Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603

Section 603(b) allows a federal inmate to seek compassionate release, but the motion must be filed in the sentencing court.

Ray v. Finley · filed 2019-10-29(b)

Based on the above, any motion for compassionate release whether under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) or the First Step Act, should be filed with the sentencing court, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.

Section 603(b)(1) provides for a compassionate release motion in the criminal case; that relief is unavailable in a § 2241 proceeding.

Palmer v. Sproul · filed 2025-01-30(b)(1)

To the extent the petitioner challenges the denial of his request to the respondent for compassionate release, he should file a motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)), in his criminal case. There is no authority to grant such relief in a § 2241 proceeding.

Section 603(b) allows defendants to seek compassionate release directly, but a sentence reduction must still comply with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements.

United States v. Henry · filed 2020-04-13(b)

To the contrary, given the plain text of § 3582(c)(1)(A), which requires a finding that any sentence reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” the limitations in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 apply and are binding.

Section 603(b) permits defendants to seek compassionate release, but courts must still apply the Sentencing Commission’s applicable policy statements.

United States v. William Andrew Kinsey, III · filed 2021-06-30(b)

As a result, the District Court here was limited to considering the “extraordinary and compelling” reasons outlined in the policy statement and accompanying application note.

Section 603 allows an inmate to seek compassionate release after exhausting BOP remedies and permits courts to consider existing Sentencing Commission guidance as advisory when deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist.

United States v. Marcussen · filed 2021-10-07(b)(1)

The commentary relevant to determining whether Marcussen’s medical conditions are extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, USSG § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(A)(ii)), is advisory not prohibitive. Thus, the district court properly looked to this commentary as relevant but not binding in determining that Marcussen’s health conditions at the time he requested a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) sentence reduction were not “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a reduction. The First Step Act required no more.

Section 603(b)’s exhaustion requirement is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule that the government can waive by failing to raise it.

United States v. Davis · filed 2024-04-18(b)

The government did not raise this issue below. In United States v. Muhammad, we held that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is a “non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule” that can be waived or forfeited if not timely raised. 16 F.4th 126, 130 (4th Cir. 2021). Thus, the government has waived the issue of exhaustion, and it is not a barrier to remand.

When the government invokes § 603(b)(1)’s filing threshold, the defendant must give objective evidence of compliance.

United States v. Christopher Wilson, Jr. · filed 2021-12-27(b)(1)

Despite the Government clearly raising the issue, Wilson did not provide any objective evidence to establish his satisfaction of the statutory threshold requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

Section 603(b)(1)’s administrative exhaustion requirement for compassionate release motions is nonjurisdictional and is waived if not timely raised.

United States v. Dourdoumis · filed 2021-11-23(b)(1)

This court recently held in United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 2021 WL 4888393 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 2021), that, “[a]lthough [§ 3582(c)(1)(A)] plainly requires [a prisoner] to complete certain steps before filing his motion [for compassionate release] in the district court, . . . this requirement [is] non-jurisdictional, and thus waived if it is not timely raised.” Id. at *2. ... The district court here did not have the benefit of our decision in Muhammad when it sua sponte raised the administrative exhaustion issue and denied Dourdoumis’ motion for compassionate release because he failed to establish that he satisfied the Act’s threshold requirement for filing such a motion. We therefore vacate the court’s order denying Dourdoumis’ motion for compassionate release and remand for further proceedings.

Section 603(b)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is nonjurisdictional, and a court cannot deny compassionate release for failure to exhaust when the government does not raise it.

United States v. McLean · filed 2022-01-05(b)(1)

Because the Government did not raise exhaustion, the district court abused its discretion in denying McLean’s request for compassionate release based on his purported failure to comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement.

Section 603(b) allows prisoners to move for compassionate release, subject to an administrative exhaustion requirement that is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.

United States v. Texeira-Nieves · filed 2022-01-12(b)

In our judgment, however, this exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional limitation: as several circuits previously have held, it is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule.

Section 603(b)(1)'s exhaustion requirement is nonjurisdictional, so a district court may not raise it sua sponte.

United States v. Barnes · filed 2022-01-18(b)(1)

Initially, we conclude that the district court improperly raised the exhaustion issue sua sponte.

Section 603(b)(1)’s administrative exhaustion requirement is nonjurisdictional and waived if not timely raised; a district court cannot deny compassionate release on that ground sua sponte.

United States v. Kershaw · filed 2022-01-19(b)(1)

The district court here did not have the benefit of our decision in Muhammad when it sua sponte raised the administrative exhaustion issue and denied Kershaw’s motion for compassionate release on exhaustion grounds. We therefore vacate the court’s order denying Kershaw’s motion for compassionate release and remand for further proceedings in light of our decision in Muhammad.

Section 603(b) permits a defendant to file a compassionate release motion after 30 days have passed since the warden received the defendant’s request.

United States v. Holroyd · filed 2020-05-26(b)

This motion comes more than 30 days after the warden received his first request on April 17, so it is properly filed, and the Court turns to the merits.

Section 603(b) permits a defendant to seek compassionate release after exhausting administrative remedies or waiting 30 days after the warden receives a request; the exhaustion requirement can be waived.

United States v. Queen · filed 2020-06-24(b)

Mr. Queen fails to demonstrate that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his motion. ... Given the case law in this District and the “contrary authority from outside this [D]istrict,” “the Court will not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or on the ground that the requirement is not waivable, but will proceed to” the merits.

Section 603(b) permits a court to proceed with a defendant’s compassionate release motion without further administrative exhaustion when requiring it would cause unnecessary delay contrary to the First Step Act’s purposes.

United States v. Evans · filed 2020-06-30(b)

“Regardless of whether this rejection has fulfilled Section 3582(c)’s exhaustion requirement, the Court concludes that requiring [Mr. Evans] to exhaust [his administrative remedies] would cause an unnecessary delay contrary to the purposes of the First Step Act.” United States v. Wheeler, No. 19-cr-85 (ESH), 2020 WL 2801289, at *2 (D.D.C. May 29, 2020). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to the merits of Mr. Evans’ motion.

Section 603(b) allows a defendant to request a sentence reduction directly from the court after exhausting administrative appeals or waiting 30 days after the warden receives the request.

United States v. Orji · filed 2020-08-31(b)

Section 603(b) of the First Step Act expanded this exception to authorize a defendant to move directly in court for a sentence reduction after having “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). ... Without any indication that defendant has petitioned BOP to review his case and move on his behalf for compassionate release or a reduction in sentence under the First Step Act, and that either his petition was denied or thirty days have lapsed, defendant has not shown that he has satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Section 603(b)(1) allows a prisoner to seek compassionate release after exhausting administrative appeals or waiting 30 days after the warden receives the request; failure to exhaust does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

United States v. Bell · filed 2020-09-30(b)(1)

Following the First Step Act of 2018, a prisoner may raise a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion if he has exhausted his administrative rights to appeal the BOP’s failure to bring such a motion or has waited 30 days after the warden’s receipt of the request, whichever is earlier. Id.; see First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. Although it is not clear that Bell exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, his failure to do so does not deprive this court of jurisdiction.

Section 603(b)(1) allows a defendant to seek compassionate release after waiting 30 days following a request to the Bureau of Prisons.

United States of America v. Jordan Manning · filed 2021-01-08(b)(1)

Because Manning waited 30 days before filing his pro se motion for compassionate release, Manning has exhausted his ... administrative rights, and so his motion is properly before me under Section 3582(c)(1)(A).

Section 603(b)’s compassionate-release exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule that the government may waive or forfeit.

United States v. Saladino · filed 2021-08-04(b)

Rather, § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule that may be waived or forfeited by the government.

Section 603 permits a prisoner to seek compassionate release 30 days after the warden receives a request, even if the Bureau of Prisons responds before then.

United States v. Garrett · filed 2021-09-09(b)(1)

Second, a prisoner may wait 30 days after filing his request and—whether the BOP has ruled on the request or not—he is free to file a motion in the district court.

Section 603(b)(1) permits a prisoner to seek compassionate release in court after exhausting administrative appeals or 30 days after the warden receives the request, whichever occurs first, even if the Bureau of Prisons responds within those 30 days.

United States v. Garrett · filed 2021-09-24(b)(1)

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) grants to the inmate the choice to take either of the two paths it provides. Once 30 days has “lapse[d] . . . from the receipt of such a request by the warden,” the prisoner may file his motion in the district court.

Section 603(b)(1) requires a court deciding a compassionate-release motion to consider all of the defendant’s arguments.

United States v. Boddie · filed 2020-08-25(b)(1)

Because the court did not consider all of Boddie’s arguments in support of his motion for compassionate release, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 603(b)(1) allows eligible inmates to seek compassionate release themselves but does not extend that procedure to offenses committed before November 1, 1987.

United States v. Rogge · filed 2025-06-20(b)(1)

We agree with our sister circuits that the FSA only amended the SRA as modified and thus did not alter its exclusion of offenses predating November 1, 1987. The FSA neither expanded inmate eligibility under § 3582(c) nor repealed a limitation that already existed.

Section 603(b)(1) permits defendants to move for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), but does not extend that procedure to offenses committed before November 1, 1987.

United States v. Matta-Ballesteros · filed 2021-02-12(b)(1)

The First Step Act did not change this two-track regime when it amended the language of § 3582(c).

Section 603(b) lets defendants file their own sentence reduction motions but does not make § 3582(c)(1) available for offenses committed before November 1, 1987.

United States v. Coonan · filed 2025-07-09(b)

But nothing in the FSA amends SRA § 235(a)(1) or suggests that the SRA, as amended by the FSA, now applies to sentences for offenses committed before November 1, 1987.

Section 603(b)(1) permits district courts to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason a defendant raises for compassionate release.

United States v. Matthews · filed 2021-12-20(b)(1)

Matthews correctly asserts that “district courts are empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise,” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up), and our review of the record reveals that Matthews did not waive his right to seek compassionate release on grounds apart from COVID-19.

Section 603(b) permits compassionate release only after consideration of the applicable § 3553(a) factors; those factors can justify denying a reduction even when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist.

United States v. Galvez · filed 2021-04-22(b)

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the § 3553(a) factors did not support compassionate release, we need not address its additional finding—based on the same considerations—that Galvez remained a danger to society.

Section 603(b) lets prisoners seek compassionate release, but eligibility remains limited to the Sentencing Commission’s definition of extraordinary and compelling reasons.

United States v. Williams · filed 2023-06-28(b)

Instead, he is seeking a sentence reduction under the compassionate release provisions of § 603(b) of the First Step Act. Because Concepcion did not address compassionate release motions, it is not directly on point and does not directly conflict with or abrogate our precedent in Bryant and its progeny that, in determining whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the compassionate release provisions, the district court is limited to “the Commission’s definition of ... ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§] 1B1.13.”

Section 603(b) allows prisoners to seek compassionate release themselves after exhausting administrative remedies and does not require an evidentiary hearing on their motions.

United States v. Vangh · filed 2021-03-15(b)

Since the passage of the First Step Act in 2018, prisoners can bring compassionate-release motions on their own, once they have exhausted their administrative remedies. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582); United States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740, 744–45 (8th Cir. 2020) (reviewing how the First Step Act changed the procedures for compassionate-release motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). ... It “does not mention,” much less require, a hearing.

Section 603(b) allows incarcerated persons to file compassionate release motions directly with a district court after exhausting administrative remedies.

United States v. Kibble · filed 2021-04-01(b)

So, when Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, it amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See First Step Act, Pub. L. 115-391 § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (titled “Increasing the Use and Transparency of the First Step Act”). As amended, § 3582(c) permits incarcerated persons to file motions for compassionate release directly with the district court so long as they first exhaust their administrative remedies.

Section 603(b) lets defendants file compassionate release motions after exhaustion or the specified 30-day lapse, without displacing the existing sentencing guideline except where the statute preempts it.

United States v. Thomas Bryant, Jr. · filed 2021-05-07(b)

But, as a general rule, we do not throw out an entire guideline after a statutory change—we continue to apply it except to the extent that specific parts have been preempted by the new statute. ... By allowing defendants to file reduction motions, Congress has significantly increased the statute’s use.

Section 603(b) permits prisoners to seek compassionate release after exhausting administrative remedies, but U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 still governs their motions.

United States v. Nesbitt · filed 2021-10-25(b)

The district court here did not err in considering whether Nesbitt’s release would be consistent with the “applicable policy statement[]”—that is, § 1B1.13; to the contrary, it was required to do so.

Section 603(b) does not entitle a defendant seeking compassionate release to appointed counsel.

United States of America v. Powell · filed 2024-10-15(b)

Neither the Sixth Amendment nor the statute entitles a defendant to counsel when he seeks compassionate release.