Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b

Section 42-110b permits a claim based on alleged anticompetitive conduct involving the distribution of products in Connecticut.

Future Industries v. Gallagher-Farren, No. Cv-01-0072788s (Mar. 24, 2003) · filed 2003-03-24(a)

These allegations sufficiently state a claim for anti-competitive practices arising out the distribution of an article or thing of value in this state for the purposes of the CUTPA count.

Section 42-110b(a) requires the challenged conduct to occur in the defendant’s trade or commerce; a university’s provision of student safety is not covered without facts connecting it to that business.

Vega v. Sacred Heart University, Inc. · filed 2011-07-20(a)

Vega has not alleged sufficient facts to suggest that, by failing to provide for her safety, SHU was engaging in “trade or commerce” or that SHU’s “primary trade or commerce” included the provision of safety and security to its students.

Section 42-110b(a) assesses whether a practice is deceptive using a reasonable-public standard.

Covenant Radio Corporation v. Ten Eighty Corporation · filed 1977-09-29(a)

Such a result would have unnecessarily severe repercussions for trades and businesses regulated by statutes such as § 42-110b (a). A more workable standard is the “reasonable public” approach advocated by WTIC. Under that approach, WKSS’ reference to the hypothetical listener falters.

Section 42-110b(a) requires a franchisor to disclose pending franchisee lawsuits alleging breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, or unfair trade practices, and judgments on those claims.

Bailey Employment System, Inc. v. Hahn · filed 1982-04-26(a)

Considering the broad remedial purposes behind CUTPA, this Court construes that Act to require a franchisor to disclose to prospective purchasers information regarding the franchisor’s current involvement in pending lawsuits in which franchisees have alleged breach of contract, fraud, misrepreséntation, or unfair and deceptive trade practices, as well as information regarding any judgments entered against the franchisor on such claims.

Section 42-110b(a) requires evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation or a duty to disclose to support a claim based on nondisclosure.

Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp. · filed 1981-07-21(a)

In this count, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice by failing to disclose that certain component parts of the Jeep were not manufactured by American Motors. Because nothing in the record before us suggests that the defendants either affirmatively misrepresented or had a duty to disclose the specific manufacturing history of the component parts, the plaintiffs have not shown that the defendants engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice in this respect.

Section 42-110b(a) does not require proof of actual or constructive knowledge of falsity to establish a CUTPA violation.

Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc. · filed 1987-05-05(a)

On the basis of these prior holdings, we conclude that knowledge of falsity, either constructive or actual, need not be proven to establish a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110b does not require a plaintiff to prove reliance on an alleged misrepresentation.

Gold v. University of Bridgeport School of Law · filed 1989-08-15

The distinction between CUTPA and fraudulent misrepresentation is that while the plaintiff must prove reliance on an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, reliance is not an element of a CUTPA claim.

False advertising that violates section 43 of the Lanham Act also violates CUTPA.

Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc. · filed 1989-01-30(a)

In ... Dial, ... this Court stated that to ... the extent the defendant’s actions violate section 43 of the Lanham Act, they also violate CUTPA. ... The same is true here.

Section 42-110b can cover knowingly false representations about a tour vessel’s safety made to induce customers to book a tour.

Gross v. International Expeditions, No. Cv91 0114227s (Feb. 5, 1992) · filed 1992-02-05

The Tenth and Fourteenth counts of the complaint to which the motion to strike has been addressed also include allegations of fact that the defendant Maritime made representations regarding the safety of the tour vessel, which were known to be untrue, for the purpose of inducing the plaintiffs to enter into a contract with the defendant Maritime for a tour of the Galapagos Islands. Such claims could result in a determination of a CUPTA violation. Where the allegations of the complaint, construed most favorably to the pleader, would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138 , 142 (1989). Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits selling non-Shell gasoline as Shell gasoline without adequate signs identifying it as non-Shell fuel.

SHELL OIL COMPANY v. Wentworth · filed 1993-04-01(a)

Here, defendant’s conduct in selling non-Shell gasoline as Shell gasoline without adequate debranding signage constitutes unfair trade practices within the meaning of CUTPA.

A car dealer can violate § 42-110b(a) by misrepresenting a vehicle’s odometer mileage without intending to deceive the buyer.

Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc. · filed 1994-02-08(a)

It is not a prerequisite of a CUTPA violation to prove that a car dealer intended to deceive when an odometer reading is not accurate.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices without requiring proof of intent to deceive, defraud, or mislead.

Associated Investment Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Williams Associates IV · filed 1994-07-19(a)

In addition to establishing a standard of conduct more flexible than traditional common law claims, the expansive language of CUTPA prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices without requiring proof of intent to deceive, to defraud or to mislead.

A violation of the Lanham Act is a per se violation of CUTPA under § 42-110b.

Pfizer, Inc. v. Miles, Inc. · filed 1994-08-19

A violation of the Lanham Act is a per se violation of CUTPA, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110b.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Southington Savings Bank v. Rodgers · filed 1995-12-26(a)

The plaintiff will be liable under CUTPA only if there is a statutory or common law duty to disclose to a depositor the existence of a hold placed on the depositor’s accounts. We conclude that the plaintiff in this case had no duty to disclose to the defendants that it had placed a hold on the defendants’ certificates of deposit prior to closing on the Mariondale mortgage.

Section 42-110b reaches unfair or deceptive trade practices, including a single transaction when aggravating circumstances make conduct more than a simple breach of contract.

Satkunus v. Catholic Cemeteries Assoc., No. Cv96 0131106 (Jan. 7, 1996) · filed 1996-01-07

Read in such a manner, the fifth count of the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the defendant declined to place the proposed footstone in the cemetery due to the non-religious nature of its inscription, while prior to and after the defendant's refusal, it allowed other monuments with non-religious inscriptions to be placed in the cemetery. Thus, the court finds that the fifth count sufficiently sets out facts that, if proven, would show that the defendant's act of singling out and refusing to place the plaintiff's footstone on its intended grave was arbitrary, capricious, unfair and deceptive. The allegations of the fifth count adequately show sufficient aggravating circumstances, beyond a mere breach of contract, such that the claim falls within the ambit of CUTPA. See Set to Fit Reality v. First Stamford Corp., supra. Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike the fifth count of the plaintiff's amended complaint is denied.

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Stanton Aviation v. the Plane Broker Inc., No. Cv-92-0309962 (Feb. 27, 1996) · filed 1996-02-27

General Statutes sec. 42-110b (hereinafter CUTPA) provides that "[N]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." ... The court finds that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of proof with regard to its claim under CUTPA. ... However, its practices were not so unscrupulous or immoral as to rise to the level of a CUTPA violation.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, including materially worsening a real estate access roadway without notice to the purchaser.

Conway v. American Excavating, Inc. · filed 1996-05-28(a)

The trial court failed to make any express determination of whether the changes made in the roadway by American and Doolittle, without notice to the plaintiffs of such a possibility at the time they purchased their property, constituted an “unfair or deceptive” act or practice in violation of § 42-110b (a). ... Accordingly, the judgment on the CUTPA count of the complaint must be reversed.

Section 42-110b requires a CUTPA claim to allege facts showing an unfair or deceptive business practice, not merely inadequate performance of a contract.

Weber v. Air Express International Corp., No. Cv95 0142974 S (Jul. 24, 1996) · filed 1996-07-24(a)

The defendant has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for CUTPA. The complaint does not allege an actual misrepresentation, it only alleges that the plaintiff did not fulfill his contract in an adequate fashion. Furthermore, the allegations do not rise to the level required under CUTPA. The fourth special defense and counterclaim does not state a claim under CUTPA, and are stricken.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Strol v. Strol, No. Cv 94 0066081 (Sep. 5, 1996) · filed 1996-09-05(a)

Under these circumstances, by fraudulently inducing Gerard into signing the quit claims deeds and then by forging them, he committed unfair trade practices under Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110b (a) which provides that "no person shall engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits deceptive sales practices, including misleading statements about a vehicle’s condition.

Goldwater v. Ollie's Garage, No. 357372 (Feb. 18, 1998) · filed 1998-02-18(a)

Conn. Gen. Stat § 42-110b (a) prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." ... The facts in this case amply establish a CUTPA violation. For reasons already discussed, there was an actual deceptive practice.

Section 42-110b(a) covers misrepresentations about the quality of seats sold to ticket buyers as deceptive trade practices.

State v. Cardwell · filed 1998-09-08(a)

On the basis of the evidence before it, the trial court properly could have determined that the defendant’s conduct with respect to Boivin constituted a deceptive trade practice in violation of CUTPA.

Withholding information that a defendant has a duty to disclose may be an unfair or deceptive practice under § 42-110b.

Willow Springs Condominium Ass'n v. Seventh BRT Development Corp. · filed 1998-06-02(a)

Where a defendant has withheld information that it is under a duty to disclose, such an act may constitute an unfair or deceptive practice and, therefore, violate CUTPA.

Section 42-110b covers deceptive practices that cause substantial injury, including the loss of an investment.

Kaplan v. Gruder, No. Cv96 033 43 08 S (May 19, 1999) · filed 1999-05-19

The plaintiffs have demonstrated that the acts of Gruder were deceptive and caused the plaintiffs substantial injury, including the value of the plaintiffs' investment.

Section 42-110b allows a claim based on a real estate broker’s alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosure when the pleaded facts support the cigarette rule’s unfairness criteria.

Schur v. David Ogilvy and Associates, No. Cv99 0175461 S (Apr. 26, 2000) · filed 2000-04-26

Because count three of the plaintiffs complaint alleges sufficient facts from which it could be found that the defendant's violated General Statutes § 42-110b , the defendants' motion to strike is denied.

A seller’s statement about a roof does not constitute an unfair trade practice under § 42-110b when the buyer knew of the roof’s condition before closing and did not rely on the statement.

Winston v. Hande, No. Cv 97-0402968s (Jul. 13, 2000) · filed 2000-07-13

There is no evidence that the plaintiff was taken advantage of in any way. The defendants engaged on no unfair trade practices, and there is no evidence to support an unjust enrichment theory.

An architect’s intentional false statements about construction drawings made in the course of business can support a CUTPA claim.

Hopper v. Hemphill, No. Cv 99-0171709 S (May 10, 2000) · filed 2000-05-10(a)

The court denies Hopper's motion to strike count four of the counterclaim because Hemphill has alleged intentional false statements by Hopper while engaged in his trade or business.

Section 42-110b treats a false message as a deceptive act without requiring proof that a consumer believed or relied on it.

Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2000-08-29(a)

Under CUTPA, if the message is false, then it is a deceptive act without inquiry into whether the consumer actually believed the message or whether the consumer acted reasonably in relying on it.

A CUTPA claim survives a motion to strike when the pleaded facts support an actual deceptive practice in a contractual relationship.

Technical Gas Prod. v. Barnes Eng. Co., No. Cv00 037 26 65 (Dec. 21, 2000) · filed 2000-12-21

In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged factual allegations that are sufficient to support a cause of action, based on an actual deceptive practice, for a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) does not make every misrepresentation an unfair trade practice; the circumstances may show an isolated misrepresentation rather than unfair or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce.

Calandro v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2001-06-05(a)

Not every misrepresentation constitutes a CUTPA violation, and the evidence permitted the court to find that the inclusion of that claim in Biller Associates’ estimate could have been an “instance of misrepresentation . . . due to the unique circumstances of this particular case as distinguished from unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the defendant’s trade or business.”

Section 42-110b can cover a seller’s omission of product information when the seller’s description may mislead consumers.

Robichaud v. Hewlett Packard Co., No. X01cv01-0165706 (Jun. 29, 2001) · filed 2001-06-29

The omission of a salient piece of information about the attributes of a product that the seller has undertaken to describe, may, depending on the context, deceive or mislead a consumer. Under the pleading standard applicable to motions to strike, this court cannot determine that there is no set of facts provable concerning the context of the defendant's labeling of its product would support a conclusion that the defendant's actions were deceptive or unscrupulous. The motion to strike Count One, in which the plaintiff alleges a violation of CUTPA, is denied.

Section 42-110b prohibits deceptive trade practices likely to mislead a reasonable consumer.

In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2017-08-24

Thus, for purposes of state consumer protection statutes, “a statement is deceptive if it creates a likelihood of deception or has the capacity to deceive.”

Section 42-110b(a) reaches a breach of contract accompanied by intentional misrepresentations.

Premium Freight Mgmt., LLC v. PM Engineered Solutions, Inc. · filed 2018-10-10(a)

Under the Act, deceptive conduct extends to simple breaches of contract when accompanied by intentional misrepresentations.

Section 42-110b requires facts showing an unfair or deceptive practice; alleging only the denial of a HAMP mortgage modification does not state a claim.

White v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-07-25(a)

Here, the Complaint fails to allege on its face a claim under the CUTPA. ... But Ms. White has not articulated how Wells Fargo’s practices offend public policy, how its conduct was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, or whether there had been substantial injury to consumers.

Actions expressly permitted by a mortgage deed were not unfair or deceptive under § 42-110b(a).

Malick v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-12-11(a)

Malick’s CUTPA claims fall short, as the District Court ruled, because the actions taken by JPM and Safeguard were not “unfair or deceptive” and were expressly contemplated by the Mortgage Deed.

Section 42-110b(a) does not require an electricity supplier whose contract permits variable rates based on business and market conditions to disclose every factor influencing those rates.

Richards v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC · filed 2019-02-04(a)

Accepting Richards's argument to the contrary would mean, in effect, that if Direct Energy wished to retain the discretion in a contract to set its variable rate based on a range of business and market conditions, it was required to disclose every factor influencing that variable rate. But CUTPA imposes no such duty.

A deceptive practices claim under § 42-110b(a) requires a misleading representation, omission, or practice; a university’s decision not to issue a refund does not by itself establish one.

Michel v. Yale University · filed 2021-07-07(a)

Michel offers no support for the proposition that a university’s decision not to take a certain discretionary action may constitute a misleading representation that satisfies the first element of a deceptive practices CUTPA claim.

A failure to disclose can be deceptive under CUTPA only when the circumstances create a duty to disclose.

Beermann v. Tauck Inc · filed 2021-08-25

Although CUTPA allows for a deception claim to be based on an omission, “in Connecticut, a failure to disclose can be deceptive only if, in light of all the circumstances, there is a duty to disclose.” Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2013). In my view, Beermann has not alleged facts to plausibly suggest that there was any duty to disclose.

Section 42-110b(a) requires a deceptive-practices claim to identify a representation, omission, or other practice likely to mislead consumers.

Hutchinson v. University of Saint Joseph · filed 2022-01-03(a)

The amended complaint does not identify a representation or omission by USJ in support of its conclusion that USJ “falsely represent[ed] and pass[ed] off to the plaintiff and class members that an online education has the same value as in-person education.”

Section 42-110b(a) permits a deceptive practice claim when a website offers customers a way to contact a listing agent but the option does not actually reach that agent.

Demetres v. Zillow, Inc. · filed 2022-09-21(a)

Unlike the Zestimates tool, Plaintiff’s description of Defendant’s website (if accurate) plausibly alleges that Defendant’s display of an option for a customer to contact the listing agent, which does not in fact allow the customer to contact the listing agent, is a device that could support a claim of a deceptive practice under CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) permits a claim based on allegations that businesses used coordinated deception to hire another company’s employee and avoid paying that company.

VLink, Inc. v. NexGen IOT Solutions · filed 2024-07-15(a)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants lied to Plaintiff in this effort to conceal the events as they were unfolding and did so in order to avoid having to pay Plaintiff for the employee’s services if offered through Plaintiff. ... But the Amended Complaint adequately alleges a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) requires evidence of an unfair or deceptive practice; a school’s statement that it prioritizes health and safety did not support a claim where the evidence showed it acted to protect the student and did not harm him.

Coffey v. Hall · filed 2025-09-12(a)

As noted above, Plaintiffs fail to show how this statement was deceptive, as Choate took the action it felt was most appropriate to protect Christian’s health and safety, and Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to support the assertion that he was held against his will, forced to withdraw from Choate, or otherwise harmed by these actions.

A failure to disclose is deceptive under § 42-110b(a) only when the circumstances create a duty to disclose.

Demetres v. Zillow, Inc. · filed 2024-07-30(a)

Although CUTPA allows for a deception claim to be based on an omission, “a failure to disclose can be deceptive only if, in light of all the circumstances, there is a duty to disclose.” Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2013). But Demetres has ... not alleged that Zillow had a duty to disclose that the agent with whom consumers were connected through the “Contact agent” button was not the listing agent. Accordingly, I cannot find that Zillow’s “Contact agent” button was a deceptive business act or practice.

A claim based on a failure to disclose information requires a duty to disclose that information.

In re Carrier IQ, Inc. · filed 2015-01-21(a)

Accordingly, where a CUTPA claim is based on a failure to disclose information, Connecticut courts first look to whether the defendant had a duty to disclose the information in question.

Section 42-110b(a) does not allow a CUTPA claim based on the filing of a single non-sham lawsuit.

Suburban Restoration Co., Inc. v. Acmat Corporation, Laborers' International Union of North America, Local 665 Afl-Cio and Robert D. Witte · filed 1983-02-09(a)

In short, we conclude that the activity complained of here — the filing of a single non-sham lawsuit — cannot form the basis of a claim under CUTPA or Connecticut’s common law of tortious interference with a business expectancy.

Section 42-110b can support an unfair trade practices claim when a broker diverts a sale for personal gain through unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous conduct.

Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Anderson · filed 1987-05-19

The court found that Anderson induced Conference Center to enter into a sales agreement with another party, and under that agreement, Anderson and Revest were to receive pecuniary gains additional to the listing broker’s commission. From those facts alone, probable cause exists to sustain a cause of action for unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous behavior.

Section 42-110b does not treat a reasonably grounded constitutional challenge to another statute as an unfair or deceptive act, even if the challenge fails.

Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc. · filed 1988-08-16(a)

Although the subjective good faith of one who has in fact performed an unfair or deceptive act is not a defense to a CUTPA violation, there is nothing unfair or deceptive in a reasonably grounded constitutional challenge of a statute.

A CUTPA claim based on an alleged sham lawsuit survives a motion to strike when the pleadings do not establish whether the lawsuit was a sham.

Gamlestaden Plc v. Backstrom, No. Cv93 0130060 S (May 17, 1995) · filed 1995-05-17(a)

Whether the action filed by the New York plaintiffs is a "sham" lawsuit cannot be determined from the facts that have been plead. ... Accordingly, the motion to strike count ten is denied because it depends upon facts outside of the pleadings.

Section 42-110b provides the basis for a CUTPA claim alleging that a prior action was a sham lawsuit.

Shea v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. Cv96 0149647 S (Jun. 17, 1997) · filed 1997-06-17

The plaintiff, Shea 1 , brought this action against the defendant, Chase, alleging in counts one and two, respectively, a claim under the vexatious litigation statute, General Statutes § 52-568 , and a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110b . ... The second count of Shea's complaint, for a violation of CT Page 6895 CUTPA, is based upon the theory that the previous action instituted by Chase was a sham lawsuit. Shea correctly points out in the memorandum in support of her motion for partial summary judgment that the standard for a sham lawsuit is the same as the probable cause standard in a vexatious litigation cause of action. ... Therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply to the sham lawsuit issue in the present case and Shea's motion for summary judgment on count two of her complaint is also denied.

A CUTPA claim based on a prior civil suit requires that the party who brought the suit lacked probable cause.

Shea v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. Cv96 0149647 (Dec. 7, 1998) · filed 1998-12-07

Moreover, both a vexatious suit and a CUTPA suit require that the party bringing the prior suit lack probable cause.

Section 42-110b claims are subject to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. International Nutrition Co. · filed 2001-11-16

The defendants argue that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be applied to Jarrow's state and common law causes of action. The court agrees.

A CUTPA claim that filing a lawsuit was an unfair trade practice is premature until that lawsuit terminates in the claimant’s favor.

Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Jeffrey S. Bagnell, Esq., LLC · filed 2023-07-10(a)

I agree and therefore will dismiss the defendants’ CUTPA claim as premature insofar as it is based on Sig Sauer’s filing of this lawsuit.

The rule eliminating the public interest nexus requirement for CUTPA claims does not apply retroactively.

O'Leary v. Industrial Park Corp. · filed 1988-05-17

We find this claim to be wholly without merit and decline to accept the plaintiffs’ offer to reconsider the rule precluding the retroactive application of the rule which eliminates the nexus requirement in CUTPA claims.

Section 42-110b requires a challenged practice to offend public policy before it supports a separate common law or statutory cause of action.

Vickers v. Hrehowsik, No. Cvnh 94056339 (Jan. 24, 1997) · filed 1997-01-24

Not all violations of C.G.S. Section 42-110b independently support a separate common law or statutory right of action; instead, the practice complained of in ... such a claim must offend public policy as established therein.

Section 42-110b treats a landlord’s knowing acceptance of rent without required certificates of occupancy as an unfair practice when it offends housing safety and habitability policy.

Conaway v. Prestia · filed 1983-09-13(a)

In the present case the defendants’ actions of receiving the rent, while not specifically prohibited pursuant to §§ 47a-5 and 47a-57, unquestionably offended the public policy, as embodied by these statutes, of insuring minimum standards of housing safety and habitability. As recited above, § 47a-57 imposed a duty upon the defendants to obtain certificates of occupancy after a vacancy and prior to human habitation. The defendants, with full awareness of this requirement, nonetheless failed to secure the certificates and continued to accept rental payments, the collection of which they had no right to enforce. The actions of the defendants amounted to unfair acts or practices within the meaning of § 42-110b.

Section 42-110b’s unfairness standard does not treat lost sales from increased competition alone as an unfair trade practice.

McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1984-04-03(b)

Increased competition alone, resulting from a practice containing none of the hallmarks of traditionally unfair practices, does not constitute a cause of action under CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) reaches unfair competition and deceptive trade practices that may not meet the stricter standard for tortious interference with business expectancies.

Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley · filed 1984-04-17(a)

A trial court must guard against considering business tort claims and CUTPA claims in the same light. Conduct that might be actionable under CUTPA may not rise to a level sufficient to invoke tort liability.

Section 42-110b does not prohibit competing offers for property or filing a purchase contract when the conduct is neither unfair nor deceptive under the circumstances.

Old Quarry Ass'n v. Hickey · filed 1986-08-15

Section 42-110b proscribes “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” ... Because the court agrees with the contention that the Rescignos’ actions were not “unfair” or “deceptive” within the meaning of CUTPA, it need not address the defendants’ other arguments.

A CUTPA claim based on a dealer’s termination requires a particularized allegation showing how the termination violated an established concept of unfairness.

Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc. · filed 1988-05-26(a)

The court is unwilling to open this inquiry to a jury absent a particularized allegation of how the termination constituted a violation of an established concept of unfairness.

Section 42-110b treats a consumer sale at an unconscionable price as an unfair trade practice when the buyer has unequal bargaining power.

Murphy v. McNamara · filed 1979-12-05(a)

In sum, an agreement for the sale of consumer goods entered into with a consumer having unequal bargaining power, which agreement calls for an unconscionable purchase price, constitutes an unfair trade practice under the CUTPA.

A breach of warranty alone does not establish a violation of § 42-110b; the claimant must also show that it offended public policy, was immoral or unscrupulous, or injured the consumer.

Gibbs v. Mase · filed 1987-05-29

The fact that the trial court found that the plaintiffs had established probable cause that they would prevail on the breach of warranty counts of their complaint does not imply or necessitate an automatic finding by the trial court of a violation of CUTPA. The plaintiffs must also establish that the breach of warranty offended public policy, was immoral or unscrupulous, or had an injurious effect on the consumer.

Under § 42-110b(a), consumer injury must be substantial to establish unfairness under the consumer injury criterion.

Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc. · filed 1987-12-08(a)

In this case it is clear from the facts as found by the trial court that the plaintiff cannot satisfy the first test of the “substantial injury” factor for the plain reason that the consumer injury here is not substantial.

A claim under § 42-110b fails when the defendant committed no unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

Roy v. Stephen Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. · filed 1988-07-05

The court specifically found that the defendant acted in good faith at all times relevant to the transaction and that the defendant had not committed any unfair or deceptive acts or practices within the meaning of General Statutes § 42-110b. These findings are not clearly erroneous and are fatal to these claims of error.

Section 42-110b(a) does not treat negligence as an unfair practice based solely on the public-policy prong of the cigarette rule.

A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. · filed 1990-08-07(a)

Contrary to the claim of the plaintiff, the first prong, standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence.

A private dispute over an unenforceable real estate commission does not support a § 42-110b claim when the alleged conduct meets none of the unfairness criteria and has no apparent effect on the general consuming public.

Weidt v. Plp Realty Partners, No. Cv 90-Pjr-0441444s (Oct. 19, 1990) · filed 1990-10-19(a)

In examining the allegations in plaintiff's third count, no claim has been made which fits into any of the above three criteria recited in the Sportsmen's Boating Corporation case, supra. ... This situation does not appear to have an effect on the general consuming public. The CUTPA claim arises out of and appears to be a consequence of the unenforceable claim for a real estate commission. Under these circumstances, we find no probable cause to sustain the action under the third count.

Section 42-110b(a) does not make a supplier’s replacement of a distributor and offer of lower prices to the replacement an unfair trade practice without more.

Retail Service Associates v. Conagra Pet Products Co. · filed 1991-03-18(a)

CUTPA prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110b(a). ... Such allegations standing alone do not rise to the level of a CUTPA violation. Therefore, count four of the complaint must be dismissed.

Section 42-110b(a) requires facts showing why the challenged conduct is an unfair trade practice; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Washington Trust Co. v. Alland Associates, No. 096798 (Apr. 9, 1991) · filed 1991-04-09(a)

In this case the Hulls have not alleged sufficient facts for the court to determine whether or not the plaintiff's actions constitute a violation of CUTPA. The Hulls have not alleged facts to show that the bank's actions "offend public policy," are "unfair," "immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous," or that the Hulls have suffered "substantial injury."

Recording a purchase agreement altered after the seller signed it violates public policy, but that violation alone may be insufficient to establish a CUTPA claim.

Francoline v. Klatt · filed 1991-12-10(a)

The recording of an altered document contravenes the public policy of this state. ... Violation of an identifiable public policy alone may be insufficient under certain circumstances to support a CUTPA violation.

Violations of lending laws that offend public policy and cause substantial consumer injury may be unfair trade practices even when another unfairness criterion is not met.

Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes · filed 1992-06-30(a)

Although the second criterion of the Sperry rule has not been met, the degree to which the other two criteria have been met leads us to conclude that the plaintiff’s violation of TILA and § 36-224l was an unfair trade practice in violation of CUTPA.

A bank’s refusal to lend funds after a course of conduct created an expectation that funds would be provided can support an unfair-practices claim under § 42-110b(a).

Fleet Bank v. Winthrop, No. Cv92-0065008 (Nov. 25, 1992) · filed 1992-11-25(a)

The plaintiff's motion to strike the fourth counterclaim is denied because the defendants' assertions sufficiently allege a violation of CUTPA. At the very least paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 20 through 22 contain sufficient allegations that the plaintiff engaged in unfair practices by refusing to loan funds to the defendants after establishing a course of conduct in which the defendants had the expectation that such funds would be provided.

Whether a business practice is unfair under § 42-110b(a) is a question of fact.

Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, No. 28 87 68 (Jun. 7, 1991) · filed 1991-06-07(a)

Whether a business practice is "unfair" is a question of fact. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the first count of defendants' counterclaim is denied since a material question of fact, whether plaintiff engaged in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," still remains.

Section 42-110b(a) is not limited to practices that injure consumers; injury to competitors or other businesses may also support a claim.

Rose Hill Assoc. v. St. Vincent Depaul Soc., No. 097612 (Jan. 24, 1992) · filed 1992-01-24(a)

First, the statute, by its own words, is not limited to consumers. It states that no "person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices"; General Statutes Section 42-110b (a); and that "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss" may bring a CUTPA action. General Statutes Section 42-110g (a).

Violations of the Home Improvement Act or Home Sales Solicitation Act can support a claim under § 42-110b because each act deems its violations CUTPA violations.

Bart v. Forte, No. Cv91 0116578 S (Mar. 5, 1992) · filed 1992-03-05

The Home Improvement Act specifically provides that a violation of its terms shall be deemed a violation of CUTPA. General Statutes Section 20-427 (b). Likewise, the Home Sales Solicitation Act provide that a violation of its terms is also a violation of CUTPA. General Statutes Section 42-141 . The Fourth and Fifth Counts of the complaint do not purport CT Page 2059 to allege independent causes of action for violations of the Home Improvement Act or the Home Sales Solicitation Act, but rather each account asserts that such violations constitute a violation of CUTPA. Accordingly, the Motion to Strike is denied.

A claim under § 42-110b based solely on negligence must satisfy all three prongs of the cigarette rule for unfair practices.

Sipperly v. Burger King Corporation, No. 09 47 46 (Mar. 17, 1992) · filed 1992-03-17(a)

When a CUTPA claim is based soley in negligence, all three prongs of the cigarette rule must be satisfied.

Section 42-110b may be violated by an actual deceptive practice or a practice that violates public policy.

Vezina v. Nautilus Pools, Inc. · filed 1992-06-16

Thus, a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy.

Allegations of intentional, willful, and malicious interference with contractual and business expectancy rights sufficiently plead unfair conduct under § 42-110b(a).

Arzonetti v. Bank of Boston Connecticut, No. 910057615s (Jun. 24, 1993) · filed 1993-06-24(a)

General Statutes 42-110b (a) prohibits acts or practices which may be characterized as "unfair" or "deceptive." ... In the case at bar, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant intentionally, willfully and maliciously interfered with the contractual and business expectancy rights of the plaintiffs. ... Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim on the ground that the second count does not allege any conduct by the defendant which may be characterized as "unfair" or "deceptive" is denied.

Section 42-110b uses the cigarette rule to determine whether a practice is unfair under CUTPA.

Milford Bank v. Barbieri, No. Cv93 04 33 15s (Aug. 30, 1994) · filed 1994-08-30(b)

The defendants have failed to meet their burden of proof as to their counterclaim Count Two. There has been no evidence that the conduct of the plaintiff comes within the purview of the so-called "cigarette rule".

A lender's unfulfilled promise to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner does not state a CUTPA claim without allegations of oppressive, unscrupulous, or unethical conduct.

Morris v. Shawmut Bank, No. 114860 (Oct. 20, 1994) · filed 1994-10-20

There is no allegation that in making that promise, the Bank or its attorneys acted intentionally or fraudulently to create a false impression. Construed most favorably, the complaint does not contain allegations of oppressive, unscrupulous, or unethical conduct necessary for a CUTPA claim.

A claim under § 42-110b fails when there is no evidence of unfair trade practices.

Southern Connecticut Gas Co. v. Parktown Assocs., No. 274334 (Jan. 9, 1995) · filed 1995-01-09

In count nine, the plaintiff alleges that CMCA's refusal to pay for the gas service constitutes a violation of Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110b . 2 ... Based on these findings of fact, the referee made the following recommendations: ... (2) there is no evidence of unfair trade practices and judgment should be entered for the defendants on that claim; ... The attorney trial referee's findings of fact and conclusions are supported by the evidence and judgment is entered in accordance with the referee's report.

Section 42-110b(a) can cover an employer's authorization of punitive physical force by its bouncers against patrons.

Duff v. Boppers of New Haven, Inc., No. Cv94-0359966 (Sep. 19, 1994) · filed 1994-09-19(a)

If, for example, the plaintiff were to prove that the defendant employer had actually authorized its bouncers to use maximal and punitive physical force against patrons they ejected as part of a method for keeping order at Boppers, then the alleged actions of the bouncers could indeed be found to have been unfair and actionable under CUTPA. Since the court cannot conclude that no set of facts provable under the allegations of Count 3 would support a cause of action under CUTPA, the motion to strike that count is denied.

A violation of § 42-110b(a) was not proved where the challenged acts did not violate public policy and were not immoral, oppressive, or unscrupulous under the cigarette rule.

Solomon v. Wmn Associates, Inc., No. 391793 (Oct. 21, 1994) · filed 1994-10-21(a)

The court finds that the defendants have not violated several of the prongs of the "cigarette rule" namely, the acts of the defendant did not violate public policy and/or were not immoral, oppressive or unscrupulous, and therefore the plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a violation of CUTPA.

A landlord’s continuing failure to keep common areas safe can support a CUTPA claim when it offends the public policy reflected in landlord-tenant law.

Levesque v. Williamsburg Associates, No. Cv93 052 62 35 S (Feb. 17, 1995) · filed 1995-02-17

Because the conduct here alleged is a continuing course of conduct which offends the public policy of this State, as expressed in General Statute § 47a-7 (3), the third count of the plaintiff s Complaint states a legally sufficient cause of action under General Statutes § 42-110b .

A credit union does not violate § 42-110b by agreeing to delay ejectment for one week and then performing that agreement.

Garvey v. Bridgeport Fire D. E. F. C. U., No. Cv 93 0300668 (Apr. 27, 1995) · filed 1995-04-27

The credit union did not engage in any deceptive practice or any practice that could be construed as a violation of public policy.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits oppressive and unscrupulous conduct that causes substantial injury as an unfair trade practice.

Fink v. Golenbock, No. 29 86 08 (Oct. 30, 1995) · filed 1995-10-30(a)

This course of action by the defendants was within the concept of unfairness, was oppressive and unscrupulous, and caused substantial injury to Fink, Golenbock, P.C. Thus General Statutes § 42-110b (a) was violated and was the basis of the court's rulings on Magner's CUTPA arguments and my verdict on plaintiff's CUTPA claim.

A practice that violates public policy established by another statute can support a claim under § 42-110b(a).

State v. the Hertz Corporation, No. Cv 950705667 (May 8, 1995) · filed 1995-05-08(a)

General Statutes § 14-153b is clearly a public policy statute seeking to protect the public's ability to rent passenger motor vehicles. As the complaint contains sufficient allegations that the defendant has violated General Statutes § 14-153b , a public policy statute, the defendant has also alleged a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) does not make negligent hospital care an unfair trade practice merely because the negligence allegations are recast as a CUTPA claim.

Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, No. 26 30 26 (Jun. 2, 1995) · filed 1995-06-02(a)

While a hospital maybe subject to CUTPA, "negligence [i]s not an unfair or deceptive trade practice within the meaning of General Statutes § 42-110b (a)." ... The CUTPA allegations are the allegations of negligence recast. ... Such allegations are insufficient for CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) does not treat negligence as an unfair or deceptive trade practice unless the allegations satisfy all three prongs of the cigarette rule.

Brown v. Riverside Health, No. Cv940534043 (Nov. 22, 1995) · filed 1995-11-22(a)

However, our Supreme Court has held that negligence does not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice for purposes of CUTPA, unless, the allegations satisfy all three prongs of the cigarette rule. ... The negligence alleged in Count Eight of the plaintiff's revised complaint does not meet the criteria of the cigarette rule and does not constitute a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110b requires facts supporting a CUTPA claim under the Cigarette Rule, such as conduct that offends public policy, is immoral or unethical, or substantially injures consumers.

Lozada v. Amador, No. Cv95-0548633 (Jun. 12, 1995) · filed 1995-06-12

The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendant has committed a violation of CUTPA. The allegations do not fit the Cigarette Rule as set forth in A. G. Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200 , 215 . Plaintiff does not allege facts which could be deemed immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous. Nor does he allege facts which would cause substantial injury to consumers. Nor would the facts as alleged offend public policy.

A landlord’s improper rent charges and security-deposit practices can violate the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Lopes v. Ironson, No. Cv N.H. 9404 6296 (Jun. 20, 1995) · filed 1995-06-20

In the Fourth Count the plaintiff claim that the defendant's actions set out in the First through Third Counts constitute a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b . ... The Court finds that the plaintiff has proved her case on all counts.

A practice is not unfair under § 42-110b when the claimed substantial injury could reasonably have been avoided by paying overdue invoices.

Cie v. West Haven Buckle Co., No. 323965 (Aug. 23, 1995) · filed 1995-08-23(b)

The defendant could have avoided the substantial injury. The defendant could have paid the overdue invoices as requested by the plaintiff. It comes as no surprise. See Ex. 21, 22, 23, 24 and 28. There was no unfair trade practice.

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair practices in trade or commerce, including conduct that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injures consumers.

Maniscalco v. Brooks, No. Cv91 027 87 36 S (Feb. 6, 1996) · filed 1996-02-06

The defendant's second, third and fourth CUTPA claims will be discussed together. They are interrelated as they turn on whether the plaintiff's claim of a special or charging lien against the escrow deposit violates CUTPA. ... Under the circumstances here, the court cannot find that ... the assertion of a lien was so baseless and lacking in merit as to constitute a CUTPA violation. ... Because each party had requested the entire $50,000, this request to "freeze" the situation temporarily was not a CUTPA violation.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

United Artists Theatre v. Groton Shoppers Mart, No. 530997 (Feb. 7, 1996) · filed 1996-02-07(a)

Even viewing the allegations of the complaint in a light most favorable to the pleading party, the court finds that the allegations are insufficient as a matter of law because they merely suggest a disagreement over the terms and conditions of a lease agreement, and do not rise to a level of a CUTPA violation.

Section 42-110b(a) does not make negligence alone a CUTPA violation; the conduct must satisfy the cigarette rule.

Anzellotti v. National Amusements, No. Cv 95 0546129s (Feb. 20, 1996) · filed 1996-02-20(a)

The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that the first prong, by itself, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence. Id. Negligent acts, in general, are not inherently immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous. Negligent conduct supporting CUTPA claims usually involves negligent misrepresentation, see, e.g., Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc. , 33 Conn. App. 575 , 636 A.2d 1383 (1994). CUTPA deals with actions that cause unjustified consumer injury rather than a personal injury based upon negligence. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , supra, 216 Conn. 217 . In the present case, the plaintiff's allegations do not satisfy the three prongs of the "cigarette test" and thus cannot be the basis of a CUTPA claim. The alleged negligent piling of snow in a parking lot of a movie theater cannot be construed as offensive to public policy or as violative of some established concept of unfairness. Further, it cannot be considered "inherently immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous." Additionally, there is no allegation that the conduct complained of caused an unjustified injury that is ... substantial. Merely reciting CUTPA language to describe acts of negligence is "insufficient to allege an actionable CUTPA claim." Chernet v. Town of Wilton, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 108840 (Sept. 19, 1990, Cioffi, J.).

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair trade practices, and a plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in one to prevail.

Benchmark Tech. Serv. v. Clocktower Shops, No. Cv95-0074300 (Feb. 29, 1996) · filed 1996-02-29

Plaintiff has failed to prove that defendant engaged in an unfair trade practice given the facts of this case, Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110b , and therefore; judgment on Count Two is for defendant.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, measured under the cigarette rule.

Meehan v. Yale New Haven Hospital, No. Cv95 032 04 18s (Mar. 12, 1996) · filed 1996-03-12(a)

General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall CT Page 1902 engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Id. The issue of whether an act or practice is unfair in violation of CUTPA is determined by applying the so-called cigarette rule, which asks: "(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it caused substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businessmen]." Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, 230 Conn. 486 , 522 , 646 A.2d 1289 (1994). ... Absent facts sufficient to demonstrate that public policy, as established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise, has been violated, the plaintiff cannot meet the first prong of the cigarette test. Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, supra, 230 Conn. 522 . Furthermore, although the plaintiff may have alleged facts sufficient to meet the second prong of the cigarette test, the plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish that he was a consumer, competitor or other businessman, who was substantially injured, as required by the third prong of the cigarette test. Id. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike the second count of the plaintiff's complaint is granted.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Dowcom, Inc. v. Rock, No. Cv 95-0468035s (May 16, 1996) · filed 1996-05-16(a)

The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110b (a), provides in relevant part: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." ... The plaintiffs' complaint fails to plead all three elements of the cigarette rule which this court finds necessary in an underlying negligence cause of action. According to A-G Foods, Inc. and Gersich, supra, which this court adopts, this failure is fatal. Accordingly, the court grants the motion to strike counts thirteen through twenty-four.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce.

Frankel v. Gomes, No. Cv N.H. 9504-6819 (Jun. 3, 1996) · filed 1996-06-03(a)

CUTPA provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b (a). ... The Supreme Court views the scope of CUTPA claims in landlord-tenant ... transactions as limited to practices that offend public policy. ... This court finds that the second count of the first amended counterclaim does not allege that the landlords' failure to keep intruders off the premises offends public policy as embodied in a specific regulatory statute, or as recognized in the common law, or as embraced within some other established concept of fairness.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Mungham v. Prudential Home Mtge. Co., No. Cvbr 9603-03056 (Jul. 3, 1996) · filed 1996-07-03(a)

A proper CUTPA count should contain the following allegations; 1) A recitation of one of the three statutory prohibitions claimed under Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110b (a), i.e.; a) unfair methods of competition, or b) unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, or c) deceptive acts or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce.

The section prohibits practices that offend public policy, are immoral or unscrupulous, or cause substantial injury to consumers, competitors, or other businessmen.

Weber v. Air Express Int. Corp., No. Cv95 0142974 S (Jul. 17, 1996) · filed 1996-07-17

The defendant has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce, and a single act may support a CUTPA violation.

Cizynski v. Tartantino, No. Cv 950147496s (Jul. 19, 1996) · filed 1996-07-19(a)

The defendant also urges the court to consider that the allegation concerns the plaintiffs' failure to maintain the restaurant according to health, safety, and building codes applicable to it, which is a part of conducting the restaurant business, and that by misrepresenting the condition of the restaurant, they engaged in unfair and deceptive acts in the conduct trade or commerce. Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied.

Section 42-110b does not require proof of reliance, and unfairness may be established by one cigarette rule criterion.

Meyers v. Cornwell Quality Tools, Inc. · filed 1996-04-09

First, it is well established that “ ‘[t]he CUTPA plaintiff need not prove reliance or that the representation became part of the basis of the bargain.’ ” ... Second, “[a]ll three criteria [of the cigarette rule] do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three. Statement of Basis and Purpose, Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614 [and] 59,635 (1978).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ... We conclude therefore that the trial court did not improperly charge the jury on the CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110b requires a CUTPA violation to involve an unfair practice that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous and causes substantial consumer injury.

Dime Savings Bank v. Bonaventura, No. 123908 (Apr. 26, 1996) · filed 1996-04-26

The required elements for a CUTPA violation are as follows: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)]. Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 209 Conn. 243 , 254 , 550 A.2d 1061 (1988).

Section 42-110b(a) defines a CUTPA claim as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Yang v. Clemente, No. 32 25 98 (Sep. 12, 1996) · filed 1996-09-12(a)

The elements of a CUTPA claim are that the defendant has engaged in "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b (a); Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559 , 591 , 657 A.2d 212 (1995).

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce, and a breach of contract may support a CUTPA claim when accompanied by substantial aggravating circumstances.

Concom, Inc. v. Redmon Sport, Inc., No. Cv95 0147896 S (Sep. 26, 1996) · filed 1996-09-26(a)

General Statutes § 110b(a) provides that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." ... The conduct alleged could be sufficient to state a CUTPA violation were they made by the vendor, but as more fully discussed below, the person engaging in the practice was not the provider of goods or services. ... Accordingly, the to strike is granted.

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce and requires facts supporting a CUTPA claim.

Delaney v. Warren, No. 0126588 (Jun. 4, 1996) · filed 1996-06-04(a)

The plaintiffs have not properly alleged that the defendants' acts were deceptive or violations of public policy. ... In the operative complaint, the plaintiffs have not alleged any of the conduct found in the "cigarette rule." ... The plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead facts to support a CUTPA claim. ... the court therefore, grants the defendant's motion to strike counts two and five (#115) of the third amended complaint dated November 9, 1995.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce and evaluates unfairness under the cigarette rule.

Triangulum Assoc. v. Harrison Conf. Ctr., No. Cv91-009981s (Jul. 25, 1996) · filed 1996-07-25(a)

The third count of the cross claim sets forth Harrison's CUTPA claim. General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." ... Our Supreme Court has adopted the so-called "cigarette rule" used by the Federal Trade Commission to determine whether an act or practice is unfair within the meaning of CUTPA. ... To find unfairness within the meaning of CUTPA, three tests must be satisfied. The injury must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it must be an injury that the consumer could not reasonably have avoided. ... Because the injury could have reasonably been avoided by Harrison, the court finds that the Bank did not act unfairly in terminating the Agreement. The court finds no merit to Harrison's CUTPA claim and finds for the Bank on the second count of the cross claim.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce and does not generally prohibit contractually authorized termination or refusal to perform after a failed condition precedent.

Nobay v. Dartmouth Medical School · filed 1996-11-05(a)

CUTPA prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110b(a). In determining whether an act or practice is "unfair" and in violation of the Act, a court must examine "(1) [W]hether the practice ... offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise ...; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers." Saturn Construction Co., Inc. v. Premier Roofing Co., Inc., 238 Conn. 293, 310, 680 A.2d 1274, 1283 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Jacobs v. Healey Ford-Subaru, Inc., 231 Conn. 707, 725, 652 A.2d 496, 505 (1995). The termination of a contract as authorized by the contract does not generally violate CUTPA. See McKeown Distributors, Inc. v. Gyp-Crete Corp., 618 F.Supp. 632, 643-44 (D.Conn.1985). Since a contracting party has the right to refuse to perform if the other party fails to satisfy a contractual condition precedent, see Christophersen v. Blount, 216 Conn. 509, 512, 582 A.2d 460, 462 (1990), such a refusal does not violate CUTPA.

Section 42-110b requires proof that an unfair or deceptive act occurred in trade or commerce and caused injury the plaintiff could not reasonably have avoided.

Schlesinger v. Prokopis, No. Cv 930355034 (Dec. 6, 1996) · filed 1996-12-06

In order to establish a CUTPA claim, a party must prove that the act or practice complained of constituted an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b . ... Under the circumstances, the court finds that the injury suffered by the plaintiff — deprivation of his vehicle during the pendency of this action — was one that the plaintiff could have avoided, such that the third requirement for a CUTPA violation, as interpreted in Williams Ford Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co. , supra is not proven.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, and an innocent negligent misrepresentation alone does not satisfy CUTPA's cigarette rule.

Capitol Sweeping v. Superior Ground, No. Cv95-0128805 (Jan. 21, 1997) · filed 1997-01-21(a)

CUTPA provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b (a). In determining whether an act constitutes a violation of CUTPA, our Supreme court has adopted the criteria of the so-called "cigarette rule" employed by the federal trade commission. ... None of the prongs of the cigarette rule is satisfied by CIA's negligent misrepresentation. Accordingly, the court cannot find a CUTPA violation and judgment is entered for CIA on the third count of the complaint in the second action.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or business, and a single act can constitute a CUTPA violation.

Bonnell v. United Parcel Service, No. 315927 (Feb. 7, 1997) · filed 1997-02-07(a)

General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides in pertinent part that: "[n]o person shall engage in . . . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or [business]." "[A]n act or practice is deceptive if three requirements are met. First, there must be a representation, omission, or other practice likely to mislead consumers. Second, the consumers must interpret the message reasonably under the circumstances. Third, the misleading representation, omission, or practice must be material — that is, likely to affect consumer decisions or conduct." ... It appears to this court that the cases holding that a single act can constitute a CUTPA violation are better reasoned in light of principles of statutory construction and the remedial intent of the act. ... However, despite this fact or allegation, this court finds that the alleged misstatement made by the UPS clerk does not equate with a deceptive practice and, accordingly, does not find that the plaintiff has proven its claim under CUTPA.

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce and directs courts to use federal interpretations when construing that prohibition.

Torres v. Allen, No. Cvnh 96037424 (Feb. 18, 1997) · filed 1997-02-18(a) and (b)

General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b (b) provides: "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (a) of this section, the commissioner and the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1), as from time to time amended)." In accordance with this legislative intent, the Connecticut Supreme Court has "adopted the criteria set out in the `cigarette rule' by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: `(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common ... law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)].'"

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce.

Ricotta v. Drummond, No. 32 40 47 (Feb. 25, 1997) · filed 1997-02-25

Because the defendants have failed to allege that such representation by the plaintiff was false, this count of the counterclaim fails to allege either an unfair or a deceptive practice within the meaning of CUTPA, for the same reasons explained above for the amended second special defense.

Section 42-110b permits a deceptive practice claim when a business represents that required permits have been obtained and that representation reasonably misleads the plaintiff and materially affects its decisions.

Winsted Land Dev. v. Design Coll. Arch., No. Cv 96 0071571 (Jun. 2, 1997) · filed 1997-06-02

In the prior counts, the plaintiffs allege that on numerous occasions the defendants advised Winsted Development that all the necessary permits and approvals had been obtained and construction could begin. Such an allegation sufficiently alleges a deceptive practice under CUTPA. In viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that the plaintiffs alleged that they were mislead by the representation, that the plaintiffs reasonably understood the representation to mean that the defendants had obtained all the necessary permits and approvals and that construction could begin, and that the representation was material in that it affected the plaintiffs' decision to sell phase two of the contract to Wal-Mart.

Section 42-110b(d) treats CUTPA as remedial and supports liberal construction in favor of intended beneficiaries.

Daniels v. Anderson, No. 319593 (Feb. 3, 1997) · filed 1997-02-03(d)

This is so even though CUTPA "applies to a broad spectrum of commercial activity . . . is remedial in character; General Statutes § 42-110b (d); Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., 184 Conn. 607 , 615 n. 4, 440 A.2d 810 (1981); and must be liberally construed in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 212-213 , 680 A.2d 1243 (1996). ... However, the complaint is susceptible, with some implication, of a construction that the defendants accepted and retained premium payments for the new coverage which they failed to place. This would bring the case within the "cigarette rule" and would be an unfair practice.

Section 42-110b directs courts construing CUTPA to consider Connecticut precedent and federal court and Federal Trade Commission interpretations of § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Ballard v. Asset Recovery Management Co., No. Cv 93 0063755 (Feb. 7, 1997) · filed 1997-02-07(b)

Accordingly, whether the placement of the mortgage violates one of the three factors enumerated in the cigarette rule is a question of fact, which precludes the granting of summary judgment as to count three.

Section 42-110b permits a CUTPA claim based on an agent's alleged self-serving conduct to proceed as a question of fact.

Morande v. Golab Builders, No. Cv96 557190s (Mar. 3, 1997) · filed 1997-03-03

As to whether this course of conduct is a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CUTPA, General Statutes Sec. 42-110b is a question of fact. ... This court cannot and does not conclude that the fifth count fails to set forth a cause of action under CUTPA as concerns the agent.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices, and conduct establishing tortious interference with business relationships can violate it.

Elliott v. Staron, No. Cv89 25 77 80s (Jul. 29, 1997) · filed 1997-07-29(a)

The facts supporting the court’s conclusion that the defendant tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs’ business relationships are sufficient to establish that the defendant also engaged in unfair or deceptive acts in violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110b(a) covers a seller’s encroachment on contracted property, reference to a nonexistent map, subdivision despite a sale contract, and mortgage of the property.

Levesque Builders, Inc. v. Hoerle · filed 1998-08-11(a)

In the memorandum of decision, the trial court clearly determined that the defendant had violated CUTPA “by encroaching on the property subject to the first contract, by referring to a nonexistent map in the second contract, by proceeding to subdivide the property when he knew he had contracted to sell it to the plaintiff and by placing a mortgage on the property.” Our review of the whole record confirms that the evidence presented at trial supports this finding.

Section 42-110b does not support an unfair trade practices verdict based on alleged wrongful interference when the evidence fails to establish the underlying misconduct, causation, and damages.

Par Painting v. Greenhorne O'mara, No. Cv 95 0545342s (Oct. 21, 1998) · filed 1998-10-21

Since the unfair trade practice claimed against the defendants was their alleged wrongful interference with the plaintiff's work, the evidence as to the CUTPA count suffered from the same deficiencies as did the evidence as to tortious interference and the verdict on the CUTPA count, Count Three, is also ordered set aside.

Section 42-110b(b) directs courts evaluating unfairness under CUTPA to use the criteria applied under Section 5 of the FTC Act.

Bristol Technology, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 1998-12-30(b)

Although this case concerned Section 5 of the FTC Act rather than CUTPA, essentially the same criteria have been used under both statutes to evaluate whether an act is "unfair.”

Section 42-110b does not support an unfair trade practices claim based on an injury the consumer could reasonably have avoided by hiring independent counsel.

Federal National Mtge. Assn. v. Jessup, No. Cv 98 0169417 S (Aug. 3, 1999) · filed 1999-08-03

The defendant could have, therefore, easily avoided the injury she is claiming by hiring her own attorney. As such, the defendant has no viable CUTPA action against Progressive and consequently the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to strike the fifth count of the counterclaim sounding in CUTPA is granted.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce; a claim fails without evidence of such conduct or a violation of public policy.

Walsh v. Seaboard Surety Co. · filed 2000-02-07(a)

To prevail on a claim of a CUTPA violation, plaintiffs must prove that Seaboard, while acting in trade or commerce, engaged in unfair or deceptive acts that caused plaintiffs to suffer an ascertainable loss. Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 42-110b(a) & 42-110g(a). ... As discussed above, no evidence indicates that Seaboard acted deceptively or unfairly. Additionally, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Seaboard’s conduct violates some public policy concern. Summary judgment will enter on plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits deceptive practices in trade or commerce, including a pattern of deception concerning patent rights under a consulting contract.

Carlyle Johnson Machine Co., LLC v. April, No. Cv97-0481243s (Feb. 10, 2000) · filed 2000-02-10(a)

"No person shall engage in . . . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b (a). ... As demonstrated in the discussion above of count one, Edward April engaged in just such deceptive practices in this case.

Section 42-110b(a) requires an unfair or deceptive practice in trade or commerce; an unsupported belief about how a lease charge would be paid does not establish one.

Hildabrand v. DiFeo Partnership, Inc. · filed 2000-03-01(a)

To prevail on a claim of a CUTPA violation, plaintiff must prove that defendants, while acting in trade or commerce, engaged in unfair or deceptive acts that caused plaintiff to suffer an ascertainable loss. Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 42-110b(a) & 42-110g(a). ... No evidence indicates that plaintiff was deceived into believing that the excess mileage charge would be incorporated into her lease payments for the 1998 Honda Civic. Accordingly, no evidence demonstrates that defendants acted unfairly or violated some public policy concern. Summary judgment will enter on plaintiffs CUTPA claim in favor of the defendants.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair trade practices; a claimant may establish unfairness through conduct that offends public policy, is immoral or unscrupulous, or causes substantial injury.

Hemingway v. Gem Chevrolet, Inc., No. Cv-96-0062116 (May 18, 2000) Roger H. Hemingway And, Marilyn E. Hemingway v. Gem C · filed 2000-05-18(a)

The court finds that the plaintiffs have not proven by a fair preponderance of credible, persuasive evidence that the acts complained of offend public policy, or are immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous. Additionally, the court finds that the evidence presented does not prove that the plaintiffs sustained any substantial injury that was not outweighed by countervailing benefits received.

An inadvertent, isolated error in a repossession notice does not violate the prohibition on unfair trade practices absent evidence of deliberate or unscrupulous conduct.

Hunter v. American Honda Finance, No. Cv 99 0587409 (Apr. 3, 2000) · filed 2000-04-03

The actions of the defendant, however, must be more than inadvertent in order to qualify for a CUTPA violation. This court has no evidence before it that the sending of this letter with the incorrect demand for the accelerated amount and for the expenses and costs of retaking is other than an inadvertence. There is no evidence that it was either deliberate or that it was more than an isolated incident. Without a showing of an intent to defraud, this court cannot say that the actions of the defendant offend public policy and or that such action was immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous.

A claim under § 42-110b(a) need not allege consumer injury when the alleged practice satisfies other unfairness criteria.

Consumer Incentive v. Memberworks, No. Cv99 036 26 55 S (Apr. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-04-25(a)

Since all three criteria do not need to be satisfied, CISI need not allege injury to a consumer.

A seller who removes promised items before delivering a yacht commits an unfair act under CUTPA.

Urich v. Fish, No. 360659 (Nov. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-11-27

The Third Count of the counterclaim presents a CUTPA question. Did Urich's removal of the items in question prior to delivery of the yacht constitute a CUTPA violation? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. Urich's action here is a prime example of the conduct which CUTPA seeks to remedy.

Section 42-110b does not impose liability for a contractor's conduct that is not immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.

Pendarvis v. Harrison, No. Cv 98-0408681s (Mar. 7, 2001) · filed 2001-03-07

There was no immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous conduct of any kind by the defendant so that there is no violation of CUTPA.

Improper conduct may violate § 42-110b even if it does not amount to tortious interference, but a claim fails when the evidence shows no improper conduct.

Par Painting, Inc. v. Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. · filed 2001-01-09(a)

We note here that improper conduct that does not rise to the level of tortious interference may, nonetheless, constitute a CUTPA violation. ... As we explained in part I of this opinion, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the Greenhome & O’Mara, Inc., inspectors did anything at all improper.

Section 42-110b does not generally require a separate duty for a CUTPA violation, but when the alleged violation is inaction, courts consider whether the defendant had an obligation to act.

Downes-Patterson Corp. v. First National Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 2001-07-24(a)

The plaintiffs are correct in pointing out that, as a general matter, the existence of a duty is not a prerequisite to a finding of a CUTPA violation. Where a plaintiff alleges that a defendant’s passive conduct violates CUTPA, however, common sense dictates that a court should inquire whether the defendant was under any obligation to do what it refrained from doing.

Section 42-110b(a) requires courts to balance the criteria for an unfair trade practice; an ACPA violation alone does not establish a CUTPA violation.

Prime Publishers, Inc. v. American-Republican, Inc. · filed 2001-08-07(a)

Moreover, there is no evidence of a substantial injury to consumers or to the Plaintiff. Balancing all three criteria, we find no CUTPA violation.

Section 42-110b(a) requires a factual predicate for a claimed unfair or deceptive act or practice.

Gomes v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 2001-11-20(a)

Having determined that the conduct of the desk clerk was not actionable under either an intentional tort or negligence theory, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim similarly must fail because the factual predicate of the claimed unfair or deceptive act or practice, as required by General Statutes § 42-110b (a), does not exist.

Diverting an employer's customers and equipment while secretly establishing a competing business violates § 42-110b(a)'s prohibition on unfair competition and deceptive practices.

Smith v. Snyder, No. Cv99-0362743-S (Dec. 14, 2001) · filed 2001-12-14(a)

It is clear from the facts of this case that the defendants engaged in unfair methods of competition as evidenced by their diversion of the plaintiffs' customers and the welding machine. Further, the defendants acted in a deceptive manner in establishing a competing business while feigning loyalty to the plaintiffs' company.

Allegations of tortious interference involving immoral or unscrupulous means can state a claim under § 42-110b.

First Fairfield Funding v. Ssmln, No. X06-Cv-00-0167489s (Jan. 15, 2002) · filed 2002-01-15

However, the allegations contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the second count and incorporated in the CUTPA claim (ninth count) invoke the concepts of morality, ethics and oppressive or unscrupulous means, the very same questions CUTPA was designed to remedy.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce.

Barbour v. Dow Corning Corp., No. X06-Cv-93-0301054s (Apr. 19, 2002) · filed 2002-04-19(a)

It is difficult to imagine how the "prior manufacturer of a product" might fit under this definition of trade or commerce, and thus be subject to the prohibitions of General Statutes § 42-110b (a) relating to unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of such trade or commerce.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Marrero v. Yale University, No. Cv 00-0442920 S (Apr. 30, 2002) Ct Page 4914 · filed 2002-04-30(a)

General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Connecticut courts have adopted "the criteria set out in the `cigarette rule' by the federal trade ... commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Electric Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co. , 250 Conn. 334 , 368 , 736 A.2d 824 (1999). Contrary to what the plaintiff claims, the defendant's evidence demonstrates that it was requiring the plaintiff to repay the amount the plaintiff owed the defendant, and, that in doing so, it followed procedures used for all students who have outstanding balances with Yale prior to graduating. Furthermore, by following such procedures, evidence indicates that the defendant was protecting itself from students who might graduate without settling their accounts. There is no evidence to indicate the defendant's actions would "offend public policy," were "immoral, unethical, unscrupulous or oppressive," or that the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff "substantial injury." Id. The plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the defendant's actions constituted a CUTPA violation. Summary judgment is granted as to count two.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair trade practices, including violations of the Home Improvement Act deemed unfair or deceptive under § 20-427(c).

Ciuffi v. Jerolman, No. Cv 01 0449452 S (May 16, 2002) · filed 2002-05-16(a)

In finding that the plaintiff violated the Home Improvement Act, the plaintiff has also engaged in an unfair trade practice pursuant to General Statutes § 20-427 (c) and 42-110b (a).

Section 42-110b bars unfair trade practices, including practices that meet the applicable unfairness criteria or constitute an actual deceptive practice.

Diversified Group v. Damman Ins. Assoc., No. X05cv010185925s (Jul. 12, 2002) · filed 2002-07-12(a)

The court finds that Damman did not violate the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b (a) et seq. ... Based on the above findings, the court finds that none of the criteria has been met for a CUTPA violation.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in conducting trade or business.

De La Concha v. Aetna Life Insurance, No. Cv 98-0580129 (Aug. 23, 2002) · filed 2002-08-23(a)

The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition in an unfair or deception acts or practice in the conduct of any trade or business." General Statutes § 42-110b (a). ... Thus, the court concludes the plaintiff has failed to establish that Aetna engaged in any acts that were unlawful, that offended public policy as established by statutes or common law, or were immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.

A CUTPA claim fails when the alleged conduct shows no deceptive, immoral, or oppressive practice, no violation of public policy, and no substantial consumer injury.

Zayas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, No. Cv 02-0812727 (Sep. 24, 2002) · filed 2002-09-24

In the present case, the facts alleged by the plaintiff do not support a cause of action for a violation of CUTPA. ... The actions of the defendant do not rise to the level of immoral or oppressive. Moreover, the plaintiff fails to allege how the defendant's conduct violates public policy. ... Furthermore, the allegations fail to support a showing of substantial injury to the plaintiff as a consumer. Accordingly, the motion to strike count three of the revised complaint is also granted.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce.

Connecticut Elec. v. Fidelity Guaranty, No. Cv00-0274893-S (Oct. 24, 2002) · filed 2002-10-24(a)

The court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding by the court that the defendants, Fidelity and Butler, engaged in "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b (a). Accordingly, the court dismisses count three of the complaint as to both Butler and Fidelity.

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce.

United States Ex Rel. Polied Environmental Services, Inc. v. Incor Group, Inc. · filed 2002-12-31

Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff is not precluded from asserting a CUTPA claim for defendants’ alleged violation of the Miller Act. ... Finally, Greenwich and USF & G argue that plaintiff may not allege a CUT-PA violation against them without first alleging a violation of CUIPA. We disagree. While a violation of CUIPA may constitute a violation of CUTPA, we have found no authority to support the proposition that a surety, which is also an insurance company, can only be sued under CUTPA for CUIPA violations. ... Therefore, we deny defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II of plaintiffs amended complaint.

Section 42-110b uses the cigarette rule criteria to determine whether conduct is an unfair trade practice, including immorality, oppression, unscrupulousness, or substantial consumer injury.

Leviness v. Klebe Fuel Co., No. Cv 02 0087327s (Jan. 13, 2003) · filed 2003-01-13

As to the second ground, however, the court must deny the motion to strike, because it must construe the allegations of a CUPTA violation in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff. "In determining whether certain acts constitute a violation of this act, we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission . . . (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 232 Conn. 559 , 591 (1995). Here a review of the allegation shows that the plaintiff has pleaded that the failure to register its trade name and to obtain a permit prior to the work caused substantial injury and has pleaded the other necessary elements.

Section 42-110b(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce and uses the cigarette rule to identify unfair practices.

Rees v. Flaherty, No. Cv01 0077316 (Feb. 6, 2003) · filed 2003-02-06(a)

"General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides that `[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.' `[I]n determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [competitors or other businessmen] . . . All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo , 50 Conn. App. 767 , 785-86 , 720 A.2d 242 (1998)." ... The allegations of the revised complaint do not meet this standard. There is no allegation that the Defendant held herself out as operating a licensed kennel or that her trade name was registered and in this manner unfairly induced the Plaintiff to leave her dog with the Defendant. Therefore the Motion to Strike Count Five as well as the accompanying claim for attorneys fees in Paragraph 3 of the Claim for Relief is granted.

Section 42-110b(a) covers fraudulent misrepresentations that induce a party to defer enforcing contractual rights and cause an ascertainable loss.

Production Resour. v. Dist. Media, No. X06-Cv-01-0170391 S (Feb. 25, 2003) · filed 2003-02-25(a)

In this case, however, PRG has alleged a pattern of misrepresentation that induced PRG to further contract with the corporate defendants and delay litigation, all of which actions potentially constitute unfair business practices in violation of public policy. The allegations contained in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the amended complaint, reciting representations by Parrella, take this case, and specifically the first count, out of the realm of a simple breach of contract dispute. Instead, the court finds that the first count claims damages as a result of fraudulent misrepresentations to induce a party to defer enforcement of its contractual rights. When it is alleged that such misrepresentations resulted in the loss of an opportunity to recover against corporate assets, such alleged conduct is sufficient to state a claim under CUTPA. The alleged delay occasioned by such alleged misrepresentations by Parrella also is sufficient to articulate a substantial ascertainable injury. The motion to strike the first count is denied.

Section 42-110b prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce and requires facts showing that the challenged conduct is unfair or deceptive.

Channer v. Channel Three News, No. 559328 (May 21, 2002) · filed 2002-05-21(a)

General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." ... A review of the complaint reveals that the plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support that the defendants conduct was unfair and deceptive as necessary to support a violation of CUTPA.

Section 42-110b defines CUTPA violations to include deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Pereira v. Maresca, No. Cv00 037 80 76 (Jun. 4, 2002) · filed 2002-06-04

Since CUTPA violations are defined in General Statutes § 42-110b to include deceptive acts of practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, it is evident that the legislature intended that the perpetrators of such fraudulent practices, as well as other CUTPA violators, should be permitted to avail themselves of the statute of limitations defense provided by § 42-110g (f).

Section 42-110b can apply to a single unfair or deceptive act by commercial real estate agents when it violates public policy.

Kane v. Neveleff, No. Cv 00-0439308 S (Jul. 11, 2002) · filed 2002-07-11

The court finds that in this instance CUTPA can apply to the home purchase transaction involving the defendant real estate agent Bello and her principal real estate agency, A-Dan Realty. Accordingly, the motion to strike Counts VII and X of the plaintiffs' complaint alleging CUTPA violations is hereby denied.