Cal. Civ. Code § 1714

Section 1714(a) establishes a default duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others.

Pham and Gan v. Overton Security Services, Inc. · filed 2024-02-23(a)

Although Plaintiffs repeatedly refer to Defendants’ statutory duty, they cite for this premise California Civil Code section 1714, which merely establishes the “default rule” in California law for each person “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.”

Section 1714 establishes California’s general negligence principle; a claim based solely on previously dismissed negligence claims may also be dismissed.

Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC · filed 2024-06-11(a)

Section 1714 is a statute that establishes the general principle of negligence in California. ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Saber’s motion as to Floyd’s tenth claim under section 1714.

Section 1714’s duty of ordinary care does not require a property owner to repair a trivial defect.

Spinelli v. United States of America · filed 2025-12-18

Premises liability is a form of negligence. Brooks v. Eugene Burger Mgmt. Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1611, 1619 (1989); see Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.”). ... The Court determines as a matter of law that the indentation stepped in by Plaintiff was trivial.

Section 1714 requires a land possessor to act reasonably in managing property in view of the risk of injury to others; a visitor’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee is not determinative.

Carlson v. Ross · filed 1969-03-24

The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with, section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determitive.” ... In the light of Rowland, the trial court erred in giving the instruction based on BAJI 212-B (licensees and licensors).

Section 1714 requires a property occupier to use reasonable care in light of foreseeable injury to others, regardless of whether they are invitees, licensees, or trespassers.

Alva v. Cook · filed 1975-07-15

Applied to the occupier of premises Rowland requires that the occupier of premises in the management of his property must act as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others whether they be invitees, licensees, or trespassers. ... Assuming as we must on demurrer that the respondents had knowledge of the conclusions alleged when they assumed responsibility for the care and shelter of Malcolm and knew as a fact that Malcolm possessed a rifle, none of these factors were of such a nature that respondents knew or should have known that Malcolm was dangerous to himself or others or that they could foresee or should have been able to foresee that Malcolm would, while he was in their charge, with or without a firearm, inflict injuries upon persons who came upon their premises.

Section 1714(a) requires evidence that an alleged dangerous property condition contributed to the injury before a property owner can be liable for negligence.

Taylor v. Trimble · filed 2017-07-27(a)

Moreover, there is no evidence that noise and ripples in the water from this equipment contributed to the tragedy by obscuring Jaylen's struggles or preventing onlookers from hearing him; he may well have slipped under quietly.

Section 1714's ordinary-care duty applies to a vendor that loads and secures cargo, including when negligently secured cargo distracts a driver and injures someone on or near the road.

Pedeferri v. Seidner Enterprises · filed 2013-05-15(a)

This principle is codified in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) ["Everyone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill"].) Bert's offers one reason why it should be excused from this general duty and two reasons why it must be excused. We consider and reject each.

Section 1714(d) allows a claim against an adult who knowingly furnishes alcohol to a minor at the adult’s residence, but does not extend that exception to others who helped supply the alcohol.

Rybicki v. Carlson · filed 2013-05-22(d)

Although the claim against Shoemaker appears to fall within the section 1714, subdivision (d) exception, plaintiffs cannot bootstrap respondents into that exception by alleging that respondents conspired with or aided and abetted Shoemaker by providing alcoholic beverages that were furnished to Garcia.

Section 1714(c) generally shields social hosts from liability for injuries caused by alcohol they furnish to guests.

Ennabe v. Manosa · filed 2014-02-24(c)

One does not normally charge guests an entrance fee to attend bar mitzvahs, weddings, or gallery openings, and the provision of alcoholic beverages to guests invited to such events typically is governed by social host immunity under Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (c).

Section 1714(c) shields a social host from liability even when the host merely fails to prevent a guest from drinking alcohol available in the home.

Allen v. Liberman · filed 2014-06-18(c)

The Libermans are immune from liability pursuant to section 1714 even if they did not directly furnish the alcohol to Shelby, but simply failed to prevent her from drinking the alcohol available in their home.

Section 1714(c) does not shield a social host from liability for negligence independent of furnishing alcohol, even when intoxication is present.

Adelaja · filed 2025-11-04(c)

Thus, if Guillen was negligent independent of any provision of alcohol, he can still be held liable.

Section 1714(a)'s duty of ordinary care requires a person who places another in peril to summon aid.

Carlsen v. Koivumaki · filed 2014-07-07(a)

Having placed Jason in a position of peril by “knock[ing] or push[ing] [him] backwards, such that he began to fall over the edge of the cliff,” Zach owed him a duty to call 911 or otherwise summon aid, which he breached by waiting several hours to report the incident to police.

Section 1714(a) requires store owners to exercise reasonable care, but they need not warn of an obvious danger or remedy one when injury is not foreseeable.

Sassoon v. Lowe's Home Centers · filed 2016-03-22(a)

“It is well established in California that although a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 36 P.3d 11, 14 (Cal. 2001); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). ... As such, Lowe’s was under no duty to warn Sassoon about the placement of or the danger from the ladder. ... Here, Lowe’s had no duty to remedy the obvious danger of the placement of the ladder.

Section 1714(a)'s duty of ordinary care requires employers and premises owners using asbestos to take reasonable care to prevent exposure of workers' household members to asbestos carried home from work.

Kesner v. Superior Court of Alameda County · filed 2016-12-01(a)

Because Civil Code section 1714 establishes a general duty to exercise ordinary care in one‘s activities, which includes the use of asbestos in one‘s business or on one‘s premises, we rely on these factors not to determine ―whether a new duty should be created, but whether an exception to Civil Code section 1714 . . . should be created.‖ (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 783.) ... Accordingly, Abex and BNSF owed plaintiffs a duty of ordinary care to prevent take-home exposure.

Section 1714 does not require a landowner who merely sites and maintains a parking lot across a public street to protect invitees from the obvious dangers of crossing that street.

Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church · filed 2017-11-13

In sum, Vasilenko does not allege that the Church has done anything more than site and maintain a parking lot that requires its invitees to cross a public street. We thus conclude that the Church owed Vasilenko no duty to protect him from the obvious dangers of crossing Marconi Avenue.

Section 1714 presumes a duty of care when negligence causes personal injury or property damage, but not when it causes only economic loss.

S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty. (In re S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases) · filed 2017-12-15

In sum, J'Aire recognized and preserved the distinction between presuming duty under Civil Code section 1714 and Rowland and not foreclosing duty for purely economic loss under Biakanja .

Section 1714 does not create a presumptive duty of care to guard against purely economic losses.

S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.(In Re S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases) · filed 2019-05-30(a)

What Civil Code section 1714 does not do is impose a presumptive duty of care to guard against any conceivable harm that a negligent act might cause.

Section 1714(a)'s general duty of care supports negligence claims when alleged property damage accompanies economic loss.

Perlmutter v. Lehigh Hanson, Inc. · filed 2021-09-03(a)

The “general rule” is that “people owe a duty of care to avoid causing harm to others and that they are thus liable for injuries their negligence inflicts.” So. Cal. Gas Leak Cases, 7 Cal. 5th 391, 398 (2019)); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). ... Because Plaintiffs have properly alleged that Defendant’s negligence caused property damage, the economic loss rule does not bar Plaintiffs’ Negligence and Gross Negligence claims.

Section 1714’s duty of reasonable care can require a university to protect students from foreseeable violence in the classroom or during curricular activities.

The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court · filed 2018-03-22(a)

In general, each person has a duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 771 (Cabral); see Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) ... Having concluded UCLA had a duty to protect Rosen under the circumstances alleged, we need not decide whether the school had a separate duty to control Thompson’s behavior to prevent the harm.

Section 1714(a) does not provide a defense to a criminal felony vandalism charge.

People v. Bonilla · filed 2018-11-29(a)

For the same reasons, Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) (everyone is responsible for injury caused to another unless that person "brought the injury upon himself or herself") and Civil Code section 1667 (dealing with unlawful contracts) are inapplicable to the criminal felony vandalism charges at issue here.

Section 1714 imposes a duty of ordinary care, and a hotel guest can plead that duty by alleging reasonably foreseeable harm from fragrances used on the premises.

Bogosian Chose v. Accor Management US Inc. · filed 2020-02-14

It is thus well established that “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. ... At least for purposes of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the foreseeability of harm—and the existence of a duty to protect patrons—from purportedly toxic fragrances at the Claremont.

Section 1714(a) may support a negligence claim, but it does not itself provide a separate statutory cause of action.

Floyd v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC. · filed 2025-01-14(a)

The statute may inform a tort cause of action for negligence, but Plaintiff fails to establish this section provides for a statutory cause of action.

Section 1714(a) does not impose a presumptive duty on banks to avoid causing their depositors emotional distress.

Mubiru v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2025-08-06(a)

The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s “ordinary duty of care” rule, Section 1714(a), imposes a presumptive duty of care on Defendant to generally avoid distressing its depositors.

Section 1714 can impose a duty to protect workers from a third party’s forced labor when a special relationship, the Rowland factors, and the defendant’s misfeasance support that duty.

Angga · filed 2025-11-12(a)

For the reasons above, the Court concludes Defendant’s special relationship with Rongcheng vessels, the Rowland factors, and Defendant’s misfeasance establish that Defendant had a duty to protect Plaintiffs from becoming victims of forced labor on Rongcheng’s vessels through reasonable protective measures.

Section 1714’s duty of reasonable care applies to a subcontractor’s scaffold used by another worker; the worker’s status as an invitee or licensee does not determine liability.

Holliday v. Miles, Inc. · filed 1968-10-04

We conclude, however, that the rules stated therein as to the duty of care owing by an occupier of real property will be held to apply to the owner or supplier of a chattel toward one using such chattel in those situations in which analogies have elsewhere been drawn to the varying obligations owing by the owner or occupier of land toward business guests, licensees, and trespassers.

Section 1714 does not impose an actionable duty of care on public school authorities for alleged failures in academic instruction because public policy precludes that duty.

Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District · filed 1976-08-06

The court declared that the foundation of all negligence liability in this state was Civil Code section 1714, paraphrased the section in terms of duty of care (as expressing the principle that “[a]ll persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the result of their conduct”), and stated that liability was to flow from this “fundamental principle” in all cases except where a departure from it was “clearly supported by public policy.” ... These recognized policy considerations alone negate an actionable “duty of care” in persons and agencies who administer the academic phases of the public educational process.

Section 1714 supports a common negligence claim when a physician learns that a device prescribed to a patient is dangerous and fails to warn the patient.

Tresemer v. Barke · filed 1978-11-22

A cay.se of action is stated for failure to warn plaintiff. This would arise by virtue of a confidential relationship between doctor and patient. It is not a malpractice cause of action in the commonly understood sense but rather a malpractice action from the imposed continuing status of physician-patient where the danger arose from that relationship. It is also a cause of action for common negligence.

Section 1714 does not impose a duty to people injured by a car thief’s driving merely because someone left the keys in or near the car, absent special circumstances.

Kiick v. Levias · filed 1980-12-17

No such special circumstance appears in this case, however. While it is undoubtedly true, as appellant asserts, that there has been a general increase in car thefts in metropolitan areas since Richards, and while as a consequence the probability that a car left unattended and with keys accessible will be stolen may well be greater now than it was in 1954, these are not “special” circumstances (Hosking v. Robles (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 98, 104 [159 Cal.Rptr. 369]), and appellant asserts no facts which otherwise distinguish Levias’ situation from that of Mrs. Stanley.