resolved at a step.

Cartagena v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2002-02-28

The Commissioner has set forth a five-step sequential analysis in determining disability for SSI benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2001). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine whether: (1) the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity, (2) the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment, (3) the impairment is a “listed impairment” that the Commissioner acknowledges as so severe to prevent substantial gainful activity, (4) claimant possesses the residual functional capacity to perform work accomplished in the past, and (5) claimant is capable of performing other available work. Id. If the Commissioner concludes that the claimant is or is not disabled at any point during the analysis, the Commissioner does not review the claim any further. Id.
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated in sequence, with the step-two severity inquiry completed before the step-three listings inquiry.

Camacho v. R.I. Dhs 01-2502 (2002) · filed 2002-06-19

DHS follows this "set order" when evaluating a disability claim.20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Thus, the agency may conclude its inquiry "at any point in the review" by making the determination that the applicant is not disabled. Id. At this point, the evaluation ceases and the agency "does not need to review the claim further." Id. ... Thus, DHS improperly proceeded to step three before completing step two thereby failing to follow the sequential order of the five-step evaluation process. Accordingly, the hearing officer's determination that Appellant's condition was not severe was based on an error committed in step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process.
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Section 416.920(d) requires the ALJ to proceed to step three and consider whether a severe medically determinable impairment meets or medically equals a listed impairment.

Villaneda v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-01(d)

If the ALJ had found Plaintiff’s brain injury and neurocognitive disorder severe at step two, the ALJ would then have assessed at step three whether Plaintiff’s condition met or medically equaled any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); SSR 16-3p (noting that if the individual has a severe medically determinable impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must then consider whether that impairment meets or equals a listing at step three).
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Section 416.920(a) requires disability claims to be evaluated through a five-step sequential inquiry, including whether the claimant can perform past or other work.

Cichon v. Barnhart · filed 2002-09-03(a)

In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step analysis outlined by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f) and considers the following questions in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 qualifies the claimant as disabled.
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Section 416.920 requires disability eligibility to be evaluated through a five-step sequential inquiry, with a negative determination at any step except step three generally ending the disability determination.

Maddalena v. R.I. D.H.S., 02-4737 (2003) · filed 2003-05-01

To determine whether an applicant qualifies as "disabled" for the purposes of MA eligibility, a Hearing Officer engages in a five-step sequential inquiry, which follows the five-step federal process enunciated in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.920with DHS Manual §§ 0352.15; 0352.15.05; 0352.15.15; 0352.15.20. The Hearing Officer asks: 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial activity? 2. If not, is the impairment severe? 3. If severe, does it meet or equal an impairment listed in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) regulations? 4. If it does not meet or equal SSI regulations, does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work? 5. Considering age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, does the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing other work in the national economy? See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; DHS Manual §§ 0352.15; 0352.15.05; 0352.15.15; 0352.15.20; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (outlining five-step process enunciated in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920). Because of the sequential nature of this five-pronged analysis, a negative determination at any one of the steps (except for step three) forecloses a finding of "disabled."
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Section 416.920 requires disability claims to be evaluated in five ordered steps, including determining whether the claimant has a severe impairment before considering listed impairments, past work, and other work.

Jackson v. Comm Social Security · filed 2003-05-23

The Commissioner evaluates disability claims pursuant to a sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. This process requires the Commissioner to consider, in order: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the claimant’s severe impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant’s impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience, and residual functioning capacity.
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Section 416.920 requires the Commissioner to evaluate disability claims through a five-step sequential process covering current work, severe impairment, listed impairments, past work, and other work in the national economy.

Fouch v. Barnhart · filed 2003-10-16

The Commissioner’s regulations provide a five step analysis in evaluating disability claims under the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. This process requires the Commissioner to consider, in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the claimant’s severe impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant’s impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity.
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Section 416.920 requires an ALJ to evaluate disability claims through a five-step sequential process, including assessing residual functional capacity at step four even after a claimant fails to meet a listing at step three.

Cook v. Barnhart · filed 2004-02-17

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven that he is disabled. ... 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1999). The ALJ must evaluate the claimant’s case using this sequential evaluation process, ... and the steps are as follows: ... As a matter of law, even if the ALJ determines at step three of his analysis that a claimant does not have a combination of impairments that meet the equivalent of a listed impairment, there can nonetheless be a finding of disability. The finding can be triggered by the ALJ’s assessment at step four, a determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity [“RFC”].
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Section 416.920 sets out the disability determination process, including requiring a claimant to show no substantial gainful activity and a severe impairment at the first two steps.

Lepenica v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2004-08-25

In determining the existence of a disability, the Commissioner follows a five-step procedure in accordance with 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. ... In the first two steps, the claimant must establish that she is not engaged in any substantial gainful activity and that she suffers from a severe medical impairment that limits her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520 and 20 C.F.R. §416.920. ... In this case, the ALJ found that Lepenica did not possess a severe impairment and was therefore not disabled under the Act; thus, the Commissioner ended the process at the second step.
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Sequential evaluation and severe impairment

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

Munoz v. Saul · filed 2020-10-05(c)

At step two of the sequential process, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant suffers from a “severe” impairment, i.e., one that significantly limits her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
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Section 416.920 requires a third-step determination of whether an impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1.

Blanton v. Social Security Administration · filed 2004-09-20

The third step in the sequential evaluation for disability benefits requires a determination of whether an impairment or a combination of impairments meets or equals one or more of the medical conditions listed in Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 416.925, 416.926.
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At step two of the sequential evaluation, an impairment is severe only if it significantly limits the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities; without a severe impairment, the claimant is not disabled.

Salazar v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2010-04-06(c)

The social security regulations establish a “five-step sequential evaluation process” to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1). If the Agency finds a claimant disabled or not disabled at any given step, it does not go on to the next step. Id. §416.920(a)(4). ... At the second step, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments from which the claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” Id. § 416.920(c). If there is no severe impairment, then the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied.
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Section 416.920(a) provides that once a claimant is found to have a severe impairment, the ALJ proceeds to the next step in the disability evaluation.

HALM v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2021-07-19(a)

If a claimant is found to have a severe impairment, then the ALJ proceeds to the next step. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a).
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At step two, a claimant must show a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the ability to perform basic work activities.

Vivier v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-02-06(a)(4)(ii)

Step two requires that a claimant make a threshold showing that her medically determinable impairments significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 145 (1987). Therefore, the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish a medically determinable severe impairment that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, or the “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a).
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Section 416.920(a)(4)(ii) requires the decision maker at step two to determine whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments, and denies the disability claim if the claimant has neither.

Hamberg v. O'Malley · filed 2024-02-07(a)(4)(ii)

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R §§ 416.920, 404.1520. Step one determines if they are engaged in substantial gainful activities. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activities, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(i), 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the decision maker proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied.
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At step two, § 416.920(a)(4)(ii) requires a claimant to show a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that meets the duration requirement.

Eastham v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-07-30(a)(4)(ii)

At the second step in the sequential evaluation process a claimant must demonstrate she suffers from a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *11 (Oct. 25, 2017); Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988).
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Determining severity of an impairment

Section 416.920(a) requires the Commissioner to consider the effect of an impairment when determining whether it is severe.

Williamson v. Barnhart · filed 2003-03-17(a)

In determining whether a severe impairment exists, the Commissioner considers the “effect” of the impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a).
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe based on the extent of its limiting effect, not merely its presence.

Briggs v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-06-13(c)

It is, of course, not the presence of the impairment, but the extent of its limiting effect which determines if a condition is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe when it significantly limits a claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; a controlled condition unsupported by evidence of functional limitation does not meet that standard.

Banks v. ASTURE · filed 2008-02-27(c)

For the ALJ to find that an applicant has a severe impairment, he must find that the claimant has “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). ... Banks has pointed to no medical opinion or made any argument as to how her hypertension, alone or in combination with her other ailments, rises to the level of a “severe” impairment. ... Thus, because Banks’ hypertension is sufficiently controlled through treatment and medication, it cannot be considered disabling.
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Section 416.920(c) requires a claimant to show that an impairment or combination of impairments significantly limits the ability to perform basic work activities; a diagnosis alone does not establish disability.

Jarrell v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2011-07-08(c)

And in any event, her diagnosis of an anxiety disorder in November 1999 does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the condition was disabling. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) (stating that the claimant must show that her impairment or combination of impairments significantly limited her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities in order to be determined disabled).
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Section 416.920(c) requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the ability to perform basic work activities.

Bryant v. Colvin · filed 2014-05-09(c)

This step requires that the ALJ determine whether the claimant suffered from a “severe impairment” or “combination of impairments” that “significantly limits” the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as non-severe when it does not significantly limit a claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, generally without considering age, education, or work experience.

Hosseini v. Berryhill · filed 2018-12-17(c)

An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit a claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c); Sullivan v. Berryhill, 317 F. Supp. 3d 658, 662 (D. Mass. 2018); Picard v. McMahon, 472 F. Supp. 2d 95, 99 (D. Mass. 2007).
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe only if it significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.

Kuhn v. Berryhill · filed 2019-03-13(c)

An ALJ’s determination at Step 2 that a claimant’s impairments are not severe is generally ““a de minimis screening for groundless claims.’” Meuser v. Colvin, 838 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting O’Connor-Spinner v. Colvin, 832 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2016)). In this case, the ALJ’s Step 2 finding was outcome determinative. The ALJ found Ms. Kuhn had the following medically determinable impairments through her date last insured of December 31, 2011 -- back pain, mild dextroscoliosis of the lumbar spine, moderate degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and hearing loss -- but that none of these impairments or combination of impairments were severe (R. 22); i.e., they did not “significantly limit [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe when it significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

Cowan v. Social Security Administration · filed 2019-04-26(c)

A “severe” impairment is one that significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. ... Accordingly, I find the ALJ could rightly determine Plaintiff’s seizure disorder was not a severe impairment.
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as non-severe when it does not significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.

Melanie S. v. Saul · filed 2019-08-27(c)

First, Dr. Coyle at least implicitly addressed staying on task and absenteeism because she found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were “not severe” (Tr. 168) which indicates her opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would not be significantly limiting. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
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At step two, an impairment is severe only if it significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; otherwise the claimant is not disabled at that step.

Ehlers v. Berryhill · filed 2019-09-16(c)

Step two of the evaluation states that a claimant is not disabled if her impairments are not “severe.”
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Under § 416.920(c), an impairment or combination of impairments is severe when it significantly limits a claimant’s ability to do basic work activities.

Seufert v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2019-09-23(c)

Indeed, given the treatment record, coupled with the ambiguity in Dr. Boyd’s assessment (especially as it relates to Dr. Kaper’s subsequent report), it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude plaintiff’s mental impairments did not significantly limit her ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) (defining a severe impairment or combination of impairments).
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe when it significantly limits a claimant's ability to perform basic work activities and persists for at least twelve consecutive months.

Milam v. Berryhill (CONSENT) · filed 2019-10-16(c)

An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it “significantly limits [Plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities” and persists for at least twelve consecutive months.
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Section 416.920(c) treats an impairment as severe when it significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.

Virden v. Social Security Administration · filed 2020-03-20(c)

A “severe” impairment is one that significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Gwathney v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1997); Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1992); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) (2007). It has “more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to work.” Hudson v. Bowen, 870 F.2d at 1396; accord, Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007); Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007).
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Notes 1–150 of 2,028, oldest cases first.

7,716 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Kotellos v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the opinion’s substantive discussion concerns the separate medical-opinion regulation, § 416.920c; its final reference to § 416.920(c)(b)(2) is a malformed citation and does not construe § 416.920. opinion →
Barnett v. Califano, the court cites § 416.920(a) and (c), and footnote 2 cites subsection (b), only while describing the administrative sequence for SSI disability claims. It does not interpret, apply, or rule on what § 416.920 requires; the decision concerns delays in administrative hearings under Title XVI. opinion →
Barnett v. Califano, the court cites § 416.920 only while recounting the SSI administrative process; it does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. The holding concerns the timeliness of disability hearings and the district court’s remedial authority under other statutory provisions. opinion →
Benko v. Schweiker, the court merely describes the ALJ's use of the sequential evaluation to reach a disability determination. The court's actual ruling concerned res judicata and the binding effect of the earlier determination, not the meaning or requirements of § 416.920. opinion →
Kolodnay v. Richard Schweiker, as Secretary of Health and Human Services, section 416.920(d) is cited as supporting authority in the discussion of whether the claimant had a severe impairment, but the court did not construe or decide the operation of subsection (d). The remand rested on the ALJ’s failure to consider the claimant’s impairments in combination under the separate severity analysis. opinion →
Donato v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States, the court merely recounts the ALJ’s finding under § 416.920(c); it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, instead remanding for credibility and record-development errors. opinion →
Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentions § 416.920(c) only to characterize and infer the ALJ’s implicit finding in the procedural discussion. It does not decide a disputed issue about the regulation; the reversal rests on the ALJ’s failure to consider the combined exertional and nonexertional impairments and on the lack of substantial evidence. opinion →
De Leon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentions § 416.920 only in a footnote as a general citation to the disability-evaluation steps. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of that regulation. opinion →
Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court mentions § 416.920(d) only while describing the adult disability framework as background for its comparison with the child standard; it decides the validity of § 416.923, not the meaning or application of § 416.920(d). opinion →
Dozier v. Heckler, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the regulatory basis for the ALJ's finding. The appellate court did not interpret or apply § 416.920(c); it reversed for failure to order needed consultative examinations and remanded for further evaluation. opinion →
Bianchi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion reports the ALJ's and Appeals Council's reliance on § 416.920 in the procedural history, but the court does not interpret or decide what the regulation means or requires. Its decision instead addresses substantial-evidence support and remands the psychiatric aspects because the hearing transcript was unintelligible. opinion →
Mattson v. Heckler, the court mentions § 416.920(a) only when reporting the Sixth Circuit’s position in Gist. This court’s own holding concerned 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), which it found invalid, and did not decide anything about § 416.920. opinion →
Meyers v. Heckler, the court merely recited the seven-step disability evaluation and cited § 416.920 as authority for it. It did not interpret or apply § 416.920 in deciding the fee motion; its actual rulings concerned EAJA fees and the ALJ’s treatment of medical evidence, cumulative impairments, and pain. opinion →
Murray v. Heckler, the court only reports that the ALJ ruled plaintiff was not disabled under § 416.920(e); the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that regulation, and remands on other grounds. opinion →
Salyers v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, section 416.920(c) appears in a background description and a string citation. The court dismissed the appeal as moot and relied on decisions interpreting § 404.1520(c); it did not decide the meaning or application of § 416.920(c). opinion →
Cruz v. Bowen, the court cited § 416.920 only to identify the five-step disability-evaluation framework. It did not interpret, construe, or decide what the regulation requires; its ruling instead concerned the improper use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in evaluating nonexertional impairments. opinion →
Maher v. Bowen, the regulation appears only in a footnote as a general cross-reference describing the Secretary's disability-evaluation steps. The court did not interpret or apply § 416.920; its holdings concerned the treating-physician rule and evaluating impairments in combination. opinion →
Kellam v. Bowen, the court merely reports the ALJ's findings under § 416.920(c) and (e) as procedural background; it does not construe the statute or decide what it requires. opinion →
Emma Jane PULLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the citation to § 416.920(e) reports the administrative law judge’s procedural step in evaluating Pullen’s SSI claim. The court did not construe or decide what § 416.920(d) or (e) means or requires; its holding concerned whether the government’s position was substantially justified for purposes of EAJA fees. opinion →
Jones v. Heckler, the court merely recites the five-step disability-evaluation framework and reports that the Secretary ruled at step two. It does not construe § 416.920 or independently decide what the regulation requires; the ruling instead concerns the evidentiary support for the finding that plaintiff’s arthritis was a severe impairment. opinion →
Reyes v. Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services, the court cites § 416.920(e) in a footnote to support the background proposition that eligibility depends on the claimant’s ability to perform previous work, but it does not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Nelson v. SEC. OF H. & HUM. SERV., the statute is cited only in reporting the ALJ's reasoning below. The court's own decision addressed the improper exclusive use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines despite nonexertional pain limitations, relying on Appendix 2 and Bapp, and did not interpret or apply § 416.920(f) itself. opinion →
Nelson v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court mentions § 416.920(f) only while reporting the ALJ’s stated basis for finding the claimant able to perform light work. The court did not construe or independently apply § 416.920(f); its remand addressed the ALJ’s failure to account for nonexertional pain limitations when relying on the medical-vocational guidelines. opinion →
Sanchez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court mentions § 416.920(a) while describing the governing sequential evaluation, but it neither interprets nor applies that provision. The decision turns on the mental-retardation criteria in Appendix 1, § 12.05, and the use of IQ norms. opinion →
Murdaugh v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services of the United States, the court does not construe or explain § 416.920(e); it merely cites the subsection while noting the undisputed fact that claimant could not perform past relevant work. The holding instead concerns whether the medical evidence established disability and inability to perform the full range of sedentary work. opinion →
Hughes v. Bowen, the court merely recites the general SSI eligibility standard in its discussion of the case; it does not interpret, define, or otherwise decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Margarita TIRADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court mentions § 416.920 only while recounting that the ALJ followed the regulatory five-step analysis. The court does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires or how it applies; the appeal is resolved on other issues, principally the handling of new medical evidence. opinion →
Sherrod v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources, the court cites § 416.920 only as general support while defining “severe impairment.” The regulation actually quoted and discussed is § 416.921(b), and the decision turns on the lack of substantial medical evidence supporting the agency’s findings, not on what § 416.920 means or requires. opinion →
Reyes v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court recited the five-step sequential evaluation framework and summarized § 416.920(a)-(f) as background. It did not construe or decide an issue about what the regulation requires; the reversal rested on the Secretary's inadequate reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinion and the administrative law judge's decision. opinion →
Seales v. Bowen, the court cited § 416.920 only to identify the usual five-step disability inquiry. Its actual ruling construed Listing 1.03(B), not § 416.920. opinion →
Franklin B. BERNAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 416.920 to identify the established five-step evaluation process and later cites subsection (e) while reporting the ALJ's step-four determination. It does not construe, explain, or decide any requirement of § 416.920. opinion →
Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, the court describes § 416.920(e) and (f) as the adult individualized-assessment procedure only to compare it with the child-disability procedure; its holding concerns § 416.924 and does not decide the meaning, validity, or application of § 416.920(e) or (f). opinion →
Williams v. Bowen, the opinion mentions § 416.920(f) only in recounting the ALJ’s reasoning in the procedural history. The court itself reviewed whether the disability denial was supported by substantial evidence and did not interpret or decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Alvarez v. Bowen, the court cited § 416.920 to describe the established five-step disability-evaluation framework, but did not construe or decide any issue about the regulation. The remand rested on inadequate hearing procedures and failure to develop the record. opinion →
Boyd L. SORENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court recited § 416.920's five-step SSI evaluation framework as background, but did not decide a dispute about the regulation's meaning or application. The holding instead concerned substantial-evidence review, the treating physician's evidence, and application of the § 404 grid. opinion →
Robinson v. Sullivan, section 416.920 appears only in a footnote as part of a comparative citation to the sequential-evaluation regulations. The court did not construe or rule on § 416.920; its holding concerned the validity of the widow-disability regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). opinion →
Skeens v. Sullivan, the court mentions § 416.920(f) only while reporting the Administrative Law Judge's use of the medical-vocational guidelines and conclusion below; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Carty v. Sullivan, section 416.920(c) appears in a quoted summary of the regulatory framework and in the quoted Second Circuit description of the sequential process. The court’s own holding addressed the widow-specific regulations and cited § 404.1520, but did not construe or independently decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Audrey HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, section 416.920(a) appears only in a citation supporting the claimant's argument. The court did not adopt or construe that provision; its holding instead concerned the procedure under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. opinion →
Robertson v. Sullivan, the court mentions § 416.920(e) only while reporting the ALJ's conclusion that claimant was capable of performing past work. The court does not construe or independently apply the regulation; its affirmance rests on substantial-evidence review of the medical evidence. opinion →
Calvin THOMPSON, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court cites § 416.920(a) only to state the general eligibility consequence of substantial gainful activity. The court does not construe or decide the meaning or application of that provision; its analysis instead concerns whether the claimant's work was substantial under 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a) and whether the agency's evidence supported that determination. opinion →
Nelson v. Sullivan, the court merely cites § 416.920 while reciting the general sequential disability-evaluation framework in the background and then decides the case on substantial evidence, medical equivalence, credibility, and vocational testimony. It does not resolve a disputed question about § 416.920. opinion →
Curtis v. Sullivan, the court cites § 416.920(a)-(f) only in its remand instruction to continue the disability evaluation; it does not interpret, explain, or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Alford v. Sullivan, the court recites the five-step disability-evaluation process and cites § 416.920(a), (d), (e), and (f), but it does not interpret or decide what § 416.920 requires; its ruling addresses the evidence, pain testimony, and use of the medical-vocational grids. opinion →
Duncan v. Sullivan, the court recites the five-step sequential evaluation framework and applies it to the claimant’s disability issues, but the parties agreed on the framework and the court did not resolve any dispute about what § 416.920 means or requires. The citation is background to the court’s rulings on the asthma listing, residual functional capacity, and reopening. opinion →
Graham v. Sullivan, the court merely recites the five-step sequential evaluation and cites § 416.920(f) in explaining the final step. It does not interpret or decide any issue about the regulation; the decision instead addresses the evidentiary support for the ALJ’s findings, credibility determination, and treating-physician opinion. opinion →
Cannon v. Heckler, the court mentioned 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) to support its conclusion that the Secretary's position was substantially justified for purposes of attorney's fees; it did not independently construe, apply, or decide a claim about the regulation. opinion →
Boyd v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court merely described the regulation's five-step disability-determination framework as background. Its decision rested on the ALJ's failure to fully develop the medical record and obtain needed consultative evidence, not on interpreting or deciding the application of § 416.920. opinion →
Harry Hammon, Jr. v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court gives a general description of the five-step disability process and cites § 416.920 as background; it does not decide a disputed issue about what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Baluski v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites § 416.920 as support for reporting that the ALJ considered the claimant's impairments, but it does not interpret or establish a requirement under that regulation; the court's operative discussion concerns use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. opinion →
Carraher v. Sullivan, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify and briefly introduce the agency’s five-step disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe the regulation or announce a rule about its meaning, requirements, or scope; the reversal instead concerns the ALJ’s evaluation of the claimant’s impairments, pain, and vocational evidence. opinion →
Bervin ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 416.920(a)-(f) to recite the general five-step disability framework, but it does not interpret or decide any disputed requirement of this regulation; its ruling concerns the evidentiary support for the ALJ’s findings and use of the medical-vocational grid. opinion →
Lewis v. Louis Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely cites § 416.920 as authority for the Secretary's five-step sequential evaluation process. It does not interpret the regulation, decide what it requires, or resolve a dispute about its application. opinion →
Leggitt v. Sullivan, the court merely cites § 416.920 as the source of the established five-step evaluation process and does not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Thompson v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court cites § 416.920 in describing the general five-step disability-evaluation process and in a supporting string cite, but its decision addresses the evidentiary support for the ALJ's step-five findings and use of the grids rather than construing or applying § 416.920 itself. opinion →
Roscoe CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 416.920(a)-(f) only to describe the regulations' five-step disability-evaluation framework. Its remand ruling concerns the ALJ's failure to make an RFC determination under applicable rulings and precedent, not the meaning or requirements of § 416.920. opinion →
Harold MASON, Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Appellee, the court cited § 416.920(a) through (c) while summarizing the five-step disability framework and noting that the first four steps were resolved; it did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 416.920(a). opinion →
Stonebraker v. Shalala, the court merely identified and described the regulation's familiar five-step sequential evaluation while reviewing the ALJ's decision; it did not construe § 416.920 or decide a disputed issue about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Garrison v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion recites the five-step disability-evaluation framework and cites § 416.920 while describing the ALJ's step-four decision, but it does not interpret or resolve a disputed issue about the regulation. The ruling instead concerns substantial evidence, pain evaluation, treating-physician evidence, and the vocational-expert hypothetical. opinion →
Karl ONSTAD, Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court merely reports that the ALJ applied the regulation's five-step procedure and summarizes the resulting disability determination. It does not interpret, explain, or independently apply § 416.920 as the basis for its holding. opinion →
Elnora G. POPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 416.920(a)-(f) only to describe the sequential disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe § 416.920(a) or decide a dispute about what that provision requires; the decision instead concerns the evaluation of pain and substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's Step Five determination. opinion →
Chanthasen v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites § 416.920(c) and (e) as supporting authorities for the general burden to establish a severe impairment, but it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about what those provisions require. opinion →
Rosetti v. Shalala, the opinion mentions § 416.920 only while recounting the five-step evaluation process and quoting Sullivan v. Zebley; the court decided jurisdiction, mootness, and class-certification issues without construing or applying this regulation. opinion →
Garnet Morse v. Donna E. Shalala, 1 Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, the court cites § 416.920 only as authority for a generic description of the five-step disability analysis. It does not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires; the decision turns on substantial evidence, medical opinions, subjective complaints, and the adequacy of the vocational hypothetical. opinion →
Mary A. KELLER, Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court recites the regulation's sequential disability-evaluation framework as background, but does not interpret or decide any dispute about what § 416.920 requires or how it applies. The decision turns on Listing 12.05C and the evaluation of subjective headache complaints. opinion →
Ortiz v. Shalala, the court cites § 416.920 to recite the general five-step disability evaluation framework, but it does not construe or decide any issue about the regulation. Its ruling concerns the ALJ's failure to consider and explain the evidence regarding Ortiz's impairments and Listing criteria. opinion →
Leigh v. Shalala, the court cites § 416.920 while reciting the Secretary’s five-step disability process, but it does not interpret, analyze, or decide any issue about what the regulation requires. The court’s ruling concerns whether the claimant met Listing 2.09 and the resulting entitlement to benefits. opinion →
Hangartner v. Shalala, the opinion merely recites the regulation’s five-step sequential evaluation and reports that the ALJ used it. The court’s remand turned on the treatment of new evidence and whether the Secretary’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, not on interpreting or deciding any issue under § 416.920. opinion →
Ross v. Shalala, the court recites the sequential-evaluation framework and cites § 416.920(a) through (c), but it does not construe or rule on § 416.920(a). The remand rests on the ALJ's failure to explain the rejection of psychological evidence. opinion →
Gauthney v. Shalala, the court gives a general description of the five-step disability process and reports that the ALJ found the claimant not disabled at step five, but it does not construe or decide any issue about § 416.920. The remand is based on inadequate notice and failure to develop the record. opinion →
Alford v. Secretary of the United States Department of Health & Human Services, the court merely reports the ALJ's application of § 416.920(e) in describing the administrative decision; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Wargowsky v. Shalala, the court mentions the regulation to describe the general sequential-evaluation framework and reports that the ALJ applied it; the court's actual decision concerned the ALJ's credibility determination and residual functional capacity, not the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Fenn v. Shalala, the court merely recites the five-step framework as background before deciding other issues; it does not construe or apply § 416.920 itself. opinion →
Burnett v. Shalala, the court merely reports the ALJ's step-five determination and cites § 416.920(f); it does not construe or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Perez v. Shalala, the court merely identifies § 416.920 as the source of the five-step disability-evaluation process while reviewing the Secretary’s decision; it does not construe or decide any issue about the regulation. opinion →
Limon v. Shalala, the court cites § 416.920(e) only as a supporting citation in its general description of the step-four standard. Its holding concerns the lack of substantial evidence and the ALJ's failure to evaluate the full record and residual capacity, rather than construing or independently applying this regulation. opinion →
Sommerhalder v. Chater, the court recited the five-step sequential evaluation in its statement of applicable law but did not construe or resolve any issue about § 416.920(a); its ruling concerned the ALJ’s treatment of medical evidence and the substantial-evidence standard. opinion →
Scott v. Shalala, the court mentions § 416.920 only to identify the general five-step disability framework. Its remand and substantive rulings concern other regulations governing pain evaluation and residual functional capacity, so it does not decide what § 416.920 means or requires. opinion →
Duyck v. Chater, the court only recited the five-step framework and stated that the ALJ applied it properly; it did not interpret or decide a disputed issue about § 416.920. opinion →
Stupakevich v. Chater, the court cited § 416.920(f) only as supporting authority while explaining that a physician’s statement of disability does not determine the claimant’s ability to perform past or other work; the court did not interpret or decide the meaning or requirements of § 416.920(f). opinion →
Barry v. Little, the opinion mentions 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 only in a footnote describing the federal SSI five-step evaluation process; the court did not interpret or apply this regulation. opinion →
Novotny v. Chater, the court merely cited § 416.920 while describing the ALJ's use of the five-step sequential analysis; it did not interpret the regulation or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
Henry NOVOTNY, Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Appellee, the court merely notes that the ALJ followed the five-step sequential analysis and cites § 416.920 alongside the parallel regulation; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Lloyd v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, the court only identifies the regulation as setting out the five-step disability procedure and discusses the fifth-step vocational inquiry; it does not interpret or decide a requirement of § 416.920. opinion →
Ward v. Chater, the court cites § 416.920(e) only in support of its conclusion that the claimant could return to prior work; it does not interpret, explain, or independently analyze the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Ortega v. Chater, the court merely recited the five-step framework and cited § 416.920 while reviewing the ALJ's disability decision; it did not construe or resolve an issue under the regulation. opinion →
Davis v. Chater, the court merely cites § 416.920 to identify the step of the sequential analysis at which the Secretary acted; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Dean v. Chater, the court mentions § 416.920 only in a general citation to the five-step sequential analysis; it does not interpret or apply the regulation in deciding the appeal. opinion →
Doreen Brown v. Shirley Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion recites the five-step disability framework and cites 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(f), but it does not interpret or decide the meaning or requirements of those provisions. Its rulings concern the evidentiary support for the ALJ's step-three and step-five determinations under other regulations. opinion →
Willis v. Chater, the regulation is cited only while reporting the ALJ's conclusion and the court expressly rejects the evidentiary support for that conclusion; the court does not interpret or apply § 416.920. opinion →
Sharp v. Chater, the regulation is cited only to identify the five-step sequential analysis and the ALJ's step-four determination in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Rice v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court merely recites the five-step disability-evaluation process, with § 416.920(b)-(f) cited in a footnote, and does not interpret or otherwise decide what this regulation requires; its actual rulings concern the listing, residual functional capacity, the vocational hypothetical, and the hearing request. opinion →
Sutton v. Chater, the court merely recounted the ALJ’s step-three analysis and cited § 416.920(d); it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. The court’s holding concerned whether the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified under the EAJA. opinion →
Chappell v. Chater, the regulation is cited only to identify the step-four sequential-analysis framework in recounting the ALJ's decision. The court did not construe or apply § 416.920 itself; its remand rested on inadequate record development and fact-finding about the demands of past relevant work. opinion →
Schaal v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 416.920 only as the source of the general five-step framework for evaluating SSI claims; it does not construe the regulation or decide an issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
Shirley JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee, the court merely cites § 416.920 while describing the final step of the disability analysis; it decides the EAJA attorney-fee issue and does not interpret or apply this regulation. opinion →
Davis v. Chater, the court merely recites the regulation’s five-step framework and burden allocation as background; it does not construe or decide an issue about § 416.920. The remand rests on the ALJ’s inadequate treatment of mental-impairment evidence. opinion →
Hunt v. Chater, the court merely cites § 416.920 while recounting the ALJ's step-five denial in the procedural and factual background; it does not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Rhonda L. Hunt v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, No. 96-5085. (d.c.no. 95-C-144-J), the court merely reports that the ALJ denied benefits at step five and cites the regulation in describing the procedural history; it does not interpret or decide what 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Terwilliger v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health & Human Services, the regulation is cited only in a background footnote to identify the Secretary's five-step evaluation process. The court's holding concerns the ALJ's treatment of subjective pain testimony and does not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. opinion →
Sird v. Chater, the regulation is mentioned only in the dissent's general description of the sequential evaluation process; the majority neither construes § 416.920(b) nor adopts the dissent's discussion. opinion →
Ruth A. KISLING, Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Appellee, the court mentions § 416.920 only while recounting the ALJ’s framework for evaluating Kisling’s claim; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the requirements of the statute itself. opinion →
Flowers v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 416.920 only in describing the ALJ's use of the five-step test in the procedural history; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
HART ON BEHALF OF THOMAS v. Chater, the court cites § 416.920 only to describe the adult sequential analysis as background. The case decides a childhood SSI disability issue under changed law and does not construe or apply this regulation. opinion →
Damian FLYNN, Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Appellee, the court merely reports the ALJ’s use of the regulation in the procedural history; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Alfred PERKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee, the court merely cited § 416.920 as part of a list of the regulations governing the ALJ’s five-step inquiry, while reviewing whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. It did not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Johnson v. Chater, the court mentions § 416.920 only to describe the ALJ's five-step evaluation in the procedural history; it does not construe or decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Robert L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the five-step process under § 416.920; it does not interpret, define, or apply that regulation as the court's own holding. opinion →
Gullett v. Chater, the court merely reports the ALJ’s fourth-step conclusion and cites § 416.920(e); it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Reidsema v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court merely reported the ALJ's findings under subsections (e) and (f) while affirming on substantial-evidence grounds; it did not construe or decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Christian v. Apfel, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation and cites § 416.920. The appellate court did not construe or independently apply the regulation; it affirmed based on substantial evidence and the reasons stated below. opinion →
Davis v. Barnhart, the citation to § 416.920 appears in the procedural history to report the ALJ’s analysis below. The court did not interpret or apply § 416.920 itself; its own legal discussion cites the parallel § 404.1520 and addresses whether the ALJ’s step-two decision was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Hernandez v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only to state the general adult disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe the regulation or decide an issue about what the five-step framework requires; the remand is based on insufficient evidentiary development and the need for medical-source statements. opinion →
Jordan v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 to identify the five-step process and described the ALJ’s application of it, including the burden shift after the first four steps. It did not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires; the holding was that the ALJ’s disability determination was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Sivilay v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 416.920(e) only in explaining why additional evidence would be useful on remand; it did not interpret, apply, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Ferrante v. Department of Human Services, 01-4265 (2002), the court cites § 416.920 only to describe the background five-step disability-evaluation framework. Its remand was based on inadequate factual findings, failure to develop the record, and lack of substantial evidence, not on deciding the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Steele v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920 only while describing the ALJ’s five-step analysis in the procedural history. It does not construe or decide what the regulation requires; its remand rests on errors in evaluating the medical evidence, testimony, and vocational evidence. opinion →
Devora v. Barnhart, the court recites § 416.920 as part of the general legal standards and does not construe or decide a dispute about that regulation; the remand rests on the ALJ’s duty to develop the administrative record and to consider obesity. opinion →
Ramirez v. Social Security, the court cited § 416.920 only to describe the general five-step disability-evaluation process and to recount the ALJ's findings at those steps. The court did not construe or decide any dispute about what the regulation requires; its holding concerned the evaluation of subjective pain complaints and substantial evidence supporting the denial of benefits. opinion →
Ramirez v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Social Security Commissioner, the court merely summarizes the regulation’s five-step process and describes what the ALJ did below; it does not construe or decide any issue about the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Bryant v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920(f) only while recounting the ALJ’s step-five disability determination; it does not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Belanger v. SSA, the court cited § 416.920 only in a general recitation of the five-step sequential evaluation process. It did not interpret or apply that regulation in deciding the case; the ruling instead addressed the ALJ's RFC assessment and explanation for discounting medical opinions. opinion →
Kamerling v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the court mentions § 416.920 only while reporting the ALJ's application of the five-step disability evaluation and explaining the steps in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Gonzalez v. Halter, the court cites § 416.920 only while reporting that the ALJ used the required five-step inquiry; it does not interpret the regulation or decide how the regulation applies. opinion →
Palmer v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 only to identify the general five-step disability-evaluation framework. It did not interpret or decide the meaning or requirements of § 416.920; the decision addressed whether the ALJ properly found substantial gainful activity at step one under the self-employment rules in § 404.1575. opinion →
Higgins v. Barnhart, the court merely identifies § 416.920 as the regulation containing the five-step disability-evaluation framework and recounts the ALJ’s use of that framework. It does not interpret, construe, or decide what § 416.920 requires; the merits analysis concerns Listing § 12.05C and the evidentiary support for the disability determination. opinion →
Ishmael v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only while reporting that the ALJ used the five-step disability analysis; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 416.920 itself. opinion →
Snyder v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only as authority for the five-step inquiry while describing the ALJ's decision; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Clapp v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only as the regulation outlining the five-step inquiry used by the ALJ. It does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires; the court instead reviews the ALJ’s application and supporting evidence. opinion →
Mathews v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only in describing the ALJ’s five-step inquiry. Its decision rests on the failure to include all of the plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations in the vocational-expert hypotheticals, without construing or deciding what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Goodson v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only while reporting the ALJ’s procedure below; the court’s own discussion of the sequential disability process cites § 404.1520 instead and does not construe or apply § 416.920. opinion →
Munoz v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the familiar five-step analysis and reports how the ALJ proceeded through that framework. The court reviews the ALJ's findings for substantial evidence and does not decide what the regulation means or independently construe its requirements. opinion →
Reyes v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 only as the parallel SSI regulation supporting its general description of the five-step disability-evaluation framework. Its decision did not interpret or apply § 416.920; the dispositive analysis concerned treating-physician opinions and new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council. opinion →
Joseph BURNS, Appellant v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the court cites § 416.920 to describe the general five-step SSI evaluation and identifies the step-five context, but its decision rests on the deficient vocational-expert hypothetical and substantial-evidence review, not on interpreting or deciding what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Gary v. Barnhart, the court merely identifies the regulation as the source of the five-step sequential evaluation process and then affirms the disability determination based on substantial evidence; it does not interpret, explain, or rule on any requirement of § 416.920. opinion →
Brown v. Barnhart, the court recited the Step 5 burden and cited § 416.920(f) as background, but its decision did not construe or apply that provision; the remand rested on the need for an additional consultative examination under § 416.919a(b)(5). opinion →
Glaze v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only as the regulation associated with the five-step inquiry and reports the ALJ's application of that inquiry. It does not interpret, explain, or independently apply the regulation in deciding the case. opinion →
Edwards v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only in describing the ALJ's finding that Edwards could perform light work; it does not interpret, explain, or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Edwards v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the regulation associated with light work in describing the ALJ's decision; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Drea v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the five-step disability analysis while framing the appeal; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Hughes v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920(b)-(f) in a footnote to describe the familiar five-step disability analysis, but it did not construe the regulation or decide a dispute about what § 416.920 requires. The case's actual discussion concerned § 404.1535 and the ALJ's handling of substance abuse. opinion →
Smith v. SSA, the court merely recited the five-step framework and reported that the ALJ used it; the remand was based on the ALJ's failure to address treating-physician limitations, not on interpreting or deciding what 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Lopez v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recites the regulation’s sequential-evaluation framework as background, but the decision does not construe or specifically apply § 416.920; it affirms based on substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings and reasoning. opinion →
Dowles v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited and described only in the section reporting the ALJ’s findings and the sequential framework. The court’s decision turns on whether Dowles met Listing 14.02; it does not construe or independently decide what § 416.920(a) requires. opinion →
Clinton v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court quoted this passage from Sullivan v. Zebley as background on the five-step disability process. Its actual legal analysis and holding concerned the corresponding SSI regulation's severity standard under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), not § 416.920. opinion →
Walton v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the general five-step disability inquiry. It does not interpret or apply any requirement of the regulation; the appeal is resolved on the treating physician’s opinion, credibility, and substantial-evidence issues, with only step five identified as disputed. opinion →
Banks v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 only to identify the familiar five-step framework and reported how the ALJ applied it. The court's own holding concerned the ALJ's inadequate explanation and evidentiary analysis at step four, not the meaning or requirements of § 416.920. opinion →
Rowan v. Comm Social Security, the court recites § 416.920 as the background five-step framework and describes the steps, but it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. Its actual ruling concerns whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's step-three and other findings. opinion →
Dowty v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only to identify the five-step process used in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 416.920 as a legal issue it decides. opinion →
Marshall v. Comm Social Security, the court cited § 416.920 only to summarize the familiar five-step disability-evaluation framework. It did not construe the regulation or decide a dispute about what it requires; the remand rested on the ALJ’s lack of substantial evidentiary support for Marshall’s RFC assessment. opinion →
Daniels v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920 only for the general existence of the five-step disability-evaluation process. Its decision concerns whether the claimant met or equaled Listing 12.05(C), relying on the parallel § 404.1520 provisions rather than construing or applying § 416.920 itself. opinion →
Santiago v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 while describing the five-step sequential evaluation, but did not construe or decide what the regulation requires. Its remand rested on the ALJ’s failure to adequately explain the step-three listing-equivalence determination, not on the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Najmi-Nejad v. Barnhart, the court merely reported the ALJ’s use of the five-step analysis and cited § 416.920(d) in describing the step-three finding; it did not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
West v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920(a)-(f) only to identify the general five-step disability framework. It did not construe or apply this regulation to resolve a disputed issue; the remand rested on the ALJ’s failure to order a psychological consultative examination and related evidentiary concerns. opinion →
Crespo v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only as part of describing the general sequential-evaluation framework and reporting how the ALJ evaluated the claim. It remands for further proceedings because the record was inadequately developed and does not construe or apply this regulation as the basis of its ruling. opinion →
Vendetti v. Rhode Island Dhs, 03-1126 (2003), the court cites § 416.920 as authority for the general five-step disability-evaluation framework, but it does not interpret or decide how § 416.920 applies. The ruling instead concerns the durational requirement under § 416.909. opinion →
Bennett v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the five-step disability-evaluation framework and then reports the ALJ's findings under it. The court's own decision turns on the treatment of the claimant's pain and depression evidence, not on interpreting or applying § 416.920. opinion →
Morris v. Comm Social Security, the court merely recited the five-step disability-determination process while describing the governing framework. It did not interpret § 416.920 or decide a disputed issue about what the regulation requires; the actual decision rested on substantial-evidence review of the ALJ’s findings. opinion →
Gillette v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only in a footnote identifying the regulation containing the five-step framework; it does not construe or apply this statute in its holding. opinion →
Winters v. Comm Social Security, the statute is mentioned while recounting the district court's procedural review of the ALJ's five-step analysis; the appellate court does not independently construe or explain § 416.920. opinion →
Leslie v. Barnhart, the court merely cites § 416.920 alongside § 404.1520 when describing the general five-step disability process. It does not construe or independently apply § 416.920; the specific Step Four discussion cites § 404.1520(f) and concerns the remand and law-of-the-case issue. opinion →
Alderman v. Barnhart, the court merely reported the Law Judge’s findings and cited § 416.920(d) and (e) in describing the procedural history. Its remand rested on inadequate consideration of concentration limitations and past-work requirements, not on interpreting or applying this regulation. opinion →
Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely noted that the ALJ used the regulation's five-step test while reviewing the disability determination; it did not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement of § 416.920. opinion →
Nelson v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only in connection with Nelson’s argument about the ALJ’s treatment of her symptom testimony. The court does not construe § 416.920 or decide what it requires; it merely upholds the ALJ’s credibility determination under the substantial-evidence standard. opinion →
Massaro v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is mentioned only to describe the ALJ’s procedure below. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 416.920 itself; its analysis concerns the ALJ’s step-four residual-functional-capacity findings and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Miller v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in the ALJ's recited finding in the procedural history; the district court did not interpret or apply § 416.920(f). opinion →
Boone v. Comm Social Security, the court merely identified § 416.920 as the source of the five-step SSI evaluation and then reviewed the evidentiary sufficiency of the ALJ's step-five determination; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Weatherbee v. SSA, the court mentions § 416.920 only while recounting that the ALJ used the five-step process; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and remands for consideration of bipolar-disorder evidence. opinion →
Cherry v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the general five-step disability-evaluation framework. Its actual ruling concerns the retroactive application of the revised listings and requires evaluation under former Listing 9.09, not the meaning or application of § 416.920 itself. opinion →
Torrey v. SSA, the court mentions § 416.920 to report that the ALJ used the five-step sequential evaluation process; it does not construe the regulation or decide a legal issue about what it requires. opinion →
Meraz v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 to summarize the governing five-step disability-evaluation framework and recited the steps, but it did not construe or decide any issue about what the regulation requires. Its decision turned on whether the claimant met Listing 2.09 and on the evaluation of the treating physician's opinion. opinion →
Schuh v. Comm Social Security, the court merely describes the five-step framework and reports the ALJ’s step-three finding under § 416.920(d). Its actual decision concerns whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s step-five disability determination, without construing § 416.920 or deciding what the regulation requires. opinion →
Scheck v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the general five-step disability-evaluation process. Its decision concerns whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings in this particular claim, and it does not interpret, define, or otherwise decide what § 416.920 means or requires. opinion →
Moore v. Barnhart, the court briefly cites § 416.920 while reciting the five-step disability framework, but it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. The remand rests on the ALJ’s failure to clarify whether the claimant could perform a full or only a wide range of sedentary work and whether exclusive reliance on the grids was proper. opinion →
Sarah M. BOONE, Appellant v. Jo Anne BARNHART Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the general five-step disability-evaluation framework; it does not construe the regulation or decide what its requirements mean or how they apply. opinion →
Barnes v. Barnhart, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the five-step sequential evaluation and cites § 416.920 as authority for that procedural description. It does not interpret the regulation or decide how it applies. opinion →
Viveiros v. SSA, the court mentions § 416.920 to identify the sequential evaluation framework used by the ALJ and cites it again among authorities concerning the step-five burden, but the decision turns on the adequacy of the vocational-expert hypotheticals and substantial evidence, not on interpreting or deciding what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Gholston v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the regulation's five-step framework as background for reviewing the ALJ's decision; it does not interpret § 416.920 or resolve a dispute about what the regulation requires. opinion →
White v. Barnhart, the opinion reports the ALJ's finding under § 416.920(f), but the court does not interpret or apply the regulation itself. The remand is based on the failure to develop the mental-impairment record under 42 U.S.C. § 421(h). opinion →
Whelchel v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only in describing the ALJ’s steps-four-and-five conclusion and the general five-step sequential evaluation; the court did not interpret or decide what § 416.920 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Gallegos v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only as authority for the general five-step disability-evaluation framework and identifies the procedural step at which the claim was denied; it does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Hagerman v. Barnhart, the court only identifies § 416.920(f) as the provision under which SSI benefits were denied and then affirms on substantial-evidence and reversible-error grounds; it does not interpret, explain, or apply the statute. opinion →
Lanclos v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) only in a footnote to identify the fifth step of the disability-analysis framework; it does not construe or decide what the provision requires or how it applies. opinion →
De Rohn v. Comm Social Security, the court cited § 416.920 to recite the general five-step SSI evaluation and identify the step-one and step-two requirements. It did not interpret or decide the meaning or application of § 416.920; its ruling concerned substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's Listing 12.06 determination and related issues. opinion →
Talat E. Sultan v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court merely described the ALJ's use of the five-step procedure and reported the ALJ's step-five determination; it did not interpret or independently apply § 416.920. opinion →
TALAT E. SULTAN, — v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, —, the citation reports the ALJ's step-five determination in the procedural history; the court does not construe or decide anything about § 416.920. opinion →
DEFORD v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 to identify the governing five-step framework, but it does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed requirement under it; the decision instead addresses the ALJ’s evidentiary findings about impairments and pain. opinion →
Gallegos v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 only as authority for the general five-step disability-evaluation framework and identified the step at which the claim was denied. It did not interpret, define, or independently decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Calhoun v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recites the five-step disability-evaluation framework, but the case turns on the ALJ's assessment of pain and credibility under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), not on the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Karnes v. Comm Social Security, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the ALJ's prior disability determination in the procedural history; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 416.920. opinion →
Corley v. Comm Social Security, the court cited § 416.920 to summarize the ALJ's five-step analysis and identify the steps applied below; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Miles v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the regulation is mentioned only to describe the ALJ’s analytical framework in the procedural history. The appellate court did not construe § 416.920 or decide what it requires; it addressed Listing 12.05 and the claimant’s residual functional capacity. opinion →
Peck v. Barnhart, the court merely reported the ALJ's benefits determination and cited § 416.920(f); it did not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Pizzo v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(b) and § 416.920 generally only to describe the disability-evaluation framework. It did not construe or apply this regulation as the basis for its ruling; the remand was based on the ALJ's treatment of the treating physician's opinion and the evidentiary record. opinion →
Sanchez v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(f) only to identify the fifth step of the disability-evaluation process; it does not interpret or independently apply that regulation, resolving the case instead on the ALJ’s record-development duty and the vocational expert’s conflicting testimony. opinion →
Barnett v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) only in describing the ALJ's application of the standard five-step analysis. It does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; the court's holding concerns the ALJ's evaluation of Listing 11.03, the evidence, and medical equivalence. opinion →
Groskreutz v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only while describing the ALJ's use of the standard five-step analysis; the court does not construe or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Schuler v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recites the five-step framework as background for reviewing the ALJ’s disability determination, but it does not construe § 416.920 or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Schwabe v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) only to recite the five-step disability framework. Its decision addresses the adequacy of the ALJ’s RFC findings and vocational-expert hypotheticals under SSR 96-8p, SSR 83-12, and the substantial-evidence standard; it does not construe or decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Ashford v. Barnhart, the court cites and briefly summarizes the regulation as background for the disability framework, but its decision turns on the ALJ's treatment of the medical evidence and bipolar disorder, not on construing or deciding the meaning or requirements of § 416.920. opinion →
Strunk v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the background five-step framework and describe where the ALJ ruled; it does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Carter v. Barnhart, the court merely reports the ALJ’s step-five finding and notes that Carter did not challenge it; it does not interpret or independently apply § 416.920. opinion →
Aiken v. Barnhart, the court merely cites § 416.920(a)(4) and (f) in support of its conclusion that the ALJ satisfied the applicable standards; it does not interpret, explain, or decide anything about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Butts v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 416.920 only while describing the ALJ’s procedure in the case’s background. It does not interpret or apply the regulation as a legal issue; the holding concerns the need for vocational-expert evidence at step five and the proper remand remedy. opinion →
Mead v. SSA, the court cites § 416.920 only as authority for the claimant's burden while discussing the separate fifteen-year prior-work issue; it does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Windus v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) only in its general description of the disability standard; it does not construe or apply that regulation in deciding the case. opinion →
Eichelberger v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 as authority for the sequential disability-evaluation process and describes the five steps, but it does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires. The holding concerns the ALJ's RFC and step-four determination under the substantial-evidence standard. opinion →
Eichelberger v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 as authority for the five-step sequential evaluation and then decides whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC and step-four finding. It does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Slovak v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 416.920 while affirming the ALJ’s disability determination, but it did not interpret the regulation or explain its requirements. The citation supports the conclusion that the ALJ properly applied the guidelines and is incidental to the substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Walker v. Barnhart, the court merely describes the ALJ’s use of the five-step regulations and reports the ALJ’s findings; it does not construe or independently apply 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. opinion →
Mitchell v. Barnhart, the court merely noted that the ALJ applied the regulation’s five-step analysis while reviewing whether the denial was supported by substantial evidence; it did not construe or independently decide what § 416.920 means or requires. opinion →
Jackson v. Barnhart, the court describes and applies the five-step disability framework, but § 416.920 appears only in a parenthetical citation to Mastro after the court cites the parallel § 404.1520 provisions. The court does not construe, explain, or independently apply § 416.920. opinion →
Hyde v. Barnhart, the subsection citation appears in the procedural history as the ALJ’s finding, and the regulation is also mentioned only in a general summary of the five-step SSI process. The court’s remand decision addresses the deficient vocational-expert hypothetical and does not interpret or apply § 416.920. opinion →
Ferstl v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920(a)-(f) only as a citation supporting the general five-step sequential evaluation framework. It does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; the remand is based on the ALJ’s credibility determination and weighing of the treating physician’s opinion. opinion →
BECKWITHE v. Barnhart, the court merely cited § 416.920 as the source of the familiar five-step disability analysis and summarized and applied that framework; it did not interpret or decide any dispute about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Harkins v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 as part of a general description of the five-step disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe the regulation or decide a dispute about what § 416.920 requires; the only specific reference to paragraph (f) reports the ALJ’s finding below. opinion →
Wright v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Reyes while the court describes the sequential evaluation and reviews the ALJ's decision under substantial-evidence and SSR 96-8p standards; the court does not interpret or independently apply § 416.920. opinion →
Fosha v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(b)-(f) to summarize the sequential-evaluation framework and reports the ALJ’s findings under that framework; it does not construe or decide what § 416.920 requires. The court’s actual analysis concerns the borderline-age rule in § 416.963(b). opinion →
White v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, International, the court cites § 416.920 to explain the differing standards used by Social Security and MetLife and to treat the SSA award as corroborative evidence in an ERISA benefits dispute. It does not decide a claim under the regulation or otherwise construe it as the basis for the judgment. opinion →
Tate Ex Rel. Tate v. Commissioner of Social SEC., the citation to § 416.920(f) appears only while reporting the ALJ’s prior determination. The court did not construe or independently apply that provision; its analysis of the child’s sequential evaluation and functional equivalence relied on §§ 416.924 and 416.926a. opinion →
Payne v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the general five-step SSI evaluation framework and cites § 416.920 as authority. Its decision remands for the ALJ’s inadequate analysis and explanation of the mental-impairment evidence, without deciding what § 416.920 means or resolving a disputed issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
Matlock v. Barnhart, the court merely reports the ALJ’s conclusion under § 416.920 as part of the procedural history; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Foley v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(a)-(f) only as background for the general five-step disability-evaluation process. Its remand addresses the evaluation of medical evidence and the vocational-expert hypothetical, without construing or deciding the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Porcher v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only while reporting the ALJ’s citation and application of the sequential-evaluation process. It does not interpret, explain, or decide what § 416.920 requires; its own discussion describes the parallel § 404.1520 framework. opinion →
Vester v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 only as background for the familiar five-step disability inquiry. It did not construe or decide any issue about that regulation; the appeal and holding concerned whether alcohol abuse was material to the claimant’s disability under § 416.935(b)(1). opinion →
Butts v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely cites § 416.920 in a footnote to support an illustrative observation about a hypothetical piano tuner; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Vester v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cites § 416.920 only in introductory background describing the familiar five-step disability inquiry. It does not interpret or decide a disputed issue about that regulation; the appeal and holding concern whether alcohol abuse was material to the disability determination under 20 C.F.R. § 416.935. opinion →
Thompson v. Barnhart, the court cites 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 in a footnote as authority for the five-step sequential evaluation and notes that the case concerns step five, but it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. The citation is incidental. opinion →
Street v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recites the regulation as part of the general disability-determination framework, but does not interpret or decide any issue about the requirements or application of § 416.920(a). opinion →
Smith v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) only while describing the regulatory sequence; its actual remand holding concerns the ALJ’s inadequate development of the administrative record and treating-physician evidence under other regulations. opinion →
Hodges v. Barnhart, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ used the five-step analysis under this regulation; the court does not interpret § 416.920 or decide what it requires. opinion →
Singleton v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the five-step disability framework and cites § 416.920 in a parenthetical; it does not interpret or apply any specific requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Kerwick v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(a) only as background for the five-step disability-evaluation process; it does not interpret or apply the regulation in deciding the appeal, which concerns the weighing of a treating physician's opinion. opinion →
Williams v. Barnhart, the opinion describes the adult sequential-evaluation steps and reports that the ALJ applied them, but the petitioner did not dispute those findings and the court expressly declined to address them. Section 416.920 was therefore not construed or applied as a contested issue by the court. opinion →
Kershaw v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human Services, 05-0632 (r.I.super. 2005), the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) while reciting the five-step disability-evaluation framework. Its decision does not construe or decide any requirement of § 416.920; the remand rests on the hearing officer's inadequate explanation and failure to address the evidence relevant to listings 6.02 and 6.06. opinion →
Wiltz v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the opinion cites § 416.920 in a footnote as authority for the generic five-step sequential evaluation framework. The court did not interpret the regulation or decide a disputed issue about what it requires; the citation is background to the disability analysis. opinion →
Reece v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only in a parenthetical citation to Mastro while describing the general five-step disability inquiry; it does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Oderbert v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only to describe the general five-step sequential evaluation framework; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
ZARKOWSKI v. Barnhart, section 416.920 appears only in a parenthetical citation to Mastro after the court recites the five-step disability framework under the parallel § 404.1520 provisions. The court did not interpret or decide anything about § 416.920; its rulings concerned the treating physician's opinion, pain credibility, and vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Pryce-Dawes v. Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(a) only while recounting the ALJ's procedural history and identifying the five-step process; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
TREGLER v. Barnhart, the citation occurs in the procedural description of the ALJ’s decision and summarizes the five-step framework. The court’s own rulings concern the ALJ’s failure to address a potentially applicable listing, identify occupations at step five, and explain the credibility finding; it does not interpret or independently apply § 416.920. opinion →
Dean v. Barnhart, the court recites the five-step disability framework and cites § 416.920 only as supporting authority; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Kornecky v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 416.920 only in a general explanation of the sequential disability-evaluation process. It did not interpret or apply the regulation to decide the appeal, which concerned whether the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Lian's opinion and treating-source status. opinion →
Owens Ex Rel. Metcalf v. Barnhart, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 only in a parenthetical citation to Mastro while reciting the general five-step disability framework; it did not interpret, explain, or decide anything about this regulation. opinion →
Smith v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only while reporting the ALJ’s use of the five-step process and step-five denial; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Robinson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court merely noted that § 416-920 generally explains how disability applications are evaluated, then clarified that the claimant’s argument concerned specific medical-source criteria governed by § 404.1520c. It did not interpret or apply § 416-920. opinion →
Kilcrease v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 while generally describing the sequential evaluation framework and recounting the ALJ’s step-by-step findings. It does not construe or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires; the ruling concerns the adequacy of the record and the ALJ’s disability decision. opinion →
Sims, Sandra K. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B., the court merely reports that the ALJ used the five-step framework and cites § 416.920(a)(4) in describing the proceedings below; it does not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Hersch v. Barnhart, the court merely describes the ALJ’s five-step process in the procedural discussion and does not construe or decide what § 416.920 requires or how it applies. opinion →
James v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) only as authority for a general description of the five-step disability-evaluation framework while reviewing the ALJ’s substantial-evidence determination; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Skidds v. SSA, the court merely described the five-step process and reported that the ALJ used it; the remand was based on new and material evidence under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), not on interpreting or deciding the application of § 416.920. opinion →
Hartzog v. Comm Social Security, the regulation is mentioned only to report the ALJ’s use of the five-step sequential analysis. The appellate court did not interpret or apply § 416.920; its holding concerned Listing § 12.05C and whether illiteracy was an additional impairment. opinion →
Kratman v. Barnhart, the court used § 416.920(a)(4)(iii) to describe the third step of the sequential disability analysis and the ALJ's progression to the next step; it did not construe or decide any issue about the subsection. opinion →
Powell v. Barnhart, the court merely recited the five-step evaluation process and cited § 416.920 as background before deciding the claimant's Step Four pain and residual-functional-capacity arguments; it did not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
SCHMEISER v. Barnhart, the court recited the five-step disability-evaluation process and described the ALJ’s use of it, but the remand ruling concerned weighing the treating physician’s opinions under §§ 404.1527 and 416.927, not the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Rogers v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 while reciting the general five-step disability framework and reports the ALJ’s step-two finding under § 416.920(c); it does not decide what the regulation means or how it applies to a disputed issue. opinion →
Mayes v. Social Security Administration, the court cites § 416.920(a) only as background authority for the five-step disability-evaluation process. It does not construe the regulation or decide an issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Bean v. Barnhart, the opinion cites § 416.920 only in a footnote to describe the general five-step framework. The court did not interpret or apply this regulation as a disputed issue, and its remand rested on other errors concerning impairment consideration, residual functional capacity, and past relevant work. opinion →
Kenney v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920(b) only in a supporting parenthetical while affirming the denial based on substantial evidence; it did not interpret or decide an issue about the regulation. opinion →
Rebeck v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 only while reciting the general five-step disability framework; it did not interpret or independently decide what § 416.920 requires. The court instead reviewed whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s denial of benefits. opinion →
Williams v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 while reciting the general five-step disability framework; it did not construe or decide the regulation. The remand rested on unresolved conflicts between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT under SSR 00-4p. opinion →
Whitmore v. Barnhart, the opinion merely reports the ALJ's step-five finding citing § 416.920(g); the court does not interpret or apply § 416.920 itself. Its own discussion concerns substantial-evidence review and the adequacy of the vocational-expert hypothetical. opinion →
Roman v. Barnhart, the opinion merely recounts the ALJ’s step-two finding and does not construe or independently analyze § 416.920(b). opinion →
Gilliss v. Astrue, the court merely reports the ALJ's findings under § 416.920(c) and (g); its remand rests on defective vocational hypotheticals, not on interpreting or applying this regulation. opinion →
Hernandez-Devereaux v. Astrue, Incidental: the court gives a general overview of the five-step SSI disability framework and cites § 416.920, but does not decide the statute’s meaning or application. The ruling instead concerns the ALJ’s evaluation of medical evidence, credibility, and residual functional capacity. opinion →
Ambrosini v. Astrue, the citation appears in the opinion only as part of the ALJ's reported step-two finding. The court did not construe or decide what § 416.920(c) requires; its remand concerned the evidentiary support for substance-abuse materiality under other regulations. opinion →
Mitsoff v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recited the five-step framework under § 416.920 as background applicable law. It did not construe or decide any dispute about what the regulation requires or how a particular step applies; the actual ruling concerned the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions and the RFC. opinion →
Stickler v. Colvin, the court mentions § 416.920 only to identify it as parallel to § 404.1520, then analyzes the disability claim under the § 404.1520 regulations. It does not independently construe or apply § 416.920. opinion →
Upshur v. Colvin, the regulation is cited only while reporting the ALJ's step-three finding in the procedural history. The court did not construe or decide anything about § 416.920(d); its remand concerned the vocational expert's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. opinion →
Dillon v. Colvin, the court cites § 416.920 only in a general description of the five-step sequential evaluation process and notes in a footnote that its criteria are the same as § 404.1520. The court does not decide a dispute about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 416.920; its reversal rests on the ALJ's treatment of the RFC and evidence. opinion →
Holmes v. Berryhill, the court cites § 416.920(a) only to describe the background five-step disability-evaluation process; it does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. The court's ruling concerns the ALJ's failure to develop the onset date and work-history evidence. opinion →
Wheeler v. Berryhill, the court merely recites the five-step framework as background. Its remand decision concerns the ALJ’s failure to apply SSR 12-2p and Listing 14.09D to fibromyalgia, not the meaning or application of 20 CFR § 416.920. opinion →
Short Horn v. Berryhill, the regulation is cited and summarized as background for the five-step disability-evaluation framework. The court did not interpret or decide the meaning or application of § 416.920; its decision addressed the ALJ's step-three analysis under Listing 1.02. opinion →
Pavao v. Berryhill, the court gives a background description of the five-step disability-evaluation process and does not construe or decide any disputed issue under § 416.920(a). The ruling instead concerns the ALJ’s weighing of a treating physician’s opinion and the RFC determination. opinion →
Patton v. Berryhill, the court cited § 416.920(a) only while reciting the generally applicable five-step disability-evaluation framework. It did not interpret or decide what § 416.920 requires; the decision addressed whether the step-five number of available jobs was significant under 20 CFR § 404.1566. opinion →
Knight v. Berryhill, the court cites § 416.920(a) only to describe the familiar five-step framework and the ALJ's process; it does not construe or decide any issue about what the regulation requires. The ruling instead concerns the ALJ's weighing of medical and lay evidence and remands on that basis. opinion →
Sheets v. Berryhill, the citation appears in the ALJ’s findings, which the court merely reports as procedural history; the court’s own decision does not interpret, explain, or decide the application of § 416.920(g). opinion →
Dole v. Berryhill, the court merely recites § 416.920(a) as the source of the five-step sequential evaluation and notes that review ends if the claimant is found not disabled; it does not construe or decide a disputed issue about the regulation. The ruling instead concerns the evidence supporting the ALJ’s listing, credibility, RFC, and step-five findings. opinion →
Hughes v. Berryhill, the court cites § 416.920(a) only while describing the general five-step sequential evaluation framework. It does not interpret or decide the requirements of that provision; the remand concerns the ALJ's evaluation of severity and the evidence at step two under other regulations. opinion →
Miller v. Berryhill, the court merely recites the sequential-evaluation framework and notes that the ALJ applied it; it does not construe or specifically decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. opinion →
Strothers v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited only in reporting the ALJ’s step-two finding; the court did not interpret or apply 20 CFR § 416.920(c). opinion →
Williams v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 as background for the five-step disability framework, but does not construe or decide the meaning or requirements of the regulation. The remand rests on the ALJ's failure to resolve apparent conflicts between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT/SCO under SSR 00-4p. opinion →
Whitmore v. Barnhart, the references to § 416.920(b) and (g) occur only in the opinion’s report of the ALJ’s numbered findings. The court does not adopt or construe those references; its own discussion cites the parallel § 404.1520(a) and decides whether the ALJ’s step-five determination was supported by substantial evidence, including the adequacy of the vocational-expert hypothetical. opinion →
Roman v. Barnhart, the citation appears in the magistrate judge’s report of the ALJ’s step-two finding. The court adopted the report but did not construe § 416.920(b) or independently decide what the subsection requires. opinion →
Gilliss v. Astrue, the court merely reports the ALJ's findings under § 416.920(c) and (g) in the procedural history. It does not construe or apply § 416.920; its own discussion of the sequential evaluation process cites the analogous § 404.1520(a), and the remand rests on defects in the ALJ's vocational-expert hypotheticals. opinion →
Hernandez-Devereaux v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920 and its subsections only while reciting the general five-step disability-evaluation framework. It did not construe or decide a disputed issue about what the regulation requires or how it applies; the decision turned on the ALJ’s handling of the medical evidence, testimony, and RFC. opinion →
Ambrosini v. Astrue, section 416.920(c) is mentioned in the ALJ’s findings and the opinion’s general description of the five-step evaluation, but the court did not decide what the severe-impairment requirement means or how subsection (c) applies. The holding concerned the evidentiary support for finding substance abuse material to disability under 20 C.F.R. § 416.935. opinion →
Mitsoff v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recites the five-step disability framework and reports the ALJ’s findings under § 416.920; it does not construe the regulation or decide the case based on what § 416.920 requires. The remand rests on the ALJ’s treatment of medical opinions and unsupported RFC determination. opinion →
Stickler v. Colvin, section 416.920 appears only in a footnote stating that its criteria are the same as § 404.1520. The court’s substantive discussion and ruling address the Title II regulation and the ALJ’s sequential-evaluation analysis; it does not construe or independently apply § 416.920. opinion →
Upshur v. Colvin, the court is reporting the ALJ's step-three finding and does not itself interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); the court's remand concerns the step-five vocational-evidence issue. opinion →
Dillon v. Colvin, the court mentions § 416.920 only as part of background describing the five-step sequential evaluation process and notes in a footnote that its criteria are the same as § 404.1520. The case is a Title II DIB appeal, and the court did not decide an issue about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Short Horn v. Berryhill, the court merely recited the five-step process as background and reported that the ALJ applied it; the decision actually resolved whether the claimant met Listing 1.02 and did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Pavao v. Berryhill, the court describes the five-step sequential evaluation process in the standard-of-review discussion, but no party disputed the meaning or application of § 416.920(a), and the decision was based on the ALJ’s treatment of medical opinions and RFC determination. opinion →
Patton v. Berryhill, the court merely recited § 416.920(a) as the general five-step framework. It did not construe or decide the application of that regulation; the ruling addressed whether the Commissioner showed a significant number of jobs at step five under 20 CFR § 404.1566. opinion →
Knight v. Berryhill, the court gives a general description of the sequential-evaluation process in the standard-of-review section, but does not decide a disputed issue about § 416.920. Its remand rests on the ALJ’s treatment of medical and lay-witness evidence and the step-three listing analysis. opinion →
Sheets v. Berryhill, the citation appears only in the ALJ's listed finding, which the court reports as procedural history; the court does not construe or apply § 416.920(g). opinion →
Dole v. Berryhill, the court cited § 416.920(a) while reciting the general five-step disability-evaluation framework and reporting that the ALJ applied it. The court did not interpret or decide any disputed issue about § 416.920; its analysis concerned the claimant's listed impairment and other evidentiary issues. opinion →
Miller v. Berryhill, the court cited § 416.920(a) only in a general description of the five-step disability evaluation process. The court’s substantive analysis and ruling applied the parallel DIB regulation, § 404.1520, and did not construe or decide anything specifically about § 416.920. opinion →
Strothers v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely reported the ALJ’s step-two finding and cited § 416.920(c) in that procedural history; it did not construe or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Smead v. Colvin, the court merely recites the five-step framework and reports the ALJ’s findings under §§ 416.920(c) and (g). It does not construe or resolve an issue about § 416.920; the decision rests on substantial-evidence review of the ALJ’s medical-opinion, RFC, and vocational findings. opinion →
Waldock v. Commissioner of Social Security, the citation appears in the procedural history describing what the ALJ decided at step two. The court did not construe or decide anything about the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c); its ruling concerned the RFC determination and the evidentiary gap created by discounting the medical opinions. opinion →
Nickels v. Berryhill, the regulation is cited in introductory background describing the sequential-evaluation framework and in reporting that the ALJ applied it; the court does not construe § 416.920 or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Jensen v. Berryhill, the court cites § 416.920(a) only to describe the standard five-step disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about how it applies; the decision turns on substantial-evidence review of the ALJ’s findings regarding the listings, RFC, medical opinions, credibility, and vocational testimony. opinion →
Nikkila v. Saul, the court cited § 416.920(a) only to describe the five-step evaluation framework and reported that the ALJ applied it; the court did not interpret or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Gadsby v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion merely reports the ALJ's Step 3 finding and cites § 416.920(d) as part of a string citation; the court does not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Haukaas v. Saul, the court merely recites the five-step framework and cites § 416.920(a) in the background. It does not construe or decide any issue about § 416.920; the substantive analysis proceeds under the parallel § 404.1520 provisions and concerns the ALJ's RFC assessment and evidentiary support. opinion →
Jockisch v. Saul, the court cites § 416.920(a) only while giving background on the SSA’s sequential evaluation process. It does not construe or decide any disputed issue under § 416.920; the opinion states that its further references will be to the parallel DI regulation, § 404.1520. opinion →
Davis v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the opinion reports the ALJ's severe-impairment finding under § 416.920(c) and describes the five-step process as background, but the court does not construe or decide anything about the statute's meaning or requirements. opinion →
Prinzing v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely reports the ALJ's Step 2 finding and cites § 416.920(c) as the regulatory basis; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about what the statute requires. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is mentioned only while reporting the ALJ’s sequential-evaluation steps and impairment findings. The court did not construe § 416.920 or decide what it requires; remand was based on the ALJ’s failure to develop the record concerning the claimant’s mental impairments. opinion →
Mardanghomi v. Saul, the court cites § 416.920(d) to identify the step-three evaluation framework, but does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. Its holding concerns whether the claimant met Listing 1.02A based on ineffective ambulation. opinion →
Nichols v. Saul, the court cited § 416.920(d) in a general description of the step-three process and reported the ALJ’s step-three finding, but did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. The ruling instead concerned step-two and residual-functional-capacity errors. opinion →
De Freeuw v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited in the plaintiff’s argument, and the court does not construe or independently apply § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); it remands because the ALJ’s decision was internally inconsistent in finding severe impairments without corresponding RFC limitations. opinion →
Wright v. Saul, the court cites § 416.920(a) only in describing the general five-step evaluation process. It does not interpret or decide what § 416.920 requires; the holding concerns the step-five national-economy requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) and 20 CFR § 404.1566. opinion →
DOAKS-PERKINS v. KIJAKAZI, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4)(iv) and (v) only in a generic summary of the sequential evaluation steps; its remand concerns the evidentiary support for the ALJ's vocational-expert findings, not the meaning or application of this regulation. opinion →
Janssen v. Commissioner of Social Security, the citation to § 416.920(d) appears only in the background while reporting the ALJ’s step-three finding; the court does not interpret, explain, or independently apply the statute. opinion →
ROBERTSON v. KIJAKAZI, the court cites the regulation in its general explanation of the five-step disability framework, but it does not construe or apply subsections (a)(4)(iv) or (a)(4)(v) in deciding the case. The remand concerns the ALJ's RFC, subjective-symptom analysis, and evaluation of medical-source opinions. opinion →
Simon v. Kijakazi, the court cited § 416.920(a) in its background summary of the five-step evaluation process and reported that the ALJ applied that process. It did not construe the regulation or decide a dispute about what it requires; the ruling instead addressed the ALJ’s evaluation of fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome under other authorities. opinion →
Mata v. Kijakazi, the citation to § 416.920(d) appears in the court's procedural summary of the ALJ's step-three finding. The court did not construe, explain, or decide anything about the meaning or application of subsection (d). opinion →
Frohman-Eades v. Kijakazi, the court gives a general description of the sequential evaluation process and cites § 416.920(a) as background. It does not construe or decide any disputed issue about that regulation; the ruling instead addresses the ALJ's treatment of medical opinions, the claimant's credibility, and the evidence supporting the disability determination. opinion →
CAIN v. O'MALLEY, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) while reciting the general five-step disability evaluation framework in its legal standards; it does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about its meaning or application. opinion →
Alejandro v. Kijakazi, the court merely recited the five-step disability-evaluation framework and reported the ALJ’s step-two and step-three findings; it did not construe or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. opinion →
Pierman v. Saul, the court cites § 416.920(d) while reciting the five-step disability-evaluation framework; it did not construe or decide any dispute about the subsection’s meaning or application. opinion →
Smith v. SSA, the citations to § 416.920(b) and (c) report the ALJ’s findings in the procedural history. The court did not construe or independently apply those subsections; its review addressed substantial evidence and other issues. opinion →
Hoynoski v. Saul, the opinion cites 20 CFR § 416.920(a) in a general summary of the five-step disability-evaluation framework, but it does not construe or independently apply that regulation; the decision concerns review of the ALJ’s disability determination under the DIB regulations. opinion →
Joanne M. Hacker v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only as authority for the familiar five-step disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe the regulation or decide a dispute about what it requires; the decision turns on substantial-evidence review of the ALJ’s treatment of medical opinions and vocational evidence. opinion →
Joanne M. Hacker v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cites § 416.920 only as support for a general recitation of the familiar five-step disability process. It does not interpret the regulation or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
George v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920(d) only while reciting the general step-three listing rule; it did not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about its meaning or application. opinion →
Woods v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(d) while reciting the general five-step disability framework and the step-three listing rule. It did not decide a dispute about that subsection or base its disposition on step three; the remand concerned the claimant’s residual functional capacity and step-four vocational issues. opinion →
White v. Barnhart, the court merely cites § 416.920 while reciting the general five-step disability framework. It does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application; the decision instead concerns the ALJ's RFC analysis and consideration of medical opinions. opinion →
Jolly v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 416.920 only in a parenthetical string citation supporting the generally described five-step disability inquiry. It does not construe the regulation or decide an issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
Kesner v. Barnhart, the opinion merely recites the five-step sequential process and reports how the ALJ proceeded through those steps. The court’s actual decision turned on the evidentiary support for the ALJ’s findings and the weighing of the treating physician’s opinion, without construing or deciding what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Riepen v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(a) only in a footnote to summarize the five-step evaluation sequence. Its actual ruling concerns the ALJ's consideration of all impairments after step two and relies on Maziarz, without construing or deciding what § 416.920(a) requires. opinion →
Behn v. Barnhart, the court recites the five-step sequential evaluation framework under § 416.920 as background, but the decision turns on the ALJ's failure to comply with the separate mental-impairment requirements in § 416.920a; it does not construe or decide a disputed issue under § 416.920. opinion →
Clark v. Comm Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(b) only to identify the general five-step SSI disability framework; it does not construe the regulation or resolve a dispute about its requirements. opinion →
DeBoard v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recites the five-step evaluation framework and reports the Administrative Law Judge’s application of it; it does not construe, clarify, or decide any issue about 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. opinion →
Colvin v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 416.920 only to recite the general five-step disability framework and termination rule. Its decision turned on substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s reliance on the vocational expert and on the meaning of the medical-assessment ratings, not on any interpretation or application of § 416.920 itself. opinion →
Ramsey v. SSA, the court cited § 416.920 only while reciting the five-step disability-evaluation framework and reporting that the ALJ used it; it did not construe or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Travis v. Barnhart, the court merely recited the five-step disability-evaluation framework and cited § 416.920(a) as background while resolving whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence; it did not interpret or independently decide an issue about this regulation. opinion →
Colvin v. Barnhart, the court recites the five-step disability framework and cites § 416.920(a)(4), but it does not interpret or independently decide the meaning or application of that regulation; its actual decision concerns substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's step-four finding. opinion →
Lewis v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the five-step framework and cites § 416.920(b)-(f), while reporting the ALJ’s step findings. It does not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Travis v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cites § 416.920(a) and (f) while summarizing the five-step disability-evaluation framework and reporting the ALJ’s step-four finding. It does not construe or independently decide what either provision requires; the appeal is resolved on substantial-evidence review of the ALJ’s disability determination. opinion →
Stennett v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(a) only to recite the general sequential disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about how its steps apply; the decision instead concerns the ALJ’s evaluation of pain, credibility, and residual functional capacity. opinion →
Stennett v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited only as part of the general framework for disability determinations. The court did not construe or apply § 416.920(a) in resolving a dispute about its meaning or requirements; the ruling instead addressed the ALJ’s evaluation of pain evidence and substantial evidence. opinion →
Wainwright v. Comr. of Soc. Security, the court merely cites § 416.920 while reciting the general five-step sequential evaluation process and describing the ALJ’s analysis; it does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Gallegos v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920(a)(4) only to describe the procedural significance of a past-relevant-work finding in the five-step evaluation. It did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; the actual remand concerned uncertainty about the disability date and application of SSR 84-25 and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). opinion →
Matthews v. Astrue, the court merely identifies § 416.920 as the regulation governing the five-part process used by the ALJ; it does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of the regulation as a matter of law. opinion →
Massachi v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) and (e) only in background footnotes to describe the five-step disability inquiry and the residual-functional-capacity step. It does not construe or decide what either provision means or requires; its holding concerns SSR 00-4p and vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Massachi v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the court cited § 416.920(a)(4) only in a footnote describing the five-step disability evaluation; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. The court's actual holding addressed SSR 00-4p and vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Thompson v. Astrue, the court cites the regulation to describe the five-step framework and the procedural posture of the claimant's evaluation; it does not interpret, define, or decide a requirement of § 416.920. opinion →
Adams v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, the court cited § 416.920 only to describe the standard used in the Social Security disability determination, while deciding whether MetLife adequately considered that determination under ERISA. It did not interpret or apply § 416.920 as the basis for its own ruling. opinion →
Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 416.920 to identify the ALJ’s five-step framework and recites the step-two severity standard in a footnote, but it does not construe or resolve a dispute about this regulation. The decision instead turns on the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions and the claimant’s credibility. opinion →
Kasberger, John M. v. Astrue, Michael J., the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) only to identify the five-step disability-evaluation framework and to describe the ALJ’s findings; it does not interpret or independently decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Wilson v. Astrue, the court mentions § 416.920 only while reporting the ALJ’s use of the five-step evaluation in the procedural history. The court did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; its actual holding concerned the evidentiary sufficiency of the ALJ’s hypothetical questions at step five. opinion →
Wilson v. Michael J. Astrue, etc., the court cites § 416.920 only while reporting the ALJ's five-step evaluation in the procedural history. The court did not construe the regulation or decide what it requires; its review instead concerned substantial evidence and defective vocational-expert hypotheticals. opinion →
Soverns v. Astrue, the regulation is cited to recite the general five-step disability-evaluation framework and its severe-impairment terminology; the court did not construe or independently rule on § 416.920. The actual remand holding concerned the failure to evaluate Listing 12.05(C). opinion →
Lewis v. Astrue, the regulation is cited only to identify the five-step evaluation process described in the procedural history. The court does not construe § 416.920(a) or decide what it requires; its holding addresses whether any failure to list bursitis at Step 2 was harmless. opinion →
Christner v. Astrue, the court mentions § 416.920 to describe the ALJ's five-step analysis and later cites subsection (a)(4)(iii) while explaining the step-three consequence of meeting Listing 12.05. It did not construe, dispute, or independently decide the meaning or requirements of § 416.920; the holding concerned the ALJ's treatment of the mental-retardation listing and remanded for reconsideration. opinion →
Hawthorne v. Astrue, the court recited the five-step framework and reported that the ALJ stopped at step four; it did not construe or decide what 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 requires. The remand rested on the ALJ's inadequate evaluation of treating-physician opinions under § 416.927. opinion →
Gilcrease v. Astrue, the regulation is cited to identify the sequential-evaluation framework the ALJ used, while the court's actual decision concerns substantial evidence supporting the step-five finding and does not interpret or independently apply § 416.920. opinion →
Rogers v. Comm Social Security, the court mentions § 416.920 in describing the ALJ’s sequential evaluation and reporting what the ALJ decided at each step. The appellate decision instead turns on the ALJ’s handling of treating-physician opinions, fibromyalgia evidence, and credibility; it does not interpret or establish a rule about § 416.920. opinion →
Albidrez v. Astrue, the opinion recites the five-step sequential evaluation and the ALJ's application of it, but does not interpret or decide what § 416.920 means or requires. Its actual ruling concerns the evidentiary basis for the Step Three medical-equivalence finding. opinion →
Valiquette v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920 while summarizing the standard five-step sequential evaluation and burdens of proof. It does not interpret the regulation or decide a disputed issue about what § 416.920 requires; the ruling instead addresses the ALJ’s credibility findings and residual functional capacity assessment. opinion →
Vo v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920 only in a parenthetical supporting its recitation of the five-step disability evaluation; it did not construe or independently apply that regulation. opinion →
Hoadley v. Astrue, the court merely recited the familiar five-step framework and reported the ALJ’s use of it. The court’s substantive rulings concerned the evidentiary support for the residual-functional-capacity finding and the need for vocational-expert testimony, not the meaning or application of § 416.920. opinion →
Vo v. Astrue, the court recites the five-step framework using the parallel § 404.1520 provisions; § 416.920 appears only in a citation to Mastro and is not construed or applied as the basis of the decision. opinion →
Davidson v. Astrue, the regulation is cited only to identify the familiar five-step evaluation process reported as having been used by the ALJ. The court does not construe § 416.920 or decide what it requires; its review concerns the ALJ’s step-five decision and the evidentiary support for that decision. opinion →
Perillo v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920 only in the procedural background while reporting the ALJ’s five-step findings. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Defenbaugh v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the court cited § 416.920(a)(4)(v) only as part of identifying the step-five sequential-evaluation context. It did not interpret the regulation or decide what the regulation requires; its holding concerned the evidentiary sufficiency and propriety of the ALJ's reliance on vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Savannah v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920(a)(4)(h) only to identify the purpose of the remand’s severity determination; it did not interpret, define, or decide any issue about the provision itself. opinion →
Sanders v. Barnhart, the court cited § 416.920 while summarizing the disability-benefits framework, but it did not construe or independently apply the regulation; the decision turned on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC and denial of benefits. opinion →
Hunter v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920(a)(4)(v) while reciting the sequential-evaluation framework and then reviewed whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s security-guard finding. It did not interpret or decide any disputed requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Laflamme v. SSA, the court merely described the ALJ's use of the five-step process and cited § 416.920(a); it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Oakes, Tonya v. Astrue, Michael J., the court cites § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v) only to describe the disability-analysis framework while addressing the treating-physician rule and residual functional capacity. It does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 416.920 requires. opinion →
Hepp v. Astrue, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the regulation's five-step process; it does not construe § 416.920 or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Hepp v. Astrue, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ used the regulation's five-step process and cites it in a footnote; the court does not interpret or otherwise decide what § 416.920 means or requires. opinion →
Bargas v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4)(v) only to identify the fifth step of the Social Security benefits review process. It does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; its ruling concerns the ALJ’s evaluation of evidence and development of the record. opinion →
Pottle v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify that the ALJ reached step five of the five-step evaluation process; it does not interpret or apply the regulation in deciding the appeal. opinion →
Anderson v. Astrue, the court mentions § 416.920(a)(4) while reciting the general five-step disability framework, but does not construe or apply that provision to resolve a disputed issue. The decision rests on substantial evidence, including Anderson's substantial gainful activity and medical evidence. opinion →
Coleman v. Astrue, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ followed the five-step sequence and summarizes the ALJ’s findings. The court did not construe or decide what 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 means or requires. opinion →
White v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920 only in a general statement of the five-step process and separately reports that the ALJ followed that process; it does not construe or decide what § 416.920 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Pevarnik v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) to recite the five-step disability-evaluation framework as background. It does not interpret or decide any requirement of the regulation; the ruling instead affirms under the substantial-evidence standard. opinion →
Blackstock v. Astrue, the regulation is cited in reciting the ALJ's step-one finding and in a general summary of the five-step disability framework. The court did not construe or independently apply § 416.920; its decision addressed whether the claimant satisfied Listing 12.05C. opinion →
Alcantara v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920 only to identify the step-five context of the ALJ's decision. It did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; the remand rested on the lack of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's factual finding. opinion →
Cornett v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920(a) as part of a general statement of the disability framework. It did not construe or decide a disputed issue about that subsection; the court's operative interpretation concerned § 416.966(c) and unemployment caused by a criminal record. opinion →
Khounesavatdy v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920 only to summarize the five-step disability-evaluation sequence in the regulatory background; it does not construe or decide an issue about the regulation. opinion →
Mendoza v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920(a)(4)(iv) only as support for the ALJ’s factual determination that Mendoza could work full time; it did not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Cordary v. Florida Department of Children & Families, the regulation appears only in a footnote reciting the five-step disability analysis. The court’s decision concerns the hearing officer’s failure to explain the evidence and findings at steps three and five; it does not construe or decide what § 416.920 means or requires. opinion →
Lohr v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920(a) only in its general background statement of the sequential disability-evaluation framework. The remand rests on the ALJ's failure to consider non-medical-source opinions under SSR 06-03p, and the court does not interpret or apply § 416.920(a) to resolve a disputed issue. opinion →
Crawford v. Barnhart, the court cites § 416.920 only to summarize the five-step disability-evaluation process. Its actual remand ruling rests on the borderline-age requirement in § 416.963, so the court does not construe or apply § 416.920. opinion →
Kriebaum v. Astrue, the court cited § 416.920 in a footnote as the authority for the five-part test while describing the ALJ’s decision. It did not construe the regulation or decide what it requires; the citation was incidental to affirming the denial of benefits. opinion →
Collier v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920 only as part of a general reference to the five-step sequential evaluation process while recounting the ALJ's decision. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Cordero v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920 only while reciting the general five-step disability framework and then reports the ALJ’s use of that framework. The decision does not construe or decide any disputed requirement of § 416.920; the judgment rests on substantial evidence and the separate drug-abuse materiality analysis under § 416.935. opinion →
Hailey v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 416.920 only to identify the Social Security Administration's five-step disability-evaluation process and then applies the substantial-evidence standard to the agency's decision. It does not interpret, decide the requirements of, or otherwise hold about § 416.920. opinion →
Woodley v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920 as authority for the five-step disability-evaluation framework, but does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires; the remand rests on contradictory vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Pickett v. Astrue, the court cites § 416.920(a)(4) in a general standard-of-review statement identifying the five-step process, but does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about that provision. The court's substantive discussion of mental-impairment evaluation concerns § 416.920a instead. opinion →
Van Vickle v. Astrue, the court mentions § 416.920(a)(4) only to describe the ALJ's procedure in the procedural history; it does not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Vickle v. Astrue, the regulation is mentioned only in reporting the five-step process used by the ALJ; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 416.920. opinion →
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, the opinion cites 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 only while reporting the ALJ’s procedural use of the five-step framework. The appellate court does not interpret the regulation or decide a legal issue about what it requires. opinion →
Juszczyk v. Astrue, the court only mentions § 416.920(a)(4) while describing the ALJ's regulatory five-step evaluation in the procedural history; it does not interpret or apply the statute itself. opinion →
…and 7,316 more.

Rulemaking authority

Authority for 20 C.F.R. Part 416 (SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED), which contains this section:

Secs. 702(a)(5) and 1601-1635 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 902(a)(5) and 1381-1383d); sec. 212, Pub. L. 93-66, 87 Stat. 155 (42 U.S.C. 1382 note); sec. 502(a), Pub. L. 94-241, 90 Stat. 268 (48 U.S.C. 1681 note).

From the part's authority statement in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR).

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