Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584

Section 52-584’s two-year limitations period for negligence claims is tolled when an employer timely intervenes in an employee’s timely filed action under § 31-293 (a).

Nichols v. Lighthouse Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1998-08-04

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that when an employer receives formal notice under § 31-293 (a) of an employee’s timely filed action against a third party tortfeasor, the applicable statute of limitations on the underlying claim is tolled if the employer intervenes within the thirty day period prescribed by § 31-293 (a).

Section 52-584 imposes a two-year statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action, and an amended complaint alleging the same cause of action relates back to the original filing date.

Gossett v. Stefanov, No. Cv 97 0074087 (Dec. 12, 1997) · filed 1997-12-12

The only remaining question for this court is whether the plaintiff's substitute complaint and certificate of good faith belief were filed within the two year statute of limitations provided in General Statutes § 52-584. ... Here, the plaintiff's amended complaint alleges the same cause of action as the original complaint, medical malpractice. Accordingly, the plaintiff's amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint. The date of the original complaint is June 10, 1997. Both the plaintiffs complaint and the defendant's memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike state that June 22, 1995 was the date of the defendants, alleged negligence. Therefore, the original complaint was filed within the two year statute of limitations. Subsequently, the plaintiff's amended complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 bars a medical malpractice action filed more than three years after the negligent act unless a continuing course of conduct tolls the limitations period.

Witt v. St. Vincent's Medical Center · filed 1999-04-13

The only other material fact relevant to this discussion is the date the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. It is clear that the plaintiffs did not file this lawsuit until March 27,1995, more than eleven years after the alleged negligent act, and, therefore, this action was filed well past the expiration of the statute of limitations pursuant to § 52-584. Since there was only a single medical service provided by Lobdell to Frank Witt in September, 1983, and there was no breach of a duty that remained in existence subsequent to September, 1983, the continuing course of conduct doctrine cannot be applied to toll the statute. Furthermore, because there exists no issue of material fact as to the date on which the complaint was filed and whether the relationship between Frank Witt and Lobdell was a physician-patient relationship and whether such relationship was ongoing, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

Section 52-584 sets a two-year malpractice limitation period running from discovery of the injury.

Saez v. St. Mary's Hospital, No. Cv 99 015230 22 S (Nov. 24, 1999) · filed 1999-11-24

The statute of limitation for the malpractice of a hospital is two years from the discovery of the injury as set forth in General Statutes § 52-584.1 According to the facts plead in the complaint and the substituted complaint, the alleged date of discovery of the injury was September 19, 1997.

Section 52-584 does not govern the limitations period for a wrongful death action alleging medical malpractice; § 52-555 governs.

Dawson v. Kuehn, No. Cv 01-0806726 S (Feb. 25, 2002) · filed 2002-02-25

It has been previously determined in this case that the applicable statute of limitations is the period prescribed by § 52-555 and the defendants have not presented any new or overriding circumstance for this court to consider with regard to the operation of § 52-555. ... Since defendants' special defense is legally insufficient, the plaintiff's motion to strike is granted.

Section 52-584 does not govern a cross-claim based on a rental agreement, even when the dispute arose from an accident.

Rinaldi v. Metropolitan Prop. Cas., No. Cv97 033 93 77 S (Nov. 29, 2000) · filed 2000-11-29

In its motion for summary judgment, Alamo argues that because Metropolitan's cross-complaint arises out of the plaintiff's negligence action, it is governed by a three-year statute of limitations found in General Statutes § 52-584. ... In response, Metropolitan argues that its cross-complaint is premised on the rental agreement between the Rinaldi's and Alamo, and thus is an action based on a contract. ... This court agrees. ... Therefore, Metropolitan's cause of action is based on contract, and the six-year statute of limitation, provided for in General Statutes § 52-576, is applicable.

Section 52-584’s two-year limit for negligence injury claims does not govern a breach of implied contract claim seeking the return of fees paid.

Bross v. Hillside Acres, Inc. · filed 2006-01-03

In the present case, no language in the second amended complaint indicates a tort cause of action. It simply states a claim for the breach of an implied contract. ... Although the plaintiff, by framing her cause of action as a breach of contract, has an additional four years to bring the claim, the defendant’s potential liability has been restricted to the contract fees paid.

Section 52-584 does not govern a minor's sexual abuse claim against a diocese alleging negligence; the extended period in § 52-577d applies.

Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. Cv 9369529 (Jun. 27, 1996) · filed 1996-06-27

The plaintiff contends, however, that the applicable statute of limitations is not § 52-584, but rather § 52-577d, in which case the plaintiffs action would be timely. ... The court finds the reasoning in these decisions persuasive. Accordingly, the CT Page 5062 extended statute of limitations in General Statutes § 52-577d applies in this case, and the complaint is timely.

The specific extended period for injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse governs related negligence claims instead of section 52-584's general negligence period.

Almonte v. New York Medical College · filed 1994-03-31

Instead, relying on the rule of statutory construction favoring application of specific over general statutes, the Superior Court held that the eases were governed by the more specific statute of limitations contained in § 52-577d, rather than the more general statutes of limitations in § 52-577 or § 52-584. ... This rule of statuto­ry construction favors application of § 52-­577d in this case as well.

The extended period for childhood-sexual-abuse injuries applies to negligence claims against schools and officials, not only claims against the perpetrator, notwithstanding section 52-584.

Doe v. Indian Mountain School, Inc. · filed 1995-08-17

However, the plaintiffs explanation of the meaning of the statute’s reference to § 52-577 is more convincing than the defendants’ argument based on the absence of any mention of § 52-584. If the legislature wanted to preclude application of the extended limitations period to all the types of claims enumerated in § 52-584, notwithstanding its objective of providing meaningful remedies to minor victims of sexual abuse, it probably would have said so explicitly, as it has in establishing other statutes of limitations. ... For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion is denied.

Section 52-584's two-year negligence period does not govern a federal duty-of-fair-representation claim; the federal six-month labor-law period applies.

Bimler v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. · filed 1997-03-31

The plaintiff contends that the claim of breach of duty of fair representation is basically an action sounding in negligence and therefore, urges the court to adopt Connecticut’s two year limitation period for negligence actions pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584. ... Accordingly, the plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation is subject to a six month limitations period beginning at the time that the cause of action accrued.

Section 52-584’s three-year limit applies to negligence claims against architects and engineers even when § 52-584a’s seven-year limit has not expired.

R.A. Civitello Co. v. City of New Haven · filed 1986-02-11

The court was not in error in concluding that the third party plaintiff’s contract action against Barnes was barred by General Statutes § 52-576 and its negligence claims against all three third party defendants was barred by General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 does not bar an action to enforce an accepted settlement of a negligence claim.

Dotolo v. Petrucelli · filed 1968-04-26

We first consider the defendant’s assignment of errors as it relates to the application of the Statute of Limitations applicable in a suit in negligence. General Statutes § 52-584. ... Since there was an acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer by the defendant, the Statute of Limitations became inoperative as a defense.

Section 52-584 does not apply to a fraudulent nondisclosure claim arising from a real estate sale.

Armellino v. Dowling, No. Cv 92-0330634 (May 16, 1995) · filed 1995-05-16

As to § 52-584 this court does not deemed it applicable as this action is not concerned with the delict of ". . . physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanitorium. . . .".

Section 52-584’s negligence limitations period does not govern a minor’s injury claim caused by sexual assault, even when the claim is against a nonperpetrator; § 52-577d supplies the time limit.

Todd M. v. Richard L. · filed 1995-07-14

In the first and second special defenses, the defendants invoke §§ 52-584 and 52-577 respectively in asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims are time barred. ... The statute provides that, regardless of the general limitations period for torts, such as those relied upon by the defendants, no action seeking redress for injuries suffered as a result of misconduct of a sexual nature may be brought later than seventeen years from the date of majority. ... Accordingly, the motion to strike the first and second special defenses is granted.

Section 52-584’s two year limitation for negligence actions does not apply to intentional trespass claims.

CACIOPOLI v. Lebowitz · filed 2011-09-06

This statute, which provides a two year statute of limitations on negligence actions, does not apply in the present case. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged trespass, an intentional tort, rather than a cause of action grounded in negligence.

Section 52-584 is not Connecticut's general or residual personal-injury statute and therefore is not borrowed for section 1983 claims.

Lounsbury v. Jeffries · filed 1994-05-27

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, § 52-584 is not a “residual” statute as described by Owens, for it contains no language suggesting that it “applies to all actions not specifically provided for, including personal injury actions,” 488 U.S. at 246-47, 109 S.Ct. at 580-81. Nor is § 52-584 a “general” statute, for it does not “appl[y] to all personal injury actions with certain specific exceptions,” 488 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. at 579. Rather, that section applies only to those actions, primarily negligence actions, that are specifically enumerated in the section itself; it does not apply to “all personal injury actions” and does not appear to reach any categories of personal injury actions that are not there enumerated.

Section 52-584's malpractice enumeration does not include accountants, so accountant-malpractice claims are governed by the catch-all tort period instead.

Seeman v. Arthur Andersen & Co. · filed 1995-04-19

In any event, because § 52-584 mentions physicians and surgeons, but not accountants, it may be inferred that accountant malpractice claims are excluded from § 52-584 and are instead subject to the catch-all torts limitation period under § 52-577.

Section 52-584 applies only to specifically enumerated actions, primarily negligence, and does not govern a statutory CUIPA action.

Grant v. City of New Haven, No. 382068 (Feb. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-02-03

Thus, § 52-584 "applies only to those actions, primarily negligence actions, that are specifically enumerated in the section itself" ... The cause of action asserted here is a private right of action under CUIPA. This statutory cause of action is not among the causes of action specifically enumerated in § 52-584 . It follows that the applicable cause of action is the general statute of limitations provided by § 52-577 .

Section 52-584’s negligence limitation period does not control the deadline for serving an apportionment complaint; § 52-102b does.

Winiarski v. Hall, No. Cv96 0566277 S (Dec. 19, 1997) · filed 1997-12-19

It is concluded that § 52-102b controls in the present case rather than the general negligence statute of limitations pursuant to § 52-584.

Section 52-584 does not bar a claim seeking only apportionment of fault because that claim is not an action to recover damages for injury.

Douglas v. Dawson, No. Cv 94-0338748-S (Jun. 16, 1995) · filed 1995-06-16

In addition, General Statutes § 52-584 provides that no action to recover damages for injury shall be brought unless it is brought within the applicable time period. Accordingly, the Statute of Limitations would not prevent the assertion of a claim seeking apportionment of fault, only, because it is not an action to recover damages." ... The cases which permit the citing in of a party defendant for apportionment purposes only reflect the better rule.

Section 52-584 does not apply to a claim for apportionment under § 52-572h(c) because that claim is not an action to recover damages.

Dapice v. Eastern Elevator Co., Inc., No. Cv 90 0105979 (Sep. 8, 1995) · filed 1995-09-08

In regard to the claim concerning the statute of limitations,Bezsyk v. Ford, 9 CSCR 425 (March 17, 1994, Lewis, J.) andKennedy v. Martinez, 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 354 (September 14, 1992, Rush, J.), stand for the proposition that a claim for apportionment based on General Statutes § 52-572h(c) is not "an action to recover damages" and hence is not within the scope of General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 does not bar a third-party claim for apportionment filed after the limitations period for the underlying negligence action has expired because an apportionment claim is not an action to recover damages.

Peeler v. Pray Automobile Corp., No. Cv 31 62 70 S (Mar. 11, 1996) · filed 1996-03-11

This court has determined that a defendant may cite in a third party for apportionment purposes after the running of the statute of limitations in the underlying action. ... In Medina v. Tunxis Hill Restaurant, this court cited the language of General Statutes § 52-584 and determined that a claim for apportionment is not an "action to recover damages" against the third-party defendant. ... Accordingly, the third-party complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

A defendant joined solely for negligence apportionment retains the right to invoke the two-year limitation and must be served within two years after injury.

Ruiz v. Savage, No. Cv93 0530783 S (Feb. 17, 1995) · filed 1995-02-17

In this case, the cited-in defendant, Jorge Proano, has clearly and unequivocally established that the claim of negligence against him is barred by the applicable statute of limitations because, in the language of the statute itself, the instant action was not "brought [against him] . . . within two years from the date when the [plaintiff's] injury [w]as first sustained." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 . Accordingly, the Court concludes that his Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted.

A negligence claim asserted after section 52-584's three-year repose period is not saved by the apportionment-defendant exception when the apportionment complaint was not timely served under section 52-102b(a).

Mazzola v. Yaghma, No. 403943 (Nov. 15, 1999) · filed 1999-11-15

The applicable statute of limitation or repose is Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 . The period of repose set forth in that provision is three years. It is evident that, since the plaintiffs' claim against Albert Bros. was asserted more than three years after the accident in question, that claim can be saved, if at all, only by the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-102b described above. ... Because the time limits set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-102b are mandatory and because they were not complied with here, Albert Bros.' motion for summary judgment must be granted.

Section 52-584’s two-year limitation bars a negligence claim against a defendant cited in for apportionment more than two years after the injury; apportionment creates no exception.

Zollner v. Hamilton, No. Cv-91-0325267 (Apr. 2, 1993) · filed 1993-04-02

The facts of the present case are analogous to those in Belanger v. Maynard, supra: Hamilton's motion to cite in Price was filed on February 27, 1992, more than two years from January 20, 1990, the date on which the plaintiffs sustained their injuries. While apportionment of damages may be the ultimate goal pursuant to tort reform, it seems economically unsound to force a third-party defendant to defend or continue to defend in an action absolutely barred by the statute of limitations. It is the function of the legislature to provide an exclusion if it seems fit, not the court's.

Section 52-584's two-year limitation does not bar a third-party claim seeking only apportionment of damages.

Pisani v. Watkins, No. Cv93 0181392 (Sep. 23, 1994) · filed 1994-09-23

Although it is not specified in the motion itself, Henderson claims in her memorandum in support of summary judgment that CT Page 9900 count two of defendants' complaint, which seeks apportionment, is barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in General Statutes § 52-584. ... While recognizing the split of authority in the Superior Court regarding this issue, this court concluded that such a claim was permissible, the statute of limitations notwithstanding. ... Since count two of defendants' third party complaint simply seeks apportionment of damages, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 52-584 does not bar adding an alleged tortfeasor solely to apportion damages when no monetary recovery is sought from that party.

Estate of Mercado v. Hartford Hosp., No. Cv91 395650s (May 5, 1994) · filed 1994-05-05

Thus, the proceeding with regard to L M is [not] an "action to recover damages" within the clear and unambiguous language of Section52-584, and accordingly, is not time barred by that statutory provision.

Section 52-584 does not bar a claim seeking only apportionment of fault because that claim is not an action to recover damages.

Cardoso v. Cardoso, No. 0106057 (Jul. 29, 1994) · filed 1994-07-29

In addition, General Statutes § 52-584 provides that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury" shall be brought unless it is brought within the applicable time period. ... The court holds that a claim for apportionment of fault is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 does not bar citing in a party solely for apportionment after the negligence limitations period expires because an apportionment claim is not an action to recover damages.

Medina v. Tunxis Hill Restaurant, No. Cv92 0296800s (Oct. 11, 1994) · filed 1994-10-11

General Statutes § 52-584 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury was first sustained . . . ." (Emphasis added.) However, the defendants' claim for apportionment is not an "action to recover damages" from GameTime USA.

Section 52-584 does not bar a claim brought solely to apportion damages.

Stropparo v. Woodlot Associates, No. 521379 (Jan. 12, 1995) · filed 1995-01-12

The statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584, is not applicable to the present case and, therefore, does not bar the apportionment claim.

Section 52-584’s two-year limitation for negligence actions does not apply to an apportionment complaint.

Tine v. Baker, No. 11 66 45 (Mar. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-03-31

General Statutes § 52-584 is therefore inapplicable in the present case.

A Connecticut negligence action must be commenced by service within two years, and filing in a forum lacking personal jurisdiction does not preserve a longer limitations period upon transfer.

Luctama v. Knickerbocker · filed 2020-03-30

“Connecticut law specifies a two-year statute of limitations for a personal injury negligence action.” ... Furthermore, under Connecticut law, “a civil action is commenced upon service on the defendant,” not upon filing suit. ... Here, the face of the complaint makes clear the applicable statute of limitations has run and this action “is a sure loser.” ... Because plaintiffs cannot state an actionable claim, it is not in the interest of justice to transfer the instant case to the District of Connecticut.

Section 52-584’s filing deadline extends to the next business day when the last day falls on a weekend or a holiday when the clerk’s office is closed.

Minkoff v. Faranda, No. Cv92 0125613 S (Dec. 14, 1994) · filed 1994-12-14

With October 9, 1993, falling on a Saturday, the weekend and the holiday made October 12, 1993, the last day for filing the cross complaint pursuant to General Statutes § 52-584. The action was brought upon filing the action with the court, which occurred on October 12, 1993.

Section 52-584's two-year period applies to bystander emotional-distress claims founded on negligence or reckless conduct, but not to a claim based on intentional misconduct.

Schwartz v. Town of Plainville · filed 2007-04-09

Defendants argue that Mrs. Schwartz’s bystander emotional distress claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations provided in Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584. If Plaintiffs’ claim for bystander emotional distress were founded on negligence or reckless conduct, the Court would agree with Defendants. However, as Plaintiffs make clear in their Opposition, the bystander emotional distress claim, Count Seven, is based on allegations of intentional misconduct on the part of the Plainville police officers, not negligence. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim is governed by Connecticut's general three-year tort statute of limitations, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577 and is not time-barred.

Section 52-584 gives a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim a two-year limitations period.

Alungbe v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CONN. STATE UNIV. · filed 2003-09-04

Nevertheless, any claims against Harris would be time-barred, because she only served as the interim president of Central from June 1995 until June 1996. ... Accordingly, the claims against Merle Harris are time-barred and dismissed. ... The statute of limitations applicable to claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress is two years. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-584.

An employer's derivative workers' compensation reimbursement claim must be brought within the same two-year period as the employee's negligence claim, even if the employer intervenes within thirty days after notice.

Wonacott v. Northeast Utilities, No. Cv 940537660s (Oct. 18, 1995) · filed 1995-10-10

defendant Fluor within two years of the date of plaintiff Wonacott's injuries operates to bar its claims under General Statutes § 52-584 , even though it filed its motion to intervene within thirty days of receiving official notice of this action. Defendant Fluor's motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.

Section 52-584 does not bar an injured employee from joining an employer’s timely action within thirty days after it begins.

Rowland Products, Inc. v. Sanitary Waste Disposal · filed 1961-12-05

We hold that upon the facts here, where the action is seasonably brought so far as the general Statute of Limitations is concerned, the legislature did not intend that it (§ 52-584) qualify the right of the employee, under § 31-156, to join as a plaintiff within thirty days thereafter.

Section 52-584 does not cover an employer’s statutory reimbursement claim derived entirely from § 31-293.

Corcoran v. Kurtyka, No. Cv92 03 04 62 (May 6, 1994) · filed 1994-05-06

The Statute of Limitation relied upon by the defendant (§ 52-584) applies to actions to recover damages "caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct or by malpractice". Thus, applying the logic of [Durniak,] supra, a statutory claim that is derived in its entirety from General Statutes § 31-293 is not encompassed within the provisions of § 52-584.

Section 52-584’s two-year limit applies to an employer’s derivative claim for reimbursement when the employee’s underlying personal injury action is subject to that limit.

Packtor v. Seppala & AHO Construction Co. · filed 1994-01-18

In this case, the employee’s cause of action is limited by the personal injury statute of limitations found in General Statutes § 52-584. Packtor’s injury occurred on September 13, 1987. Stop & Shop did not initiate any action until it filed a motion to intervene on August 27, 1990, well beyond the two year statute of limitations. Stop & Shop’s derivative right to reimbursement was, therefore, time-barred pursuant to § 52-584.

Section 52-584's two-year limit applies to an injured employee's negligence claim against a third party even if the employee intervenes within 30 days of notice under § 31-293(a).

Derby Feed Co. v. First Nat'l Supermarkets, No. Cv92 0505636 (Jul. 26, 1994) · filed 1994-07-26

The court finds that the intervening plaintiff could have brought his own action within the two-year time limitation of § 52-584. "When that right expires it is not revived for an additional thirty days after the employer brings an action against the third party and gives notice of it to the employee. Stated another way, when the employer's action against the third party brings § 31-293(a) into play, the employee must comply with both it and § 52-584."

Section 52-584's two-year limit applies to an employee who intervenes in an employer's action against a third party; the thirty-day intervention period does not revive an expired claim.

City of Hartford v. Corp. Jntrl., No. Cv93 052 47 36 S (Oct. 27, 1994) · filed 1994-10-27

It therefore holds, as it did in Derby, that the intervening plaintiff could have brought his own action within the two-year time limitation of § 52-584.

Section 52-584's two year limitations period does not bar intervention when the underlying action was timely filed and the statutory notice triggering the intervention period was never given.

Fire Systems Inc. v. Semac Elec. Cont., No. Cv 96 0382930 S (Jun. 22, 1999) · filed 1999-06-22

The question, however, is whether Estell's ability to intervene survives beyond the two year statute of limitations. ... In this case, Estell's ability to intervene survives the expiration of the statute of limitations because: 1) Fire Systems suit was timely filed and 2) the statutory notice that provides the nonsuing employer/employee with a thirty day window to intervene was never given to him.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years of discovering actionable injury and in all events within three years of the act or omission.

Devico v. Vetro, No. 059315 (Jul. 9, 1999) · filed 1999-07-09

Since the ninth and tenth counts sound in negligence, the appropriate statute of limitations is contained in General Statutes § 52-584. ... Since the court finds the action barred by the statute of limitations/statute of repose contained in § 52-584, there is no need to address the defendants' alternative grounds for summary judgment.

Section 52-584 generally requires an action for injury caused by negligence to be brought within two years after the injury is first sustained.

Inovejas v. Dufault, No. Cv 99-0496171s (Mar. 13, 2000) · filed 2000-03-13

Section 52-584 would ordinarily bar this second suit by plaintiff. It states in relevant part: "No action . . . for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained . . ." General Statutes § 52-584.

Negligence-based personal-injury claims must be brought within two years after injury is sustained or reasonably should have been discovered, and unsupported concealment allegations do not establish equitable tolling.

Pal v. Cipolla · filed 2020-11-23

The Connecticut statute of limitations for personal injury claims based on negligence is “two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52–584. ... Even assuming the truth of Pal's allegations, without more, they are not a basis for equitable tolling.

Section 52-584’s limitation period for a negligence claim is not tolled merely because the plaintiff was insane.

Kirwan v. State · filed 1975-05-27

Consequently, the plain meaning and intent of the statute bars the plaintiff’s negligence claim in the absence of any allegation that the Institute fraudulently concealed from him the existence of a cause of action.

Section 52-584 provides no exception to its limitations period for mental incapacity.

Lopez v. United Nurseries, Inc. · filed 1985-04-23

General Statutes § 52-584, provides no exceptions for minors; Lametta v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 139 Conn. 218, 92 A.2d 731 (1952); nor does it provide an exception for insane persons.

Section 52-584’s limitations period is tolled for a minor ward of the state whose guardian’s interests may be adverse to the minor’s, until a guardian of the estate is appointed or the minor reaches majority.

Caron v. Adams · filed 1994-03-08

Considering the particular facts presented here where a child is a ward of the state without a next friend or guardian of his estate, and has a guardian of his person with interests possibly adverse to his own, we conclude that the statute of limitations is tolled. Under the unique circumstances of this case, the limitations tolled as to both defendants until a court-appointed guardian of the estate was established or until the minor reached the age of majority and was able to act on his own behalf.

Section 52-584's two-year limit for personal injury claims is not tolled by a class action involving different claims.

Grimes v. New Haven Housing Authority, No. 26 87 00 (May 22, 1995) · filed 1995-05-22

Since the claim in the present case is for personal injuries not directly related to the class action, and since the class action did not prohibit plaintiffs at any time from filing their own independent action, it is found that the statute of limitations began to run on September 4, 1982, and was not tolled by the Connelly action.

Section 52-584's two-year limitations period for negligence actions is tolled for asserted class members from commencement of the class action until class certification.

Grimes v. Housing Authority · filed 1997-07-29

We thus conclude that the American Pipe & Construction Co. tolling rule that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action as originally brought is the rule most consistent with Connecticut class action procedure. Accordingly, we adopt that rule. ... We next consider whether the American Pipe & Construction Co. rule applies to toll the commencement of the two year statute of limitations for the plaintiffs’ ... negligence action from September 3, 1982, to January, 1987, the date the Connelly class was certified. ... Finally, tolling the statute of limitations in this case is consistent with the rationale of the rule in American Pipe & Construction Co. ... Once the class was certified in January, 1987, the plaintiffs did not “sleep on their rights,” but, rather, exercised their responsibility by filing their complaint in a timely fashion.

Negligent-misrepresentation claims are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins on inquiry notice.

Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-03-31

Connecticut has a two-year statute of limitations for claims of negligent misrepresentation. ... Here, the statute of limitations bars Peterson’s claim. ... Therefore, Peterson’s limitations period began to toll at least as of May 23, 2018. Peterson brought this lawsuit more than two years later, on June 4, 2020. Thus, Peterson brought her lawsuit after the limitations period had expired and her claim is time-barred.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years of discovering the injury and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Cucuel v. Fayed, No. Cv 94 315420 (Feb. 28, 1997) · filed 1997-02-28

Although the issue may not have been clear in the recent past; see Johnson v. Healy, 176 Conn. 97, 100-102, 405 A.2d 54 (1978); there appears no reason why the negligence statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584, should not apply to a claim of negligent misrepresentation.

A negligent-nuisance claim has a two-year discovery period and three-year repose period; permanent nuisance accrues when harm first becomes observable, while temporary nuisance accrues anew with each injury.

Laviero v. Bristol · filed 2022-08-29

The applicable statute of limitations for a nuisance claim based on alleged negligent conduct is Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 ... For limitations purposes, a permanent nuisance claim accrues when injury first occurs or is discovered[,] while a temporary nuisance claim accrues anew upon each injury. ... Because Plaintiff failed to file her lawsuit within the two-year limitations period for nuisance claims, the court hereby GRANTS summary judgment to all Defendants on Count Two.

Section 52-584 applies to injuries caused by negligence or reckless or wanton misconduct, but not to absolute nuisance claims.

Russell v. Town of Vernon, No. Cv 96 59841 S (Dec. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-12-30

Statute of limitations: General Statutes § 52-584 pertains to injuries caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct. An absolute nuisance is in a category by itself, not necessarily the product of negligence. The creation and continuing maintenance of a nuisance is not subject to the negligence statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 may bar a tort claim arising from an incident over 25 years earlier, but a court cannot raise the limitations defense on its own on a motion to strike.

Ford v. Anderson, No. Cv 00-0804029 (Jan. 8, 2003) · filed 2003-01-08

Applying this standard to the defendant's behavior, as alleged by the plaintiff, the court finds that it is only the alleged rape which rises to the level of extreme and outrageous; but that incident occurred over 25 years ago and would normally be barred by the statute of limitations under General Statutes § 52-584. However, this court cannot raise the statute of limitations sua sponte on a motion to strike.

Section 52-584's three-year limit begins with the negligent act, but a limitations defense does not make amendment futile when the proposed pleading does not establish an ironclad bar and may support continuing-course or fraudulent-concealment tolling.

Rahman v. General Electric Corporation · filed 2022-10-24

The three-year requirement “begins to run from the date of the negligent act.” ... The Court disagrees that the statute of limitations dispositively renders Plaintiff’s claims futile at this stage. ... Plaintiffs’ complaint does not “allege[] facts that create an ironclad defense.” ... Thus, it would be inappropriate for the Court to determine on the face of the proposed pleadings that Plaintiffs’ claims are futile as time-barred.

A defense that a negligence counterclaim is barred by § 52-584 must be pleaded as a special defense; it cannot be raised by a motion to strike when neither recognized exception applies.

Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Armor Elevator Co., No. Cv 92 0125016 (Aug. 9, 1994) · filed 1994-08-09

The defendant argues, and the court agrees, that the disposition of this motion to strike is governed by Forbes v.Ballaro, 31 Conn. App. 235, 239, 624 A.2d 389 (1993), which held that: "[a] claim that an action is barred by the lapse of the statute of limitations must be pleaded as a special defense, not raised by a motion to strike. Practice Book § 164." The Appellate Court recognized two exceptions to this rule, neither of which are present in this case.

A § 52-584 limitations defense must be pleaded as a special defense when the parties have not agreed that the complaint contains all facts relevant to whether the claim is time barred.

Forbes v. Ballaro · filed 1993-05-04

The plaintiffs argue6 that the defense that the cause of actions against Cook, Kullberg and the city of Shelton are time barred by General Statutes §§ 52-577 and 52-584 is not a proper basis for a motion to strike. The plaintiffs argue that they should be given the opportunity to plead fraudulent concealment, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-595,7 in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense. We agree.

The limitation period in § 52-584 must be raised by special defense in a common-law negligence action.

Behrle v. Balance Rock Condominium Assoc., Inc., No. 328298 (Sep. 1, 1994) · filed 1994-09-01

Defendant's objection is overruled. The issue of statute of limitations must be raised by special defense, pursuant to Practice Book § 164.

Section 52-584's statute of limitations defense must be specially pleaded and may be waived if it is not raised.

Doe v. Yale University, No. Cv-90-0305365-S (Dec. 1, 1997) · filed 1997-12-01

By the time the Hospital had intervened, however, the statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-584 had long since expired. ... As mentioned earlier, however, the defendant has not asserted such a special defense, and our law is that the question of whether a statute of limitations has expired prior to the commencement of an action must be raised as a special defense to a complaint. ... Thus, our rules of practice appear to limit the universe of parties that are able to contest the viability of a complaint on the grounds of the statute of limitations to those against whom the complaint is directed. ... In light of the plaintiff's inability to seek judgment based on a statute of limitations defense which he lacks the standing to raise, it is unnecessary to consider the Hospital's contention that the plaintiff has waived this defense by waiting six years to raise it, nor is it necessary to examine the intervening plaintiff's arguments as to why the Nichols decision should be found inapplicable to the present situation.

Section 52-584's discovery and repose periods for negligence claims seeking damages from an allegedly wrongful conviction are tolled until the conviction is vacated because the damages cannot be recovered before invalidation.

Jackson v. New Haven · filed 2024-03-29

The statute of limitations that applies to the negligence claims, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, has both a discovery provision and a repose provision: it requires that a claim be brought within two years of the date the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with reasonable diligence, and not more than three years from the relevant act or omission. ... I agree that Taylor provides controlling authority on the issue of the timeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims. The claims seek damages for harm resulting from the plaintiffs’ allegedly wrongful convictions and imprisonment. These damages could not be recovered until the convictions were vacated. Once that occurred, the plaintiffs had at least two years to bring suit. ... Accordingly, none of the claims is time-barred.

Section 52-584's discovery and repose periods for negligence claims seeking damages from an allegedly wrongful conviction are tolled until the conviction is vacated because the damages cannot be recovered before invalidation.

Horn v. New Haven · filed 2024-03-29

The statute of limitations that applies to the negligence claims, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, has both a discovery provision and a repose provision: it requires that a claim be brought within two years of the date the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with reasonable diligence, and not more than three years from the relevant act or omission. ... I agree that Taylor provides controlling authority on the issue of the timeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims. The claims seek damages for harm resulting from the plaintiffs’ allegedly wrongful convictions and imprisonment. These damages could not be recovered until the convictions were vacated. Once that occurred, the plaintiffs had at least two years to bring suit. ... Accordingly, none of the claims is time-barred.

Section 52-584's discovery and repose periods for a negligence claim that would imply an existing conviction's invalidity do not begin until the conviction is invalidated and the plaintiff can maintain the action.

Morant v. New Haven · filed 2025-10-03

Likewise, Plaintiff’s state law negligence claim is timely. The relevant statute of limitations is Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, which provides that any action for injury caused by negligence shall be brought “within two years of the date the injury is first sustained, discovered, or should have been discovered,” but in no case shall it be “brought more than three years” after the complained of conduct took place. ... Defendants are wrong. Under Connecticut law, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff can maintain an action—that is, until “all elements are present, including damages.” ... For Plaintiff here, that means the statute of limitations clock did not start until July 7, 2021, the day he was granted a full and unconditional pardon.

Section 52-584 contains a two-year discovery period running from actionable harm and a separate three-year repose period, both of which receive Connecticut's emergency COVID-19 extension.

Pileggi v. Mathias · filed 2024-03-29

Thus, § 52-584 contains both a two-year “limitation section” sometimes called the “discovery section,” and a three-year “repose section.” ... Consequently, the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice, Connecticut General Statutes § 52-584, ran in or around December 2023. With respect to the three-year statute of repose in Connecticut General Statutes § 52-584, the last date on which Dr. Zemel treated EP was April 15, 2019. Thus, the statute of repose would have ordinarily run on April 15, 2022, but was extended, pursuant to Executive Orders 7G and 10A, to March 28, 2023. Thus, Claim Twelve is not barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed on October 19, 2022.

Section 52-584 gives negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims two years from discovery; conduct before the two-year cutoff is barred, while fraudulent concealment may preserve a later claim.

Lawrence v. Westport · filed 2024-07-18

The statute of limitations for negligent infliction of emotional distress is two years. ... Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584. ... Therefore, any cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress that accrued prior to December 20, 2020 is time-barred. ... Drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, to the extent this claim is based on the January 2020 Seizure, it is not time-barred because of the 15-month period during which defendant Grasso held the emails.

Section 52-584 provides a three-year limitations period for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

Harman v. Bench Secs. Corp., No. Cv 95 0534266s (Jan. 22, 1998) · filed 1998-01-22

The applicable statute is General Statutes Section 52-584 which has a three year statute of limitation. Based on the March 1991 date, the statute would have run on March of 1994.

Section 52-584 does not govern respondeat-superior liability derived from an employee's alleged intentional tort; the three-year general tort period applies instead.

Mayes v. New Haven · filed 2024-11-26

Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations in her Second Amended Complaint suggest that Defendant police officer Witcher acted intentionally, as opposed to negligently, in conspiracy with her employer, the New Haven Police Department. ... Applying Connecticut General Statute § 52–577 as the proper three-year limitations statute, the present claim for respondeat superior survives for the present. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim, filed on November 8, 2022, the three-year anniversary date that her charges were dismissed, fell within the three-year statute of limitations. The respondeat superior claim may proceed.

Section 52-584’s limitation period is suspended from the decedent’s death until an administrator is appointed.

Lubas v. McCusker · filed 1965-12-22

Of course the running of the Statute of Limitations applicable to an action such as this (General Statutes § 52-584) was suspended from the date of ... the decedent’s death until the appointment of the administrator.

Section 52-584’s limitations period for negligence actions is tolled when the alleged tortfeasor dies until a fiduciary is properly appointed for the estate.

Lydem v. Feldman · filed 1979-12-05

Thus, the statute of limitations here was arrested at the time of death and did not begin to run until the proper appointment of an administrator in November, 1978, in Wisconsin. Accordingly, the instant action was timely brought.

Section 52-584's two-year limitation period for personal injury actions is suspended from the defendant's death until an administrator is appointed.

Castillo v. Castillo, No. Cv 90 0269710 S (Jan. 14, 1991) · filed 1991-01-14

Although General Statutes Sec. 52-584 provides for a two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, this action, nevertheless, is not barred even though the service on October 3, 1990 was a complaint for personal injuries sustained on April 29, 1988. The reason is that the administratrix was appointed on May 11, 1990. "Of course the running of the Statute of Limitations applicable to an action such as this (General Statutes 52-584) is suspended from the date of the decedent's death until the appointment or the administrator." Lubas v. McCusker, 153 Conn. 250,255-56, 216 A.2d 289 (1965).

Section 52-584's two-year limitation period bars a negligence claim against a defendant added after it expires when the plaintiff could have sued that defendant separately in time.

Kerr v. Metropolitan District Comm., No. Cv &8212 92 &8212 0515671s (Apr. 27, 1994) · filed 1994-04-27

Because he did not, the limitations period of Section 52-584 was allowed to expire under circumstances which compel this Court to grant defendant Galasyn's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Section 52-584 gives two years from when an injury is first sustained to bring an action, subject to tolling when an alleged tortfeasor dies before an estate fiduciary is appointed.

Riley v. Murray, No. Cv 96 0072104 (Jan. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-01-06

General Statutes § 52-584 provides a two-year period, from the date when the injury is first sustained, to bring such an action. Accordingly, under ordinary circumstances the statute of limitations would have expired on September 29, 1996. It is well established, however, that the death of an alleged tortfeasor tolls the statute of limitations until a fiduciary of her estate is properly appointed and qualified. Lydem v. Feldman,36 Conn. Sup. 121, 123, 414 A.2d 202 (1979). Althea Murray died on January 14, 1996. Lynne A. Long was appointed as executrix of Althea Murray's estate on March 12, 1996. The statute of limitations was tolled during the nearly two months between Althea Murray's death and the appointment of Lynne A. Long as executrix of Althea Murray's estate. Subsequently, the statute of limitations expired on or about November 27, 1996.

Section 52-584 imposes a two-year limitation period that is not extended for legal incompetence or false imprisonment in a negligence claim.

Zajkowski v. International Inst. of Ct., No. Cv96 032 98 30 (Jun. 19, 1998) · filed 1998-06-19

The court declines to extend the statute of limitations extension contained in § 52-576 to § 52-584.

Section 52-584 does not bar a substituted complaint based on the same facts alleged in the original complaint when the original service controls the limitations period.

Briggs v. Merrell · filed 1966-12-20

The Norman Dairy case contains ample authority to conclude that the Statute of Limitations will not bar the substituted complaint required in this case.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence claim added after its limitation period when the substitute complaint states a new cause of action that cannot relate back to the original complaint.

Patterson v. Szabo Food Service of New York, Inc. · filed 1988-04-19

On April 28,1986, outside of the limitation provided by § 52-584 for commencement of an action for negligence, a substitute complaint was filed. ... A new cause of action is barred by the running of the statute of limitations. In order to avoid this result, the substitute complaint must be capable of being related back to the original complaint. This will be so unless it alleges a new cause of action, in which event it will speak as of the date when it is filed. ... We agree with the defendant that the substitute complaint presents a new and different factual situation from that stated in the original complaint and that it therefore states a new and different cause of action.

Section 52-584 bars an amended assault claim that states a cause of action separate from the original negligence claim when the amendment is filed after the limitations period.

Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hospital · filed 1974-11-05

It is clear that the count alleging an assault, as made more specific, raises a cause of action separate and distinct from the negligence originally pleaded. Consequently, the amendment speaks as of August 11,1972, the date when it was filed. The amendment is barred by General Statutes §52-584 and was properly disposed of by summary judgment.

Section 52-584 does not bar an amended negligence claim when the amendments leave the cause of action substantially the same.

Ziewacz v. Yankee Building Products, No. Cv 28 22 44 (Jan. 21, 1994) · filed 1994-01-21

The claims brought against the two defendants in this action remain "substantially" the same, the amendments notwithstanding; accordingly, the facts alleged in plaintiffs' amended/revised complaints have not asserted a new cause of action against Commercial which would be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 bars an amendment that adds a new cause of action after the limitations period has run.

Zesk v. Stock, No. Cv 88-0432442 (Sep. 25, 1990) · filed 1990-09-25

1.) The amended complaint alleges a new cause of action CT Page 2263 which is barred by the statute of limitations. General Statutes Section 52-584; Keenan v. Yale-New Haven Hospital,167 Conn. 284.

An amendment filed after § 52-584’s two-year limit can relate back to a timely negligence complaint when it concerns the same injury-causing event.

Gurliacci v. Mayer · filed 1991-05-07

We next consider Mayer’s claim that the trial court improperly struck his special defense that the plaintiff’s amendment of her complaint was barred by the two year negligence statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584.9 ... We conclude that the amendment related back and that, therefore, the court properly granted the motion to strike the special defense.

A recklessness claim arising from the same facts as an original negligence claim relates back to the original filing for purposes of Section 52-584.

Landes v. Anchor's Away Seafood, No. 56640 (Apr. 27, 1992) · filed 1992-04-27

In the present case the recklessness claim is derived from the same group of facts which give rise to the negligence claim asserted in the original as well as in the amended complaint. Consequently, the amended complaint, does not give rise to a new cause of action, as no "entirely new and different factual situation is presented." See Sharp, supra, 72. Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing the plaintiffs' eighth count sounding in recklessness, and the corresponding request for punitive damages, relate back to the filing of the original complaint. As such, they are legally sufficient, and the motion to strike is denied.

Section 52-584 bars an amendment adding a new personal injury negligence claim more than two years after the claim accrued.

Felsted v. Kimberly Auto Services, Inc. · filed 1991-09-10

Section 52-584 prohibits the requested amendment because the plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint on April 12,1988, more than two years after the cause *668of action accrued on April 2,1986.

Section 52-584 bars an untimely action against a person but does not prevent impleading that person solely to apportion damages.

Bulley v. Tettelbaum, No. 64090 (Sep. 7, 1993) · filed 1993-09-07

However, even though any action against Bulley is barred by the statute of limitations, pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 52-584, the court should allow the defendants to implead Bulley as a third-party defendant for apportionment purposes. ... Therefore, the court grants the defendants' motion to implead Bulley as a third-party defendant for the sole purpose of apportionment of damages under Tort II.

Section 52-584 gives two years to bring a negligence action, and the limitations period is suspended between a tortfeasor's death and the appointment of an estate fiduciary.

Thomas v. Nicola, No. 524494 (May 6, 1994) · filed 1994-05-06

Therefore, the plaintiffs' cause of action would ordinarily be barred by General Statutes § 52-584, unless commenced on or before April 11, 1992. ... The limitations period was then suspended until August 12, 1992, the date of the defendant's appointment as executrix of the decedent's estate.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence claim against a newly added defendant when the amendment does not relate back and the claim is filed more than three years after the injury.

Anderson v. Hartford Housing Auth., No. Cv 92 050 84 11 (Sep. 26, 1994) · filed 1994-09-26

Accordingly, the plaintiff's action against Raines, filed over three years after the plaintiff was injured, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Amended claims based on the same facts as the original complaint relate back for purposes of § 52-584’s two-year limit.

Gould v. M B Motorsport, No. 112515 (Nov. 30, 1994) · filed 1994-11-30

The moving defendants rely on the pleadings and argue that the fourth and fifth counts of the second amended complaint are time barred because these counts were first alleged after the expiration of the two year period required by General Statutes § 52-584. ... In the present case, the plaintiff's original complaint contains allegations of negligence based on the moving defendants' relationship as owners of the vehicle operated by Devers. The fourth and fifth counts amplify the basis of that relationship, and rely on the same facts as alleged in the original complaint. Accordingly, the fourth and fifth counts relate back to the original complaint.

Section 52-584 may be raised as a special defense when an amended medical malpractice complaint adds causes of action that may not relate back to the original complaint.

Neary v. McCarthy, No. Cv 93 0063412 (Jun. 20, 1995) · filed 1995-06-20

The plaintiff also moves to strike the second special defense which alleges that the plaintiff's claims of negligence as set forth in the sixth paragraph of the amended complaint are barred by the statute of limitations, General Statutes Sec. 52-584. ... Thus, under these cases, the plaintiff's amended complaint introduces new causes of action not alleged in the original complaint. ... Instead, the issue of whether the new allegations of the amended complaint are new causes of action that do not relate back to the original complaint is more properly raised and decided by means of a special defense asserting the statute of limitations. Therefore, the motion to strike the second special defense is denied.

Section 52-584 does not bar an amended claim when the amendment relates back to the original complaint.

Vaughan v. Mural Transport, Inc., No. Cv 94 0064472 (Nov. 20, 1995) · filed 1995-11-20

Based on Gurliacci, the proposed amendment in the present case is not dramatic, and does not require the defendants to gather different facts, evidence and witnesses to defend the claim. The plaintiff merely seeks to amplify what has already been alleged in support of his claim. Therefore, the proposed amendment relates back to the original cause of action.

Section 52-584 does not bar an amended negligence claim that arises from the same factual situation as the original complaint and therefore relates back.

Greatsinger v. Saturn of Branford, No. Cv 97 0575147s (May 23, 2000) · filed 2000-05-23

The Plaintiff does not contest the applicability of § 52-584. ... No new or different factual situation regarding whether repairs were properly made is presented. The proposed amendment, therefore, relates back.

Section 52-584 permits an amended claim to relate back to the original complaint when it arises from the same underlying acts.

Schumacher v. Morey, No. Cv98 0064798s (May 8, 2001) · filed 2001-05-08

The new count will be permitted and is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584. "An amended complaint if permitted, relates back and is treated as filed at the time of the original complaint. . . ."

Section 52-584 limits negligence and malpractice actions to two years from injury discovery and three years from the act or omission.

Alswanger v. Smego · filed 2001-07-24

We conclude that the allegations in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleging lack of informed consent regarding a resident’s participation in the surgery arose from a different set of facts than the allegations set forth in the original complaint. The amended complaint, therefore, did not relate back and was barred under the statute of limitations.

An amended malpractice complaint filed after § 52-584’s deadline relates back when the new negligence allegations arise from the same transaction or occurrence and the original complaint gave fair notice of the claim.

Briere v. Greater Hartford Orthopedic Group, P.C. · filed 2017-04-11

Instead, they constitute a change in and addition to an act of negligence, which is permitted under the relation back doctrine.

Section 52-584 gives a plaintiff with a qualifying motor vehicle injury two years to bring suit.

Mocek v. Robinson · filed 1987-04-07

When a suit is permitted under the statute, the suit is governed by the limitation period of General Statutes § 52-584. General Statutes § 38-335. Since the minor plaintiff sustained a bone fracture, he had to bring his action within two years.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence action brought nearly five years after the alleged negligent act unless the action is saved by § 52-592 (a).

Marangio v. Shop Rite Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 1987-06-02

The plaintiffs third action obviously would be outside the statute of limitations because it was brought nearly five years after the negligent “act or omission complained of”; General Statutes § 52-584; unless it is saved by the operation of § 52-592 (a).

Section 52-584 bars a negligence injury action brought more than three years after the alleged act or omission.

Vessichio v. Hollenbeck · filed 1989-05-30

Section 52-584 makes it evident that the action against the named defendant Carl Hollenbeck was not brought “within the time limited by law.”

Section 52-584 bars a property-damage negligence action brought after its three-year limit when fraudulent concealment has not been proved.

Cutsumpas v. Connecticut Light & Power Co. · filed 1988-09-06

Because the allegedly negligent act complained of occurred in June, 1964, absent any unusual circumstances, the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584,2 clearly had run.

Section 52-584 bars a personal injury action when the defendant is served after its two-year limitation period expires.

Estate of Adamec v. H. East Elderly Apt., No. Cv 36 79 02 (Jul. 19, 1990) · filed 1990-07-19

As stated, defendants here were not served within the time limit set forth in the applicable statute of limitation, Section 52-584.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence action brought more than two years after the accident.

Almonte v. Simon Ford, Inc., No. 510195 (Apr. 24, 1992) · filed 1992-04-24

Since the action was brought more than two years after the accident it is barred by the two year statute of limitations for action in negligence. Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-584.

Section 52-584’s two-year negligence limitation bars an employee’s claim when the employee intervenes in an employer’s action more than two years after the injury.

Standard v. Brewer Electric, No. Cv91 0397565 (Aug. 1, 1994) · filed 1994-08-01

In this case, following the Appellate Court's reasoning in Packtor, Pierce could have filed a direct action against Brewer Electric within the two-year negligence statute of limitations. Pierce sustained her injuries on October 18, 1988 and did not initiate her action until she intervened in the action brought by Hamilton Standard in July, 1991, beyond the two year negligence statute of limitations. Since Pierce's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment against Pierce is granted.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action to be brought within two years after the injury is or should be discovered, and no more than three years after the act or omission complained of.

Dalton v. Knell, No. 66422 (Sep. 13, 1993) · filed 1993-09-13

Furthermore, the applicable statute here does not simply provide for a two year period as Knell claims. It provides that an action must be brought "within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been CT Page 7955-I discovered," but that in any event no action may be brought "more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." General Statutes Sec. 52-584.

Section 52-584 provides a two-year limitations period for injuries to personal property.

Radiology Clinics, P.C. v. Kollmer, No. 65559 (Dec. 22, 1993) · filed 1993-12-22

The statute of limitations applicable to injuries to personal property is General Statutes Sec. 52-584, which provides a two-year limitations period. In the present case, therefore, the statute ran on September 12, 1993, two years after the fire occurred.

Section 52-584 bars a medical malpractice action brought more than two years after the injury is sustained or discovered; a petition for an extension filed after that period expires does not revive the action.

Gabrielle v. Hospital of St. Raphael · filed 1994-01-04

Section 52-584 mandates that no action to recover for the alleged malpractice of a hospital or physician shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered, except under certain circumstances where the time may be enlarged. Failure to bring suit within the period of limitations bars the action.

Section 52-584's three-year outer limit does not toll an insurance benefits claim until the insurer denies it; the limitations period runs from the occurrence giving rise to the benefits.

Boisvert v. Great American Insurance Co., No. Cv 92 0518506 (Jul. 5, 1994) · filed 1994-07-05

Further, by imposing an absolute three year limit on actions in § 52-584, the law, as written; does not favor tolling. Therefore, the statute of limitations on claims brought against insurers for benefits runs from the date of the occurrence giving rise to the benefits, rather than from the date the insurer denies the claim.

Section 52-584 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence claim for injury to property.

Welsh v. Cummings Lockwood, No. Cv 94 0462437s (Oct. 17, 1994) · filed 1994-10-17

Because that action sounds in negligence it is governed by the two year statute of limitations. General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence action for personal injury after the injury is sustained or discovered, or should reasonably have been discovered.

Louden v. Charles Brand MacHinery, Inc., No. Cv930349370 (Nov. 17, 1994) · filed 1994-11-17

Therefore, there being no genuine issue of material fact relative to the issues raised by the motion for summary judgment, the court finds as a matter of law that Section 52-592 is not applicable to the facts of this case, and that the two year statute of limitations as provided in Section52-584 had expired prior to July 20, 1993, when this action was commenced.

Section 52-584 requires a personal injury negligence action to be brought within two years after the injury is first sustained.

Rosario v. Hasak, No. Cv93 528569s (Nov. 30, 1994) · filed 1994-11-30

In Connecticut, the law provides that "no action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained." General Statutes § 52-584. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue as to the validity of the defendant's special defense under the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 gives a plaintiff two years from when a negligence injury is first sustained or discovered to bring a personal injury action.

Migliore v. Merritt Medical Center, No. Cv93 30 89 57 S (Jan. 26, 1995) · filed 1995-01-26

The applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584, provides in pertinent part that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered . . . ." In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that she was injured on January 28, 1991. Clearly the present action was commenced beyond the statute of limitations, because it was commenced approximately two years and nine months after the plaintiff allegedly sustained her injuries.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action for personal injury to be brought within two years after the injury is first sustained or discovered, unless a saving statute applies.

Parkes v. Patson's Confectionery Corp., No. Cv92 29 92 36 S (Jan. 26, 1995) · filed 1995-01-26

The applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584, provides in pertinent part that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered. . . ." In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that he was injured on June 18, 1988. Clearly CT Page 463 the present action was commenced beyond the statute of limitations, as it was commenced approximately four years and three months after the plaintiff allegedly sustained his injuries. Unless the plaintiff can avail himself of the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592, his negligence claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action for personal injury to be brought within two years after the injury is sustained or discovered, unless a saving statute applies.

Rausch v. Estate of Boyd, No. 067470 (Jul. 13, 1995) · filed 1995-07-13

The applicable statute of limitation, General Statutes §52-584, states that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . . ." General Statutes § 52-584. ... Therefore, the plaintiffs' present action was commenced beyond the time permitted by law and unless the plaintiffs can avail themselves of the accidental failure of suit statute, the action is barred.

Section 52-584 provides a two-year limitations period for an injury claim.

Tillman v. Ginter Associates, No. Cv94-0314988 (Jul. 18, 1995) · filed 1995-07-18

The defendant, Mercede, filed a special defense of Statute of Limitations and has moved for Summary Judgment based on its contention that the plaintiff's claim is barred by Connecticut General Statutes § 52-584 which provides for a two year Statute of Limitations. The court finds the claimed injury to have occurred on August 11, 1986 and this action was commenced by Writ, Summons and Complaint May 6, 1994 — considerably not within the two year Statute of Limitations.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence action brought more than two years after the injury.

Pabon v. Dow Associates, No. Cv 95 054 62 49 (Jul. 19, 1995) · filed 1995-07-19

The accident took place on January 16, 1993. According to the Sheriff's affidavit, the Summons and Complaint came into his hands on January 12, 1995, and the writ was served on January 19, 1995. See General Statutes § 52-584. The Motion to Strike is granted without prejudice to a proof by defendant that the Sheriff received the Summons and Complaint at a later time.

Section 52-584 requires injury negligence actions to be brought within two years of discovery, subject to an absolute three-year limit from the act or omission.

Geladino v. Pizzitola, No. Cv 94-0463918 (Sep. 6, 1995) · filed 1995-09-06

Section 52-584 states that "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. . . ." General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 requires property negligence actions within two years of discovering the injury and no later than three years after the negligent act or omission.

Middlesex Mutual v. Lennox International, No. Cv 31 10 24 S (Oct. 11, 1995) · filed 1995-10-11

The limitations period begins to run when the defendant's tortious conduct occurs and not the date when the plaintiff first sustains the injury.

Section 52-584 gives reckless misconduct claims a maximum three-year limitation period measured from the act or omission complained of.

Mountaindale Condominium Assoc. v. Zappone, No. 06 72 79 (May 11, 1998) · filed 1998-05-11

Count twenty-two of the plaintiff's complaint sounds in reckless misconduct. Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is General Statutes § 52-584. Section 52-584 provides a maximum period of three years in which a plaintiff may bring such an action; measured from the date of the act or omission complained of. The acts complained of in count twenty-two surround the issuance of building permits and the issuance of certificates of occupancy. According to the plaintiff's complaint, these acts occurred in 1986 and 1987. The plaintiff's action was commenced in January of 1995. Thus, on its face, count twenty-two is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 limits negligence, misconduct, and malpractice actions to two years from injury and three years from the act or omission.

Daum v. Stamford Propane, Inc., No. Cv94 0139456 S (Jun. 5, 1998) · filed 1998-06-05

This court finds that the amended complaint alleges a knew cause of action against Quick which is time barred under General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 gives a plaintiff two years from discovery of an injury to bring a covered negligence or misconduct claim, subject to a three-year limit measured from the defendant’s act or omission.

Franco v. Mediplex Construction, Inc., No. Cv 96-390458s (Aug. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-08-25

The plaintiffs' causes of action for negligence, negligent and reckless concealment and negligent and reckless misrepresentations are governed by the limitations of General Statutes § 52-584.10 ... Because the plaintiffs did not commence this action until July 17, 1996, it is clear that these causes of action are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations unless the plaintiffs can show that the statutes were tolled.

Section 52-584 requires negligent injury claims to be brought within two years of when the injury is discovered and within three years of the act or omission.

Decorso v. Watchtower Bible, No. Cv 98 145296 (Mar. 10, 2000) · filed 2000-03-21

General Statutes § 52-584 provides in pertinent part that “[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . . .” ... The claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is time barred by the two year statute of limitations. The plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to toll the statute in that there are no allegations that the defendants concealed facts for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to delay the filing of this cause of action. The defendants’ motion to strike the second count of the complaint is granted.

Section 52-584’s limitations period does not bar a state subdivision acting within its delegated governmental capacity to enforce public rights.

Department of Transportation v. Canevari · filed 1982-03-05

The Connecticut Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, as respects public rights, “a subdivision of the state, acting within its delegated governmental capacity, is not impliedly bound by the ordinary statute of limitations.” ... Accordingly, we sustain the action of the court below.

Section 52-584’s two-year limitation does not bar the State’s third-party action because the State is not subject to the ordinary statute of limitations.

King v. State, No. Cv910287324s (Jan. 26, 1995) · filed 1995-01-26

The third party defendant also claims that the third party action was not brought within two years from the date of the injury as required by General Statutes § 52-584 and that the claims made by the State are accordingly barred. The State, being sovereign, is not impliedly bound by the ordinary Statute of Limitations. ... In view of the holding of the Court that the State is not subject to the statute of limitations, it is not necessary to consider the remaining claims of the State.

Section 52-584's two year limitations period does not apply when the state sues as plaintiff.

State v. Castaldo, No. Cv 96 0385371s (Feb. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-02-03

Because the DOT is acting as an agent of the state, sovereign immunity renders the two year statute of limitations found in General Statutes § 52-584 inapplicable to this plaintiff. General Statutes § 52-584 does not apply to the sovereign by its express terms or by necessary implication.

Section 52-584 bars a new counterclaim filed more than two years after the injury and after the pleadings have closed.

Isaacson v. Wiese, No. Cv-21-4837 Sc (May 28, 1992) · filed 1992-05-28

What purported to be a "Revised Counterclaim," filed in October of 1991, was therefore in fact a new counterclaim. Coming, as it did, more than two years after the precipitating event and some weeks after the pleadings were closed, it was barred by Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-584.

Section 52-584 permits a counterclaim filed before the pleadings close, even after the ordinary two-year limitations period.

Pressley v. Transportation General, No. Cv 93 0352093 S (May 2, 1995) · filed 1995-05-02

The statute expressly states that a counterclaim may be filed any time before the pleadings are closed. ... In the present case, since Transportation's counterclaim was filed before the plaintiff filed his reply, the counterclaim preceded the closing of the pleadings and was thus timely filed.

Section 52-584 permits a defendant to file a counterclaim in an action for injury to person or property any time before the pleadings are finally closed.

Moore v. Sergi · filed 1995-08-22

It should be noted that pursuant to General Statutes § 52-584 and Practice Book § 168, a defendant may interpose a counterclaim in an action for injury to person or property at any time before the pleadings are finally closed.

Section 52-584 limits personal injury and property damage actions caused by negligent, reckless or wanton misconduct and permits related counterclaims before pleadings close.

Kenyon Oil v. Milo's Service Station, No. X06-Cv99-0161338s (Oct. 5, 2000) · filed 2000-10-05

The court concludes that the legislature intended to restrict the § 52-584 provision for asserting a counterclaim outside of the limitation period CT Page 12460 exclusively to counterclaims asserting personal injury or property damage caused by negligent, reckless or wanton misconduct. The statute does not authorize such a counterclaim in a contract/collection action.

Section 52-584 limits negligence actions to two years, subject to its three-year outer limit and counterclaim exception.

Fernandes v. Lee, No. Cv97 034 66 64 S (Apr. 7, 1999) · filed 1999-04-07

General Statutes § 52-584 provides that: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, . . ., shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed." ... Here, the defendant answered the plaintiff's complaint and CT Page 4464 raised a special defense on December 8, 1997. Subsequently, on December 10, 1997, the plaintiffs replied to the defendant's special defense, thereby closing the pleadings.2 The defendant did not file a counterclaim against the plaintiffs until November 30, 1998. Not only is November 30, 1998 more than two years after the date the injuries were sustained, it is also more than one year after the date that the pleadings were closed. ... Therefore, the defendant's counterclaim is untimely and the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim in its entirety is granted.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years of injury discovery and no more than three years after the underlying act or omission.

Simonoff v. McPhee Sons, No. X07-Cv94-56290 (Nov. 17, 1999) · filed 1999-11-17

"No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . ." General Statutes § 52-584. Thus, if the added claim of successor liability constitutes an "action" within the meaning of the statute, the claim would be time-barred. ... The new allegations relating to successor liability state an additional theory of liability and constitute a new cause of action. As such, the amendment is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 52-584 allows a counterclaim in a covered action any time before the pleadings are finally closed.

Norwalk Eye Surgical Ctr. v. Kousidis, No. Cv920121992 (Jul. 26, 1994) · filed 1994-07-26

General Statute § 52-584 clearly states that a counterclaim may be filed "any time before before the pleadings in such action are finally closed."

Section 52-584 permits a counterclaim after the ordinary two-year period when it relates back to the original pleading and was filed before the pleadings finally closed.

Badorek v. Suchecki, No. Cv 94360364 (Oct. 27, 1995) · filed 1995-10-27

In the present case, the counterclaim was filed before the pleadings were finally closed, on July 27, 1994, qualifying for the counterclaim exception pursuant to General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 supplies the limitation period for negligence, negligent nuisance, and negligence per se actions.

Hansen v. Huntington Realty, Inc., No. Cv 94 0539334 (Jan. 25, 1996) · filed 1996-01-25

The statute of limitations that governs actions for negligence per se is § 52-584.

Section 52-584 requires negligence and recklessness actions to be brought within two years of injury discovery, subject to an outer three-year limit from the act or omission.

Valeri v. Quijano, No. 70 09 42 (Mar. 12, 1996) · filed 1996-03-12

It is clear that Counts One and Two of the plaintiff's complaint, respectively alleging causes of action for negligence and recklessness, are governed by the three-year statute of limitations provided in General Statutes § 52-584.

Section 52-584 bars negligence actions brought more than two years after the injury is sustained or discovered, subject to its three-year outer limit.

Grimes v. Housing Authority · filed 1996-07-23

The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by § 52-584.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions for injury to be brought within two years of injury discovery and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Johnson v. Przondo, No. Cv 950465565s (Oct. 21, 1996) · filed 1996-10-21

The relevant statute of limitations in negligence cases requires that "no action to recover damages for injury . . . caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-584. ... Therefore, for the reasons stated, because the action against this apportionment defendant commenced after the statute of limitations on the underlying negligence claim had expired, and the applicable standards of substantive law require it, the motion for summary judgment in favor of the apportionment defendant is granted.

Section 52-584 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years after injury is discovered or should be discovered and no more than three years after the act or omission.

Farms Country Club v. Knickerbocker-Barry, No. 372119 (Feb. 10, 1997) · filed 1997-02-10

Section 52-584 is not unconstitutional as applied to FCC because it does not alter or abridge FCC's cause of action; it ... creates a time period in which the negligence action must be brought.

Section 52-584 bars a negligence action that is not commenced within the time frame it provides.

Pastizzo v. Conn. Valley Fitness Centers, No. Cv94 0540236 (Oct. 7, 1997) · filed 1997-10-07

The plaintiff was allegedly injured on April 9, 1991 and served the present complaint on July 28, 1994. Thus the action was not commenced within the time frame provided by General Statutes § 52-584, is time barred under that statute and accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the first count of the plaintiff's complaint is granted.

Section 52-584 sets a two-year limitations period for negligence actions measured from when the injury is first sustained or discovered, subject to tolling in proper circumstances under the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Macellaio v. Newington Police Department · filed 2013-09-03

An action for negligence must be commenced “within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered . . . .” General Statutes § 52-584. ... The plaintiff, therefore, cannot toll the statutes of limitations applicable to his claims on the basis of the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Section 52-584 bars a new cause of action added after the limitations period unless the amendment relates back to the lawsuit's initiation.

Keller v. Town of East Hartford, No. Cv 95-0469989s (Feb. 7, 1996) · filed 1996-02-07

The Defendants oppose Plaintiff's request to amend on the ground that the proposed additional counts allege a new cause of action that is barred by General Statutes § 52-584, the statute of limitations applicable to injuries caused by negligence. ... Accordingly, if the proposed additional counts set forth a new cause of action, they are barred by the statute of limitations, and Plaintiff's request must be denied.

Section 52-584 imposes a two year limitation period on the underlying tort action.

Dalfino v. Coady, No. Cv 95 0546808 (Feb. 13, 1998) · filed 1998-02-13

The facts of the present case are identical to the facts in Nichols, consequently the intervening plaintiff's action is barred because it was not filed within the two year limitation period applicable to the underlying tort action.

Section 52-584 bars negligence actions after two years from discovery and in all events more than three years after the act or omission.

A.P. Development Services v. St. John, No. Cv93 0129171 (Feb. 20, 1998) · filed 1998-02-20

General Statutes § 52-584 states in relevant part: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence. shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission CT Page 1943 complained of." ... The maximum time limitation allowed by both General Statutes § 52-577 and General Statutes § 52-584 is three years "from the date of the act or omission complained of."

Section 52-584 requires a negligence action to be brought within two years of the injury.

Raynor v. Hickock Realty Corp., No. Cv970073726s (May 4, 1999) · filed 1999-05-04

Since the incident occurred on June 19, 1995, and the applicable statute of limitations provides a two year period1, the statute ran on June 19, 1997. ... Under Howard v. Robinson and the applicable statute, the court finds that the plaintiff did not commence her action until February 10, 1998, when she first served the signed complaint with a return date on the defendant. ... Because the plaintiff failed to bring suit within the period of applicable limitations this action is barred.

Section 52-584 bars a claim when the applicable limitations period has expired.

Freeman v. McCarthy, No. 118347 (Nov. 9, 2000) · filed 2000-11-09

It is apparent, and the plaintiffs do not dispute, that the present actions were filed long after the expiration of the statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-584.4 The accident in question occurred on September 9, 1993, and the present complaints were not filed until late 1999. The motion for summary judgment should therefore be granted unless the action is saved by § 52-592.

Section 52-584 provides a two-year limitations period and a three-year repose period for negligence and malpractice claims.

Neuhaus v. Decholnoky, No. Cv 96 015 3565 S (Jun. 5, 2002) · filed 2002-06-05

Summary judgment in favor of the Stamford Hospital is granted. The court finds that there are no material facts at issue; that General Statutes § 52-584 is constitutional and bars the plaintiff's claims, and that plaintiffs have failed to establish any basis for invocation of the fraudulent concealment statute.

Section 52-584 gives a negligence claimant two years to sue, and here that period ran from March 1, 2021, through March 1, 2023.

Marks v. GLT Development Corp. · filed 2025-02-25

Applying the foregoing clear and unambiguous provisions of Executive Order Nos. 7G and 10A to the present action, we conclude that the court properly determined that the limitations period set forth in § 52-584 began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023.

Section 52-584's limitations defense does not support summary judgment when material facts about when the limitations period began to run remain disputed.

Dinegar v. University of New Haven, No. Cv95-0378256s (Oct. 16, 1997) · filed 1997-10-16

The defendants seek summary judgment with regard to the four counts sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress based on their contention that the two-year statute of limitations for the tort of negligence, General Statutes §52-584, had already run before the August 22, 1995 institution of this action. ... There are material issues of fact in dispute regarding the ate on which the statute of limitations began to run, and the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of their statute of limitations defense.

Section 52-584 requires a loss of consortium claim to be asserted within two years of the spouse's injury.

Astorino v. Torello Tire Co. Inc., No. Cv 94-0357545 (Feb. 22, 1996) · filed 1996-02-22

Since the injury that CT Page 1331-EEE gives rise to a claim of loss of consortium is the date of injury to the spouse, a loss of consortium claim must be asserted within two years of that date, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-584.