Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-4-106

Section 24-4-106(4)'s briefing deadlines apply when the adverse final agency decision occurs after they take effect, even if the underlying request was filed earlier.

Warren Village, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1980-11-03(4)

Here, although Warren Village initially applied for a tax exemption prior to May 24, 1976, the effective date of the statute setting briefing deadlines, the final administrative decision adverse to the claimant was the Board of Assessment Appeals decision on November 3,1976, and the right to district court review did not arise until that date. Therefore, the trial court properly applied the statutory deadlines in section 24-4-106(4) and C.A.R. 31(a).

Section 24-4-106(4)’s filing deadline is satisfied when an amendment seeking APA review relates back to a timely petition stating the same substantive claim.

Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commission · filed 1980-12-15(4)

Therefore, although the motion to amend was filed approximately one month after the thirty-day period prescribed by section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), had expired, leave to amend should have been granted under C.R.C.P. 15(a) and, because the amended pleading related back to the date on which the original petition was filed, C.R.C.P. 15(c), the pleading, as amended, stated a timely claim for judicial review under the APA.

Judicial review under subsection (4) follows the Colorado Appellate Rules’ briefing deadlines, and dismissal for a late brief is within the trial court’s discretion.

Wilkinson v. MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE · filed 1981-06-18(4)

Under Warren Village, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, Colo., 619 P.2d 60 (1980), judicial review of agency action pursuant to § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1980 Cum.Supp.) is subject to time limits specified in the Colorado Appellate Rules. ... Dismissal for failure to comply with statutory time limitations for filing briefs is within the discretion of the trial court. ... In view of Wilkinson’s failure to file his brief within 40 days of receipt of the record and his failure to file within the 15-day period agreed upon as a quid pro quo for withdrawal of the motion to dismiss, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion here.

Judicial review under subsection (4) is subject to C.A.R. 31(a)’s briefing deadlines, but dismissal for a late brief is within the trial court’s discretion.

DuPuis v. Charnes · filed 1983-08-29(4)

Judicial review of agency action pursuant to § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10) is subject to the time limitations specified in C.A.R. 31(a). ... Dismissal for failure to comply with statutory time limitations for filing briefs is left within the trial court’s discretion.

Section 24-4-106(4) sets the briefing schedule for judicial review, but dismissal for a late brief is discretionary.

Lanes v. Scott · filed 1984-08-16(4)

Section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10) provides that the parties shall file briefs with the trial court within the time periods specified in the Colorado Appellate Rules. ... Contrary to the trial court ruling, dismissal was not mandatory. Rather, it is within the discretion of the trial court to dismiss a complaint for judicial review of state administrative action for failure to comply with the statutory time limitations for filing briefs.

Section 24-4-106 allows review of final agency action whether or not reconsideration is requested, unless the law governing the agency requires reconsideration; a voluntary request does not extend the time to seek review.

Cheney v. State of Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board · filed 1991-08-29(2)

Thus, the June 30, 1989, order was the final decision of the Board subject to judicial review, notwithstanding the filing of the motion for reconsideration and the Board’s denial of the motion. Consequently, the complaint for judicial review filed on November 22, 1989, was not timely.

Section 24-4-106(2) permits judicial review of final agency action despite an application for reconsideration, unless the agency’s governing statute requires reconsideration; a voluntary application does not toll the review deadline.

Jeffries v. Fisher · filed 2003-02-13(2)

Even if we assume that petitioner might be permitted to seek administrative reconsideration of the revocation order, filing such a motion did not toll the thirty-day period for seeking judicial review. The State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106(2), C.R.S. 2002, specifically provides as follows: Final agency action under this or any other law shall be subject to judicial review as provided in this section, whether or not an application for reconsideration has been filed, unless the filing of an application for reconsideration is required by the statutory provisions governing the specific agency.

Section 24-4-106(4) allows a timely challenge to appealable agency action, including an agency’s alleged refusal to stop advising licensees that association with a person could jeopardize their licenses.

Ainsworth v. Colorado Ltd. Gaming Control Commission · filed 2001-10-11(4)

We conclude that, under the circumstances presented here, the Division's alleged refusal to discontinue advising its licensees that associating with the petitioner might adversely affect their ability to maintain their licenses is an appealable agency action. Additionally, because the petition was filed within thirty days of the date of the meeting, we also conclude that it was timely filed pursuant to § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.2001, and Dep't of Revenue Reg. 47.1-208.

Section 24-4-106(4)’s thirty-five-day deadline does not apply when the Water Quality Control Act supplies a thirty-day deadline for judicial review.

Sage v. Colo Dept of Pub Health · filed 2020-08-20(4)

Therefore, the time to seek judicial review of the final administrative action is governed by the operative provisions of the Water Quality Control Act (the Act), §§ 25-8-403, -404, C.R.S. 2019, rather than the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § 24-4- 106(4), C.R.S. 2019.

Section 24-4-106(8) governs review of nonfinal agency actions under a higher standard than Rule 54(b) certification for ordinary interlocutory appeals.

v. Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment · filed 2020-03-31(8)

Section 24-4-106(8) governs appeals of nonfinal agency actions, and the OAC’s decision regarding the SWA defense was a nonfinal action. Section 24-4-106(8) reflects a legislative policy judgment that appeals of nonfinal agency actions meet a higher standard of review than ordinary civil interlocutory appeals under Rule 54(b).

Section 24-4-106 permits judicial review of final agency action without requiring a formal agency adjudication.

West Colorado Motors, LLC v. General Motors, LLC · filed 2016-06-30

The division concluded that “[t]he prerequisite for judicial review under section 24-4-106 is a final agency action, not a final agency adjudication.” Marks, ¶ 39. ¶ 39 We agree with the reasoning in Marks, and conclude that a formal adjudication was neither necessary nor required as a prerequisite to the Executive Director’s final agency action.

Section 24-4-106(4)'s thirty-five-day period for judicial review begins when agency action becomes final; a conditional approval is not final while a required resolution remains pending.

1405 Hotel, LLC v. Colorado Economic Development Commission · filed 2015-09-10(4)

Section 24-4-106(4) similarly provides for judicial review of final agency action; however, petitions filed under that statute must be filed within thirty-five days of the effective date of agency action. ... Rather, we conclude that final agency action did not occur until October 2013 when the CEDC adopted a resolution memorializing the terms of the award, pursuant to section 24-46-305(3).

Section 24-4-106(2) allows judicial review of a final agency decision despite a handbook provision calling that decision final.

Saxe v. Board of Trustees · filed 2007-03-08(2)

Here, the 2003 Handbook’s indication that “the President’s decision is final” should not be construed to limit a tenured faculty member’s right to judicial review of a dismissal decision. See § 24-4-106(2), C.R.S.2006 (“Final agency action under this or any other law shall be subject to judicial review_”).

Section 24-4-106(7) permits review of the outcome of a board vote as agency action, but not the individual votes.

Maggard v. Department of Human Services · filed 2009-09-17(7)

As discussed above, the seope of our review pertains to agency action. See § 24-4-106(7). The individual votes of the members of the Board do not constitute ageney actions. Rather, the outcome or effect of those votes is subject to review, whether or not the Board effectively upholds or reverses the actions of the appointing authority. See Hussein v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 124 P.3d 871, 872 (Colo.App.2005) ("In general, only a final agency action is subject to judicial review."); see also § 24-4-106(2), C.R.S. 2008.

Section 24-4-106(7) places the burden on a party challenging an agency rule to establish its invalidity under the listed grounds for judicial review.

Colorado Consumer Health Initiative v. Colorado Board of Health · filed 2010-06-10(7)

When reviewing a challenge to board or agency rules, we presume a rule is valid if it was adopted pursuant to a statutory rulemaking proceeding, and the challenging party has the burden to establish the rule's invalidity by demonstrating that it is arbitrary or capricious, a denial of statutory right, contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, purposes, or limitations, not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of [the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] or as otherwise required by law, an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous on the whole record, unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole, or otherwise contrary to law. § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2009; accord Augustin v. Barnes, 626 P.2d 625, 627 (Colo.1981); McClellan v. Meyer, 900 P.2d 24, 29 (Colo. 1995).

Section 24-4-106(2) generally requires final agency action before judicial review: the agency must have completed its decision-making process, and its action must determine rights or obligations or have legal consequences.

Chittenden v. Colorado Board of Social Work Examiners · filed 2012-09-13(2)

For ageney action to be final pursuant to section 24-4-106(2), it must (1) mark the consummation of the agency's decision-making process and not be merely tentative or interlocutory in nature, and (2) constitute an action by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences will flow. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the Order did not constitute final ageney action under section 24-4-106(2), and thus we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

Section 24-4-106 permits judicial review of final agency action even when the agency proceeding was not an APA adjudication.

Marks v. Gessler · filed 2013-08-01(2)

The prerequisite for judicial review under section 24-4-106 is a final agency action, not a final agency adjudication.

A premature petition for judicial review need not be dismissed absent prejudice, and the district court acquires jurisdiction when the agency order becomes final.

Denver Local 2-477, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers' International Union v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation District · filed 1999-11-12

Nevertheless, even if we assume that the Union's petition was prematurely filed, absent a showing of prejudice to the other party, we conclude that dismissal of the petition was error. ... Hence, we conclude that the district court acquired jurisdiction to rule upon the Union's petition for judicial review once the Division's order became final.

Section 24-4-106 does not permit review of a generally applicable rule before it has been applied to a person seeking review.

Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. AIR POLLUTION · filed 1979-03-19

We conclude that the adopted air quality standards are prospective only and are not directed specifically at Colorado Ute. They do thus not constitute final agency action as contemplated by § 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973.

Section 24-4-106(8) allows interlocutory review of an agency proceeding when a party faces irreparable injury and the agency acts clearly beyond its constitutional or statutory authority; expense and delay alone do not establish irreparable injury.

Colo. Health Fac. Rev. Council v. Dist. Ct. · filed 1984-10-22(8)

In Colorado, this requirement is included in section 24-4-106(8), 10 C.R.S. (1982), [5] which allows interlocutory review of agency proceedings if a party will suffer "irreparable injury" and the agency action is "clearly beyond the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency." The criterion of irreparable injury is not met in the instant case.

Section 24-4-106 permits judicial review of final agency action and allows interlocutory review only when the statutory criteria, including irreparable injury, are met.

Colorado Health Facilities Review Council v. District Court In & For City & County of Denver · filed 1984-10-22

Therefore, we conclude that the remand order of the board of health is not reviewable under section 24-4-106. It is neither final agency action, nor does it satisfy the criteria for interlocutory review.

Section 24-4-106(11)(b) requires a final order from the board of education before a teacher’s dismissal under the tenure act can be reviewed.

Snyder v. Jefferson County School District No. 1 · filed 1985-08-01(11)(b)

In cases arising under the tenure act, the “final order” described in § 24-4-106(ll)(b) is certainly the “order” of the board of education required by § 22-63-117(10), C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.).

Section 24-4-106(2) permits review only of final administrative actions. In teacher tenure cases, a board’s dismissal order is final even if back pay remains unresolved.

Lockhart v. Board of Education of Arapahoe County School District No. 6 · filed 1986-12-18(2)

Although only final administrative actions are reviewable by this court, § 24-4-106(2), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10); ... in cases arising under the Teacher Tenure Act, the final order subject to review under § 24-4-106 is the order of the board relative to retention, dismissal, or placement on probation as required by § 22-63-117(10), C.R.S. (1986 Cum.Supp.). ... Here, the written order dismissing petitioner was issued by the Board on December 11, 1984, pursuant to § 22-63-117(10) and is therefore final for purpose of review.

Section 24-4-106 requires a new request for judicial review after final agency action on a separate claim for interest.

Hurricane v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n of Colorado · filed 1989-01-05

We do not consider PERA’s contentions because we conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion, as the issues therein should have been raised by Hurricane in a new request for judicial review pursuant to § 24-4-106, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Yol. 10B), after final agency action by PERA on the issue of interest.

Section 24-4-106(11)(b) permits judicial review of final State Personnel Board orders; an interlocutory remand order is not reviewable.

Fiebig v. Wheat Ridge Regional Center · filed 1989-04-27(11)(b)

Here, since the Board’s February 11 order was interlocutory, this court did not have jurisdiction to review that ruling, and the notice of appeal was void.

Section 24-4-106 permits judicial review of final agency action when no specific statute conflicts with that review.

Flores v. Colorado Department of Revenue, State, Tax Division · filed 1990-11-08(2)

Section 24-4-106 applies to all final agency actions. Here, we have final agency action because the tax was determined, a demand for payment was issued, and there are no administrative remedies under § 39-21-101, et seq., to exhaust. Since there is no conflict with any other statute, the court properly had subject matter jurisdiction under § 24-4-106.

Section 24-4-106 permits judicial review of a board order that is final agency action, including an order issued after the board reviews an ALJ's initial decision.

Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Lopez-Samayoa · filed 1994-12-19(2)

Under section 24-4-106(2), 10A C.R.S. (1988), of the APA, any "final agency action" is subject to judicial review. ... We conclude that the Board's first order was a final agency action, and that it was therefore appealable under section 24-4-106(11)(b) and section 12-36-119(2).

Section 24-4-106(2) makes final agency action subject to judicial review; a tentative license is not final agency action.

Western Colorado Congress v. Umetco Minerals Corp. · filed 1996-05-02(2)

We note that the district court erred in basing its decision on the PLS/PL because that document — tentatively authorizing the license amendment — was not a final agency action subject to judicial review.

Section 24-4-106(4) leaves initial service of a judicial review complaint to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure; its mail notice provision does not authorize service of process by mail.

Bennett v. Colorado Department of Revenue · filed 2024-08-22(4)

Consequently, we hold that section 24 -4-106(4) does not authorize initial service of process for a judicial review complaint by mail.

An aggrieved party must commence an action for judicial review of agency action to obtain review of the agency decision on appeal.

Davila v. Merit System Council · filed 2000-03-02(3)

Subsection 3 provides that an action may be commenced by any person aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action. The plain language of § 24-4-106 thus requires that an aggrieved party commence an action for review.

Section 24-4-106(3) places actions to enforce final agency orders within the district court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

State Ex Rel. Colorado Department of Health v. I.D.I., Inc. · filed 1981-08-20(3)

The proceeding below was an action to enforce a final agency order under § 24-4-106(3), C.R.S. 1973 (as amended), and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court.

Section 24-4-106(4) makes judicial review of an agency order an original action in district court, rather than an appeal.

Tassian v. People · filed 1984-08-23(4)

An “appeal” is not the same as an “action for judicial review.” In contrast to this original action for review, an appeal is not a new lawsuit; it is, instead, a continuation in a higher court of a suit initially filed in a lower court where there has been an exercise of judicial power.

Section 24-4-106(2) permits judicial review of final agency action without a motion for reconsideration unless a statute requires one.

Foos v. State · filed 1994-06-16(2)

Thus, absent any statutory authorization for such a “reopening” right here, we conclude that the asserted right thereto was a nullity and that plaintiff was not required to “exhaust” such an invalid administrative “remedy” as a condition precedent to his statutory right to seek judicial review of the Department’s final order of revocation in this matter.

Section 24-4-106(2) allows judicial review of an agency's denial of a petition to amend its regulations.

Moss v. MEMBERS OF COLORADO WILDLIFE COM'N · filed 2010-05-13(2)

The denial of such a petition is subject to judicial review. See § 24-4-106(2), C.R.S.2009.

Section 24-4-106(2) provides judicial review of an agency’s denial of a petition to amend its rules.

Moss v. Members of Colorado Wildlife Commission · filed 2010-05-18(2)

The denial of such a petition is subject to judicial review. See § 24-4-106(2), C.R.S.2009.

Judicial review under § 24-4-106 does not preclude a separate § 1983 action.

National Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez · filed 1991-11-21

We conclude that the availability of judicial review pursuant to § 24-4-106 does not preclude this § 1983 action.

Section 24-4-106 provides the exclusive means of judicial review for a driver’s license revocation under the implied-consent statute.

People v. District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District · filed 1980-06-09

Binkley was only authorized to seek judicial review pursuant to section 24-4-106 of the “State Administrative Procedure Act.”

Section 24-4-106 is the exclusive means of judicial review for a driver’s license revocation under the implied consent statute.

People v. District Court of Seventeenth Judicial District · filed 1980-06-09

Binkley was only authorized to seek judicial review pursuant to section 24-4-106 of the “State Administrative Procedure Act.”

Section 24-4-106 does not provide judicial review of actions by state educational institutions administered under title 23 or their presidents.

Van Pelt v. State Board for Community Colleges & Occupational Education · filed 1978-05-01

Since, as the appellees correctly point out, the board and the college are “state educational institutions administered pursuant to title 23,” the APA by its terms excludes them and the college president from judicial review under section 24-4-106.

Section 24-4-106(7) applies to judicial review of agency rulemaking as well as adjudication.

Citizens for Free Enterprise v. Department of Revenue · filed 1982-08-09(7)

Section 24-4-106(7) does not distinguish between rule-making and adjudicatory functions of agencies for purposes of judicial review.

Section 24-4-106 provides the exclusive means of judicial review of proceedings to revoke a driver's license under section 42-2-203.

Crocker v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division · filed 1982-10-25

Section 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.), to which section 42-2-127(1) refers, is the exclusive means of review of proceedings under section 42-2-203 for revocation of a driver's license.

Section 24-4-106 does not provide judicial review of a municipal licensing director’s decision made solely under local law.

Two G's, Inc. v. Kalbin · filed 1983-06-27

The Denver Department of Excise and Licenses is not a state “agency” having “statewide territorial jurisdiction” as required by sections 24-4 — 102(3) and -107 in order to bring the director’s decisions within the ambit of review procedures under section 24-4-106.

Before the 1983 revision, § 24-4-106 supplied the judicial review procedure for appeals from state engineer decisions on well permits for nontributary groundwater.

State v. Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation District · filed 1983-11-07

Any desired appeals from a state engineer's decision taken prior to the time governed by the 1983 Revision must be made under the procedures set forth in sections 37-90-115 and 24-4-106.

Section 24-4-106 permits a party adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency proceeding to seek judicial review in the City and County of Denver when no specific review method applies.

Gunnison County v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1984-11-29

Since there is no specific method for judicial review of the Board’s ruling, where, as here, proceedings are brought for refund of taxes under § 39-10-114, we hold that the State Administrative Procedure Act applies. Under § 24-4-106, C.R.S., any party “adversely affected or aggrieved” by an agency’s administrative proceedings may seek judicial review in the City and County of Denver.

Section 24-4-106 does not apply to the Property Tax Administrator’s review of a county tax abatement application.

Valley Country Club v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1989-02-16(7)

We also disagree with defendants’ argument that the record before the Administrator was insufficient under § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A), to support a finding of no notice. Section 24-4-106 C.R.S. (1988 RepLVol. 10A) has no application to the Administrator’s review.

Section 24-4-106(7)’s substantial evidence standard does not govern review of a body that is not a state agency.

Pueblo v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n · filed 1992-02-13(7)

Because the FPPA is not an agency of state government, the standard of review is not whether there is “substantial evidence” under the State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106(7) C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A), but rather, whether there is “no competent evidence” under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to support the decision.

Section 24-4-106 does not control judicial review of a county property valuation when § 39-8-108 authorizes de novo review.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1993-09-09

Because § 39-8-108, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) allows a trial court to conduct a de novo review of valuation for assessment confirmed by a county board of equalization, the Administrative Procedure Act is not the controlling procedural statute.

Section 24-4-106’s record-review procedure does not prevent a plaintiff from bringing a separate action challenging a quasi-legislative regulation and presenting further relevant evidence.

Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. v. Colorado Ground Water Commission · filed 1994-04-04(6)

This is so because, since the Commission’s adoption of regulations constitutes quasi-legislative action, plaintiff would not be limited to a record review under § 24-4-106, but could bring a separate action in which further relevant evidence could be presented.

Section 24-4-106(4) calls for reasonableness review of agency rulemaking; a rule based primarily on policy considerations may be upheld without factual support.

Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Colorado, Inc. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Liquor Enforcement Division · filed 1996-05-02(4)

Explaining the “based on the record” requirement of § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (1988 RepLVol. 10A), the court held that the standard of review in the consideration of agency rulemaking is reasonableness. ... Here, defendant, in our view, properly based its actions primarily upon policy considerations without providing any factual support. The defendant could reject any adverse submissions by the public and adopt its rule so long as it was reasonable to do so.

Section 24-4-106 permits federal constitutional claims during judicial review of final agency action and requires a reviewing court to set aside action contrary to constitutional rights.

Amanatullah v. Colorado Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1999-07-22

Amanatullah also has the opportunity to raise his federal claims in the judicial review process. See C.R.S. § 24-4-106(11). “If [the court of appeals] finds that the agency action is . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, . . . or otherwise contrary to law . . . the court shall hold unlawful and set aside the agency action . . ..” C.R.S. § 24-4-106(7).

Section 24-4-106 governs judicial review of Ground Water Commission rulemaking on the agency record in Denver District Court.

Colorado Ground Water Commission v. Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. · filed 1996-06-24

Other provisions of the Act also confirm the General Assembly’s choice to leave Commission rulemaking review to section 106 of the APA.

Section 24-4-106’s judicial review procedures do not apply to a State Board charter-school order that the Charter Schools Act makes final and unreviewable.

Booth v. Board of Education · filed 1998-02-02

We recognize that the State Board’s order is “final and not subject to review,” § 22-30.5-108(3)(d), and that such order is, therefore, not subject to the judicial review procedures of the Colorado Administrative Procedures Act, § 24-4-106, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to affirm an agency rule unless the agency action violates applicable procedures, lacks substantial evidentiary support, or is otherwise contrary to law.

Sohocki v. Colorado Air Quality Control Commission · filed 1999-12-09(7)

A court shall affirm an agency rule unless the ageney action is, among other things, not in accord with procedures or procedural limitations of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act or otherwise required by law, is unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole, or is otherwise contrary to law. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1999.

Section 24-4-106 does not provide an available judicial review remedy for objections that the agency had no authority to consider when approving an action.

Denver Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1 · filed 2015-06-04

Section 24-4-106 generally provides for judicial review in the district court of final agency actions. ... Nothing in the Act authorizes the state board to deny designation for any other reason. Thus, even if we assume without deciding that the state board's approvals of the innovation plans were final agency actions for purposes of judicial review, the Associations could not have challenged the innovation plans on the grounds relied on in the district court or on appeal. ... Accordingly, the Associations were not required to seek judicial review of the state board's designations before seeking mandamus relief.

Section 24-4-106(8) allows attorney fees only if the court finds that a proceeding challenging an agency's jurisdiction or authority is frivolous or brought for delay.

Meridian Ranch Metropolitan District v. Colorado Ground Water Commission · filed 2009-11-12(8)

In any event, attorney fees are awardable under section 24-4-106(8) only if a court finds that a "proceeding contesting the jurisdiction or authority of the ageney is frivolous or brought for the purpose of delay." After considering the contents of the briefs filed by the parties and amici curiae, we cannot conclude that the appeal was frivolous or prosecuted for the purpose of achieving delay. Consequently, we deny the Management District's request for fees.

Section 24-4-106(11) directs that the appellate record be prepared under the Colorado Appellate Rules, with the party seeking review bearing the costs of perfecting review.

Ware v. Morgan County School District Re-3 · filed 1986-05-12(11)

The review action taken by the teacher pursuant to § 24-4-106(11), C.R.S., as permitted by § 22-63-117(11), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.), states that “the designation, preparation, transmission of the record to the Court of Appeals shall be in accordance with the Colorado Appellate Rules.” Therefore, C.A.R. 10(b) governs the allocation of costs of providing the transcript on appeal. Here, that could only be, at most, the cost of assembling the record, which includes the previously prepared and paid-for transcript, and presenting it to this court. We conclude that costs associated with perfecting a review are properly born by the party seeking review.

Section 24-4-106 does not authorize an award of costs against the State to a person seeking judicial review of an administrative hearing officer’s action.

Lucero v. Charnes · filed 1980-02-14

Under C.R.C.P. 54(d), “[c]osts against the State of Colorado, its officers or agencies, shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.” There is no specific statutory provision allowing for an award of costs where an individual pursues his right to judicial review of an administrative hearing officer’s actions under § 42-2-127, C.R.S.1973, and § 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973, and therefore the trial court had no power to award costs in the instant case.

Section 24-4-106 exempts an agency from paying a docket fee on further review in the court of appeals, and the agency need not pay one when filing an answer in district court.

Miller v. Charnes · filed 1984-07-19(11)

There is no specific provision in that section which exempts the agency from payment of a docket fee upon filing answer. However, § 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10), dealing with further review of agency action directed to the court of appeals, specifically exempts the agency from the requirement of paying a docket fee in that court. We conclude that there is no rational basis for requiring the agency to pay a docket fee upon filing answer in the district court but exempting the agency from the requirement of paying a docket fee in the Colorado Court of Appeals.

Section 24-4-106(4) permits prejudgment interest when an agency fails to honor a contractual commitment authorized by statute.

Colorado Department of Social Services v. Health Care Management Consultants, Inc. · filed 1991-06-06(4)

The final issue for resolution is the Department’s contention that an award of ... prejudgment interest was improper under § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Department argues that this proceeding is not an action for breach of contract and, thus, an award of interest is not warranted. We reject this contention. ... We view the Department as having failed to honor a contractual commitment authorized by the statute. We therefore conclude that an award of prejudgment interest was authorized as an element of damage.

Section 24-4-106(1) allows a board aggrieved by an ALJ's erroneous discovery order to seek judicial review.

Colorado Medical Board v. Office of Administrative Courts · filed 2014-06-23(1)

We reject Train's argument that the Board is not an aggrieved party under section 24-4-106(1), C.R.S. (2013), and her corresponding argument that the Board did not have standing to initiate what Train characterizes as an improper interlocutory appeal to the district court. The ALJ's erroneous conclusion of law led to its decision to allow discovery of protected professional review records, rendering the Board an aggrieved party for the purpose of this case.

Section 24-4-106(4) allows judicial review only when agency action adversely affects a party’s rights, privileges, or duties distinct from the state’s; a county social services department acting as part of the state lacks standing to challenge a Merit System Council decision.

Nadeau v. MERIT SYSTEM COUN. FOR DEPTS. OF SOC. SERV. · filed 1975-08-26(4)

Construing these statutes in the light of the ruling in Otero, supra, the right of the Jefferson County Department and its director to obtain judicial review of the action of the Merit System Council depends on whether they are parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges, and duties, as distinct from those of the state, are adversely affected by that action. ... The Jefferson County Department, in the instant case, occupies the same position as the Board of County Commissioners in Otero, supra, vis-a-vis the State Board of Social Services, and, in such role, it has no standing to seek judicial review of the action by the Merit System Council.

Section 24-4-106(4) does not give county social services boards or departments standing to seek judicial review of a superior state agency’s decision absent an express statutory right.

Martin v. District Court · filed 1976-06-07(4)

In Nadeau, the court of appeals held that a county department of social services is not an adversely affected or aggrieved “party” empowered to bring an action for judicial review of an agency action within the meaning of section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973. We now expressly adopt the reasoning of that opinion and extend it to include county boards of social services as well as county departments.

Section 24-4-106(4) requires a party to be adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency decision to seek judicial review.

Utah Intern., Inc. v. BOARD OF LAND COM'RS · filed 1978-05-11(4)

However, we also hold that the portion of the action seeking judicial review of the Board's decision should have been dismissed by the district court, since Utah was not "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the decision as required by § 24-4-106(4).

Section 24-4-106(4) requires a party seeking judicial review to be adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action; a purchaser who did not bear the tax lacks standing to seek its refund.

Washington Plaza Associates v. State Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1980-08-07(4)

Plaintiff does not allege that it has been harmed in any way by assessment and collection of taxes at a time when it did not own the property. It does not show itself to be adversely affected or aggrieved by the action of the Board of Assessment Appeals in denying the claim. One who does not bear the financial burden of tax suffers no loss or injury and has no standing to seek a refund.

Section 24-4-106(4) allows aggrieved parties to seek judicial review of agency action.

Colorado Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Department of Revenue · filed 1980-09-15(4)

The appellees are aggrieved parties under section 24-4-102(3.5), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Supp.), as they were exposed to potential business and economic loss due to the effect of regulation 42 6-134 on their ability both to acquire certificates of title to motor vehicles and to sell those vehicles. As aggrieved parties they had standing to commence an action for judicial review under section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Supp.).

Section 24-4-106(4) allows a person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action to seek judicial review without formally becoming a party to the administrative proceeding.

Town of Frederick v. Colorado Water Quality Control Commission · filed 1980-12-26(4)

Formal party status is not a prerequisite to a right of judicial review under § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Cum.Supp.), and by analogy, under § 25-8-404(1) and § 25-8-404(2), C.R.S.1973, so long as the concerned plaintiff can show that it is “adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action.”

Section 24-4-106(4) allows a person subject to an effective agency regulation to challenge it before the agency takes enforcement action against that person.

CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission · filed 1980-03-03(4)

Even where a regulation is of general applicability, and even where enforcement measures concerning compliance with the regulation have not yet been specifically against an individual, whether it be a permit denial, a cease or desist order, or the like, we can see nothing in the APA that denies standing to that individual to initiate a pre-enforcement challenge to the validity of the regulation, if he is subject to its demands.

Section 24-4-106 does not authorize the Division of Employment and Training to seek judicial review of an Industrial Commission decision on unemployment benefits.

Colorado Division of Employment & Training, Department of Labor & Employment v. Industrial Commission · filed 1983-02-03

However, even the court review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10) do not authorize the Division of Employment and Training to seek judicial review in this case.

Section 24-4-106(4) limits judicial review of agency decisions to persons; a state agency is not a person entitled to seek that review.

Maurer v. Life · filed 1988-03-14(4)

The statute itself provides that only ‘persons’ may appeal from adverse decisions by any agency, and ‘person’ is defined to specifically exclude any ‘agency’ of the State of Colorado.

Section 24-4-106(4) allows a county board to seek judicial review of agency action that injures the county’s own legally protected interests.

Board of County Commissioners v. Romer · filed 1996-07-11(4)

Here, however, BOCC is not suing under § 24-4-106(4.5) to vindicate rights of another board, agency, official, or employee of the county, but, instead, is suing under § 24-4-106(4) to vindicate its own right to manage the Pueblo County Budget.

Section 24-4-106(4), even when read with section 26-1-126(5), does not authorize a subordinate county agency to seek judicial review of its superior department's action.

Romer v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1998-04-27(4)

We further conclude that under the rule of Martin, the General Assembly did not confer to the county explicit authority to seek judicial review of the Department's action under any reading of section 26-1-126(5) and section 24-4-106(4).

Section 24-4-106(4.5) allows a county board to seek judicial review of agency action involving a county official’s duty or function.

Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission · filed 2003-09-25(4.5)

In addition, plaintiffs have a right and interest under § 24-4-106(4.5), C.R.S. 2002, of the APA to seek judicial review of agency action. ... Under this statute, a board of county commissioners may seek review of agency action that "involves" any duty or function of the named county officials. On its face, amended Rule 303(a) involves the duty or function of plaintiffs' employees relating to local governmental permits and land use approval processes.

Section 24-4-106(4.5) allows judicial review only to the extent an action could be maintained under subsection (4).

Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment · filed 2007-10-04(4.5)

Likewise, section 24-4-106(4.5) precludes review for the same reason, as it allows judicial review only “to the extent” that an action could be maintained under § 24-4-106(4).

Section 24-4-106(4) does not give a subordinate county express authority to seek judicial review of a superior state agency’s action without another statute granting that authority.

Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment · filed 2007-10-04(4)

Here, there is no identifiable statute that, when read in conjunction with section 24 — 4—106(4), provides express authority for Adams County to seek judicial review.

Section 24-4-106(4) authorizes an adversely affected person, including a county, to seek judicial review of agency action; a county’s separate statutory authority can support its prudential standing.

Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment · filed 2009-10-13(4)

We also note that, as in Douglas County, statutory provisions expressly permit suit. ... § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (2009) (authorizing "any person adversely affected" by agency action to "commence an action for judicial review"). Moreover, "person" is defined to include a "county." § 24-4-102(12), C.R.S. (2009); § 25-15-101(13), C.R.S. (2009). ... We therefore find that, read together, these provisions, combined with the County's "separate power" to issue (or not issue) a CD, satisfy the requirements of prudential standing in this context.

When agency action follows a hearing under section 24-4-105, a person seeking judicial review must have been a party to that hearing.

Colorado Division of Insurance v. Statewide Bonding, Inc. · filed 2022-06-23(4)

We reject this contention on multiple grounds. First, FCS, Libre, and Libre’s principal are not parties to this appeal. Nor were they parties to the underlying administrative action. § 24-4-106(4) (“[I]f such agency action occurs in relation to any hearing pursuant to section 24-4-105, then the person [seeking judicial review] must also have been a party to such agency hearing.”).

Section 24-4-106 provides a procedure for judicial review but does not itself create a substantive right to challenge agency action.

Butts v. State of Colorado, and Jena Griswold, in her official capacity · filed 2026-03-31

Relevant here, the State Administrative Procedure Act “does not create substantive legal rights on which a claim for relief can be based.” ... Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a legally cognizable interest that he can assert under the APA, and he lacks standing to bring Claim Five.

Section 24-4-106(4) allows a person aggrieved by agency action to seek judicial review, and that right can support standing to challenge a permit revocation.

StreetMediaGroup v. DOT · filed 2026-04-16(4)

Because StreetMedia has a statutory right to judicial review of CDOT’s permit revocation, StreetMedia has standing for its judicial review claim.

Section 24-4-106(4) gives a party 35 days after a final agency decision issues to seek judicial review in state court.

Grimes v. Bimestefer · filed 2020-12-04(4)

Plaintiff was entitled to seek judicial review of the Final Agency Decision in state court within 35 days after its issuance. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-4-106(4). Because Plaintiff opted not to seek judicial review at that time, the Final Agency Decision remains the final judgment for the purposes of preclusion.

Section 24-4-106(11)(d) requires an agency to be designated as an appellee when judicial review of its action goes directly to the court of appeals.

Family Trust v. Bd. of Cty · filed 2018-05-03(11)(d)

The Trust’s challenge to the Board’s standing (or ability to file a brief in the subject appeal) is misplaced. See § 24-4-106(11)(d) (mandating that an agency shall be designated as an appellee when judicial review of the agency’s action is directed to this court and ... 9 ... that the “docketing of the appeal and all procedures thereafter shall be as set forth in the Colorado appellate rules”); see also C.A.R. 28(b), (h) (discussing an appellee’s ability to file a brief and detailing related requirements); Capital Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Arapahoe Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 802 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Colo. App. 1990) (“[W]e hold that when judicial review of a decision of the [Board] is sought, that board must be joined as a party to such proceedings.”); cf. B.C., Ltd. v. Krinhop, 815 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Colo. App. 1991) (“Because a court’s judgment in de novo proceedings may affect the action of a board of equalization in the exercise of its constitutional duties, the board must be joined in order to protect its constitutionally conferred interests, to afford complete relief among all affected or interested persons or entities, and to assure the adequacy of the court’s judgment.”).

Section 24-4-106 requires a party seeking judicial review of a regulation to be aggrieved.

CF & I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission · filed 1978-10-12

On the record before us, we can neither conclude that we have a party “aggrieved,” as required by the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, see § 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973, or by the Colorado Declaratory Judgment Act.

Section 24-4-106(4) requires parties to the agency action who do not seek judicial review as plaintiffs to be joined as defendants.

Cissell v. Colorado State Bd. of Assessment App. · filed 1977-01-27(4)

Thus, we conclude that for purposes of judicial review in this case, the county board was an indispensable party under § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973.

Section 24-4-106(4) requires a party to the agency action that does not seek judicial review to be joined as a defendant in the review action.

Ricci v. State Personnel Board · filed 1980-01-10(4)

Applying Cissell to the facts of this case, we conclude that the University was an indispensable party, and had to be joined by the plaintiff.

Section 24-4-106(4) does not require a county to be named as a defendant in judicial review of a property tax exemption decision when the county was not required to participate in the agency proceeding.

West-Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper · filed 1980-03-17(4)

Thus, whether the county meets the statutory requirement as a mandatory party in an action for judicial review depends on whether the county should have been included in the administrative proceeding. ... Although the county is not barred from participation, ... the General Assembly has not required the county’s presence in these cases.

Section 24-4-106(4) does not make a person who was not a party to the agency proceeding indispensable to judicial review.

Denver Beechcraft, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1984-05-07(4)

By implication, parties not required to be joined under section 24-4-106 are not “indispensable” in the sense that the action must be dismissed in their absence.

Under the former version of § 24-4-106(4), a person seeking judicial review had to seek or obtain party status in the agency proceeding, though an agency could be estopped from enforcing that requirement when its rules and notice misled the person.

Colorado Water Quality Control Commission v. Town of Frederick · filed 1982-03-22(4)

Because we determine that section 24-4-102(11), C.R.S.1973 requires that a person seeking judicial review of an agency action under section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1980 Supp.) must have sought admission or have been admitted as a party to the agency proceeding as a prerequisite to judicial review, we disapprove language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

Section 24-4-106(4) requires an opportunity to add an indispensable party before an action for judicial review may be dismissed for failure to join that party.

Cold Springs Ranch, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources, Mined Land Reclamation Division · filed 1988-06-09(4)

An amendment of § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (1987 Cum.Supp.) now prohibits dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party until an opportunity has been afforded to an affected party to bring the indispensable party into the action. Colo.Sess. Laws 1981, ch. 276, § 24-4-106(4) at 1135. Here, that requirement has been met since the answers and briefs of the Division and Crested Butte sufficiently provided Cold Springs the opportunity to name the Board as a proper party defendant. Hence, the action should have been dismissed for Cold Springs’ failure to name an indispensable party.

Section 24-4-106(4) requires an opportunity to join an indispensable party before an action for review is dismissed for non-joinder.

B.C., Ltd. v. Krinhop · filed 1991-07-18(4)

Thus, under the current version of the statute, non-joinder of indispensable parties no longer requires summary dismissal of actions for review. More importantly, § 24-4-106 is no longer the controlling procedural statute under § 39-8-108(1), which now provides for a trial de novo instead of a review of the record made before the BOE as provided for by the Administrative Procedures Act.

Section 24-4-106(4) allows an affected party an opportunity to join an indispensable party before an agency-review action is dismissed for failure to join that party.

Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. v. Lost Creek Ground Water Management District · filed 2000-02-03(4)

Although § 87-90-115 requires service within 30 days of the District's decision, it is silent as to the consequence for a failure to join an indispensable party. Therefore, because § 24-4-106(4) allows for the opportunity to correct a failure to join an indispensable party, failure to obtain service on an indispensable party within 30 days also does not mandate dismissal.

Section 24-4-106(8) does not authorize an injunction against agency action when the agency had authority to act.

Evans v. Simpson · filed 1976-03-29(8)

The trial court was correct in its determination that it did not have jurisdiction under section 24-4-106(8), C.R.S. 1973, to enjoin the Board under these circumstances.

Section 24-4-106(5) allows a reviewing court to postpone agency action, but an order permitting limited driving does not postpone a license revocation when the court declines to return the license.

Donelson v. COLO. DEPT. OF REVENUE, ETC. · filed 1976-11-12(5)

While the March 19 order granted Donelson a privilege which the Department has no power to grant, see Creech v. State, Colo., 544 P.2d 633 (1976), the district court specifically declined to order the return of Donelson's license. Hence, that order could not and did not operate to postpone the effective date of the Department's revocation order.

Section 24-4-106 provides judicial review as a remedy for wrongful agency action and permits a state court to postpone the action’s effective date in exceptional cases.

Gilbert v. School District No. 50, Adams County · filed 1980-03-04

It is clear from an examination of C.R.S.1973 § 22-63-117 and C.R.S.1973 § 24-4-106 that the judicial review merely provides a remedy for wrongful state agency action. In exceptional cases the state court may postpone the effective date of the agency action.

Section 24-4-106(5) allows a reviewing court to stay agency action upon a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result.

State Department of Revenue v. District Court · filed 1977-09-06(5)

Under this statute, the only prerequisite to entry of a stay of agency action is a “finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result.”

Section 24-4-106(7) allows declaratory and injunctive relief as part of judicial review of agency action.

Jeffrey v. Colorado State Department of Social Services · filed 1979-08-20(7)

Thus, section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 1973, in effect, allows for declaratory and injunctive relief as part of the Administrative Procedure Act review.

Section 24-4-106(5) permits restricted driving during review of a license suspension only if the licensee expressly agrees that the restricted period will not count toward the suspension if it is upheld.

Tomasi v. Thompson · filed 1981-10-05(5)

We hold that it is improper to enjoin the suspension in such circumstances unless conditioned upon an express agreement by the licensee that the time when driving is restricted will not be credited on the license suspension period if the suspension is upheld.

Subsection (5) permits a district court to postpone agency action only during judicial review filed after final agency action.

State Personnel Bd. v. DISTRICT COURT FOR CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER · filed 1981-11-09(5)

The language of this provision clearly indicates that the jurisdiction of a district court to postpone the effective date of an agency action is limited to proceedings taken in conjunction with an action for judicial review filed after final agency action.

Section 24-4-106(8) does not authorize a court to halt an agency’s statutory proceedings before the agency takes final action.

Chonoski v. State, Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division · filed 1985-03-14(8)

Premature judicial interference, whether predicated on C.R.C.P. 106 or § 24-4-106(8), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10), violates the principle of separation of powers.

Section 24-4-106(8) permits a court to enjoin an ongoing agency proceeding only when the agency clearly exceeds its authority and the party seeking relief shows irreparable injury.

Envirotest Systems, Corp. v. Colorado Department of Revenue · filed 2005-03-28(8)

For a district court to intervene, the agency proceeding or action must clearly exceed the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency and the party seeking to enjoin the proceedings must show that the agency action will cause irreparable injury. ... Because Envirotest’s district court action did not meet the requirements of section 24-4-106(8), the district court should have dismissed it.

Section 24-4-106(4) does not allow venue in Denver when a special statute requires judicial review in a designated local court.

Air Pollution Control Commission v. DISTRICT COURT, ETC. · filed 1977-05-02(4)

AMAX claims that venue in the Denver district court is proper because the State Administrative Procedure Act, section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973, and C.R.C.P. 98 each allow venue in Denver under the facts of this case. The short answer to this argument is that special statutory provisions control over general procedural rules and statutes of general application.

Section 24-4-106(4) permits an aggrieved person to seek district court review of state agency action and treats Denver as the agency’s residence unless another statute provides otherwise.

Borquez v. State, Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division · filed 1985-09-19(4)

Section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S., of the State Administrative Procedure Act (the APA) specifies that, unless otherwise provided, any person aggrieved by state agency action may apply for judicial review in the district court, with the residence of the state agency deemed to be the city and county of Denver.

When C.R.C.P. 98 governs venue for review of a state agency order, § 24-4-106(4) deems the agency’s residence to be Denver, where the claim arises.

Farmers Cafe, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenue ex rel. Charnes · filed 1988-02-04(4)

Thus, even if we assume, as licensee argues, that C.R.C.P. 98 establishes the venue rules for actions under § 24-4-106(4) (but see C.R.C.P. 81), nevertheless, since the official residence of a state agency is deemed to be the city and county of Denver, licensee’s claim arose in that city and county.

Section 24-4-106(4) places venue for review of state agency action in Denver, but a specific statute requiring review in the licensee’s county of residence controls.

State, Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division v. Borquez · filed 1988-03-14(4)

Section 24-4-106(4) prescribes that jurisdiction for review of “any agency action” shall be “in the district court.” That section also is relevant to venue, for it provides that the residence of a state agency for the purpose of judicial review of its actions shall be the City and County of Denver. ... Since subsection 42-2-122.1(9)(a) explicitly directs that a driver’s right of review lies only in her county of residence, it is inconsistent with the provision of the State Administrative Procedure Act that, read together with C.R.C.P. 98, would place venue in Denver. Pursuant to section 42-2-122.-1(10), the State Administrative Procedure Act applies only to the extent it is consistent with subsection (9); therefore, subsection 42-2-122.1(9)(a) controls.

Section 24-4-106(4) treats a state agency as residing in Denver for purposes of venue in a judicial-review action.

Hastie v. Huber · filed 2009-05-28(4)

The plain language of sections 24-4-106(4) and 42-2-1835(1) leads us to conclude that, absent a specific statute such as section 42-2-126(9)(a), the proper venue for the licensee's petition for review is the Denver District Court.

Section 24-4-106(4) bars a declaratory judgment action used to obtain administrative review after the deadline for seeking review has passed.

GREYHOUND RACING ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN COLORADO, INC. v. Colorado Racing Commission · filed 1978-09-14(4)

Plaintiff's failure to pursue these remedies in a timely manner bars a declaratory judgment action. ... The plaintiff's complaint seeking a declaratory judgment should have been dismissed, since the plaintiff was thereby attempting to do indirectly that which was barred by § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1976 Cum.Supp.), and C.R.C.P. 106(b).

Section 24-4-106(4)'s filing deadline does not bar a declaratory action challenging a regulation as unconstitutional in its application after the regulation takes effect.

Collopy v. WILDLIFE COM'N, ETC. · filed 1981-03-16(4)

We therefore hold that a person, like Collopy, to whom an agency regulation is allegedly being unconstitutionally applied, need not defy that regulation to obtain a judicial determination of its validity, but may instead commence a suit under C.R.C.P. 57. An action for declaratory relief brought under these circumstances will not be barred because the time period prescribed by section 24-4-106(4) has elapsed since the agency regulation under attack became effective.

Section 24-4-106(4)'s filing period does not bar a declaratory judgment action challenging an agency regulation as unconstitutional as applied.

Collopy v. Wildlife Commission, Department of Natural Resources · filed 1981-03-16(4)

An action for declaratory relief brought under these circumstances will not be barred because the time period prescribed by section 24-4-106(4) has elapsed since the agency regulation under attack became effective.

Section 24-4-106(4) does not make judicial review the exclusive remedy for a quasi-legislative agency action; a declaratory judgment action may also be available.

Colorado Common Cause v. Meyer · filed 1986-06-05(4)

The question whether a failure to pursue the remedy provided in § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S., in a timely fashion precludes an action for declaratory relief under C.R.C.P. 57 depends initially on whether the agency action was quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative. ... Thus, even if judicial review had been available to Common Cause following Meyer’s ruling, such review was not the exclusive remedial vehicle.

Section 24-4-106(7)(c) does not require review of the entire administrative record before a court decides a standing question that turns on legal interpretation.

Defend Colorado v. Governor Jared Polis · filed 2021-01-28(7)(c)

The Colorado APA provides that, in reviewing agency action, a court “shall review the whole record or portions of the record cited by any party.” § 24-4-106(7)(c), C.R.S. 2020. ... Defend Colorado argues that whether its claims were brought under section 24-4-106 or C.R.C.P. 57, the district court could not rule on the question of standing without the full administrative record. We disagree. ... Neither element, however, requires a court to review the full administrative record. Instead, as discussed above, Defend Colorado’s standing turns on the interpretation of various statutes and regulations. Accordingly, the administrative record was unnecessary to resolve whether Defend Colorado has standing.

Section 24-4-106(6) limits judicial review of an agency determination to the administrative record.

Chostner v. Colorado Water Quality Control Commission · filed 2013-07-18(6)

Judicial review of an administrative agency determination is limited to the record before the agency. ... Accordingly, the district court erred to the extent that it reweighed the evidence and made credibility determinations based on information outside the administrative record.

Section 24-4-106 requires agency findings detailed enough to permit meaningful judicial review.

Chase v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission · filed 2012-06-07(6)

In summary, we lack an order with sufficiently detailed findings of facts, including assessments of the evidence and testimony, and conclusions of law-in particular regarding the number requirement in the DOAA definition-to allow meaningful review on appeal.

Section 24-4-106(6) does not require reversal for an incomplete hearing transcript when the available record permits review.

Shafron v. Cooke · filed 2008-06-12(6)

Although review of the Department's determination calls for a review of the record, the absence of a complete transeript, standing alone, does not mandate the reversal of an administrative order. ... Under these cireumstances, we conclude that the record is sufficient for review, and therefore reject plaintiff's contention.

Section 24-4-106(6) limits judicial review to the agency record unless a statutory exception applies.

Downey v. DEPT. OF REVENUE, STATE OF COLO. · filed 1982-09-09(6)

We hold, therefore, that, in a proceeding in the district court under § 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973, for judicial review of a Department of Revenue license suspension, the trial court is limited in its review to the record before the Department of Revenue hearing officer, absent the presence of one of the statutory exceptions.

Section 24-4-106(6) requires the court to allow a certified agency record to be completed unless the parties stipulate to a smaller record.

Harris v. District Court, Second Judicial District · filed 1982-12-13(6)

Finally, the Board requested supplementation of the record to include all matters required as a part of the record on review by section 24-4 — 106(6), including those matters not listed in Bedford Motors’ designation of record. The materials had been certified by the agency, and because the parties here had not stipulated to a record less than that required under section 24 — 4-106(6), the court did not have discretion to deny the Board’s motion to supplement.

Section 24-4-106(6) does not require a complete typewritten transcript of the agency hearing in the record on judicial review.

Schaffer v. District Court in & for the City & County of Denver · filed 1986-06-02(6)

We do not read section 24-4-106(6) as mandating that a complete typewritten transcript of the evidentiary phase of the proceedings before the agency be included as part of the record on review.

Section 24-4-106(6) defines the agency record for judicial review; that record does not automatically include a hearing transcript.

Cop v. Charnes · filed 1987-05-14(6)

The record includes “the original or certified copies of all pleadings, applications, evidence, exhibits, and other papers presented to or considered by the agency, rulings upon exceptions, and the decision, findings, and action of the agency.” Section 24-4-106(6), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10). “[T]he record specified in the statute does not include a transcript of the proceedings.”

Section 24-4-106(6) permits a reviewing state court to take evidence beyond the administrative record.

Crocog Co. v. Reeves · filed 1993-04-29(6)

Under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-4-106(6) (1988),1 the state court reviewing Plaintiffs ease was entitled to take evidence independent of the administrative record.

Section 24-4-106(6) permits a reviewing state court to take evidence independent of the administrative record.

Crocog Company v. Reeves · filed 1993-06-08(6)

Under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-4-106(6) (1988),1 the state court reviewing Plaintiff's case was entitled to take evidence independent of the administrative record.

Section 24-4-106(6) does not specifically require a transcript of agency proceedings in the record for judicial review.

Rigmaiden v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2006-09-07(6)

Furthermore, unlike § 24-4-105(15)(a), the record described in § 24-4-106(6) does not specifically include a transcript of the proceedings.

Section 24-4-106(6) requires the record for judicial review to include all exhibits and papers presented to or considered by the agency unless the parties stipulate otherwise.

Gilbert v. Julian · filed 2009-10-01(6)

The APA provides that the record in every case of agency action “shall include” copies of “all” exhibits and other papers presented to or considered by the agency, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties. § 24-4-106(6), C.R.S.2009. Because the missing documents were admitted into evidence as an exhibit in the hearing and the parties did not stipulate to their exclusion, the Department’s failure to include these items in the record submitted was improper, especially in view of licensee’s motion to complete the record.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to remand final agency action only when the agency acted contrary to law.

Ranum v. Colorado Real Estate Commission · filed 1985-12-12(7)

In a subsequent judicial review, in order for a court to remand a case in which' final agency action has been taken, it must be determined that the agency acted “contrary to law.”

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to remand an agency decision for further proceedings and grant appropriate relief when part of the decision lacks sufficient evidentiary support.

Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Bd. of Assess. App. · filed 1987-08-20(7)

Once the district court found that a portion of the BAA's order was unsupported by sufficient evidence, it had authority to remand the case for further proceedings and to afford such other relief as may be appropriate. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10). The district court's inclusion of a calculation proposal to the BAA does not exceed this authority.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to remand an agency decision for further proceedings and grant appropriate relief when part of the decision lacks sufficient evidentiary support.

County Board of Equalization v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1987-08-20(7)

Once the district court found that a portion of the BAA’s order was unsupported by sufficient evidence, it had authority to remand the case for further proceedings and to afford such other relief as may be appropriate. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10). The district court’s inclusion of a calculation proposal to the BAA does not exceed this authority.

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside an agency order if the agency abused its discretion.

Dodge v. Meyer · filed 1990-04-05(7)

And, under the APA, if the court determines that the agency has abused its discretion, as plaintiff alleged the Secretary did, the agency’s order can be set aside, as plaintiff requested. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to set aside an agency order that is contrary to the evidence and contrary to law.

Colorado State Board of Nursing v. Lang · filed 1992-06-18(7)

Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s order on this issue is both contrary to the evidence and contrary to law and must therefore be set aside. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to set aside agency action that denies a statutory right.

Western Colorado Congress v. Colorado Department of Health · filed 1992-09-24(7)

A court must set aside an agency action that is a denial of a statutory right. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A). ... Here, the record reflects that WCC properly appealed to the agency within 30 days and, thus, is entitled to a review by the agency. Consequently, when the Department issued a license to Umetco on February 10, 1989, it did so without authority, in violation of state law, and that license is therefore void.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to set aside agency action that is arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the agency’s statutory authority.

Lopez-Samoyoa v. Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1993-05-20(7)

However, pursuant to § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A), this court is bound to set aside any agency action which is, inter alia, arbitrary or capricious or lies beyond the agency’s statutory jurisdiction and authority.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside agency action that exceeds statutory authority or is otherwise contrary to law.

Bostron v. Colorado Department of Personnel · filed 1993-07-29(7)

A reviewing court may set aside any action taken which is in excess of the agency’s statutory authority or otherwise contrary to law. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106 does not expand a court’s power to initiate or compel agency action beyond the remedy available under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2).

Jones v. Colorado State Board of Chiropractic Examiners · filed 1994-04-21

We conclude that § 24-4-106 does not expand the power of the courts with respect to initiating and compelling administrative action beyond that available under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2).

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to reverse agency action that is arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by the record, based on legal error, or beyond the agency’s authority.

Ohlson v. Weil · filed 1997-07-17(7)

A reviewing court may reverse an administrative agency’s determination if the court finds that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority. ... Further, even if we accept the Department’s interpretation of § 8.590, basing coverage on whether an individual’s affliction is temporary or on the rental versus purchase price of equipment would be arbitrary and capricious.

Section 24-4-106(7) authorizes a court to set aside agency action that exceeds statutory authority or is otherwise contrary to law.

Colorado Ass'n of Public Employees v. Colorado Department of Personnel · filed 1999-10-28(7)

The district court was thus authorized to set aside any action taken by the department in excess of its statutory authority or otherwise contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits reversal of an agency decision for arbitrary or capricious action, lack of record support, legal error, or action beyond constitutional or statutory authority.

Miller v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2003-07-03(7)

The decision of an administrative agency may be reversed only if the court finds the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority.

Failure to file the required notice of intent to seek appellate review does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction.

Harris v. Regional Transportation District · filed 2006-12-28(9)

He correctly points out, however, that failure to comply with § 24-4-106(9) does not deprive this court of jurisdiction, and RTD agrees.

Section 24-4-106(9) permits appeals from district court judgments reviewing state agency decisions as allowed by law or the Colorado appellate rules; the applicable rules provide a 45-day notice period.

City & County of Denver v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1987-06-04(9)

At that time, therefore, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § 24-4-106(9), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10), governed appeals to this court in such proceedings. ... However, it is the provisions of the APA and C.A.R. 4, providing a 45-day period within which to file a notice of appeal with this court, which govern the district court’s judgment relating to the 1984 assessment.

Section 24-4-106(9) permits an appeal from a district court judgment reviewing a state agency decision as allowed by law or the Colorado appellate rules.

Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals · filed 1987-07-23(9)

At that time, therefore, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § 24-4-106(9), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10), governed appeals to this court in such proceedings. ... That statute allows an appeal from a district court judgment entered upon its review of a state agency decision "as may be permitted by law or the Colorado appellate rules."

Section 24-4-106(11)(b) does not authorize an extension of the time to file an appeal from a final agency order.

Martinez v. Colorado State Personnel Board · filed 2001-06-07(11)(b)

This court lacks authority pursuant to C.A.R. 26(b) to enlarge the time for filing an appeal from a state ageney "except as specifically authorized by law." Neither § 24-4-106(11)(b) nor § 24-50-125.4 authorizes an extension of the time for filing.

Final agency action remains subject to judicial review after a request for reconsideration unless the agency’s governing statute requires that request; an unauthorized filing does not extend the time to appeal.

Hussein v. Regents of the University of Colorado · filed 2005-05-19(2)

Section 24-4-106(2) provides in part: “Final agency action under this or any other law shall be subject to judicial review as provided in this section, whether or not an application for reconsideration has been filed, unless the filing of the application for reconsideration is required by the statutory provisions governing the specific agency.” ... We thus conclude that the Board’s August 22 order was the final agency action subject to judicial review, notwithstanding Hussein’s filing of exceptions and the Board’s September 22 order denying those exceptions.

Section 24-4-106(3) allows judicial enforcement of a final agency order only by or on behalf of an agency.

McGihon v. Cave · filed 2016-05-19(3)

Section 24-4-106(3) permits an action to be commenced for judicial enforcement of a final agency order, but only by or on behalf of an agency. The statute provides no method of enforcement for such an order by a private party.