Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183

Section 4-183(j) requires a person seeking reversal for an agency’s procedural error to show prejudice to substantial rights.

Scott v. Commr. of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv 95 012 72 56 (Feb. 26, 1996) · filed 1996-02-26(j)

It is fundamental that a party must demonstrate that some prejudice resulted from the procedural flaw. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides, in part, that "(t)he court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . (3) made upon unlawful procedure [or] . . . (4) affected by other error of law . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Section 4-183(j) permits reversal based on a hearing officer's ruling only when the ruling prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Joyell v. Commissioner of Education, No. Cv 95 55 27 59 (May 16, 1996) · filed 1996-05-16(j)

A ruling by a hearing officer during an administrative hearing may be the basis for reversing the agency's final decision only if "substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced" as a result. General Statutes § 4-183 (j). Jutkowitz v. Department of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86 , 94 (1991). The court finds that the plaintiff has suffered no such prejudice as a result of the hearing officer's rulings with respect to the documents in question in this case.

Section 4-183(j) requires an appellant seeking reversal for an agency procedural error to show material prejudice.

A-1 Auto Service v. Dept. of M. Veh., No. Cv 96 055 85 49 (Jul. 18, 1996) · filed 1996-07-18(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . (3) made upon unlawful procedure . . . ." In order to obtain reversal of an agency's decision on that basis, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it suffered "material prejudice as a result of this alleged procedural deficiency." Jutkowitz v. Department of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86 , 94 (1991). ... If the hearing officer failed to label some subordinate conclusions as such or failed to state some subordinate conclusions explicitly, the plaintiff has not demonstrated any material prejudice as a result.

Section 4-183(j) requires a person seeking reversal for an agency procedural deficiency to show material prejudice.

Porcello v. Commissioner of Motor Veh., No. Cv 96 056 53 62 (Mar. 3, 1997) · filed 1997-03-03(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . made upon unlawful procedure." (Emphasis added.) ... Since the videotape could not have recorded the events that gave rise to the probable cause, the plaintiff was not materially prejudiced by the failure to present it at the hearing.

Section 4-183(j) requires the court to affirm an agency decision unless the appellant shows prejudice to substantive rights.

Book v. Foic, No. Cv97 0567176 (Jan. 28, 1998) · filed 1998-01-28(j)

Plaintiff points out correctly that the FOIC failed to file an answer in this action, but he in no way points out how this is in any prejudices plaintiff. There is no dispute of plaintiff's aggrievement asserted by the FOIC. Pursuant to § 4-183 (j) "the court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds substantive rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced . . . ."

Section 4-183(j)(3) requires material prejudice before a court may sustain an administrative appeal based on procedural errors.

Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, No. Cv96 033 01 76 (Sep. 2, 1997) · filed 1997-09-02(j)(3)

Even assuming that the commission committed every one of the procedural errors complained of by Merchant, the court will not sustain this appeal on that basis because Merchant has failed to show that any procedural errors resulted in material prejudice to his case.

Section 4-183(j) permits a court to overturn an agency decision only if the error prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights; hearsay evidence caused no prejudice when the appellant did not dispute its accuracy.

Almonte v. Blumenthal, No. Cv97 0572948 S (Feb. 25, 1998) · filed 1998-02-25(j)

The court under the UAPA may only overturn an agency's decision if "substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced. . . ." If plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of the agency's documentary evidence, then no prejudice exists from its hearsay nature.

Section 4-183(j) requires an appellant to show prejudice from an alleged constitutional violation.

Martinez v. O'meara, No. Cv97 0572386 (Apr. 27, 1998) · filed 1998-04-27(j)

Under General Statutes § 4-183 (j), the plaintiff must show he was prejudiced by this alleged constitutional violation. The record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the method of assessing retardation.

Section 4-183(j) requires an appellant to show prejudice to substantial rights before obtaining relief for an agency's failure to respond to a motion to correct.

Lombardi v. State, Department of Labor, No. Cv97 0571166 (Jul. 9, 1998) · filed 1998-07-09(j)

The plaintiff fails to establish how the failure to respond to the motion to correct prejudices his substantial rights, which the court must find to affirm an appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183 (j) requires the court to affirm an agency decision unless it finds that the decision prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Pomarico's Service v. Dep't of M. Vehicles, No. Cv96 0380775 (Jul. 27, 1998) · filed 1998-07-27(j)

Pursuant to the UAPA, "[t]he court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced. . . ." General Statutes § 4-183 (j). The plaintiff does not articulate any right which was compromised, or any theory under which its conduct could be found to be proper.

Section 4-183(j) requires a showing that an alleged defect in an agency order prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Dillon v. Department of Public Health, No. Cv97 0570364 (Sep. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-09-30(j)

The plaintiff who was in contact with the Hartford Health Department failed to show how the alleged illegibility of her copy of the order prejudiced her substantial rights. See General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183 requires an appellant challenging agency hearing procedures to show that those procedures substantially prejudiced its rights.

Local 1042 v. Norwalk Board of Education, No. Cv98 0578335 (Nov. 23, 1998) · filed 1998-11-23(j)

The Court under the UAPA, § 4-183 ; "shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced . . ." The plaintiff has failed to show how the procedures followed substantially prejudiced its rights.

Section 4-183(g) requires a procedural error to prejudice a substantial right before it can justify overturning an agency decision.

Jones v. State Dept. of Adm. Serv., No. Cv 98 049 2716 (Feb. 3, 1999) · filed 1999-02-03(g)

The plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the Commissioner's testimony was material concerning a layoff which was in effect dictated by staffing reductions mandated by the Office of Policy and Management. Deputy Commissioner Mazzola testified for the Department and the process by which the plaintiff's position was selected for elimination. A procedural error must result in prejudice to a substantial right to overturn an administrative decision under the UAPA. See General Statutes § 4-183 (g); Fromer v. Boyer-Napert Partnership, 42 Conn. Sup. 57 , affirmed, 26 Conn. App. 185 (1990).

Section 4-183(j) requires a person seeking to overturn an agency decision for procedural errors to show prejudice to substantial rights.

Merchant v. State Ethics Commission · filed 1999-06-22(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that “[t]he court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that the substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ... (3) made upon unlawful procedure . . . .” ... Even assuming that the commission committed all of the procedural errors alleged, the plaintiff failed to show that his substantial rights were prejudiced by the actions of the commission.

Section 4-183(j) requires a court to affirm an agency decision unless an error prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

Gillogly v. Commissioner of D. M. v. No. Cv 99 0494641s (Aug. 3, 1999) · filed 1999-08-03(j)

The agency decision under the UAPA must be affirmed unless the substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced. Ms. Gillogly had no right to have the bus driver's statements to the police officer redacted or excluded from the record.

Section 4-183(j) permits an administrative appeal to be sustained only if the agency action prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Wallingford Police Union v. Wallingford, No. Cv 99 0494272s (Sep. 21, 1999) · filed 1999-09-21(j)

Pursuant to the UAPA, an appeal may only be sustained if substantial rights of the plaintiff have been prejudiced by the agency action. See General Statutes § 4-183 (j). In that the Labor Board decision would have been the same whatever the constables' employment status, the Union was not prejudiced by the preclusion of an opportunity to present evidence on the constables' employment status.

Section 4-183(j) requires prejudice to substantial rights before an evidentiary error warrants setting aside an agency decision.

Cooper v. Commission on Human Rght., No. Cv 99 0496223 (Oct. 23, 2000) · filed 2000-10-23(j)

The court does not find that the substantial rights of the plaintiffs have been prejudice. The hearing officer referenced a black roommate in the background portion of his decision and did not rely on this fact in reaching his conclusion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint.

Section 4-183(j) requires prejudice before a court may reverse an agency decision for a procedural error.

Fromer v. Commissioner of Dept. of Env., No. Cv 00 0499825s (May 1, 2001) · filed 2001-05-01(j)

Without prejudice, the court cannot reverse the Commissioner's determination.

Section 4-183(i) requires a court to affirm an agency decision despite an unlawful procedure unless the procedure prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Keklik v. State, No. Cv 99 0498295s (Apr. 5, 2001) · filed 2001-04-05(i)

The UAPA provides: "The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings . . . are . . . made upon unlawful procedure. . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-183 (i). ... As such, even if written notification of the hearing decision was not provided within 60 days of the plaintiff's request for a fair hearing, no substantial rights of the plaintiff were prejudiced. Accordingly, the agency's determination must be affirmed.

Section 4-183(j) requires a court to affirm an agency decision despite an unlawful procedure unless the procedure prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

Pettway v. State, No. Cv 99 0498296s (Apr. 5, 2001) · filed 2001-04-05(j)

The UAPA provides: "The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings . ., are . ., made upon unlawful procedure. . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-183 (j). 4 In the present case, the defendant issued a stay of the disqualification, which allowed the plaintiff to continue to participate in the WIC program during the hearing process. As such, even if written notification of the hearing decision was not provided within 60 days of the plaintiffs request for a fair hearing, no substantial rights of the plaintiff were prejudiced. Accordingly, the agency's determination must be affirmed.

Section 4-183(j) requires a plaintiff to show that an agency error prejudiced substantial rights before a court may sustain an administrative appeal.

Scinto v. Ct Fire Protection, No. Cv 00 0500854s (May 1, 2001) · filed 2001-05-01(j)

Assuming arguendo that these records were inadmissible and therefore should not have been relied on by the Board, the court, under the UAPA, would still have to find that the substantial rights of the plaintiff have been prejudiced by the agency in order to sustain the plaintiffs appeal. ... Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to show prejudice or that there was not substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusions.

Section 4-183(j) requires an appellant to show prejudice or harm from an alleged administrative error to prevail.

Guarco v. State D.P.H., No. Cv 01-0510064 S (Feb. 27, 2002) · filed 2002-02-27(j)

Further, even assuming that the hearing officer in this case erroneously relied on the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer CT Page 2129 in Guarco I , the plaintiff cannot show any prejudice or harm, which is required for him to prevail. See General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183(j) requires a finding that agency action prejudiced an appellant’s substantial rights before a court may sustain an appeal.

P.D. Chief v. New Haven Foic, No. Cv 02-0514313 S (Oct. 31, 2002) · filed 2002-10-31(j)

Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (j), a finding by the court that substantial rights of an appellant have been prejudiced by agency action is a prerequisite to sustaining an appeal.

Section 4-183(j) requires a party challenging an agency decision to show that an agency error prejudiced its substantial rights. A licensee given a hearing and an opportunity to show compliance well before the final decision cannot establish prejudice from the procedural error.

Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp. v. Department of Public Utility Control · filed 2004-08-31(j)

As we previously have noted in this opinion, the complaining party bears the burden of demonstrating that its substantial rights were prejudiced by the administrative agency’s error. See General Statutes § 4-183 (j); ... When a procedural error has occurred, but a licensee has had an opportunity to offer evidence at a hearing militating against an agency’s adverse action, and has had an opportunity to show compliance “well in advance” of an agency’s final determination, no such prejudice results.

Section 4-183(j) permits reversal or modification of an agency decision for a notice error only if the appellant shows substantial prejudice.

Jones v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board · filed 2011-06-21(j)

“Judicial review of an administrative decision is a creature of statute . . . and [§ 4-183 Q)] permits modification or reversal of an agency’s decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; ... The complaining party has the burden of demonstrating that its substantial rights were prejudiced by the error.” ... We therefore conclude that the plaintiff has not established that he was substantially prejudiced by the slight variance between the statement of charges and the defendant’s findings.

Section 4-183(j) requires an appellant to show substantial prejudice from an agency decision before a court may reverse or modify it.

SGRITTA v. Commissioner of Public Health · filed 2012-02-21(j)

We agree with the trial court that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they were substantially prejudiced, under § 4-183 (j), by the hearing officer’s determination that she did not have jurisdiction over three of the citations.

Section 4-183(j) requires an appellant seeking reversal for an agency’s procedural error to show prejudice to substantial rights; the appellant ordinarily bears that burden.

Matthew M. v. Department of Children & Families · filed 2013-07-09(j)

“Judicial review of an administrative decision is a creature of statute . . . and [General Statutes § 4-183 (j)] permits modification or reversal of an agency’s decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error or law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” ... Because the plaintiff is not alleging a violation of § 4-181, we conclude that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove prejudice.

Section 4-183(j) requires a party seeking reversal for an agency procedural error to show that the error prejudiced its substantial rights.

Direct Energy Services, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority · filed 2023-07-04(j)

‘‘The complaining party has the burden of demonstrating that ... its substantial rights were prejudiced by the error.’’ ... On the basis of our examination of the record and the briefs, and our consideration of the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their procedural claims.

Section 4-183(j) requires an appellant seeking reversal for a procedural error to show that the error prejudiced substantial rights.

Hornish v. Suffield · filed 2025-07-29(j)

The complaining party has the burden of demonstrating that its substantial rights were prejudiced by the error. ... Because we reject the plaintiffs’ procedural challenges, we likewise reject their contention that the alleged errors resulted in substantial prejudice to the plaintiffs.

Section 4-183(g) bars a reviewing court from retrying a case or reweighing the evidence on factual questions.

Glenn v. Stop & Shop, Inc. · filed 1975-05-06(g)

The court does not retry the case nor substitute its judgment for that of the commissioner as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. General Statutes § 4-183 (g); Practice Book § 435.

Section 4-183(g) bars a reviewing court from retrying an agency case or substituting its judgment for the agency’s.

DiBenedetto v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles · filed 1975-06-17(g)

It is not the function of this court nor was it the function of the Court of Common Pleas to retry the case or substitute our or its judgment for that of the defendant.

Section 4-183(g) bars a reviewing court from retrying an agency case or substituting its judgment for the agency’s.

C & H ENTERPRISES, INC. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles · filed 1978-08-15(g)

Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant.

Section 4-183(g) calls for courts to give considerable weight to agency factual and discretionary determinations while deciding questions of law themselves.

Real Estate Listing Service, Inc. v. Connecticut Real Estate Commission · filed 1979-09-11(g)

Although the factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies are to be given considerable weight by the courts; see General Statutes § 4-183 (g); ... it is for the courts, and not for administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law.

Section 4-183(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of testimony about questions of fact.

Board of Education v. Connecticut State Board of Education · filed 1980-02-26(g)

The director of the Center testified with respeet to the program, however, and for the Court of Common Pleas to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of this testimony on questions of fact would be in clear contravention of General Statutes §4-183 (g).

Section 4-183(g) leaves credibility and the weight of evidence to the agency factfinder.

Howell v. Administrator · filed 1978-04-04(g)

A fact is not proven merely because a claimant testifies to it and no one denies it, for it is the province of the referee as trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. General Statutes § 4-183 (g); Practice Book § 435; Guevara v. Administrator, 172 Conn. 492, 495, 374 A.2d 1101.

Section 4-183(g) precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of the evidence.

Hospital of St. Raphael v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care · filed 1980-11-11(g)

The trial court recognized that in reviewing the commission’s action it was precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. General Statutes § 4-183 (g). ... But that conclusion was for the commission to reach. Its contrary conclusion is not subject to judicial reversal on the facts of this case.

Section 4-183(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence about factual questions.

Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Utilities Control Authority · filed 1981-02-13(g)

A reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Subsection (g) limits judicial review of agency decisions: a court may not retry the facts or substitute its judgment for the agency’s.

Buckley v. Muzio · filed 1986-05-27(g)

“Judicial review of the commissioner’s action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (General Statutes, c. 54, §§ 4-166 through 4-189), and the scope of that review is very restricted. ... Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant.”

Section 4-183 (g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Clark v. Muzio · filed 1986-09-18(g)

This court, in its review of the agency’s decision, “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” General Statutes § 4-183 (g).

Section 4-183(g) requires courts reviewing administrative factfinding for substantial evidence to defer to the agency’s assessment of witness credibility, including expert testimony.

Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission · filed 1989-02-28(g)

The “substantial evidence” rule governs judicial review of administrative factfinding under General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-183 (g). ... In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by “substantial evidence,” a court must defer to the agency’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.

Section 4-183(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s reasonable exercise of discretion.

Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission · filed 1989-07-11(g)

It is axiomatic that the trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.

Section 4-183(g) limits judicial review of agency factfinding: courts may not retry the facts or substitute their judgment for the agency’s when substantial evidence supports its decision.

Intervale Homeowners Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Board · filed 1989-07-26(g)

Our assessment of the record leads us to conclude that, as to each of the avenues the plaintiffs would have had the board adopt, the board had substantial evidence before it to support its determinations. ... “With regard to questions of fact, it is neither the function of the trial court nor of this court ‘to retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.’ ... see General Statutes § 4-183 (g).”

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on questions of fact.

Caldor, Inc. v. Heslin · filed 1990-07-10(j)

We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the named defendant.

Section 4-183(g) limits judicial review of FOIC decisions: the court cannot find facts or substitute its discretion for the agency's.

Ottochian v. F. O. I. C., No. 0700494 (Feb. 21, 1991) · filed 1991-02-21(g)

Upon an appeal from a decision of the FOIC, the court cannot find facts nor can it substitute its discretion for that of the FOIC.

Section 4-183 limits judicial review of agency decisions: the court does not retry the case or substitute its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of evidence or questions of fact.

Ulmer v. Delponte, No. 51 56 35 (Jan. 30, 1992) · filed 1992-01-30(j)

In an appeal to the court under Connecticut General Statutes Section 4-183 , the court does not retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency factfinding: a court may not substitute its judgment for the agency's on the weight of the evidence.

Board of Trustees v. Foic, No. Cv91-503053 (Jun. 18, 1992) · filed 1992-06-18(j)

The scope of review is limited by Sec. 4-183 (j). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency (here the FOIC) as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j)(5) bars a reviewing court from reweighing an agency’s factual findings and permits reversal when substantial rights were prejudiced by findings clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Vicino v. Zoning Board of Appeals · filed 1992-08-04(j)(5)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (5) mandates that the trial court “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.”

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Paternostro v. Goldberg, No. Cv91 0517961s (Jul. 27, 1992) · filed 1992-07-27(j)

General Statutes Section 4-183 (j) provides the applicable standard of review: The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission · filed 1992-06-03(j)

“The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” General Statutes § 4-183 (j)- ... From our review we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the commission’s implicit finding that adequate provision for sewage disposal on the sixteen lots approved would be made when permits for the construction of residences on the lots are issued and that the subdivision as approved did not lack adequate “means of . . . sanitary sewage disposal,” as required by § 3 (e).

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions; a court may not retry factual issues or substitute its judgment for the agency’s.

Tomlinson v. Board of Education · filed 1993-07-27(j)

As under the prior statute, [t]he [reviewing] court may not retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. ... Applying these principles to the facts before us, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the factual findings and conclusions reached by the hearing officer are supported by the evidence and are legally correct.

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Bierce v. Comm. of Mental Retardation, No. Cv 93 052 72 80 (Jun. 1, 1994) · filed 1994-06-01(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... These familiar principles require the court to affirm the hearing officer's decision on the issue of the plaintiff's adaptive behavior.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of an agency decision: the court may not substitute its discretion for the agency's and may set aside a decision that is clearly erroneous and affects substantial rights.

Nassau Wood Indus. v. Plng./zng. Comm., No. Cv 92-0453643s (Jun. 17, 1994) · filed 1994-06-17(j)

It is, of course, well settled that in reviewing the commission's denial of the Nassau Wood site plan, the court is not permitted to substitute its discretion for the discretion conferred on the commission. Nor should the court engage in a "microscopic search for technical infirmities." McCrann v. Town Planning and Zoning Commission , 161 Conn. 65 , 71 (1971); General Statutes § 4-183 (j). ... Because the record does not support the commission's actions refusing the application due to size and height requirements, and because the regulations provide no guidance as to screening requirements in general industrial zones, it is the court's conclusion that the commission's denial of the application was clearly erroneous in view of the record, affecting substantial rights of Nassau Wood.

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Borsella v. Commissioner of Motor Veh., No. Cv 92 034 17 53 (Jun. 27, 1994) · filed 1994-06-27(f)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Almeida v. Freedom of Infor. Comm'n, No. Cv 93 070 46 27 (Jun. 24, 1994) · filed 1994-06-24(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Bridgeport Hos. v. Comm'n on H.R. Opp., No. Cv92 0299985 (Jan. 31, 1994) · filed 1994-01-31(j)

The court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." General Statutes § 4-183 (j) Lieberman v. Board of Labor Relations , 216 Conn. 253 , 261-62 (1990).

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Chiarenzelli v. Board of Firearms Per., No. Cv 93 013 26 41 (Jul. 11, 1994) · filed 1994-07-11(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

In judicial review under § 4-183, a court need not give its usual deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation when the agency has interpreted the statute inconsistently.

Glastonbury Education Ass'n v. Freedom of Information Commission · filed 1994-07-12(j)

Here, the FOIC has interpreted the statute in a manner inconsistent with its previous interpretation of the same statute. ... Therefore, we must determine, without our usual deference, whether arbitration proceedings held pursuant to General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (4) are subject to the FOIA.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions: a court may not reweigh factual evidence and must affirm unless a listed defect prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Comptroller v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, No. Cv93 0307378 (Jul. 18, 1994) · filed 1994-07-18(j)

The scope of judicial review in such an appeal is limited: The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(f) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Ward v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv 93 006 91 72 (Sep. 21, 1994) · filed 1994-09-21(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... Based on these familiar principles and the Appellate Court decisions cited above, the court concludes in this case that the hearing officer's admission of the police report containing the CT Page 9584 HGN test results, her consideration of that evidence and her finding that the police officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff were not unreasonable or in abuse of discretion.

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

La Penta v. Com. on Human Rts. Opp., No. Cv 93 052 40 17 (Oct. 19, 1994) · filed 1994-10-19(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

City of Norwich v. Occup. Safety, No. Cv 93 053 14 50 (Oct. 25, 1994) · filed 1994-10-25(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... The totality of this evidence was sufficient to support the commission's judgment that the city's failure was not simply negligent but was wilful, as that term is used in § 31-382 . Accordingly, the court cannot disturb that judgment.

Section 4-183(f) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Finder v. Dept. of Administrative Serv., No. Cv 93 052 37 39 (Oct. 28, 1994) · filed 1994-10-28(f)

The scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence and requires it to affirm an agency decision unless a specified error prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

Bristol Housing Aut. v. freedom/inf. Com., No. Cv 94-0460621s (Dec. 8, 1994) · filed 1994-12-08(j)

Under General Statutes § 1-21i (d), appeals from decisions of the FOI Commission are brought pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "UAPA"), as codified in Chapter 54 of the General Statutes, particularly § 4-183 (j) which provides that: The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact. ... Because the decision of the FOIC is reasonably supported by the evidence on record, the decision of the FOIC is affirmed, and the BHA's appeal is dismissed.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency action to whether the action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion.

Connecticut Bd., Med. v. Freedom, Info., No. Cv920509654 (Jan. 9, 1995) · filed 1995-01-09(j)

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but CT Page 927 may only determine whether, in light of the evidence in the record, the agency's action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of its discretion. Id.; General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Town of East Hampton v. Middlesex Hosp., No. Cv 93 007 00 42 (Jul. 18, 1994) · filed 1994-07-18(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Adler v. Conn. Medical Examining Board, No. Cv 93 070 42 37 (Jul. 29, 1994) · filed 1994-07-29(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(f) bars a court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Torres v. Commissioner, Motor Vehicles, No. Cv 93 070 47 36 (Jul. 25, 1994) · filed 1994-07-25(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence on factual questions and requires it to uphold agency findings supported by substantial evidence.

Department of Lbr. v. Freedom of Info., No. Cv 93 070 46 80 (Oct. 12, 1994) · filed 1994-10-12(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." The court must affirm the decision of the agency unless it finds that the decision was "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." ... In the present case, the uncontradicted evidence summarized above was sufficient to support the commission's finding of fact with respect to Brey's status when he requested the information in question.

Section 4-183(f) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing the evidence behind an agency's factual finding.

Scinto v. Rowe, No. Cv 93 030 89 73 (Jan. 23, 1995) · filed 1995-01-23(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... These familiar principles dictate that the court may not disturb the fair hearing officer's finding of fact with respect to the nature of the care that Dennis Scinto provided to his mother while living with her prior to her institutionalization.

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Cannata v. Comm'r of Envt'l Protection, No. Cv930520419 (Jan. 30, 1995) · filed 1995-01-30(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... The court finds that in light of the evidence concerning the plaintiffs' proposed tree cutting, the commissioner's findings and conclusions were not unreasonable.

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Commissioner of Lbr. v. Occu. Saf./hlth., No. Cv 93 053 10 37 (Feb. 9, 1995) · filed 1995-02-09(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... In this case, the court examined the administrative record and determined that there was ample and substantial evidence to support the commission's findings of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence on factual questions and requires it to uphold an agency finding supported by substantial evidence.

Bennett v. Commissioner, Motor Vehicles, No. Cv940705079 (Mar. 24, 1995) · filed 1995-03-24(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or interfering with an agency's supported factfinding.

Fay v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv 94 070 55 05 (Feb. 14, 1995) · filed 1995-02-14(j)

In accordance with § 4-183 (j), the court may not interfere with that factfinding process.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Woodmancy v. Commissioner of Motor Veh., No. Cv940705159 (Feb. 28, 1995) · filed 1995-02-28(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... The court may not disturb such a finding.

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Williams v. Bd. of Firearms Per. Exmrs., No. Cv 94 035 80 71 (Jul. 11, 1995) · filed 1995-07-11(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the: agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... In accordance with the principles of administrative law summarized above, the court cannot disturb the board's finding in that regard.

Section 4-183 does not permit a reviewing court to make factual findings for an agency; when a necessary finding is missing, the court must remand.

Corona's Auto Pts. v. Comm. of M. Veh., No. Cv 94 053 36 88 (Jul. 13, 1995) · filed 1995-07-13(j)

Nonetheless, under the UAPA this court does not function as a fact-finder on appeal. Field v. Goldberg, 42 Conn. Sup. 306 , 322 , 618 A.2d 80 (1991). Therefore, this matter must be remanded to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Mozzochi v. Freedom of Info. Comm., No. Cv 93-0530875 S (Sep. 5, 1995) · filed 1995-09-05(f)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Gleason v. Comm. of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv 93 070 46 14 (Sep. 20, 1995) · filed 1995-09-20(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." ... Once admitted in evidence.[,] the hearing officer was entitled to rely on it and afford it as much weight as he deemed appropriate.

Section 4-183(f) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Madigan v. Hadley, Comm. of Motor Vehicles, No. 531303 (Sep. 22, 1995) · filed 1995-09-22(f)

General Statutes § 4-183 (f) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact". The hearing officer was entitled to credit fully the police statements.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Pronger v. Comm. of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv 940705448 (Sep. 22, 1995) · filed 1995-09-22(j)

With respect to the weight to be given to the contents of the notice, the court again refers the parties to the rule that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing the credit and weight an administrative hearing officer gives evidence.

Fitzgerald v. Comm. of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv 95 037 26 00 (Jan. 3, 1996) · filed 1996-01-03(j)

Under familiar rules of factfinding in administrative proceedings and judicial review of such proceedings, the hearing officer was entitled to give such credit and weight to the police report as she deemed appropriate and the court is prohibited from interfering. See, for example, General Statutes § 4-183 (j) and Hospital of St. Raphael v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 182 Conn. 314 , 318 (1980).

Section 4-183(j) requires a court reviewing agency factfinding to defer to the agency’s weighing of evidence and affirm findings supported by substantial evidence.

Menillo v. Comm. on Human Rts. and Opp., No. Cv 95 032 48 42 (Oct. 8, 1996) · filed 1996-10-08(j)

The statutory and case law authority is absolutely unequivocal in prohibiting the court from interfering in the factfinding function of an administrative agency, whether that function be performed by the agency head or by a properly designated hearing officer. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The CT Page 7836 court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) limits review of agency fact findings; a court may not retry the case or substitute its judgment for the agency's.

American Fed. of St. Ct. M. E. v. Csblr, No. Cv96 0558128 (Nov. 26, 1996) · filed 1996-11-26(j)

It is the established law that the court reviewing an administrative agency's decision pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act 4-166 et seq., and specifically 4-183 ; may not retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the agency which heard the evidence.

Section 4-183(j) requires courts to defer to agency factfinding and uphold findings supported by substantial evidence.

Ames Department Stores, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities Ex Rel. Lewis · filed 1997-04-30(j)

The court has examined the record in this case and concludes that there was ample and substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer. Indeed, the briefs submitted by all the parties make clear that their evidentiary dispute centers on the credibility of various evidence, the relative weight to be given to it, and the inferences that might fairly be drawn from the evidence. Such issues must be left to the hearing officer, not this court, to resolve.

Section 4-183(j)(5) requires a court to affirm an agency’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Redden v. Kozlowski · filed 1997-05-20(j)(5)

The factual findings of the commissioner of motor vehicles must be affirmed by the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (5).

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing an agency's factual findings when substantial evidence supports them.

City of Hartford v. Dept. of P. U. Ct., No. Cv 97 056 82 52 (Jan. 21, 1998) · filed 1998-01-21(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." ... The court has reviewed the record and concludes that the department's decision with regard to the allocation of the city's various expenses is amply supported by substantial evidence contained therein. In particular, the department's decision to omit the expenses claimed by the city was essentially a judgment call based on the department's weighing of the evidence. The court may not, therefore, overrule that decision.

Section 4-183(j)(5) limits a court’s review of agency fact findings: the court may not reweigh the evidence unless the findings are clearly erroneous in light of the whole record.

Ellam v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles · filed 1998-01-27(j)(5)

Our standard of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact found by an administrative agency is well defined. “[U]nder General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (5), a reviewing court cannot ‘substitute its judgment for that of the [administrative] agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact’ unless the court finds, inter alia, that the administrative findings of fact are ‘clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record’ before the administrative agency.”

Section 4-183(j) requires the court to defer to an agency's weighing of factual evidence and affirm unless the agency's decision is clearly erroneous on the whole record and prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Boone v. Freedom of Information Commission, No. Cv96 0564971 (Sep. 10, 1997) · filed 1997-09-10(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) bars a court from reweighing an agency’s factual findings and requires affirmance unless the decision prejudices the appellant’s substantial rights under the statutory standard.

Genn v. Connecticut Dep't of Children, No. Cv97 0569090 (Dec. 4, 1997) · filed 1997-12-04(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(i) limits judicial review of agency fact findings, but permits a court to set aside an agency decision affected by legal error or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Reliance Ins. Co. v. Reider, No. 0569131 (Jan. 12, 1998) · filed 1998-01-12(i)

General Statutes § 4-183 (i) provides that "the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact" and "shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . affected by other error of law; clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. . . ."

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions: the court may not reweigh evidence and must affirm unless the appellant’s substantial rights were prejudiced by a specified error.

Hispano Market v. Harriman, No. Cv96 0564958 (Feb. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-02-03(j)

Under General Statutes § 4-183 (j), "the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . the court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing the evidence and requires it to affirm an agency decision unless a listed ground has prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Earley v. Maryland Casualty Company, No. Cv970567497 (Oct. 3, 1997) · filed 1997-10-03(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) establishes the standard of review for this court: (j) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing agency fact findings and requires affirmance unless a clearly erroneous decision prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

R.A. Lalli Co., Inc. v. Chro, No. Cv96-0333234 (Feb. 9, 1998) · filed 1998-02-09(j)

Under General Statutes § 4-183 (j), "the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . the court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, CT Page 2404 conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of an agency decision: the court may not retry the facts or substitute its discretion for the agency's, and the appellant must show legal error or abuse of discretion.

Wilkinson v. Comm'r of Dept. Motor Veh., No. Cv97 0057231s (Mar. 9, 1998) · filed 1998-03-09(j)

This court may not try the case de novo, adjudicate facts or substitute its own discretion for that of the agency. On an appeal such as this, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the hearing officer, on the facts before him, acted contrary to law and in abuse of discretion. Demma v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 165 Conn. 15 , 16-17 (1973). See also Conn. General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183(j) requires a court to sustain an agency appeal when the decision is clearly erroneous in light of the whole record, while accepting factual findings supported by the record.

Frosceno v. Board of Firearms Examiners, No. Cv97 0571959 (Mar. 10, 1998) · filed 1998-03-10(j)

The court cannot substitute its judgment for the board's but it must sustain this appeal if it finds the decision clearly erroneous in light of the entire record of this case. While the court might find facts differently from the board, it cannot do so and must accept the findings of fact that are supported by the record.

Section 4-183(j) limits factual review and bars a court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of evidence.

Perry v. Commissioner, No. Cv 97 0056252 S (Mar. 12, 1998) · filed 1998-03-17(j)

As to the plaintiff's second argument, this court is limited in its factual review by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183 (j). ... This court may not substitute its judgment for the agency as to the weight of evidence on a question of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Lertch v. Kozlowski, No. Cv970542007s (Apr. 1, 1998) · filed 1998-04-01(j)

The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. . . . General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions and requires affirmance unless a specified error prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Hernandez v. Commissioner of the Dph, No. Cv960564623 (Apr. 8, 1998) · filed 1998-04-08(j)

Our Appellate Courts have interpreted General Statutes § 4-183 (j) to limit the scope of this court's review. ... The hearing officer's reliance upon the hearsay evidence was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Basso v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, No. Cv97 0402159 (Apr. 14, 1998) · filed 1998-04-14(j)

The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. . . . General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency factfinding and requires the court to affirm unless a clearly erroneous decision prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Clinton Board of Education v. State, No. Cv97 0083016 (Apr. 16, 1998) · filed 1998-04-16(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency fact-finding: the court may not reweigh evidence and must affirm unless the specified error prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Town of W. Hartford v. W. Hartford P. U., No. Cv97-0574188 (Apr. 27, 1998) · filed 1998-04-27(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review to the grounds on which the agency based its decision; a court cannot uphold that decision on a different ground.

Town of Windham v. Freedom of Information Commission · filed 1998-04-28(j)

“[T]he limited scope of review set forth in [General Statutes] § 4-183 (j),... and expressed by our appellate courts, does not allow [the] result [reached by the trial court]. Here, the trial court improperly traveled a different path rather than determining whether the commission properly trod on the stepping stones of the path it took.”

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency factfinding and requires affirmance unless the agency's decision prejudices substantial rights through clear error on the whole record.

Internal B., P.O. v. State, Dept., Lab. Rel., No. Cv98 0577452 (May 5, 1998) · filed 1998-05-05(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or CT Page 5866 decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) permits plenary review of legal questions, including the interpretation of a statute and an unambiguous contract in an administrative appeal.

Southeastern Connecticut Regional Resources Recovery Authority v. Department of Public Utility Control · filed 1998-03-31(j)

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the agreement is not ambiguous and, thus, judicial review of both the statute and the contract is plenary. The trial court, therefore, employed the proper standard of review.

Section 4-183(j) calls for deferential review of an agency decision.

Bezzini v. Department of Social Services · filed 1998-07-21(j)

Because we are reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, our review is highly deferential. See Neri v. Powers, 3 Conn. App. 531, 537, 490 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 808, 494 A.2d 905 (1985); see also General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

On judicial review, the court does not reweigh agency fact findings and affirms a decision supported by substantial evidence unless the appellant's substantial rights were prejudiced.

Finkeldey v. Shifrin, No. Cv97 0575293 (Jun. 12, 1998) · filed 1998-06-12(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." ... Ms. Smith's testimony provides substantial evidence that the plaintiffs violated § 30-86 on December 9, 1995, by selling her an alcoholic beverage.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence and requires it to affirm an agency decision unless the specified grounds for prejudice are met.

Ecap v. Foic, No. Cv97 0574054 (Jul. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-07-30(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency fact-finding: the court may not reweigh the evidence and must affirm unless the decision prejudices substantial rights under the statutory grounds for reversal.

The New England Cable Tv Assoc. v. Ct., Dpuc, Cv97 0571302 (Aug. 4, 1998) · filed 1998-08-04(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or CT Page 8879 decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing an agency’s factual findings and requires it to affirm when substantial evidence supports the decision.

Reed v. Com. on Hum. Rights and Opp., No. Cv970567388 (Sep. 18, 1998) · filed 1998-09-18(j)

Under General Statutes § 4-183 (j), "the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record." ... This court cannot retry those issues of fact and credibility that underlie the CHRO determination of no reasonable cause for the April 1993 complaint.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency factual findings: a court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency's when substantial evidence supports the finding.

Lepri v. Board of Firearms Permit Exam., No. Cv96-0055714 (Sep. 29, 1998) · filed 1998-09-29(j)

Moreover, the court may not retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

Section 4-183 prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s; the court asks whether the record supports the agency’s decision.

Connecticut Empl. Union v. State Dept., Ins., No. Cv970573468 (Oct. 1, 1998) · filed 1998-10-01

Under General Statutes § 4-183 , this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the department. The question before the court is not whether it agrees with the department's decision but whether the record supports the department's decision.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing the evidence and requires it to affirm an agency decision unless a qualifying error prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

Ct Consumer Counsel v. Ct Public Utility, No. Cv97 0572743 (Oct. 16, 1998) · filed 1998-10-16(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency factfinding and requires the court to affirm when substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision.

Hunter's Amb. Ser. v. Dept., Pub. H. Ser., No. Cv98 0576615 (Oct. 16, 1998) · filed 1998-10-16(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." ... Based on all of the foregoing, this court finds that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's findings and conclusions.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency fact findings and requires affirmance unless the agency's decision prejudices substantial rights under the statutory standard.

Sands v. Ct. Comm. on Human Rights, No. Cv97 0083924 (Nov. 5, 1998) · filed 1998-11-05(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. . . ." ... In summary, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the CHRO investigator's conclusion that there was no reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory act had occurred.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency fact findings: the court may not reweigh the evidence and must affirm unless the decision prejudices substantial rights and is clearly erroneous on the whole record.

Notaro v. Department of Consumer Prot., No. Cv98 0578422 (Nov. 12, 1998) · filed 1998-11-12(j)

Of course, it is not the function of this court to second guess the factual findings of the Commission. A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing the evidence and limits its review of agency fact findings to whether the record contains substantial evidence.

Hartford Mun. Emp. A. v. City, Hartford, No. Cv97 0569648 (Nov. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-11-30(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on the questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . ."

Section 4-183(j) requires courts to defer to agency factual findings supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

New England Cable Television Ass'n v. Department of Public Utility Control · filed 1998-09-22(j)

Our review of an agency’s factual determination is constrained by General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ... (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . . .”

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency fact findings and requires affirmance unless the appealing person's substantial rights were prejudiced by a clearly erroneous decision.

Quiceno v. State of Connecticut, Department of Social Services · filed 1999-01-27(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court’s review of an agency’s decision is very limited. “General Statutes § 4-183 (j) . . . mandates that a court ‘shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record ....’”

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions: a court may not reweigh factual evidence and may reverse for prejudicial legal error or findings unsupported by substantial evidence.

Connecticut Dep. of Transportation v. Chro, No. Cv98-0492664s (Mar. 4, 1999) · filed 1999-03-04(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; . . . made upon unlawful procedure; . . . [or] clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. . . ."

Section 4-183(j) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when substantial rights were prejudiced by legal error, insufficient evidence, or an arbitrary or capricious decision.

Nosik v. Danbury Board of Education, No. Cv95 032 33 94s (Apr. 21, 1999) · filed 1999-04-21(j)

"General Statutes § 4-183 (j) . . . permits modification or reversal of an agency's decision if substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Kiniry v. State, Dept. of Public Health, No. Cv 98 0085189s (May 11, 1999) · filed 1999-05-11(j)

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review of an agency's decision is very limited. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Warner v. Thomas, No. Cv 98 0492631s (Jun. 22, 1999) · filed 1999-06-22(j)

The court's "review of an agency's factual determination is constrained by General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a court from reweighing an agency’s factual findings and requires affirmance unless the appellant’s substantial rights were prejudiced by a decision that is clearly erroneous on the whole record.

Amadeo v. State Bd., Labor Rel., No. Cv 98 0492618s (Jul. 21, 1999) · filed 1999-07-21(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are., clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. . ."

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Torres v. Comm. Human Rights, No. Cv 95 0323545s (Mar. 11, 1999) · filed 1999-03-11(j)

Our review of an agency's factual determination is constrained by General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Cadlerock Prop. Jnt. Venture v. Com., E.P., No. Cv 980492629s (May 5, 1999) · filed 1999-05-05(j)

The court's "review of an agency's factual determination is constrained by General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing the evidence on questions of fact; agency findings supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.

Klies v. Department of Social Services, No. Cv 96 0133666s (May 28, 1999) · filed 1999-05-28(j)

The court's "review of an agency's factual determination is constrained by General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Martinez v. State Dmr, No. Cv 98 0492725s (July 23, 1999) · filed 1999-07-23(j)

The court's "review of an agency's factual determination is constrained by General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from reweighing an agency’s factual evidence and requires affirmance unless a specified error prejudices the appellant’s substantial rights.

Cleveland v. Norwich Board of Education, No. 545746 (Aug. 5, 1999) · filed 1999-08-05(j)

It is clear that the scope of this court's review is limited. Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 4-183 (j): The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) limits a court's review of agency factfinding and directs it to sustain an appeal when specified errors prejudice the appellant's substantial rights.

D'Amato v. Town of Groton Zoning Commission, No. 545324 (Sep. 10, 1999) · filed 1999-09-10(j)

The limitations on the scope of judicial review has been codified in Connecticut General Statutes § 4-183 (j), in relevant part: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: . . . (4) effected by other errors of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal. . . ."

Section 4-183(j) does not authorize the Superior Court, while reviewing an agency decision, to rule on a motion for summary judgment or grant relief on a counterclaim.

Beizer v. Department of Labor · filed 2000-01-11(j)

Nothing in § 4-183 (j) gives the trial court authority to rule on a motion for summary judgment or to grant Lenge the relief he sought.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on questions of fact and requires substantial evidence review.

Nobs v. Connecticut Siting Council, No. Cv 98 0492714s, (Apr. 28, 2000) · filed 2000-04-28(j)

The court's "review of an agency's factual determination is constrained by. General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Demello v. Comm. on Human Rights Opp., No. Cv 98 0489424s (Jan. 10, 2000) · filed 2000-01-10(j)

The court's "review of an agency's factual determination is constrained by General Statutes § 4-183 (j), which mandates that a court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions to a very restricted scope.

H.P.T. Co. v. Shiffrin, No. Cv. 99 0493546s (May 11, 2000) · filed 2000-05-11(j)

In an administrative appeal, the UAPA sets forth the standard of review for the court. ... The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183 (j) and is very restricted. ... The record certainly shows that there was substantial evidence to support their findings and conclusions. ... Since HPT has failed to meet its burden, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions and bars the court from retrying the case or substituting its judgment for the agency's.

Murphy v. Conn., State Dept. of Educ., No. Cv 99 0498476s (Jul. 5, 2000) · filed 2000-07-05(j)(6)

Just as the Department cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Education, this court cannot re-try this case. See General Statutes §§ 10-186 (b)(4) and 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183 places the burden on the plaintiff to show that substantial evidence does not support an agency decision and permits relief only when the decision is arbitrary, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.

Watertown Educ. v. Watertown Bd., Educ., No. Cv00-0156961s (Jul. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-07-25

The parties further agree that the scope of judicial review as set forth in § 10-153f (c) is the same as governs appeals pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, General Statutes § 4-183 . Under that provision, "[t]he plaintiff shoulders the burden of proof when challenging a decision of an administrative agency. A showing by the plaintiff that another decision maker might have reached a different conclusion does not satisfy this burden. Instead, the plaintiff must establish that substantial evidence does not exist in the record to support the agency's decision. Should substantial evidence exist in the record to support any basis or stated reason for the agency's decision, the court must sustain the decision. The reviewing court may grant relief from the agency's decision only where the decision is 'arbitrary, illegal or not supported by the evidence.'"

Section 4-183(j) limits review of agency factual findings to whether they are reasonably supported by substantial evidence, and section 4-183(k) authorizes remand with appropriate directions.

Keyes v. Board of Firearms Permit Exmr., No. Cv 99 0495543s (Aug. 2, 2000) · filed 2000-08-02(j), (k)

This court recognizes that under General Statutes § 4-183 ... (j), its review of the Board's factual determination is limited in that it should not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. ... Thus, this court will conclude that the Board's decision is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the whole record, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (j).

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions: courts may not retry the case or substitute their judgment for the agency’s.

Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Freedom of Information Commission · filed 2000-09-05(j)

The scope of permissible review is governed by [General Statutes] § 4-183 Q) and is very restricted. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions and requires the court to affirm when the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion.

McCray v. Board of Firearms, No. Cv99-0118270 (Oct. 26, 2000) · filed 2000-10-26(j)

Considering the limitations on the scope of review imposed by General Statutes § 4-183 (j) it cannot be found that in determining that plaintiff was unsuitable to possess a permit to carry pistols and revolvers the Board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions; the court applies a restricted standard of review rather than retrying the case.

Waterbury Pol. Un. v. Conn. Bd., L.R., No. Cv 99 0496671s (Nov. 13, 2000) · filed 2000-11-13(j)

The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183 (j) 4 and is very restricted. ... The court finds that the Labor Board's decision on adverse impact was correct under the above-quoted principles.

Section 4-183(j) strictly limits the Superior Court's review of an agency decision.

Bridgeport Fire F. v. Board of Lab. Rel., No. Cv 990497600s (Nov. 15, 2000) · filed 2000-11-15(j)

The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183 (j) and is very restricted.

Section 4-183(a) requires an appellant to establish aggrievement to obtain Superior Court review of an agency decision.

Joseloff v. Sullivan, No. Cv 990499507s (Nov. 16, 2000) · filed 2000-11-16(a)

Before this court, at the hearing on the merits, DOT raised the issue of Joseloff's standing and aggrievement to bring this appeal, and this issue must be addressed as it is one of subject matter jurisdiction. General Statutes § 4-183 (a); New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. CHHC , 226 Conn. 105 , 120 (1993). The principles of aggrievement are settled: The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a wellsettled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected. . . ." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. DPUC , 247 Conn. 95 , 103 (1998).

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of administrative agency decisions to a very restricted scope.

First Selectman v. State Freedom of Inf., No. Cv00 0501055 (Nov. 28, 2000) · filed 2000-11-28(j)

The scope of permissible review is governed by General Statutes § 4-183 (j) of the UAPA and is very restricted.

Section 4-183(j) restricts judicial review of agency decisions and bars the court from retrying the case or substituting its judgment.

Town of Seymour v. Freedom of Information, No. Cv 99 0498475 (Nov. 28, 2000) · filed 2000-11-28(j)

The scope of permissible review is governed by General Statutes § 4-183 (j) of the UAPA and is very restricted.

Section 4-183(j) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's; when a necessary issue was not addressed by the agency, the court should remand it for agency consideration.

Town of Groton v. Freedom of Information Comm., No. 496887 (Feb. 13, 2001) · filed 2001-02-15(j)

The court agrees that under the standard of review set forth above, it may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, and that the applicability of § 17a-101k to the specific facts in this case is an issue for the FOIC to consider in the first instance. When, as here, it becomes clear that analysis of additional issues, not addressed by the FOIC, is necessary to the resolution of a controversy, the proper procedure is for this court to remand the matter.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency decisions: a court may not retry the facts or substitute its judgment for the agency’s and must uphold a decision supported by the evidence.

City of Hartford v. Hartford Mun. Emp., No. Cv 99 0494364s (Mar. 20, 2001) · filed 2001-03-20(j)

The court reviews the issues raised by the City in accordance with the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act ("UAPA"). ... The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183 (j) and is very restricted. . . . [T]he trial court may [not] retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant. . . . The conclusion reached by the defendant must be upheld if it is legally supported by the evidence.

Section 4-183(j) permits a court to review an agency decision for constitutional violations but does not authorize the court to declare a statute unconstitutional.

McGarry v. State Board of Education, No. Cv00-0502744s (Apr. 2, 2001) · filed 2001-04-02(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) authorizes the court to determine if the "administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . [i]n violation of constitutional . . . provisions," but it does not grant to the court the authority to declare a statute unconstitutional.

Section 4-183(j) bars a court from reweighing evidence and requires it to affirm an agency decision unless an error prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Stocking v. Commissioner, No. Cv99-0496508 (Apr. 12, 2001) · filed 2001-04-12(j)

General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides that "(t)he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. . . . The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."

Section 4-183(j) restricts judicial review of agency decisions and does not permit the court to retry the case or substitute its judgment for the agency’s.

Royce v. Freedom of Information Comm., No. Cv 00 0505232 (Jun. 11, 2001) · filed 2001-06-11(j)

The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183 (j) and is very restricted.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of agency fact findings under the substantial evidence rule.

Kaz v. Freedom of Information Commission, No. Cv 00 05039425 (Jun. 26, 2001) · filed 2001-06-26(j)

In an administrative appeal, the UAPA sets forth the standard of review for the court. General Statutes § 4-183 (j). ... This is a factual decision and is governed by the substantial evidence rule, quoted above. The court may not reevaluate the FOIC's conclusion that the town was prompt.

Section 4-183(j) limits judicial review of an agency decision to whether the agency acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.

Labrie v. Department of Social Services, No. Cv 01 0509692s (Mar. 22, 2002) · filed 2002-03-22(j)

Under General Statutes § 4-183 (j), such review is limited to whether the agency, in light of the evidence before it, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion in reaching its decision.