Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state bank whose letter of credit caused consequences in a Colorado real estate transaction.

Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, Eighteenth JD · filed 1975-07-14

Petitioner Van Schaack contends that the district court erroneously dismissed the third-party complaint against Highland since Highland’s issuance of a letter of credit in a transaction that had a substantial connection with this state satisfied the long-arm statute of the State of Colorado, section 13-1-124, C.R.S. 1973, and the minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause. The respondent court contends that Colorado cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Highland because the bank has had virtually no contact with this state. We agree with the petitioner. ... Application of that test to the facts of this case reveals that exercise of jurisdiction over Highland is appropriate.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose guarantee induces consent to assign a lease of Colorado real property.

Giger v. District Court for County of Summit · filed 1975-09-08

For the reasons set forth herein, we now discharge the rule and hold that the trial court is properly exercising personal jurisdiction over this petitioner under the provisions of section 13-1-124, C.R.S. 1973, our long-arm statute. ... In executing the contract of guarantee, petitioner induced the Theobalds to furnish their consent, as lessors, for the assignment to Harold Giger of a lease of Colorado real property. ... In our view, the facts here amply justify long-arm jurisdiction over the person of this petitioner.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose purposeful activities cause consequences in Colorado from which the claim arises, when the connection makes jurisdiction reasonable.

Duckworth v. MM Cole Publishing Co. · filed 1976-06-03

Cole asserts, and the trial court so found, that the totality of contacts did not meet the requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction under the Colorado long-arm statute. We do not agree. ... Utilizing this test we determine that the trial court erred in deciding that the defendant did not have sufficient contacts with the State of Colorado for the assumption of in personam jurisdiction.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over an insurer doing substantial business in Colorado and its liquidator for actions concerning the liquidation.

Insurance Affiliates, Inc. v. O'CONNOR · filed 1981-09-22

There is no doubt that defendants are subject to jurisdiction under the provisions of the Colorado long-arm statute, C.R.S. § 13-1-124 (1973).

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident guarantor when the guaranteed obligation is payable in Colorado.

Panos Investment Co. v. District Court Ex Rel. County of Larimer · filed 1983-04-25(1)(a)

To require a guarantor to defend in the courts of the state where the guaranteed obligation is payable is fully consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Section 13-1-124(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who transact business or commit a tortious act in Colorado.

First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States · filed 1984-01-10(1)

That statute provides that personal jurisdiction can be asserted over nonresident defendants who transact business in Colorado or who have committed a tortious act in the state. ... Because the defendants have not committed tortious acts within Colorado nor have “minimum contacts” with the state, jurisdiction over them cannot be exercised by this court under the Colorado long-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state law firm whose representation involved substantial contacts with Colorado residents and affected their rights.

RAF Financial Corp. v. Resurgens Communications Group, Inc. · filed 1991-04-26

In summary, a traditional sense of fair play and substantial justice allows that K & L be subjected to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. K & L was responsible for discharging the claims of RAF and the individual Colorado plaintiffs in bankruptcy, and undertook a variety of actions in Colorado to meet those ends.

Section 13-1-124(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction when tortious conduct occurs elsewhere and its effects manifest in Colorado.

Cawley v. Mullane · filed 1979-02-08(b)

The fact that the result of tortious conduct occurring elsewhere manifests itself in Colorado is insufficient to invoke the long-arm jurisdiction.

A tortious act under § 13-1-124(1)(b) occurs where the injury takes place; purchase of the product in Colorado and the injured person’s Colorado residence do not establish jurisdiction when the accident occurred elsewhere.

Shon v. DISTRICT CT. IN AND FOR CITY, ETC. · filed 1980-01-21(1)(b)

Similarly, in the instant case, we must reject plaintiffs argument that a tortious act occurred in Colorado merely because the allegedly defective automobile was purchased in Colorado and the alleged defect injured a Colorado resident.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) treats an out-of-state act causing injury in Colorado as a tortious act within the state, subject to due process limits on jurisdiction.

Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court in & for the County of Jefferson · filed 1980-12-08(1)(b)

Although the subject tire was manufactured in France, the injuries allegedly resulting from that tire’s failure occurred in Colorado. Therefore, the “tortious act” standard of the long-arm statute has been satisfied if such a construction of the statute is consistent with due process of law.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) does not confer jurisdiction merely because a truck broke down in Colorado when the alleged tort concerns the contract and a refusal to pay for repairs.

Vickery v. Amarillo Freightliner Sales, Inc. · filed 1984-12-27(1)(b)

Here, the alleged tort relates not to the condition of the truck but rather to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the contract and its terms. The operative fact which is material to the tort is not the fact that there was a breakdown but rather was the defendant’s refusal to pay the cost of repairing the truck. Thus, no significance attaches to the place where the breakdown occurred. We therefore find no merit in plaintiffs’ argument that the tort was committed here because the truck broke down in Colorado. Thus, plaintiffs’ argument that § 13-l-124(l)(b), C.R.S., vests jurisdiction in the Colorado courts must, as the trial court held, fail.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose alleged deceptive solicitation causes a plaintiff to rely on it and suffer initial injury in Colorado, even if most damages occur elsewhere.

Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc. · filed 1991-10-07(1)(b)

For this reason, defendants' deceptive solicitation of plaintiff may be deemed deliberate "tortious conduct within this state" sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124(b) permits personal jurisdiction, to the extent allowed by due process, when a defendant’s acts outside Colorado proximately cause injury in Colorado.

Ruggieri v. General Well Service, Inc. · filed 1982-03-19(b)

Because the Colorado Supreme Court has held that C.R.S. § 13-1-124 is to be construed as asserting jurisdiction to the maximum extent permissible under due process, Colorado courts, and this court in diversity cases, may assert personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by due process over defendants whose acts outside of Colorado proximately cause adverse effects in Colorado.

A Colorado plaintiff’s economic loss from a product sold and damaged in Texas does not by itself bring the foreign manufacturer within Colorado’s long-arm jurisdiction.

Resources Investment Corp. v. Hughes Tool Co. · filed 1983-04-28

As stated, the pipe in this case was sold in Texas and the weld broke in Texas. RIC seeks, in effect, to sever the physical damage from its ultimate economic effects, and give jurisdictional consequences to the latter. ... I find and conclude that Breda is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Colorado’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) requires a direct injury in Colorado when the alleged tortious conduct occurred elsewhere; lost profits felt at a plaintiff's Colorado headquarters are insufficient.

AMAX Potash Corp. v. Trans-Resources, Inc. · filed 1991-07-05(1)(b)

Further, the injury in the forum state must be direct, not consequential or remote, and loss of profits in the state of plaintiff's domicile is insufficient to sustain long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) does not establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based on merely informational telephone calls.

Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. · filed 1983-05-27(1)(b)

Unlike a situation where specific misrepresentations have been made by telephone from out-of-state into the forum state, the telephone conversations here in question cannot be deemed to have constituted substantial action resulting in tortious conduct.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) treats purposeful or negligent conduct outside Colorado that causes injury in Colorado as a tortious act for personal jurisdiction.

Pace v. D & D Fuller CATV Construction, Inc. · filed 1988-01-25(1)(b)

Purposeful or negligent conduct initiated in a foreign state which causes injury in Colorado constitutes tortious conduct within the meaning of the lóng-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident in a tort action when the injury occurs in Colorado, even if the negligent conduct occurred elsewhere.

Doe v. National Medical Services · filed 1990-10-23(1)(b)

“[T]o exercise jurisdiction pursuant to section 13-1-124 over a nonresident defendant in a tort action, the injury itself must have occurred in Colorado, even if the negligent conduct ... occurred in another state.” ... The injuries alleged here, including loss of employment, occurred in Colorado. Thus, the requirements of section 13—1—124(l)(b) are met.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction based on a tortious act causing injury in Colorado, but the plaintiff must plead sufficient evidence of the alleged tort.

Sirbaugh v. Brace K. Case and Marilyn Case · filed 1991-12-19(1)(b)

The pleadings reveal that the only possible basis for jurisdiction under this statute is that defendants committed a tortious act within the state. ... We hold that plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient evidence of negligent entrustment under Colorado law as set forth in Halstead v. Peterson, 797 P.2d 801 (Colo.Ct.App.1990), to merit requiring Darton Case's parents to appear in a Colorado court to defend the allegations brought by plaintiff.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) permits personal jurisdiction when tortious conduct outside Colorado causes injury in Colorado.

First Entertainment, Inc. v. Firth · filed 1995-04-24(1)(b)

To satisfy the requirements for the assertion of statutory jurisdiction under § 13-l-124(1)(b), the tortious act constituting the cause of injury need not have occurred in Colorado; it is sufficient that the resulting injury occurs in Colorado.

When tortious conduct occurs outside Colorado, section 13-1-124(1)(b) requires a direct injury in Colorado; economic effects felt there solely because the plaintiff resides there are insufficient.

Wenz v. Memery Crystal · filed 1995-05-31(1)(b)

That Wenz may be economically impacted in Colorado, simply because he lives there, is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under subsection (l)(b) of the Colorado long-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) permits personal jurisdiction for tortious conduct outside Colorado that causes injury in Colorado, if the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of that injury.

Encore Productions, Inc. v. Promise Keepers · filed 1999-06-30(1)(b)

Second, Encore has also failed to demonstrate that any tortious conduct initiated by Mr. Whalen in another state caused injury in Colorado sufficient to invoke long arm jurisdiction under C.R.S. 13-1-124(1)(b).

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) requires a direct injury in Colorado when the alleged tortious conduct occurred elsewhere; economic impact felt by a Colorado plaintiff is insufficient.

National Business Brokers, Ltd. v. Jim Williamson Productions, Inc. · filed 2000-08-31(1)(b)

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot rely on the tortious conduct provision of Colorado’s long-arm statute to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction over Williamson and JWP in this case.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for tortious conduct only when the injury itself occurs in Colorado and is direct rather than consequential or remote.

National Business Brokers, Ltd. v. Jim Williamson Productions, Inc. · filed 2001-08-14(1)(b)

NBB also claims that the district court erred in refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over Williamson and JWP under the tortious conduct provision of Colorado’s long-arm statute, see C.R.S. § 13-1-124(1)(b). We disagree. ... Thus, the fact that a Colorado resident sustains a loss of profits in Colorado as a result of a ... tort that occurred elsewhere is insufficient to sustain long-arm jurisdiction under the Colorado statute.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when tortious conduct occurs in Colorado or tortious conduct begun elsewhere causes injury in Colorado.

International Beauty Products, LLC v. Beveridge · filed 2005-12-02(1)(a)

In Colorado, minimum contacts are satisfied: “(1) tortious conduct occurs in Colorado; or (2) tortious conduct initiated in another state causes injury in Colorado.” Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-1-124(1)(a); Nat’l Union Fire, 115 F.Supp.2d at 1236 (citation omitted).

The tortious act provision does not confer jurisdiction when the injury occurs abroad and a Colorado plaintiff experiences only incidental economic consequences in Colorado.

Grynberg v. IVANHOE ENERGY, INC. · filed 2010-01-28

Plaintiffs allege no injury beyond mere incidental economic injury from the loss of their rights in another country, an injury that is insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts prong.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) does not authorize personal jurisdiction based on a tortious act when no tortious act occurred in Colorado.

Dart International, Inc. v. Interactive Target Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-02-28(1)(b)

Consequently, personal jurisdiction over Interactive is lacking under C.R.S. § 13 — 1—124(l)(b) because no tortious act was committed in Colorado.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) permits personal jurisdiction when either the alleged tortious conduct or the resulting injury occurs in Colorado.

Vogan v. County of San Diego · filed 2008-07-24(1)(b)

Here, the tortious conduct alleged against defendants falls within subsection (1)(b) of the long-arm statute. The long-arm statute is satisfied if either the tortious conduct or the resulting injury occurs in Colorado. Id. at 285-36. The amended complaint sufficiently alleges that plaintiff was damaged in Colorado by defendants' tortious conduct.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) provides long-arm jurisdiction for the alleged commission of a tortious act in Colorado, subject to due process limits.

Etchieson v. CENTRAL PURCHASING, LLC · filed 2010-04-15(1)(b)

However, because Colorado’s long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum limits allowed by due process, ... we note that here there is statutory long-arm jurisdiction for the alleged commission of a tortious act, ... and proceed directly to determining whether exercising jurisdiction over Precision is consistent with due process.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose tortious conduct and resulting injury occur in Colorado.

J.L. v. Best Western International, Inc. · filed 2021-02-24(1)(b)

Best Western’s allegedly tortious conduct and the attendant injuries that plaintiff allegedly suffered both occurred in Colorado, satisfying Colorado’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124(1) extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Due Process Clause permits, regardless of the claim brought.

Samuelson v. Aptiv U.S. Services General Partnership · filed 2026-03-20(1)

Personal jurisdiction in this case is governed by Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124(1), which “confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent with the Due Process Clause.” See Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070. Thus, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction that is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause, regardless of the claims that a plaintiff may bring.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent permitted by due process.

Ruiz-Paramo v. Aroma360, LLC · filed 2026-06-09

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose purposeful Colorado activities relate to a contract to buy Colorado land, within the limits of due process.

Dwyer v. District Court, Sixth Judicial District · filed 1975-03-10

Respondent maintains that the reach of the Colorado Long Arm statute, 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 37-1-26, extends to petitioner in this case, and exercise of jurisdiction over him is consistent with the protections afforded by the due process clause. We agree.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits, which requires sufficient contacts between the defendant and Colorado.

Expotrade, Ltd. v. Dominguez · filed 1979-05-03(1)(a)

This section has been interpreted as extending the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts to the “fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . .” Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1969). ... Therefore, the only question which must be determined is whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the protection provided by the due process clause.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by due process.

Associated Inns & Restaurant Co. of America v. Development Associates · filed 1981-06-08(1)(a)

The Colorado Supreme Court interpretation of Colorado’s long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the Due Process Clause, Mr. Steak, Inc. v. District Court, 194 Colo. 519, 521, 574 P.2d 95, 96 (1978) (citing Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968)), so these two tests are now congruous.

A note executed outside Colorado but payable in Denver can establish the purposeful contacts needed for personal jurisdiction under section 13-1-124.

Kingston v. Brussat · filed 1988-08-09

When a defendant acting outside of the forum state, executes a note that expressly obligates him to pay money to a resident inside the forum state, he may be properly sued on that obligation in the forum state. ... Brussat’s execution of the note was a purposeful act. Clearly, it was contemplated that performance or nonperformance on the note would cause important consequences in the state of Colorado. The single act of executing the note constituted a substantial enough connection to render exercise of jurisdiction over Brussat reasonable in the circumstances.

A timely challenge to personal jurisdiction under § 13-1-124(1) requires a hearing or appropriate consideration of the jurisdictional issue before judgment.

Paymar v. Cann · filed 1991-05-09(1)

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over him, pursuant to § 13-1-124(1), without conducting any hearing on the factual issues raised by the parties’ pleadings regarding that issue. We agree. ... Thus, because no hearing or appropriate consideration of the jurisdictional issue was afforded to defendant prior to entry of judgment on the arbitration award, that judgment cannot stand.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as federal due process permits, which requires a substantial connection with Colorado.

Beckman v. Carlson · filed 1983-01-17

The Colorado long-arm statute has been interpreted to extend the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts to the fullest extent permitted by the United States Constitution. ... Although the defendants may have caused important consequences to persons in Colorado, they did not have any substantial contacts with Colorado. I find and conclude, therefore, that they are not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court.

Section 13-1-124(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant who engaged in none of the acts it enumerates.

In Re the Marriage of Ness · filed 1988-07-07(1)

However, the long-arm statute does not operate to confer personal jurisdiction here since defendant did not engage in any of the acts enumerated therein.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Fischer v. BMW of N. Am., LLC · filed 2019-03-25

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when exercising jurisdiction complies with due process.

Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen · filed 1994-11-07

Because the Colorado long-arm statute ... is “coextensive with constitutional limitations imposed by the due process clause,” ... the statute allows jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if jurisdiction complies with due process.

Colorado’s long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent allowed by Fourteenth Amendment due process.

Greenberg v. Greenberg · filed 1997-02-14

By enacting its long-arm statute, C.R.S. 13-1-124, “the Colorado legislature intended to extend the jurisdiction of [its] courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” ... Because Colorado case law extends its jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution, “[my] only concern is whether ... maintenance of the suit ... would ... offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Section 13-1-124(1) extends Colorado courts’ personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.

CGC HOLDING CO., LLC v. Hutchens · filed 2011-11-01(1)

The statute was intended to extend the jurisdiction of Colorado courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits jurisdiction over defendants who transact business in Colorado, to the full extent allowed by federal law.

Rocky Mountain Chipseal, LLC v. Sherman County · filed 2012-01-19(1)(a)

Hence, the first step in the analysis is examining Colorado’s long-arm statute. That statute permits exercising jurisdiction over defendants who transact business in the state. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-1-124(1)(a). It is construed to grant personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted under federal law.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Klein Frank, P.C. v. Girards · filed 2013-03-18

The Colorado long arm statute, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by constitutional due process.

Spaceco Business Solutions, Inc. v. Mass Engineered Design, Inc. · filed 2013-04-29

Colorado’s “long-arm” statute, C.R.S. § 13-1-124, has been interpreted to confer the maximum jurisdiction permitted by constitutional due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado courts’ personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent permitted by constitutional due process.

Giduck v. Niblett · filed 2014-07-03

Colorado’s long-arm statute confers the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions; therefore, if a plaintiff satisfies the constitutional requirements, Colorado’s long-arm requirements are also satisfied.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits.

Cloudpath Networks, Inc. v. SecureW2 B.V. · filed 2016-01-13

Colorado’s long-arm statute “confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent with the Due Process Clause.” Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Colo.2005) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124). Thus, the Court need only address the constitutional question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the relevant defendant comports with due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado courts’ personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum extent allowed by due process.

Rome v. Reyes · filed 2017-06-15

Because the long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the Due Process Clause, the due process inquiry is controlling.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.

Basf Corp. v. Willowood, LLC · filed 2019-01-14(1)(a)-(b)

Colorado's long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause, and therefore, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry.

Section 13-1-124 does not confer personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff alleges no facts connecting the defendants' actions to Colorado.

No. 95-1438 · filed 1996-09-25

He alleges no actions on the part of defendants which involved the state of Colorado, and he alleges no facts under which the Colorado long-arm statute could confer jurisdiction.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by due process, but requires sufficient contacts with Colorado.

Pandaw America, Inc. v. Pandaw Cruises India Pvt. Ltd. · filed 2012-02-06

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Colorado so as to subject Defendants to personal jurisdiction under the Colorado long-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted by federal due process.

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. CO. OF PITTS. v. Kozeny · filed 2000-06-23

By enacting its long-arm statute, § 13-1-124, C.R.S., "the Colorado legislature intended to extend the jurisdiction of [its] courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution." Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Colo.1980). See also Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo.). Because Colorado case law extends its jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution, "[my] only concern is whether ... maintenance of the suit ... would ... offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Kuenzle, 102 F.3d at 455 (Wyoming long-arm statute) quoting Shanks v. Westland Equip. & Parts. Co., 668 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir.1982).

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents based on business transacted and alleged tortious acts committed in Colorado.

Ziegler v. Inabata of America, Inc. · filed 2004-04-12

Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, personal jurisdiction over Defendants also exists based upon the business Defendants transacted and the alleged tortious acts they have committed within the State of Colorado.

Section 13-1-124 applies to personal jurisdiction in administrative subpoena enforcement proceedings against nonresidents, subject to due process and purposeful availment.

Tulips Investments, LLC v. State of Colorado ex rel.Suthers, Colorado Attorney General · filed 2015-01-12

Certainly, an out-of-state person may invoke lack of personal jurisdiction in a trial court subpoena enforcement proceeding. The principles of International Shoe and Colorado's long-arm statute, section 13-1-124, C.R.S. (2014), apply. Due process requires "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154. We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court that issuing and enforcing administrative subpoenas against nonresidents is a due process concern and is limited to requiring the attendance of those who have purposefully availed themselves of entering the State's commercial market. See Silverman, 661 A.2d at 1276.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado's personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by constitutional due process.

Warad West, LLC v. Sorin CRM USA Inc. · filed 2015-08-11

Colorado’s long-arm statute “confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent with the Due Process Clause.” Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Colo.2005) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124).

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado courts’ personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc. · filed 2017-12-15

Colorado’s long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, extends jurisdiction to the Constitution’s full extent. Benton, 375 F.3d at 1075; Mr. Steak, Inc. v. District Court, 574 P.2d 95, 96 (Colo. 1978) (en banc).

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) confers jurisdiction over claims arising from business transactions in Colorado to the maximum extent permitted by due process.

Dorsey & Whitney LLP v. RegScan, Inc · filed 2018-02-22(1)(a)

Colorado’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from “[t]he transaction of any business within this state” to the maximum extent permitted by the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. § 13-1-124(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017; Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 14; Archangel Diamond Corp., 123 P.3d at 1193. This constitutional overlay means that a plaintiff desiring to invoke a Colorado court’s jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must show that doing so comports with the long-arm statute and due process.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b) allows Colorado courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a tortious act in Colorado when the cause of action relates to that act.

Parocha v. Parocha · filed 2018-05-21(1)(b)

Thus, we hold that an out-of-state party’s harassment of, threatening of, or attempt to coerce an individual known by the non-resident to be located in Colorado is a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under our long-arm statute.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by due process.

Fairbrother v. American Monument Foundation, LLC · filed 2004-08-27

The Colorado long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the fullest extent consistent with due process of law. ... Consequently, because the long-arm statute imposes no greater limitation than federal due process, I proceed directly to the constitutional analysis.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado courts’ personal jurisdiction over nonresidents as far as due process permits.

Memoryten, Inc. v. LV Administrative Services, Inc. · filed 2013-04-30

In Colorado, the state’s long arm statute “confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent with the Due Process Clause.” Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Colo.2005) (referring to Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-1-124). Thus, the Court need only address the constitutional question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants comports with due process.

Section 13-1-124 authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent federal due process permits it.

Matthys v. Narconon Fresh Start · filed 2015-05-04

“Colorado’s long arm statute is coextensive with constitutional limitations imposed by the due process clause. Therefore, if jurisdiction is consistent with the due process clause, Colorado’s long arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,” Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1075 (10th Cir.2004); accord Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Colo.2002) (citing Colo.Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1-124(1)(a)-(b)). So the relevant inquiry here is whether exercising personal jurisdiction over ABLE and NI comports with due process, a question of federal law.

Colorado’s long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction as far as state and federal due process allow, so a court need not analyze the statute separately when due process is satisfied.

Boustred v. Align Corporation Limited · filed 2016-04-21

The General Assembly intended Colorado’s long-arm statute to confer the maximum jurisdiction allowable by the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Id. ; see § 13-1-124, C.R.S. 2015. Because our constitutional due process analysis necessarily addresses the requirements of Colorado’s long-arm statute, we need not separately address them.

Section 13-1-124(1) allows personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business or commits a tortious act in Colorado.

Shell v. American Family Rights Ass'n · filed 2012-09-28(1)

Under the statute, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may arise from, inter alia, (1) the transaction of any business within the state or (2) the commission of a tortious act within the state.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado courts’ jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum extent allowed by constitutional due process.

Leachman Cattle of Colorado, LLC v. American Simmental Ass'n · filed 2014-08-29

Colorado’s “longarm” statute, C.R.S. § 13-1-124, has been interpreted to confer the maximum jurisdiction permitted by constitutional due process. ... Therefore, the Court need only determine whether exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant comports with due process.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum extent allowed by federal and Colorado due process.

Align Corp. Ltd. v. Boustred · filed 2017-11-13

Colorado's long-arm statute confers "the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado constitutions."

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional inquiry turns on due process.

Desrochers · filed 2026-03-06

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as the United States and Colorado Constitutions permit.

Durango Merchant Services, LLC v. Flagship Merchant Services, LLC. · filed 2019-07-16

Colorado’s long arm statute confers the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Due Process Clause permits.

PopSockets LLC v. Online King LLC · filed 2019-12-23

Colorado’s long-arm statute, in turn, confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent with the Due Process Clause.

Section 13-1-124(1) extends personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits, so its requirements are addressed through a due process analysis.

Frontier Astronautics, LLC v. Frontier Aerospace Corp. · filed 2020-03-13(1)

In Colorado, only one inquiry is necessary, as the Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124(1), “confer[s] the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado constitutions,” and its requirements are necessarily addressed under a due process analysis.

Colorado’s long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, so its requirements are resolved through a due process analysis.

Relaximals, Inc. v. Brentwood Originals, Inc. · filed 2020-03-31(1)

In Colorado, only one inquiry is necessary, as the Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124(1), “confer[s] the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado constitutions,” and its requirements are necessarily addressed under a due process analysis.

Section 13-1-124 reaches as far as constitutional due process permits, so the statutory and due process jurisdiction inquiries merge.

Farmland Partners Inc. v. Fortunae · filed 2021-02-26

Because the Colorado long-arm statute mirrors that which is permitted by the due process clause, it collapses the two-part inquiry into one.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution.

Wood v. Kelley · filed 2021-03-02

The Colorado long arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent of the United States Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Colorado’s long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Ally Financial Inc. v. allypayments LLC · filed 2021-09-27

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Constitution permits, making the jurisdictional analysis a due process inquiry.

Zayo Group, LLC v. 6X7 Networks, LLC · filed 2022-10-26

“Colorado’s long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, extends jurisdiction to the [United States] Constitution’s full extent. The personal jurisdiction analysis here is thus a single due process inquiry.”

Section 13-1-124(1) permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.

Behavior Analyst Certification Board, Inc. v. Moates · filed 2022-12-07(1)

Colorado’s long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause, and therefore, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Warming Trends, LLC v. Flame Designz, LLC · filed 2023-01-17

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so exercising jurisdiction must satisfy due process.

United States v. Noell · filed 2023-06-27

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124(1) permits Colorado courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.

Stuart v. Petzl America, Inc · filed 2023-08-17(1)

Colorado’s long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause; therefore, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry. See id. (citing C.R.S. § 13-1-124(1)).

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Constitution permits, so its application turns on due process.

Geiger v. Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company · filed 2024-02-27

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Constitution permits, so its reach turns on due process.

SEBO America, LLC v. Mega Mart Warehouse LLC · filed 2024-03-25

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, so the jurisdictional analysis is a single due process inquiry.

Pawnee Leasing Corporation v. Optical Technologies, Inc. · filed 2024-03-28

Because Colorado’s long arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, extends to the limits of the Due Process Clause, the personal jurisdiction analysis is a single due process inquiry.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution, making due process the sole jurisdictional inquiry.

Beachley v. Palisades Funding, Corp. · filed 2024-04-29

However, “Colorado’s long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, extends jurisdiction to the [United States] Constitution’s full extent. The personal jurisdiction analysis here is thus a single due process inquiry.”

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, making due process the controlling limit.

Silverstein v. Wolf · filed 2024-09-13

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Constitution permits, making due process the controlling inquiry.

PMW, LLC v. ANKC San Francisco LLC · filed 2024-09-23

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent the Constitution permits.

Camp Bow Wow Franchising, Inc. v. Gone to the Dogs, LLC · filed 2025-02-18

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Duffy Archive Limited v. Montage Salon Corp. · filed 2025-02-28

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional inquiry turns on due process.

Kostroun v. Greenhouse Partners, LLC · filed 2025-08-13

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado’s personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits permitted by constitutional due process.

Leventhal v. Jensen · filed 2025-10-30

Colorado’s long-arm statute extends the state’s jurisdiction to the maximum limit permitted by the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Great Bowery Inc. d/b/a Trunk Archive v. Vivid Beauty · filed 2026-01-12

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Michael Lichter Photography, LLC v. Git Corp. · filed 2026-01-26

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the Constitution.

Collins · filed 2026-01-28

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Colorado’s long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Constitution permits, so the inquiry is whether exercising jurisdiction satisfies due process.

Lodos · filed 2026-03-11

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process.

Baldwin v. Pelican Reef Management, LLC · filed 2019-09-24

The Colorado long-arm statute has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, making due process the controlling inquiry.

AMG National Corp. v. Wright · filed 2021-09-14

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Ditter v. Subaru Corporation · filed 2022-03-25

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124(1) extends personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by due process, so its requirements are assessed under the due process standard.

KCooper Brands, Inc. v. Ezzigroup Inc. · filed 2022-05-12(1)

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124(1), “confer[s] the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado constitutions,” and its requirements are necessarily addressed under the due process standard.

Section 13-1-124(1) permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process, so the statutory and due process inquiries merge.

Syght, Inc. v. Partee · filed 2022-10-04(1)

Colorado’s long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause, and therefore, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution, so jurisdiction turns on due process.

Pro Polish, LLC v. Abkarian · filed 2024-05-24

However, “Colorado’s long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, extends jurisdiction to the [United States] Constitution’s full extent. The personal jurisdiction analysis here is thus a single due process inquiry.”

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of federal due process, which requires the defendant to have sufficient contacts with Colorado.

SEBO America, LLC v. Azar · filed 2021-02-24

“Colorado’s long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, extends jurisdiction to the [United States] Constitution’s full extent. The personal jurisdiction analysis here is thus a single due process inquiry.” ... Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that SEBO fails to make a prima facie showing that Mr. Azar had the requisite minimum contacts with Colorado.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution, so its application turns on due process.

Growcentia, Inc. v. Jemie B.V. · filed 2021-08-10

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-1-124, has been ... construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis in this case reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado courts’ personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits; a contract with a Colorado resident alone does not establish jurisdiction over a nonresident.

v. Women's Professional Rodeo Association · filed 2021-08-17

In enacting the long arm statute, § 13-1-124, C.R.S. 2020, the Colorado General Assembly “intended to extend the jurisdiction of our courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions.” Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 649 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Colo. 1982). ... Applying the first step of the minimum contacts analysis for specific jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado solely because the defendant entered into a contract with a Colorado resident.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Eighth District Electrical Pension Fund v. Watts Electric, LLC · filed 2021-12-28

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124(1) permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the United States and Colorado constitutions, so its requirements are addressed through due process analysis.

Auge v. PC · filed 2023-02-15(1)

In Colorado, only one inquiry is necessary, as the Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124(1), “confer[s] the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado constitutions,” and its requirements are necessarily addressed under a due process analysis.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Lodos v. Empire Towing Corp. · filed 2025-02-21

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Colorado’s long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever that jurisdiction is consistent with due process.

OptumRx PBM of Illinois, Inc. v. National Benefit Builders, Inc. · filed 2025-09-12(1)

In Colorado, the long- arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124(1).

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent permitted by due process.

Dwight · filed 2025-12-31

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Colorado’s long-arm statute reaches as far as due process permits; one Colorado resident’s online purchase of a service to be provided in Peru did not establish sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction.

Hoof · filed 2026-02-11

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process. ... Just as the seven orders were insufficient to establish minimum contacts in Red Vacuums, the single order here is insufficient to establish minimum contacts.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.

Western Acceptance LLC v. General Agriculture Inc. · filed 2022-03-18(1)(a)–(b)

Colorado’s long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause, and therefore, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Titan Feeding, LLC v. Corey Cattle Company, LLC · filed 2022-09-13

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional inquiry turns on due process.

Brown v. Tennison · filed 2025-05-20

Given the Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, the jurisdictional analysis reduces to whether jurisdiction offends due process.

Section 13-1-124 extends personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.

Meany v. Atomic Protocol Systems OU · filed 2024-09-10

The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1- 124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends due process.

A complaint alleging that a defendant transacted business in Colorado can withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when factual assertions support that allegation.

Pioneer Astro Industries, Inc. v. District Court · filed 1977-07-25(1)(a)

Plaintiffs allegation that petitioner is transacting business in Colorado, supported by ten factual assertions appearing in the amended complaint, is sufficient to withstand petitioner’s motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2).

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who participates by telephone in Colorado business negotiations and agrees to guarantee a note, creating substantial business consequences in the state.

Halliburton Co. v. Texana Oil Co., Inc. · filed 1979-06-08(1)(a)

In summary, the consequences of James Callaway’s business activities in connection with the note and guaranty are found to be sufficient and substantial enough so that the assertion of personal jurisdiction by this court under applicable Colorado law is both fair and reasonable.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who negotiates and signs an agreement in Colorado in an individual capacity when those contacts satisfy due process.

Mr. Steak, Inc. v. DIST. COURT, ETC. · filed 1978-02-06(1)(a)

The issue presented here is whether Wilson’s execution of the June 1973 memorandum agreement in Denver with Mr. Steak, Inc., a Colorado corporation, was sufficient under the due process clause to justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction of him pursuant to Colorado’s “long arm statute,” which is section 13-1-124, C.R.S. 1973. ... Applying this test to the facts here, we conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction over Wilson does not violate the requirements of due process. Consequently, we hold that the trial court improperly ruled that it did not have in personam jurisdiction over Wilson.

Stocking fish in Utah does not constitute transacting business within Colorado under the long-arm statute.

Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Andrus · filed 1979-09-19(a)

I cannot perceive how the stocking of fish in Utah can be considered a transaction of business within Colorado, therefore jurisdiction must be asserted, if at all, under the tortious act section of the statute.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in Colorado to the full extent allowed by due process.

Cleverock Energy Corporation, and Cross-Appellant v. Martin Trepel and Trepel Petroleum Corporation, and Cross-Appellees · filed 1979-11-20(1)(a)

This statute confers jurisdiction limited only by the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, consistent with the standards of due process enunciated in ... subsequent cases.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation that conducts business in Colorado through an agent when the claim arises from that business.

Marquest Medical Products, Inc. v. Emde Corp. · filed 1980-09-10(1)(a)

I find that defendant EMDE has clearly met the criteria necessary to fall within the ambit of Colorado’s long arm statute.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits a nonresident to transact business in Colorado through telephone or mail contacts without being physically present in the state.

Waterval v. District Court in and for El Paso County · filed 1980-10-27(1)(a)

A person need not be physically present within the state in order to transact business therein. Contact with the forum state by telephone or mail may furnish the necessary minimum contacts essential for the exercise of jurisdiction under the transaction-of-business standard.

Section 13-1-124 treats becoming an officer or director of a Colorado corporation as transacting business in Colorado for claims arising from those duties.

Public Warranty Corp. v. Mullins · filed 1988-06-09

Therefore, we hold that an individual who has become an officer or a director of a ...Colorado corporation has sufficiently transacted business within the state to subject himself to the jurisdiction of its courts with respect to claims made by the corporation or by others on behalf of the corporation arising out of his duties as an officer or director.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) permits jurisdiction when an out-of-state firm's purposeful communications cause substantial business consequences in Colorado and give rise to the claim.

Marquest Medical Products, Inc. v. Daniel, McKee & Co. · filed 1990-03-29(1)(a)

Section 13-l-124(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A) confers on Colorado courts jurisdiction of any cause of action arising from “the transaction of any business within this state.” ... We conclude that these alleged contacts were sufficient to satisfy both the transaction-of-business standards under Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, supra, and Waterval v. District Court, supra, plus the due process requirements of Burger King v. Rudzewicz, supra.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) does not reach a defendant whose licensing agreement and other contacts do not amount to transacting business in Colorado.

Shepard's McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Legalsoft Corp. · filed 1991-07-09(1)(a)

The contacts, evaluated singly or collectively, fail to qualify as “the transaction of any business within” Colorado. Colo.Rev. Stat. § 13-l-124(l)(a). Consequently, Shepard’s has failed to establish a prima facia case of personal jurisdiction over United.

Section 13-1-124 permits jurisdiction over a nonresident for claims arising from business transacted or a tortious act committed in Colorado; the defendants’ conduct alleged in the complaint satisfied the statute.

East Vail Townhomes, Inc. v. Eurasian Development D.A., Inc. J.K. Long and Nick Profaci · filed 1983-09-13(1)(a), (1)(b)

Under the Colorado long-arm statute, a nonresident, such as these defendants, submits himself, or itself, to jurisdiction of the courts of Colorado as to any cause of action arising out of the “transaction of any business within the state” or arising out of “the commission of a tortious act within the state.” Under the four corners of the complaint, did the defendants transact any business within the confines of the State of Colorado, or did they commit a tortious act within the State? It is quite obvious to us that they most definitely did.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) and (b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when business dealings and tortious conduct establish a prima facie basis for jurisdiction in Colorado.

Von Palffy-Erdoed v. Bugescu · filed 1985-09-26(1)(a) and (b)

Here, defendant corresponded with plaintiff through the mails and accepted funds from Colorado in payment for the automobile. Plaintiff suffered repair expense in Colorado, allegedly as a result of defendant’s misrepresentation as to the automobile’s prior collision. Finally, defendant, through his agent, repossessed the automobile from plaintiff in Colorado. Therefore, plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction under § 13 — 1—124(l)(a) and (b), C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.).

Section 13-1-124 allows an agent’s acts on behalf of a principal to support personal jurisdiction over the principal.

H2O Engineering, Inc. v. Leidy's, Inc. · filed 1990-10-29(1)(a)

Section 13-1-124 provides that an agent’s activities on behalf of the principal may provide the acts sufficient to confer jurisdiction as if those acts were performed by the principal himself.

Section 13-1-124 permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident that transacts business in Colorado when the claims arise from its Colorado contacts.

National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Kozeny · filed 2000-06-23

This Court may also properly exercise specific jurisdiction over Turnstar because Turnstar transacted business within Colorado.

Section 13-1-124(1)(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on a nonresident’s passive investment in a Colorado limited partnership when the investor lacks sufficient contacts with Colorado.

Sender v. Powell · filed 1995-07-13(1)(a)

A party asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the long-arm statute must make a prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction. ... Here, even if we assume that Powell himself was a limited partner in HIA, we conclude that he lacked sufficient contacts with Colorado for our courts to exercise jurisdiction over him.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction under its transaction-of-business provision when a defendant directs business activity toward Colorado, the claim arises from that activity, and exercising jurisdiction is reasonable.

Progressive Games, Inc. v. Amusements Extra, Inc. · filed 1999-07-29(1)(a)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under the business provisions of the long-arm statute. DEQ Casinos purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the State. It negotiated with a Colorado company for at least six months to distribute the allegedly infringing games in the United States. The infringement action arises from, in part, DEQ Casinos distribution of the game in the United States. In addition, the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable because of the length of time Defendant directed its activities toward Colorado and the fact that it displayed its merchandise in Colorado.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction for business transacted in Colorado and extends as far as due process allows.

Wise v. Lindamood · filed 1999-09-28(1)

Colorado’s long-arm statute subjects a defendant to personal jurisdiction for various enumerated acts including the transaction of any business within the state of Colorado.

Section 13-1-124 allows an agent’s Colorado contacts to support jurisdiction over a nonresident principal when the contacts involve business transacted or a tortious act committed in the state.

Goettman v. North Fork Valley Restaurant · filed 2007-12-17(1)(a)-(b)

Hence, under Colorado's long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado based on the imputed contacts of the defendant's agent. Id. To establish this agency theory of personal jurisdiction under Colorado's long-arm statute, the jurisdictional facts must connect the actions of the agent to the principal by either "the transaction of any business" or "the commission of a tortious act" within the state.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who transacts business or commits a tort in Colorado.

CrossFit, Inc. v. Jenkins · filed 2014-09-22

Under Colorado’s long arm statute, Jenkins is subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado based on the transaction of business and the commission of a tort in Colorado.

A plaintiff invoking § 13-1-124 bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction when it is challenged.

Jenkins v. Glen and Helen Aircraft, Inc. · filed 1979-01-25

One who asserts jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, § 13-1-124, C.R.S.1973, has the burden of proof to establish jurisdiction, when that jurisdiction is challenged.

Section 13-1-124 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose agreement to purchase Colorado land establishes a purposeful connection with the state, even without their physical presence there.

Brownlow v. Aman · filed 1984-08-02(1)(c)

On the basis of the Amended Complaint with attached copies of the promissory notes and deeds of trust, the allegations support the proposition that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege.

Section 13-1-124 permits jurisdiction over a nonresident whose notes finance Colorado real estate, are payable to Colorado payees, and arise from substantial dealings in the state.

Alameda National Bank v. Kanchanapoom · filed 1990-12-14

Jurisdiction over the defendant exists, if at all, under Colorado’s long-arm statute, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-1-124. ... Such purposeful intent is no less evident when, as here, the notes at issue concern dealings in Colorado real estate and were made payable to Colorado partnerships and individuals who retained absolute discretion to direct precisely where payment was to be made. Given the notes’ subject matter, the payees’ identity and the prior course of dealing among the parties, the defendant had clear reason to foresee being haled into a Colorado court to defend a suit on the notes.

Section 13-1-124(1)(e) provides personal jurisdiction over support obligations arising from a matrimonial domicile in Colorado when one spouse remains continuously domiciled there.

In Re the Marriage of Doria · filed 1993-05-06(1)(e)

However, the trial court had jurisdiction over this issue, based on personal service on mother in Massachusetts, father’s continuing domicile in Colorado, and the long-arm statute which submits a person to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from: The maintenance of a matrimonial domicile within this state with respect to all issues relating to obligations for support to children and spouse in any action for dissolution of marriage ... if one of the parties of the marriage continues without interruption to be domiciled within the state.

Section 13-1-124 extends Colorado courts’ personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by federal due process.

Garrett v. Klingner · filed 2001-06-12

Colorado’s long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124, extends jurisdiction of courts in Colorado “to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” Mr. Steak, Inc. v. District Court , 574 P.2d 95, 96 (Colo. 1978) (en banc).

A spouse’s affidavit that the spouse has resided and continues to reside in Colorado is sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction under the matrimonial domicile provision.

In Re Marriage of Akins · filed 1997-01-23(1)(e)

Thus, a spouse’s affidavit that the spouse has resided and continues to reside in Colorado is sufficient for a Colorado court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the husband under § 13-l-124(l)(e).

Section 13-1-124(1)(e) allows jurisdiction in matrimonial domicile matters when one spouse remains domiciled in Colorado without interruption.

Marriage of Kelly · filed 2025-10-30(1)(e)

But she misreads the statute. Rather, section 13-1-124 confers jurisdiction on Colorado courts for actions related to “the maintenance of a matrimonial domicile . . . if one of the parties of the marriage continues without interruption to be domiciled within the state.” The court found that husband continued to be domiciled in Colorado and, as we have discussed, we defer to this finding of fact.

Section 13-1-124 does not make a foreign corporation’s registration or its registered agent in Colorado a basis for personal jurisdiction.

Lumen Technologies Service Group, LLC v. CEC Group LLC · filed 2023-09-08(1)

There is no mention of registration of a foreign corporation or the existence of a registered agent conferring jurisdiction to the state courts, id., and CEC has not argued that any of these provisions apply here.