Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a

Section 37-3a permits interest on conversion damages from the date of conversion through the close of evidence at trial.

Barron v. Benton Auto Body, Inc., No. Cv97-0573293-S (Dec. 21, 2000) · filed 2000-12-21

Where interest is awarded pursuant to § 37-3a , interest should be found to have accrued from the date of the defendants' conversion, through the date of the close of evidence at trial.

Section 37-3a permits ten percent annual interest on an unpaid amount awarded as damages.

Ortiz Agencies v. City of New Haven, No. Cv 99 427681 S (Jan. 2, 2001) · filed 2001-01-02

Judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $12,065.00 plus interest at the rate of ten percent per annum; General Statutes § 37-3a ; from July 1, 1999 to date in the amount of $3016.

Section 37-3a permits an award of interest on an unpaid loan.

Soucy v. Soucy, No. Cv97-0141716s (Jun. 16, 2000) · filed 2000-06-16

The plaintiff is awarded interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a permits 10% annual interest on liquidated unpaid wages wrongfully withheld, calculated on the wages before statutory doubling.

Alvarado v. Law, No. Cv 00 0179512 (Jul. 10, 2001) · filed 2001-07-10

Moreover, the plaintiff is entitled to interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes due. This money represents unpaid wages, a specific, liquidated sum, that was due to plaintiff for labor he performed. The detention of money under those circumstances is wrongful. Interest runs at 10% per year on $2,924, the unpaid wages prior to doubling, from November 18, 1995, when the plaintiff left his employment, to the date of this judgment.

Section 37-3a permits interest at 10% per year on an unpaid amount when the court finds no acceptable reason for withholding payment.

Patrissi Landscaping v. Ellington Road, No. Cv 00-0596215 (Nov. 14, 2001) · filed 2001-11-14

Inasmuch as the defendant offered no acceptable evidence as to why this amount was never paid to the plaintiff, the court is of the opinion that interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a is appropriate and therefore awards interest at 10% per annum from March 24, 1999 to November 14, 2001 (965 days at $1.986 per day) in the amount of $1,916.50.

Section 37-3a permits an award of 10% annual interest on overdue settlement payments.

Finley Assoc. v. Crossroads Invest., No. X03 Cv 99 0499388 S (Dec. 17, 2001) · filed 2001-12-17

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Crossroads has breached the Settlement Agreement and awards George C. Finley and Finley Associates the following amounts: $736,700 for 8 quarterly payments past due under the Settlement Agreement plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a of $56,019.85 through July 10, 2001; ... Crossroads has not met its burden of proving that the Settlement Agreement is illegal and unenforceable.

Interest under § 37-3a is an element of damages for the trier of fact to decide.

Neptune Group, Inc. v. MKT, Inc. · filed 2002-01-03

Pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 37-3a, MKT may seek to recover interest at the rate of ten percent a year as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. ... Accordingly, as the decision to include such interest as part of MKT’s award lay properly with the trier of fact, MKT’s motion for imposition of prejudgment interest is hereby DENIED.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when a defendant wrongfully detains money after it becomes payable.

Phoenix Horizon, Inc. v. Anderson, No. Cv 00 0083363s (Jan. 7, 2002) · filed 2002-01-07

In the present case, the court concludes that the defendant did wrongfully detain funds due the plaintiff prior to the entry of judgment against the defendant. The statutory language indicates that wrongful detention occurs when money is detained "after it becomes payable." General Statutes § 37-3a ; see also Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc., ... supra, 239 Conn. 734 -35.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable; whether to award it is for the trier of fact.

L.T. Overseas Ltd. v. Hartej Corp., No. Cv 98 0169172 (Jan. 11, 2002) · filed 2002-01-11

As indicated previously, the attorney trial referee recommended that the' plaintiff also recover interest as authorized by General Statutes § 37-3a for "damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. . . ." The awarding of prejudgment interest is an issue for the trier of fact. ... Thus, in accordance with the report and recommendation of the attorney trial referee, judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff to recover $35,906.67, plus interest of $9,674.80, for a total of $45,581.47, from the corporate defendant, of which $13,934.40, plus interest of $3,754.54, for a total of $17,688.94, is the personal responsibility of the individual defendant, Ripee Sawhney.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on an unpaid invoice from the invoice date.

Schink v. Baker, No. Cv 99 017 2704 (Feb. 25, 2002) · filed 2002-02-25

Prejudgment interest is awarded from the date of invoice. General Statutes § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a permits a court to award prejudgment interest for the wrongful detention of money due another, at a discretionary rate of up to 10% per year.

Shaw v. Greenwich Anesthesiology Assocs., P.C. · filed 2002-03-21

Defendant is found to have wrongfully detained money owed Plaintiff in varying amounts and over different periods from May 11, 1998 to July 5,- 2001. ... As to the interest rate, this court in its discretion chooses the rate of approximately 7.5% per year.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when a party wrongfully detains money due to another party.

Conant v. Fidalgo, No. Cvnh-0105-10477 (Apr. 12, 2002) · filed 2002-04-12

Finally, the Conants are seeking interest for one year under General Statutes § 37-3a . 7 ... The court finds that Fidalgo has wrongfully detained the unpaid rent and damages due the Conants. Accordingly, the court finds that an award of prejudgment interest is warranted in this case and, therefore, the Conants are awarded interest for one year.

Section 37-3a permits a court to apply the statutory rate when awarding prejudgment interest on an overdue liquidated sum.

Simkins Industries v. Standard Group, No. X01 Cv 00 0165315 S (Jun. 5, 2002) · filed 2002-06-05

The parties did not present the court with the evidence of actual interest rates in effect from February 14, 2000, to date, and the court exercises its discretion to apply the statutory rate allowed in § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a allows a court to decline to award prejudgment interest.

Chila v. Stuart, No. Cv 99 0170228 (Sep. 6, 2002) · filed 2002-09-06

Prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a was not recommended by the attorney trial referee and is not awarded.

Section 37-3a permits interest of up to 10% per year when payable money has been wrongfully detained.

Northington Partners v. Executive Risk, No. X03 Cv99 0506449s (Oct. 3, 2002) · filed 2002-10-03

The court finds that the detention of the $50,000 due upon the signing of the MOU's was wrongful, and, therefore, awards interest on that amount at the rate of 10% per annum from November 28, 1998 in the amount of $19,247.

Section 37-3a prejudgment interest runs from the date the plaintiff first pleads a valid cause of action and is calculated on the full contract award despite a separate counterclaim award.

Ceci Brothers v. Five Twenty-One Corp., No. Cv 96 0150073 (Oct. 21, 2002) · filed 2002-10-21

As to prejudgment interest under General Statutes § 37-3a , the awarding of prejudgment interest is clearly an issue for the trier of fact. ... Therefore, it is not a set off and interest will be calculated on the total due the plaintiff for breach of contract, $44,248, not on that amount less the counterclaim. ... It seems most logical and just to commence the running of prejudgment interest on the date when the plaintiff first pleaded a valid cause of action.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on an unpaid loan from the date the lender sought payment.

Lenares v. Miano · filed 2002-12-24

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment ... plus interest pursuant to § 37-3a from the date the plaintiff sought payment, plus interest pursuant to § 52-192a (b) from the date of the filing of the plaintiffs complaint.

Section 37-3a permits ten percent annual interest as damages for money wrongfully detained after it becomes payable.

Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, No. 124551 (Feb. 3, 2003) · filed 2003-02-03

In accordance with General Statutes § 37-3a , the court awards the plaintiffs ten percent interest per year on all damages other than the punitive damages and the attorneys fees incurred to bring this action. ... The interest shall accrue from September 1, 2001 at which time it became payable to the plaintiffs as it was wrongly charged and subsequently wrongly detained by the defendant.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when an action concerns money wrongfully withheld after it became due and payable, but ordinarily not for damages to compensate for injury or repair costs.

Tang v. Bou-Fakhreddine · filed 2003-03-04

Prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a is appropriate only where the essence of the action itself involves the wrongful withholding of money due and payable to the plaintiff. The prejudgment interest statute does not apply when the essence of the action is the recovery of damages to compensate a plaintiff for injury, damage or costs incurred as a result of a defendant’s negligence.

Section 37-3a interest on a plaintiff’s award is calculated before subtracting a defendant’s negligence counterclaim award.

Ceci Bros. v. Five Twenty-One Corp. · filed 2004-02-10

In this case, the defendant’s counterclaim did not sound in contract, but was based on negligence, for which no § 37-3a interest can be due. To set off one claim against the other before calculating interest would, in effect, award § 37-3a interest to the defendant when the defendant had not been awarded such interest and was not entitled to such interest.

Section 37-3a sets a maximum prejudgment interest rate of 10 percent; the trial court has discretion to award a lower rate.

Gianetti v. Meszoros · filed 2004-04-13

... this court held that the 10 percent interest rate set forth in § 37-3a is not a fixed rate, but rather the maximum rate of interest that a trial court, in its discretion, can award. The judgment in the present case included an award of prejudgment interest from November 15, 1994, to December 11,2002, but the trial court did not establish the applicable rate of interest.

Section 37-3a permits interest on a counterclaim recovery.

Co-Options v. News America Mktg., No. X01 Cv 00 0163095 S (Feb. 27, 2002) · filed 2002-02-27

Judgment shall enter in favor of News America on its counterclaim in the amount of $30,000 plus interest in the amount of $5,250, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a permits interest at 10% on conversion damages from the wrongful act through judgment.

Fontaine v. Colt's Manufacturing Co., No. Cv-99-0594929 (Mar. 20, 2002) · filed 2002-03-20

Interest is due to the plaintiff additionally from August 1, 1999 until the date of this judgment, January 16, 2002 at the statutory rate of 10% pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a permits 10% annual interest as damages for overdue payment on a promissory note, even when the note provides for no interest before payment is due.

Goldberg v. Winogradow, No. Cv 00 0093186 S (Dec. 18, 2002) · filed 2002-12-18

However, since the required payments were not made, the plaintiffs have requested and the court will award interest from June 30, 1995 until the present at the rate of 10% per annum pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a , which provides for the award of interest at that rate "as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable."

Section 37-3a permits interest on an unpaid hospital bill through the date of judgment.

Stamford Hospital v. Tanimichi, No. Cv010186109 (Jan. 15, 2003) · filed 2003-01-15

Judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff in the principal amount of $174,724.99 plus interest from September 25, 2001 through January 15, 2003, pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a does not allow prejudgment interest on a disputed service fee when no sum certain was agreed, the dispute was in good faith, and the party charged with interest neither controlled nor benefited from the money.

Travelers Property & Casualty Co. v. Christie · filed 2007-03-06

The defendant did not agree contractually to pay a sum certain before D’Amore began his work, she had a good faith disagreement with D’Amore over the amount of his fee, and she did not actually control or benefit from the detention of the money. Thus, on the basis of these facts, no interest as provided in § 37-3a should have been awarded to the appraiser.

Section 37-3a(a) caps prejudgment interest for detained money at 10 percent per year.

A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Guay · filed 2007-05-15(a)

Therefore, the trial court properly adopted the plaintiffs figures in accordance with the maximum allowable interest rate of 10 percent per year permitted under § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest for wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable, with the award left to the trial court’s discretion.

McCullough v. Waterside Associates · filed 2007-06-26

In his cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a. We disagree. ... On the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying prejudgment interest.

Section 37-3a(a) permits prejudgment interest for money wrongfully withheld when the evidence supports the award.

Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Westview Carlton Group, LLC · filed 2008-06-24(a)

The defendants’ final claim is that the court improperly awarded prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a (a). ... The trial court’s award of interest pursuant to the statute for money wrongfully withheld was amply supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest against a conspirator who helped a debtor evade payment, even though the conspirator did not personally owe the debt.

Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager · filed 2008-07-22(a)

Pursuant to the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly held the defendant hable for the interest accruing on Scalzo’s debt after Scalzo failed to repay the plaintiff as he had agreed.

Section 37-3a sets a maximum prejudgment interest rate of 10 percent and permits a court to award a lower rate.

Stuart v. Stuart · filed 2009-01-20

Faced with the identical issue, our Supreme Court held: “[W]e decline to negate, judicially, the significance of the phrase ‘and no more’ by holding that § 37-3a fixes the rate of prejudgment interest at 10 percent. We conclude instead that, consistent with its plain language, § 37-3a establishes a maximum rate above which a trial court should not venture in the absence of specific legislative direction.” Id., 765-66. Accordingly, it was within the discretion of the court to award prejudgment interest at the rate of 7.5 percent for the breach of fiduciary duty claims against Stuart, Jr.

Section 37-3a (a) makes an award of prejudgment interest discretionary.

Rissolo v. Betts Island Oyster Farms, LLC · filed 2009-09-29(a)

Our review of § 37-3a (a) does not support his argument that the award of prejudgment interest is mandatory. ... As this court has previously concluded, an award of prejudgment interest is discretionary, not mandatory.

Section 37-3a makes prejudgment interest discretionary; an improper detention of money does not by itself establish wrongful detention.

Kovacs Construction Corp. v. Water Pollution & Control Authority · filed 2010-04-27

We concluded in Maloney, as we do in this case, that the court was well within the exercise of its sound discretion when it declined to award such interest. ... The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying prejudgment interest.

Section 37-3a permits interest at ten percent a year as damages for money withheld after it becomes payable.

ALV Events International v. Johnson · filed 2010-08-20

Pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 37-3a, ALV can recover, as damages, interest at a rate of ten per cent a year, for the detention of money after it becomes payable.

Section 37-3a(a) permits prejudgment interest when payable money is wrongfully detained, with the award left to the trial court’s discretion.

Atelier Constantin Popescu, LLC v. JC Corp. · filed 2012-04-17(a)

We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff prejudgment interest. The court found that it was wrongful and unjust for JC Corporation to detain the key money payment and the security deposit. Given the facts before the court, as well as its other findings of fact regarding JC Corporation’s gross negligence and recklessness, such a finding was well within the discretion of the court.

Section 37-3a allows prejudgment interest as damages for the detention of payable money, but the award rests in the trial court’s equitable discretion.

Carrillo v. Goldberg · filed 2013-03-19

Finally, we address the plaintiffs’ claim that the court erred in not awarding them prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a. We conclude that the court did not so err. ... While the plaintiffs have provided us with a hypothetical rationale for why the court could have exercised its discretion to award prejudgment interest, they have not shown how, on this record, the court abused its discretion by choosing not to award it. Absent such a showing, we will not disturb the decision of the court.

A claim for prejudgment interest under § 37-3a may be considered on remand when the trial court denied it because it had awarded finance charges that were later reversed.

Alarmax Distributors, Inc. v. New Canaan Alarm Co. · filed 2013-03-19

Thus, we do not read the record as a determination, on the merits, that the plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest but rather as an equitable determination by the court that the plaintiff should not be entitled to recover prejudgment interest in addition to the finance charges. ... Thus, we reverse the trial court’s award of finance charges and remand the case to the trial court for adjudication of prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a permits a discretionary prejudgment interest award below its ten percent annual maximum, based on an appropriate rate of compensation for the loss of use of money.

Weber v. Fujifilm Medical Systems U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2013-03-19

Under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 37-3a, Plaintiff may recover “interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more.” ... In consideration of the economic context for time-frame of Plaintiffs discharge, the Court concludes that Plaintiff should be awarded prejudgment interest at a simple annual rate of four percent from January 1, 2010, the date of Plaintiffs termination, to June 15, 2012, the date of the entry of judgment in this ease, for a total award of $32,899.13 in prejudgment interest.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest in an unjust enrichment action when money due and payable is wrongfully detained.

Nation Electrical Contracting, LLC v. St. Dimitrie Romanian Orthodox Church · filed 2013-08-13

Our review of the record in this case leads us to conclude that this matter falls squarely within the scope of § 37-3a. We decline the defendant’s invitation to create a rule disallowing prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a in an action seeking damages for unjust enrichment.

Section 37-3a(a) allows a trial court to set prejudgment interest below 10 percent when a lower rate fairly compensates the plaintiff for the loss of use of money.

Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. · filed 2017-05-23(a)

In granting the award for prejudgment interest, the court relied heavily on the fact that the interest rates during the period of time that the funds were wrongfully detained from the plaintiff were lower than the 10 per- cent allowed under § 37-3a. ... We thus conclude that the court acted well within its discretion in award- ing prejudgment interest at the rate of 3 percent.

Section 37-3a does not allow prejudgment interest for property damage caused by negligence.

Muckle v. Pressley · filed 2018-10-16(a)

As we have indi- cated in this opinion, § 37-3a, by its explicit reference to § 37-3b, does not apply to actions to recover damages to property caused by negligence.

Section 37-3a (a) permits a discretionary award of prejudgment interest when a party unjustifiably withholds money owed to another.

Lavy v. Lavy · filed 2019-05-21(a)

Given the court’s determination that the plaintiff was unjustified in failing to disclose assets, which resulted in a failure to distribute to the defendant at the time of dissolution her equitable share of those assets under the separation agreement, an award of prejudgment interest properly was within the discretion of the court.

When no earlier repayment date was agreed, § 37-3a prejudgment interest on an unjust enrichment award begins when repayment is demanded.

Hamann v. Carl · filed 2020-03-24

We conclude that, although the court was well within its discretion to award prejudgment interest, the inter- est should not have commenced until demand for pay- ment was made on the plaintiff’s behalf on January 14, 2016.

Section 37-3a(a) permits a court to award prejudgment interest, at a rate up to ten percent, to compensate for the detention of money after it becomes payable.

North American Specialty Insurance Company v. QSR Steel Corporation LLC · filed 2022-09-12(a)

The Court awards pre-judgment interest at the Prime Rate of 3.25%, simple interest to run monthly from January 13, 2021 (30 days after Plaintiff’s December 14, 2021 demand letter to Defendants [Doc. # 31-8]).

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on unpaid wages when a contract fixes the salary and the wages become due, even if the employer prevented the employee from working.

Paniccia v. Success Village Apartments, Inc. · filed 2022-10-11

Further, although the defendant emphasizes that the plaintiff is not seeking liquidated damages under the contract and argues that, therefore, § 37-3a should not apply, much like liquidated damages, the award for unpaid wages here was determined by the terms of the contract governing the amount of the plaintiff’s salary.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest at a rate of up to ten percent a year.

Cojom v. Roblen, LLC · filed 2025-04-09

Connecticut law permits a prejudgment interest rate of up to “ten per cent a year.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a(a) permits prejudgment interest for the detention of payable money at a discretionary annual rate of up to 10%; the rate should compensate for lost use of the money rather than punish bad faith.

Pizziconi v. Gray · filed 2025-08-22(a)

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established her entitlement to an award of prejudgment interest against Norman Gray and Sherman 695 at a rate of three percent annually running from October 15, 2020, whether assessed as a matter of probable cause or by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest of up to 10% on unpaid wages recovered by a private employee.

Stewart · filed 2026-03-11

In the absence of Connecticut Appellate or Supreme Court authority on this issue, I find that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a applies here, which caps prejudgment interest at 10%.

When the amount of recoverable damages remains disputed, prejudgment interest under § 37-3a cannot be determined as a matter of law on summary judgment.

Swiss Re Corporate Solutions America Insurance Corporation v. Quality Companies Inc. · filed 2026-03-28(a)

Whether to award interest under § 37-3a “is principally an equitable question lying within the trial court’s discretion.” ... Because the amount of recoverable damages cannot be determined as a matter of law on this record, the related issue of any interest on any such damages cannot be determine as a matter of law now either.

Section 37-3a permits discretionary prejudgment interest on contract claims involving the wrongful detention of money when its statutory exceptions do not apply.

Los Cabos II Equity, LLC v. State Farm Fire · filed 2026-03-30

As a result, because Los Cabos alleges a claim for the wrongful detention of money, and none of the exceptions enumerated in Section 37-3a apply to its contract claims, prejudgment interest remains available.

When prejudgment interest is awarded under § 37-3a, it runs through the date of judgment even if judgment follows the factfinder’s determination after a lengthy delay.

Wallenta v. Moscowitz · filed 2004-01-27

Paulus holds that in situations in which there is an extended period between the time the finder of fact determines that money has been wrongfully detained and the time the court renders judgment, equity does not intervene to stop the accrual of interest.

Section 37-3a(a) permits prejudgment interest as damages when money is wrongfully withheld after it becomes payable.

McCarter and English LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc · filed 2024-02-08(a)

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a permits parties in civil trials to recover “an award of interest on money from the time money is wrongfully withheld.” Paulus v. Lasala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 150 (1999). ... The jury determined that Jarrow wrongfully withheld McCarter’s legal fees, and awarded prejudgment interest.

When a judgment awards interest at the statutory rate without fixing a percentage, § 37-3a’s increase from 6 to 8 percent applies to interest accruing from October 1, 1979.

Laurel, Inc. v. Caldwell · filed 1982-05-18

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that the award contemplated payment in accordance with the prevailing statutory rate of interest as payments became due. We agree with its determination that the plaintiff is entitled to interest on its judgment at the rate of 6 percent from the date of taking to October 1, 1979, and at the rate of 8 percent per annum from October 1,1979 to the date of payment.

Section 37-3a limited interest for wrongful detention of money to the then statutory rate of 8 percent when there was no agreement to pay finance charges.

Northwestern Electric, Inc. v. Rozbicki · filed 1986-03-11

Since there was no finding of an express agreement to pay finance charges of 1.5 percent per month and since the trial court did not conclude that there was an implied agreement to pay such finance charges, but rather concluded that interest should be allowed for the wrongful detention of money only, the court’s award of interest was limited by the then statutory rate of 8 percent. General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 37-3a. The court was in error in awarding interest at the rate of 15 percent.

An increase in § 37-3a’s interest rate applies prospectively and does not raise interest accrued before the increase took effect.

Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Associates, Inc. · filed 1986-05-20

The amendment increasing the rate of interest was only prospective in its operation, and was not intended to modify obligations which had already been fixed prior to its enactment.

Section 37-3a limited interest to 6 percent per year from July 1 through September 30, 1979.

Crest Plumbing & Heating Co. v. DiLoreto · filed 1987-09-22

During the period from July 1, 1979, through September 30, 1979, however, the plaintiff was entitled to interest at only 6 percent per annum. See General Statutes § 37-3a; Public Acts 1979, No. 79-364, § 2.

Section 37-3a permits a trial court, in its discretion, to apply an increased statutory interest rate to money that became due before the increase took effect.

Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Associates, Inc. · filed 1984-02-29

Since one of the purposes of allowing interest as damages, in cases where the parties themselves have not established a particular interest rate, is to accomplish justice in a particular situation and since the inclusion of interest is discretionary with the court in accord with the principles of equity, the decision to award interest at a greater or lesser statutory percentage rate should be left with the trial court.

Section 37-3a caps interest recoverable as damages for the detention of payable money at 10 percent per year, even when the parties stipulate to a higher rate.

Bank of Boston Connecticut v. Degroff · filed 1993-05-11

Regardless, the reduction of the interest rate from 11 percent to 10 percent per annum will not and could not be altered by this court because the maximum rate of 10 percent is established by statute. General Statutes § 37-3a provides in pertinent part that “interest at the rate of ten percent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings under chapter 909, including actions to recover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. . . .”

Section 37-3a’s ten percent interest rate does not displace a lawful rate the parties agreed would apply until a debt is paid.

The Bankmart v. Sorrell, No. Cv 84 0217498s (Nov. 9, 1994) · filed 1994-11-09

The cases cited by the defendants do in fact apply the interest rate of General Statutes § 37-3a to the amounts remaining unpaid on a judgment. ... Those cases nonetheless are inapposite. First, O'Leary and Gionfriddo address the interest rate applicable to damages awarded in a civil action to recover damages. Second, in those cases, there was no agreement between the parties as to what the interest rate should be. Conversely, here the note explicitly provides that "interest on the unpaid balance from the date of this Note, until paid, [shall be] at the rate of eighteen percent per annum." To apply the statutory legal rate of interest in these circumstances would subvert traditional loan arrangements.

Section 37-3a provides a 10% interest rate, calculated on the balance owed after applicable setoffs.

Patterson Pump Company v. Hydro-Dyne, No. Cv91 0501908s (Nov. 18, 1994) · filed 1994-11-18

Interest should have been applied at the rate of 10% as provided in General Statutes § 37-3a , computed separately on the two claims as follows: On the pug mill balance of $24,500., reduced by the setoffs of $8,343 and $4,181.59, interest should have been calculated on the net principal balance of $11,975.41 from March 19, 1989 to December 7, 1993 at the rate of 10%, resulting in interest of $5,638.24.

Section 37-3a permits an award of 10% interest on money ordered restored to an estate, running from the date the recipient received it.

Hall v. Schoenwetter, No. 30 75 14 (Oct. 3, 1995) · filed 1995-10-03

Accordingly, the court affirms the decision of the Bethel Probate Court and orders Marcelle Hall to restore to the estate of Julian Altman, and account for the same, the sum of $263,475.75 plus interest at the rate of 10%; see General Statutes § 37-3a ; from the date of her receipt of the disbursement from Lloyd's of London, to the present.

Section 37-3a supplies a 10% annual rate for interest on the unpaid reimbursement, calculated from the date the Probate Court allowed the estate’s final account.

Saradjian v. Saradjian, No. Cv 90 112768 (Nov. 21, 1995) · filed 1995-11-21

Interest on $10,559.86 at 10% per annum (General Statutes § 37-3a ) from July 29, 1992, the date of allowance CT Page 13166 of the final account by the Probate Court, to the date of this judgment, amounts to $3,496.40, and thus judgment hereby enters in favor of the plaintiff in the total amount of $14,056.26.

Section 37-3a fixes the recoverable interest rate at ten percent a year; a court cannot award a lower rate.

Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Board of Tax Review, No. 381310 (Apr. 9, 1996) · filed 1996-04-09

The plain language and long history of § 37-3a persuade me that the interest rate commanded by the statutory language is not only "no more" than ten per cent but it is also no less.

Section 37-3a permits an award of ten percent annual interest on a bond claim when the bond specifies no interest rate.

Gerrity Co., Inc. v. Pace Const., Inc., No. Cv 92299440 (Nov. 4, 1996) · filed 1996-11-04

The Bond does not specify an interest rate. As a result, the court will award interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a , in the amount of ten (10) percent per annum. Interest shall accrue from October 17, 1992, the date St. Paul received notice of Gerrity's claim, until the date of judgment.

Section 37-3a sets a maximum prejudgment interest rate of 10 percent and permits a lower rate.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Board of Tax Review · filed 1997-07-22

We conclude instead that, consistent with its plain language, § 37-3a establishes a maximum rate above which a trial court should not venture in the absence of specific legislative direction.

Section 37-3a permits an award of 10 percent statutory interest on damages from a specified date until payment.

Schaller Imports v. East European Imports, No. Cv97-0483553s (Nov. 4, 1999) · filed 1999-11-04

Statutory Interest of 10 percent from May 20, 1997, per General Statutes § 37-3a , to payment date.

A court may rescind an award of statutory interest under § 37-3a after reconsidering it.

Carmel Homes v. Bednar, No. Cv 99-0079393 S (Oct. 1, 2001) · filed 2001-10-01

The defendants' re-argument on the issue of substantial performance, however, has caused the court, suo moto, to reconsider and, for the reasons set forth in the margin, 8 rescind its order of statutory interest under General Statutes § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a permits interest at 10% on an unpaid fee balance from the date of default.

Noble v. White, No. Cv 97-0575751, (Feb. 15, 2002) · filed 2002-02-15

The court therefore finds for the plaintiff as against the defendant on the complaint and the special defenses and therefore finds the principal sum due on November 1, 1997, the date of the default, to be the adjusted sum found on Plaintiff's Exhibit 15 $10,665.25 and interest in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a at the rate of 10% from November 1, 1997 plus a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.

Section 37-3a limits recoverable interest in a civil action to ten percent per year.

A.G. Associates v. Parafati, No. Cvn004-1808ne (Apr. 11, 2002) · filed 2002-04-11

Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a permits interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) and no more, per year, in a civil action. Paragraph 3c provides for interest at the rate of one and one-half percent ( 1-1 /2%) per month or eighteen percent (18%) per year: Eighteen percent is in excess of the statutory amount permitted. The plaintiff is awarded interest at the rate often percent (10%) per year on the past due rent, from April 1, 1997 to May 1999, in the amount of $8,828.30.

Section 37-3a does not set the interest rate when the note specifies a rate before and after default until the principal is paid in full.

Ocwen Federal Bank Fsb v. Spencer, No. Cv 00 74584 S (Aug. 28, 2002) · filed 2002-08-28

The court has calculated the interest owed based on the interest rate established in the note rather than pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a since the note sets the interest rate to be paid before and after CT Page 11071 any default and until the full amount of principal has been paid.

Section 37-3a allows a court to award interest at a discretionary rate of up to ten percent a year.

Nolan v. City of Milford · filed 2005-01-11

The plaintiffs sought interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a, which provides for interest at the rate of “ten percent a year, and no more ... in civil actions . . . .” That is not a fixed rate, but the maximum rate of interest that the court can, in its discretion, award.

Section 37-3a permits a discretionary interest award of up to 10 percent and sets no presumptive rate.

Paul Fiano, Sr. · filed 2019-09-25(a)

Section 37-3a does not ... establish a presumptive statutory rate of interest, rather an award of interest under § 37-3a is discretionary and a trial court, in its discretion, can award a rate of interest up to 10% percent.

Section 37-3a leaves an award of interest for detained money to the trial court’s equitable discretion.

Vernon Foodliner, Inc. v. Central Mutual Insurance · filed 1984-02-08

The allowance of interest is primarily an equitable determination to be made within the discretion of the trial court. ... We do not find an abuse of discretion in the court’s determination not to award statutory interest in this matter.

Section 37-3a leaves an award of interest as damages to the trial court’s discretion.

Perlmutter v. Johnson · filed 1986-02-25

Perlmutter’s cross appeal raises one final claim, namely, that the court erred in failing to award him interest, as damages on his award. See General Statutes § 37-3a. Such an award is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial court. ... We conclude, upon the record, that the court did not abuse its discretion in this case.

Section 37-3a allows interest as damages, and the award is primarily an equitable decision within the trial court’s discretion.

King v. Board of Education · filed 1987-04-28

The allowance of interest as an element of damages is primarily an equitable determination within the discretion of the trial court. ... On this record, we see no reasonable ground upon which to find an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Section 37-3a leaves prejudgment interest to the court's discretion, guided by whether money was wrongfully withheld and the demands of justice.

Center Ct. Assoc. v. maitland/strauss Behr, No. Cv-86-252381 (May 4, 1994) · filed 1994-05-04

The award of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a is an equitable determination that lies within the trial court's discretion. ... In our view the "demands of justice" under the circumstances cause this court, in exercising its discretion, to deny the plaintiffs' claim for prejudgment interest in this case.

Section 37-3a allows a court to award interest as damages for wrongfully detained money, but the court may deny additional interest when an award would be inequitable.

Loomis Institute v. Town of Windsor · filed 1995-07-11

In these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the taxpayer interest pursuant to § 37-3a in addition to interest awarded pursuant to § 52-192a.

Section 37-3a permits a discretionary award of up to ten percent annual interest for the detention of money after it becomes payable, subject to equitable considerations.

Munroe v. Emhart Corporation, No. Cv90-0379604 S (Sep. 7, 1995) · filed 1995-09-07

Plaintiff has moved for an additional award of interest under General Statutes § 37-3a which provides that (with certain exceptions) interest at the rate of ten percent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. The Court believes this motion should be denied. The allowance of interest is primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the court. Inasmuch as the court has already awarded interest pursuant to § 52-192a , it believes it would be inequitable to award further interest in light of the fact that there was a good faith dispute.

Interest under § 37-3a is discretionary with the court.

Jones v. Ippoliti, No. Cv 93 53116 S (Sep. 12, 1995) · filed 1995-09-12

It should be noted that interest under General Statutes § 37-3a is discretionary with the court.

Section 37-3a allows interest for detention of money after it becomes payable; a bona fide dispute over the amount due can justify denying interest.

Annetta v. Ianniello, No. Cv91 0115897 S (Jul. 18, 1996) · filed 1996-07-18

The claim is made under Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a . The claim for interest is denied. The standard for the court is whether or not there was detention of money after it became payable. The court finds that there was a bona fide dispute as to the amount due and does not award interest.

Section 37-3a permits interest for wrongful withholding of money; a good faith dispute over the amount owed does not warrant interest.

Landscape Mgmt. Ser. v. Farmington Plaza, No. Cv94-0539633s (Sep. 18, 1996) · filed 1996-09-18

Plaintiff's request for interest is denied because the court does not conclude that the withholding of the sums at issue was wrongful, but concludes that the sums were withheld as a consequence of a good faith business disagreement as to what sums were owed. Connecticut General Statutes Section 37-3a ; Cecio Brothers, Inc. v. Feldmann, 161 Conn. 265 , 275 (1971).

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest for the detention of money after it becomes payable, and the award is within the fact finder's discretion.

Post Road Iron Works v. Lexington Dev., No. Cv 95 0143463 (Feb. 24, 1998) · filed 1998-02-24

The plaintiff asked the referee to add a recommendation that prejudgment interest be awarded as authorized by General Statutes § 37-3a for the "detention of money after it becomes payable." ... It is well recognized that the awarding of prejudgment interest is within the discretion of the fact finder. ... Therefore, the plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest is denied.

Section 37-3a gives the trial court discretion to award prejudgment interest.

Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc. · filed 1998-06-23

We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award prejudgment interest because the reasons stated were consistent with the discretion given to it by General Statutes § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a leaves an award of interest to the court's legal discretion.

Michaud v. Quinn, No. Cvnh 9710-8476 (Jul. 9, 1998) · filed 1998-07-09

In the exercise of its legal discretion, the court declines to award attorney's fees pursuant to those provisions or interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest when equitable considerations warrant it, leaving the award to the trier of fact’s discretion.

Hoye v. Dewolfe Co. · filed 2001-01-30

The plaintiff cross appeals from the court’s denial of her request for prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a on the amount of the judgment not paid to her under the terms of the severance agreement. “It is clear that Connecticut case law establishes that prejudgment interest is to be awarded if, in the discretion of the trier of fact, equitable considerations deem that it is warranted.” ... We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award prejudgment interest to the plaintiff.

Section 37-3a permits a court to deny interest when an executor reasonably defers payment until the estate's accounts and obligations are clear.

Kalas v. Cook, No. Cv 99 71319 S (Oct. 23, 2000) · filed 2000-10-23

No interest is awarded under General Statutes § 37-3a because the death of Simmons made it understandably necessary for the executor of her estate to defer payment of these bills until a clear accounting and determination of responsibility could be made.

Section 37-3a permits a trial court to award prejudgment interest for the detention of money after it becomes payable, but leaves the award to the court’s discretion.

Phoenix Color Corp. v. Krause America, Inc. · filed 2001-12-27

The statute does not state that inter- est shall be recovered and allowed. The awarding of prejudgment interest therefore lies within the discretion of the trial court.

Section 37-3a permits the court to award interest as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable, subject to equitable considerations.

Grunsell v. Saaf, No. Cv00 033 85 14 S (Jan. 25, 2002) · filed 2002-01-25

Finally, the court refuses to award the defendant the statutory interest he seeks pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a which allows for the recovery of interest in civil actions as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. This court has the authority to determine whether to award the interest requested by the defendant. ... In light of the defendant's possession of the security deposit and the plaintiffs subjective beliefs about the status of the lease after August 1999, the court finds that it would be inequitable to award the defendant statutory interest as damages.

Section 37-3a leaves interest awards to the trial court’s equitable discretion, including consideration of whether the money was wrongfully withheld.

Medvalusa Health Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc. · filed 2005-05-17(a)

The trial court cited as its primary reason for denying the plaintiffs motion for interest pursuant to § 37-3a that the defendant had not wrongfully withheld the money because its arguments in opposition to the application to confirm the award and in support of its motion to vacate the award were not frivolous. This was an appropriate equitable consideration within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court’s decision, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 37-3a(a) permits a court to award prejudgment interest for the wrongful detention of payable money, but does not require an award even when the detention was wrongful.

Town of Stratford v. A. Secondino & Son, Inc. · filed 2012-02-28(a)

Although the court did not specifically find that the plaintiffs detention of payment was wrongful, the court’s discretionary authority meant that even if it was wrongful, an award of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a was not necessarily mandated.

Section 37-3a(a) leaves an interest award to the court's discretion when liability and damages are disputed in good faith.

Gianetti v. NORWALK HOSP. · filed 2012-05-15(a)

The same reasoning applies to the plaintiff's claim for prejudgment and postjudgment interest in the present case. ... Like the defendant in MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc., the hospital made good faith arguments as to liability and damages throughout the litigation, and the parties did not know if the plaintiff would receive a damage award until the trial court determined in 2009 that the plaintiff was a lost volume seller. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the plaintiff prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

Section 37-3a leaves an award of interest to the trial court’s equitable discretion; the court may deny interest when there is no evidence that the money was wrongly withheld.

Farmassony v. Farmassony · filed 2016-04-19(a)

‘‘Ordinarily, [t]he decision of whether to grant interest under § 37-3a is primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court. ... Our review of the record indicates that the decision not to award interest was not an abuse of discretion. The denial of interest is affirmed.

Section 37-3a authorizes postjudgment interest that accrues during an appeal until the amount owed is paid.

O'Leary v. Industrial Park Corp. · filed 1989-06-27

This post-judgment interest is authorized by General Statutes § 37-3a. ... The interest accrues whether an appeal has been taken and until such time as the amount duly owed has been paid.

Section 37-3a authorizes a court to award postjudgment interest at the legal rate on an amount a condemnee must repay after a compensation award is reduced.

McCarthy v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1990-05-01

The committee acting as a court had authority to award postjudgment interest at the legal rate.

Section 37-3a permits ten percent annual interest on an unsatisfied judgment from the judgment date.

Essex Hardware Co., Inc. v. Hayden-Bianco, No. 55770 (Aug. 4, 1992) · filed 1992-08-04

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the individual interest of defendant John J. Carta, Jr. in the partnership of Copp, Berall, Wellette, Carta Sluis, or its successor, is hereby charged with payment of the judgment rendered in this action in favor of plaintiff Essex Hardware Co., Inc. for $12,473.51 damages and $199.80 for costs, with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum per Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 37-3a , due from February 22, 1990 to August 4, 1992 in the amount of $2,587.50 for a total this day of $15,260.81.

Section 37-3a interest may be awarded in addition to interest under § 52-192a (b).

Gillis v. Gillis · filed 1990-05-22

The trial court did not, therefore, err in awarding § 52-192a (b) interest in addition to § 37-3a interest.

Section 37-3a allows a court to award postjudgment interest when money due has been wrongfully detained; the award is discretionary.

D.A.N. Joint Venture v. Mead, No. Cv 89-371058 (Jun. 17, 1999) · filed 1999-06-17

§ 37-3a is therefore the appropriate statute to determine whether or not postjudgment as well as prejudgment interest is to be awarded. a necessary predicate for such and award is, however, a determination that the party against whom interest is to be awarded `has wrongfully detained money due the other party'". State of Connecticut v. Lex Associates , 248 Conn. 612 , 628 (1999).

Section 37-3a sets a maximum postjudgment interest rate of 10%, rather than a fixed rate.

Weyel v. Catania, No. Cv 94-0361996 (Jul. 1, 1999) · filed 1999-07-01

The plaintiff claims post judgment interest at the rate of 10% in accordance with General Statutes § 37-3a . The defendants, however, correctly argue that this statute does not fix the rate of post judgment interest at 10% but instead establishes a maximum rate.

Section 37-3a makes postjudgment interest in a contract action discretionary and requires wrongful detention of money before interest may be awarded.

D.A.N. Joint Venture v. Mead, No. Cv 89-0371058 (Jul. 26, 1999) · filed 1999-07-26

Four superior court judges have held that postjudgment interest (other than in negligence cases) is discretionary. ... This court agrees and so holds. ... § 37-3a is therefore the appropriate statute to determine whether or not postjudgment as well as prejudgment interest is to be awarded. ... Therefore, the court declines to award postjudgment interest.

Section 37-3a permits postjudgment interest at a rate below its ten percent maximum.

Ham v. Greene, No. 322775 (Jun. 12, 2000) · filed 2000-06-12

In Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Board of Tax Review , 241 Conn. 749 , 756-66 , 699 A.2d 81 (1997), the court held that General Statutes § 37-3a does not fix a uniform rate of interest in all cases but establishes a maximum rate. ... In the absence of any evidence from the plaintiff as to what interest rate is appropriate, the court awards interest at the rate of 5.86 percent.

Section 37-3a permits postjudgment interest from the date of judgment, with the decision whether to award it left to the trier of fact.

TDS Painting & Restoration, Inc. v. Copper Beech Farm, Inc. · filed 2002-11-12

The determination of whether interest pursuant to § 37-3a should be awarded is a question for the trier of fact.

Section 37-3a limits recoverable postjudgment interest to 10% when a stipulated judgment calls for the highest rate Connecticut law allows.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Cromwell Crossroads Associates, Ltd. · filed 2007-03-29

Connecticut law does not allow for an interest rate of 24% in this matter. The applicable Connecticut law is Section 37-3a of the Connecticut General Statutes, which provides that “interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions ..., including actions to recover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a permits postjudgment interest at the trial court’s discretion; it does not award interest automatically.

Urich v. Fish · filed 2009-03-03(a)

This court previously has determined that an award of postjudgment interest is authorized by § 37-3a. ... As an award of postjudgment interest is discretionary, the plaintiffs argument that he is entitled to postjudgment interest as a matter of law is premised on a misreading of statutory authority.

Section 37-3a(a) leaves an award of postjudgment interest to the court’s discretion even when the judgment is payable in installments.

Discover Bank v. Mayer · filed 2011-04-12(a)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, this exercise of discretion is not, in any way, circumscribed in cases where installment payments have been ordered by the court. The plain language of § 52-356d (e), as well as its relationship with other statutes, makes clear that a judgment creditor may request postjudgment interest to accrue on a money judgment pursuant to § 37-3a, and that such interest, if awarded, shall continue to accrue on the unpaid portion of a money judgment in cases where installment payments have been ordered by the court.

Section 37-3a applies only when the parties have not agreed on an interest rate; a note’s agreed rate can govern after judgment.

Cadle Co. v. D'ADDARIO · filed 2011-09-06

Section 37-3a applies only where the parties have not agreed otherwise.

Section 37-3a(a) generally leaves an award of postjudgment interest to the court's discretion, even when it enters an installment payment order.

Ballou v. LAW OFFICES HOWARD LEE SCHIFF · filed 2012-04-10(a)

As we previously explained, however, the legislature expressly has provided that, under § 37-3a (a), awards of postjudgment interest ordinarily are discretionary, and § 52-356d (e), fairly construed, contains no exception to that general rule.

Section 37-3a allows a court to award postjudgment interest at a discretionary rate of up to 10 percent.

Salce v. Wolczek · filed 2013-03-26(a)

The court was not bound to apply these lower interest rates, and was within its discretion in awarding 8 percent, which was lower than the statutory maximum of ten percent. See General Statutes § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a(a) permits a court to award discretionary postjudgment interest when the contract does not specify a postjudgment rate.

Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts · filed 2013-08-06(a)

Having decided that it could properly consider the issue of postjudgment interest under § 37-3a, and not § 37-1, the court properly exercised its discretion to grant postjudgment interest at the rate of 2 percent pursuant to that statute.

Section 37-3a permits a court to award interest on attorney’s fees paid late during an appeal when the interest compensates the recipient for loss of use of the money.

Rostad v. Hirsch · filed 2014-03-04(a)

Given the court’s invocation of the well established policy underlying § 37-3a, as well as the undisputed fact of the award in favor of the plaintiff, the affirmance of the award in large part by this court, and the defendant’s delay in paying the award,4 we conclude that the court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did with respect to its award of interest under § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a permits a postjudgment interest rate of up to 10 percent, but supplies no default rate when the judgment omits one.

U.S. Equities Corp. v. Ceraldi · filed 2018-12-18

The court, however, did not set forth in the judgment the rate of postjudgment interest which, pursuant to § 37-3a, could have been 10 percent or some lower rate per year, and that omission precluded both the plaintiff and the defendant from knowing what postjudgment interest rate was to be applied.

Section 37-3a permits a court to exercise discretion over interest in a civil action, subject to a 10% annual maximum.

Longo, Jr v. Discover Bank · filed 2023-07-13

Under Connecticut law, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 37-3a and 37-3b provide that, in a civil action, the trial court may determine the appropriate postjudgment rate of interest to be awarded up to a maximum of 10% per year. ... In the exercise of its discretion under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 37-3a and 37-3b, and in accordance with the Court’s equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105, the default rate as set above is generally consistent with these provisions.

Section 37-3a permits postjudgment interest when money awarded in a judgment remains unpaid, including while a dispute over the award is resolved.

Anketell v. Kulldorff · filed 2024-01-16(a)

The court properly found that the defendant wrongfully withheld the $175,000 beginning on December 3, 2018, and that the wrongful detention continued until the court issued its decision in September, 2022.

Section 37-3a’s interest rate does not bind the trier when setting interest on a condemnation award; the trier must determine what rate provides just compensation.

Leverty & Hurley Co. v. Commissioner of Transportation · filed 1984-03-06

To cloak the committee inextricably in a statutory straitjacket in determining the amount of interest in condemnation actions would prevent the trier (the committee herein) from equitably considering this element of a condemnation award and thus preclude the committee from exercising its duty to comply with the constitutional mandate requiring “just compensation.” Accordingly, we find error in the committee’s decision that it was bound by the interest statute.

Section 37-3a does not require compound interest on an alimony arrearage; a court may calculate interest on the total arrearage.

Bruno v. Bruno · filed 2017-10-31

As the court noted in its memorandum of decision in response to her motion to reargue, however, ‘‘[t]here is nothing in § 37-3a that calls for compounding of interest.’’ In light of the court’s broad discretion in determining the amount of postjudgment interest to be awarded, the court’s decision to calculate interest on the basis of the total arrearage, rather than on the basis of each weekly payment over the course of several years, was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 37-3a permits interest on wrongfully withheld money owed under a dissolution judgment.

LaBow v. LaBow · filed 1988-02-02

General Statutes § 37-3a provides that “interest . . . may be recovered and allowed in civil actions ... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable . . . .” ... Because there is no statutory prohibition against awarding interest on a judgment in domestic relations cases, and because the courts may fashion remedies that are appropriate and equitable, and because the court found that the retention of the sums owed was wrongful, the award of interest in this case was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 37-3a allows 10 percent annual interest on wrongfully withheld alimony and child support arrearages.

Ford v. Ford · filed 1990-05-09

Since the defendant has wrongfully detained sums owed the plaintiff totaling $27,304, the plaintiff is entitled to recover this arrearage, together with interest at the rate of 10 percent per year or $7369.

Section 37-3a permits interest on an alimony arrearage only after payment is due and the money is wrongfully detained.

Crowley v. Crowley · filed 1997-08-05

Section 37-3a provides for interest on money detained after it becomes due and payable. ... Because the defendant is not required to pay any of the arrearage until December 1, 1999, the defendant cannot be found to have detained money that he has not yet been required to pay. Since there has been no detention, there can be no wrongful detention. We conclude that the trial court improperly awarded the payment of interest.

Section 37-3a permits interest on an unpaid child support arrearage established by a dissolution judgment.

Mish v. Mish, No. Fa92-0514088 (Apr. 25, 2000) · filed 2000-04-25

Accordingly, the court finds the child support arrearage to be $24,508.00 as of October 15, 1998. Additionally, the plaintiff demands interest on the. unpaid judgment. The court requested that each party submit a written memorandum articulating its position with a proposed computation of arrearages. The plaintiff based her claim on General Statutes § 37-3a . The defendant essentially conceded that if this court found the original arrearages unpaid, the plaintiff's computation was correct. Since the court found for the plaintiff on those issues, interest is awarded to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,586.70.

Section 37-3a provides a ten percent annual rate of simple interest on unpaid installments in family matters.

Bowers v. Bowers, No. Fa-87-0340254s (Dec. 21, 1999) · filed 1999-12-21

The plaintiff is further ordered to pay the defendant simple interest on any unpaid portion of the monthly installments ... due, at the rate of ten per cent per year, the appropriate interest rate in family matters, as established by General Statutes § 37-3a .

Section 37-3a permits interest of up to ten percent annually on overdue alimony when the payor wrongfully withholds payment.

Dowd v. Dowd · filed 2006-06-13

Because the record supports the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs exclusion of his K-l income from his calculations of gross annual earned income for alimony purposes was wrongful and wilful, the court did not abuse its discretion, and the award of interest was proper. ... The interest of $33,900 on the arrearage was calculated at the rate of 10 percent from April 15, 2001, to July 14, 2004. “[I]nterest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions ... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. . . .” General Statutes § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a permits a discretionary award of interest on money wrongfully withheld, including in a marital dissolution decree.

McKenna v. Delente · filed 2010-08-10

We disagree and conclude that the court’s award of interest in its dissolution decree on moneys wrongfully withheld by the defendant was within its broad power, under the statute, to resolve equitably property issues incident to the marital dissolution.

Section 37-3a permits discretionary interest on wrongfully withheld alimony and child support arrearages, calculated from when the payments became due.

Behrns v. Behrns · filed 2010-11-09

Pursuant to § 37-3a, a party seeking the payment of an arrearage may be entitled to interest. ... Under our law, the court could have ordered interest to run beginning with the first missed payment in 1990, with the base principal of the debt continuing to grow with each and every subsequently missed payment and with interest compounding. In the exercise of its discretion, the court, instead, ordered interest to begin in 1998, rather than from the outset in 1990.

Section 37-3a permits interest on a payable debt when the debtor withholds payment without a legal right to do so.

Berchem, Moses & Devlin, P.C. v. Town of East Haven · filed 2012-02-28(a)

The defendants’ obligation to pay statutory interest depends on whether the defendants refused to pay the plaintiffs bill “without the legal right to do so.” ... The defendants’ objections to the court’s award of postjudgment interest do not, therefore, suffice to establish an abuse of discretion by the court.

Section 37-3a permits a jury to decide whether to award interest as an element of damages.

Iseli Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co. · filed 1989-05-09

The defendant’s claim is meritless. “Our cases have recognized that interest, as an element of damages, is ... a matter within the jury’s province.

Section 37-3a interest requires factual findings that money was wrongfully withheld and when the withholding began.

Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London · filed 2008-10-07(a)

The jury did not make any findings concerning § 37-3a. Specifically, the jury did not find that the defendants wrongfully withheld money from the plaintiff beginning on March 2,1991. Therefore, the court’s factual determination on remand that the jury’s answers to the interrogatories set forth the requisite factual underpinning for an award of interest under § 37-3a is clearly erroneous.

Section 37-3a permits a trial court to award interest retroactive to an arbitration award on the amount ultimately upheld, even when the original award is reduced.

Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1991-05-14

The fact that the ultimate award, as determined by the trial court and by this court, is considerably less than that awarded by the arbitrators does not necessarily mean, as the defendant’s argument suggests, that the trial court could not exercise its discretion to award interest on that portion of the award that was upheld by the trial court and this court. The defendant has claimed throughout the litigation that there was no coverage whatsoever, and has had the use of the money throughout. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of interest retroactive to the date of the arbitration award.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on an arbitration award in a chapter 909 proceeding, subject to the trial court’s discretion.

Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh · filed 1991-05-14

Section 37-3a provides, with certain exceptions inapplicable here, that interest “may be recovered and allowed in . . . arbitration proceedings under chapter 909 ... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable . . . .” The proceeding commenced by Middlesex to vacate the arbitration award under General Statutes § 52-418, a provision contained in chapter 909 of the General Statutes, is unquestionably one in which the legislature intended that prejudgment interest might be recovered.

Section 37-3a allows interest on an arbitration award from the award date when payment was wrongfully delayed.

Bodner v. United Services Automobile Assoc., No. 31 26 95 (May 29, 1991) · filed 1991-05-29

The court finds that payment of money due and payable to Bodner by United was wrongfully delayed by United. ... Statutory interest on the award may commence from February 19, 1991.

Section 37-3a permits a court to award prejudgment interest on an arbitration award from the date of the award when justice warrants it.

Buell v. American Universal Ins. Co., No. 310385 (Oct. 17, 1991) · filed 1991-10-17

"[A] trial court has discretion, under General Statutes Section 37-3a , to award prejudgment interest on an arbitration award retroactively to some date prior to the date of the trial court's judgment affirming the award." ... Implicit in that determination is the conclusion that the prior date may be the date of the arbitration award. ... The court exercises its discretion to award interest at the statutory rate from the date of the arbitration award to the date of this judgment.

Section 37-3a permits a court to award interest on an arbitration award from the date the money became payable.

Kiper v. State Farm Fire Casualty Company, No. 51 08 61 (Dec. 10, 1991) · filed 1991-12-10

The basis for an allowance for interest on an arbitration award is statutory under the provisions of Section 37-3a . In exercising the discretion to award interest in this matter as an element of damages, this Court concludes that the money owed by the defendant to the plaintiff became payable as of the date of the arbitration award, namely, May 9, 1991.

Section 37-3a permits a trial court to award prejudgment interest on an arbitration award when the award was wrongfully withheld.

Lawrence v. New Hampshire Insurance · filed 1992-11-17

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the award was not wrongfully withheld by the defendant. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding not to award prejudgment interest under § 37-3a.

Section 37-3a leaves an award of interest on payable money to the trial court’s equitable discretion, including which amount of a modified arbitration award bears interest.

Stephan v. Pennsylvania General Insurance · filed 1993-03-02

Nevertheless, because this decision has increased the net award to Stephan by disallowing a reduction of $71,500 paid to others, and because the award of interest is within the sound discretion of the trial court to be made in view of the demands of justice on the basis of equitable principles, the issue of whether interest should run on the net award allowed by the arbitrators ($250,000), or the amount as modified by this court ($321,500), is a matter for the trial court to determine.

Section 37-3a allows discretionary interest on an arbitration award when money is payable and wrongfully withheld.

Buell v. American Universal Insurance · filed 1993-03-02

In determining whether to award interest, the trial court must determine whether the money involved is “payable”; General Statutes § 37-3a; see White Oak Corporation v. Department of Transportation, 217 Conn. 281, 302, 585 A.2d 1199 (1991); and whether the money was “wrongfully” withheld. ... American has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in this case.

Section 37-3a permits a trial court to award prejudgment interest from the date of an arbitration award if it finds that the insurer wrongfully detained money after it became payable.

D'Addio v. Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 1993-03-30

Implicit in that determination is the conclusion that the prior date may be the date of the arbitration award. The trial court has the discretion under General Statutes § 37-3a to determine when the amount recoverable was payable under the policy and whether the insurance company wrongfully detained that money.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest from the date of an arbitration award when the detention of the money was wrongful under the circumstances.

Spearhead Construction Corp. v. Bianco · filed 1995-09-05

In this case, we disagree with the trial court’s changing the date from which interest should run. Since the referee found that the defendants thwarted the plaintiffs performance it was not an abuse of her discretion to award interest from the date of the award.

Section 37-3a permits interest on a back pay award in an administrative appeal because administrative appeals are civil actions.

Ct Dept. of Correction v. Chro, No. Cv96-0559284 S (Apr. 24, 1997) · filed 1997-04-24

Statutory authority for an award of interest may also be found in General Statutes § 37-3a , "interest at the rate of ten percent a year . . . may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration hearings. Practice Book § 256 provides: For purposes of these rules, administrative appeals are civil actions.

Section 37-3a permits a court to award interest from the date of an arbitration award when money due was wrongfully withheld.

Kass v. Schless, No. 553375 (Jun. 27, 2000) · filed 2000-06-27

In the present case, the arbitrator has already included interest in the arbitration award, and in so doing implicitly determined that the money was wrongfully withheld. The court sees no reason to conclude that interest should not also be awarded for the time period after the arbitration award. Therefore, the court awards simple ten percent interest, on the pre-interest award of $27,407.28.

Section 37-3a permits interest for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable, including an arbitration award.

Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, No. Cv 99-0420529s (Jul. 6, 2000) · filed 2000-07-06

The request of the plaintiff to award interest pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a for the wrongful detention of money after it becomes payable is granted, retroactive to thirty days after the award.

Section 37-3a permits interest on a back pay award reviewed in an administrative appeal, which qualifies as a civil action.

Thames Talent v. Commission on H. Rights, No. Cv 00 504806 S (Aug. 27, 2001) · filed 2001-08-27

Second, the statutory authority for an award of interest can also be found in General Statutes § 37-3a , "interest at a rate often per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings . . . In this regard Connecticut Practice Book § 14-6 provides "[f]or purposes of these rules, administrative appeals are civil actions." ... This court finds that the CHO did not commit error by awarding interest in conjunction with back pay.

Section 37-3a permits interest to be awarded in arbitration proceedings.

Town of Columbia v. J.S. Nasin Company, No. Cv-01-0074739-S (Mar. 26, 2002) · filed 2002-03-26

General Statutes § 37-3a specifically permits the allowance of interest in arbitration proceedings.

Section 37-3a provides 10% statutory interest on a condemnation award from the date of taking.

Commissioner of Transp. v. Bakery Place, No. Cv 00 0503028s (Jan. 6, 2003) · filed 2003-01-06

Accordingly, as to Docket No. CV 00 0503028, 634 Main Street, judgment may enter in favor of the defendant, Bakery Place Limited Partnership, in the amount of $37,840, less the sum of $1.00 paid by the state plus statutory interest at the rate of 10% as provided in General Statutes § 37-3a , from the date of taking.

Section 37-3a permits prejudgment interest on an arbitration award from the original award date even when the award is later clarified.

Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance v. Underwriters at Lloyd's & Companies Collective · filed 2010-05-11

We also reject the plaintiffs assertion that “prejudgment interest cannot be awarded before—at the earliest—the issuance of the 2006 [clarified] [a]ward.” The plaintiff has provided no authority in support of that allegation. To the contrary, our Supreme Court has held that “atrial court has discretion, under General Statutes § 37-3a, to award prejudgment interest on an arbitration award retroactively to some date prior to the date of the trial court’s judgment affirming the award. . . . Implicit in that determination is the conclusion that the prior date may be the date of the arbitration award.”

Section 37-3a permits a court to deny additional interest when offer of judgment interest has already been awarded and further interest would be inequitable.

Munroe v. Emhart Corp. · filed 1997-07-29

Munroe contends that denial of § 37-3a interest because § 52-192a interest has already been awarded is not supported in the law. We do not agree.

Section 37-3a prejudgment interest may be awarded alongside offer of judgment interest under § 52-192a.

Paulus v. Lasala, No. Cv 87 0089213 (Apr. 24, 1998) · filed 1998-04-24

Moreover, as pointed out in Black v. Goodwin, Zoomis Britton, Inc., 239 Conn. 144 , 165 , 681 A.2d 293 (1996), our law authorizes the imposition of both § 37-3a interest and interest pursuant to the offer of judgment statute, § 52-192a .

Section 37-3a interest counts toward a plaintiff’s recovery when comparing it with an offer of judgment, unless the trier finds special circumstances of inequity.

Flynn v. Kaumeyer · filed 2001-11-20

We hold that such interest should be included when determining whether the plaintiff recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum stated in the plaintiffs offer of judgment except in the event that the trier finds special circumstances of inequity. The amount recovered by the plaintiff here included the 10 percent interest of § 37-3a, and that amount exceeded the offer of judgment made by the plaintiff, thereby triggering the imposition of the additional interest provided by § 52-192a.

Section 37-3a allows interest for wrongfully withheld money without proof that the claimant would have earned the statutory rate, and the defendant bears the burden of establishing a lower rate.

Suffield Development Associates Ltd. Partnership v. National Loan Investors, L.P. · filed 2006-09-19(a)

Accordingly, we reject that the plaintiff, to be eligible for statutory interest as a component of damages, was required to show that had it received the lender liability settlement funds immediately, it would have retained them, invested them and earned interest at the statutory rate. ... We agree with the plaintiff that when a statute provides for a presumptive rate of allowable interest, it is the defendants’ burden to establish that some lesser rate ought to apply.

Section 37-3a interest on a counterclaim is calculated before any setoff against an opposing claim that was not awarded interest.

Urich v. Fish · filed 2006-10-03

To set off one claim against the other before calculating interest would, in effect, award § 37-3a interest to the plaintiff when the plaintiff had not been awarded such interest and was not entitled to such interest.