Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for injuries inflicted through fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the victim’s rights and feelings.

Frick v. Abell · filed 1979-11-13

Section 13-21-102, C.R.S. 1973, provides that exemplary damages may be assessed in a civil action if the injury is inflicted through fraud or with malice, insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the victim’s rights and feelings. ... After reviewing the evidence, we hold that .the jury, by believing the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses at trial, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully and wantonly disregarded the rights of Billy and Roger Frick. The award of exemplary damages was proper.

Section 13-21-102 requires liability and compensatory damages before exemplary damages can be awarded.

Moore v. Triangle Construction & Development Co. · filed 1980-07-17

And, there can be no exemplary damages unless plaintiff is found liable and compensatory damages are proved in the counterclaim. See § 13-21-102, C.R.S. 1973.

Section 13-21-102 leaves the decision to award exemplary damages to the jury, even when the evidence establishes a basis for them.

Mince v. Butters · filed 1980-09-02

Thus, we hold that even where the evidence might irrefutably establish a basis for exemplary damages, the decision to award such damages is an exclusive function of the jury, and it would be error for a trial court to direct the jury to make such an award.

Section 13-21-102 requires more than a breach of trust to award exemplary damages; the evidence must show wanton and reckless disregard of others’ rights.

Climax Molybdenum v. Specialized Installers, Inc. (In Re Specialized Installers, Inc.) · filed 1981-07-16

However, the evidence falls short of that required to sustain an award of punitive damages. A breach of trust is not necessarily tantamount to a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of others as this case shows. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973. Hence, no exemplary damages will be awarded.

Section 13-21-102 requires a factual basis for fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings to support exemplary damages.

Winters v. City of Commerce City · filed 1982-03-11

Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of exemplary damages because they contend that a question of fact remains as to whether the denial of the building permit was, as specified by § 13-21-102, C.R.S. 1973, “attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings....” We disagree. The uncontroverted affidavits of Ale-shire, Evans, House, and Timmerman and the depositions of Gene and Pat Winters indicate that there is no factual basis for an award of exemplary damages. Thus, the trial court properly entered summary judgment on this claim.

An exemplary damages prayer may be reinstated when the underlying damages claim is reinstated, subject to resolution of rescission issues.

H & K Automotive Supply Co. v. Moore & Co. · filed 1982-09-16

The trial court ruled that, since plaintiffs’ damages claim was forfeited by their election of the rescission remedy, their exemplary damage prayer was baseless. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973; Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc., 35 Colo.App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 (1974). Because we have reinstated the damages claim subject to a determination of the rescission issues, the exemplary damages prayer must also be reinstated.

Section 13-21-102 requires the court to decide whether evidence supports exemplary damages, while the jury determines their amount.

Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. · filed 1983-08-02

In all cases, it is within the province of the jury to determine the proper amount of exemplary damages,... but it is a question for the court as to whether there is any evidence to justify a finding of exemplary damages. Such a finding cannot be made at this time. Because defendant’s motion as to the claim for punitive damages is premature, the motion for summary judgment as to the second claim for relief is denied.

Section 13-21-102 does not allow exemplary damages when a plaintiff rescinds a contract for fraud and seeks the return of the consideration paid.

Dodds v. Frontier Chevrolet Sales & Service, Inc. · filed 1983-10-27

In the rescission of a contract on the grounds of fraud, plaintiff cannot recover exemplary damages under the statute, § 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973, for the reasons stated in Aaberg v. H.A. Harman Co., 144 Colo. 579, 358 P.2d 601 (1960).

Section 13-21-102 leaves exemplary damages to the factfinder’s discretion, even when the factfinder finds malice or another listed circumstance.

Torrez v. Rizo (In Re Rizo) · filed 1983-11-09

By the clear wording of the statute, the award of exemplary damages is optional and rests in the discretion of the trier of fact. A judge or jury could find fraud, malice, insult or wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings and still not award exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for injury attended by wanton and reckless conduct in an action at law for breach of fiduciary duty.

Holter v. Moore and Co. · filed 1983-12-08

In their claim for exemplary damages, the Holters contend that their injury was attended by wanton and reckless conduct on the part of Moore in disregard of their rights and feelings. Exemplary damages are appropriate in such cases. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973; ... Moreover, the fact that the second claim is based upon breach of fiduciary obligations is not dispositive as the action brought by the Holters is at law for damages and therefore supports a claim for exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages against a builder whose wanton and reckless conduct injures a subsequent purchaser through latent defects.

Johnson v. Graham · filed 1984-04-09

So viewed, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to support a jury finding that Tri-Aspen, in ignoring the recommendations in the soil report and in not properly compacting the soil or installing a peripheral drain, acted with “a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.” C.R.C.P. 101(d); § 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973. Subsequent purchasers, in a situation, as here, involving latent defects, are as much “injured parties” as the original owners.

Section 13-21-102 permits reasonable exemplary damages when a wrong is accompanied by fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.

Basnett v. Vista Village Mobile Home Park · filed 1984-08-30

Reasonable exemplary damages may be awarded where the fact finder determines that the wrong done to a person is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the injured parties’ rights and feelings. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S.

Section 13-21-102 permits punitive damages on a tort claim against an insurer if its conduct was willful, wanton, and reckless.

Hiatt v. Schreiber · filed 1984-11-14

Such allegations, if proved, will entitle plaintiffs to recover punitive damages on their tort claims.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings; evidence is relevant if it tends to establish one of those elements.

Coale v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1985-04-25

The material elements of an exemplary damages claim are set forth in § 13-21-102, C.R.S., which authorizes an award of punitive damages if the injury to the plaintiff is “attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.” The relevancy threshold in a punitive damages claim is satisfied if the offered evidence tends to make more probable than not the existence of any of these elements.

Section 13-21-102 requires willful, wanton, and reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights and feelings to recover exemplary damages; negligence alone is insufficient.

Kedar v. Public Service Co. of Colorado · filed 1985-05-09

To justify recovery of exemplary damages, the act causing the injuries must be done with a willful, wanton, and reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights and feelings. ... Here, plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case that PSC acted in wrongful, wanton, or reckless disregard for plaintiffs rights and feelings. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs claim.

Section 13-21-102 allows exemplary damages for conversion when the taking shows wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights.

Clark v. Morris · filed 1985-07-18

if the taking is done in such a manner as to constitute a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights, exemplary damages are available.

Section 13-21-102 permits consideration of a defendant’s failure to apologize for or retract a disproved accusation as evidence relevant to exemplary damages when no privilege applies.

Patane v. Broadmoor Hotel, Inc. · filed 1985-09-05

Here, in the absence of privilege, failure to apologize for or to retract the accusation of theft after it was discovered that another employee had taken the money is relevant to the issue of exemplary damages. See § 13-21-102, C.R.S.; CRE 401.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages in a breach of contract action when the conduct is willful and wanton and shows reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s rights.

Podleski v. Mortgage Finance, Inc. · filed 1985-11-04

We disagree and hold that, where appropriate, exemplary damages may be recovered in a breach of contract action. ... This is because the allegations in an action for breach of contract do not ordinarily bring the case within the confines of the statute. See § 13-21-102, C.R.S. Where, however, as here, the facts alleged and proved establish willful and wanton conduct and reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff, the maleficent intent on which exemplary damages awards in tort are based is present, and exemplary damages may be awarded though the action sounds in contract.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when a repairer represents that it performed repairs it did not perform.

Francis v. Steve Johnson Pontiac-GMC-Jeep, Inc. · filed 1986-02-27

Exemplary damages are authorized in civil suits by § 13-21-102, C.R.S. This section permits a jury to assess reasonable exemplary damages in cases involving “circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights or feelings.” ... The situation here, in which Steve Johnson Pontiac represented that it had performed repairs which in fact it had not, falls within the ambit of this statutory language.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when an injury is attended by fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.

Barbara Ann Alley and W.H. Alley, Cross-Appellees v. Gubser Development Company, National Gypsum Company and Weyerhaeuse · filed 1986-03-03

Applying these standards, we must hold that the district court erred in denying NGC and Weyerhaeuser’s motions for a directed verdict on punitive damages and permitting the issue to go to the jury. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs and drawing all reasonable inferences to support the verdict, we cannot hold that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants’ conduct was a “wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings” as required under section 13-21-102.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for conversion when the taking shows wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights, even if the defendant claims a mistaken right to the property.

Mari v. Wagner Equipment Co., Inc. · filed 1986-03-06

Exemplary damages are available in a conversion action if the taking of property is done in such a manner as to constitute a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights, even if the taking allegedly is done under a mistaken claim of right. ... We conclude that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s actions in connection with its conversion of Scraper # 2 were taken in a wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when the defendant’s conduct shows wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.

Bodah v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. · filed 1986-06-05

Section 13-21-102, C.R.S., provides that a jury may award exemplary damages when “the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.” ... From this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that beyond a reasonable doubt Ward acted with wanton and reckless disregard.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages alongside equitable relief when tortious conduct causes injury and actual damages are found.

Cox v. Bertsch · filed 1986-09-25

The equitable nature of the relief awarded is not determinative of the question of availability of exemplary damages; therefore, the trial court did not err in awarding them here.

Section 13-21-102 leaves exemplary damages to the jury’s discretion and gives a claimant no right to an award.

Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Andrews · filed 1987-02-19

Also, § 13-21-102, C.R.S., provides that “the jury ... may award ... reasonable exemplary damages.” (emphasis supplied) Hence, the determination as to whether to grant such damages is discretionary with the jury; there is no right to any exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102 does not authorize exemplary damages for a claim that sounds only in breach of contract.

Postal Instant Press v. Jackson · filed 1987-04-21(1)(a)

As a matter of statutory construction, therefore, § 13-21-102 simply does not authorize recovery of punitive damages for actions which do not sound in tort.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages but leaves the award to the fact finder’s discretion, even when fraud is found.

Colorado Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Associates · filed 1987-11-05

Section 13-21-102, C.R.S., authorizes, but does not require, an award of exemplary damages. An award of such damages “rests in the discretion of the trier of fact.”

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages against a corporation whose wanton and willful conduct caused actual damages, even when its fault is attributed to its principal under the alter ego doctrine.

Geringer v. Wildhorn Ranch, Inc. · filed 1988-12-14(1)(a)

Having found that the conduct of Wildhom Ranch, Inc. was negligent, that its conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer actual damages, that its conduct was wanton and willful, the jury awarded exemplary damages against the corporation in accordance with Colorado law. ... The fact that a jury applies the law of corporate alter-ego to attribute the fault of a corporation to its principal does not defeat its finding that the corporation’s conduct caused actual damages to a plaintiff.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for tortious conduct, but not for breach of contract.

Redies v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1989-04-14

Pursuant to § 13-21-102, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A), exemplary damages are only available for tortious conduct, not for breach of contract claims.

Section 13-21-102 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of evil intent or wanton or reckless disregard for another’s rights showing a wrongful motive.

Norman G. Kelley, Cross-Appellant v. Sears, Roebuck and Company Allstate Life Insurance Company, Cross-Appellees · filed 1989-08-04

To support an award of punitive damages, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with an evil intent or with such a wanton or reckless disregard for his or her rights as to evidence a wrongful motive. See Colo.Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (1973); Gruntmeir v. Mayrath Indus., Inc., 841 F.2d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir.1988).

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) measures the exemplary damages cap against the total compensatory damages awarded by the jury before reductions for comparative negligence.

Davis v. Lira · filed 1991-09-16(1)(a)

We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of Hansen that the term “actual damages awarded,” as relevant here, means those total compensatory damages awarded to plaintiff prior to adjustment affecting reductions for the negligence of plaintiff.

Section 13-21-102(3) permits exemplary damages for repeated willful misconduct related to conversion.

Flexisystems, Inc. v. American Standards Testing Bureau, Inc. · filed 1992-11-05(3)

Rather, the punitive damages were awarded on the basis of defendants’ repeated willful misconduct related to the conversion claim, as permitted by § 13-21-102(3), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Section 13-21-102 requires an injury attended by fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct before exemplary damages may be awarded; negligence alone does not suffice.

Van Leeuwan v. Nuzzi · filed 1993-01-21

Colorado law requires injury attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or willful and wanton conduct before exemplary damages can be awarded. ... Van Leeuwan’s viable claims are based on negligence, not intentional, malicious conduct. Her request for punitive damages is stricken.

Section 13-21-102(1) permits exemplary damages on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim.

Elliott v. Aspen Brokers, Ltd. · filed 1993-01-21(1)

In addition, Colorado law permits the award of exemplary damages on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102(1) (1987).

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) limits reasonable exemplary damages to the amount of actual damages awarded to the injured party.

Graphic Directions, Inc. v. Bush · filed 1993-02-16(1)(a)

Nevertheless, § 13-21-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A) provides that “the amount of reasonable exemplary damages shall not exceed an amount which is equal to the amount of the actual damages awarded to the injured party.” Thus, the most that can be awarded here is an amount equal to the actual damages awarded GDI against Bush on the remaining claims of conversion and diversion of corporate opportunity.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) limits reasonable exemplary damages to the amount of actual damages awarded.

Graphic Directions, Inc. v. Bush · filed 1993-06-10(1)(a)

Nevertheless, the amount of reasonable exemplary damages may not exceed an amount equal to the amount of the actual damages awarded. Section 13-21-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). Thus, the most that can be awarded here is an amount equal to the actual damages awarded GDI against Bush on the remaining claims of conversion and diversion of corporate opportunity.

Section 13-21-102 applies a different standard from the tort of outrageous conduct, so dismissal of that tort does not require dismissal of an exemplary damages claim.

Orjias ex rel. Pridy v. Stevenson · filed 1994-08-01

Because the standard for awarding punitive damages is not the same as that for the tort of outrageous conduct, we hold that the district court did not err in granting L-P’s motion to dismiss the outrageous conduct claim while denying L-P’s motion to dismiss the punitive damage claim.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) allows either a jury or a trial judge acting as the trier of fact to award exemplary damages.

Messler v. Phillips · filed 1993-10-07(1)(a)

Further, an award of exemplary damages rests in the discretion of the trier of fact, be that the jury or the trial court.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages when the conduct causing injury involves fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.

Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. East Hampden Associates Ltd. · filed 1995-03-23(1)(a)

The relevant statute provides that exemplary damages are proper only if the evidence shows that the actions that caused the injury are “attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” Section 13-21-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Section 13-21-102(1) limits exemplary damages to the actual damages awarded; a $75,000 exemplary award is permissible when the compensatory award is $124,840.

Sprung v. Adcock · filed 1995-08-10(1)

We have concluded above that the trial court should award $124,840 to Sprung based on Adcock’s liability for misrepresentation. Thus, § 13-21-102 does not require reduction of the $75,000 exemplary damage award.

Section 13-21-102(5) generally bars exemplary damages in arbitration, but a party can waive that protection by compelling arbitration without objecting to a punitive damages claim.

Padilla v. DE Frey & Co., Inc. · filed 1997-04-03(5)

Section 13-21-102(5), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A) provides, in pertinent part, that, “unless otherwise provided by law,” exemplary damages shall not be awarded in arbitration proceedings even if the award is enforced or approved in an action commenced in a court. ... Here, because the Frey parties sought an order from the district court compelling arbitration and did not challenge Padilla’s right to recover punitive damages through the arbitration proceedings, we conclude that the Frey parties waived their statutory right to be free from an arbitral award of punitive damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. · filed 1997-07-08(1)(a)

Although we will never know the complete scope of the effect this had on the doctors’ careers and life paths, I find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cyanamid’s actions were “attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct” such that: Drs. Allen and Seligman are entitled to an award of reasonable punitive damages pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102(l)(a).

Exemplary damages require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard; mere negligence is insufficient.

Webster v. Boone · filed 1999-02-18

Conduct that is merely negligent cannot serve as a basis for exemplary damages. A party requesting exemplary damages must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.

Section 13-21-102(3) permits a trial court to enhance exemplary damages up to three times the jury’s award for qualifying willful and wanton conduct during the case; the decision is discretionary.

Harvey v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1999-09-13(3)

Enhanced exemplary damages, up to three times the amount awarded by the jury, are authorized by statute. Section 13-21-102(3), C.R.S.1998. ... Where the statutory language is permissive rather than mandatory in granting authority to the trial court, the trial court’s decision is entrusted to its sound discretion. ... We perceive no abuse of discretion.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) provides for exemplary damages when conduct is attended by fraud, malice, or willful and wanton misconduct.

University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. · filed 2000-07-07(1)(a)

I also reiterate my finding that the conduct of Dr. Ellenbogen and Cyanamid in betraying the Doctors’ trust, exploiting their work, and thwarting their intent that their discovery inure to the benefit of the public generally, and not just to Cyanamid, was attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, and willful and wanton misconduct for purposes of Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102(l)(a).

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) limits exemplary damages to the amount of actual damages in both bench and jury trials.

Sky Fun 1 v. Schuttloffel · filed 2001-07-02(1)(a)

We also hold that the limitation on exemplary damages in section 13-21-102(1)(a) applies equally to bench and jury trials.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages when the defendant’s conduct is attended by fraud, malice, or willful and wanton misconduct.

University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. · filed 2002-08-13(1)(a)

61. I again find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cyanamid’s clandestine and deceptive conduct relating to the application for and issuance of the ’634 Patent, together with its exploitation of the doctors for its own gain, was attended by circumstances of fraud, malice and willful and wanton misconduct and that Drs. Allen and Seligman are entitled to an award of exemplary damages. C.R.S. § 13-21-102(l)(a).

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages when evidence supports a finding that the defendant acted purposefully with wanton and reckless disregard for the plaintiff's feelings.

Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co. · filed 2003-05-19(1)(a)

This evidence, together with the VP's reported statement that he did not care if Archer was "on his deathbed," sufficed to support a reasonable conclusion that Farmer's agents acted purposefully with wanton and reckless disregard for Archer's feelings. Thus, the evidence was adequate to support an award of exemplary damages under § 13-21-102(1)(a).

Section 13-21-102(3) allows a court to increase exemplary damages based on the defendant’s conduct while the case is pending, up to three times actual damages.

Coors v. Security Life of Denver Insurance Co. · filed 2005-05-23(3)

A trial court may increase an award based on behavior during the pendency of the case.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages when the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant purposefully disregarded a substantial risk of harm.

Western Fire Truck, Inc. v. Emergency One, Inc. · filed 2006-03-23(1)(a)

Accordingly, the jury could find that E-One’s actions were purposefully performed with an awareness of the risk in disregard of the consequences, and its award of punitive damages against E-One must be reinstated.

Section 13-21-102(8)(a) permits a court to increase exemplary damages when the defendant’s conduct continued during the case and was particularly reprehensible.

Blood v. Qwest Services Corp. · filed 2009-05-28(8)(a)

Hence, it can be interpreted consistently with Philip Morris as permitting trial courts to increase an exemplary damages award only if the defendant's conduct is particularly reprehensible because it has continued during the pendency of the case.

Section 13-21-102 permits a court to award exemplary damages for fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct, but the award remains discretionary.

Bonidy v. Vail Valley Center for Aesthetic Dentistry, P.C. · filed 2010-03-18(1)(a)

Section 13-21-102(l)(a), C.R.S.2009, allows exemplary damages to be awarded in civil actions accompanied by circumstances of “fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that Dr. Harding’s conduct was vindictive could be inconsistent with its declining to award exemplary damages. Therefore, we remand to the trial court to resolve the apparent inconsistency in its conclusion that Dr. Harding’s conduct was vindictive and retaliatory, but did not support an award of exemplary damages.

The cap on exemplary damages is based on the jury’s compensatory damages award before prejudgment interest is added.

Vickery v. Vickery · filed 2010-03-18(1)(a)

The trial court's final judgment demonstrates that it capped the exemplary damage awards at the amount of the jury's verdicts for compensatory damages on those claims, without first adding prejudgment interest under section 183-21-101(1). The court then awarded prejudgment interest on the amount of compensatory damages set forth in the jury's verdiets. For reasons articulated below, we perceive no error in the trial court's ruling with respect to the base it used to reduce exemplary damages under section 13-21-102(1)(a).

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages for an invasion of privacy claim because it is a wrong done to the person.

Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, PC · filed 1996-09-16(1)(a)

Because there is no dispute that the invasion of privacy claim was “for a wrong done to the person,” exemplary damages were appropriately awarded under § 13-21-102(l)(a).

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages in an action at law by a successor trustee to recover trust funds misappropriated by a former trustee.

Peterson v. McMahon · filed 2004-10-18(1)(a)

The suit against Peterson is an action of a successor trustee against a former trustee for misappropriation of trust funds. In this type of suit, the former trustee is under a duty to pay money immediately and unconditionally to the new trustee. Thus, the action is legal in nature and exemplary damages can properly by awarded pursuant to section 13-21-102(1)(a).

Section 13-21-102(3)(b) does not require a party to seek sanctions before moving to treble an exemplary damages award.

General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller · filed 2012-11-27(3)(b)

The exemplary damages statute contains no requirement that a party must first seek sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37 or C.R.C.P. 11 before filing a motion to treble an exemplary damages award.

Section 13-21-102(1.5)(a) requires a party to wait until after initial disclosures and establish prima facie proof of a triable issue before amending a pleading to request exemplary damages.

Cahey v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2020-09-01(1.5)(a)

Ms. Cahey has not complied with the requirements of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1.5)(a), and thus the court STRIKES her request for punitive damages.

Section 13-21-102 bars an exemplary damages claim in an initial complaint and permits it by amendment after initial disclosures upon prima facie proof of a triable issue.

American Health Connection v. Doctor to Doctor Sales Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-12-06(1.5)(a)

A claim for exemplary damages, however, may not be included in the initial complaint. See C.R.S. § 13-21-102(1.5)(a) (“A claim for exemplary damages . . . may not be included in any initial claim for relief” and “may be allowed [only] by amendment to the pleadings . . . after the exchange of initial disclosures . . . [if] the plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue.”). Therefore, the Complaint does not state a valid claim for exemplary damages.

Exemplary damages under § 13-21-102 are unavailable when the illegality defense bars recovery tied to a federally illegal marijuana investment.

Sensoria, LLC v. Kaweske · filed 2022-12-02

However, the illegality defense does not allow treble damages under Utah Code § 61-1-22(2) or exemplary damages under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102.

Section 13-21-102 permits an exemplary damages claim when the plaintiff presents prima facie evidence of willful and wanton conduct.

Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic LLC · filed 2024-09-19(1)(a)

Applying these principles, the Court concludes that Coomer has asserted prima facie evidence showing that Defendants published statements that were made willfully and wantonly, see § 13-21-102(1)(a), and with actual malice.

A defendant seeking to reduce exemplary damages by showing that the conduct causing the injury has ceased must prove cessation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Perez v. Sunbeam Products, Inc · filed 2025-05-29(2)(b)

Because § 13-21-102(2)(b) gives no indication to the contrary, the Court finds that defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that they have ceased the conduct that resulted in Ms. Perez’s injuries by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits reasonable exemplary damages when fraud causes actual damages, up to the amount of actual damages awarded.

Nichamin · filed 2026-03-16(1)(a)

Consequently, the Court concludes that awarding Plaintiff $18,000 in punitive damages is reasonable.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when the jury awards actual damages and finds malice and purposeful wanton or reckless disregard.

Asplin v. Mueller (In Re Mueller) · filed 1983-11-07

The award of punitive damages in civil actions in Colorado is governed by § 13-21-102, C.R.S. ... The end result of this combination of instructions was that it was necessary for the jury to find that the Defendant acted with malice and purposefully in order to assess punitive damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for a wrong attended by fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard, when the claimant proves those circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hawkinson v. AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1984-09-18

Under the provisions of C.R.S. § 13-25-127(2) exemplary damages shall only be awarded when the party asserting the claim proves beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a wrong under the circumstances set forth in the exemplary damages statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-102. ... Accordingly, no exemplary damages are awarded.

Section 13-21-102 permits punitive damages when the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury involved fraud, malice, or wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights and feelings; proof of evil intent is unnecessary when wanton and reckless disregard is shown.

Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1976-02-13

The jury in this case was instructed in accordance with Colorado law. 1973 C.R.S. § 13-21-102. The approved instruction implementing that statute appears in Colorado Jury Instructions, 1975 Supplement, Instruction 5:3. It requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury complained of was attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and feelings of the plaintiff. Viewing the award of punitive damages in this case as relating to the trademark infringement claim, it is not necessary that there be proof of “evil intent” because malice is not an element of that claim. The jury finding of punitive damages on that claim is supported if the evidence is sufficient to warrant a determination beyond a Reasonable doubt that Goodyear acted with a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. The evidence is adequate for that finding.

Section 13-21-102 requires an award of actual damages on the underlying claim before punitive damages may be awarded.

Defeyter v. Riley · filed 1983-04-28

It is a fundamental principle of law that punitive damages may not be awarded absent an award of actual damages. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973; Ress v. Rediess 130 Colo. 572, 278 P.2d 183 (1954); Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 (1977); Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc., 35 Colo.App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 (1974). There being no award of actual damages on the claim of tortious interference against Mayer, an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained.

Section 13-21-102 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of malice to recover punitive damages.

Rawson v. Sears Roebuck and Co. · filed 1984-06-06

In order to recover punitive damages, plaintiff will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sears discharged him with "malice.”

Section 13-21-102 requires allegations of fraud, malice, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights and feelings to support punitive damages.

Bauer v. Southwest Denver Mental Health Center, Inc. · filed 1985-01-31

Similarly, we agree with the trial court’s determination that there were no allegations of conduct by defendants which would constitute “fraud, malice, or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the [plaintiff’s] rights and feelings,” as man...dated by § 13-21-102, C.R.S. Thus, granting of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages was correct, Mince v. Butters, 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980).

Section 13-21-102 permits a punitive damages claim in a contract action when the alleged conduct is willful and wanton.

Riva Ridge Apartments v. Robert G. Fisher Co. · filed 1987-05-14

Here, under the rule in Davies v. Bradley, supra, plaintiffs’ factual allegations are, when liberally construed, sufficient to assert a claim for punitive damages under § 13-21-102, C.R.S. (1979 Cum.Supp.).

Section 13-21-102 requires fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct for punitive damages; proving bad faith breach of an insurance contract alone is insufficient.

Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble · filed 1988-11-18

However, establishment of a claim for bad faith breach of insurance contract alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for punitive damages. ... Entitlement to an award of punitive damages also requires that “the injury complained of [be] attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” ... The record supports this determination. Accordingly, we find no error.

Section 13-21-102 permits punitive damages when an injury is attended by fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct; the court decides whether the evidence warrants submitting the issue to a jury.

Surdyka v. DeWitt · filed 1989-07-06

Pursuant to § 13-21-102, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Yol. 6A), entitlement to an award of punitive damages requires that “the injury complained of [be] attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” ... Hence, the issue was properly-submitted to the jury, and the award for punitive damages will not be disturbed on appeal.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits exemplary damages when a plaintiff receives actual damages and the injury is attended by fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct.

Berger v. Security Pacific Information Systems, Inc. · filed 1990-04-05(1)(a)

Under § 13-21-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A), a party who is awarded actual damages may also be awarded exemplary damages if the injury complained of is attended by “circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct.” Here, because plaintiff was awarded actual damages on her fraudulent concealment claim, an award of punitive damages was authorized. The jury’s finding that the elements of fraud were established also established the “circumstances of fraud” required for punitive damages.

Exemplary damages under § 13-21-102 are a remedy tied to an underlying claim for actual damages, not a separate cause of action.

Ambraziunas v. Bank of Boulder · filed 1994-03-25

In Colorado exemplary damages are a creature of statute which may be awarded when damages have been assessed by a jury for a wrong and the injury complained of is attended by specified circumstances. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987). A request for exemplary damages does not constitute a separate and distinct cause of action but is a request for relief, auxiliary to an underlying claim for actual damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits punitive damages for fraud and fraudulent concealment.

Wood v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co. · filed 2008-08-05

Pursuant to relevant Colorado statute, punitive damages are permissible for fraud and fraudulent concealment.

Section 13-21-102 permits punitive damages for willful and wanton conduct, and a reckless failure to investigate or warn of a potential danger can present a jury question.

Watson v. Dillon Companies, Inc. · filed 2011-06-22(1)(a)

Colorado law permits recovery of punitive damages against a defendant where the conduct at issue is “wanton and willful.” C.R.S. § 13-21-102(l)(a). ... A reasonable jury could find that given the magnitude of the harm and the lack of information about the minimum exposure level capable of causing harm, the manufacturer acted recklessly in failing to investigate or warn consumers of the potential for harm. Accordingly, whether the conduct of GilsterMary Lee amounts to willful and wanton conduct is an issue of fact and cannot be decided as a matter of law.

Attorney fees and court costs awarded under section 10-3-1116(1) count as actual damages when calculating permissible punitive damages.

e Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Casper · filed 2018-05-29(1)(a)

We then consider the award of attorney fees and court costs available pursuant to section 10-3-1116(1) and determine that such an award constitutes “actual damages” within the meaning of section 13-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (2017), the punitive damages statute.

Section 13-21-102 permits punitive damages when an injury is attended by fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct; a slow or ineffective response to complaints alone does not establish willful and wanton conduct.

Oberstar v. PRCP-CO Governors Park · filed 2024-11-07(1)(a)

Before the fact finder may impose punitive damages, it must determine that the “injury complained of” was “attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct,” § 13-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, § 13-25-127(2), C.R.S. 2024. ... Because the only evidence she presented was that the landlord did not respond quickly or effectively to her concerns, we cannot say that she proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the landlord’s conduct was willful and wanton.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) permits a jury to consider exemplary damages when evidence of a retaliatory motive supports a finding of malice.

Coomer v. Lindell · filed 2024-08-29(1)(a)

Colorado law permits a jury to award exemplary damages where “the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1)(a). ... The Court respectfully agrees with Plaintiff that evidence of a retaliatory motive supports the claim for exemplary damages here.

Section 13-21-102 provides the statutory basis for exemplary damages in Colorado, and awards under it are penal in nature.

Sherwood v. Graco, Inc. · filed 1977-01-31

A claim for punitive damages in Colorado is exclusively statutory and, therefore, is based on a penal statute. ... In response to those decisions the Colorado legislature, in 1889, passed the forerunner of 1973 C.R.S. § 13-21-102.

Section 13-21-102 requires wanton and reckless disregard for punitive damages; when the evidence permits only one conclusion on that issue, the court must instruct the jury accordingly.

Butters ex rel. Butters v. Mince · filed 1979-08-02

This instruction was tendered in connection with plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages under § 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973, which requires a finding of “wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.” ... Therefore, reasonable people could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence, and it was error for the court not to instruct the jury that defendant’s intoxication constituted wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiffs’ rights and safety.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when an injury is attended by wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.

Bill Manning, Inc. v. Denver West Bank & Trust · filed 1984-09-27

Section 13-21-102, C.R.S. provides for an award of exemplary damages if “the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of ... a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.” ... While there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the bank’s conduct after the discovery of the forgery manifested a wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights and feelings, such determination was made based upon disputed evidence, and does not preclude a determination that the bank’s defense against the other claims at trial was not frivolous or groundless.

A warning and the absence of prior similar accident reports can show that a defendant did not recklessly disregard a known danger, precluding exemplary damages.

prod.liab.rep.(cch)p 11,101 Antonio Juarez v. United Farm Tools, Inc. · filed 1986-09-18

The warning and the absence of any reports of other accidents persuade us that as a matter of law Juarez has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant disregarded the consequences of the danger presented by the cart.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when an injury is attended by wanton and reckless disregard, including a purposeful failure to correct a known danger.

Jacobs v. Commonwealth Highland Theatres, Inc. · filed 1986-10-30

For exemplary damages to be awarded, § 13-21-102, C.R.S., requires the injury complained of to be attended by “a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings.” ... Because the jury could reasonably infer from the lack of corrective measures taken with regard to the step that defendant’s failure to act was purposeful, with knowledge of the risk involved to patrons, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew of a substantial risk of harm and recklessly disregarded its consequences.

prod.liab.rep.(cch)p 11,707 Jim Gruntmeir v. Mayrath Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-03-14

Thus, we conclude that the evidence in the instant case was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) there was a substantial risk of harm to users of the Mayrath grain auger, 2) Mayrath’s management was aware of the risk, and 3) Mayrath disregarded the consequences of the risk by continuing to market the bottom-drive auger with a shield that was likely to be removed.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for a personal injury attended by wanton and reckless disregard of the injured person's rights and feelings; “wanton” means willful and intentional.

Bradley v. Guess · filed 1990-10-09(1)(a)

Section 13-21-102, C.R.S. (originally enacted Colo.Sess.Laws 1889, p. 296, § 1; as amended July 1, 1986, codified at § 13-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A)) permits, as here, an award of exemplary damages upon a finding of injury to the person attended by a "wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings." The term "wanton," in this context, means nothing more than "willful and intentional."

Section 13-21-102 permits punitive damages for tortious conduct accompanying a contract breach when the defendant acts willfully and wantonly.

McCrea & Co. Auctioneers, Inc. v. Dwyer Auto Body · filed 1990-05-03(1)(b)

We conclude that this type of tortious conduct by one joint venturer against the other is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements under either McCrea & Co.’s fraud or business interference claims. Therefore, the trial court properly submitted this issue to the jury in the first instance and erred in thereafter setting aside the award of punitive damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for willful and wanton conduct.

Larsen v. Consolidated Pet Foods, Inc. (In Re S & D Foods, Inc.) · filed 1992-08-07

Finally, because Larsen’s conduct was willful and wanton, and exercised business decorum we cannot condone, Pet is entitled to exemplary or punitive damages. C.R.S. § 13-21-102.

Section 13-21-102 requires a punitive damages claim to allege willful or wanton conduct.

American Casualty Co. v. Glaskin · filed 1992-10-20

Having reviewed defendants’ counter-claims, I conclude that they adequately allege the requisite willful or wanton conduct. C.R.S. § 13-21-102.

Section 13-21-102(1)(b) defines willful and wanton conduct in subjective terms; evidence of objective unreasonableness alone is insufficient.

Strachan v. City of Federal Heights, Colo. · filed 1993-11-17(1)(b)

The language here is cast in subjective, rather than objective, terms. As a result, the evidence used by Mr. Strachan to resist summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity — evidence that the operation was not objectively reasonable — is not sufficient to establish willful and wanton conduct.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when an injury is attended by fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.

Eads v. Dearing · filed 1993-12-30(1)(b)

Section 13-21-102, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A) provides that exemplary damages may be awarded if the injury is “attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” ... Here, there is ample evidence to support the court’s finding that defendant’s actions were accompanied by a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. ... Under these circumstances, the court properly awarded plaintiff exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for conduct purposefully performed with awareness of a substantial risk of harm and in disregard of the consequences.

Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc. · filed 1993-10-07(1)(b)

Based upon the totality of the evidence, and viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that reasonable jurors could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Solaglas’ conduct in installing the windshield retention system created a substantial risk of harm to others and was purposefully performed with an awareness of the risk and in disregard of the consequences so as to constitute “wanton and reckless conduct.”

Section 13-21-102's willful and wanton standard concerns intent or reckless disregard of the injury caused, rather than knowledge or reckless disregard of a statement's falsity.

Zerr v. Johnson · filed 1995-07-28

The import of “willfulness and wantonness” in the tort of defamation differs from that in C.R.S. § 13-21-102 by virtue of the object to which each is directed. The question of how one could prove another knowingly or recklessly published a false statement about one is not the same as how one could prove a separate and additional element that the statement was published “heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the plaintiff.” The distinction is that in the first instance the statement is published knowing it is false or wantonly indifferent to its falsity whilst in the second instance the publication is uttered with intent or reckless disregard of the injury it causes.

Section 13-21-102 allows punitive damages when willful and wanton misconduct is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the claim must go to the jury if the evidence could meet that standard.

Miller v. Byrne · filed 1995-10-05(1)(a), (1)(b)

Punitive damages are available only when a plaintiff is able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in “willful and wanton” misconduct. ... Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Miller and Cloud Base, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts causing injury were attended by circumstances evincing a wanton or reckless disregard of the rights and feelings of Miller. Consequently, the trial court erred in directing a verdict on this claim, and, under a similar evidentiary posture on retrial, the issue should be presented to the jury.

Section 13-21-102 allows a punitive damages claim to proceed when a reasonable juror could find the defendant’s conduct willful and wanton.

Bartholic v. Scripto-Tokai Corp. · filed 2000-12-14(1)(a)-(b)

Based on the foregoing, a reasonable juror could conclude that Scripto’s conduct rose to the level of willful and wanton within the meaning of Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102. Accordingly, Scripto’s motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to its argument that plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages.

Post-accident conduct may support exemplary damages when it tends to show that the defendant acted heedlessly, recklessly, and without regard to others' safety during the tortious act.

Jones v. Cruzan · filed 2001-08-30(1)(b)

However, we agree with plaintiff that defendant's entire course of conduct, including the portion that occurred after the accident, tended to show that defendant had been operating his vehicle heedlessly, recklessly, and without regard to the consequences or the safety of others. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that it was material to the issue of punitive damages.

Section 13-21-102 requires proof of willful conduct to recover punitive damages.

Vista Resorts, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2004-11-18(1)(a)

To recover punitive damages, Vista needed to prove that Goodyear acted willfully. Section 13-21-102(l)(a), C.R.S.2004. Evidence that Goodyear continued to manufacture Entran II, despite receiving notice of potential defects, is relevant to willfulness.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) does not require proof of a continuing course of conduct if other evidence satisfies the statutory elements for exemplary damages.

Bonidy v. Vail Valley Center for Aesthetic Dentistry, P.C. · filed 2008-01-10(1)(a)

Because we have concluded the trial court erred in dismissing Bonidy's wrongful discharge claim, we also reverse the trial court's dismissal of her exemplary damages claim. See § 13-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S.2007. Although the trial court indicated that a claim for exemplary damages must be based on a continuing course of conduct, we note that "(while evidence of a continuing course of conduct may buttress a claim for exemplary damages, the absence of such evidence does not preclude such an award if the statutory elements are met by other sufficient proof."

Willful and wanton conduct can support exemplary damages without proof of malicious intent when the actor deliberately and recklessly disregards a known serious safety risk.

Wake v. SSC Greeley Centennial Operating Co. · filed 2013-10-10(1)(b)

This conclusion would be sufficient to demonstrate willful and wanton conduct such that no malicious intent is required to trigger liability for exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102 requires willful and wanton conduct for punitive damages; inattentiveness alone does not meet that standard.

Wortman, Jr. v. Reinsbach · filed 2020-01-30(1)

To be entitled to claim punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that “the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of . . . willful and wanton conduct.” C.R.S. § 13-21-102(1). ... Inattentiveness, alone, is not willful and wanton conduct.

Exemplary damages require fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct; evidence of available safety measures may help determine whether conduct was willful or wanton.

Gould v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2021-09-27(1)(a), (1)(b)

As to the second, to state a claim for exemplary damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the circumstances causing the injury were “attended by . . . fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1)(a). ... While Mr. Ubaldi may not testify that defendant was, in fact, willful or wanton, he may discuss the various options defendant had and the relative difficulty of exercising those safety measures in an effort to assist the trier of fact in determining whether defendant was willful or wanton.

Section 13-21-102 requires more than the conduct underlying a common law bad faith claim to establish a prima facie case of willful and wanton conduct for exemplary damages.

Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2023-09-14(1)(b)

But a prima facie case of willful and wanton conduct requires more than the same bad acts that underlie the claim for common law bad faith. Here, Plaintiff points to evidence of mistake and a lack of explanation from Defendant about her claim, but this does not rise to evidence of intentional and reckless conduct.

A finding of willful and wanton conduct under subsection (1)(b) does not necessarily establish that a defendant made a statement with reckless disregard for the truth.

Johnson v. Staab · filed 2025-05-01(1)(b)

‘“[W]illful and wanton conduct’ means conduct purposefully committed which the actor must have realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the plaintiff.” § 13-21-102(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. ... Thus, the standard for willful and wanton conduct differs from the standard for statements made with reckless disregard for the truth.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for willful and wanton conduct; an insurer’s failure to train adjusters on governing law can allow a jury to find that standard met.

Cody · filed 2025-10-23(1)(a), (1)(b)

Under Colorado law, exemplary damages may be awarded in a civil case where the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of willful and wanton conduct. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1)(a). ... As the cases cited above demonstrate, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s failure to train its adjusters (or at least refresh the training) on important principles of Colorado insurance law was done heedlessly and recklessly without regard to Plaintiff’s rights.

Section 13-21-102 requires proof of actual damages before the jury may be instructed on exemplary damages.

Campbell ex rel. Campbell v. Jenkins · filed 1979-12-20

Also, because of the lack of proof of actual damages, the court was correct in not instructing on exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102 provides no basis for punitive damages when the claimant has no compensatory damages.

Shriver v. Carter · filed 1982-06-17

Since the judgment for compensatory damages is reversed, there is no basis for any award of punitive damages to sellers. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S. 1973; Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc., 35 Colo.App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 (1974).

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages only when there is an underlying award of actual damages.

Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation · filed 1984-01-30

Obviously, Sec. 13-21-102 has no application in the absence of an underlying award of actual damages.

Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the claimant is also awarded actual damages.

Denman v. Burlington Northern Railroad · filed 1988-03-31(1)(a)

Plaintiff’s contention that the court erred in granting Burlington’s motion for directed verdict dismissing the exemplary damage claim has been rendered moot by the jury’s finding that Burlington was not negligent. Exemplary damages may be awarded only if a claimant is also awarded actual damages.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) requires proof of actual damages before punitive damages may be recovered.

Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc. · filed 1989-06-19(1)(a)

In order to be entitled to punitive damages, Staats had to prove the conduct of Pioneer and Nuclear caused actual damages. Failure to prove the existence of actual damages means that no punitive damages may be recovered. Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 29 Colo.App. 386, 486 P.2d 477, 479 (1971), rev’d on other grounds, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (Repl.Vol.1987).

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages when a jury assigns a monetary value to an injury and the defendant’s conduct is wanton and willful, even if the plaintiff receives no compensatory payment.

White v. Hansen · filed 1991-08-05(1)(a)

Furthermore, under § 13-21-102, an award of exemplary damages is proper when the jury has “assessed” damages. ... There is no necessity that the plaintiff receive money from a compensatory damage award. It is sufficient if, as here, there is a injury which is monetarily quantified by a jury.

Section 13-21-102 requires a legally supported award of actual damages before exemplary damages may be awarded.

Western Cities Broadcasting, Inc. v. Schueller · filed 1992-06-08

Since we have concluded that the verdicts awarding actual damages for fraud and negligent misrepresentation are not supported by legally sufficient evidence, it necessarily follows that the verdict and judgment awarding exemplary damages must also be vacated. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A); Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 29 Colo.App. 386, 486 P.2d 477 (1971).

Section 13-21-102 requires a successful underlying claim for actual damages before exemplary damages may be awarded.

Ballow v. Phico Insurance Co. · filed 1992-12-14

Thus, because we have reversed the trial court’s award of actual damages, its award of punitive damages cannot stand.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) requires an award of actual damages before a plaintiff may recover punitive damages.

v. SCC Pueblo · filed 2019-12-05(1)(a)

Because plaintiffs don’t seek recovery of any awardable actual damages, they can’t recover punitive damages. Section 13-21- 102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019, provides that a plaintiff must be awarded actual damages before he may recover punitive damages.

Section 13-21-102 does not permit exemplary damages without a successful underlying claim for actual damages.

Litterer v. Vail · filed 2025-01-30

Therefore, Litterer did not have an underlying claim for actual damages to which exemplary damages could be tied. Accordingly, the court did not err by determining that Litterer could not independently pursue a claim for exemplary damages.

A claim for punitive damages under § 13-21-102 is not subject to the one-year limitation period for actions seeking a penalty or forfeiture under § 13-80-104.

Resource Exploration & Mining, Inc. v. Itel Corp. · filed 1980-07-17

The defendant argues that section 13-21-102, C.R.S. 1973, upon which the claim for punitive damages is premised, is a “penal statute” within the meaning of section 13-80-104. ... Without extending the discussion unnecessarily, this Court finds the reasoning of Dorney v. Harris more persuasive, and therefore holds that the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages in this case is not an action for a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of section 13-80-104.

Section 13-21-102 authorizes punitive damages tied to an underlying tort, so a claim under it is not a separate penalty action subject to § 13-80-104's one-year limit.

Jones v. Harding Glass Co., Inc. · filed 1980-11-24

Thus, plaintiffs' claim for exemplary damages is not a suit or action for a penalty or forfeiture, and § 13-80-104, C.R.S.1973, is inapplicable as a bar to that claim. ... Here, § 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973, does nothing more than authorize a claim for punitive damages when the underlying tort claim is attended by the enumerated circumstances.

An exemplary damages claim under § 13-21-102 is not an action for a penalty or forfeiture subject to the one-year limitations period in § 13-80-104.

Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. · filed 1984-08-07

The question is whether customer’s claim for exemplary damages, premised on § 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973, concerns an action for a penalty or forfeiture. We hold that it does not.

A plaintiff seeking discovery of a defendant's financial condition for an exemplary damages claim must first show a prima facie triable issue on liability for those damages.

Leidholt v. District Court in and for City and County of Denver · filed 1980-11-24

We hold that prima facie proof of a triable issue on liability for punitive damages is necessary to discover information relating to the defendant's financial status.

A question about a defendant’s assets does not require a mistrial under subsection (6) when the witness does not answer it, the jury is told to disregard it, and the jury awards no exemplary damages.

Lunsford v. Western States Life Insurance · filed 1996-05-02(6)

Defendants’ attorney objected and moved for a mistrial on the grounds that § 13-21-102(6), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A) precludes introducing evidence of a defendant’s financial status in any civil action in which exemplary damages may be awarded. ... At the outset, we note that the jury did not award any exemplary damages, indicating that defendants were not prejudiced by the language of the question. ... The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the question. ... Under these circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of a mistrial.

Section 13-21-102 allows a punitive damages claim to proceed for an agent’s breach of fiduciary duty when the claim is legal rather than equitable.

Sall v. G.H. Miller & Co. · filed 1985-07-08

The relationship between Larry D. Sail and the defendant was clearly one of principal-agent, even though the parties signed no express agreement to that effect. ... this is a legal action. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to strike paragraphs 96, 97, 103 and 104 is denied.

Section 13-21-102 allows punitive damages for conduct that breaches a contract only if the same conduct is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.

Mullaney v. Albertson's, Inc. (In Re Mullaney) · filed 1995-04-11

Punitive damages are recoverable only pursuant to statute. ... See § 13-21-102, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). Punitive damages may be recovered where the conduct constituting the breach of contract is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable. ... Consequently, I will grant defendant’s motion strike plaintiffs request for punitive damages.

Section 13-21-102 permits an award of exemplary damages supported by nominal damages alone.

Carey v. After the Gold Rush · filed 1986-01-30

We therefore conclude that nominal damages alone are sufficient to support an award of exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102(6) bars consideration of a party’s income or net worth when deciding whether to award exemplary damages or setting the amount.

Amber Properties, Ltd. v. Howard Electrical & Mechanical Co. · filed 1989-03-27(6)

“In any civil action in which exemplary damages may be awarded, evidence of the income or net worth of a party shall not be considered in determining the appropriateness or the amount of such damages.” Section 13-21-102(6), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). That amendment should be followed upon remand.

Section 13-21-102 bars consideration of a party’s income or net worth when determining whether to award exemplary damages or how much to award.

Computer Associates International, Inc. v. American Fundware, Inc. · filed 1993-08-26

Under this statute, “[i]n any civil action in which exemplary damages may be awarded, evidence of the income or net worth of a party shall not be considered in determining the appropriateness or amount of such damages.” ... Accordingly, evidence of AFW’s financial condition is not relevant to the issue of punitive damages either.

Section 13-21-102(6) bars using a party’s income or net worth to determine whether to award exemplary damages or how much to award.

Gould v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2022-09-15(6)

Thus, although defendant fails to explain its failure to cite the law defendant now bases its motion for reconsideration on, the Court will grant the motion to prevent clear error and thereby prohibit plaintiff from introducing evidence of defendant’s net worth in order to prove exemplary damages.

Section 13-21-102(6) bars consideration of a party’s income when determining exemplary damages, including money made from sales of the product at issue.

Perez · filed 2026-03-31(6)

The amount of money made by defendants was not relevant to any portion of Ms. Perez’s claims, and her reference to the amount of money defendants made selling the multicooker was improper under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(6).

The former version of § 13-21-102 survives due process and Eighth Amendment excessive fines challenges.

The Post Office v. Portec, Inc., a Delaware Corporation · filed 1990-08-27

Punitive damages were awarded in this case under Colorado’s old punitive damages statute, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102 (1973). ... Defendant challenges the constitutionality of this statute on due process and eighth amendment excessive fines grounds. We uphold the statute as constitutional.

The 1973 version of § 13-21-102 does not violate due process.

Estate of Robert W. Korf, Sr. And Minnie Korf, Cross-Appellants v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Cross-Appellee · filed 1990-11-06

Finally, AOSHPI raises a due process challenge against Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102 (1973), under which this punitive damage award was granted. ... Accordingly, we affirm the statute.

Section 13-21-102(5) does not restrict punitive damages in an FAA arbitration unless the parties agreed that Colorado arbitration law would govern.

Pyle v. Securities U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1991-03-08(5)

Because there has been no showing that the parties agreed that Colorado arbitration law should govern in this FAA action, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102(5) does not apply.

Section 13-21-102 permits exemplary damages for bad faith breach of an insurance contract when the breach involves fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.

South Park Aggregates, Inc. v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. of Milwaukee, Wisconsin · filed 1992-12-17

Exemplary damages may be recovered on a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract if the breach is accompanied by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct. ... Thus, there is substantial evidence in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to South Park, that would support a jury finding of willful and wanton conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The 1986 amendment to § 13-21-102 preserves punitive damages claims that accrued before July 1, 1986, even if suit was filed later.

Ortivez v. Davis · filed 1995-09-25

We conclude, therefore, that the presumption established by § 2-4-303 applies to the 1986 amendment to § 13-21-102 and that the amendment must be interpreted as “saving” plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim under the prior statute.

Section 13-21-102’s limit on punitive damages does not apply to an award under federal § 1981.

Gwin v. Chesrown Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1996-04-18(1)(a)

We also reject Chesrown’s contention that the award of punitive damages violated § 13-21-102(a)(l). An award of punitive damages under a § 1981 claim is governed by federal law rather than state law.

Subsection (2) gives a court discretion to reduce or disallow a punitive damages award when the conduct has ceased, deterrence has been accomplished, or the purpose of punitive damages has otherwise been served.

United International Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. · filed 2000-04-28(2)

Contrary to Wharf’s assertion, § 13-21-102(2) does not “direct” a court to reduce a punitive damages award if the conduct has ceased, the deterrent effect has been accomplished, or the purpose of punitive damages has been otherwise served. The statute grants the district court discretion (“court may reduce or disallow the award”).

Section 13-21-102(3)(a) allows exemplary damages of up to three times actual damages when willful and wanton conduct during the case foreseeably aggravates the other party’s damages.

Double Oak Construction L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Development International, L.L.C. · filed 2003-09-25(3)(a)

Section 13-21-102(3)(a) permits a trial court to increase any exemplary damages award to a sum that does not exceed three times the actual damages if, as relevant here, during the pendency of the action, a party engages in willful and wanton conduct and such behavior has further aggravated the damages of the other party, when the wrongdoer knew or should have known that such conduct would cause aggravation.

Section 13-21-102(3)(b) permits increased exemplary damages for willful and wanton conduct during a case that further aggravates the plaintiff’s damages, even if the conduct is unrelated to the original claim.

Martin Ex Rel. Martin v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2007-09-20(3)(b)

The "subject of the claim" limitation in section 13-21-102(3)(a) does not appear in section 13-21-102(3)(b). Thus, conduct subject to the latter section may warrant an increase of exemplary damages even if that conduct does not relate directly to "the action which is the subject of the claim."

Discovery violations made without bad faith do not establish continued or repeated willful and wanton conduct supporting increased exemplary damages.

RCHFU, LLC v. Marriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation · filed 2020-03-20(3)(a)

Because defendants’ discovery violations were not made in bad faith, they do not demonstrate continued or repeated bad behavior.

Exemplary damages on a tort claim are limited to the actual damages awarded on that same claim; damages awarded on a separate contract claim do not raise the limit.

Hensley v. Tri-QSI Denver Corp. · filed 2004-08-12(1)(a)

Here, the General Assembly's intent to limit the punitive damages awarded on a particular tort claim to the amount of actual damages awarded on that same claim is evident from the plain wording of the statute.

Section 13-21-102(1)(a) counts prejudgment interest as actual damages when applying its limit on exemplary damages.

James v. Coors Brewing Co. · filed 1999-11-05(1)(a)

Accordingly, I hold that prejudgment interest on damages should be considered as a part of “actual damages” within the meaning of § 13-21-102(1)(a).

The cap on exemplary damages includes prejudgment interest owed on the compensatory damages recovered from each defendant.

Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 2008-06-02(1)(a)

Accordingly, I find that the statutory cap on each Defendant’s liability for exemplary damages in this case includes the prejudgment interest each Defendant is required to pay on the compensatory damages recovered from it.

Section 13-21-102’s procedural guidelines do not apply to exemplary damages claims in wrongful death actions.

Stamp v. Vail Corp. · filed 2007-11-19(1.5)(b)

By its own terms, the procedural guidelines of the general exemplary damages statute do not apply to claims for exemplary damages in wrongful death actions.

Section 13-21-102 does not require aggravating conduct to be the sole cause of an injury for exemplary damages to be available.

Heinrich v. Master Craft Engineering, Inc. · filed 2015-09-18(1)(a)

Jeg’s argument is without merit. The plain language of the statute does not support Jeg’s interpretation. Had the General Assembly intended to limit exemplary damages to situations where aggravating circumstances are the sole cause of a plaintiffs injuries, the General Assembly could have expressed such an intent directly.

A plaintiff may amend a complaint to seek exemplary damages after making a prima facie showing of willful and wanton conduct.

Argo v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2019-09-04(1.5)(a)

This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, suffices to make out a prima facie case of willful and wanton conduct under § 13-21-102.

A plaintiff may amend a pleading to request exemplary damages after making a prima facie showing of willful and wanton conduct.

Fisher v. Martell · filed 2020-10-09(1.5)(a)

The court finds the allegations in the proposed Amended Complaint and the evidence provided by Mrs. Fisher, viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. Fisher, suffice to make out a prima facie case of willful and wanton conduct under § 13-21-102.

Section 13-21-102(1.5)(a) permits a plaintiff to amend a pleading to seek exemplary damages after initial disclosures if the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of a triable issue.

Stoker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2021-02-22(1.5)(a)

But Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 governs proposed amendments concerning exemplary damages. Pursuant to section 13-21-102(1.5)(a), a plaintiff cannot move for exemplary damages in the initial pleading and may seek to amend the pleading to add a claim for exemplary damages “only after the exchange of initial disclosures pursuant to rule 26 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure” and if she establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue.

A plaintiff seeking to add exemplary damages by amendment must present prima facie proof of a triable issue involving fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.

Grays v. Navient Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-11-12(1.5)(a)

Under Colorado law, a claim for exemplary damages may be allowed by amendment to the pleadings if “the plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1.5)(a). A plaintiff must demonstrate that “the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful wanton conduct.” Id. § 13-21-102(1)(a). ... The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has pointed to evidence of a dispute between her and Navient, but nothing that supports allegations of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct. As a consequence, Plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie proof in support of exemplary damages.