Statute Annotations › Federal › 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

Evaluation of disability in adults: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
6,452
Cited in passing
26,624
Citing cases indexed
71,843
Case dates
1981–2026
Screened through
2026-06-25
Checked for later law changes
2026-09-30
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

33,076 citing cases reviewed of 71,843 in the citation index: 6,452 interpreted the section (annotated below), 26,624 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-25 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1985-03-05 SSA revised § 404.1520 (50 FR 8727, corrected 1985-05-07); its five-step framework continued. Source
  • 1987-06-08 The Supreme Court held in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, that the step-two severity regulation is facially valid, displacing earlier holdings that § 404.1520(c) could not be used. Source
  • 1991-08-01 SSA amended § 404.1520 to apply the adult sequential process to disability-based widow's and widower's benefits for months after December 1990 (56 FR 36960). Source
  • 2000-12-21 SSA corrected § 404.1520(a)'s cross-reference for continuing disability review to § 404.1594(f); the five-step rule for initial claims was unchanged. Source
  • 2003-09-25 SSA reorganized § 404.1520, moving the old step-four and step-five provisions to (f) and (g), and expressly placed one residual-functional-capacity assessment between steps three and four for use at both later steps (68 FR 51153). Source
  • 2012-03-26 SSA added the § 404.1520(a)(3) cross-reference to new § 404.1520b, which gives adjudicators flexibility in resolving insufficient or inconsistent evidence rather than always recontacting the medical source first (77 FR 10651). Source
  • 2012-08-24 SSA added § 404.1520(h), permitting an expedited step-five denial without a step-four past-work finding when past-work evidence is insufficient and the claimant can adjust to other work (77 FR 43492). Source
  • 2016-03-28 SSR 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p's separate symptom-credibility framing; adjudicators assess symptom intensity and persistence against the evidence, without judging general character. Source
  • 2017-03-27 SSA's new § 404.1520c ended controlling-weight treatment of treating-source opinions for claims filed on or after this date; § 404.1527 continues to govern earlier claims (82 FR 5844). Source
  • 2024-06-08 SSA narrowed past relevant work under §§ 404.1560(b)(1) and 404.1565(a) from the preceding 15 years to five years and excluded work started and stopped within fewer than 30 calendar days (89 FR 27653). Source

Residual functional capacity

At the step-three point where impairments do not meet or equal a listing, § 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine residual functional capacity from all relevant medical and other record evidence, and that assessment is used at steps four and five.

Saez v. Colvin · filed 2016-10-24(e)

If the impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ makes a finding about the claimant’s residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical evidence and other evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to step four and to consider the relevant evidence in making that determination.

Dillon v. Colvin · filed 2016-09-26(e)

Before considering step four of the evaluation process, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 CFR § 404.1520(e). RFC is a claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite any limitations from his impairments. 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(1). In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including those which are not severe. 20 CFR § 404.1545(e). All of the relevant medical and non-medical evidence in the record must be considered. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(e) and 404.1545. ... The ALJ did not complete a proper analysis of Mr. Dillon’s RFC at step four.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before deciding whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Roberson v. Linda McMahon, etc. · filed 2007-04-02(e)

Before determining whether Ms. Roberson was able to return to her past work, the ALJ was required to determine her RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an individualized assessment of each claimant's residual functional capacity before deciding whether the claimant can perform prior work.

City of New York v. Heckler · filed 1984-08-27(e)

If the residual functional capacity is consistent with prior employment, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). ... The procedural irregularity challenged in this litigation concerns the fourth step of the sequential evaluation process—the determination of residual functional capacity. In disregard of the regulatory requirement to conduct an individualized assessment of the residual functional capacity of each claimant, SSA, informally and without public disclosure, adopted an administrative practice that effectively imposed a presumption upon the determination of eligibility for DI benefits: Claimants whose mental impairments were not as severe as those in the Listing of Impairments were presumed to retain a residual functional capacity sufficient to perform at least unskilled work.
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Section 404.1520(f) permits the required residual-functional-capacity determinations and supporting reasoning to appear throughout the administrative law judge's opinion, rather than requiring a separate specific finding in one designated section.

Roger WAITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appell · filed 1987-06-01(f)

Waite avers that the Secretary erred in determining whether he could do other work despite his limitations because the AU failed to make a specific finding of his residual functional capacity, in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). ... We examine the AU’s opinion as a whole to ascertain whether he considered all of the relevant evidence, made the required determinations, and gave supporting reasons for his decisions. ... An AU may recite his determinations and supporting reasoning in either the findings or the discussion section of his opinion. ... Here, the AU discussed Waite’s residual functional capacity at length in his opinion, specifically noting the extent of Waite’s “residual permanent injury of a total loss of motor and sensory function of his non-dominant left upper extremity.” ... This is sufficient consideration of Waite's residual functional capacity, or what work Waite can do despite his limitations. Id.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the adjudicator to consider a claimant’s residual functional capacity and whether the claimant can still perform the type of employment performed in the past.

Virgil A. HALL, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of United States Department of Health and Human Services, Appelle · filed 1988-09-27(e)

The Secretary’s regulations require the AU to consider a claimant’s residual functional capacity and whether he can still perform the type of employment he has performed in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity and denying benefits when the claimant can perform prior work.

Smith v. Shalala · filed 1994-02-17(e)

Pursuant to the sequential evaluation process established by the Social Security regulations, if a claimant’s impairments are not listed in the “Listing of Impairments” contained in the Appendix of the regulations, the Secretary must assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RPC”); that is, the claimant’s capacity to engage in basic work activities. If the claimant’s RFC permits him to engage in his prior work, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the claimant’s residual functional capacity to be determined at step four, and subsection (f) carries that RFC finding forward with other factors at step five to assess ability to perform other work.

Jones v. Apfel · filed 2000-01-04(e), (f)

The claimant’s RFC is determined once, in detail, at step four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); Social Security Ruling 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *2, *5-*9; Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5-*7; Social Security Ruling 86-8, 1986 WL 68636, at *4; see also Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). If the evaluation of the claim proceeds to step five, the same RFC finding is considered along with other factors to determine whether the claimant can perform work other than his or her past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); Social Security Ruling 86-8, 1986 WL 68636, at *7.
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At the fourth step of the disability evaluation, § 404.1520(f) requires assessing residual functional capacity and determining whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Wilson v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart · filed 2002-03-06(f)

Since we have already determined that Wilson does not have an impairment which meets or equals those contained in the Listings and that Wilson has not had a continuous disability, the next inquiry is whether the claimant has an impairment which prevents his past relevant work. This step assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and measures whether a claimant can perform past relevant work despite his or her impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); see also Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Subsection (e) requires assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity after step three when the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment.

Jones v. Barnhart · filed 2003-01-10(e)

If his condition had met the equivalency requirement, there would have been no need to measure his RFC. That procedure is only required when the claimant's condition is determined in step three not to meet or equal a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess a claimant's residual functional capacity before determining whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Depover v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart · filed 2003-11-14(e)

To reach his decision, the ALJ was required to assess Mr. Depover's RFC, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), which is defined as "the most [a claimant] can still do despite" his or her "physical or mental limitations," see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
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Section 404.1520 uses a five-step sequence, with step four addressing past relevant work and step five addressing other work based on residual functional capacity and vocational factors.

Butler, Joan S. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B. · filed 2004-01-13(e)

The ALJ’s RFC assessment bears on Butler’s ability to perform past relevant work (step four) and her ability to do ‘‘other work’’ (step five). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f); id. §§ 404.1545(a)(5)(i)-(ii), 416.945(a)(5)(i)-(ii). It is designed to determine the claimant’s uppermost ability to perform regular and continuous work-related physical and mental activities in a work environment.
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Section 404.1520(e) directs the Commissioner to use a claimant’s residual functional capacity at steps four and five to assess past relevant work and adjustment to other work.

Perez v. Barnhart · filed 2005-07-01(e)

The claimant’s RFC is used at both steps four and five of the sequential analysis: at the fourth step to determine if the claimant can still do his past relevant work, and at the fifth step to determine whether the claimant can adjust to any other type of work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) places assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity at step four of the sequential evaluation.

RICKERTSEN v. Barnhart · filed 2005-08-12(a)(4)(iv)

The Court is also aware that the regulations regarding the assessment of residual functional capacity were revised on August 26, 2003. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) states that the Commissioner’s assessment of the claimant’s residual functional is assessed at step four of the sequential evaluation.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to assess a claimant’s RFC using all relevant medical and other evidence to determine whether the claimant can perform past relevant work or adjust to other work.

Humphries v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart · filed 2006-06-08(e)

In determining whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act, the ALJ is required to include an assessment of the claimant’s RFC to determine whether the claimant can do her past relevant work or can make an adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The RFC assessment is based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the case record. Id.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity using all relevant medical and other evidence to determine whether the claimant can perform past work or adjust to other work.

Fries v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2006-09-14(e)

In determining whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act, the ALJ is required to make several findings under a five-step sequential evaluation process, including an assessment of the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) to determine whether the claimant can do her past relevant work or can make an adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The RFC assessment is based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the case record. Id.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the Commissioner to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity after determining that the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, and that assessment is used at steps four and five.

Perbeck v. Astrue · filed 2007-05-17(e)

If plaintiffs impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the Commissioner assesses claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the process.
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Section 404.1520 requires the claimant's residual functional capacity to be assessed between steps three and four and then used at both steps four and five.

Lingenfelter v. Astrue · filed 2007-10-04(4)

Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your residual functional capacity. . . . We use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step four and step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before step four and to consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including nonsevere impairments, in making that determination.

Rapp v. Astrue · filed 2009-11-04(e)

Before considering step four of the evaluation process above — whether the claimant can perform past relevant work — the ALJ must first determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e)). An individual’s residual functional capacity is her ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments. In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 416.920(e), and 416.945; SSR 96-8p).
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Subsection (e) requires the SSA to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity after the claimant does not meet or equal a listed impairment, for use at steps four and five.

Rosado v. Astrue · filed 2010-05-20(e)

The new § 404.1520(e) explains that if the claimant has an impairment that does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the SSA will assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The SSA uses the residual functional capacity assessment at step four to determine whether the claimant can perform past relevant work and, if necessary, at step five to determine whether the claimant can do any work. ... The ALJ appropriately utilized the residual functional capacity assessment amendments in this case.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity after step three and before step four of the sequential evaluation.

Young v. Astrue · filed 2011-01-25(e)

After step three and before proceeding to step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ was mandated to ascertain Claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity based on the sustained work-related activities the claimant can perform on a regular and continuing basis despite the claimant’s limitations.

Feskens v. Astrue · filed 2011-04-08(e)

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, he must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a regular and continuing basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the Commissioner to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity before steps four and five and use it to determine whether the claimant can perform past relevant work or adjust to other work.

Borrego v. Astrue · filed 2011-10-04(e)

Before considering the fourth and fifth steps, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). ... “The claimant’s RFC is used at both steps four and five of the sequential analysis: at the fourth step to determine if the claimant can still do his [or her] past relevant work, and at the fifth step to determine whether the claimant can adjust to any other type of work.”
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Section 404.1520 requires an ALJ to assess residual functional capacity before the fourth step and use that assessment at the fourth and fifth steps.

Lehman v. Astrue · filed 2013-02-22(a)(4), (e)

Before an ALJ advances to the fourth step, he must assess plaintiffs “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), which is then used at the fourth and fifth steps. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), (e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the decision maker to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to step four.

Henderson v. Carolyn Colvin, Acting Cmsnr · filed 2013-03-26(e)

Before considering step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must first determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). An individual’s residual functional capacity is her ability to do physical and mental work activities despite limitations from impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545. The ALJ spent approximately five pages detailing his findings about her residual functional capacity, relying in part on testimony of medical experts, including Dr. Hopson, Dr. Kaber, and at least six others. Medical expert Dr. Sowell testified that Henderson had a residual functional capacity for medium-level work.
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to step four of the disability analysis.

Douglass v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2018-04-09(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity before Step Four of the disability analysis.

Hall v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2018-04-13(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before deciding at Step Four whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Manuel v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2018-04-19(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before Step Four of the disability analysis.

Gulley v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2018-04-23(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess and make a finding about a claimant’s residual functional capacity using all relevant medical and other evidence; the court upheld the RFC assessment as adequately addressing the claimant’s limitations.

Hooks v. Berryhill · filed 2018-03-29(e)

Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... Although the ALJ may not have articulated precise findings regarding appropriate response to customary work pressures, interactions with supervisors, dealing with change in the work place, or ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace, he did address these limitation generally. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first claim of error is meritless.
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Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity while considering all medically determinable impairments, including non-severe impairments.

Shered v. Colvin · filed 2018-04-27(e)

Quite simply, the ALJ made a determination that the Plaintiff had the non-severe medical impairment of depression at step two, but then failed to discuss this impairment when determining the Plaintiff’s RFC in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and § 404.1545 and SSR 96-8p.
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After a claimant's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment at step three, § 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess the claimant's residual functional capacity.

Walker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2018-08-20(e)

If a claimant’s severe impairments neither meet nor equal the severity of a listed impairment, as was the undisputed step-three determination in this case, the ALJ must then assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).4 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before deciding whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Nichols v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2019-02-07(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This RFC determination must be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ at step four to assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity and ability to perform past relevant work, while subsection (e) requires the residual functional capacity to be based on all relevant medical and other evidence and used at steps four and five.

Vidrine v. Berryhill · filed 2019-06-25(a)(4)(iv), (e)

At Step Four, the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the Commissioner to consider all of a claimant’s impairments, including non-severe impairments, when assessing residual functional capacity.

Morse v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2019-07-15(e)

Plaintiff’s argument conflates the regulatory requirement that an ALJ consider all impairments when assessing RFC with a non-existent requirement to discuss “not severe” impairments when assessing RFC. The ALJ noted the requirement that in assessing RFC he must “consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” (R. 837, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 404.1545; SSR 96-8p).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires assessing whether a claimant whose impairment does not establish disability at an earlier step retains enough residual functional capacity to perform past or other work.

Walter WOODY, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES · filed 1988-10-21(e)

Second, he can introduce evidence that even if he does not suffer from a “listed” impairment, his “residual functional capacity” resulting from his impairment prevents him from engaging in his past work or any other work. ... If the Form does not dictate a conclusion of disability, the Secretary’s regulations call for a determination of whether the alleged mental disorder has left the claimant with sufficient residual functional capacity to perform his or her former work or other work in the economy.
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At step two, an impairment is severe when it significantly limits a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities, and a severe impairment’s work-related limitations must be reflected in the residual functional capacity.

Rodriguez v. Kijakazi · filed 2019-09-11(c)

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ considers and identifies the claimant’s severe impairments, defined as those impairments that significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 415.920(c). ... If an impairment is found severe, by definition it causes some limitations on the individual’s ability to perform work activities, and thus must be accounted for in the RFC. If the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome caused no functional limitations, then she should have found it to be a non-severe impairment.
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Section 404.1520(a)(4) and (e) places assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity between steps three and four of the disability evaluation and requires it to be based on the relevant evidence in the record.

Dillinger v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2019-09-27(a)(4), (e)

A claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is assessed between steps three and four and is “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in your case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), -(e) and 416.920(a)(4), -(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires assessment of a claimant's residual functional capacity before steps four and five, and the RFC is used to determine whether the claimant can perform past relevant work or adjust to other work.

Stallings v. Berryhill · filed 2019-10-30(e)

Before considering the fourth and fifth steps, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is, in layman’s terms, her maximum work capability. Id. at 461-62; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a). “The claimant’s RFC is used at both steps four and five of the sequential analysis: at the fourth step to determine if the claimant can still do his [or her] past relevant work, and at the fifth step to determine whether the claimant can adjust to any other type of work.”
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity using all relevant medical and other evidence before proceeding to the next step.

Bryant v. Social Security · filed 2019-11-01(e)

The ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). ... The ALJ complied with the regulations by: (1) recognizing that Bryant’s symptoms may not be fully supported by objective medical evidence; (2) considering all of her impairments – including her fibromyalgia – in light of the medical and other evidence in the record; and (3) clearly explaining that she rejected Bryant’s subjective symptom complaints because her testimony concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms was not consistent with her daily activities, the conservative treatment she sought and the medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1529(c)(3), 416.920(e), 416.929(c)(3); SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5; SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4; SSR 02-1p, 2002 LESIS 1 at *18; Felisky, 35 F.3d at 1036; (Tr. 17-19).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the Commissioner to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity after step three and use that assessment at steps four and five.

Low v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2019-11-07(e)

After evaluating step three, the Commissioner assesses claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ, when assessing residual functional capacity, to consider all of a claimant’s impairments, including non-severe impairments.

Smith v. Saul · filed 2019-12-05(e)

In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including those that are non-severe. ... This court finds that this RFC determination of light work was improperly assessed by excluding limitations regarding plaintiff’s digestive, bladder, and bowel issues. ... Since the ALJ did not properly consider the entire record or sufficiently explain in his decision the weight afforded to each source, this matter should be remanded with instructions to reassess plaintiff’s RFC based on the excluded limitations established above.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ at step four to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity by considering all relevant medical and other evidence.

Gora v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2019-12-17(e)

At Step Four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to step four of the disability analysis.

Neighbors v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2020-01-22(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Section 404.1520(c) treats an impairment as severe at step two when it significantly limits basic work abilities, and § 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to consider all resulting limitations in formulating the RFC, including limitations from non-severe impairments.

McCaslin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-31(c), (e)

At step two, the “medical severity” of a claimant’s impairments is considered. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment is not considered to be “severe” if it does not “significantly limit” a claimant's mental or physical abilities to do basic work activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff has the burden to show (1) he has a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments; (2) the impairment or combination of impairments is severe; and (3) the impairment lasted at least 12 months. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). ... The Court agrees the ALJ should have found vertigo and migraines to be severe impairments at step two, based on substantial evidence. ... The ALJ must consider all limitations and restrictions when formulating the RFC, even those stemming from impairments that are not “severe.” See Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d at 1049; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... The ALJ erred by failing to consider the limitations imposed by plaintiff’s vertigo and migraines in formulating plaintiff’s RFC. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s failure to include vertigo and headaches among plaintiff’s severe impairments and failure to include the limitations associated with these conditions was harmful error.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant's residual functional capacity using all relevant medical and other evidence when deciding whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Wilson v. Berryhill · filed 2020-03-23(e)

In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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At the RFC stage before step four, the Commissioner must base the claimant’s residual functional capacity on all relevant medical and other evidence, not only formal medical opinions.

Gonzalez v. Berryhill · filed 2020-03-25(a)(4), (e)

It is well-established that ALJs are required to consider all relevant medical evidence, not just certain medical opinions, in assessing the residual functional capacity. See Greek, 802 F.3d at 374 n.2 (“The Commissioner determines the claimant’s ‘residual functional capacity’ based on “all the relevant medical and other evidence of record.’”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (e), 404.1545(a)).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider all relevant medical and other evidence when assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity.

Ortiz v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-31(e)

In rendering his RFC findings, the ALJ must consider “‘all the relevant medical and other evidence’ in the case.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4) requires an ALJ to use a five-step sequence to evaluate disability, and § 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ at step four to determine residual functional capacity from all relevant medical and other evidence.

Avery v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-14(a)(4)(i) (e)

The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process the ALJ must use to determine whether a claimant is entitled to benefits: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether that impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work in light of her RFC; and (5) if not, whether, based on the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, she can perform other work found in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); ... At Step Four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to steps four and five of the sequential disability evaluation.

April J. v. Saul · filed 2020-05-19(e)

Before proceeding to steps four and five, an ALJ must first assess the claimant’s RFC.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ, at step four, to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity by considering all relevant evidence.

Thompson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-01(e)

At Step Four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). ... In deciding Thompson’s RFC, the ALJ was required to consider all the evidence in the record in accordance with the agency’s regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). ... The ALJ followed the proper legal procedures and reasonably drew his factual findings from the evidence in the record.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to consider all medically determinable impairments, including non-severe impairments, when assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity.

McGrath v. Commissioner of the Social Security · filed 2020-07-14(e)

Therefore, in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC the ALJ must consider the medical opinions in conjunction with all the other evidence of record and must consider all the medically determinable impairments, including impairments that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); see Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that the “ALJ must consider the applicant’s medical condition taken as a whole”).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity by considering all relevant medical and other evidence.

DeBose v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-30(e)

An ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). ... It appears that the ALJ complied with these regulations.
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Section 404.1520 requires the ALJ to use a five-step disability sequence and, at step four, determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity from all relevant medical and other evidence.

Winner v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-08-13(a)(4)(i), (e)

At Step Four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... Here, the ALJ complied with the regulations by expressly considering all of the evidence and all of Winner’s symptoms in evaluating his mental RFC; and he discussed Winner’s hearing testimony (including testimony that he had periodic panic attacks during which he called off work and became “loud and uncontrollable), exhaustively reviewing the medical records, and addressing and weighing each of the medical opinions. (Tr. 20-24); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1529(a); SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity after step three and before deciding at step four whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.

Dokes v. Berryhill · filed 2020-08-26(e)

After step three of the ALJ’s sequential analysis, but before deciding whether a claimant can perform past relevant work at step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 404.1545(a)(1).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity based on all relevant evidence of the claimant’s limitations.

Quaraish v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-09(e)

A claimant’s RFC is the most a claimant can still do despite his limitations and is assessed based on an evaluation of the all relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.945(a)(1), (a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the Commissioner to assess residual functional capacity after step three and use that assessment at steps four and five.

Wyrick v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2020-10-06(e)

After evaluating step three, the Commissioner assesses claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to steps four and five of the sequential evaluation.

Sahra M. v. Saul · filed 2020-10-08(e)

Before proceeding to steps four and five, an ALJ must first assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8P at *1.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the Commissioner to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity from the medical and other relevant evidence after the claimant is not found disabled at step three.

Wandick v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-11-25(e)

Step three and RFC determinations serve different functions, address different issues, and involve separate findings. If the claimant does not meet or equal the requirements of a Listed Impariment and is not found disabled at step three, the Commissioner must then assess the medical and other relevant evidence to determine the claimant’s RFC to perform work-related activities, despite the limitations imposed by his severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e); Social Security Ruling 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996); see also Keith K. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 4889095 at * 3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2019).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the adjudicator to assess residual functional capacity from all relevant medical and other evidence; it does not require a supporting medical opinion.

Dickerson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-02-22(e)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ must base his RFC finding on a medical opinion, is unsupported. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (“we will assess the residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in your case record”) (emphasis added), §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3) (the adjudicator will assess the RFC based on all the relevant evidence in the case record); ... Monroe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 676 F. App’x. 5, 9 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that the ALJ could rely on treatment notes and activities of daily to formulate the RFC assessment, and rejecting the argument that a medical opinion was required); Johnson v. Colvin, 669 Fed. App’x 44, 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that an ALJ looks to “all of the relevant medical and other evidence’ including relevant medical reports, medical history, and statements from the claimant when assessing an applicant’s RFC).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity from all relevant medical and other evidence in the case record.

Duron v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-16(e)

The ALJ determines the RFC “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess a claimant's residual functional capacity using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case record.

Larson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-23(e)

The ALJ determines the RFC “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4) makes impairment severity the subject of the ALJ’s step-two inquiry under a de minimis threshold, while § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) assigns the ALJ responsibility for assessing residual functional capacity from the record as a whole.

Crochet v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-26(a)(4), (a)(4)(iv)

The Social Security regulations, rulings, and Sixth Circuit precedent provide that the ALJ is charged with the final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (the final responsibility for deciding the residual functional capacity “is reserved to the Commissioner.”). Moreover, the Social Security Act and agency regulations require an ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity based on the evidence as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (“the administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity”). ... At step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process, an ALJ considers the “medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairments.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). ... The Sixth Circuit has construed step two as a “de minimis hurdle.” Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 862 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Under this approach, “an impairment can be considered not severe only if it is a slight abnormality that minimally affects work ability regardless of age, education, and experience.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4) places the residual-functional-capacity assessment between the third and fourth steps of the sequential disability evaluation.

Hall v. SSA · filed 2021-05-26(a)(4)

The real question before this Court is whether the ALJ’s RFC finding was reasonable. A claimant’s RFC is assessed by the ALJ between steps three and four and is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] impairments.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1545(a)(1),(5).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ, when an impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity from all relevant medical and other evidence in the record.

Hale v. Saul · filed 2021-06-09(e)

When an individual's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ will "make a finding [of the individual's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the] case record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). An individual's RFC is the most an individual can still do despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
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At the residual-functional-capacity stage, the ALJ evaluates all relevant medical and other evidence, and a medical opinion or newer opinion is not necessarily required when the record is sufficient.

Howard, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-09(e)

A claimant’s RFC is the most he can still do despite his limitations and is assessed based on an evaluation of all relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.945(a)(1), (a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996). ... As discussed above, a medical opinion is not required to support an RFC finding, nor is a more recent opinion required where, as here, the later-submitted evidence does not show that Plaintiff was more restricted than found by the ALJ.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ, when assessing residual functional capacity, to consider all symptoms and their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects in light of the claimant’s testimony, objective medical evidence, and opinion evidence.

Charvat v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-08-17(e)

The ALJ applied proper legal standards in assessing Charvat’s RFC. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241. In determining what limitations to include in the RFC, the ALJ complied with the regulations by “consider[ing] all symptoms” and assessing “the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of those symptoms in light of Charvat’s testimony, objective medical evidence, and opinion evidence. (Tr. 23-25); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ specifically: (1) addressed Charvat’s testimony and other evidence concerning fatigue, panic attacks, migraines, and pain, (Tr. 23-25); and (2) explained that the evidence in the record (including treatment notes reporting normal psychological findings, normal concentration, and cooperative behavior) demonstrated that she could understand and carry out simple/repetitive instructions and maintain an ordinary routine in a setting without frequent changes, (Tr. 25). And that’s all the regulations required. SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5.
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At Step Four, § 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine the claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence.

Russ v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-08-20(e)

At Step Four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ determining disability to establish the claimant’s residual functional capacity by considering all relevant medical and other evidence and determining whether the claimant can perform available work despite her impairments.

Kinnebrew v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-08-26(e)

To make a disability determination, an ALJ must first arrive at an RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence and determining whether a claimant is able to perform work available in the national economy, despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ, before proceeding to step four, to assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity using all relevant evidence and to account for limitations from all medically determinable impairments, including non-severe impairments.

Dulude v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-03(e)

Prior to step four, the ALJ must assess Plaintiff’s RFC, which is the most she can do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). ... An ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), (3). So, the ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not “severe.”
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After finding that a claimant does not meet or equal a listed condition at step three, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Izzard v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2021-09-13(e)

If a claimant does not meet or equal one of the conditions listed in the step 3 analysis, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This step requires the ALJ to assess a claimant’s ability to perform sustained work given any restrictions resulting from all impairments, including the non-severe impairments that the ALJ identified in step 2. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) places the residual-functional-capacity determination before steps four and five of the sequential disability evaluation.

Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-13(a)(4)(iv)

Before Steps Four and Five of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to step four.

Cascio v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-23(e)

Before step four, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity, which is the most a claimant can still do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). It consists of a claimant’s “impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such as pain, [that] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what [a claimant] can do in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). An ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), (3). So, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2); Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the agency to assess and make a finding about a claimant’s residual functional capacity based on all relevant medical evidence when the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment.

ANDERSON v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2021-11-24(e)

If a claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the Agency will assess and make a finding about a claimant’s RFC “based on all the relevant medical evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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At step four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity by considering all relevant medical and other evidence.

Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-01-12(e)

At Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the residual functional capacity assessment to account for all of a claimant’s impairments, including nonsevere impairments and impairments that do not meet a listed impairment.

Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-02-09(e)

The RFC must account for all of the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe or fail to meet a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e), 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); SSR 96-8P, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474, 34,475 (July 2, 1996). ... On the facts presented here, the court finds that the ALJ erred when he omitted from his RFC assessment a limitation that reflects his finding of Plaintiff’s mild mental impairments and failed to state why any such limitation is not necessary.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity even when state-agency doctors have found the claimant not disabled.

Spivey v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-02-24(e)

However, this does not relieve the ALJ of the obligation to determine Plaintiff’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) authorizes and directs the ALJ to formulate a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Dieker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-21(e)

Dieker argues that the ALJ is not competent to formulate an RFC. The regulations authorized and directed the ALJ to make an RFC determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 404.1545. The ALJ did not err by following those regulations.
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At the residual-functional-capacity stage, an ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe.

Black v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-03-23(e)

An RFC must reflect the claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work on a sustained basis despite limitations caused by her impairments. When determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 404.1545. The ALJ considered the limitations caused by Ms. Black’s Type 1 diabetes. The ALJ acknowledged the symptoms which Ms. Black contends the ALJ overlooked, and the ALJ concluded that the evidence does not support the limitations that Ms. Black attributes to those symptoms.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider all medically determinable impairments when establishing a claimant's residual functional capacity.

DANIELS v. SAUL · filed 2022-04-29(e)

An ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments when establishing the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider a claimant's mental-health limitations when assessing residual functional capacity.

Charlier v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-06-01(e)

‘First, I agree with Charlier that the ALJ had to consider her mental health limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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At Step Four, § 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity by considering all relevant medical and other evidence.

Sellards v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2022-06-08(e)

At Step Four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. ... The ALJ complied with the regulations by: (i) assessing Sellards’s RFC in light of the medical evidence, her testimony, and other evidence in the record; and (ii) clearly explaining that he rejected Sellards’s subjective symptom complaints because her statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not consistent with the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, at *3-4, 11-12, 15; SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5, at *13-15; (Tr. 21-25).
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At Step Four, the regulation requires the ALJ to determine the claimant’s RFC after considering all medical and other evidence in the record.

Keller v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-06-27(e)

At Step Four of the sequential analysis laid out in the regulations, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC after considering all the medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to assess and make a finding about a claimant’s residual functional capacity based on all relevant medical and other evidence.

Finley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-01(e)

An ALJ must “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s] [RFC] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to assess and make a finding about a claimant’s residual functional capacity based on all relevant medical and other evidence.

Guth v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-09(e)

An ALJ must “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s RFC] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to base the residual functional capacity assessment on all relevant evidence in the case record.

Mielbeck v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-16(e)

This assessment must be based on all relevant evidence in the record before the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before proceeding to Step Four.

McCauley v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2023-01-19(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Sections 404.1520(e)–(g) require the ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity and determine what work the claimant can perform despite the claimant’s limitations.

Cimachowski v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-02-07(e), (f), and (g)

The ALJ must determine whether the claimant maintains “residual functional capacity” to work, and what type of work his residual functional capacity allows him to do. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & 404.1520(f). Residual functional capacity is an assessment of the individual’s physical and mental work abilities, or “what the individual can do despite his or her limitations.” Davila v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 993 F.Supp.2d 737, 753 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2014); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).
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Under § 404.1520’s sequential process, step-three mental-limitations findings must be reflected and reconciled in the step-four residual-functional-capacity assessment; a moderate limitation cannot be treated as meaningless.

Hawkins v. Social Security Administration · filed 2022-12-16(a)(4)(iii), (e)

At step three, the ALJ determines the severity of the claimant’s impairments to determine whether her symptoms meet or equal the criteria for an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). ... While acknowledging their differences, the analytical similarities and overlap of evidence considered at these steps require their findings to be consistent even if they are not identical. A “moderate” limitation at step three cannot be meaningless for that capacity at step four. See Haga, 482 F.3d at 1208.
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Section 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity before evaluating whether the claimant can perform past relevant work at step four.

Jacobs v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2023-03-30(a)(4)(iv)

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ, when assessing residual functional capacity, to consider all medically determinable impairments, including non-severe impairments, and the total limiting effects of each.

Padilla v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-07-25(e)

In rendering the RFC, therefore, the ALJ must consider the medical opinions in conjunction with all the other evidence of record ... and will consider all the medically determinable impairments, including impairments that are not severe, and the total limiting effects of each.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ, when assessing residual functional capacity, to consider all medically determinable impairments, including non-severe impairments, and the total limiting effects of each.

Vazquez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-07-26(e)

In rendering the RFC, therefore, the ALJ must consider the medical opinions in conjunction with all the other evidence of record and will consider all the medically determinable impairments, including impairments that are not severe, and the total limiting effects of each.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity using all relevant medical and other evidence, including medical-opinion evidence.

Layne v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2023-07-27(e)

In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant medical and other evidence, including medical opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess residual functional capacity by considering all impairments, including non-severe impairments, and to incorporate all credited limitations into the RFC.

Erb v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-08-09(e)

The RFC reflects a claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). To determine this, the ALJ must consider all impairments, including those that are not considered severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 1520(e), 404.1545, 416.920(e), and 416.945; SSR 96-8p. ... Because the ALJ credited the opinions of the state agency psychologists that Plaintiff was limited to brief and routine encounters, the ALJ was required to incorporate those limitations into Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ’s limitation to “occasional” social interactions does not specify whether these occasional interactions can be lengthy or brief. This was error.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity using all relevant medical and other evidence in the record, not just medical opinions.

Laurie v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-23(e)

A claimant’s RFC is the most he can still do despite his limitations and is assessed based on an evaluation of all relevant evidence in the record.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ, when formulating a claimant’s residual functional capacity, to consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including non-severe impairments.

Debruzzi v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-08-25(e)

In formulating an RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including those that are non-severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); see also Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *5). ... Nothing in the record, including the hypotheticals the ALJ posed to the vocational expert (AR 56–60), demonstrates that the ALJ seriously considered Plaintiff’s ulcerative colitis and associated limitations in crafting the RFC. ... Because an “RFC that fails to take into account a claimant’s limitations is defective,” the Court concludes that the ALJ erred by failing to substantively consider Plaintiff’s ulcerative colitis.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider all medically determinable impairments, including nonsevere impairments and their combined effects, when assessing residual functional capacity and work attendance.

Bobbitt v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2023-08-24(e)

In any event, although the ALJ stated that she “considered all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe” in assessing Bobbitt’s RFC, she did not discuss absences potentially caused by headaches combined with absences caused by seizures to determine whether Bobbitt could maintain work attendance. Since Bobbitt’s ability to maintain work attendance was clearly an issue in the case, the ALJ should have done so.
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In assessing residual functional capacity, an ALJ must consider all of the claimant's impairments, including impairments that are not severe; an express reference to SSR 96-8p, discussion of the nonsevere impairments' functional limitations, and assurance that the entire record and all symptoms were considered can establish compliance.

Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-20(e)

First, as in Emard, the ALJ’s decision here explicitly referenced SSR 96-8p as the ALJ stated that she “must consider all of [Plaintiff’s] impairments, including impairments that are not severe (20 CFR 404.1520(e) and 404.1545; SSR 96-8p).” ... Finally, the ALJ expressly stated that her decision stemmed from “careful consideration of the entire record” and that she “considered all symptoms.” ... Under Emard, the ALJ therefore provided a sufficient basis for the Court to conclude that she properly considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments when crafting the RFC.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to base the residual-functional-capacity assessment on all relevant medical and other evidence in the claimant's case record.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-30(e)

The ALJ considers impairments that are both “severe” and “not severe,” see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520 treats a severe impairment as a step-two threshold; that finding alone does not establish that a claimant cannot perform unskilled or semi-skilled work at steps four and five.

Hankins v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2023-11-27(c)–(g)

A finding that the plaintiff has a severe impairment does not prevent a finding that the plaintiff can also complete unskilled and semi-skilled work. ... After all, a “severe impairment” or a combination of impairments must be found in step two of the sequential process to progress to determining ... the plaintiff’s capabilities when performing certain types of work in steps four and five. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)–(g).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider all of a claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing residual functional capacity.

Erffmeyer v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-12-01(e)

The ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 404.1545; SSR 96-8p.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the residual functional capacity to be assessed from all relevant medical and other evidence in the claimant's case record.

Jennings v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-01-10(e)

Thus, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s treatment notes to formulate the RFC assessment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (“we will assess the residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in your case record”).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the residual functional capacity assessment to consider all relevant evidence about the claimant’s impairments, but step-two paragraph B severity findings do not themselves dictate RFC limitations.

Smagala v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-12(e)

In evaluating an individual’s RFC, the ALJ considers impairments that are both “severe” and “not severe”, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... In summary, while the ALJ’s determination at step 2 established that plaintiff’s alleged depression, anxiety and substance addiction were not severe impairments, it did not make any determination regarding plaintiff’s RFC. ... Based on this record, the ALJ did not err by excluding plaintiff’s step 2 “paragraph B” criteria from the step 4 RFC determination. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim of error is denied.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to consider all of a claimant's impairments, including non-severe impairments, when assessing residual functional capacity.

Farell V SSA · filed 2024-03-25(e)

First, as in Emard, the ALJ’s decision here explicitly referenced SSR 96-8p as controlling his RFC finding, stating that he “must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe (20 CFR 404.1520(e) and 404.1545; SSR 96-8p).” ... Thus, under any reading of Emard, the ALJ provided a sufficient basis for the Court to conclude he properly considered all of Farrell’s impairments when crafting her RFC.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess residual functional capacity based on all relevant medical and other evidence, including impairments that are severe and not severe.

Kelly v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-25(e)

In evaluating an individual’s RFC, the ALJ considers impairments that are both “severe” and “not severe”, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... Plaintiff’s contention is without merit. The ALJ recognized that plaintiff had problems with memory and concentration (PageID.31-32) and limited him to simple, routine, repetitive work.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to determine a claimant’s RFC before step four and consider all impairments, including non-severe impairments.

Hill v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-05-29(e)

“Before considering step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must first determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).” ... “In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.”
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant's residual functional capacity before step four and to consider all impairments, regardless of severity.

Tello v. Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2024-08-29(e)

Prior to step four of the sequential process, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At this time, the ALJ must consider all impairments, regardless of severity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 416.920(e), 416.945.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to consider the limiting effects of all impairments, including nonsevere impairments, when assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Parkhurst v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-09(e)

Plaintiff is correct that an “ALJ is required to consider the limiting effects of all of the Plaintiff's impairments, including those that are nonsevere, in assessing the Plaintiff’s RFC.” Lewis v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-cv-00057-MR, 2022 WL 4456255, at *4 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(2); SSR 96-8p (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’”)).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity at step four of the disability evaluation.

Sanders v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2024-09-23(e)

At step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider all of a claimant’s impairments when formulating the claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Beauerle v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-24(e)

Applying these principles here, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s discussion was sufficient to comport with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e) and the requirement that an ALJ consider all of a claimant’s impairments in formulating that claimant’s RFC, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545 and SSR 96-8p.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ assessing residual functional capacity to consider the claimant’s condition as a whole and evaluate all pertinent information in the record.

Brackins v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-30(e)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the Plaintiff’s condition “taken as a whole,” Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588 (citations omitted), after evaluating all the pertinent information in the record, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a), 416.920(e), 416.945(a). As described above, this information includes the problems the Plaintiff had with her right eye, the results of the January 2022 surgery on that eye, and Dr. Rodriguez’s finding that the Plaintiff had limited left-eye near acuity, far acuity, depth perception, accommodation, and color vision.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ evaluating residual functional capacity to consider both severe and non-severe impairments using all relevant medical and other evidence in the claimant's case record.

Lau v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-30(e)

In evaluating an individual’s RFC, the ALJ considers impairments that are both “severe” and “not severe”, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to base the claimant’s residual functional capacity on all relevant medical and other evidence in the case record.

Hensinger v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-10-16(e)

In evaluating an individual’s RFC, the ALJ considers impairments that are both “severe” and “not severe”, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant's residual functional capacity after considering all medical and other evidence in the record.

Fraley v. SSA · filed 2025-03-19(e)

The ALJ must determine a claimant's RFC after considering all the medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an RFC assessment to measure a claimant's ability to function in a workplace despite medical limitations, based on all relevant medical and other evidence in the case record.

Calicchio v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-05-23(e)

An RFC assessment evaluates a claimant’s ability to function in a workplace despite medical limitations, “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the] case record.”
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider both severe and nonsevere impairments when assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

(SS) Tapia v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-05-29(e)

However, an ALJ “must consider severe and nonsevere impairments in assessing a claimant’s RFC.” Rhone v. Kijakazi, No. 2:21-CV-01296-VCF, 2022 WL 2870589, at *2 (D. Nev. July 21, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and 404.1545(a)(2)); see Hutton v. Astrue, 491 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Regardless of its severity, however, the ALJ was still required to consider [plaintiff’s nonsevere impairment of] PTSD when he determined [plaintiff’s] RFC.”).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity after considering all medical and other evidence in the record.

Miller v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-03-31(e)

At Step Four of the sequential evaluation of a claimant, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity after considering all the medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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At the RFC assessment before step four, § 404.1520(e) requires consideration of all the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe.

Forsch v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-11(e)

First, as in Emard and Napier, the ALJ explicitly referenced SSR 96-8p as controlling his RFC finding, stating that he “must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe (20 CFR 404.1520(e) and 404.1545; SSR 96-8p).” ... Finally, the ALJ expressly states that his RFC determination at Step Four was based on “careful consideration of the entire record” and that he “considered all symptoms.” ... In light of the above, the Court finds that the ALJ complied with the requirements set forth in Emard and Napier, thereby providing a sufficient basis to conclude that he properly considered Forsch's mild mental limitations in assessing the RFC.
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At the RFC assessment before step four, § 404.1520(e) requires consideration of all the claimant’s impairments, including their combined effects and those that are not severe.

Hunt v. Bisignano · filed 2025-08-13(e)

As part of the RFC assessment, the ALJ must evaluate the claimant’s “ability to perform work despite [his] limitations” in light of “‘all’ relevant record evidence.” Patterson, 846 F.3d at 659 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)). ... In sum, the ALJ’s written decision indicates that he considered the combined effects of Claimant’s impairments on his ability to work. ... As such, the undersigned FINDS that the ALJ’s RFC assessment accounts for the combined effects of Claimant’s impairments.
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At the RFC stage, § 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to base the claimant’s residual functional capacity on the claimant’s condition as a whole after assessing all the pertinent information presented.

Robinson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-28(e)

In sum, it evident from the ALJ’s decision that he based his RFC determination on the entirety of the Plaintiff’s condition, Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588 (citations omitted), after assessing all the pertinent information before him, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a), and that this determination is adequately substantiated.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires RFC findings to be based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the case record.

Burns v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2025-09-29(e)

“This requirement that determinations be made in light of the record as a whole helps to ensure that the focus in evaluating an application does not unduly concentrate on one single aspect of the claimant’s history[.]” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (findings regarding RFCs will be “based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case record).
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Section 404.1520(c) requires an impairment to significantly limit a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities to be severe at step two; finding one severe impairment makes the characterization of additional impairments non-dispositive when all impairments are considered in the RFC.

Daria · filed 2025-11-19(c)

A “severe impairment” is defined as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [a claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). ... The finding of at least one severe impairment at step two is merely a “threshold inquiry,” the satisfaction of which prompts a full investigation into the limitations and restrictions imposed by all the individual’s impairments. ... So, the ALJ’s non-severe finding pertaining to Plaintiff’s physical impairments by itself does not require reversal. ... All this shows that the ALJ adequately considered both Plaintiff’s severe and non-severe impairments when crafting the RFC.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to assess a claimant's residual functional capacity using all medical and other relevant evidence in the record.

Maurer · filed 2025-11-20(e)

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assesses a claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) based on all medical and other relevant evidence in the record.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant's residual functional capacity after considering all medical and other evidence in the record.

Stamm · filed 2026-03-24(e)

The ALJ must determine a claimant's RFC after considering all the medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an individual assessment of residual functional capacity; a claimant whose mental impairment does not meet a listed impairment cannot be presumed capable of unskilled work.

Mental Health Ass'n of Minnesota v. Heckler · filed 1983-11-04(e)

The effect of this presumption was that mentally impaired claimants ruled ineligible for benefits under the third step were presumed ineligible under the subsequent steps, thereby bypassing the individual assessment required in the fourth level. ... The presumption preempts the thorough evaluation of claims intended by the statutes and regulations.
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Under § 404.1520, examining a vocational expert about a claimant’s ability to perform work can show that the ALJ considered residual functional capacity.

Donald F. WHEAT, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary, Health & Human Services, Appellee · filed 1985-06-11

Wheat claims the AU failed to consider his residual functional capacity, his age, education, or work experience, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1984). We do not find the AU failed to consider Wheat’s residual functional capacity because the record does indicate the AU examined the vocational expert regarding Wheat’s ability to perform certain work.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires consideration of relevant written symptom testimony when assessing residual functional capacity.

Vivian v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-11-17(e)

Because it is not evident that the ALJ considered this relevant evidence in formulating the RFC, the Court remands for correction of this legal error. ... Therefore, this case must be remanded for the ALJ to perform this role. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
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Section 404.1520 requires the ALJ to assess residual functional capacity after step three and account for limitations associated with impairments deemed nonsevere.

Cruz Roman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-04-25(e)-(f)

Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff’s diabetes was not severe, ALJ McKenna was required to incorporate the associated limitations in his RFC determination. ... After step three, ALJ McKenna was required to determine Plaintiff’s RFC, which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for collective impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f).
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At the residual functional capacity stage, an ALJ must explain how a claimant’s nonsevere mental impairments affect work-related functions sufficiently to permit meaningful review.

Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-09-23(e)

The ALJ’s failure to discuss Robin’s anxiety and depression in her RFC analysis requires remand because she failed to “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion[,]” thereby frustrating meaningful review.
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Section 404.1520 requires an ALJ to consider non-severe impairments when assessing residual functional capacity, even after addressing them at step two.

Dooley · filed 2026-03-26

The fact that the ALJ addressed those impairments at step two and explained why she found them to be non-severe does not excuse the failure to address them at step four.
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When a claimant has a severe impairment, § 404.1520(e) and (f) require consideration of residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience in assessing whether the claimant can perform past or other work.

Rodriguez v. Schweiker · filed 1981-10-07(e), (f)

Moreover, when a claimant is found to be severely impaired, the Secretary is bound, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 404.1520(f) (1981), to consider the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” — i. e., what the claimant is able to do despite her limitations— along with the claimant’s age, education and work experience, in determining whether the claimant is precluded from “past relevant” or any other work.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity after finding severe impairments that significantly limit basic work activities.

Childress v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2025-02-18(e)

Accordingly, the ALJ was required to determine claimant’s residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520’s sequential evaluation requires an assessment of a widow’s residual functional capacity when her impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment.

Williams v. Bowen · filed 1987-04-29

The Second Circuit recently noted the ambiguity as to how the basic procedure outlined in section 404.1520 fits with the special provisions for widows. ... In the absence of any elaboration from the Secretary on this issue, the decision in Tolany obligates the AU to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity to determine whether he or she can engage in any gainful activity, not merely to determine whether the impairments complained of do not meet the Listing of Impairments.
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At step four, § 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to determine residual functional capacity by considering all relevant medical and other evidence.

Civitarese v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2020-07-30(e)

At Step Four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
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Section 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider all relevant medical and other evidence when determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Boggs v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-09-20(e)

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) requires an ALJ to consider “all the relevant medical and other evidence” in determining a plaintiff’s RFC.
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In assessing residual functional capacity, the ALJ must consider the entire record, including alleged symptoms and non-severe impairments.

Bacon v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-09-21(e)

The ALJ must consider the entire record, including all alleged symptoms and non-severe impairments, when formulating a decision. SSR 16-3p, 96-8p; 20 CFR § 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 404.1529. ... The ALJ failed to mention or consider plaintiff's symptoms of urinary hesitancy from her numerous tumor resection surgeries.
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At the residual functional capacity stage, the ALJ assesses what a claimant can still do using all relevant record evidence.

Lopez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-05(e)

A claimant’s RFC is the most she can still do despite her limitations and is assessed based on an evaluation of all relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.945(a)(1), (a)(3); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996).
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A step-two finding of a severe impairment does not require the ALJ to include a corresponding limitation in the residual functional capacity.

Hazel v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-02-07(c)

It logically follows from this interpretation of “severe impairment” at Step Two that an ALJ need not account for every severe impairment in the RFC.
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A moderate limitation found at step two does not, by itself, require a corresponding limitation in the residual functional capacity assessment.

Bratton v. O'Malley(CONSENT) · filed 2024-02-23(a)(4)

Thus, the ALJ was not required to include any particular limitations in Bratton’s RFC based simply on his step-two finding that Bratton was moderately impaired in her ability to interact with others.
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The RFC must consider all of a claimant’s impairments, including those found to be non-severe.

Tate v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2024-02-23(e)

The RFC must consider all of a claimant’s impairments, include those found to be non-severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... The ALJ explained how she considered this evidence in formulating the RFC and so limiting the RFC to account for these medical issues.
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Before step four, the ALJ must consider and discuss non-severe mental impairments when assessing residual functional capacity.

ARENA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2024-03-05(e)

Applying this standard to the present record, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to sufficiently consider and discuss Plaintiff's non-severe mental impairments in making Plaintiffs RFC finding.
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Section 404.1520(e) calls for an assessment of residual functional capacity based on all relevant evidence when a claimant’s impairment does not meet a listing.

Hopfer v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-05(e)

A claimant’s RFC is the most she can still do despite her limitations and is assessed based on an evaluation of all relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.945(a)(1), (a)(3); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996).
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Section 404.1520 requires the ALJ to consider physical and mental impairments when assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity, including impairments found non-severe at step two.

Martinez-Maldonado v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-14(e)

This error is dispositive because the ALJ must consider all physical and mental evidence when formulating a claimant’s RFC.
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Section 404.1520(e) requires the ALJ to consider limitations from both severe and non-severe impairments when formulating residual functional capacity.

Jenson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-19(e)

The ALJ must consider all limitations and restrictions when formulating the RFC, even those stemming from impairments that are not “severe.” See Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d at 1049; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... In sum, the ALJ erroneously failed to consider plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and other physical impairments in formulating the RFC.
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A severe impairment found at step two does not automatically require a corresponding residual functional capacity limitation at step four; the ALJ must assess what the claimant can still do.

Fisher v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2024-03-27(e)

The ALJ’s finding that an impairment is severe at step two does not mandate a corresponding RFC limitation at step four, because severity is a threshold question, while RFC requires a more detailed analysis of what the claimant is still capable of doing.
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Section 404.1520(e) directs the Commissioner to evaluate residual functional capacity under § 404.1545; it does not require the ALJ to identify which mental condition causes each limitation.

Irizarry-Lebron v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-28(e)

However, Irizarry does not point to a specific portion of this regulation the ALJ violated in her analysis and I fail to see one. The regulation states the Commissioner will evaluate a claimant’s RFC as explained in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). And with respect to mental impairments, that regulation states the Commissioner must “first assess the nature and extent of [a claimant’s] mental limitations and restrictions and then determine [a claimant’s] residual functional capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. It does not say the ALJ must explain which limitation stems from which mental condition.
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After step three, an ALJ must assess residual functional capacity before proceeding to steps four and five.

O'DONNELL v. SAUL · filed 2024-04-01(a)(4)

After the step three listings determination, an ALJ must make an RFC assessment before moving to steps four and five of the disability evaluation.
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At step four, the ALJ must determine residual functional capacity by considering all relevant medical and other evidence, but need not expressly discuss every item considered.

Barto v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2024-04-12(e)

At step four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). ... Thus, it is clear to the Court that the ALJ considered the entire record in formulating the RFC and did not err in failing to further discuss the specific evidence cited by Claimant.
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Section 404.1520’s sequential evaluation allows an impairment found nonsevere at step two to be considered through its symptoms and limitations when assessing residual functional capacity.

STARLING v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2024-04-17(a)(4)

Thus, although the ALJ did not list narcolepsy as a severe impairment, the ALJ did consider its related symptoms and limitations in formulating the RFC.
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Under § 404.1520(e), an ALJ need not include a mild social-interaction limitation in the residual functional capacity when the ALJ explains why the evidence does not warrant it.

Cannon v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-04-29(e)

Plaintiff’s objection lacks merit. The Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiff’s argument on appeal because, in addition to the ALJ’s discussion demonstrating his finding that Plaintiff’s mild limitation did not affect her ability to work, “[t]he ALJ’s discussion . . . creates a logical bridge between his step-three finding and his determination that the evidence did not warrant any social interaction limitation” (R&R, ECF No. 15 at PageID.852).
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Notes 1–150 of 6,452, oldest cases first.

26,624 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Walden v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion construed the distinct medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c(c)(5), not the target sequential-evaluation regulation § 404.1520. opinion →
Molina v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the opinion addressed medical-opinion supportability and consistency under the distinct regulation § 404.1520c, not the target sequential-evaluation regulation § 404.1520. opinion →
Johnson v. Kijakazi, the opinion addressed the distinct medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c(c)(5), not the target sequential-evaluation regulation § 404.1520. opinion →
Smith v. Kijakazi, although the opinion contains a mistaken citation to § 404.1520 in its remand sentence, its discussion and holding concern the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c, not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
STILLWILL v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, the opinion addresses the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c, not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
FORJOHN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, the opinion construes the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c(d), not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
Spears v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the opinion’s substantive discussion concerns the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c, despite a malformed citation to § 404.1520(c)(1)–(5); it does not construe the target sequential-evaluation regulation § 404.1520. opinion →
Sparks v. Social Security, Commisioner of, the opinion construes the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c, not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
Ihinger v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the opinion’s supportability discussion concerns the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c; its citation to § 404.1520(c)(1) is not a holding about this section. opinion →
Blackmon v. Saul (CONSENT), the opinion expressly applies the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c, not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
Hillsman v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion’s supportability discussion concerns the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c; its citation to § 404.1520(c)(1) is not a holding about this section. opinion →
Manley v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion expressly applies the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c, not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
Herrera v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion’s “special technique” discussion concerns § 404.1520a and its mental-impairment criteria, not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
Mercuri v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court construed the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c(b)(2), not the target sequential-evaluation regulation § 404.1520. opinion →
Jackson v. Kijakazi(CONSENT), the court construed the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c(b)(3), not the target sequential-evaluation regulation § 404.1520. opinion →
Kimball v. Kijakazi, the opinion concerns § 404.1520c’s rules for evaluating medical opinions and prior administrative findings, not the target section § 404.1520. opinion →
Teamer v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the opinion construes and applies the separate medical-opinion regulation, § 404.1520c(b)(2) and (c)(2), rather than § 404.1520; its citation to the target section is not a holding about this section. opinion →
Hillman v. Saul, the court’s discussion concerns the persuasiveness of medical opinions and appears to cite § 404.1520(c) for that separate subject; it does not construe or apply the target sequential-evaluation subsection in deciding the case. opinion →
Offord v. Kijakazi, the court applied the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), not the target sequential-evaluation regulation § 404.1520. opinion →
Perkins v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the opinion addresses the separate medical-opinion regulations in § 404.1520c(b)(2), not § 404.1520. opinion →
Guerrero v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion was screened out of chronological order and its discussion of the five-step framework was not treated as a holding on § 404.1520. opinion →
Dixon v. Berryhill, the court merely recites the five-step disability framework and identifies Step Five; it does not interpret, decide the requirements of, or apply § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) to resolve the case. The remand concerns the evaluation of medical opinions and the resulting sequential analysis. opinion →
Kovach v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1520(a)(4) while reciting the generic five-step disability framework. Its decision does not construe or apply that regulation; the ruling instead concerns the ALJ’s failure to evaluate the treating physician’s opinion under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). opinion →
Perrone v. Berryhill, the court merely cites § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) while assuming the parties’ familiarity with the five-step disability framework; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Rasmussen v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited in an introductory description of the five-step process and in recounting the ALJ’s findings. The court did not construe or independently decide the requirements of § 404.1520; it resolved the claims on the evidence, briefing waiver, and the Listing analysis. opinion →
Wimberly v. Saul (CONSENT), the court cites § 404.1520 only in describing the general five-step disability-evaluation framework. It does not construe or decide any issue about what the regulation requires; the ruling concerns whether the ALJ adequately explained the weight given to a consultative examiner’s stooping limitation. opinion →
Morales v. Saul, the court recited the five-step disability-evaluation framework as background, but did not construe or decide a disputed requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; its remand ruling concerned the ALJ's treatment of medical opinions and the RFC. opinion →
Decker v. Saul, the court merely recited the five-step evaluation framework and described the ALJ’s steps; it did not construe or decide what 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Fergus v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited in a boilerplate summary of the five-step disability-evaluation framework. The court did not construe or apply § 404.1520 to decide the case; the remand was based on the ALJ’s treatment of the treating physician’s opinion. opinion →
Bankert v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the court merely recited the five-step disability framework and later reported the ALJ’s findings under the regulation. Its holding addressed the evaluation of treating-physician opinions and the claimant’s symptoms, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Ring v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v) only to provide general background on the five-step disability process. It does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue by applying its requirements; the actual rulings concern Appeals Council evidence, waiver, symptom evaluation, and remand. opinion →
Stracco v. Berryhill, the court merely recites the five-step disability framework in its legal standards. It remands because the ALJ failed to explain the evaluation of the medical evidence, without deciding what § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
Rivera v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1520(a)(4) and (e) only when describing the five-step disability process and the RFC step in the background. It did not construe or decide the meaning or application of those provisions; its decision concerned the step-five burden and vocational-expert evidence. opinion →
Vaughn v. Berryhill, the court merely recites the five-step framework in its background discussion. It does not interpret § 404.1520 or decide the case by applying a disputed requirement of that section; the remand is based on the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions. opinion →
Bowman v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(ii) only to recite the general five-step disability process. It did not construe or decide the application of step one; the appeal concerned steps three, four, and five. opinion →
Gallagher v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1520 only in a general recitation of the five-step disability-evaluation framework. It did not interpret the regulation or decide a disputed issue about its requirements; the decision instead reviewed the ALJ’s factual findings, credibility assessment, and substantial-evidence support. opinion →
Lim v. Colvin, the court merely recited the five-step sequential process in its statement of applicable law; it did not construe or decide an issue about § 404.1520. The remand rested on the ALJ's use of an incorrect standard for evaluating fibromyalgia and failure to develop the record. opinion →
Turner v. Berryhill, the court recited the five-step framework in its general standard of review, but did not construe § 404.1520 or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires. Its remand rested on errors in evaluating medical opinions and the RFC. opinion →
Pierce v. Colvin, the court merely recites the five-step sequential evaluation framework in its regulatory-background discussion. It does not interpret or apply § 404.1520 in resolving the case; the remand instead concerns the ALJ’s evaluation of pain, medication side effects, and treating-physician opinions. opinion →
Hafford v. SSA, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the five-step process; it does not construe § 404.1520(a) or decide an issue about what the regulation requires. The remand was based on the ALJ’s failure to address a medical opinion in the RFC analysis. opinion →
Moody v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1520 to recite the general five-step disability framework and briefly describe its steps, but it does not construe or decide any issue under that regulation. The remand rests on the ALJ’s handling of borderline age under § 404.1563(b). opinion →
Mason v. Berryhill, the court merely reported the ALJ’s step-two finding and cited § 404.1520(c) while describing the sequential evaluation; it decided the appeal on the RFC assessment and vocational-expert testimony, not on the meaning or application of § 404.1520(c). opinion →
McDuffie v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion construes the separate medical-opinion regulation § 404.1520c(b)(2), not the target sequential-evaluation section § 404.1520. opinion →
Wider v. Colvin, the court recited the five-step sequential evaluation process under § 404.1520 as general background law, but did not construe or apply that regulation to resolve the case. The remand turned on the treating-physician rule under other regulations. opinion →
Jacob v. Colvin, the court gives a general statutory-framework description of the SSA’s five-step process and cites § 404.1520(a)(4)(I) and (a)(4)(iv), but it does not decide the meaning or application of either provision; the remand rests on the treating-physician rule. opinion →
Ward v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1520 in its statutory-framework overview of the five-step disability process, but did not construe or decide an issue about the regulation; its remand rested on the ALJ's inadequate consideration and explanation of medical opinions. opinion →
Allen v. Berryhill, the court merely reported the ALJ’s enumerated finding citing § 404.1520(c); it did not construe or apply the regulation as a legal issue. The court’s own discussion cited § 404.1520 only as part of a string citation describing the five-step process, while the remand concerned the treating-source rule under § 404.1527(c)(2). opinion →
Tann v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the general five-step framework; its decision addresses the ALJ’s handling of stress, medical evidence, residual functional capacity, and obesity, without interpreting or deciding a disputed requirement of § 404.1520. opinion →
Conley v. Colvin, the court merely described the agency's five-step framework as background and cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; it did not construe or decide what the regulation requires. Its ruling concerned Listing 12.05 and the claimant's intellectual-disability evidence. opinion →
Henderson v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1520 only to introduce and outline the familiar five-step disability-evaluation process; it does not interpret or decide any issue about what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Stickler v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1520 to describe the five-step process, but its remand analysis did not construe the regulation as a disputed legal rule. opinion →
Farnsworth v. Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1520(a)(1) while reciting the general five-step disability-evaluation framework; it does not construe or resolve any disputed issue about that subsection, and its decision rests on the ALJ’s weighing of source opinions. opinion →
Pamonicutt v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1520(a) only to identify the sequential evaluation process used by the ALJ; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about what the regulation requires. The sentence reports the ALJ’s disposition as procedural history. opinion →
Wilson v. Colvin, the court merely recites the Social Security Act’s five-step evaluation and cites § 404.1520(b), (c), and (e) in explaining the procedural framework. It does not construe or decide any issue about what those provisions require; the decision concerns the ALJ’s RFC findings, record development, and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Frazier v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court reported the ALJ’s finding that Frazier’s asthma and depression were severe and that the ALJ considered her cognitive limitations; it did not independently construe § 404.1520(c). opinion →
Garrison v. Colvin, the court recites § 404.1520(a)(4)'s five-step framework as background, but does not construe or decide the regulation's application; its decision rests on the ALJ's evaluation of medical opinions and symptom testimony and the credit-as-true remedy. opinion →
Engebrecht v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely reported the ALJ's five-step analysis and its step-two finding citing § 404.1520(c); it did not construe or independently apply § 404.1520. The court's analysis concerned other regulations governing medical-source opinions. opinion →
Garrison v. Colvin, the court quotes and describes § 404.1520(a)'s five-step process as general background, but does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. The decision instead concerns the ALJ's treatment of medical opinions and symptom testimony and the proper credit-as-true remand. opinion →
Capman v. Colvin, the regulation is cited only to identify the five-step analysis the ALJ applied in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Rogers v. Colvin, the court recited the sequential-evaluation rule in its general legal framework, but did not decide a disputed issue about § 404.1520; its decision addressed the ALJ’s weighing of evidence, obesity analysis, and credibility determination. opinion →
Fisher v. Barnhart, Comm, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the general five-step disability inquiry. It does not construe the regulation or decide a legal issue about what the regulation requires; the appeal is resolved through discussion of the ALJ’s findings and other regulations and rulings. opinion →
Greenwood v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1520(a)-(f) in a background explanation of the five-step disability framework, but does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. The decision instead concerns the ALJ’s RFC finding and evidentiary analysis. opinion →
Stackhouse v. Barnhart, the opinion cites § 404.1520 only in describing the SSA's five-step process in the standard-of-review section. It does not interpret or apply the regulation; the decision instead turns on the ALJ's treatment of medical opinions and reliance on an incomplete vocational-expert hypothetical. opinion →
Alfred v. Barnhart, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 only as authority for the general five-step sequential evaluation framework. It did not interpret the regulation or decide a requirement specific to it; the decision instead applied step four using the substantial-evidence standard and SSR 96-8P. opinion →
Musico v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion mentions § 404.1520 only to report that the ALJ used the five-step evaluation process. The court did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; it affirmed the agency decision as supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Skidds v. SSA, the court cites § 404.1520 to recite the standard five-step sequential evaluation and to report that the ALJ used it. The court did not decide a disputed issue about the regulation; remand was based on new evidence under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). opinion →
Freeman-Park v. Barnhart, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ used the five-step sequential evaluation process under § 404.1520 in reaching the administrative decision. The court did not construe or decide anything about the regulation; it remanded based on the invalid waiver of counsel and inadequate development of the record. opinion →
Brown v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only to identify the general five-step framework. The court's actual ruling concerned the duration requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) and the ALJ's treatment of fibromyalgia, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Baker v. Barnhart, the court merely identifies and summarizes the five-step disability-evaluation framework while reviewing the ALJ's decision; it does not interpret, clarify, or independently decide what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Dixon v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recited the five-step disability framework and burdens in describing the governing process, but it did not interpret or decide the meaning or application of § 404.1520; the appeal concerned the evidentiary support for the ALJ’s findings and vocational-expert hypothetical. opinion →
Lopez v. Barnhart, the opinion mentions § 404.1520 only while reporting the ALJ’s step-four finding in the procedural background; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Baker v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the five-step framework used by the ALJ and to recount the administrative decision; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Sparks v. Barnhart, the court briefly cites § 404.1520(a)-(f) to summarize the general five-step disability framework; it does not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of the regulation. opinion →
Jager v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in a footnote explaining the five-step framework and the procedural role of the RFC assessment; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1520(a)(4) as a disputed legal issue. opinion →
Bazinet v. Barnhart, the court merely reports that the ALJ followed the regulation's sequential steps and cites § 404.1520(f) in describing the agency decision. It does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires; the court's holding concerns res judicata, administrative finality, and applying revised regulations. opinion →
Arce v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) only to identify the step-three issue raised by Arce. It did not interpret or apply that regulation; its ruling addressed whether the evidence showed that Arce met Listing 11.02. opinion →
Izzo v. Commissioner of Social Security, the only direct reference to § 404.1520(b) reports the ALJ’s severity finding in the procedural history; the appellate court did not construe or independently apply subsection (b). Its later citation to § 404.1520 merely states the five-step framework while resolving the step-five appeal. opinion →
Bingaman v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recited the five-step disability-evaluation framework and cited § 404.1520(b)-(f). It did not interpret or decide a disputed issue about this regulation; the actual holdings concerned Listing 1.03, residual functional capacity, and the treating physician’s opinion. opinion →
Ochs v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recites the five-step disability-evaluation procedure and the ALJ’s findings; it does not interpret, define, or decide any requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. opinion →
White v. Barnhart, the court merely describes the regulation's five-step sequential evaluation framework in the administrative-decision background. It does not construe or apply § 404.1520 in deciding the appeal; the court's analysis concerns RFC, credibility, and mental limitations. opinion →
Webster v. Barnhart, the statute appears only in a footnote reciting the five-step sequential analysis. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 404.1520; its holding addressed the ALJ’s failure to develop findings concerning advanced-age vocational adjustment and transferable skills. opinion →
Law v. Barnhart, the court merely cites § 404.1520 as the source of the general five-step disability-evaluation procedure and then recounts the ALJ’s application of that procedure; it does not interpret, define, or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Patty, Donna v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B., the citation appears in the court's account of the ALJ's procedural analysis. The appellate court did not interpret or apply § 404.1520(a); it reversed because the ALJ's RFC finding and vocational-expert hypothetical were inconsistent. opinion →
Hines v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited only parenthetically as authority for the five-step inquiry. The court does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 means or requires; its actual holdings concern pain evidence, residual functional capacity, treating-physician evidence, and vocational testimony. opinion →
Kangail, Tina v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B., the court cites § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) and (b) to state the background rule that gainful employment precludes disability, but it does not interpret or apply those provisions. The decision turns on whether the claimant's jobs qualified as substantial gainful activity under § 404.1574 and on the adequacy of the ALJ's medical analysis. opinion →
Prochaska, Nancy v. Barnhart, JoAnne B., the citation appears in the court's description of the ALJ's application of the five-step disability analysis. The appellate court did not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; its holding concerned the ALJ's affirmative duty under SSR 00-4p to inquire about conflicts between vocational-expert testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. opinion →
Prochaska v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1520(a)-(g) only while recounting the ALJ’s application of the five-step disability analysis. The court did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; its holding concerned the ALJ’s duty under SSR 00-4p to investigate conflicts between vocational-expert testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. opinion →
Lawson v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1520(a)-(f) in a string cite while reciting the general five-step framework; it does not construe or apply the regulation in deciding the case. opinion →
Hill v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1520(a)-(f) only to recite the general five-step disability framework. It does not interpret or decide any disputed requirement of that regulation; the decision turns on the ALJ's treatment of pain testimony and medical opinions, with step five mentioned only as the procedural burden. opinion →
Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court merely recites the five-step sequential evaluation framework and cites § 404.1520 alongside § 416.920. It does not construe, interpret, or decide an issue about § 404.1520; the holding concerns the ALJ's failure to discuss lay testimony and whether that error was harmless. opinion →
Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court recites the five-step sequential evaluation and cites § 404.1520 as background, but it does not construe or decide the meaning or requirements of that regulation. The actual holding concerns the ALJ's failure to discuss competent lay testimony and the resulting harmless-error standard. opinion →
Santiago v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1520(a)(4) only while describing the standard five-step disability determination procedure. It does not construe or decide an issue under that regulation; the remand rests on the treating-physician rule under § 416.927. opinion →
Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to report the ALJ’s use of the five-step analysis in the procedural history. The court’s own decision concerns the evidentiary evaluation of multiple sclerosis and the appropriate remand, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Armer v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only in the procedural history to describe the ALJ’s step-four determination; the appellate court did not construe or independently decide anything about § 404.1520. opinion →
Ward v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1520 only while reciting the familiar five-step disability-evaluation framework; it did not interpret the regulation or decide an issue about its application. opinion →
Laing v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1520(g) only while reporting the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling in the procedural history; the court does not construe, explain, or apply the regulation in its own decision. opinion →
Karlix v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1520 as part of a general description of the sequential disability-evaluation framework. It does not interpret or decide any issue about what the regulation requires; the appeal is resolved on the evidence concerning the listing, duration, onset date, residual functional capacity, and credibility. opinion →
Hilliard v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1520 only in describing the ALJ’s procedural history and quotes a generic description of the five-step process from Celaya; it does not construe or decide what § 404.1520 requires. The remand was based on the ALJ’s duty to develop the record, including under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e). opinion →
Meece v. Comm Social Security, the court quoted § 404.1520(a)(4) to identify the SSA's five-step framework, but did not construe or decide what the regulation requires; its holding concerned the ALJ's treatment of medical-opinion evidence and the disability determination. opinion →
Cain v. Barnhart, the opinion cites § 404.1520 while reciting the familiar five-step disability-evaluation framework as background. The court did not interpret the regulation or decide a disputed issue about its requirements or application; it resolved the appeal on the evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings. opinion →
Outlaw v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court merely recited the five-step process and then reviewed the ALJ's application of the listings; it did not construe or decide a dispute about § 404.1520. opinion →
Ribaudo v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited only in the procedural history to identify the five-step analysis applied by the ALJ; the court does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Wyatt v. Barnhart, the court merely reports that the ALJ denied the application at step four and cites § 404.1520; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the regulation itself. opinion →
Wyatt v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1520 only in recounting the ALJ’s step-four denial. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1520 only to identify the familiar five-step disability-evaluation framework and did not interpret or apply any requirement of that regulation. Its actual analysis concerned treating-source opinion evidence under § 404.1527. opinion →
George v. Barnhart, the court merely recited the five-step sequential evaluation and reported the ALJ’s finding that George could perform past relevant work; it did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The appeal was resolved on substantial-evidence and physician-opinion issues. opinion →
Cassidy v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the sequential-evaluation framework as a general legal principle; it does not interpret or decide an issue about § 404.1520(a)(4). opinion →
Fleming v. Barnhart, the citation appears in the procedural history to report the district court’s merits ruling and is not construed or applied by the Tenth Circuit, which decided only whether the government’s position was substantially justified for EAJA fees. opinion →
Malcom v. Barnhart, the court merely recited the five-step framework in the background, relying on precedent; it did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 404.1520(a)(4). The remand instead concerned the ALJ’s failure to consider the VA’s disability findings. opinion →
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1520 to identify the sequential-evaluation framework and recited the ALJ's step findings, but it did not construe the regulation or decide a dispute about what it requires; the appeal was resolved by substantial-evidence review of the ALJ's findings. opinion →
Lounsburry v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1520 to describe the five-step disability-evaluation framework and the point at which the grids are used, but it does not construe or decide what § 404.1520 requires. The holding concerns the application and meaning of Medical-Vocational Guideline Rule 202.00(c). opinion →
Beauclair v. Barnhart, the court recited the five-step framework in its legal-standard discussion, but did not construe or independently decide anything about § 404.1520. Its remand ruling concerned the ALJ’s failure to address IBS at step two and in the residual functional capacity assessment. opinion →
White v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1520(a)(4) while reciting the general five-step disability framework; it does not construe or apply that provision. The decision instead turns on the ALJ's unsupported RFC assessment and treatment of medical and vocational-expert opinions. opinion →
Gramlisch v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1520(a)(4) while stating the general five-step framework and mentions subsection (c) only in reporting the ALJ's findings. The court's remand rests on the ALJ's handling of subjective complaints and residual functional capacity, not on construction or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Rogers v. Barnhart, the opinion recites the five-step sequential analysis and cites § 404.1520 as background authority, but it does not construe or apply that regulation to decide an issue about the regulation; the case instead addresses whether the ALJ improperly considered the claimant's poverty. opinion →
Osborn v. Barnhart, the court merely cited § 404.1520 while reciting the general five-step disability-evaluation framework; it did not interpret or decide an issue about this regulation. opinion →
Fleming v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1520(a)(iv) and (v) only to support its application of the five-step disability analysis; it did not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Jolly v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the regulation's five-step disability framework as background. Its actual decision turns on the claimant's age classification, the vocational-expert hypothetical, and the RFC analysis, not on what § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
MICKEVICH v. Barnhart, the court recites § 404.1520 and its five-step process as general legal framework, but does not construe the regulation or decide an issue about what it requires. The ruling instead concerns the ALJ’s heightened duty to develop the record for an unrepresented claimant and whether any failure caused prejudice. opinion →
Stafford v. Barnhart, the citation appears only in the opinion’s recitation of the ALJ’s findings; the court does not construe or decide anything about § 404.1520. opinion →
Nieves v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recites the five-step framework and reviews whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s step-four finding; it does not construe or independently decide a disputed meaning, requirement, or application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. opinion →
Montalvo v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1520 only as the source of the general five-step sequential inquiry, and the relevant steps were undisputed. The court did not interpret or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 404.1520; its ruling instead addressed the treating-physician rule and whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Martin v. Barnhart, the court merely recites the regulation's five-step framework in describing the ALJ's decision; it does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires or means. opinion →
Tucker v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1520(a)(4) only while reporting the ALJ’s step-five denial and identifying the five-step evaluation process; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Lacroix v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the citation to § 404.1520(g) appears only in the procedural history to report the ALJ's step-five determination; the appellate court did not construe or decide anything about that subsection. opinion →
Blea v. Barnhart, the citation to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 appears in the procedural history to describe the ALJ’s five-step analysis. The appellate court did not construe or apply § 404.1520; its holding concerned SSR 83-20 and the requirement to infer an ambiguous onset date with assistance from a medical advisor. opinion →
Gonzales v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court merely recites the general five-step disability framework while reviewing the ALJ's decision; it does not construe or decide any disputed issue about § 404.1520. opinion →
Blea v. Barnhart, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ used the five-step analysis under § 404.1520; the appellate court's holding concerns SSR 83-20 and the need to infer onset and consult a medical advisor, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Keane v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely identifies § 404.1520 as the source of the five-step sequential evaluation framework. It does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; the actual discussion concerns Listing 4.04(C) and the severity standard under §§ 416.920(c) and 404.1521. opinion →
Allred v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1520 only as authority for the five-step sequential analysis while reviewing the ALJ’s decision; it does not interpret, define, or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Robbins v. Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) only to identify the step-four context of the ALJ’s RFC determination. The decision reverses on evidentiary and procedural errors in assessing credibility, lay testimony, and the vocational-expert hypothetical; it does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Gantt v. Commissioner Social Security, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the SSA's five-step evaluation process, then reports the ALJ's step-by-step findings; it does not interpret, construe, or decide the requirements or application of the regulation. opinion →
Burton, Robert W. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B., the court merely reported the ALJ's use of the five-step process in the procedural history; it did not interpret or independently apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. opinion →
Bellucci v. Avedesian, the court recited the five-step process from Dorf as background for assessing Bellucci's disability and the date his municipal-ordinance pension entitlement vested. It did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Bellucci v. Avedesian, Incidental: the court recited the federal five-step framework and speculated about a hypothetical Social Security application while deciding Bellucci's entitlement under a municipal retirement ordinance; it did not construe or independently apply § 404.1520. opinion →
Betances v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1520 as part of a generic description of the five-step disability-evaluation framework, relying on an earlier decision for the recitation. It does not interpret or decide the requirements or application of § 404.1520; the judgment turns on substantial evidence supporting the denial. opinion →
Sird v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court's holding concerns the additional-and-significant-work-related-limitation requirement in § 12.05(C). Section 404.1520(d) appears only in a footnote as supporting authority for the general consequence of meeting a listed impairment; the court did not interpret or decide the meaning or application of § 404.1520(d). opinion →
Wilson v. Shirley Chater, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1520 only while describing the ALJ’s step-five determination in the procedural history. It does not construe or decide what § 404.1520 requires; its holdings concern collateral estoppel, the separate mental-impairment procedure in § 404.1520a, and substantial-evidence support for the residual-functional-capacity determination. opinion →
Perez v. Chater, the statute is cited in a footnote to explain the general sequential-evaluation framework and the ALJ's procedural history; the court's remand was based on the failure to identify specific unskilled jobs at step five, not on a ruling construing or applying § 404.1520. opinion →
Garcia, the plaintiff mistakenly invoked § 404.1520 in arguing that the ALJ had to compare a medical opinion with other medical sources. The court’s analysis and ruling concerned the separate medical-opinion regulation, § 404.1520c, not § 404.1520. opinion →
Kujawa, the court’s discussion concerns the separate medical-opinion regulation, § 404.1520c(c), not § 404.1520. opinion →
Cooper, the court construed 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), a different medical-opinion regulation, rather than § 404.1520. opinion →
Birdwell, the court’s discussion concerns the medical-opinion articulation rules in § 404.1520c and § 416.920c, not the sequential-evaluation rule in § 404.1520. opinion →
Deutsch v. Harris, the court mentions § 404.1520(f) only as part of a description of the regulatory circumstances in which the vocational rules apply. The court does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520(f) requires; its ruling instead addresses the lack of substantial evidence for sedentary work and the resulting application of other regulations. opinion →
Decker v. Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentions § 404.1520(a) only in a footnote as a cross-reference for a description of the state disability agency's functions and relationship to the Administration; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Hutchinson v. Schweiker, the court’s operative analysis and remand concerned the predecessor § 404.1503(d) and the adequacy of the agency’s review. Section 404.1520(d) appears only in footnote 3 as the unchanged recodified counterpart, so this court did not construe or apply that provision. opinion →
Broz v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court mentions § 404.1520(c) only in a footnote identifying it as the source of a paraphrased definition of impairment; it does not interpret or apply the subsection as a holding. opinion →
Broz v. Schweiker, the court cites § 404.1520(c) only in a footnote to identify the source of its paraphrase of “impairment” while explaining when the grid regulations apply. It does not construe, decide the meaning of, or rule on the requirements of § 404.1520(c). opinion →
Tyson v. Schweiker, the court expressly declined to extensively discuss § 404.1520(c) and decided the case on the record showing that plaintiff could return to his former work; the regulation is only a procedural/background reference, not a holding about its meaning or operation. opinion →
Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to identify the current regulation corresponding to the regulation relied on by the ALJ. The court did not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 means or requires; its holding concerned substantial evidence supporting the disability determination, the listings, and the medical-vocational grid. opinion →
Prill v. Schweiker, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the sequential evaluation method formerly codified at § 404.1503 and now codified at § 404.1520; it does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Little v. Schweiker, the court gives a general background description of the regulation's sequential evaluation process, but its remand rests on the ALJ's failure to make an express credibility finding concerning the claimant's pain testimony, not on construction or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Chambers v. Schweiker, the court recited the sequential-evaluation framework and the consequence of current substantial gainful activity, but it did not decide whether § 404.1520(b) applied to this claimant. The remand rested on the ALJ's inadequate evaluation of the severe-impairment evidence under § 404.1521. opinion →
Callais v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court applied the former §§ 404.1503(c) and 404.1504, which were then in effect. Section 404.1520 was mentioned only in a footnote as the later renumbered equivalent, not construed or applied by the court. opinion →
Grant v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary Department of Health and Human Services, the court mentions § 404.1520(f) only to identify the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process. Its actual ruling concerns when the grid rules may be applied in cases involving nonexertional impairments, based on other regulatory provisions; it does not construe or decide what § 404.1520(f) means or requires. opinion →
Cavitt v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the court identifies § 404.1520 as the source of the sequential evaluation scheme, but does not construe or decide a requirement of that regulation. Its ruling concerns the evidentiary support for Cavitt's residual functional capacity and the resulting application of Rule 201.27, with the substantive regulatory discussion addressing § 404.1567 instead. opinion →
Back v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520(f) only as regulatory support for the Secretary's denial and its finding that plaintiff could perform sedentary work; it does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Chandler v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the regulation is cited while reporting the administrative law judge’s test and findings in the procedural history. The court affirmed on substantial-evidence grounds and did not interpret or independently decide what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Viola Burkhalter v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cited § 404.1520(b) while describing the sequential evaluation procedure, but did not construe or independently decide anything about that provision. Its decision instead upheld the validity of §§ 404.1572–404.1574 and applied the earnings presumption in § 404.1574(b)(2). opinion →
Simons v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520(d) only in describing the basis of Simons's original disability determination. The court did not interpret or apply the listing provision in its own ruling; it reversed the Secretary because the ALJ's finding that Simons could work was unsupported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Tillery v. Richard S. Schweiker, Jr., Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, the court briefly described the regulation's sequential framework, but it did not decide an issue about the meaning or application of § 404.1520. The appeal was resolved on the alternative finding based on the medical-vocational guidelines and substantial evidence. opinion →
Haynes v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court only mentions § 404.1520 to report that the administrative law judge followed the regulations' sequence of determinations. The court's actual ruling concerns the improper use of the medical-vocational guidelines for nonexertional impairments, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Curtis C. BAUGUS, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee, the court only reports Baugus's argument concerning § 404.1520(d) and expressly declines to decide or remand for that issue because it independently found him disabled under the Act. opinion →
Gregory VAN HORN, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 only to describe the Secretary’s general disability-determination process. It does not interpret the regulation or base its ruling on how § 404.1520 applies; the reversal instead concerns evidentiary deficiencies and consideration of a closed period of disability. opinion →
Smith v. Ransom v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant, the court merely recites the sequential evaluation framework and cites § 404.1520 in its background discussion; it does not decide the statute's meaning or apply any of its requirements to resolve the appeal. opinion →
McCoy v. Richard S. Schweiker, Clifford M. Stack v. Richard S. Schweiker, James D. Desedare v. Richard S. Schweike, the opinion mentions § 404.1520(c) only in a footnote reporting what the Tenth Circuit decided; it expressly says that issue was not before this court and that it expresses no opinion on it. opinion →
Coleman v. Heckler, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process and cites § 404.1520. It does not interpret, explain, or decide any issue about what § 404.1520 requires; the court's analysis instead addresses sedentary-work capacity and the evidentiary support for the ALJ's findings. opinion →
Jack BLACKNALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 only parenthetically as a general outline of disability-evaluation factors. Its decision rests on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and § 404.1567(b), so it does not construe or decide anything about § 404.1520. opinion →
Johnson v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520(c) to describe the agency policy challenged in the class action, but decides only class certification and does not construe, apply, or rule on the regulation’s validity. opinion →
Castorena v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520 only as part of a general description of the sequential evaluation process. Its actual ruling concerned the claimant’s exertional capacity and the light-work definition in § 404.1567(b), and the remand referred generally to § 404.1501 et seq. and Appendix 2; it did not construe or decide an issue about § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Lawrence O. PERRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant, the court cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) in describing the Secretary’s burden and the guidelines’ role, but it does not construe that subsection. The decision rests on the separate requirement that the Secretary produce evidence of medical improvement before applying the guidelines, and the court expressly declined to reach the issue of inappropriate guideline application. opinion →
Mersel v. Heckler, the court describes § 404.1520 in background while distinguishing initial disability applications from the termination proceeding before it; it does not decide the regulation’s meaning or apply its five-step sequence to resolve this case. opinion →
Graham v. Heckler, the court merely quoted the Supreme Court’s summary of the fifth-step inquiry and cited § 404.1520(f). Its actual ruling addressed the ALJ’s improper exclusive reliance on the Appendix 2 grid despite non-exertional impairments, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520(f). opinion →
Ferraris v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 while briefly describing the disability-determination framework; it does not construe or decide the regulation, and the reversal rests on inadequate findings concerning residual functional capacity and transferable work skills. opinion →
Harris v. Heckler, the court recites subsection (d) as part of the regulatory background, but does not construe or apply it to decide the case; the remand rests on the Secretary’s failure to prove the availability of specific jobs after finding the claimant unable to perform past work. opinion →
Ellis STOKES, Appellant, v. Richard SCHWEIKER, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court cited § 404.1520 to summarize the Secretary’s five-step disability procedure. Its actual remand was based on the later circular requiring more detailed mental-impairment residual-functional-capacity assessment and on the undeveloped record, so the court did not construe or decide what § 404.1520 requires beyond this background description. opinion →
Avery v. Heckler, the court reports the plaintiffs’ allegation and decides only that the psychiatric-standard claim is collateral for exhaustion and jurisdiction purposes. It does not construe, validate, invalidate, or apply § 404.1520(e) on the merits. opinion →
Irene GARFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 only in a footnote to summarize the sequential disability inquiry. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue about this regulation; the holding concerns the evaluation of medical evidence and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Winston v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 in a general statement of the disability standard; it neither interprets nor independently applies the regulation, and the remand rests on evidentiary deficiencies. opinion →
Gordon v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520(c) only while describing possible future statutory challenges in another case; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Brown v. Heckler, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the sequential evaluation process and cites § 404.1520(b)-(e) in describing the ALJ’s findings; the court does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Holden v. Heckler, the court gives a general overview of the five-step disability evaluation and mentions § 404.1520(a) as the first-step regulation, but it does not decide what the subsection means or requires; the case concerns termination of disability benefits and allocation of the burden of proof. opinion →
Michael Edwin SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appe, the opinion mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in a footnote while describing the sequential evaluation process, but expressly declines to decide the appellant’s challenge to that process. The court instead resolves the case based on evidentiary errors and the severity of the impairment under §§ 404.1521 and 416.921. opinion →
Ted W. WOLFE, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the opinion only reports that the Secretary used the five-step process and expressly declines to decide whether that process properly applies; the judgment is affirmed instead on Wolfe's ability to perform light work. opinion →
Stewart v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to report the ALJ's sequential-analysis findings; it does not interpret or apply the regulation in its own holding. The remand instead addresses the ALJ's reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and the treatment of nonexertional impairments under Appendix 2. opinion →
Podedworny v. Harris, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the regulation’s evaluation procedure; it does not interpret, define, or decide any requirement under § 404.1520. The holding instead concerns the evidentiary treatment of pain, defective vocational hypotheticals, transferable skills, and the applicable medical-vocational grid. opinion →
Velazquez v. Heckler, the court merely quotes § 404.1520(c) as part of the class definition from City of New York v. Heckler. It does not construe the regulation or decide how it applies; the citation is background to the court’s EAJA bad-faith ruling. opinion →
Jacobs v. Heckler, the court cites subsection (f) only when directing the Secretary what further determination to make on remand. It does not construe, explain, or independently apply the subsection; the court's actual decision concerns the lack of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's finding. opinion →
Gomez v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520(a) only while reporting the administrative law judge's reasoning and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Stevenson v. Heckler, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the regulation's five-step sequence. It does not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement of § 404.1520; the ruling is based on the ALJ's failure to consider psychiatric evidence and the resulting lack of substantial evidence. opinion →
Montan v. Heckler, the court cited § 404.1520 only to introduce the five-step disability-evaluation framework; it did not construe or decide any disputed requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Gomez v. Heckler, the opinion mentions § 404.1520(c) only while describing the Dixon class action and the basis for the agency denials. This court did not construe or apply the regulation; it remanded under Dixon because an improper legal standard had been used. opinion →
Barbara DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520(d) in a footnote explaining Appendix 1’s place in the sequential evaluation, but the remand turned on whether the ALJ used the correct standard for a severe impairment under § 404.1520(c); the court did not construe or decide § 404.1520(d). opinion →
Donnie D. RUBLE, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520(c) only while recounting the ALJ's finding; it does not construe or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Dixon v. Heckler, the opinion reports the judge’s earlier ruling on the severity regulation as procedural history. The present decision affirms relief based on Dixon’s separate mental-impairment/listing argument and does not independently decide what § 404.1520(c) means or requires. opinion →
Mary L. COOK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the citation appears in the procedural history to identify the ALJ’s finding; the court did not interpret or decide what § 404.1520(e) requires or how it applies. opinion →
Losco v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 only in a string cite supporting the general proposition that the claimant bears the initial burden of proving disability; it does not construe the regulation or decide how its requirements apply. opinion →
Sandra BELLAMY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant/Appellee, the regulation is mentioned only in the procedural history to describe the Magistrate’s finding and corrective action below. The appellate court did not decide what § 404.1520 means or requires; it expressly noted that the challenge to the sequential evaluation was not reached. opinion →
Tobias v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 only as a general authority in a string cite for the disability burden-shifting framework. It does not construe, interpret, or apply § 404.1520; the operative rulings concern other regulations. opinion →
Pagan v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 only in the conclusion as supporting authority for remanding the case so the Secretary can determine whether the claimant could perform other work; it does not interpret or apply the regulation's requirements. opinion →
Opal Maxine SMITH, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the regulation appears only in a footnote giving background on the sequential evaluation and is not construed or independently applied by the appellate court. The court's decision affirmed the denial based on the credibility of Smith's pain complaints and substantial evidence supporting her ability to perform light work; the ALJ's finding that her impairment was not listed is procedural history. opinion →
John M. ZALEWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, De, the opinion merely recites the regulation’s sequential five-step test in a footnote while describing the ALJ’s process; the court does not interpret or independently decide anything about § 404.1520. opinion →
Tibbetts v. Heckler, the court merely reports the ALJ's finding and cites § 404.1520(d) as authority for the listings step; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Alice HALVORSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520 as a principal regulation underlying the five-step disability test, but does not construe or apply that regulation in deciding the appeal. The court's operative regulatory discussion instead quotes and relies on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(b), while the judgment rests on evidentiary and credibility errors. opinion →
Cabral v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to describe the five-step evaluation framework. It does not construe or decide any issue about that regulation; its ruling concerns the evidentiary support for the claimant's residual functional capacity at step five and the application of Appendix 2. opinion →
Shiner v. Heckler, the opinion merely reports the ALJ's sequential-evaluation finding and cites § 404.1520(f); the court did not interpret or apply that provision. The reversal rested on the lack of substantial evidence supporting the finding that the claimant could perform sedentary work. opinion →
Robert L. NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C.,, the regulation is cited in the procedural history and in the parties' arguments, but the court does not construe or decide what § 404.1520(c) requires. The holding concerns whether the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the evaluation of pain and credibility. opinion →
Thornton v. Heckler, the court merely described the five-step sequential analysis and quoted step five in a footnote. It did not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires; its holding concerned the separate medical-vocational guideline at § 201.00(f). opinion →
Jones v. Heckler, the court mentioned subsection (b) while reciting the sequential evaluation framework, but it did not apply or interpret that provision; the decision turned on the separate severity step under subsection (c). opinion →
Mason L. GIBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520(d) in a footnote to report the unchallenged ALJ finding that Gibson did not meet a listed impairment; it does not decide the meaning or application of subsection (d). opinion →
Cunningham v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cited subsection (d) in a footnote as background support for the general proposition that a qualifying listed impairment automatically establishes disability; it did not construe or apply subsection (d) to decide this appellant's claim. The decision instead turned on the lack of substantial evidence regarding vocational capacity. opinion →
McDonald v. Heckler, the court described the severity test and ruled only that the plaintiffs’ challenge was not mooted and could proceed; it did not decide what § 404.1520 means or whether the regulation is valid. opinion →
Bohn v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 only to summarize the administrative five-step disability-evaluation process in the background of its EAJA attorneys’ fee analysis. It does not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Johnson SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the opinion describes the five-step framework and recounts the Appeals Council's use of § 404.1520(e), but the court's holding concerns the Appeals Council's own-motion review authority under § 404.970(a), not the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Jennings v. Secretary of Department of Health, the court cites § 404.1520(a) only to describe the disability-determination framework. Its decision remands for further development of the medical record concerning asthma and the criteria in the Listing of Impairments, without construing or deciding how § 404.1520 applies. opinion →
Lundquist v. Heckler, the opinion cites § 404.1520 only in a footnote identifying the Secretary’s five-step test. The court did not construe or independently apply that regulation; its ruling relied on Johnson v. Heckler’s then-controlling holding that the step-two severity requirement violated the Act. opinion →
Bulpett v. Heckler, the opinion cites § 404.1520 to introduce the five-step disability framework, but does not construe or resolve a disputed issue under that section. The remand instead rests on inadequate evidentiary findings and the mechanical use of the Grid despite cumulative and nonexertional impairments. opinion →
Farris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion's actual holding construes the severity requirement in the second step of the SSI sequential evaluation under 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920 and 416.921. Section 404.1520 appears only in a see citation describing the final step and is not itself interpreted or applied as the basis of the decision. opinion →
Jan M. Sexton Salmi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court’s holding interprets and upholds the parallel SSI severity regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), not § 404.1520. The reference to § 404.1520(a) merely identifies the codification of an earlier 1968 regulation, and the footnote’s reference to § 404.1520(c) reports another circuit’s ruling. opinion →
Rivera v. Heckler, the court cited § 404.1520 to state the general five-step framework and reported that the ALJ conformed to it; the reversal was based on the improper treatment of medical evidence and the lack of substantial evidence, not on interpreting or applying § 404.1520. opinion →
Stamps v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites § 404.1520 in its general description of the disability-evaluation sequence and burden of proof, but does not construe or apply that regulation as the basis for its decision. The holding concerns whether the claimant had transferable skills and whether the Secretary met the evidentiary burden. opinion →
Sprague v. Heckler, the statute is mentioned in the procedural background while describing the plaintiffs’ allegations and the regulatory framework. The court decided an attorney-fee motion based on substantial justification and did not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 as part of its holding. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Heckler, the regulation is cited in the opinion's account of the ALJ's determination to identify the Secretary's five-step sequence. The court did not construe or decide what § 404.1520 means or requires; its ruling addressed substantial evidence, sedentary work, the medical-vocational grid, and development of the record. opinion →
Marcus v. Heckler, the court cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 to identify the sequential-evaluation regulations and reports the plaintiffs’ allegation, but it decides only jurisdiction and class certification; it does not construe or rule on what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Jackson v. Heckler, the court merely recites the familiar sequential-evaluation framework while addressing the ALJ's burden-shifting error and improper use of the medical-vocational guidelines; it does not interpret or independently apply § 404.1520. opinion →
Larry R. BRANHAM, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520(d) only to state the general disability-determination framework. Its actual analysis and holding concern the requirements and onset date under Listing 12.05(C), not the meaning or application of § 404.1520(d). opinion →
Meyers v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) as authorities while summarizing the seven-step disability analysis. It does not construe or decide the meaning or application of those provisions; its holding concerns whether the Secretary's position was substantially justified for purposes of attorney's fees. opinion →
Richard A. ROBERTS, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary, Health and Human Services, Appellee, the opinion cites § 404.1520(e) only while reporting the administrative law judge’s determination; the court did not construe or apply the regulation’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
Garcia v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the five-step disability-claim evaluation framework and then addresses the fourth step; it does not interpret, define, or otherwise decide what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Brenda BENSON, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the opinion merely reports the ALJ's finding and cites § 404.1520(c) as authority. The court does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its reversal rests on errors concerning psychological pain, mental-impairment listings, medication, and vocational evidence. opinion →
Burton v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to describe the general sequential-evaluation framework; it does not construe or independently apply that regulation. The decision instead addresses the severity standard under § 404.1521(a) and the evidentiary standard for disability due to alcoholism. opinion →
Schweitzer v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 to recite the general five-step disability framework, but the case decides the separate issue of using the medical-vocational grid despite alleged nonexertional limitations; it does not construe or apply § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Jantz v. Heckler, the court recited the five-step disability framework and cited § 404.1520 among its authorities, but did not construe or decide what the regulation requires. The actual ruling concerned whether substantial evidence supported the finding that the claimant could perform sedentary work. opinion →
Carothers v. Heckler, the court merely reports the ALJ’s characterization of the impairments under subsection (c); it does not interpret or decide the application of that provision. The remand rests on the asthma-listing provisions and prescribed-treatment analysis. opinion →
Woods v. Heckler, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ used the sequential evaluation in § 404.1520. The court did not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires; its ruling concerned the improper use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in light of non-exertional pain. opinion →
Kenneth E. POPP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cited § 404.1520(d) only for the general background proposition that a listed impairment results in disability without considering age, education, or work experience. Its actual decision addressed whether the claimant satisfied Listing 12.05 and whether the IQ evidence could be disregarded, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520(d). opinion →
Josefa DELGADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the regulation is cited only in the procedural history to identify the ALJ's rationale; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 404.1520(e) and instead decides issues concerning magistrate review and substantial evidence. opinion →
Milonas v. Heckler, the court merely describes the regulation’s sequential disability tests as background to its review; it does not construe § 404.1520 or decide a dispute about what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Wilbur D. HERBERT, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Etc., Appellee, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying Step 4 of the sequential evaluation process; the court's actual ruling concerned evaluation of subjective pain complaints under Polaski and related authorities, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Otha CALVIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 only while describing the regulatory sequential evaluation in the background. It does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 means or requires; the holding concerns the validity and use of the age component of the medical-vocational grids. opinion →
Essie D. COOK, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court did not construe or apply § 404.1520 to decide the appeal; it merely described the wage-earner five-step process in a footnote. The holding concerned widow’s-benefit disability standards, development of arthritis evidence, and consideration of combined impairments under other provisions. opinion →
Lawrence LANDRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, as Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appelle, the opinion merely reports the Administrative Law Judge’s use of the regulation’s sequential analysis in the procedural history. The court’s decision addresses the separate statutory standard for evaluating pain and substantial-evidence review, and does not interpret or decide what 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
Kellough v. Heckler, the court cites § 404.1520 only as a general reference to the sequential evaluation process when directing where the agency should resume proceedings. It does not interpret, define, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Constance GALLO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the court did not decide the validity or meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Its discussion of the regulation and the statute was conditional, while the case was remanded for the ALJ to determine whether Gallo could perform her prior work. opinion →
Dixon v. Heckler, the court reviewed only whether the preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion and expressly left the ultimate validity of the severity regulations unresolved; it did not construe or definitively apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. opinion →
Fedoce v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion recites the five-step disability-evaluation framework and reports that the ALJ found a severe impairment under § 404.1520(c), but the court's ruling concerned whether the back condition met an Appendix I listed impairment, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520(c). opinion →
Robert L. GILLILAND, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court recited the regulation as part of the general disability-evaluation framework, but expressly assumed without deciding that the claimant did not meet the relevant listing and resolved the appeal on the lack of substantial evidence supporting the residual-capacity finding. opinion →
Wilson BREWSTER, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Appellee, the court merely recites the regulation’s sequential-evaluation framework and cites subsections (b), (c), (e), and (f). Its decision turns on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding about Brewster’s past work and on the evaluation of treating- and non-treating-physician opinions; it does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
Stewart v. Heckler, the opinion reports that the ALJ applied § 404.1520(f) at step five, but the court does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; it remands because the sedentary-work finding lacked substantial evidence and because of errors in weighing the medical evidence. opinion →
Agresti v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites § 404.1520(c) while reporting another judge’s step-two ruling in a footnote. Agresti’s actual decision reverses the Secretary for inadequate evaluation of medical evidence and lack of substantial evidence at step four; it does not adjudicate the meaning, validity, or application of § 404.1520(c) to Agresti. opinion →
Brian J. RATCLIFFE, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health & Human Services of the United States, Appellee, the regulation is mentioned only in describing the ALJ's procedural history. The court did not interpret or apply § 404.1520; it remanded because the ALJ failed to address conflicting vocational-expert testimony and related evidence. opinion →
Felicita MUNOZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 while describing the agency’s five-step process, but it does not decide the regulation’s meaning, requirements, or scope. The remand concerns the possible failure to apply SSR 85-28 and to evaluate the claimant’s past relevant work. opinion →
Bowen v. City of New York, the opinion summarizes the sequential-evaluation regulations and the lower court’s finding that an undisclosed policy bypassed them, but the Supreme Court decides only whether exhaustion and the § 405(g) limitations period could be excused. It does not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Ollie G. CHESTER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ used the regulation's framework in making the underlying findings. The appellate court does not interpret or apply § 404.1520; its holding concerns substantial evidence and the need for vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Derby v. Bowen, the court mentioned § 404.1520(c) in the procedural history and in rejecting an EAJA fee argument that applying the non-severity regulation made the government's position unjustified. It did not construe the regulation or decide its substantive requirements or application. opinion →
Fitzpatrick v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to identify the regulations' five-step disability-evaluation procedure and then reviews the ALJ's findings under the substantial-evidence standard; it does not construe or decide what § 404.1520 requires or how a disputed step applies. opinion →
Linda MASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court merely reports that the ALJ used the analysis in § 404.1520 as part of the administrative decision. It does not construe the regulation or decide what the regulation requires; the court instead reverses and remands because the ALJ failed to consider Mason’s subjective complaints of pain. opinion →
Vera D. SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the citation appears only in the court’s description of the ALJ’s analysis below; the appellate court did not construe or apply § 404.1520. Its holding concerned the Secretary’s failure to consider subjective testimony of pain. opinion →
Julia DORF, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Appellee, the court describes the regulation's five-step framework as background, but its decision rests on substantial-evidence review of the Secretary's step-four finding. It expressly declined to decide which regulations applied at step three and did not construe or independently apply § 404.1520. opinion →
Monteiro v. Heckler, the opinion describes the regulation’s five-step framework but does not decide what § 404.1520 means or requires. Its footnote notes that the legality of the severity regulations in subsection (c) was in question, then expressly states that step two is not at issue because the ALJ found a severe impairment. The judgment instead turns on whether substantial evidence supported the light-work finding. opinion →
Davis C. HERRON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis W. BOWEN, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to describe the sequential disability-evaluation framework while deciding whether the government's position was substantially justified under the Equal Access to Justice Act; it does not construe or decide an issue about this regulation. opinion →
Salling v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 while describing the sequential evaluation and the grid system, but it does not interpret the regulation or decide a claim under it; the discussion is background rather than a holding. opinion →
Hayes v. Bowen, the court expressly declined to address the claim concerning application of § 404.1520(c); the statute is mentioned only in an unresolved issue listed in a footnote. opinion →
Salyers v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion recounts the interpretation adopted in Farris and Salmi but does not independently decide what § 404.1520 means or requires; it dismisses the appeal as moot and expressly declines to reach the remaining issues. opinion →
Pratt v. Bowen, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote describing the basis for the plaintiffs’ benefit denials. The court’s holdings in this order concern class relief, exhaustion, interim benefits, and rehearing procedures, and do not construe or decide anything about § 404.1520(c). opinion →
McDonald v. Otis Bowen, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the court mentions § 404.1520 to describe the five-step regulatory scheme and the first-step rule, but its decision construes the Act's twelve-month disability requirement and the trial work period rather than deciding what § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
Fields v. Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant, the opinion only recites the regulation's five-step disability-evaluation process in explaining the background. It does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires; its holding concerns the improper use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and the need for expert vocational testimony or similar evidence for a nonexertional impairment. opinion →
Charles BAPP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the five-step disability-evaluation sequence as background. Its holding addresses when nonexertional impairments make reliance on the medical-vocational grids inappropriate and require vocational-expert or similar evidence, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Clemente v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520(f) only while describing the fifth step of the disability-evaluation process, then states that the ALJ never reached that step; it does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Raymond R. DA ROSA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520 only in describing the Administrative Law Judge’s procedure below; it does not interpret or apply the regulation in its own holding. opinion →
Wesley E. GREEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defend, the court recites the general disability-benefits burden-shifting framework and cites § 404.1520(f) in support, but it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about that regulation; the appeal is resolved on the ALJ's credibility finding regarding pain testimony. opinion →
Dan HAVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 only while briefly describing the disability-benefits inquiry; it does not interpret or decide the regulation, and its holding concerns the treating-physician rule. opinion →
Spencer v. Secretary, Health and Human Services, the court mentions § 404.1520(c) only while reporting the administrative denial; it does not construe or decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Pearson v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 only while recounting the Secretary’s five-step sequential framework; it does not construe or decide the meaning or application of that regulation. The decision instead turns on the evaluation of pain and the claimant’s capacity to perform past work. opinion →
Welch v. Heckler, the court merely identified § 404.1520 as the regulation containing the five-step disability-evaluation process and reproduced its text. It did not construe or decide the meaning or requirements of § 404.1520; the remand instead addressed the Appeals Council’s failure to assess the effect of Welch’s deafness on his ability to work. opinion →
Jacqueline BRADLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Def, the court mentions § 404.1520(d) only while reporting the ALJ’s sequential-evaluation findings. It does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; the appellate decision addresses substantial-evidence review and whether a remand was warranted for new evidence. opinion →
Hadden v. Bowen, the regulation is discussed only in a footnote explaining the prior remand and the agency’s sequential evaluation; the court did not decide an issue about what § 404.1520 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Charles TURPIN, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520(c) only while reporting the holding and possible effect of Brown; it expressly states that its own decision is based on other grounds. opinion →
Ramon CHAPARRO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 to recite the five-step disability-evaluation framework, but it does not construe the regulation or decide a dispute about its requirements. Its holding concerns whether substantial evidence supported the Secretary’s determination that Chaparro could return to his past relevant work. opinion →
Leonard L. RAY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendan, the regulation appears only in a general statement of the sequential-evaluation framework, alongside a case citation. The court resolved the appeal on substantial evidence and on the requirements that disability result from a medically determinable impairment and that technological changes are not disabling, without deciding an issue under § 404.1520(f)(1). opinion →
Rivera v. Bowen, the court mentions § 404.1520(c) only in a parenthetical identifying the regulation discussed in Dixon; it does not interpret, apply, or adopt a rule about this statute. opinion →
Walden v. Bowen, the court merely recited the five-step evaluation while describing the ALJ’s disability analysis in an EAJA fee decision; it did not construe or rule on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. opinion →
Johnson v. Bowen, the court describes the agency's sequential disability-claim process and cites § 404.1520, but its decision turns on the treating physician rule and the need for agency reconsideration; it does not construe or decide what § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
Necessary v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 only as a general reference while stating the governing disability framework; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that regulation. The decision turns on the statutory disability standard and the listing for ischemic heart disease. opinion →
Ida McDONALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis BOWEN, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Ap, the court cites § 404.1520 only to describe the Secretary’s five-step scheme and the first-step rule; it does not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 404.1520. The actual decision concerns the interaction between disability eligibility and a trial work period. opinion →
Wiegmann v. Bowen, the court merely reports that the ALJ considered the five-step process during the administrative decision; it does not interpret or apply § 404.1520. The court's actual ruling concerns the use of the regulatory grid for a nonexertional impairment. opinion →
E.L. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the only reference to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) appears in the claimant’s argument. The court rejected the listing argument because the claimant did not satisfy Listing 1.05(C), but it did not construe or apply § 404.1520(d). opinion →
William R. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis BOWEN, Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, Defenda, the court merely identifies § 404.1520 as the source of the five-step disability-evaluation process. It does not interpret or decide what the regulation means or requires; its rulings concern the evidentiary support for the Secretary’s findings and the step-five burden. opinion →
Bradley v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 only as part of its general background description of disability-evaluation standards; it does not construe, interpret, or specifically apply this regulation in deciding the claim. opinion →
Joyce M. JOHNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court merely reports that the ALJ conducted the inquiry under § 404.1520; it does not interpret or apply the regulation in its own holding. The court's remand concerned the standards for evaluating disabling pain, not § 404.1520. opinion →
Rose M. TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-App, the citation to § 404.1520 appears while reporting the administrative law judge’s step-two determination. The court did not construe the regulation; it dismissed the appeal on the procedural failure to object and noted that Yuckert had already upheld the severity regulation. opinion →
Williams v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 only while reciting the Secretary’s general five-step disability test. Its decision remanding the case rests on the ALJ’s unexplained findings, failure to evaluate evidence adequately, and lack of reasons permitting judicial review; it does not decide what § 404.1520 means or require. opinion →
Ware v. Bowen, the court quotes § 404.1520(c) only as part of the Johnson class definition and recounts the prior injunction; it does not interpret, apply, or decide the validity or requirements of this subsection. opinion →
Mattson v. Bowen, the appeal concerned whether the Secretary's position was substantially justified for purposes of EAJA attorney fees. The court did not independently construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); its description of the regulation and reference to Bowen v. Yuckert's upholding of it were background to the fee ruling. opinion →
Harlan E. HYDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ applied the medical-vocational guidelines and cites § 404.1520(f); the appellate court remanded for consideration of new evidence and did not construe or decide anything about this regulation. opinion →
Samuel C. EVANGELISTA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the opinion mentions § 404.1520(f) only while reporting the administrative law judge’s disposition of Evangelista’s earlier application. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Rosa Lee BROWN, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520 only in a footnote from its earlier opinion as a supporting citation for the general proposition that mental impairments can establish disability. The present decision does not interpret, apply, or rule on the regulation; it remands under the standard announced in Bowen v. Yuckert. opinion →
Smith v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to identify the Secretary’s five-step disability-evaluation procedure; it states that the first four steps are not at issue and does not construe or decide what § 404.1520 requires. The holding concerns use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and the need for vocational evidence when nonexertional limitations are present. opinion →
Donald C. CHESHIER Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defe, the court cited § 404.1520(d) only to state the general rule for listed impairments, then held that the claimant waived his argument concerning Listing 4.12; it did not decide what subsection (d) requires or apply it on the merits. opinion →
Paul H. BAEDER, Appellee, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Appellant, the citation describes the procedural history and an earlier ruling that was later recognized as incorrect; this appeal concerns an Equal Access to Justice Act attorney-fee award and substantial justification, so the court does not decide what § 404.1520(c) means or requires. opinion →
Richard D. BAILEY, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the opinion only quotes the Administrative Law Judge’s finding citing § 404.1520(c) as procedural history. The court does not construe or apply that regulation; its decision concerns whether the Secretary’s position was substantially justified under the EAJA. opinion →
Wilkerson v. Bowen, the court did not construe or apply § 404.1520(d); the provision appears only in a footnote reciting the effect of listed impairments while describing the statutory and regulatory background. opinion →
Neal v. Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court only identified § 404.1520 as the source of the five-step test and expressly said there was no need to apply it; the decision rested on the claimant's failure to satisfy the disability-duration requirement. opinion →
Richard FANNING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the opinion only reports that the Secretary applied § 404.1520(c) in Nieves; it does not construe or apply that regulation itself. The court’s holding concerns the meaning of the second prong of Listing 12.05(C) and the need for remand under the SSI regulation, § 416.920. opinion →
Allegra v. Bowen, the court merely recites the Secretary’s five-step disability-evaluation process and cites § 404.1520; it does not construe, enforce, or decide the case under that regulation. The decision instead concerns the sufficiency and admissibility of medical and other evidence. opinion →
George M. CRAIGIE, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the opinion only reports that the administrative law judge used the five-point analysis under § 404.1520; the court did not construe or apply the regulation itself, deciding the appeal on substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Steiner v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court merely identifies the five-step process used by the ALJ and does not construe or decide any requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; its rulings concern substantial evidence and whether the claimant’s skills were transferable to sedentary work. opinion →
Virgil L. CRADY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the citation to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(f)(1) appears only in the dissent, where it is included in a string cite supporting the dissent's general statement of the Secretary's burden. The majority did not adopt that discussion or decide what § 404.1520(f)(1) means or requires. opinion →
Beeler v. Bowen, the court merely reported the AU's finding and included § 404.1520(e) in a string citation; it did not construe or apply the regulation in its own holding. opinion →
Walker v. Bowen, the court mentions § 404.1520 in a footnote to describe the agency’s five-step test, but does not construe or decide what subsection (b) means or requires. opinion →
20 soc.sec.rep.ser. 60, unempl.ins.rep. Cch 17,696 Claire McDonald v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the five-step disability-inquiry framework and the step 2 issue involved in the earlier merits litigation. This appeal decides jurisdiction and tolling of administrative-review deadlines, not what § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
Minter v. Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services, the court cites § 404.1520(a) while giving background on the Secretary's sequential disability-evaluation process. It does not decide the regulation's meaning or application; its holding concerns whether the government's position was substantially justified under the EAJA. opinion →
Koning v. Bowen, the court merely describes the five-step test, including identifying this case as reaching step five. It does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires; the remand rests on inadequate evidence, residual-functional-capacity analysis, and record development. opinion →
John KANGAS, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520(f) only while stating the general burden-shifting framework. Its remand decision turned on the Secretary’s failure to evaluate the claimant’s ability to work on a regular, continuing, or sustained basis, not on construction or application of § 404.1520(f). opinion →
Whiting v. Bowen, the court mentions § 404.1520(b)-(f) while describing the administrative law judge’s background five-step procedure; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Cummings v. Bowen, the court cited § 404.1520 only as authority for a quoted summary of the familiar five-step disability procedure; it did not construe the regulation or decide an issue about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Chambers v. Bowen, the court cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 only as authority for the general five-step disability-benefits procedure; it does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Kuwahara v. Bowen, the opinion recites the regulation's five-step disability test, but does not construe or independently decide what § 404.1520 means or requires. The remand rests on the agency's unsupported step-four finding and its failure to obtain vocational evidence for the step-five analysis. opinion →
Sanchez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court merely cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 as the source of the general five-step disability-claim framework. Its decision applied the mental-disorder criteria in Appendix 1, § 12.05, and did not interpret or decide how § 404.1520 applies. opinion →
Whitt v. Secretary of Health & Human Services of the United States, the court cites § 404.1520 only as the source of the general five-step disability test; it does not interpret or decide a disputed requirement of the regulation, and resolves the appeal on substantial evidence and past relevant work. opinion →
STUNKARD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. Appeal of William STUNKARD, section 404.1520(e) is cited only in a footnote identifying the agency’s five-step sequence and reporting the ALJ’s step-five finding. The court did not construe or apply subsection (e); its holding rests on the light-work, residual-functional-capacity, nonexertional-limitations, and Medical-Vocational Guidelines provisions. opinion →
Baker v. Bowen, the court cites the regulation while reciting the agency's five-step sequential evaluation and identifying step four as the stage at which the claim was decided; it does not interpret or independently decide what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Seibel v. Liberty Homes, Inc., the statute is quoted only in the dissent and is used as a premise for the dissent's proposed offset of damages. The majority does not adopt or decide any interpretation or application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. opinion →
Martinez v. Bowen, the court cited § 404.1520 only in stating the general disability framework and in identifying the five-step procedure summarized from precedent. Its decision addressed the evidentiary support for the denial, including the treating-physician rule and subjective complaints, rather than deciding what § 404.1520 means or how it independently applies. opinion →
Jose A. TORRES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the court mentioned § 404.1520 only to observe that the administrative decision did not discuss the sequential evaluation process; it did not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Lisa TSARELKA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the regulation is cited only in the procedural history to identify the ALJ's step-two finding; the appellate court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 404.1520(c). opinion →
Robert H. DESROSIERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520 only to identify where the full five-step disability process is described. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that regulation; the holding concerns the limits on using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and the need for vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Lapinsky v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court cites § 404.1520(d) only to state the regulatory framework before construing listing 1.13; it does not decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 404.1520(d). opinion →
Kelley v. Bowen, the court cited § 404.1520(c) only in a parenthetical definition while deciding whether the claimant satisfied Listing § 12.05(C); it did not interpret, apply, or rule on § 404.1520(c) itself. opinion →
DiStefano v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520(f) only to state the agency's next steps on remand; it does not interpret or apply the regulation in deciding the case. opinion →
Beasley v. Bowen, the regulation is cited in a footnote describing the plaintiff’s asserted mental-retardation theory and in a string citation supporting a burden-shifting proposition. The court did not decide the claim under the regulation or interpret its requirements; it reversed on the evidentiary record concerning schizophrenia and work capacity. opinion →
George v. Bowen, the regulation is mentioned in the court's description of the ALJ's proceedings below; the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1520 itself, and remanded solely because the treating-physician rule was not followed. opinion →
Cieutat v. Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant, section 404.1520 appears only in a footnote that describes the general sequential-evaluation framework. The court does not construe, enforce, or decide any issue under this regulation; its holdings concern reopening under § 404.988, trial work under § 404.1592(e), and the benefits determination. opinion →
Evans v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 in background while reciting the agency’s five-step disability test. It does not construe the regulation or decide a legal question about what the regulation requires; its holding concerns whether the denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Williams v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 while reciting the general five-step disability framework and burden shifting, but it does not construe or decide any issue about the regulation; the citation is incidental to the remand and substantial-evidence analysis. opinion →
Johnson v. Bowen, the court merely reported the ALJ's conclusion and cited § 404.1520(f); it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Annie E. FOSTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the only citation to § 404.1520(d) appears in the plaintiff’s argument. The court decided whether the claimant met the § 12.04 listing criteria, but did not construe or expressly adopt a rule about § 404.1520(d). opinion →
William C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appelle, the court cited 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f) only to recite the five-step disability-review framework. It did not construe or apply subsection (b)'s substantial-gainful-activity criterion; the decision turned on whether substantial evidence supported sedentary work and on the light-work rules. opinion →
McDonald v. Bowen, the citation to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) appears in the court’s recitation of the plaintiffs’ challenge. This opinion decides entitlement to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA and does not itself construe or apply § 404.1520(c) as a substantive rule. opinion →
Annie WINGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court only identifies § 404.1520 as the source of the five-step disability-evaluation process. It does not construe or decide the meaning or requirements of that regulation; the ruling concerns whether the Secretary’s step-five determination was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Roy HARPER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant, the statute appears only in the procedural history as a citation to the regulation involved in the district court’s remand. This court decided appellate jurisdiction and did not construe or apply § 404.1520. opinion →
Paige v. Bowen, the court cited § 404.1520 to describe the Secretary’s five-step disability determination process, but did not construe the regulation itself; its ruling concerned the Appeals Council’s evidentiary and analytical errors in applying step 4. opinion →
Hooker v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, the citation appears only in the procedural history to report the administrative law judge’s ruling; the appellate court did not decide what § 404.1520(d) means or how it applies. opinion →
Smith v. Bowen, the regulation is cited only in the procedural history to identify the five-step analysis used by the ALJ; the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1520 and instead ruled on the adequacy of the evaluation of Smith’s pain testimony. opinion →
Brown v. Bowen, the court cited § 404.1520 only to identify the general five-step disability process. Its decision addressed whether substantial evidence supported the findings under the Appendix 1 mental-impairment listings, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Howard MULLIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant, the court merely recites the sequential-evaluation framework and cites § 404.1520; its decision rests on substantial gainful activity and the related regulations, without construing or deciding the meaning or application of § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Nelson v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in a footnote as the authority for a sequential-analysis description attributed to Bauzo v. Bowen. The court did not construe or decide any issue under § 404.1520; its holding was that additional evidence was material and that the case should be remanded for further consideration. opinion →
Kernis J. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appell, the court recites the five-step procedure and cites § 404.1520(b)-(f), but the citation is background to its substantial-evidence review. The court did not construe § 404.1520(b) or decide a disputed question about what that provision means or requires. opinion →
Fernandez-Sosa v. Bowen, the court merely identifies the regulation as the source of the five-step disability-evaluation sequence in its background discussion; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Miller v. Bowen, the court merely cites § 404.1520 as the source of the five-step process and recounts the administrative law judge's steps. The remand rests on the RFC analysis under §§ 404.1545(c) and 404.1546 and on evidentiary errors, not on interpreting or deciding what § 404.1520 requires. opinion →
Torres v. Bowen, the court merely identifies and describes the regulation's five-step sequence as background; it does not interpret § 404.1520 or decide a disputed issue about how the regulation applies. opinion →
Mosteller v. Bowen, the regulation is cited and described as background for the five-step disability-evaluation framework; the court does not interpret § 404.1520 or decide a disputed legal issue about its requirements. The decision instead reviews whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Hayes v. Bowen, the cited subsection appears in the court’s account of the Administrative Law Judge’s earlier determination; the court does not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) itself. opinion →
Gowen v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Louie v. Pittman v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of H, the court merely reported the Administrative Law Judge’s reliance on § 404.1520(e) in the procedural history; it did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Hansley v. Bowen, the court only cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in a see-also reference while stating the governing statutory disability standard; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about this regulation. opinion →
Crist v. Bowen, the regulation is cited as authority for the Secretary’s general five-step sequential evaluation framework; the court’s ruling instead concerned substantial evidence, residual functional capacity, and the Grid, without construing § 404.1520. opinion →
Calandro v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520 to describe the Secretary’s five-step process and states a general proposition about it, but it does not decide whether the process was properly applied or rely on the regulation as the basis for relief. opinion →
Baker v. Bowen, the court recited the regulation's five-step framework and cited its separate steps while reviewing the agency's disability determination, but it did not construe or decide a disputed requirement of § 404.1520. opinion →
DeCarolis v. SECRETARY, DHHS, the court cites § 404.1520 only to identify the Secretary's five-step evaluation process. It does not interpret or decide the requirements or application of that regulation; the ruling instead concerns the proper legal standard for evaluating chronic alcoholism and remands for further proceedings. opinion →
WALLACE v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Appeal of John R. WALLACE, the citation appears in an explanatory footnote describing the Listings; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1520(d). Its holding concerned post-hearing medical reports and cross-examination under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b). opinion →
Annie M. PEARSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appelle, the court mentions §§ 404.1520(e) and (f) only to describe the administrative law judge’s sequential steps; it does not construe or decide what either provision requires. The holding instead concerns the improper use of the medical-vocational guidelines because Pearson lacked the capacity for light work. opinion →
Hyatt v. Heckler, the court mentions § 404.1520(d) in the attached pain-evaluation instructions as support for the uncontroversial sequential-evaluation point that no further pain assessment is needed after a claimant meets or equals a listed impairment. It does not construe, interpret, or decide a dispute about this regulation; the case concerns the Secretary’s pain-evaluation policy and Fourth Circuit precedent. opinion →
Hill v. Sullivan, the court cites § 404.1520 only in the statutory-background description of the generally applicable five-step process. It does not decide what the regulation means or requires; its ruling concerns the adequacy of the Secretary’s widow-claim policies and whether the plaintiffs’ claims could proceed. opinion →
Velma R. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the opinion mentions § 404.1520(e) and (f) to identify the sequential-evaluation steps reached or not reached in Smith’s case. It does not interpret or independently apply those provisions; the court’s substantive discussion concerns past relevant work under § 404.1565(a), and the ruling rests on substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Hodge v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1520(a)-(f) while describing the sequential evaluation process, but it does not decide the statute’s meaning or application. The disposition turns on the treating-physician rule, so the statute’s citation and general summary are incidental. opinion →
Marilyn FINKELSTEIN, Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellant, the regulation is cited in footnote 3 only to describe the sequential disability inquiry for wage earners, as background contrasting it with the stricter widow's-benefit standard. The court expressly stated that it lacked jurisdiction and therefore expressed no opinion on the merits of whether residual functional capacity must be considered for widow's benefits. opinion →
Dixon v. Bowen, the court cited § 404.1520 in describing the Step 2 severity regulation, but this opinion decided only whether to permit further discovery and denied summary judgment without reaching the merits of the regulation's meaning or application. opinion →
Dunn v. Bowen, the court merely identifies § 404.1520 as codifying the five-step disability analysis and summarizes its steps; it does not construe or decide any issue under that regulation. The holding concerns 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d), not § 404.1520. opinion →
Thompson v. Sullivan, the court cites § 404.1520(b) only while reciting the general disability standard; its actual ruling concerns the ALJ’s duty to develop the record about special work conditions and the earnings presumption under § 404.1574. opinion →
Raymond CROUCHET, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendan, the court cites § 404.1520 only to describe the Secretary’s general five-step process. It does not interpret, define, or decide the requirements or application of that regulation; the appeal is resolved on substantial evidence supporting the finding that Crouchet could perform past relevant work. opinion →
Margie BRYANT, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the statute appears only in a footnote reciting the disability-proof framework; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1520. The decision instead addressed whether substantial evidence supported the denial and discussed the combined effect of impairments under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522. opinion →
27 soc.sec.rep.ser. 18, unempl.ins.rep. Cch 14888a Claire McDonald v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the present appeal decided entitlement to and the scope of EAJA attorney fees. This sentence reports the court's earlier McDonald I ruling about the regulation; the present opinion did not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). opinion →
Alida RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the regulation is cited only while reporting the Administrative Law Judge's step-five finding in the procedural history. The court does not interpret or decide what § 404.1520 requires; its holding concerns whether substantial evidence supported the disability determination. opinion →
Welchance v. Bowen, the regulation is cited in the opinion's general recitation of the five-step disability-review framework; the court does not interpret § 404.1520 or decide a disputed issue about what it requires. The decision instead concerns whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's application of the framework. opinion →
Boyd L. SORENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appelle, section 404.1520(d) appears in a quotation of the claimant’s argument about qualifying respiratory impairments. The court expressly declined to address that issue and decided the case under the medical-vocational grids instead. opinion →
Robert J. ANDERSON Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defenda, the court merely quotes the sequential disability-evaluation process and cites § 404.1520(b) and (d) as background; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Louise HAYWOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appelle, the court merely recites the five-step sequential procedure as background and affirms on substantial-evidence grounds; it does not interpret or decide a dispute about § 404.1520. opinion →
Stegall v. Sullivan, the court cites § 404.1520(d), (e) to describe the sequential-evaluation procedure while deciding whether separate Listings regulations were valid; it does not construe or independently rule on § 404.1520. opinion →
Cook v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cited § 404.1520(f) while affirming that substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits; it did not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
McAdams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the regulation is cited only to report the Appeals Council’s framework for its disability determination. The court’s own discussion criticizes the agency’s use of the grid analysis and addresses related provisions in Appendix 2, but it does not construe or decide what § 404.1520(f) means or requires. opinion →
Clevenger v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cited § 404.1520 only to describe the five-step framework used by the ALJ in the procedural history; it did not construe or decide any issue about what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Hayes v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, the regulation is mentioned in the dissent only to report what the court did on a previous appeal; this opinion does not construe or apply § 404.1520 as part of its disposition. opinion →
Degrande v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cited § 404.1520(c) only in a footnote to identify step two as the threshold severe-impairment inquiry while distinguishing step-two cases from the step-four issue decided here; it did not decide what subsection (c) means or requires. opinion →
Edward STEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Defendant-Appellee, the regulation appears only in a footnote as a citation to Zalewski while the opinion recites the sequential disability steps. The court decided the disability onset date and the Appeals Council’s failure to consider relevant evidence, not the meaning or application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. opinion →
Villa v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cited § 404.1520(b)-(f) only to identify the familiar five-step sequential process and then reviewed the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence; it did not interpret or decide any disputed requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Barbara MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520(b)-(f) only to identify the Secretary’s five-step evaluation framework. It reverses because the administrative law judge applied an improper duration standard and failed to determine whether Moore could obtain and maintain employment; it does not construe or apply subsection (b) itself. opinion →
Tommy L. SKINNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the regulation is cited only to describe the general sequential-evaluation framework. The court's actual decision concerns whether the claimant was illiterate or had a marginal education and the resulting application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520 itself. opinion →
Smith v. Sullivan, the opinion cites § 404.1520 only in its general background description of the five-step disability framework and the burdens at each step. The court did not construe the regulation or decide the case based on what § 404.1520 means or requires; its rulings concerned the vocational-expert hypothetical and the evidence regarding alcoholism. opinion →
Robinson v. Sullivan, the court described § 404.1520 as the five-step sequential evaluation procedure applicable to wage earners and used it as background for contrasting the separate widow regulations. Its actual holding invalidated the widow regulations insofar as they omitted an individualized RFC assessment; it did not decide what § 404.1520 means or requires. opinion →
Awilda CASSAS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the court mentions § 404.1520 while reporting the Second Circuit’s discussion of its relationship to the special widow-benefits procedure. This court’s holding concerns considering residual functional capacity in medical equivalence under the widow-benefits regulations, not the meaning or application of § 404.1520. opinion →
Thompson v. Sullivan, the court mentions § 404.1520 as a supporting citation for the general five-step sequential inquiry, but it does not interpret or apply the regulation in deciding the case. opinion →
Mae D. IVY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1520 only as part of the general legal framework and does not interpret or apply the regulation in resolving the appeal; the decision rests on the onset date and sufficiency of the medical and other evidence. opinion →
Wilma J. BATTLES, Appellant, v. Louis SULLIVAN, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Appellee, the court cited § 404.1520(e) as support for its substantial-evidence conclusion that the claimant was not disabled, but it did not interpret, explain, or independently decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Caldwell v. Sullivan, the court cites § 404.1520 as background for the five-step sequential evaluation and applies that framework in recounting the administrative decision, but it does not decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, or scope. Its disposition rests on substantial-evidence and credibility findings. opinion →
Guy v. Sullivan, the citation appears in the court’s account of the Appeals Council’s remand rationale and is not a holding by this court about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 404.1520(f). opinion →
Kathleen A. POTTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the court cited § 404.1520 only in a footnote as authority for administrative notice of job data and did not construe or decide what the regulation requires; the case’s holding concerned the evidentiary support for the disability determination. opinion →
Brown v. Sullivan, the court recites the five-step disability framework and cites § 404.1520 in its general statement of applicable law, but the decision does not construe or apply that regulation in a disputed ruling; it remands for further record development and vocational consideration. opinion →
Melton ex rel. Melton v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the statute is cited in a footnote only to describe the Listing-of-Impairments route to disability; the court reports that the ALJs found no qualifying impairment and expressly notes that the plaintiff did not challenge that finding. The court decided transferable skills instead. opinion →
Verna B. TERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appelle, the court cites § 404.1520(f)(1) only as part of a general list of regulations supporting the Secretary’s burden to identify other work and the factors considered; it does not construe, analyze, or decide any issue about that subsection. opinion →
Doris ALSTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellan, the court cites § 404.1520 to provide background on the five-step disability-evaluation process and expressly states that there was no dispute about the Secretary's progression through those steps. The decision instead resolves the separate issue whether the findings that Alston could not perform her prior light work and could perform sedentary work were inconsistent. opinion →
…and 26,224 more.

Rulemaking authority

Authority for 20 C.F.R. Part 404 (FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE (1950- )), which contains this section:

Secs. 203, 205(a), 216(j), and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 403, 405(a), 416(j), and 902(a)(5)) and 48 U.S.C. 1801.

From the part's authority statement in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR).

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