Statute Annotations › Colorado › Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102

Limitation of actions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Colorado
Case notes
204
Cited in passing
85
Citing cases indexed
124
Case dates
1975–2026
Screened through
2026-06-12
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-07
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

289 citing cases reviewed: 204 interpreted the section (annotated below), 85 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-12 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1986-07-01 The legislature rewrote article 80, placed the general two-year periods in § 13-80-102, and moved the one-year assault, battery, false-imprisonment, libel, and slander periods to § 13-80-103. Source
  • 1987-07-01 The legislature amended subsection (1)(b), which covers strict and absolute liability and failure to instruct or warn, and repealed subsection (1)(e). Source
  • 1988-07-01 The legislature amended subsection (1)(c), which covers actions against veterinarians. Source
  • 1989-07-01 The legislature added subsection (1)(k) for actions under § 13-21-109(2). Source
  • 1994-07-01 The legislature excluded motor-vehicle-use torts covered by § 13-80-101(1)(n) from subsection (1)(a)'s general two-year tort period. Source
  • 1995-01-01 The legislature amended subsection (1)(j), which covers actions under § 42-6-204. Source
  • 2014-07-01 SB 14-213 added a four-year exception for wrongful death when the defendant committed vehicular homicide and left the accident scene in the same criminal episode; other wrongful-death actions retain the two-year period. Source

Tort claims — two-year statute of limitations

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides a general two-year limit for tort actions outside the motor vehicle provision and other specific limitations statutes.

Nesjan v. J & A Distributing, Inc. · filed 2025-10-02(1)(a)

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) is a general statute of limitations for all tort actions that don’t fall within the ambit of section 13-80-101(1)(n)(I) or other specific statutes.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on general tort claims.

Rice v. Albino · filed 1996-10-28

Any tort claims plaintiff may have had against defendants in their individual capacities, as distinguished from their official capacities, were also barred. Plaintiff’s grievance filed in April 1990 details various complaints plaintiff had about individual defendants and an alleged conspiracy against plaintiff. This action demonstrates his knowledge more than five years before the complaint was filed. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (general tort statute of limitations is two years).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year statute of limitations for the Bivens/civil-rights actions at issue.

Russell-El v. United States · filed 1999-11-01

Colorado provides for a two-year statute of limitations for such actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) provides a two-year limitations period for the civil-rights claims at issue, making claims brought more than two years after the events untimely.

Duncan v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2001-07-31(1)(i)

The district court correctly applied the Colorado two-year statute of limitations to Mr. Duncan’s civil rights claims and properly dismissed them as untimely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in Colorado.

Appleby-El v. Catron · filed 2003-12-10

Bivens actions are “subject to the statute of limitations of the general personal injury statute in the state where the action arose.” ... Colorado provides a two-year statute of limitations for such actions. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102; Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying § 13-80-102 to § 1983 claim). Therefore, the latest date plaintiff could file his claim was August 18, 2000, two years after the date he was allegedly informed his longevity credits would be forfeited.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1) provides Colorado’s general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims.

Smith v. Ortiz · filed 2006-03-14(1)

State law determines the applicable statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions for § 1983 actions. Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995). Thus, Colorado’s general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1), applies to this case. Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year limitations period for the § 1983 claims at issue, subject to applicable exceptions, and bars suits filed more than two years after accrual.

Rosales v. Ortiz · filed 2009-04-30

Mr. Rosales does not dispute that the limitations period applicable to this § 1983 suit is Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations which, subject to exceptions discussed below, bars suits filed more than two years after the time the cause of action accrued. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102; Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1993).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(g)'s two-year limitations period governs the claims at issue, requiring accrual on or after July 25, 2006 for the action filed on July 24, 2008 to be timely.

Hawkinson v. Montoya · filed 2010-07-08(1)(g)

The parties agree Hawkinson’s claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g). Thus, in order to be timely, his claims had to accrue on or after July 25, 2006. ... The district court correctly concluded his claims are now time-barred and did not err in dismissing his complaint.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims and supplies the limitations period applicable to a § 1983 action in Colorado.

Shinault v. Foster · filed 2014-05-22

In § 1983 actions, we apply the forum state’s statute of limitation for personal injury claims. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1994). The forum state here, Colorado, provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on a wrongful-discharge claim, accruing when the employee is terminated.

Aman v. Dillon Companies, Inc. · filed 2016-04-15(1)(a)

A claim for wrongful discharge accrues upon termination and is subject to a two-year limitations period. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a); Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 361 P.3d 1075, 1077 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15SC445, 2015 WL 7423588 (Colo. Nov. 23, 2015). Aman was terminated on May 27, 2008. He filed suit on November 15, 2011, more than two years later. ... We exercise our discretion to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment because Aman’s wrongful discharge claim was untimely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102’s two-year limitations period limits recovery to injuries incurred during the two years before suit and after filing when the violation repeats during that period; it does not necessarily bar the entire action.

Hamer v. City of Trinidad · filed 2019-05-15

Instead, it concluded that Plaintiff could not “rely solely on the continued inaccessibility of the City’s sidewalks and curb cuts” to survive dismissal under Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations. This was error. Because the district court applied an incorrect standard, it could not determine under the proper framework how the two-year statute of limitations affected Plaintiff’s claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) requires claims arising under federal statutes that provide no limitations period to be commenced within two years after accrual.

Givens v. Anderson · filed 2020-08-24(1)(g)

Colorado law also specifically provides a two-year statute of limitations for claims arising from federal statutes without their own limitations period. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-80-102(g) (“[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute . . . shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues”). Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s proposed claims against the Defendants are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions based on liability created by a federal statute when that statute provides no limitations period.

Allen v. Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-31(1)(g)

Allen’s § 1983 claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-80-102(1)(g). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (2014) (creating a two-year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim). As such, the Court must determine whether Allen’s cause of action accrued more than two years prior to the filing of his initial Complaint on January 27, 2020.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires negligence actions to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Catto v. Kelchner Enterprises · filed 1997-07-03(1)(a)

Therefore, the proper statute of limitations period to apply in assessing the timeliness of this action is the general two-year period for negligence actions contained in § 13-80-102(1)(a)--not the three-year period for actions accruing outside of Colorado as set forth in § 13-80-101(1)(k).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies Colorado’s residual two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1981 claims when analogous state law supplies the limitations period.

Mobley v. Dillon Companies · filed 1998-05-29(1)(i)

The statute of limitations bars Ms. Mobley’s § 1981 claims. As § 1981 does not specify a time period in which claims under that statute must be brought, we look to analogous state law for a limitations period. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). We apply Colorado’s residual two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i); Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1532 n.12 (10th Cir. 1995). Ms. Mobley complains of events occurring in 1993 and 1994. She filed her complaint in 1997. Thus her § 1981 claims are untimely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 imposes a two-year limitation period on negligence claims arising in Colorado, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Wilkins v. Colorado Department of Social Services Division of Vocational Rehabilitation · filed 2001-05-16(1)

Nonetheless, under any theory, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitation found in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102, applicable to negligence claims arising in Colorado, including claims under § 1983.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires bad-faith actions to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Wardcraft Homes, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 2014-09-29(l)(a)

Bad faith actions must be “commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(l)(g) provides a two-year limitations period for actions based on liability created by a federal statute when the federal statute supplies no limitations period.

Vasquez v. Davis · filed 2016-12-28(l)(g)

Colorado law provides a two-year statute of limitation for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(i) imposes a two-year limitations period on all other actions for which no other period of limitation is provided.

Jenkins v. Chance · filed 2019-01-29(1)(i)

A complaint filed on November 17, 2017, more than two years after their cause of action accrued, is barred by Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i)’s two-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 supplies a two-year limitations period for the tort claims at issue, and absent equitable tolling a complaint filed more than seven years after accrual is untimely.

Herrera-Zamora v. Crosby · filed 2019-05-08

It is well-settled, however, that “state law determines the appropriate statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions” for § 1983 and Bivens claims. ... Accordingly, absent some basis for equitable tolling, the complaint was untimely under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year catch-all limitations period for actions for which no other limitations period is provided, but it does not govern a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish a right or interest in real property when the specific eighteen-year real-property period applies.

Metzler v. Ball · filed 2019-08-09(1)(i)

In Colorado, there is “no statute of limitations specifically applicable to declaratory judgment actions,” Harrison v. Pinnacol Assur., 107 P.3d 969, 972 (Colo. App. 2004), but actions of every kind “for which no other period of limitation is provided” must be brought within two years of accrual. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i). ... Either way, the two-year catch-all does not apply. ... And, as to actions such as these that seek to establish the right to an interest in land, the relevant limitations period is eighteen years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101 (“No person shall commence or maintain an action for the recovery of . . . possession or to enforce or establish any right or interest of or to real property . . . unless commenced within eighteen years after the right to bring such action or make such entry has first accrued.”). No statute of limitations has run, therefore, and the Court considers the merits of Claims One and Two.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) and (b) imposes a two-year limitations period on tort claims, including personal-injury and products-liability actions.

Williams v. Smith & Nephew Inc. · filed 2020-01-24(1)(a)(b)

Colorado applies a two-year statute of limitations to all tort actions, including personal injury and products liability actions. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a)(b); id. § 13-80-106(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence and strict-liability claims.

Hardy-Roy v. Shanghai Kindly Enterprise Development Group Co. Ltd · filed 2021-01-22(1)(a)

Pursuant to Colorado law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to Ms. Hardy-Roy’s product liability claim and negligence claim against. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-80-102(1)(a) (negligence and strict liability causes of action), 13-80-106(1) (products liability causes of action).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for negligence claims, and the court applied that period to conclude the proposed negligence claim was untimely even assuming accrual in 2018.

Kahler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2021-08-17(1)(a)

Moreover, the statute of limitations governing Kahler’s proposed claims for negligence and defamation are two and one years, respectively. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a); id. § 13-80-103(1)(a). ... First, even assuming Kahler’s tort claims accrued in 2018, she filed her Motion to Amend in February 2021, well outside the one- and two-year statute of limitations for her claims. (ECF No. 51.)
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year statute of limitations for civil theft and conversion claims.

Focke v. Allen · filed 2021-08-27

A plaintiff has two years to bring either a civil theft or conversion claim. Oaster v. Robertson, 173 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1168 (D. Colo. 2016) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) bars common-law and statutory bad-faith insurance claims filed more than two years after accrual, which here occurred when the insurer denied the claims.

Martinez v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2021-09-30(1)(a)

Judge Neureiter recommends dismissing each claim as follows: ... Common Law and Bad Faith Insurance Claims: Ms. Martinez brought this suit more than two years after Allstate denied her claims, so her claim is barred by the statute of limitations for such claims. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a). ... This de novo review of Ms. Martinez’s more specific objections confirms that Judge Neureiter correctly applied the law to Ms. Martinez’s allegations. None of Ms. Martinez’s objections are persuasive, and the Court will adopt Judge Neureiter’s report and recommendation and dismiss this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims, measured from when the cause of action accrues.

Oakley v. Williams · filed 2022-01-28

With respect to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims arising under § 1983, “[l]imitations periods in § 1983 suits are to be determined by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). Under Colorado law, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is two years “from the time the cause of action accrued.” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. A cause of action accrues when “the plaintiff knows or should have known that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.

Harper v. Biolife Energy Systems, LLC · filed 2022-09-08

The Court applies the Colorado statute of limitations for invasion of privacy, which is two years.7 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (general statute of limitations for tort actions is two years).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury-based § 1983 claims, so claims accruing before July 1, 2019 are untimely when the action is filed on July 1, 2021.

Polaner v. Regents of the University of Colorado, The · filed 2022-09-27

There is a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Colorado. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. ... Even assuming, for the sake of illustration, that Plaintiff’s statute of limitations accrued when he resigned on February 14, 2019 at the latest, these claims are time-barred because Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until July 1, 2021.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) subjects bad-faith and unreasonable-delay claims to Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.

Auer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2023-02-03(1)(a)

Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a), these claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations on tort actions in Colorado.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) requires civil actions for which no other limitation period is provided to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

RMCO Holdings, LLC v. Golden Trading & Transport, LLC · filed 2023-06-05(1)(i)

In sum, because this Court has determined that Colorado’s two-year catchall statute of limitations under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i) applies to Plaintiffs’ COCCA claims, and because Plaintiffs do not dispute that their COCCA claims would be time-barred under a two-year limitations period, see [Doc. 128 at 31–32], the Court ADOPTS the portion of the Recommendation finding that Plaintiffs’ COCCA claims are time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 sets a two-year statute of limitations for the claims to which it applies.

Sanders v. CoreCivic, LLC · filed 2024-08-09

To briefly reiterate, the applicable statute of limitations for all of Mr. Sanders’ claims is two years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102; Riel v. Reed, 760 F. Supp. 852, 855 (D. Colo. 1991).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The catch-all provision sets a two-year limitations period for all actions for which no other limitations period is provided.

Lopez v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2025-02-27(1)(i)

This necessarily suggests that the forfeiture statute of limitations does not apply to COCCA claims, placing those claims within the ambit of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i), which sets a two-year statute of limitations for “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided.” ... Thus, the Court joins RMCO Holdings and Scolari in finding that a two-year statute of limitations applies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The statute requires civil actions, regardless of the legal theory or defendant, to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Chavez-Bravo v. Brighton School District 27J · filed 2025-03-14(1)

Under Colorado law, generally, “civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1). ... The Court has found that minority tolling does not apply to Ms. Chavez-Bravo’s claims, and that Colorado’s general two-year statute of limitations limits her ability to recover for injuries outside the limitations period.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on § 1983 claims arising in Colorado.

Townsend v. Williams · filed 2025-07-03(g)

Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the general personal injury limitation period of the state in which the action arose. Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1994). In Colorado, the limitation on a claim brought pursuant to section 1983 is two years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(g). Federal law determines when a section 1983 cause of action accrues. Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 990 (10th Cir. 2022).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) imposes a two-year limitation period on general personal-injury claims, running from when the action accrues.

Bradshaw v. Meyer · filed 2025-09-30(1)(a)

The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury actions sets the limitations period for § 1983 actions,” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 2010), which, in Colorado, is two years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a) (general limitation for personal injury claims is two years from when the action accrues).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides a two-year limitations period for tort claims generally, which barred Hoid's other two claims.

Hoid v. Gray Media Group · filed 2025-11-10(1)(a)

Although only one of Hoid’s three claims was expressly identified as a defamation claim, Gray Media persuasively argued that all three claims were time-barred, even if we applied to the other two claims Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations for tort claims in general. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a). We agree and may affirm on this alternative basis.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year residual limitations period for personal injury claims, and a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming its basis.

Glasser v. King · filed 2018-01-09(1)(i)

The district court correctly held that the proposed claims would be barred by Colorado’s two-year residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... Here, the injury that is the basis for this action is Glasser’s March 26, 2010, heart attack. Thus, the district court didn’t err in concluding that Glasser’s § 1983 claims accrued on that date.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(g) requires actions imposing liability created by a federal statute, when that statute supplies no limitations period, to be filed within two years after accrual.

Chacon v. Zahorka · filed 1987-07-01(g)

While the notice provisions of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act do not apply, the two-year statute of limitations for actions based upon liability created by federal statutes is applicable. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(g), which states in pertinent part: The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter: ... (g) All actions upon which liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Since July 1, 2014, SB 14-213 allows four years for wrongful-death actions involving vehicular homicide and leaving the accident scene in the same criminal episode; the two-year rule continues for other wrongful deaths.

Subsection (1)(d) imposes a two-year limitations period on wrongful-death actions, measured from the decedent's death.

Donald L. Cope, Individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Connie L. Cope v. Ethicon, Inc., a Foreign Corporation · filed 1991-10-30(1)(d)

A wrongful death cause of action is time barred unless it is filed within two years after death. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(d). This action was commenced almost three years after the action accrued. We agree with the district court that the plaintiff-appellant is limited to a wrongful death action and that the action is now barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(g) requires actions upon liability created by a federal statute, when no federal limitations period is provided, to be commenced within two years after accrual.

Workman v. Jordan · filed 1994-08-16(g)

Therefore, Colorado’s two-year limitations period applies to this claim. ... His claim of retaliation against his right to testify at the coworker’s hearing is therefore time barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 sets a two-year limitations period for actions for negligence, strict liability, trespass, nuisance, and outrageous conduct.

Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 1998-07-29

Colorado law currently prescribes a two-year statute of limitations in actions for negligence, strict liability, trespass, nuisance and outrageous conduct. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 (1997). Insofar as Plaintiffs assert claims against Dow accruing on or after July 1, 1986, this period applies. To the extent that such claims accrued before July 1, 1986, they are governed by the Colorado limitations periods in force at the time of the accrual. Cook I, 755 F.Supp. at 1483.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(a) sets a two-year limitations period for tort actions such as trade libel, while § 13-80-102(g)’s two-year period for liabilities created by federal statutes does not govern Lanham Act unfair-competition claims when applying it would discriminate against a federal cause of action.

Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc. · filed 2000-01-31(a), (g)

Thus, a two-year statute of limitations applies to AMO’s trade libel claim, and Idaho Nor-land, which merely applied a now-repealed statutory section, certainly does not command a contrary result. ... The Court finds, however, that neither § 13-80-102(a) nor § 13-80-102(g) apply to a claim under the Lanham Act. Instead, Colorado’s three-year statute of limitations for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and deceit, § 13-80-101(e), governs such claims. ... While Full Draw is certainly correct that the Lanham Act is a federal statute that provides a cause of action but not a statute of limitations, § 13-80-102(g) cannot bar AMO’s Lanham Act claim because “a state statute of limitations will not be applied when it discriminates or expresses hostility against a federal cause of action.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(a) requires negligence actions and § 13-80-102(g) requires actions based on federal statutes without their own limitations period to be commenced within two years after accrual.

P.R. v. Zavaras · filed 2002-10-30(a), (g)

Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102, which requires a civil suit to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) gives COCCA civil claims a two-year statute of limitations, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Grubka v. WebAccess International, Inc. · filed 2006-06-29(1)(i)

The two-year statute of limitations for a COCCA claim arising out of the Series A offering expired on December 1, 2002.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) provides a two-year limitations period for actions based on federal statutes without their own limitation period and for other actions lacking a specified period.

Escobar v. Reid · filed 2009-09-17(1)(g)

In Colorado, the limitation on a personal injury claim brought pursuant to Section 1983 is two years. See Colo.Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(g) (creating a two-year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and for “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir.1993) (applying Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) requires actions based on liability created by a federal statute with no specified limitations period to be commenced within two years.

Hull v. COLORADO BD. OF GOVERNORS OF COLORADO · filed 2011-03-28(1)(g)

State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations periods for § 1983 claims. Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir.1999). Therefore, in this case, plaintiff's § 1983 claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) ("All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute" and "regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought . . . shall be commenced within two years."); see also Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that "§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions and we therefore apply" the State of Colorado's two-year statute of limitations (citation omitted)). Federal law, however, "governs the time of accrual of § 1983 claims." Beck, 195 F.3d at 557. Plaintiff's § 1983 claim "accrued when [he] knew or should have known that his constitutional rights had allegedly been violated." Parkhurst v. Lampert, 264 Fed.Appx. 748, 749 (10th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (citing Beck, 195 F.3d at 557).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions based on liability created by a federal statute when the federal statute provides no limitations period.

Hull v. Colorado Board of Governors of the Colorado State University System · filed 2011-03-28(1)(g)

Therefore, in this case, plaintiffs § 1983 claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (“All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and “regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought ... shall be commenced within two years.”); see also Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that “ § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions and we therefore apply” the State of Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations (citation omitted)).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year limitations period for tort actions and other actions for which no different period is provided, including non-administrative employment-discrimination claims.

Kennedy v. Colorado RS, LLC · filed 2012-02-01(1)(a), (1)(i)

Such claims would instead fall under the two-year limitations period found in Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102, which covers tort actions as well as “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided[.]” ... As a tort, these claims are subject to the two-year limitations period found in Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(a). Therefore, a two-year limitations period is appropriate for Mr. Kennedy’s ERISA 510 claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides a two-year limitations period for tort claims, including outrageous-conduct claims.

Maiteki v. Marten Transportation Ltd. · filed 2013-12-04(1)(a)

The statute of limitations for an outrageous conduct claim is two years. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(a). As with the defamation claim, Plaintiff was aware of both his injury and the source of his injury in September 2008. (Am. Compl.f 5.) Because Plaintiff did not initiate this action until more than two years after his claim accrued, it is untimely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) bars an outrageous-conduct claim filed more than two years after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its cause.

Taylor v. Goldsmith · filed 1994-02-24(1)(a)

Consequently, because the complaint was filed more than two years after plaintiff learned of the statements, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs claims for libel, slander, and outrageous conduct as barred by § 13-80 — 102(l)(a) and § 13-80-103(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Yol. 6A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) generally gives a plaintiff two years after accrual to bring a tort action, including a negligence action outside the No Fault Act.

Boyer v. Ito Packing Co. · filed 1992-08-27(1)(a)

Generally, tort actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Section 13-80-102(l)(a). ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the action was not “under” the Act and that the two-year statute of limitation applied.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) imposes a two-year limitation period on a tort claim for economic duress.

Duell v. United Bank of Pueblo, N.A. · filed 1994-06-16(1)(a)

Because any such tort claim would be subject to the two-year statute of limitations set out in § 13-80-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A), plaintiffs’ claim for economic duress, if such ever existed, was also time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives a plaintiff two years to bring an outrageous conduct claim.

Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc. · filed 1993-06-30(1)(a)

A two year statute of limitation period applies to an outrageous conduct claim. § 13-80-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Colorado.

Siblerud v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture · filed 1995-08-14(1)(i)

Colorado's two-year residual statute of limitations, C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(i) applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... I conclude Siblerud's claims are barred as a matter of law under C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(i).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives an outrageous conduct claim a two-year limitations period, even when the conduct could also support a battery claim.

Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference of the United Methodist Church · filed 1996-01-18(1)(a)

The limitation period applicable to outrageous conduct is two years from the date of accrual. Sections 13-80-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.) and 13-80-108(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives negligence claims a two-year limitation period measured from accrual.

Johnston v. Cigna Corp. · filed 1996-03-07(1)(a)

For plaintiffs’ negligence claims as to the 1987 investments, the limitation period is two years from the date of accrual, pursuant to § 13-80-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 requires negligence claims against home inspectors to be brought within two years after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the faulty inspection.

Gleason v. Becker-Johnson Associates, Inc. · filed 1996-03-21

Nevertheless, actions against home inspectors would still need to be brought within two years after the buyer discovers or should have discovered a ... problem arising from faulty inspection.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 gives Colorado personal injury claims a two-year limitations period, which applies to Bivens claims arising in Colorado.

Trujillo v. Simer · filed 1996-07-25

Plaintiffs’ claims arose in Colorado, the state where the alleged unlawful search and seizures took place. Colorado’s general statute of limitations for personal injury claims provides that a claim must be brought within two years after the action accrues. C.R.S. § 13-80-102.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 supplies a two-year limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Crumpton v. Perryman · filed 1998-04-16

The two-year statute of limitations in § 13-80-102, C.R.S.1997, applies to claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives a plaintiff two years from accrual to file a conversion claim.

McGee v. Hardina · filed 2005-12-15(1)(a)

Here, McGee filed a complaint for conversion, an action in tort. Therefore, he had two years from the date his cause of action accrued to file his claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides a two-year limitations period for tort actions involving interference with relationships.

Layton v. Toole · filed 2025-11-13(1)(a)

And her complaint was filed in February 2023, which was within the applicable statute of limitations for each of her claims. See ... § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (establishing two-year statute of limitations for tort actions involving interference with relationships); ... (promissory estoppel is based in contract principles).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires a plaintiff to commence a tort action within two years after the claim accrues.

Bell v. Land Title Guarantee Co · filed 2018-05-17(1)(a)

A plaintiff must commence tort actions within two years from the date the cause of action accrues, see § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, and contract actions within three years from the date the cause of action accrues, see § 13-80-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017. ... So, taking the complaint’s factual allegations as true, the Bells filed their negligence and breach of contract claims within the statute of limitations in May 2016.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year limitations period for Colorado tort actions, which the court applied to claims arising from the alleged stay violation and denial of due process.

In Re: Aurora Commercial Corp. · filed 2020-07-24

It is appropriate in this case to apply the statute of limitations for tort actions in Colorado, which provides for a limitations period of two years.5 C.R.S. § 13-80-102. The conduct at issue occurred in 2009, a decade prior to Pierre’s submission of a proof of claim and related complaint in the ACC bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the claim alleging a willful violation of the automatic stay is time barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference, and trade libel to be commenced within two years after accrual.

Shat Acres Higland Cattle, LLC v. American Highland Cattle Association · filed 2024-11-25(1)(a)

Colorado law generally requires tort claims—including intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference, and trade libel—to “be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.” § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (2024).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires tort claims, including negligence and interference with the formation of a contract, to be brought within two years after accrual.

Conte v. Frazar · filed 2025-10-09(1)(a)

Claims for tortious actions — including negligence and interference with the formation of a contract — expired by the end of June 1994, which is two years after the cause of action accrued, see § 13-80-102(1)(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives intentional infliction of emotional distress claims a two-year limitations period after accrual.

Topa v. Frechin · filed 2026-06-11(1)(a)

Tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be brought “within two years after the cause of action accrues,” § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, unless they seek to recover damages caused by an act of domestic violence, in which case they must be brought “within six years after [the] cause of action accrues,” § 13-80-103.6. ... We conclude that the district court correctly allowed this claim to proceed only as to the facts alleged to have occurred in 2023, as only those facts fell within the two (or six) years preceding the 2024 filing of the complaint.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires abuse of process actions to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Davenport v. Parrot · filed 2024-07-11(1)(a)

Tort actions for abuse of process “must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.” § 13-80-102(1)(a). ... Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s decision to dismiss the officers’ claims against the lawyer and against the law firm because their lawsuit was filed after the statute of limitations had run.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for claims under section 10-3-1115.

Peña v. American Family · filed 2018-04-19(1)(a)

And because the applicable two-year limitations period measured from American Family’s September 17, 2015, response, has expired, Peña would have no avenue for relief if we were to turn aside her appeal. See Wardcraft Homes, Inc. v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 70 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1213 (D. Colo. 2014) (applying the two year limitations period of section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, for actions brought under section 10-3-1115).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) sets a general two-year limit for tort actions; the more specific three-year limit governs claims for injuries arising from the use or operation of a motor vehicle.

Dominguez · filed 2026-06-12(1)(a)

Colorado’s general statute of limitations for tort actions is two years, as set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a). ... The three-year statute of limitations therefore applies to Plaintiff’s negligent hiring and entrustment claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Applicability to § 1983 claims

Section 13-80-102 supplies the two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims arising in Colorado.

Coleman v. Morall · filed 2003-04-04

Because Congress has not expressly provided a statute of limitations for actions brought under § 1983, such claims are subject to the statute of limitations of the general personal injury statute in the state where the action arose. ... Accordingly, the district court properly determined that Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (2001), applied to Mr. Coleman’s action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims, while § 13-80-102(1)(a)'s two-year period for outrageous-conduct claims is a general statute that yields to the specific one-year period for actions against police officers.

Donohue v. Hoey · filed 2004-09-21(1)(i), (1)(a)

Because no Colorado statute of limitations expressly applies to personal injury actions, this court has previously looked to the Colorado residual statute of limitations, which provides for a two-year statute of limitations. ... Colorado law imposes a one-year statute of limitations on “[a]ll actions against . . . police officers or any other law enforcement authority.” In this case, this statute arguably conflicts with another statute, which imposes a two-year statute of limitations for outrageous conduct claims. ... Thus, the specific statute of limitations that applies to actions against police officers must control, and the district court did not err in applying the one-year statute of limitations to this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Colorado.

Nicholas v. Boyd · filed 2009-03-19(1)(i)

In Colorado, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1993). ... The statute of limitations may begin to accrue before a party has all the evidence supporting its case. Baker, 991 F.2d at 632. It begins to run when the plaintiff knows facts sufficient to support a cause of action. Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675. ... Because the factual allegations in the amended complaint were nearly all known to Plaintiffs over two years prior to the filing of their suit, the suit is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 sets a two-year limitations period for Colorado personal-injury actions.

Thorpe v. Ancell · filed 2010-02-26

The limitations period for a personal injury action in Colorado is two years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102; Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 482 (10th Cir. 1994).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102's two-year limitations period does not govern a bad-faith claim arising from an alleged CAARA violation; the three-year period in § 13-80-101(1)(j) applies.

Folks v. State Farm Mutual Insurance · filed 2008-10-20

The district court applied § 13-80-101(1)(a) to Folks’ breach of contract claims (three-year statute of limitation) and § 13-80-102 to her bad faith breach claim (two-year statute of limitation). Section 13-80-101(1)(j), however, is the correct statute to apply to the latter because it arose from the alleged violation of CAARA.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Colorado, and claims filed more than two years after accrual are untimely.

Meier v. Aspen Academy · filed 2024-08-01(1)(i)

In Colorado, claims for federal constitutional violations under § 1983 have a two-year limitations period. Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750–51 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i)). ... The Court finds that the statute of limitations ran on Plaintiffs’ claims on October 6, 2023. This lawsuit was filed in federal court on October 10, 2023, four days too late. Because the lawsuit was filed too late, Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) and (i) require actions based on federal statutes without their own limitations period and other actions lacking a specified period to be commenced within two years.

Dodson v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-07-13(1)(g), (i)

In Colorado, a two-year statute of limitations applies. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g), (i) (creating a two-year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and for “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750-51 (10th Cir.1993) (applying Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim). ... Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on June 28, 2011[# 1]. Because Plaintiff was terminated on June 29, 2009, his causes of action accrued on that date, and the claims arising from his termination were timely filed less than two years later. See also Motion [# 18] at 18 (stating Defendant Beilis’s agreement that Plaintiff “was required to file these claims by June 29, 2011, which was two years after his termination”). Accordingly, Defendant Beilis’s argument on this point is without merit.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for actions based on liability created by a federal statute, including § 1983 claims.

Holmes v. Regents of the · filed 1999-05-07(1)(g)

In Colorado, a two-year statute of limitations applies to “actions upon liability created by a federal statute.” See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1) provides a two-year limitations period for federal civil rights actions in Colorado.

Graham v. Taylor · filed 2016-02-10(1)

In Colorado, the relevant statute prescribes a two-year statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Limitations period for legal malpractice actions

Section 13-80-102(1) requires a legal-malpractice claim to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, with accrual governed by Colorado’s discovery rule.

Derkevorkian v. Lionbridge Technologies, Inc. · filed 2008-12-03(1)

Even if there was an attorney-client relationship between Ross and her law firm and DerKevorkian, about which we express no opinion, any cause of action for malpractice arising therefrom accrued more than two years before DerKevorkian sued Ross on January 7, 2005, and thus is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. A claim for legal malpractice must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1); Torrez v. Edwards, 107 P.3d 1110, 1113 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). Colorado has adopted the discovery rule for legal malpractice actions. Accordingly, a “claim accrues when a plaintiff learns ‘facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of the general nature of damage and that the damage was caused by the wrongful conduct of an attorney.” Rantz. v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 136 (Colo. 2005) (quoting Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Colo. 2004)).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(g) bars actions under federal statutes unless they are commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Arko v. United States Air Force Reserve Officer Training Program · filed 1987-02-26(g)

Under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(g) (1986 Cum.Supp.), such claims are barred if they are not commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A legal malpractice claim accrues when the client knows or reasonably should know of the attorney’s negligence and has sustained some damage, including legal fees incurred to address it.

Palisades National Bank v. Williams · filed 1991-08-01(1)(a)

Based upon these undisputed facts, we conclude that, because the bank knew, or should have known, of the facts giving rise to a claim against Williams, and because it had already sustained some damage, the bank’s claim accrued against Williams as of that date, irrespective whether that claim is classified as one arising in tort or in contract. See § 13-80-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 RepLYol. 6A); Morris v. Geer, supra.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions, including those against law enforcement officers.

Nieto v. State · filed 1998-03-23(1)(g)

Hence, in Colorado the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, even those asserted against law enforcement officers, is the two-year limitation period of § 13-80-102(l)(g).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1) gives a negligence claim against attorneys a two-year limitations period.

Miller v. Byrne · filed 1995-10-05(1)

Miller’s negligence claim against the Attorneys was governed by a two-year statute of limitations. ... Hence, the claim accrued as of that time, and thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the negligence claims filed more than two years later were time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1) requires a legal malpractice action to be filed within two years after the claim accrues.

Torrez v. Edwards · filed 2004-12-16(1)

A plaintiff must commence an action for legal malpractice within two years after the cause of action accrues.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 gives negligence-based legal malpractice claims a two-year limitations period.

Boulders at Escalante LLC v. Otten Johnson Robinson Neff & Ragonetti PC · filed 2015-06-18

The statute of limitations bars legal malpractice actions based on negligence brought more than two years after the action accrues. § 13-80-102, C.R.S.2014; Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1052 (Colo.2004).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Tolling of limitations period

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) supplies a two-year limitations period for covered claims, but equitable tolling may apply when exceptional circumstances and diligent good-faith efforts make timely filing impossible.

Nasious v. City & County of Denver-Denver Sheriff's Department · filed 2011-02-22(1)(g)

Without question, Mr. Nasious’s first lawsuit, insofar as the claims at issue in this second lawsuit are concerned, was filed within Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations. ... The magistrate judge’s effective dismissal of the second lawsuit defendants and claims without considering the statute of limitations clearly prejudiced Mr. Nasious and was not “just” under Rule 21, because, as the district court found, those claims, when refiled on February 8, 2008, were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Indeed, dismissal made timely refiling impossible. Severance, however, would have preserved the filing date of the original complaint and avoided any statute of limitations concerns. ... Thus, we must address whether Colorado’s doctrine of equitable tolling requires that Mr. Nasious’s original filing date be honored and that his second lawsuit be deemed timely. See generally Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (recognizing that federal courts refer to state law for tolling rules). We conclude that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 does not specifically authorize tolling the limitations period while a prior action is pending.

Glaser v. City and County of Denver · filed 2014-01-29

The applicable Colorado statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102, does not specifically allow for tolling during the pendency of a prior action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) requires a § 1983 claim to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues, subject to equitable tolling.

Chrisco v. Gibson · filed 2019-08-09(1)(g)

Colorado law requires that a plaintiff file his § 1983 claim within two years of the cause of action accruing. ... Thus, the statute of limitations required that Plaintiff assert these causes of action on or before August 4, 2017. ... In the absence of equitable tolling, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Al Ghareeb v. Board of Trustees at the University of Northern Colorado · filed 2020-01-13(1)(a)

In Colorado, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a); see also id. § 13-80-102(g). Accordingly a two-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s national origin discrimination claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year limitation period for general personal-injury claims in Colorado, running from accrual.

Gosselin v. Kaufman · filed 2016-07-19

The personal injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits determines the limitation period for § 1983 suits. Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). The general limitation for personal injury claims in Colorado is two years from when the action accrues. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. Federal law establishes when the claim accrues and when the limitations period begins to run. Mondragon, 519 F.3d at 1082.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since The 1986 rewrite moved the one-year assault, battery, false-imprisonment, libel, and slander periods to § 13-80-103; § 13-80-102 now states other limitations periods.

Section 13-80-102 provides a one-year limitations period for false imprisonment actions; § 13-80-106 extends that period to two years for federal statutory and constitutional claims.

McKay v. Hammock · filed 1982-07-15

Section 13-80-102 limits actions based on false imprisonment to one year. ... I find that the state one-year limitations period, applicable to false imprisonment actions, is the most analogous state limitations period and that such period is extended to two years by § 13-80-106. Accordingly, the two-year limitations period is applicable to the federal statutory and constitutional claims and the one-year period is applicable to the common law claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 13-80-102 requires assault and battery actions to be filed within one year, and filing an EEOC charge does not toll that period.

Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc. · filed 1982-10-28

Against this backdrop of judicial constraint, I feel obligated to rule that Plaintiff’s EEOC action did not operate to toll the one-year limit of § 102.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 13-80-102’s one-year limitations period bars a defamation claim filed more than a year after the initial publication when the claim alleges continuous publication.

Corporon v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1985-08-22

Corporon’s complaint, in effect, alleges a continuous publication which began August 25, 1982, until sometime later. See Spears Free Clinic v. Maier, supra. Hence, the trial court properly dismissed his first claim based on the statute of limitations bar found in § 13-80-102, C.R.S.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 requires an abuse of process action to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Cartwright v. Colorado Bank of Walsh, Inc. · filed 1987-04-20

The period of time within which one must bring a claim of abuse of process is governed by 1973 C.R.S. § 13-80-102 (1986 Cum.Supp.). That statute bars an abuse of process action if suit is not brought within two years from when the cause of action accrues.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The limitations period for a medical malpractice claim is tolled when, before it expires, a plaintiff files a motion to amend with an amended complaint and serves the motion, complaint, and summons on the new defendant.

Moore v. Grossman · filed 1991-04-25(1)(c)

In summary, we hold that if, before the expiration of the appropriate statute of limitations, a plaintiff files a motion to amend accompanied by an amended complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 15(a), and if the motion, amended complaint, and summons are served on a defendant before expiration of the statute of limitations, then the statute of limitations is tolled until the trial court rules on plaintiff’s motions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Once a defendant raises the two-year tort limitation as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that it was tolled.

Overheiser v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1991-06-20(1)(a)

Once the statute of limitations is raised as an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the statute has been tolled.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1) imposes a two-year limit on professional negligence claims; strategic reasons for delaying suit during related tax proceedings do not, without a good faith effort to sue timely, warrant equitable tolling.

Noel v. Hoover · filed 2000-03-30(1)

Therefore, because the Noels failed to make a good faith effort to bring their claims in a timely manner, we conclude that the doctrine of equitable tolling is not applicable to this action. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that the Noelg' lawsuit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives an invasion-of-privacy claim two years from accrual; an earlier action dismissed without prejudice does not toll that period.

Seale v. Peacock · filed 2023-09-29(1)(a)

In the absence of any reasons or case citations that oppose Mr. Peacock’s motion to dismiss, other than Mr. Seale’s appeal to fairness, the Court finds that the statutes of limitation have run on Mr. Seale’s SCA and invasion of privacy claims and those claims are therefore barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Statute of limitations

Section 13-80-102 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on the federal and residuary claims at issue.

Squire v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1997-07-29(l)(g) and (l)

At that time, the statute of limitations for both federal claims and “residuary”- claims was two years.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) supplies a two-year limitation period for § 1983 claims when federal law provides no limitations period.

Jones v. Skulstad · filed 2021-02-18(1)(g)

Jones’s Eighth Amendment claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-80-102(1)(g). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (creating a two-year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim). Accordingly, all conduct by Defendants which occurred prior to December 19, 2017 is not subject to challenge.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 requires Colorado personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims, to be filed within two years of accrual; the accrual date for § 1983 claims is determined under federal law.

Aryee v. City and County of Denver, The · filed 2023-04-05

In Colorado, personal injury claims must be filed within two years of the date of accrual. Gosselin v. Kaufman, 656 F. App’x 916, 919 (10th Cir. 2016); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. However, the date of accrual is determined by federal law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 provides a two-year statute of limitations applicable to Section 1985 claims.

King v. United States · filed 2025-01-30

The applicable statute of limitations for Section 1985 claims is two years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102; Lyons v. Kyner, 367 Fed. App’x. 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2010) (“For conspiracy claims under § 1985(3), courts have also applied the forum state's personal-injury statute of limitations.”). The claim here alleges a conspiracy between the Defendants at USP Leavenworth, USP McCreary, and USP Lee; however, Plaintiff alleges that he moved out of each of these three facilities in 2019. The two-year statute of limitations period thus expired in 2021, which was two years before Plaintiff first brought this claim. Thus, claim two is time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides a two-year limitations period for tort actions, but a civil-theft claim seeking the return of stolen property is governed by the more specific three-year limitations period in § 13-80-101(1)(h).

Commissiong v. Center at Lincoln, LLC, The · filed 2025-03-25(1)(a)

Analyzing the examples of tort actions provided in § 13-80-102(1)(a) indicates that, even if civil theft is a “tort action,” it more naturally falls within the scope of § 13-80-101(1)(h).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) imposes a two-year limitation period on actions based on federal statutes that provide no limitation period, including § 1983 claims.

Vigil v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2021-03-08(1)(g)

Vigil’s § 1983 claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-80-102(1)(g). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (2014) (creating a two-year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions based on liability created by a federal statute when that federal statute supplies no limitations period.

Hoffman v. Shaetzle · filed 2021-03-23(1)(g)

Hoffman’s claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-80-102(1)(g). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (creating a two-year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim). The parties agree that the events giving rise to this action occurred on November 13, 2017. (ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 1–22; ECF No. 36 at 9.) Accordingly, the statute of limitations expired on November 13, 2019. ... As Hoffman has not alleged facts suggesting that Aquino or the Doe Defendants were on notice that they may be implicated in this action, the statute of limitations bars his claims against them. Accordingly, the Court adopts this portion of the Recommendation as modified and dismisses Hoffman’s claim as to Aquino and the Doe Defendants. Because this is not an adjudication of these claims on the merits, the dismissal will be without prejudice.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions based on federal statutes when the federal statute provides no limitations period.

Vigil v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2021-06-25(1)(g)

Vigil’s § 1983 claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-80-102(1)(g). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (2014) (creating a two-year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) requires actions based on liability created by a federal statute with no limitations period, including § 1983 claims in Colorado, to be commenced within two years.

Nolan v. City of La Junta, Colorado, The · filed 2023-01-10(1)(g)

The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Colorado, the forum state here, is two years.2 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (“All actions upon liability created by federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and “regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought . . . shall be commenced within two years.”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) to § 1983 claims); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We have made clear that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 requires actions based on liability created by a federal statute, when the federal statute provides no limitations period, to be commenced within two years.

Grays v. Munn · filed 2024-05-21

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (“All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute, must be commenced within two years.”). ... In this matter, it is undisputed that APS issued the Directives in May and August 2018. Consequently, Plaintiff’s federal law claims needed to be filed no later than May and August 2020 to avoid being time-barred. But Plaintiff filed this lawsuit nearly two years beyond that.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) requires actions based on liability created by a federal statute, when that federal statute provides no limitations period, to be commenced within two years.

Gearhart v. University of Colorado Colorado Springs · filed 2025-08-25(1)(g)

The Colorado statute of limitations for Title IX claims is two years, and therefore, because Plaintiff filed this action on April 10, 2024, any claims that accrued prior to April 10, 2022, are untimely. Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying the same state statutes of limitations for § 1983 claims to Title IX); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (“All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” must commence within two years).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives outrageous-conduct claims a two-year limitations period measured from the date of accrual.

Banks v. Jackson · filed 2021-09-13(1)(a)

The limitations period applicable to outrageous conduct claims5 is two years from the date of accrual. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a); accord Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference of United Methodist Church, 923 P.2d 152, 161 (Colo. App. 1995).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires tort claims to be commenced within two years after accrual, but the limitations defense cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss when the accrual date is not clear from the complaint.

Happy Beavers LLC v. Angry Beavers, LLC · filed 2021-09-29(1)(a)

Furthermore, § 13-80-102 states that all tort claims “must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a). ... Missing from defendants motion, however, is any discussion of the accrual date and why the signing of the contracts or agreements constitutes the proper date for accrual. ... The complaint and claims here do not reach that standard.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) gives claims based on liability created by a federal statute, including § 1983 claims, a two-year limitations period in Colorado.

Thompson v. Williams · filed 2021-10-12(1)(g)

The governing statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Colorado, the forum state here, is two years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (“All actions upon liability created by federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and “regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought . . . shall be commenced within two years.”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) to § 1983 claims); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We have made clear that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) requires actions based on liability created by a federal statute that lacks its own limitations period to be filed within two years after accrual.

McDonald v. Citibank N.A. · filed 2021-12-02(1)(g)

The magistrate judge recommended dismissing plaintiff’s claims as untimely. ... As the magistrate judge correctly noted, the statute of limitations for §§ 1983 and 1985 actions is borrowed from state statutes. ... Because neither §§ 1983 nor 1985 provide a statute-of-limitations period, the magistrate judge noted that, in Colorado, the relevant statute of limitations for those claims is two years. Id. (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (“The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter . . . [a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute.”)); ... The Court therefore accepts the magistrate judge’s recommendation that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and overrules plaintiff’s objections.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) requires actions based on liability created by a federal statute, when that statute provides no limitations period, to be commenced within two years.

Yapoujian v. Stancil · filed 2025-08-13(1)(g)

The governing statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Colorado is two years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (“All actions upon liability created by federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and “regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought . . . shall be commenced within two years.”); ... Therefore, granting leave to amend would be futile because the claim Plaintiff desires to add would be barred by the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on § 1983 claims in Colorado because they are liabilities created by federal statute without a specified limitations period.

Salazar · filed 2026-04-16(1)(g)

The governing statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Colorado is two years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (“All actions upon liability created by federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and “regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought . . . shall be commenced within two years.”); see also Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) to § 1983 claims); Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We have made clear that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) provides a two-year limitations period for the claims at issue, and that period may be equitably tolled when the circumstances warrant it.

Orlin v. City and County of Denver, The · filed 2022-12-20(1)(g)

Here, Defendant Aurora has raised a statute of limitations defense. For the purposes of Plaintiffs’ Section-1983 claims, the forum state’s law “determines the appropriate statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions.” Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995). The forum state is Colorado, where a two-year statute of limitations applies. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g). ... Given the nature of the alleged incident and Plaintiffs’ counsel’s diligent public records requests, the Court has no difficulty concluding the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled and leave should be freely granted for Plaintiffs to add Sgt. Brukbacher and Officer Budaj.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The subsection provides a two-year limitation period for actions based on liability created by a federal statute when that statute supplies no limitations period, but the court held this catch-all provision inapplicable to the ADA claim because more analogous state statutes governed.

Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1990-08-24(g)

Although Colorado provides a general two year limitation period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said statute,” Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(g), I still must locate and apply the statutory period found in the state statute most analogous to the ADA. ... The catch-all provision of § 13-80-102(g) is not “analogous” to the ADA and is thus inapplicable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 imposes a two-year limitations period on actions arising under Title II of the ADA.

Hughes v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2009-01-15

Colorado’s general two-year statute of limitations, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102, applies to actions arising under Title II of the ADA.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (g) establishes a two-year limitations period that applies to the § 1983 claims at issue.

Onyx Properties LLC v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-12-12(g)

In that ruling, I first noted that the applicable period of limitations is two years. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(g). ... As I ruled previously, I conclude that the Rohrbachs’ § 1983 claims accrued, at the latest, on November 10, 2006, when Elbert County filed its enforcement action against the Rohrbachs in state court. And, because I have again determined that the filing date of the Rohrbachs’ federal case here, on September 2, 2011, was the date of filing for the purposes of assessing the running of the statute of limitations, I hold that their § 1983 claims are time barred in this Court as outside of the applicable two-year limitations period.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) allows a negligence complaint to be filed on the second anniversary of the day the claim accrued.

Cade v. Regensberger · filed 1990-07-19(1)(a)

Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 4, 1988, the last permissible day for filing under § 13-80-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives a legal malpractice claim two years to be filed; a complaint accompanied by an insufficient funds check is not filed for limitations purposes until the filing fee is paid.

Broker House International, Ltd. v. Bendelow · filed 1998-01-22(1)(a)

Upon consideration of these authorities, we hold that, if a complaint submitted to the court clerk is accompanied by an insufficient funds check, then it is not “filed” with the court for purposes of the statute of limitations. Thus, we agree with the trial court in this case that plaintiffs complaint was not filed for purposes of the statute of limitations until the filing fee was paid on April 15,1996.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) does not support summary judgment on a negligent misrepresentation claim when a factual dispute remains about when the claim accrued.

Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. · filed 2012-10-25(1)(a)

GAB/Hansen argues that summary judgment is proper because (1) the negligent misrepresentation claim is time barred under section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S.2012, and (2) plaintiffs cannot prove damages. ... Because there is a disputed issue of fact as to the accrual date, we conclude that summary judgment could not be based on the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) provides a two-year limitations period for a claim under section 10-3-1117 because no other limitations period applies.

Weatherill v. State Farm · filed 2026-03-12(1)(i)

Then, because a section 10-3-1117 claim is not otherwise enumerated in another statute of limitations, we conclude that such a claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations under the catchall provision for “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided.” § 13-80-102(1)(i).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Two-year limitations period for actions against public entities and employees

Section 13-80-102(1)(h) requires actions against public entities or their employees to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

McNamara v. Siegfried · filed 2024-08-26(1)(h)

In Colorado, “all actions against any public or government entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity” must be brought “within two years after the cause of action accrues[.]” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(h). ... Additionally, Plaintiff’s requests for records pursuant to the Colorado Open Records Act, were denied, for the second time, by Defendant McKenzie on July 1, 2021. Id. at 37. Thus, Plaintiff was aware of his negligence claims pertaining to CORA against all the School Defendants on July 1, 2021, at the latest, and any negligence or negligence per se claim had to be brought by July 2, 2023. Because Plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed on July 17, 2023, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s negligence and negligence per se claims against the School Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado, measured from when the cause of action accrues.

Whitefield v. Executive Director · filed 2024-09-17

“[T]he statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.” Id.; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. And accrual occurs “when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) requires tort actions, including negligence actions, to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Hutchins v. Board of County Commissioners of Larimer County, Colorado · filed 2024-09-27(1)(a)

Because plaintiffs’ negligence claim involves an action against an “engineer” for the “planning,” “design,” and “inspection” of an improvement to real property, section 13-80-104(1)(a) applies to plaintiffs’ claim. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-104(1)(a). As a result, plaintiffs’ negligence claim “must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.” See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(a) requires tort actions, including negligence claims, to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

McGann · filed 2025-12-30(1)(a)

“The statute of limitations bars legal malpractice actions based on negligence brought more than two years after the action accrues.” ... COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102 provides, in relevant part: (1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter: (a) Tort actions, including but not limited to actions for negligence, trespass, malicious abuse of process, malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, interference with relationships, and tortious breach of contract . . . . ... Therefore, the Court cannot assess the propriety of dismissing the First Claim on statute of limitations grounds at this time based only on the Complaint.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) provides a two-year limitations period for all other actions for which no other period of limitation is provided.

Roman v. Morconava Group, LLC · filed 2023-07-24(1)(i)

Section 13-80-103.5(1)(a), which applies to “[a]ll actions to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money” is arguably more specific than § 13-80-102(1)(i), which is something of a catch-all limitation period for actions for which no other limitations period is provided. ... The Court agrees. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the two-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s second and fifth claims for relief that allege violations of 7 C.C.R. 1103-1 and dismisses all claims for relief that are time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) provides a two-year residual limitations period for § 1983 civil-rights actions seeking a general remedy for injuries to personal rights.

Arvia v. Black · filed 1989-10-12(1)(i)

I conclude therefore that § 13-80-102(1)(i), Colorado’s two year residual statute, is best suited to govern actions that confer a general remedy for injuries to personal rights. I further conclude that this section applies to civil rights actions predicated on § 1983.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 requires actions for assault, battery, false imprisonment, slander, and libel to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

McKay v. Hammock · filed 1984-03-30

Under Colorado law, actions for assault and battery and false imprisonment are subject to the one-year period provided by Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 (1973), and actions on the case are subject to the six-year period provided in Colo.Rev. Stat. 13-80-110 (1973). ... Under the rationale in Garcia, state limitations periods that make such an irrelevant distinction determinative are not applicable to a section 1983 claim. ... Under this statute, McKay’s section 1983 claims are timely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for actions based on liability created by a federal statute when that statute supplies no limitations period.

Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 1991-02-13(1)(g)

The parties further dispute whether the Price Anderson claims have the same limitations period as the analogous diversity claims. On the theory that the Price Anderson Act is “silent” on what limitations period should apply, Dow contends that Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(g) should apply. This section establishes a two-year limitations period for “[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitations is provided in said federal statute.” This section does not apply because Price Anderson does provide a period of limitations. The Price Anderson Act mandates application of state substantive law. Statutes of limitations are substantive. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-53, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 1985-86, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980). Thus, for plaintiffs’ Price Anderson claims, the Colorado statute of limitations specific to each state claim applies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The 1986 amendment to § 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year limitations period for claims arising on or after July 1, 1986; claims arising earlier are governed by the prior three-year period.

Riel v. Reed · filed 1991-03-26(1)(i)

Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by Colorado’s residual statute of limitations, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13—80—102(l)(i) (1987). ... The residual statute previously provided a three-year limitations period. ... In 1986, however, that statute was amended to provide a two-year period. ... Thus a three-year limitations period applies to actions arising prior to July 1, 1986, the statute’s effective date, while a two-year period governs actions arising on or after that date. ... Based on the complaint’s allegations, the affidavits and other documents submitted, I conclude that the three-year limitations period of Colo.Rev. Stat. § 13-80-108(l)(b) (1973), in effect when the acts here occurred, governs this action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(g) imposes a two-year limitation on actions based on federal statutes that do not provide their own limitation period.

Bowdry v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1992-02-13(1)(g)

The question then is which Colorado statute to apply. We hold that the proper statute to apply is Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g), which applies a two-year limitation to "All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said statute."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(i) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions accruing on or after July 1, 1986, and the action accrues when the denial of court access is discovered or, by reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.

Stump v. Gates · filed 1991-10-31(1)(i)

Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by Colorado’s residual statute of limitations, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i) (1987). ... Thus a three-year limitations period applies to actions that accrued prior to July 1, 1986, the statute’s effective date, while a two-year period governs actions accruing on or after that date. ... For the above reasons, I conclude that the plaintiffs’ action alleging denial of the right of access to the courts accrued when the fact of that denial was discovered or, by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered. Because the plaintiffs did not know, and could not have known, before June 14, 1990, that their right of access to the courts had been denied, the two year limitations period of Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13 — 80—102(1)(i) is controlling. It follows that the action was timely commenced on March 29, 1991, and I so hold.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence actions.

Brooks v. Bank of Boulder · filed 1995-07-01(1)(a)

The Bank contends Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is barred by the two year statute of limitations applicable to negligence claims. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(a) (1987). ... In January 1992 the Bankruptcy Court ruled that the trustee did not have standing to bring the investors’ claims. Plaintiffs’ action was commenced on November 23, 1994. Plaintiffs, therefore, are barred from bringing further negligence claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 imposes a two-year limitations period on tort actions, including tortious breach of contract, regardless of the theory of suit or the defendant named.

Insurance Co. of North America v. Aspen Alps Condominium Ass'n · filed 1996-02-22(1)(a)

Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 (1987 & Supp. 1995) is the statute of limitations that governs tort actions in Colorado. This statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ... (1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues and not thereafter: ... (a) Tort actions, including but not limited to actions for negligence, trespass, malicious abuse of process, malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, interference with relationships; and tortious breach of contract. .,. ... Accordingly, in the case at hand, the implied promise or warranty of fitness that Plaintiff relies upon is grounded in contract. In other words, the nature of the right sued upon by Plaintiff arises out of a contract obligation, not a tort obligation. This dictates that the three year contract statute of limitations is applicable to such claim rather than the two year tort statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) gives negligent misrepresentation claims a two-year limitations period, so claims added more than two years after accrual are time-barred.

Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp. · filed 1996-09-06(1)(a)

We have determined that Colorado law should govern. Colorado law subjects negligent misrepresentation claims to a two-year limitations period. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80 — 102(l)(a); see Callaham v. First American Title Ins. Co., 837 P.2d 769, 771 (Colo.Ct. App.1992). The claim here accrued no later than March 1, 1990. Trierweiler v. Watt, No. 93-Z-82, slip op. at 4 (D. Colo. June 13, 1994). The plaintiff added each of the individual Wenner Partners as defendants in his Third Amended Complaint, which was filed on June 15, 1993. Because more than two years passed before these defendants were added, we hold that summary judgment was appropriate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligent misrepresentation claims.

Trierweiler v. Croxton · filed 1996-09-06(1)(a)

Colorado law subjects negligent misrepresentation claims to a two-year limitations period. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a); see Callaham v. First American Title Ins. Co., 837 P.2d 769, 771 (Colo.Ct.App.1992).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

Frazier v. Leach · filed 2007-01-10

In Colorado, personal injury actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 1266; Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102. Because his cause of action arose in Colorado, Frazier’s § 1983 suit was governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(g) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions when no federal limitations period is provided.

Dodge v. Shoemaker · filed 2010-03-11(g)

Colorado law provides a two-year statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(g) (establishing a two-year limitation period for “all actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and for “all other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided”); Blake, 997 F.2d at 750 (applying § 13-80-102 to § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 sets a two-year limitations period for tort actions, beginning when the injury becomes known; for bad-faith failure-to-settle claims based on excess liability, accrual awaits final appellate judgment establishing that liability.

Vanderloop v. Progressive Casualty Insurance · filed 1991-08-01(1)(a)

Under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102, the plaintiff’s right to proceed against Progressive accrued when the injury became known. ... I conclude that, under the circumstances here presented, the action asserting insurance company bad faith failure to settle resulting in an excess liability judgment against the insured accrued when excess liability ultimately was established. I further conclude that excess liability was not established, and the controlling statute of limitations therefore did not commence running, until judgment on appeal became final.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(g) establishes a two-year limitations period for actions created by a federal statute when that statute provides no limitation period, including § 1983 actions.

Whitington v. Sokol · filed 2007-06-19(g)

Colorado law provides a two-year statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(g) (establishing a two-year limitation period for “all actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and for “all other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided”); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d at 750 (applying § 13-80-102 to § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on tort actions.

Conrad v. THE EDUC. RESOURCES INSTITUTE · filed 2009-08-13(1)(a)

A two year statute of limitations applies to tort actions. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(a). ... Accordingly, this court finds Plaintiffs tort claims 4, 5, 6, 7 accrued, at the very latest, on January 6, 2003. As such, Plaintiff should have filed these tort claims no later than January 2005. As these tort claims are barred by the statute of limitations, they should be dismissed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) provides a two-year limitations period for Colorado § 1983 claims arising on or after July 1, 1986, while claims arising before that date receive a three-year period.

Jesusdaughter v. Mesa County Department of Social Services Mesa County Sheriff's Department Mesa County Police Department · filed 1992-10-16(1)(i)

The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Colorado, which has multiple statutory provisions governing various personal injury actions, is the residuary statute of limitations now codified at Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i) (1987) (formerly § 13-80-108(1)(b) (1973)). ... Due to the repeal and reenactment of this statute in 1986, a three-year period applies to claims arising before July 1, 1986, while the current two-year period applies to claims arising on or after that date.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102 supplies a two-year limitations period for Bivens claims arising in Colorado.

Turner v. Schultz · filed 2001-02-15

Like an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Bivens action as a general matter “is subject to the statute of limitations of the general personal injury statute in the state where the action arose.” Industrial Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir.1994). Colorado provides for a two-year statute of limitations for such actions. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102; Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750-51 (10th Cir.1993) (applying § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(i) supplies a two-year limitations period for civil rights claims.

Evans v. Supreme Court · filed 2002-07-30(1)(i)

Civil rights claims are time barred by the relevant state statute of limitations. See Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir.1993). In this case it is two years. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(i) (1987). ... Mr. Evans’s complaint was time barred. For that reason the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint is AFFIRMED.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (6) imposes a two-year limitations period on federal civil-rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Colorado.

Montoya v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2007-03-14(6)

In Colorado, a two-year statute of limitations period found in Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-80-102(6) applies to federal civil rights claims asserted under section 1983.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(1)(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions based on liability created by a federal statute when the federal statute provides no limitations period.

Onyx Properties LLC v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-06-12(1)(g)

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is two years. ... Thus, the accrual date that the two-year statute of limitations began to run on Onyx’s § 1983 claim commenced on September 20, 2006.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 13-80-102(l)(g) requires an action based on liability created by a federal statute, when that federal statute provides no limitations period, to be filed within two years after the claim accrues.

McDonald v. School District No. 1 · filed 2015-03-17(l)(g)

The parties agree that, pursuant to Colorado law, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(g) (“All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute” and “regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought ... must be commenced within *1143two years.”); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006) (“the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued”); Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir.1999) (“State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations periods for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claims.”). ... Plaintiff filed this case on November 21, 2013; thus, plaintiffs claim is limited to those injuries that plaintiff knew of or had reason to know of on or after November 21, 2011. Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. Defendants concede that plaintiffs First Amendment claim is not barred by the statute of limitations to the extent the claim is based upon his termination. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he injury, Plaintiffs termination, occurred on January 24, 2012,” Docket No. 30 at 7, but does not explicitly identify any other adverse employment actions that took place within the statute of limitations.8 Thus, in the absence of argument to the contrary, the Court concludes that the District’s termination of plaintiffs employment is the only adverse employment act falling within the statute of limitations. See Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 482 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that allegedly retaliatory poor employment evaluation “occurred more than three years before the suit was filed [and] is therefore time barred”). Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this issue is granted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 204, oldest cases first.

85 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Owens v. Okure, the Court cited § 13-80-102(i) only in a footnote as an example of a state residual limitations provision; it did not interpret or apply Colorado law. The decision concerned the limitations period under New York law for § 1983 actions. opinion →
Goldsmith v. Learjet, Inc., the court merely quoted § 13-80-102(l)(d) to identify Colorado’s two-year wrongful-death limitations period while deciding the effect of Kansas’s borrowing and saving statutes; it did not construe or independently decide the Colorado statute’s operation. opinion →
Hays v. McLachlan, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the district court’s grounds for dismissal. The Tenth Circuit did not analyze what § 13-80-102 means or independently apply its requirements; it merely stated that it was in substantial agreement with the district court’s overall legal analysis. opinion →
Workman v. Colorado DOC, the statute is cited in a footnote to report the trial court's application of Colorado's two-year limitations period; the appellate court did not construe or independently decide what § 13-80-102 means or requires. opinion →
Garrett v. Fleming, the statute is mentioned only in a procedural-history statement of an undisputed premise; the court does not construe or decide what § 13-80-102 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States Ex Rel. Wilson, the statute appears only in a footnote listing possible analogous state statutes of limitations, and the Court expressly left the choice of the applicable state limitations period unresolved; it did not construe or apply Colorado § 13-80-102. opinion →
Alvarez v. Sandridge, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the magistrate judge’s and district court’s conclusions below. The Tenth Circuit affirmed for substantially the same reasons but did not independently construe or explain the statute. opinion →
Kikumura v. Osagie, the statute appears only in a string citation in footnote 11 listing potentially applicable statutes of limitations; the court does not construe or apply § 13-80-102. opinion →
Everplay Installation Inc. v. Guindon, the opinion only reports the district court’s limitations ruling and notes that the plaintiffs did not challenge it on appeal; the Tenth Circuit did not construe or apply § 13-80-102 in its own holding. opinion →
Aguirre v. City of Greeley Police Department, the statute is cited while recounting the district court’s limitations ruling. The appellate court did not decide the statute’s meaning or application on the merits; it held that Aguirre waived any challenge to the timeliness determination. opinion →
Tara Woods Ltd. Partnership v. Mae, the court mentions § 13-80-102 only in describing Fannie Mae’s motion and the district court’s limitations ruling. The appellate court’s analysis concerns accrual under § 13-80-108 and does not construe or independently apply § 13-80-102. opinion →
Gargano v. Owners Insurance, the court merely reports the parties’ agreement about the applicable two-year limitations period and cites the statute in support; it does not construe or independently decide anything about § 13-80-102. opinion →
Canfield v. Douglas County, the court mentions subsection (1)(g) only to report the district court’s approach, then expressly relies on subsection (1)(i) instead; it makes no holding about the meaning or application of subsection (1)(g). opinion →
Estate of Walter, ex rel. Klodnicki v. Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., the court cited § 13-80-102(1)(g) only as supporting authority for the two-year limitations period applicable to § 1983 claims; it did not interpret or apply this statute in deciding the motions. opinion →
Vasquez v. Davis, the court merely cited § 13-80-102(1)(a) as the source of the agreed two-year limitations period; it did not construe the statute or decide a statutory issue. The court’s accrual analysis was based on federal law governing § 1983 claims. opinion →
The Money Source Inc. v. Paymap Inc., the court cited § 13-80-102(1)(a) in a footnote to identify the agreed two-year limitations period for the negligence and wantonness claims. It did not construe the statute or decide any issue about its meaning, scope, or application; the timeliness discussion instead concerned accrual and the possible continuing-tort doctrine. opinion →
Brookshire Downs v. Owners Ins. Co., the statute is cited only in a footnote reporting Plaintiff's argument about the default limitations period. The court did not construe, adopt, or decide anything about § 13-80-102. opinion →
Estate of Goodwin by and through Alvarado v. Connell, the court cites § 13-80-102(1)(d) only as authority for the background proposition that wrongful-death claims have a two-year limitations period. Its ruling addresses relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), not the meaning or application of this statute. opinion →
Lucero v. Safeway, Inc., the court merely reported Defendants’ limitations argument and discussed a possible concern while evaluating whether to allow amendment; it did not decide the statute’s meaning, applicability, or whether either negligence claim was time-barred. opinion →
Pryor v. United States, the court cited § 13-80-102 only to identify the expiration of the limitations period in discussing prejudice and equitable considerations for an untimely nonparty designation. It did not construe or decide what the statute requires or how it applies. opinion →
McDonald v. Citibank, the statute appears only in a footnote recounting the magistrate judge’s and district court’s statute-of-limitations analysis. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the Rooker-Feldman ground and expressly declined to address the parties’ other arguments, so it did not decide anything about § 13-80-102. opinion →
The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Drahota Development Company, LLC, the court merely recounts Tico’s accrual argument under § 13-80-102(1); it resolves the timeliness issue under § 13-80-104(1)(b)(II)’s tolling provision and does not construe or independently apply § 13-80-102. opinion →
American Economy Insurance Company v. Rocha, the court cited § 13-80-102 only while discussing uncertainty about whether the defendant could still bring potential tort claims; it did not adjudicate the limitations period, decide accrual, or hold that any claim was time-barred. opinion →
Auer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the court merely recited the two-year limitations period as an undisputed point and decided the case based on the factual question of when the bad-faith claims accrued; it did not interpret or otherwise decide what § 13-80-102 requires. opinion →
Hutchins v. Board of County Commissioners of Larimer County, Colorado, the court merely stated the two-year period and described the plaintiffs’ argument that § 13-80-102 controlled. It did not construe or independently apply that statute; instead, it held that the negligence claim fell within § 13-80-104 and resolved accrual under that statute. opinion →
Weidner, III v. McHale, the court cited § 13-80-102 only in a parenthetical string cite to support characterizing the complaint's claims as torts. It did not decide the statute's limitations period, interpret its terms, or apply it to determine the timeliness of any claim. opinion →
Reed, the statute is mentioned only in describing the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and plaintiff did not object to the two-year period. The district court decided accrual, equitable tolling, and related procedural issues without construing or applying the statute itself. opinion →
Ayon v. Gourley, section 13-80-102 appears only in a footnote describing plaintiff's position about which limitations period applied. The court did not construe or decide anything about that statute; it held the claims accrued in 1984 and discussed the limitations periods applicable at that time. opinion →
Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, the opinion merely recounts the Tenth Circuit’s treatment of Colorado’s one-year limitations period in McKay; this Maine court decides which Maine limitation period governs § 1983 claims and does not construe § 13-80-102. opinion →
Larsen v. Munoz (In Re Munoz), the court mentioned § 13-80-102 only in a footnote to describe the statute relied on by the bankruptcy court and parties, rejected it as the more appropriate provision, and decided the limitations issue under § 13-80-101. opinion →
Harrison v. Luse, the statute is mentioned in the procedural account as the one-year limitations period of which the plaintiffs were aware; the court's fee ruling is under Rule 11 and Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-17-101 et seq., and the opinion does not construe or apply § 13-80-102 itself. opinion →
Adamson v. City of Provo, Utah, the opinion cites Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 (1987) only in a footnote’s list of general state limitation statutes; it does not interpret or apply Colorado’s statute. opinion →
Industrial Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, the court cited § 13-80-102 only in a footnote to identify Colorado's possible two-year limitations period, but it applied New Mexico's three-year period and did not construe or apply the Colorado statute. opinion →
Hunt v. Bennett, the opinion only reports that the Magistrate Judge applied the statute and that Hunt did not challenge that reliance; the appellate court resolves the appeal through the continuing-violation and conspiracy analysis without construing or independently applying § 13-80-102. opinion →
Arnold v. Duchesne County, Merv Taylor, Jerry Foote, and Clair Poulson, the opinion mentions Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) only in a footnote listing statutes and reporting that another federal district court applied the Colorado statute; it does not interpret, adopt, or decide anything about Colorado law. opinion →
Frymire v. Ampex Corp., the opinion merely reports Plaintiffs’ assertion in a footnote and does not construe or apply § 13-80-102; the court adopted Colorado’s contract limitations period under § 13-80-101 instead. opinion →
Goldsmith v. Learjet, Inc., the opinion mentions § 13-80-102 only in the procedural background to identify Colorado's two-year wrongful-death limitations period; the court decides the case under Kansas's borrowing and saving statutes and does not construe or independently apply § 13-80-102. opinion →
Rose v. Kinevan, the statute is mentioned only in a parenthetical citation to another case, as part of an example that claims might be time-barred; this court did not interpret or apply Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. opinion →
Goldsmith v. Learjet, Inc., the opinion mentions § 13-80-102 only in describing Learjet's timeliness argument that Colorado has a two-year wrongful-death limitation; the court decides questions under Kansas's borrowing and saving statutes and does not construe or hold about § 13-80-102. opinion →
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Refco Group, Ltd., the statute is quoted in footnote 15 as a pertinent limitations provision, but the opinion text supplied does not construe or apply its meaning; the citation is incidental. opinion →
Larson v. Snow College, the opinion mentions § 13-80-102 only in a comparison with Utah’s statute and reports another court’s application; it does not decide how Colorado’s statute operates. opinion →
Larson v. Snow College, the court mentioned and briefly described Colorado’s statute only as a comparison in deciding whether an amended Utah statute conflicted with federal law and policy. It did not decide a claim under, or otherwise issue a ruling about, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. opinion →
Smith Ex Rel. Boston v. Arthur Andersen LLP, the court cites § 13-80-102 only in a comparative statement that Colorado and Arizona have two-year limitations periods; it does not interpret or apply that statute, and its actual accrual discussion relies on other Colorado provisions. opinion →
Garrett v. Fleming, the court did not construe or apply the statute; it merely reported the parties' undisputed assumption in a footnote while deciding separate Rule 15(c) relation-back and equitable-tolling issues. opinion →
Stivers v. Ellington, the court merely reports the parties’ agreement that this statute provides a two-year limitations period; it does not interpret or independently decide anything about § 13-80-102. opinion →
Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the statute is cited only in footnote 4 as one item in a list of states’ limitation periods; the court does not construe or apply Colorado law. opinion →
Neiberger v. Hawkins, the court cites § 13-80-102 in a string citation for the general two-year limitations period but does not interpret or independently decide anything about this statute; its tolling ruling rests on Colorado's disability provisions. opinion →
Graham v. Teller County, the court did not construe or independently decide the meaning or application of § 13-80-102; it merely recited the parties’ agreement about the applicable two-year limitations period while deciding statutory and equitable tolling under other provisions. opinion →
Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo., Bd. of Regents, the court applied the earlier three-year statute; it cited § 13-80-102 only for comparison. opinion →
Ebrahimi v. EF Hutton & Co., Inc., the court applied the pre-1986 limitation statutes; it cited § 13-80-102 only for comparison and did not decide its rules. opinion →
Badis v. Martinez, the court cited § 13-80-102 to support its interpretation of § 13-20-602, but did not decide a rule under § 13-80-102. opinion →
Jacobson v. Shine, the citation appears in the plaintiff’s argument, which the court rejected. The court applied the then-applicable six-year limitation period under § 13-80-110. opinion →
Cent. Bank v. MEHAFFY, RIDER, WINDHOLZ, the majority expressly declined to address the limitations defense; the citation to § 13-80-102 appears only in the dissent. opinion →
Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, the reference to § 13-80-102 is plaintiff’s assertion, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
Golden's Concrete Co. v. State, the court decided that exhaustion was unnecessary because the limitations dispute was a question of law; it did not decide whether § 13-80-102 applied or what it required. opinion →
Gutrich v. LaPlante, the cited limitations period appears in the defendants’ argument about an earlier motion, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
Cassidy v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Texas, this sentence reports the trial court’s ruling; this court does not decide anything about § 13-80-102. opinion →
Ayon v. Gourley, the court resolved when the claims accrued under § 13-80-108; it reported the parties’ agreement about § 13-80-102 without deciding that section’s rules. opinion →
Kearns Motor Co. v. Cimino (In Re Dreiling), the court says the two-year period “would appear” to apply, a tentative conclusion rather than a decision applying this section. opinion →
Buckley Powder Co. v. State, the court rejected the limitations argument under the law of the case doctrine without deciding a rule of § 13-80-102. opinion →
Highline Village Associates v. Hersh Companies, the opinion rejects a party’s claim that § 13-80-102 governs; its ruling applies the construction statute § 13-80-104. The proposed note incorrectly described § 13-80-102 as the general contract limitations statute. opinion →
Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., the court decides the accrual and tolling rules of section 13-80-104; it mentions section 13-80-102 only as a cross-reference. opinion →
Build It & They Will Drink, Inc. v. Strauch, the court mentions the general tort limitations period only for comparison while deciding liability under the dram-shop statute; it does not decide a rule under § 13-80-102. opinion →
Estate of Guido v. Exempla, Inc., the section appears only in Exempla's argument, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
Seabron v. American Family Mutual Insurance, the court chose a discovery period without deciding the limitations rule under § 13-80-102. opinion →
Garcia v. Schneider Energy Services, Inc., the court decided the notice period for relation back under C.R.C.P. 15(c), not a rule of § 13-80-102. opinion →
Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc. v. Bradbury, the court decides the repose rules of section 13-80-104 and mentions section 13-80-102(1) only as the source of an incorporated limitations period. opinion →
Sopris Lodging, LLC v. Schofield Excavation, Inc., section 13-80-102 supplies the two-year period, but the court decides the accrual and tolling rules of section 13-80-104. opinion →
Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., the court cites § 13-80-102(1)(i) as context while deciding the Wage Claim Act’s separate limitations period; it does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Torrez v. Eley, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 13-80-102 or § 13-80-101 governed because the claim was late under either period; its mention of § 13-80-102 was incidental. opinion →
v. Zag Built LLC —, the court uses the limitations period as background while deciding service and notice-of-claim rules; it does not decide a rule of section 13-80-102. opinion →
State of Colorado v. Robert J. Hopp & Associates, LLC, the court expressly declined to decide whether section 13-80-102 applied. opinion →
Lehouillier v. Gallegos, the court cites the section only as an example of an affirmative defense; it does not decide or apply the section’s rules. opinion →
West Colo. Motors v. General Motors, the court decided whether section 13-80-111 revived the claims; it did not decide a rule under section 13-80-102. opinion →
Nunnery v. City of Lamar, the court declined to reach the arguments about § 13-80-102(1)(h), so it did not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Nicola v. City of Grand Junction, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 13-80-102(1)(h) applies because the survival action was timely under either proposed limitations period. opinion →
Patricia Kappes, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lula M. Tanner v. Diana Rhodes and Rhodes Law Firm, Llc., the court cites the section only as an example in a quoted passage while deciding the burden of proof in Wyoming legal malpractice cases; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Stoecklein v. Fayette Farms, the court decided that section 13-80-104 governs these construction defect claims and when they accrued; it did not decide a disputed rule of section 13-80-102 itself. opinion →
Marken v. Knez, the court declined to consider the argument raised under this section and did not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Omer A v. Nsirat A, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 13-80-102(1)(a) governs the claim; its reference to § 13-80-102(1)(i) reports another decision. opinion →
Hodgden v. Mountain West Insurance and Financial Services LLC, the court does not decide whether § 13-80-102(1)(a) applies; it cites another case that analyzed that question. opinion →
V&H v. Beardsley, the court recites section 13-80-102’s general deadline but decides timeliness under sections 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) and 13-20-805. opinion →
United States v. Holmes, the opinion attributes the proposition about § 13-80-102 to Mr. Holmes and does not adopt it as the court’s decision. opinion →
Silver v. Primero Reorganized School District No. 2, the opinion text provides only bare footnote citations to § 13-80-102, with no sentence deciding its rules. opinion →
Harp v. Department of Human Services, Colorado Mental Health Institute, the magistrate judge cited the section in recommending dismissal of the defamation claim as untimely; the opinion is a recommendation, not a district court ruling. opinion →

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace