Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-4-106

Section 24-4-106(7) permits reversal when an agency’s exclusion of comparable-sales evidence is reversible error.

Platinum Properties Corp. v. Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1987-04-09(7)

This exclusion of other comparable sales from evidence was reversible error. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10).

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) limits reversal of a State Personnel Board decision to decisions that are arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, contrary to law, or beyond the Board’s jurisdiction.

Madruga v. Dept of Revenue · filed 2026-03-26(7)(b)

We may only reverse the Board’s decision if it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, contrary to law, or in excess of the Board’s jurisdiction.

Section 24-4-106(11) governs judicial review of BAA decisions; a valuation may be set aside if it lacks competent evidence or fails to follow the statutory assessment scheme.

Shaffstall v. Adams County · filed 2025-12-11(11)

We review BAA decisions under the State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. 2025. ... “A decision of the Board may be set aside only if it is unsupported by competent evidence or if it reflects a failure to abide by the statutory scheme for calculating property tax assessments.” ... Because the BAA correctly applied the law and because its valuation is supported by the record, we cannot disturb its order.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b)(VII) allows a court to disturb a hearing officer’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous based on the whole record.

Notarmuzi v. CDOR · filed 2025-02-13(7)(b)(VII)

We may not disturb the hearing officer’s findings unless they are “clearly erroneous [based] on the whole record.” Neppl, ¶ 9 (quoting section 24-4-106(7)(b)(VII), C.R.S. 2024, which is made applicable by section 42-2-126(11)).

Section 24-4-106 limits a court’s review of an agency’s factual findings to whether they are clearly erroneous based on the whole record.

Latus v. State of Colo · filed 2025-05-08(7)(b)(VII)

We may not disturb a hearing officer’s factual findings unless they are “clearly erroneous [based] on the whole record.” ... Because the hearing officer’s probable cause finding is based on the proper legal standard and supported by substantial record evidence, we are bound by it.

Section 24-4-106(7)(d) requires a reviewing court to apply its interpretation of legal and constitutional provisions to the facts duly found or established, without substituting its own factual findings for the ALJ’s.

StreetMediaGroup v. Dept of Transportation · filed 2025-11-20(7)(d)

As reviewing courts, neither this court nor the district court is free to substitute our factual findings for the ALJ’s. See M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Colo. 1994). This is no less true when the claimant raises a constitutional challenge. See § 24-4-106(7)(d) (“In all cases under review, the court shall determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved and shall apply the interpretation to the facts duly found or established.”).

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) permits a court to overturn an agency decision that is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, contrary to law, or beyond the agency’s authority.

State Board of Social Work v. Tacha · filed 2024-10-24(7)(b)

Given this record, the Board’s decision to revoke Tacha’s license was not arbitrary or capricious and may not be disturbed on appeal. See § 24-4-106(7)(b).

Section 24-4-106(7)(a) requires a court to affirm agency action unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, or contrary to law.

Matter of Clark Brothers · filed 2024-10-24(7)(a)

Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2024, sets forth the standard of review for agency actions. On review, we will affirm the agency’s decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the evidence in the record, or contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) presumes agency action valid and permits a court to set it aside only when the challenging party shows a statutory basis.

Ida v. Univ Colo Boulder · filed 2025-01-09(7)(b)

In such an appeal, we presume the agency action is valid and may set it aside only if the challenging party shows one of the statutory bases set forth in section 24-4-106(7)(b).

Section 24-4-106 allows a reviewing court to set aside agency action that is contrary to law.

Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Colorado Secretary of State · filed 2025-02-20(7)(b)

Section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 2024, governs judicial review of this agency action. ... We may set aside an agency’s action if we conclude that the agency acted contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) permits a court to set aside a BAA order for abuse of discretion, arbitrary or capricious action, clearly erroneous findings, lack of substantial evidence, or a decision contrary to law.

Backman v. BOE · filed 2025-02-20(7)(b)

We will set aside a BAA order only if its decision constituted an abuse of discretion or was arbitrary and capricious, based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to sustain an agency decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law.

303 Beauty v. Division of Labor · filed 2025-02-20(7)

Under section 24-4-106(7), we must sustain an agency’s decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) limits reversal of a final agency decision to specified legal, procedural, evidentiary, or discretionary defects.

McCallum v. CDOT · filed 2025-03-06(7)(b)

We will reverse only if the final agency decision is “arbitrary or capricious, in excess of statutory authority, not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of the APA or as otherwise required by law, an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.”

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) permits reversal of a Board decision that is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, contrary to law, or beyond the Board’s jurisdiction.

Madruga v. DOR · filed 2025-05-29(7)(b)

We may reverse the Board’s decision if it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, contrary to law, or in excess of the Board’s jurisdiction. § 24-4-106(7)(b), C.R.S. 2024; Lawley v. Dep’t of Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo. 2001).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to affirm an agency decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, or contrary to law.

Colorado Medical Board v. Singer · filed 2025-09-11(7)

Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2025, sets forth the standard of review for agency actions. We will affirm the agency’s decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the evidence in the record, or contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) limits when a reviewing court may overturn an agency decision, including when the decision is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, contrary to law, or beyond the agency’s authority.

Russell v. Dept of Local Affairs · filed 2026-03-12(7)(b)

Under the APA, we may overturn the Board’s decision only if it was arbitrary or capricious, was unsupported by the record, was contrary to law, or exceeded the Board’s authority.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits reversal of an agency order for arbitrary or capricious action, lack of record support, legal error, or action beyond the agency’s authority.

Anderl v. Dept of Human Services · filed 2026-04-09(7)

The standards set forth in section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2025, govern judicial review of the Board’s decision. That statute provides that an appellate court may reverse an administrative agency’s order if it finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) allows a reviewing court to set aside agency action that is arbitrary or capricious, exceeds statutory authority, violates required procedures, abuses discretion, lacks substantial evidence, or is otherwise contrary to law.

HCA-HealthONE v. Colo. Dept. of Labor and Employment · filed 2020-03-31(7)(b)

Judicial review of the agency action in this case is governed by section 24-4-106. As relevant to the Hospital’s claims, a reviewing court may set aside an agency action if it is arbitrary or capricious, in excess of statutory authority, not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of the APA or as otherwise required by law, an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b)(V) permits a reviewing court to set aside agency action that fails to follow required procedures.

Grey v. Alliance Alamosa · filed 2025-01-23(7)(b)(V)

Under the State Administrative Procedure Act, we may set aside the agency action if it is “[n]ot in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of this article 4 or as otherwise required by law.” § 24-4-106(7)(b)(V). Here, the final agency action essentially adopted the ALJ’s procedurally erroneous grant of summary judgment. Thus, we must set aside the Commission’s order.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) permits a court to set aside a BAA decision for specified errors, including a decision beyond the BAA’s statutory jurisdiction.

Hernandez v. BOAA · filed 2025-07-03(7)(b)

We review a BAA decision under section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 2024, and we may only set aside a BAA decision if, among other things, the decision is arbitrary or capricious, contrary to a constitutional right, in excess of the BAA’s statutory jurisdiction, or unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.

A reviewing court may disturb a hearing officer's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous on the whole record.

Neppl v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue · filed 2019-02-21(7)(b)(VII)

A reviewing court may not disturb a hearing officer's factual findings unless they are "clearly erroneous on the whole record." § 24-4-106(7)(b)(VII), C.R.S. 2018 (made applicable through section 42-2-126(11) ).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires courts to defer to agency findings of fact unless they lack substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Res., Inc. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n · filed 2018-03-22(7)

We defer to an agency’s findings of fact unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole.” § 24-4-106(7).

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to overturn an agency’s ultimate conclusion of fact if it is an abuse of discretion, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to law.

Romero v. Colorado Department of Human Services · filed 2018-01-11(7)

The district court could only overturn the Department’s ultimate conclusion of fact regarding the application of the adverse inference if it was an abuse of discretion, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to law. § 24-4-106(7); Gessler, ¶ 9.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to set aside a license suspension as arbitrary and capricious when no statutory or regulatory standards guide the agency’s decision.

Farmer v. Colorado Parks & Wildlife Commission · filed 2016-08-25(7)

We may set aside an agency’s decision when it abused its discretion or when the decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law. § 24-4-106(7); Grand Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Colo. Prop. Tax Adm’r, 2016 COA 2, ¶ 26. ... Thus, because neither the statute nor any applicable regulations provide sufficient standards to guide the agency’s suspension decision, we conclude that the Commission’s action in suspending Farmer’s license was arbitrary and capricious.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires reversal of agency action that exceeds the agency’s statutory authority.

Williams v. Department of Public Safety · filed 2015-12-31(7)

An action exceeding an agency’s statutory power must be reversed.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires reversal of agency action that exceeds the agency’s statutory authority.

Williams v. Department of Public Safety, Colorado State Patrol · filed 2015-12-31(7)

An action exceeding an agency’s statutory power must be reversed. § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2015.

Section 24-4-106(7) provides for de novo review of legal questions arising from agency action.

Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc · filed 2015-08-13(7)

Whether Masterpiece violated CADA is a question of law reviewed de novo. § 24-4-106(7).

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside a Board order for abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, clearly erroneous factual findings, lack of substantial evidence, or conflict with law.

Grand County Board of Commissioners v. Colorado Property Tax Administrator · filed 2016-01-14(7)

We may set aside an order of the Board only where the Board abused its discretion or where the order was arbitrary and capricious, based on findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside a Board order for abuse of discretion, arbitrary or capricious action, clearly erroneous findings, lack of substantial evidence, or an error of law.

Grand County Board of Commissioners v. Colorado Property Tax Administration · filed 2016-01-14(7)

We may set aside an order of the Board only where the Board abused its discretion or where the order was arbitrary and capricious, based on findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.

Subsection (7) calls for deference to an agency’s factual findings and de novo review of its legal conclusions.

Rust v. Board of County Commissioners of Summit County · filed 2018-05-17(7)

Review of the BAA’s decision presents a mixed question of law and fact. Aberdeen Inv’rs, Inc. v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 240 P.3d 398, 400 (Colo. App. 2009); Farny v. Bd. of Equalization, 985 P.2d 106, 109 (Colo. App. 1999); see § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2017. Thus, we defer to the BAA’s factual findings, but review de novo its legal conclusions.

Section 24-4-106(7) limits when a reviewing court may set aside a Board of Assessment Appeals decision, including for abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous findings, or lack of substantial evidence.

Children's Hospital Colorado v. Property Tax Administrator and Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 2018-06-28(7)

The appropriate standard to be applied in reviewing the BAA’s decision is set forth in section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2017. ... Under that section, we may set aside a decision of the BAA only if we determine that the BAA abused its discretion, “or that the order was arbitrary and capricious, based upon findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.”

Section 24-4-106(7)(a) requires a reviewing court to affirm agency action if it finds no error.

Real Estate Commission v. Vizzi · filed 2019-03-07(7)(a)

We must sustain the Commission’s decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law. Coffman v. Colo. Common Cause, 102 P.3d 999, 1005 (Colo. 2004); see also § 24-4-106(7)(a), C.R.S. 2018 (On review of agency action, “[i]f the court finds no error, it shall affirm the agency action.”).

Subsection (7) limits when an appellate court may set aside a BAA order to specified errors in the agency’s decision.

Hinsdale County Board of Equalization v. HDH Partnership · filed 2019-04-08(7)

An appellate court may set aside an order of the BAA only if it finds an abuse of discretion, or that the order was arbitrary and capricious, based upon clearly erroneous factual findings, unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, or otherwise contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision supported by a reasonable basis and substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole in the agency's favor.

Rags Over the Arkansas River, Inc. v. Colorado Parks & Wildlife Board · filed 2015-02-12(7)

Where the record, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the agency, contains a reasonable basis and substantial evidence to support the agency's decision, the decision must be upheld. § 24-4-106(7); Bodaghi v. Dep't of Natural Res., 995 P.2d 288, 303 (Colo.2000) (when there is conflicting evidence the agency's determination is binding and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder); accord Inst. for Research v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 748 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Colo.App.1987).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to set aside an agency action unsupported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Colorado Department of Revenue v. Astro Imports, Inc · filed 2016-02-25(7)

Under section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2015, we must set aside an agency action that is ... unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole, or otherwise contrary to law. ... Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Astro engaged in deceptive trade practices, and we must defer to that finding.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to consider the whole record when deciding whether substantial evidence supports an administrative action.

Rocky Mountain Retail Management, LLC v. City of Northglenn Ex Rel. City Council · filed 2017-04-24(7)

We conclude that the City’s decision to deny Rocky Mountain’s license was supported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole. See § 24-4-106(7).

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a reviewing court to set aside an agency rule that exceeds the agency's authority.

Colo. Common Cause v. Gessler · filed 2012-08-30(7)

Thus, in promulgating this rule, the Secretary exceeded his authority and the rule must be set aside as void. Id.; see also § 24-4-106(7) ; Colo. Consumer Health Initiative, 240 P.3d at 528.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to set aside an agency order for abuse of discretion, arbitrary or capricious action, clearly erroneous findings, lack of substantial evidence, or an error of law.

Larimer County Board of Commissioners v. Colorado Property Tax Administrator · filed 2013-04-11(7)

We may set aside an order of the Board only when the Board abused its discretion or the order was arbitrary and capricious, based upon findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law. § 24-4-106(7), CRS. 2012; Boulder County Bd. of Comms v. HealthSouth Corp., 246 P.3d 948, 951 (Colo.2011). ... We conclude that the Board did not apply the proper legal standards and, therefore, erred as a matter of law.

Subsection (7) requires courts to hold unlawful and set aside agency action that is contrary to law.

Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause · filed 2014-06-16(7)

If a conflict exists-Le., if Rule 4.1 is "contrary to law"-we must hold Rule 4.1 unlawful and set it aside. See § 24-4-106(7) (providing that "the court shall hold unlawful and set aside" any agency action that is "contrary to law").

Section 24-4-106(7) limits when a reviewing court may overturn an agency decision.

Colorado State Board of Pharmacy v. Priem · filed 2012-01-05(7)

A reviewing court may overturn an agency decision only if it was arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or violative of constitutional rights, or if it constituted an abuse of discretion.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision for arbitrariness or caprice to consider the whole record and determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Colorado Real Estate Commission v. Bartlett · filed 2011-06-23(7)

To set aside an agency's determination as arbitrary or capricious, the reviewing court must be convinced, based on the record as a whole, that there is no substantial evidence supporting that determination. Colo. Ethics Watch, 203 P.3d at 626 (citing § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2010).

Section 24-4-106(7) limits the grounds on which an appellate court may set aside a Board of Assessment Appeals order to abuse of discretion, arbitrary or capricious action, clearly erroneous findings, lack of substantial evidence, or action contrary to law.

Boulder County Bd. of Com'rs v. Healthsouth · filed 2011-01-31(7)

An appellate court may set aside an order of the BAA only if it finds an abuse of discretion, or that the order was arbitrary and capricious, based upon findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law. § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (2010); Padre Resort, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 30 P.3d 813, 814 (Colo.App.2001).

Section 24-4-106(7) limits review of the BAA's factual findings to whether the record contains competent evidence and whether the BAA followed the statutory assessment scheme.

OPEX Communications, Inc. v. Property Tax Administrator · filed 2007-05-17(7)

We will not disturb a factual determination made by the BAA unless it is unsupported by competent evidence in the record, considered as a whole, or reflects a failure to abide by the statutory scheme for calculating property tax assessments. See § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2006; Board of Assessment Appeals v. E.E. Sonnenberg & Sons, Inc., 797 P.2d 27, 34 (Colo.1990); ASARCO, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 916 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo.App.1995).

Subsection (7) requires a court to affirm a Personnel Board decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, legally erroneous, or beyond the board's authority.

Aragon v. DEP. OF COR. SAN CARLOS COR. FAC. · filed 2006-05-04(7)

This court must affirm the decisions of the Personnel Board unless we find that it "acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority." Lawley v. Dep't of Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo.2001); see § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2005.

Section 24-4-106 permits reversal of a final agency decision only when the agency exceeds its authority, misinterprets the law, acts arbitrarily and capriciously, or makes a determination unsupported by the record.

Sullivan v. Bucknam · filed 2006-06-01

This appeal is governed by § 24-4-106, C.R.S.2005, of the State Administrative Procedure Act. Under this statute, we may reverse the final decision only if the agency exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to reverse an agency decision for arbitrary or capricious action, lack of support in the record, legal error, or action beyond the agency’s constitutional or statutory authority.

Reiff v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2006-09-07(7)

The decision of an administrative agency may be reversed only if the court finds the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence and the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to overturn an agency decision that is arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by the record, legally erroneous, or beyond the agency’s authority.

Bourgeron v. City and County of Denver · filed 2006-09-07(7)

A reviewing court may overturn an administrative agency's determination only if the court finds the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority.

Section 24-4-106(7) limits review of a BAA determination: a court may not reweigh evidence or set aside the determination unless it is arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by competent evidence.

Microsemi Corp. of Colorado v. Broomfield County Board of Equalization · filed 2008-12-11(7)

Our review of the BAA's decision involves a mixed issue of law and fact. See § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2008. ... However, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the BAA, and we may not set aside the determination unless it is arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by any competent evidence.

Section 24-4-106(7) directs a reviewing court to sustain an agency decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law.

Sherritt v. Rocky Mountain Fire District · filed 2009-02-19(7)

On review, an agency decision will be sustained unless it is arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to affirm agency action unless it finds specified legal or evidentiary defects, including findings unsupported by substantial evidence.

Black Diamaond Fund, LLLP v. Joseph · filed 2009-05-28(7)

The standard for review of such actions is found in section 24-4-106(7), which provides that the court shall affirm the agency action unless it finds, insofar as pertinent here, that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or based on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous on the whole record, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) limits reversal of an agency decision to specified errors, including arbitrary or capricious action, lack of record support, legal error, or action beyond the agency's authority.

Colorado Division of Insurance v. Auto-Owner's Insurance Co. · filed 2009-10-01(7)

We may only reverse the Commissioner's decision if we conclude that the Commissioner acted arbitrarily or capriciously; decided an issue that was not supported by the record; erred in her legal interpretation; or exceeded her authority. § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2008; Koinis, 97 P.3d at 195.

Section 24-4-106(7) supplies the standard for judicial review of State Engineer decisions on substitute water supply plans under section 37-92-308(4).

WELL AUGMENTATION SUBDISTRICT v. Aurora · filed 2009-12-14(7)

Because the judicial review standards set forth in the APA apply to decisions of the State Engineer unless they conflict with a specific statutory provision, the question before us is whether section 37-92-308(4)(c), [5] governing appeal of subsection (4) SWSPs, conflicts with APA review as outlined in section 24-4-106. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that it does not.

Section 24-4-106(11) incorporates the standard of review in subsection (7) for review of State Personnel Board action.

Taylor v. State Personnel Board · filed 2010-02-18(11)

Our review of the Board's action is pursuant to section 24-4-106(11), C.R.S.2009, which incorporates by reference the standard of review set forth in section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2009.

On appeal from judicial review under subsection (7), an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the trial court.

Kirkmeyer v. Department of Local Affairs · filed 2011-03-31(7)

On appeal of an action for judicial review under section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2010, as provided for in section 24-50-112.5(4)(b), C.R.S.2010, an appellate court employs the same standard of review as the trial court.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to set aside a final agency decision unsupported by evidence in the record.

Martelon v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2005-10-06(7)

Because the department’s final ruling is not supported by evidence in the record, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with directions to set aside the final agency decision.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to consider the whole record and find no substantial evidence supporting an agency determination before setting it aside as arbitrary or capricious.

Colorado Ethics Watch v. City and County of Broomfield · filed 2009-01-08(7)

To set aside an agency's determination on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious, a reviewing court must be convinced, based on the record as a whole, that there is no substantial evidence to support the agency's determination. § 24-4-106(7); see Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27, 33 (Colo.1987).

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a district court to grant relief when an agency’s discretionary penalty is a clear abuse of discretion.

Hickam v. Colorado Real Estate Commission · filed 1975-04-29(7)

The scope of review provided by the State Administrative Procedure Act in § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973 (1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 3-16-5(7)), is to determine, inter alia, whether the agency action was "an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Under C.R.S.1963, 117-1-12(1), the Commission is given discretion to determine whether a broker's license should be suspended or revoked for a violation of the statute. Hence, upon a showing that the penalty imposed constituted a clear abuse of discretion, the district court is empowered to award the relief set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to affirm agency factual findings supported by substantial evidence.

Dixon v. State Bd. of Optometric Examiners · filed 1977-04-07(7)

The findings of the hearing officer that these acts were willful and deliberate is supported by substantial evidence and must therefore be affirmed. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973; Hickman v. Colorado Real Estate Commission, 36 Colo.App. 76, 534 P.2d 1220 (1975).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a district court to affirm an agency decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious; the court may set it aside on that ground only if no competent evidence supports it.

Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1981-02-13(7)

On judicial review the decision of an administrative agency must be affirmed by a district court unless the court finds that the agency action is arbitrary or capricious. ... A district court reviewing the decision of an administrative agency must find that the decision is unsupported by any competent evidence before the court may set aside the agency’s decision as arbitrary or capricious.

Section 24-4-106(7) allows judicial review of an agency order for abuse of discretion or lack of substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Davis v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division · filed 1981-02-17(7)

We cannot conclude that the department’s findings of fact and order of revocation constitute “an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion” or “are unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole.” Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 1973.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision as arbitrary or capricious only when no competent evidence supports it.

Dolan v. Rust · filed 1978-04-03(7)

In order for a court to set aside a decision by an administrative agency on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious pursuant to section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973, the court must find that there is no competent evidence supporting the agency's decision.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision as arbitrary or capricious when no competent evidence in the record as a whole supports it.

Noe v. Dolan · filed 1979-01-22(7)

In order for a reviewing court to set aside a decision by an administrative agency on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious pursuant to section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 1973, the court must find that there is no competent evidence in the record as a whole supporting the agency’s decision.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires judicial review for abuse of discretion when a liquor licensing board revokes or suspends a license.

Mr. Lucky's, Inc. v. Dolan · filed 1979-03-05(7)

There is no question that we can measure abuse of discretion in light of the statutory criteria. In fact, such a review is mandated by the very section under which this appeal was brought below, section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 1973. Today we specifically hold that a liquor licensing board which revokes or suspends a license under section 12-47-111 (1 )(a)(VIII) is subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires an agency’s findings to be supported by the record on judicial review.

Hoehl v. Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue · filed 1980-10-30(7)

Consequently, the presumption that the records of the Division of Motor Vehicles are correct was overcome. Since the Department introduced no additional evidence, the hearing officer’s findings were not supported by the record, § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973, and plaintiff’s driver’s license should not have been revoked.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires substantial evidence to support a hearing panel’s basic factual findings, but that standard does not govern review of a school board’s ultimate findings in a bifurcated teacher-dismissal proceeding.

Ricci v. Davis · filed 1981-05-04(7)

Section 22-63-117(11) provides that an order of dismissal entered in accordance with sections 22-63-116 and 117 is to be reviewed pursuant to section 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973 (the State Administrative Procedure Act). Both Ricci and the Board assume that the standard of review prescribed by that section is the “substantial evidence test.” However, in a bifurcated proceeding in which one tribunal finds the evidentiary facts upon which a second tribunal bases conclusions of ultimate fact, we do not believe, for the reasons set out in the text, that the second tribunal’s findings of ultimate fact are properly reviewable under the substantial evidence rubric.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to examine the whole record and decide all questions of law when reviewing agency action.

Hudson v. Board of Education, Huerfano School District Re-1 · filed 1982-10-14(7)

The Act provides that the standard for judicial review of a Board action shall be pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973. ... Subsection (7) further provides that the court shall review the whole record and determine all questions of law. Here, the trial court conducted a full review of the record, made determinations of all questions of law, and concluded that the Board had abused its discretion. We agree with the trial court.

Section 24-4-106 does not authorize a reviewing court to act as a professional licensing board.

Disciplinary Proceedings Regarding the License to Practice Dentistry of Maul v. State Board of Dental Examiners · filed 1983-09-06

It is not within the scope of judicial review, as provided in section 12-35-115, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 5), and section 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973 (1980 Supp.), for this court to act as a professional licensing board.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to decide questions of statutory interpretation without being bound by the agency’s determination.

Transponder Corp. of Denver v. Property Tax Administrator · filed 1984-04-23(7)

In reviewing an agency’s actions, “the court shall determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory ... provisions involved and shall apply such interpretation to the facts duly found or established.” Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10). Here, whether Transponder is a “telephone company” within the meaning of the applicable statute is a question of law to be determined on the basis of the operative facts. As such, it is a question of statutory interpretation, and the court is not bound by the agency’s determination.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside an agency’s ultimate finding of fact if it is contrary to law; the finding stands if it has a reasonable basis in law.

Lee v. State Board of Dental Examiners · filed 1982-12-06(7)

An ultimate finding of fact will be set aside by a reviewing court only if, assuming there is evidence to support the finding, it is “contrary to law,” section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10); stated conversely, an ultimate finding of fact will be sustained if it has a reasonable basis in law.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to accept administrative findings of fact unless the record as a whole shows they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Mondragon v. Poudre School District R-1 · filed 1984-11-23(7)

The standard for judicial review under an administrative hearing is set forth in § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10). Under that section, the hearing officer’s findings of fact must be accepted unless, when the record is considered as a whole, they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to accept a hearing officer’s findings of basic facts unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole.

Thompson v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF ROARING FORK SCH. · filed 1983-02-10(7)

Under the Act, an action for judicial review is brought under the State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106(11), C.R. S.1973, which in turn directs that the standard of review set forth in § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Yol. 10) shall apply. And, under that section, the hearing officer’s findings of basic facts must be accepted unless, when the record is considered as a whole, they are clearly erroneous, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires courts to uphold an agency’s evidentiary findings when substantial evidence supports them on the record as a whole.

DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue · filed 1983-06-20(7)

Under section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10), evidentiary findings of an administrative agency will not be set aside when, as here, they are supported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to affirm an agency decision supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. State, Division of Insurance · filed 1983-11-10(7)

Because there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Division of Insurance’s finding that Hickey was the agent of Northwestern, the court erred in not affirming the Division’s decision. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973.

Section 24-4-106(7) does not give a reviewing court power to modify an agency’s chosen penalty.

Petersen v. Colorado Racing Commission · filed 1983-10-13(7)

And, the power to modify is not given to a reviewing court under § 24-4-106(7), C.R. S.1973.

Section 24-4-106(11) prevents a reviewing court from disturbing findings and a decision supported by evidence received at the hearing.

Engelbrecht v. Jefferson County School District R-1 · filed 1984-06-14(11)

Contrary to Engelbrecht’s contention, the findings of the hearing officer on which her conclusions and recommendation were based, and the decision of the board of education of the school district, are supported by the evidence received at the hearing. Therefore, they may not be disturbed on appeal.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to decide questions of law and apply the law to facts already found or established; the reviewing court does not find facts.

K.C.R. Resources, Inc. v. State Board of Land Commissioners · filed 1984-11-26(7)

In contrast, the present case is purely a judicial review of an administrative proceeding under section 24-4-106, C.R.S. (1982). ... Thus, the district court had no fact finding role and received no evidence in this case. C.R.C.P. 52 has no applicability to such a proceeding.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to consider the whole agency record; the board’s lack of findings does not invalidate its decision if the record supports its conclusion.

Eliopulos v. Colorado State Personnel Board · filed 1985-08-15(7)

Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S., governs judicial review of agency actions. In making its determination, the court is to consider the record as a whole. The absence of findings by the board is not fatal to its decision if there is evidence in the record to support the board’s conclusion.

Section 24-4-106 limits judicial review of agency action to the record made before the agency.

Lanes v. O'BRIEN · filed 1987-07-02

In a proceeding to review agency action under § 24-4-106, C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10), the reviewing court is limited to a consideration of the record made before that agency.

Section 24-4-106 permits a court to set aside an agency valuation that is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by competent, substantial evidence.

Leavell-Rio Grande Central Associates v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1988-02-04

Therefore, we conclude that this valuation increase was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. See § 24-4-106, C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10); Montrose Properties, Ltd. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, supra. Thus, we cannot affirm the 1984 and 1985 Park Central Building assessment.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to decide questions of law and set aside agency action that exceeds statutory authority or is contrary to law.

Kennedy v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n of Colorado · filed 1988-12-22(7)

In cases involving judicial review of agency actions, the court must determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory provisions involved and must apply such interpretations to the facts established; and if the court finds that the agency action is in excess of statutory authority or is otherwise contrary to law, then the court must set aside the agency action and compel such action to be taken as has been unlawfully withheld, and remand the case for further proceedings.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to set aside a final agency finding that lacks substantial evidence.

Madril v. El Paso County Sch. Dist. 11 · filed 1985-10-03(7)

The standard of review that we must apply to final agency actions of the board is set forth in § 24-4-106(7). If the finding of immorality is supported by substantial evidence, we may not set aside the board’s action and substitute our own. ... Conversely, if the ultimate finding is not supported by substantial evidence, the finding must be set aside as contrary to law. ... We conclude, as a matter of law, that the words, “I know you are here for me, and I know you are here to see me,” do not constitute substantial evidence of sexually provocative or exploitive conduct.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside a hearing officer’s decision as arbitrary or capricious when the record as a whole contains no substantial evidence supporting it.

Glasmann v. State, Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division · filed 1986-04-17(7)

To set aside a decision by a hearing officer on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious pursuant to § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.), a reviewing court must be convinced from the record as a whole that there is no substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision.

Section 24-4-106(7) makes findings supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole binding on review.

Beechwood v. Board of Education of School District No. 11 · filed 1988-12-29(7)

We conclude that the hearing officer’s findings are supported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole, and hence, they are binding on review. See § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside an agency finding that lacks substantial evidence.

Salas v. State Personnel Board · filed 1989-03-09(7)

We hold, therefore, that the hearing officer’s conclusion that there had been a determination of exemption, not being supported by substantial evidence, is erroneous. See § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside an agency decision as arbitrary or capricious only when the record as a whole shows a manifest insufficiency of supporting evidence; the court may not reweigh conflicting evidence.

Marek v. State, Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division · filed 1985-10-31(7)

To set aside a decision by a hearing officer on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious pursuant to § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.), a reviewing court must be convinced from the record as a whole that there is a manifest insufficiency of the evidence to support the agency’s decision. Davis v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 623 P.2d 874 (Colo.1981). Where, as here, the evidence is conflicting, the hearing officer’s finding is binding on appeal, and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Creech v. Department of Revenue, 190 Colo. 174, 544 P.2d 633 (1976). We conclude that the district court improperly set aside the findings of the hearing officer based on conflicting evidence in the record.

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious when the agency refuses expungement despite good cause shown.

E.C.L. v. Denver Department of Social Services · filed 1987-04-02(7)

The hearing officer’s refusal to order expungement of the CWS 59 was thus arbitrary and capricious under § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 10).

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside an agency’s evidentiary findings only when they are clearly erroneous on the whole record or unsupported by substantial evidence.

First Christian Church v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1985-11-29(7)

A reviewing court may not set aside the evidentiary findings of an administrative agency unless they are clearly erroneous on the whole record or are unsupported by substantial evidence.

Subsection (7) allows a court to uphold agency factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.

Bassett v. State Board of Dental Examiners · filed 1986-09-04(7)

Our review of the record convinces us that neither of the two disputed findings of fact is clearly erroneous nor unsupported by substantial evidence. Thus, we uphold the findings.

Section 24-4-106 requires a court to uphold a board’s ultimate conclusion of fact unless the decision is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Adkins v. Division of Youth Services, Department of Institutions · filed 1986-01-30(7)

This was an ultimate conclusion of fact, and therefore, it must be upheld on appeal unless the Board’s decision was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 24-4-106(7) confines review of the Board of Assessment Appeals' finding to whether competent evidence supports it.

Montrose Prop. v. BD. OF ASSESSMENT APP. · filed 1987-01-29(7)

Therefore, because the BAA found that appropriate consideration was given to all three approaches, our review is confined to whether there is competent evidence to support the BAA's finding. See § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10); Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals, 628 P.2d 156 (Colo.App.1981).

Section 24-4-106(7) limits review of the Board of Assessment Appeals’ finding to whether competent evidence supports it.

Montrose Properties, Ltd. v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1987-01-29(7)

Therefore, because the BAA found that appropriate consideration was given to all three approaches, our review is confined to whether there is competent evidence to support the BAA’s finding.

Section 24-4-106(7) prevents a reviewing court from reversing an agency decision supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record as a whole.

Institute for Research on Social Problems v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1987-08-20(7)

Under § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 10), a reviewing court may not reverse an administrative agency’s decision if the record as a whole contains sufficient competent evidence to support the decision.

Section 24-4-106(11) limits appellate review of agency findings and conclusions supported by the evidence and applicable law.

Maurer v. Denver Urban Economic Development Corp. · filed 1989-05-04(11)

Since the Board’s findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence and applicable law, we may not disturb them on appeal. Sections 39-2-117(6), C.R.S. (1988 Cum. Supp.), and § 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(4) limits review of agency rules driven predominantly by policy choices to whether they are reasonable.

Amax, Inc. v. Colorado Water Quality Control Commission · filed 1990-03-29(4)

Inasmuch as the Regulation addresses predominantly policy determinations, judicial review is limited to considerations of reasonableness.

Section 24-4-106(11) permits a court to set aside a BOAA decision that lacks competent evidentiary support.

City & County of Denver v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1990-04-12(11)

BOAA decisions have been expressly held to be subject to this rule and, thus, may not be set aside unless unsupported by any competent evidence.

Section 24-4-106(7) directs a reviewing court to hold arbitrary and capricious agency action unlawful and compel action unlawfully withheld or unduly delayed.

New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board · filed 1987-04-16(7)

Thus, the trial court correctly held that April 6, 1984, was the effective date of transfer and that the Board’s action was arbitrary and capricious in that it had unduly delayed transfer of the permit. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10).

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision as arbitrary or capricious when no competent evidence in the record as a whole supports it.

Mertsching v. Webb · filed 1988-03-31(7)

In order for a reviewing court to set aside a decision by an administrative agency on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious, the court must find there is no competent evidence in the record as a whole supporting the agency’s decision.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits judicial review of an agency’s abuse of discretion, including its failure to consider relevant evidence.

E.E. Sonnenberg & Sons, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 1988-09-22(7)

Since there were no other feedlots in Logan County, Sonnenberg offered evidence of value of other feedlots located in Colorado and elsewhere. To fail to consider this evidence was an abuse of discretion by the Board. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Yol. 10).

Section 24-4-106(7) does not bind a reviewing court to an agency’s determination of a question of law, including contract interpretation.

Brennan v. Department of Local Affairs · filed 1989-05-25(7)

Since contract interpretation is a question of law, Pepcol Manufacturing Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310 (Colo.1984), a reviewing court is not bound by the agency’s determination. See § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to set aside agency action unsupported by the evidence or contrary to law and to decide questions of law.

Colorado Department of Social Services v. Davis · filed 1990-07-19(7)

In a proceeding for judicial review of an agency action, the district court is required to set aside the agency action if it finds the action to be unsupported by the evidence or otherwise contrary to law. It is for the court to determine all questions of law, interpret the applicable statutes and state regulations, and apply such interpretations to the facts duly found or established. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(11)(d) requires the Board of Assessment Appeals to be joined as a party when a court reviews one of its decisions.

Capital Associates International, Inc. v. Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners · filed 1990-11-08(11)(d)

Accordingly, we hold that when judicial review of a decision of the BAA is sought, that board must be joined as a party to such proceedings.

Section 24-4-106 permits a reviewing court to set aside agency rule changes unsupported by substantial evidence.

Board of County Commissioners v. Water Quality Control Commission · filed 1991-03-14

Because the record is devoid of any other data, or alternate appropriate statistical methodology interpreting existing data, see Amax, Inc. v. Water Quality Control Commission, supra, to underpin the Commission’s rule changes concerning cadmium, lead, and silver, they are “unsupported by substantial evidence” and cannot stand. See § 24-4-106, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A); Citizens for Free Enterprise v. Department of Revenue, 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo.1982).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to uphold an agency finding unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Magness v. State ex rel. Department of Highways · filed 1992-12-03(7)

This finding must stand unless it is demonstrated to be “unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole.” Section 24-4-106(7) C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A). ... Hence, we necessarily conclude that there is substantial record support for the finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proof under the Code, and thus, we may not overturn that finding on review.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to uphold an agency’s quasi-judicial decision when substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports it.

Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n v. Stermole · filed 1993-12-02(7)

Under § 24-^-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A), an agency’s quasi-judicial decision must be upheld if a consideration of the record as a whole reveals that decision to be supported by substantial evidence.

Section 24-4-106 requires a reviewing court to assess whether an agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Nicholas v. North Colorado Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1995-09-25(11)(e)

That statute directs review under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. (1988 RepLVol. 10A). Section 24-2-106(ll)(e), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A) contains the pertinent standard of review which requires us to determine whether the findings and conclusions of the committee are “unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole.”

Section 24-4-106 applies the substantial evidence standard to judicial review of the administrative panel’s decision.

Garner v. Colorado State Department of Personnel · filed 1992-01-16(7)

Rather, as noted by the district court, the- “substantial evidence” standard of review applies to judicial review of the panel’s decision, not to the panel’s review of the hiring agency’s action in a selection and examination process appeal.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to affirm an agency determination supported by competent evidence.

National Institute of Nutritional Education v. Meyer · filed 1993-05-20(7)

Contrary to the district court’s ruling, we conclude that defendant’s determination that both questions presented for declaratory judgment were hypothetical is adequately supported by competent evidence, thus requiring its affirmance.

Section 24-4-106 allows reversal of an agency decision if it is arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law.

Blake v. Department of Personnel · filed 1994-03-10(7), (11)(e)

Under the APA, the standard of review by this court is the same as that which governed the district court’s review of the administrative ruling. The decision of the agency may not be reversed unless it is found to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law. Sections 24-4-106(7) and 24-4-106(ll)(e), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision when the record as a whole contains no competent evidence supporting it.

United Financial Credit v. Colorado Collection Agency Board · filed 1995-02-09(7)

In order for a reviewing court to set aside a decision by an administrative agency, the court must find there is no competent evidence in the record as a whole which supports the agency’s determination. Life Investors Insurance Co. v. Smith, 833 P.2d 864 (Colo.App.1992). See § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision against an arbitrary-or-capricious challenge unless a reasonable person considering the record would be compelled to reach a different conclusion.

Ramseyer v. COLO. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERV. · filed 1995-04-20(7)

In determining whether an administrative agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court must determine whether a reasonable person, considering all of the evidence in the record, would fairly and honestly be compelled to reach a different conclusion. If not, no abuse of discretion has occurred and the agency decision must be upheld.

Section 24-4-106(11) allows an appellate court to reverse a trial court’s review of agency action when the ruling lacks competent record support or rests on an error of law.

Ager v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n Board · filed 1996-01-18(11)

Our review of the trial court’s decision is governed by the same standard that is applicable to the trial court’s review of the Board’s determination. Thus, we may reverse the trial court’s ruling only if it is unsupported by competent evidence in the record or is based on erroneous conclusions of law. Section 24-4-106(ll), C.R.S. (1988 RephVol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) treats an agency’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing as arbitrary and capricious when the allegations before it are facially supported.

Ivy v. State · filed 1993-08-26(7)

Because the hearing officer found, based upon the information submitted to her, that the employee’s allegations were facially supported, however, we conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously within the meaning of § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A) in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing upon those allegations.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to set aside agency action that is arbitrary or capricious or lacks substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Q & T Food Stores, Inc. v. Zamarripa · filed 1995-06-01(7)

Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A) requires that this court set aside an agency action that is, among other things, arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole. ... Here, we conclude that, by not considering any evidence of K.J.L.’s rehabilitation and his character at the time of the revocation proceeding, the Panel acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court reviewing agency action for arbitrariness or caprice to uphold the decision unless the record would compel a reasonable person to reach a different conclusion.

Ramseyer v. Colorado Department of Social Services · filed 1995-04-20(7)

In determining whether an administrative agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court must determine whether a reasonable person, considering all of the evidence in the record, would fairly and honestly be compelled to reach a different conclusion. If not, no abuse of discretion has occurred and the agency decision must be upheld.

On judicial review, an agency decision is not arbitrary or capricious if a reasonable person considering the whole record would not be compelled to reach a different conclusion.

McPeck v. Colorado Department of Social Services · filed 1996-05-30(7)

Similarly, to decide whether an administrative agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court must determine whether a reasonable person, considering all of the evidence in the record, would fairly and honestly be compelled to reach a different conclusion. If not, no abuse of discretion has occurred and the agency decision must be upheld.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to set aside agency action that exceeds the agency’s authority, misinterprets the law, is arbitrary or capricious, or lacks support in the record.

Colonial Bank v. Colorado Financial Services Board · filed 1998-05-14(7)

Like the district court, we review this agency action under the standards set forth in § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1997. ... Under that section, agency action is set aside if the court finds that the agency exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of law, acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record.

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to reverse agency action for arbitrariness, lack of record support, legal error, or excess of authority; an ultimate factual conclusion must have substantial support in the record as a whole.

Koinis v. Colorado Department of Public Safety · filed 2003-12-04(7)

Our review of the Board’s decision is governed by the standards set forth in § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2003, which provides that a court may reverse an administrative agency if it finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority. Where the challenge is to the Board’s resolution of an ultimate conclusion of fact, a reviewing court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support that conclusion.

Section 24-4-106(7) limits reversal of final agency action to grounds including legal error, abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous findings, and lack of substantial evidence.

Nededog v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2004-08-12(7)

We reverse final ageney action only if it is arbitrary or capricious, contrary to law, an abuse of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction, based on clearly erroneous findings, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, legally erroneous, or beyond the agency’s authority.

Rice v. Auraria Higher Education Center · filed 2005-06-16(7)

On appeal, a court may reverse the decision of an administrative agency if the court finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority. The court determines all questions of law, interprets the statutory and constitutional provisions involved, and applies such interpretation to the facts duly found or established.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a district court to set aside agency action that is unsupported by the evidence or contrary to law.

Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Office of the Secretary of State · filed 1997-05-01(7)

In a proceeding for judicial review of agency action, the district court is required to set aside the agency action if it finds the action to be either unsupported by the evidence or contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(11) directs courts to subsection (7) for the standard of judicial review of agency action.

Board of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM International · filed 1997-07-28(11)

Section 24-4-106(11) clarifies that the standard of review is set forth in section 24-4-106(7), which provides: ... If the court finds no error, it shall affirm the agency action.

Section 24-4-106 permits a court to reverse agency action it finds arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law.

Alexander v. Colorado Department of Personnel · filed 1998-02-23(7), (11)(e)

A reviewing court may not reverse the decision of the agency unless the court finds it to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law. Sections 24-4-106(7) and 24-4-106(ll)(e), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a reviewing court to affirm agency action unless the agency exceeds its authority, misinterprets the law, acts arbitrarily or capriciously, or makes a determination unsupported by the record.

Wildwood Child & Adult Care Program, Inc. v. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment · filed 1999-04-01(7)

Thus, a reviewing court is limited by the standard set forth in § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 1998, which requires that the agency action be affirmed unless the court finds that the agency exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of law, acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to affirm an agency finding supported by substantial evidence when the finding is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.

Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners v. Property Tax Administrator · filed 1999-06-24(7)

Because the evidence in the record substantially supports this finding, and the finding is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law, we must affirm the Board of Assessment’s order. See 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1998.

Section 24-4-106 requires a reviewing court to sustain the BAA’s property tax classification when it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Farny v. Board of Equalization of Dolores County · filed 1999-07-22(7), (11)(e)

Thus, under the applicable standard of review, the BAA’s classification determination must be sustained if it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.

Section 24-4-106(7) limits when a court may set aside a BAA decision, including for abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous findings, or lack of substantial evidence.

Padre Resort, Inc. v. Jefferson County Board of Equalization · filed 2001-03-01(7)

This court may set aside the BAA's decision only if it was an abuse of discretion, arbitrary or capricious, based upon findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits reversal of an agency determination for arbitrary or capricious action, lack of record support, legal error, or action beyond the agency's authority.

Morgan v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2002-03-14(7)

Under § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S8.2001, an administrative agency's determination may be reversed only if the court finds the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority.

Section 24-4-106 requires a reviewing court to set aside an agency decision that is contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.

Moczygemba v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2002-05-23(7), (11)

If a reviewing court finds an agency decision to be contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, it shall set aside the decision. Section 24-4-106(7), (11), C.R.S.2001.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to affirm agency action unless it exceeds the agency’s authority, rests on an erroneous interpretation of law, is arbitrary or capricious, or lacks record support.

GF Gaming Corp. v. Hyatt Gaming Management, Inc. · filed 2003-08-14(7)

Our review is limited by the standard set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2002. Thus, the agency action must be affirmed unless the court finds that the agency exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of law, acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record.

Section 24-4-106(7)'s standard for reviewing agency action does not apply to an injunction action challenging a disclosure determination that is not an adjudicatory agency action.

CF & I Steel, L.P. v. Air Pollution Control Division · filed 2003-08-14(7)

Under CAPA, a reviewing court may not reverse an agency action unless the court finds it to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.$S.2002. ... On this record, we conclude that the Division's determination regarding whether the documents here contained confidential information within the meaning of § 24-72-204(8)(a)(IV) did not constitute an adjudicatory agency action of the kind addressed in CAPA. See § 24-4-105, C.R.8.2002. Therefore, we reject the Division's and the Union's claims that RMSM's petition should be construed as a review of an agency action under CAPA.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits a court to reverse agency action that is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the record, based on legal error, or beyond the agency's authority.

Stell v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing · filed 2003-11-17(7)

A reviewing court may reverse an administrative agency's determination if the court finds that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2002; Ohison v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939 (Colo.App.1997).

Section 24-4-106(7) directs courts to sustain an agency decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious.

Coffman v. Colorado Common Cause · filed 2004-12-06(7)

On review, an agency decision will be sustained unless arbitrary or capricious, section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (2004), or unsupported by the evidence or contrary to law, Regents of the Univ. of Colorado v. Meyer, 899 P.2d 316, 317 (Colo.App.1995).

Section 24-4-106(7) allows a court to set aside a Board of Assessment Appeals decision if competent evidence does not support it or it fails to follow the statutory assessment scheme.

Board of Assessment Appeals v. Sampson · filed 2005-01-10(7)

A decision of the Board may be set aside only if it is unsupported by competent evidence or if it reflects a failure to abide by the statutory scheme for calculating property tax assessments.

Section 24-4-106(7) supplies the arbitrary or capricious standard for judicial review of agency decisions.

Williams v. Teck · filed 2005-04-07(7)

On review, an agency decision will be sustained unless arbitrary or capricious, see § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2004, unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law.

Section 24-4-106(7) presumes an administrative regulation valid and places the burden of proving invalidity on the challenger.

Colorado Division of Insurance v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1998-07-09(7)

Further, the initial presumption is that the regulation is proper. The burden is upon the party challenging the regulation to demonstrate its invalidity.

Section 24-4-106(7) presumes rules adopted through statutory rulemaking valid and places the burden on a challenger to establish their invalidity.

Brown v. Colorado Limited Gaming Control Commission · filed 1999-06-03(7)

Rules adopted pursuant to a statutory rulemaking proceeding are presumed valid. The burden is on the challenging party to establish their invalidity by demonstrating that the rulemaking body acted in an unconstitutional manner, exceeded its statutory authority, or otherwise acted in a manner contrary to statutory requirements. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1998.

Section 24-4-106(7) requires a court to affirm agency sanctions unless the agency exceeded its authority, misinterpreted the law, acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or made a decision unsupported by the record.

Colorado State Board of Accountancy v. Paroske · filed 2001-12-20(7)

We must affirm agency sanctions unless the agency exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, erroneously interpreted the law, acted in an arbitrary or capri-clous manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.2001;, see also Colorado Real Estate Commission v. Hanegan, 947 P.2d 933 (Colo.1997).

Section 24-4-106(7) permits an agency decision to be set aside when its factual findings are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

M.G. ex rel. M.A.G v. Colorado Department of Human Services, Central Registry · filed 2000-05-25(7)

An agency decision may only be set aside if the findings of fact on which it is based are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as whole.

Section 24-4-106(7) permits reversal of an agency decision for arbitrary or capricious action, lack of record support, legal error, or action beyond the agency's authority.

COLORADO DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES v. Maggard · filed 2011-02-07(7)

The standards set forth in section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. (2010) govern judicial review of the Board's decision. That statute provides that an appellate court may reverse an administrative agency if it finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority. ... Because the record supports this determination and because a reviewing court should give deference to the Board's conclusions, we will not disturb it on review.

Section 24-4-106(7) limits when an appellate court may set aside a state agency decision, including for arbitrariness, legal error, abuse of discretion, or clearly erroneous factual findings.

Colorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board v. Freeman · filed 2016-06-20(7)

An appellate court will set aside a decision of a state agency only if the decision is “arbitrary or capricious,” violates or is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, is “an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion,” or is based upon “clearly erroneous” findings of fact.

Section 24-4-106(7)(b) governs judicial review of agency action for arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, lack of substantial evidence, and other legal defects.

Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez · filed 2019-01-14(7)(b)

With that understanding, we cannot say that the Commission’s decision to decline to engage in rulemaking to consider Respondents’ proposed rule was arbitrary or capricious; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, purposes, or limitations; an abuse of discretion; unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole; or otherwise contrary to law. See § 24-4-106(7)(b).

Section 24-4-106 allows judicial review of final agency action even when a party has sought reconsideration; a motion to reconsider does not extend the deadline when the agency declines to reconsider.

Sterling Ethanol, LLC v. Colorado Air Quality Control Commission · filed 2017-02-23(2)

The party seeking judicial review must file a complaint within thirty-five days of the effective date of the Commission’s final order, even if that party first filed a motion to reconsider, and the Commission declined to reconsider its order.

When an agency fails to act and no specific review period applies, section 24-4-106(4) requires an action for judicial review to be brought within a reasonable time.

National Wildlife Federation v. Cotter Corp. · filed 1983-06-06(4)

Where the statutes regulating the Department do not specifically provide a time for judicial review when the Department fails to act, we must look to the general provisions of the APA. Section 106(4) of the APA provides that “any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court within thirty days after such agency action becomes effective.” “Action” is defined as including “failure to act.” Section 24-4-102, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10). Where, as here, there is no specific decision being challenged, and consequently no specific date from which to reckon the time for filing for judicial review, the standard must be that the action is to be brought within a reasonable time.

Section 24-4-106(4)'s filing period is determined by the law in effect when the right to judicial review arises after a final adverse decision.

McCartney v. WEST ADAMS CTY. FIRE PROTECTION · filed 1978-01-19(4)

Accordingly, since the right to seek judicial review did not arise until September 29, 1976, the date when the Civil Service Committee's action became final, the 30 day period which was in effect at that time was applicable.