Cal. Civ. Code § 1714

Section 1714 requires landowners to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.

Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center · filed 1993-12-16

It is now well established that California law requires landowners to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].)

Section 1714, subdivision (a), requires a person to exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the circumstances.

Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center · filed 1994-12-05(a)

Thus, as a general proposition one "is required to exercise the care that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the circumstances." [2] ( Polk v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 26 Cal.2d 519, 525 [159 P.2d 931]; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; see Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)

Section 1714(a) establishes general liability for injuries caused by a failure to use due care, subject to statutory or clear public policy exceptions.

Herrle v. Estate of Marshall · filed 1996-05-31(a)

(1) As a general rule, persons are liable for injuries they cause others as a result of their failure to use due care. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 536; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 111-112 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].) The only exceptions to this rule are those created by statute or clear public policy.

Section 1714 establishes a general duty for everyone to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by their conduct.

Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District · filed 1997-01-27

In this state, the general rule is that all persons have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct. ( Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; see Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714(a) makes each person liable for injuries caused by failing to use ordinary care.

Dyer v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County · filed 1997-06-30(a)

“As a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 936 P.2d 70]; see Civ. Code, §1714, subd. (a).)

Section 1714 requires all persons to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by their conduct.

Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2000-03-24

“[E]very [negligence] case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct.” ( Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36; Civ.Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714(a) imposes a general duty of ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by one's conduct.

Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors · filed 2002-04-24(a)

Liability for misfeasance is based on the general duty of ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by one’s conduct. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36].)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property or one's person.

Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court · filed 1997-01-06(a)

Civil Code section 1714 states a civil law principle that is the foundation of our negligence law, whether developed under the statutory command or from the common law. ( Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112.) It has never been construed as imposing a duty to comply with an unlawful demand that property be surrendered, however.

Section 1714 makes each person liable for injuries caused by failing to use reasonable care in the circumstances.

Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. · filed 1997-05-08

As a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and “is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances . . . .” (Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112; Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property, subject to the injured person's own lack of ordinary care.

Pineda v. Ennabe · filed 1998-03-09(a)

As a source of duty Rowland cited with approval section 1714 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows: “(a) Every one is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property . . . except so far as the latter has ... hy want of ordinary care brought the injury upon himself.” ... Applying the Rowland tests, we conclude respondent owed no duty of care to prevent the kind of accident which occurred here.

Section 1714(a) makes everyone liable for injuries caused by failing to use reasonable care, subject to public policy considerations that may eliminate a duty in a particular case.

N.N v. v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks · filed 1999-10-28(a)

While California statutory law generally provides that everyone is liable for injuries caused by their failure to exercise reasonable care, public policy and other considerations may lead a court to conclude no duty toward the plaintiff existed in a particular case.

Section 1714(a) makes people responsible for injuries caused by a want of ordinary care in managing property or person, subject to exceptions supported by statute or public policy.

Martinez v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n · filed 2000-08-01(a)

We also look to the analytical factors in Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108 to decide whether public policy considerations make this a proper case for departing from the general rule in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) and excepting the Bank from that statutory duty. We conclude that the Rowland v. Christian factors do except the Bank from that duty.

Section 1714, subdivision (a) makes a person responsible for injuries caused to another by a lack of ordinary care or skill, unless the injured person willfully or negligently caused the injury.

Adelman v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. · filed 2001-06-29(a)

"Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself."

Section 1714 requires people to use due care to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of injury to others.

Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2001-08-16

Under general negligence principles, of course, a person ordinarily is obligated to exercise due care in his or her own actions so as to not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others, and this legal duty generally is owed to the class of persons who it is reasonably foreseeable may be injured as the result of the actor's conduct. (Civ.Code, § 1714; see generally Rest.2d Torts, § 281; Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed.1984) § 31, p. 169; 3 Harper et al., The Law of Torts (2d ed.1986) § 18.2, pp. 654-655.)

Section 1714(a) generally requires people to use due care to avoid injuring others, subject to the sports related primary assumption of risk exception.

Mastro v. Petrick · filed 2001-10-23(a)

To sort through the tort law at issue in this case we begin by stating the basic rule that we all generally have the duty to use due care to avoid injuring others. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) ... We find that Petrick owed no duty of care to a nonsnowboarder occupying an area properly utilized by snowboarders.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent conduct.

Yong Shao Ma v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2002-01-23

Since 1872, the fundamental principle underlying common law tort doctrine has been codified in Civil Code section 1714: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willful or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”

Section 1714 requires everyone to use ordinary care to prevent injuring others through their conduct.

Friedman v. Merck & Co. · filed 2003-03-26

In this state, the general rule is that all persons have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct. ( Rowland v. Christian [, supra, ] 69 Cal.2d [at p.] 112, [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561][ ]; see Civ.Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 does not make a landowner liable for hazards created by an occupant’s business solely because the owner knows the business poses risks to its employees.

Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2004-10-27

Civil Code section 1714 sets forth the general duty of a property owner toward others: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” ... Were we to hold CUSA responsible for all the risks of CRTC’s testing, we would in effect be assigning strict liability to CUSA based solely on its status as the premises owner and its knowledge that the business activity conducted there posed special risks to the business’s employees.

Section 1714(a) makes businesses liable for accidents caused by negligent conduct when the injured person is not an employee and the claim is independent of an employee’s injury.

Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-10-30(a)

Generally speaking, businesses, like other actors, must bear the costs of accidents caused by the negligent conduct of their activities; when the injured person is not an employee, and the person’s claim does not derive from an employee’s injury, the costs are assessed and recovered through the civil justice system. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing their property or person.

Grahn v. Tosco Corp. · filed 1997-11-04

The principle that everyone is responsible for one’s own negligent acts is firmly entrenched in California law. Civil Code section 1714 reads, in pertinent part, “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, . . .” Therefore, holding Tosco directly liable for its negligent acts does not place “an onerous burden” on a fault-free party.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care and permits recovery for foreseeable economic injury even without personal or property damage.

North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County · filed 1997-12-01

Every person is responsible for injuries caused by his or her lack of ordinary care. (Civ. Code, § 1714.) As we have already noted, the J’Aire court held, “That section does not distinguish among injuries to one’s person, one’s property or one’s financial interests. . . . Recovery for injury to one’s economic interests, where it is the foreseeable result of another’s want of ordinary care, should not be foreclosed simply because it is the only injury that occurs.” (J’Aire, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 806, italics added.) That same principle applies with equal force here.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a failure to use ordinary care.

Wooden v. Raveling · filed 1998-02-26

Negligence damages have never been confined to those caused by “outrageous” negligent conduct, leaving losses caused by conduct that is merely negligent to be borne by the victim. Instead, negligence damages generally compensate the victim for all injuries caused by defendant’s breach of duty. (See, e.g., Civ. Code § 1714 [everyone is responsible for injury caused by their want of ordinary care].)

Section 1714 makes each person responsible for injury caused by their lack of ordinary care or skill.

Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. · filed 2000-09-29

First, Civil Code section 1714 states, in pertinent part, “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person.....” “The principle that everyone is responsible for one’s own negligent acts is firmly entrenched in California law.” (Grahn v. Tosco Corp. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1385 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].) Negligence law focuses on each person’s responsibility for his or her own care or lack thereof.

Section 1714 generally makes a tortfeasor liable for all damages proximately caused by the tortious conduct.

EXPRESSIONS AT RANCHO NIGUEL ASS'N v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. · filed 2001-02-05

Under the law, a tortfeasor generally is liable for all damages proximately caused by his tortious conduct. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 generally makes a tortfeasor liable for all damages proximately caused by the tortfeasor's tortious conduct.

Expressions at Rancho Niguel Ass'n v. Ahmanson Devs., Inc. · filed 2001-02-05

Under the law, a tortfeasor generally is liable for all damages proximately caused by his tortious conduct. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 states the basic rule of negligence but cannot extend a public entity's liability beyond Government Code section 835 in this setting.

Zelig v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2002-05-20

To the extent the Court of Appeal determined that the provisions of Civil Code section 1714 properly may be applied to extend the Lability of a pubLc entity in this setting beyond the usual reach of the “dangerous condition” provisions of Government Code section 835, we conclude that the appellate court was in error.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Kadish Ex Rel. Kadish v. JCC · filed 2003-12-23(a)

We begin with the fundamental principle, codified in section 1714 of the Civil Code, that "[e]very one is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property...." (Civ.Code, 1714, subd. (a).)

Section 1714 makes people liable for harm caused by their fault, reduced by any contributing fault of the injured person.

Childs v. County of Santa Barbara · filed 2004-01-22

A fundamental rule of tort law is that all persons are legally liable for the harm they cause based on their fault reduced by any contributing fault by the injured party. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 816, 829.) The doctrine of primary assumption of risk is an exception to the rule and completely bars recovery by an injured party irrespective of the negligence of another.

Section 1714(a) makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing their person or property, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent conduct.

Sears v. Morrison · filed 1999-11-29(a)

But the issue is not Morrison’s “right” to be negligent to himself. By the terms of Civil Code section 1714, he has a duty to prudently manage his person so as not to endanger others.

Section 1714(a) subjects land possessors to the general negligence standard and requires reasonable conduct in view of the probability of injury to others.

Alpert v. VILLA ROMANO HOMEOWNERS ASSN. · filed 2000-06-30(a)

We begin our analysis with Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), which makes a possessor of land subject to the general negligence standard of that section. Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury on himself.”

Section 1714 creates a general duty of care but alone cannot provide the specific statutory basis for direct tort liability against a public entity.

Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority · filed 2003-12-18

We think that Ma erred in concluding that Civil Code section 1714, and the common law principles it codified, were alone sufficient bases for imposing direct tort liability on a public entity. ... In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714.

Section 1714’s general duty of care may require a landowner to remedy an obvious wet pavement hazard when injury remains foreseeable.

Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2004-08-26

However, that the hazard was open and obvious did not relieve defendant of all possible duty, or breach of duty, with respect to it. ... But a holding that defendant’s general duty of due care (Civ. Code, § 1714) extended to assuring that the pavement adjacent to its driveway remained free of dangerous wetness would not entail a legislative rule of the type and sweep that defendant here hypothesizes.

Section 1714 does not expressly impose a duty on landowners abutting public sidewalks to pedestrians, and its silence does not preempt a local ordinance imposing that duty.

Gonzales v. City of San Jose · filed 2004-12-16(a)

Despite Huang’s assertion to the contrary, Civil Code section 1714’s lack of specific reference to adjacent landowner liability is not an indication of the state’s intent to fully occupy the field of law. Like Streets and Highways Code section 5610, Civil Code section 1714’s silence on the issue of adjacent landowner liability does not preempt the local ordinance.

Section 1714(a) establishes a general duty of ordinary care in managing one’s person or property; public policy may justify an exception.

Melton v. Boustred · filed 2010-03-12(a)

As provided by statute: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) ... As the Rowland court explained, no exception to this statutory principle “should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.”

Section 1714 requires a breach of duty for negligence; loan servicing charges permitted under an unrescinded loan do not establish a breach.

Falcocchia v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2010-02-12

Because the loan had not been rescinded at the time of the alleged acts, and absent any other allegation of wrongdoing, defendants’ actions were permitted. Thus, assuming that a duty existed as to servicing the loan, plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of this duty.

Section 1714 imposes a general duty of reasonable care, but the Rowland factors can warrant an exception; here they supported finding that a pest inspector owed no duty to a property owner's guest.

Formet v. the Lloyd Termite Control Co. · filed 2010-06-10

The factors warranting a departure from the general duty of reasonable care—as imposed by Civil Code section 1714—include the “foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. [Citations.]” (Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113; see Civ. Code, § 1714.) Analysis of the applicable individual factors leads to the conclusion that a departure from the general duty of reasonable care is warranted.

Section 1714’s general duty of ordinary care is assessed by category of cases; case-specific facts about a defendant’s conduct concern breach rather than duty.

Chavez v. Glock, Inc. · filed 2012-07-24

In Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 772 [122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170], the Supreme Court made clear the question whether an exception is warranted to Civil Code section 1714’s general duty of ordinary care should be evaluated at a relatively broad level of generality to “preserve the crucial distinction between a determination that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of ordinary care, which is for the court to make, and a determination that the defendant did not breach the duty of ordinary care, which in a jury trial is for the jury to make.” (See Cabral, at p. 772 [essential question is not whether facts of particular case justify departure from the general duty rule, “but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy”].) The fact-specific duty analysis Clock and Revolver Club posits presents a question of breach, not duty.

Section 1714 requires property owners to use ordinary care to prevent injury, and a city’s seismic retrofit deadline does not suspend that duty.

Myrick v. Mastagni · filed 2010-06-21

The basic rule of tort liability for property owners is that an owner must use ordinary care in the management of his or her property to prevent injury to another. (Civ. Code, § 1714.) ... To hold that as a matter of law a building owner has no duty until after the compliance date of a code provision would frustrate the very policy that the provision was designed to promote.

Section 1714 requires ordinary care to prevent injury caused by one’s conduct, but AEG’s directions to Michael Jackson’s doctor did not create a foreseeable risk that the doctor would administer a dangerous sedative.

Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC · filed 2015-01-30

‘. . . [E]very case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct.’ (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46 [(Weirum)]; Civ. Code, § 1714.) ... AEG’s instructions to Dr. Murray did not create an unreasonable risk of harm to Michael.

Under section 1714(a), whether a driver who exercised some care nevertheless breached the duty of ordinary care is a question of fact for the jury.

Minnegren v. Nozar · filed 2016-10-24(a)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides: ―Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.‖ ... Thus, he exercised some measure of care, and it was up to the jury to determine whether Nozar exercised due care.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care; a prima facie showing of false and malicious statements can support a negligence claim.

Bikkina v. Mahadevan · filed 2015-10-09

Civil Code section 1714 provides: ―Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .‖ (Civ. Code, § 1714.) ... His negligence claim is based on the same conduct as the defamation claims: Mahadevan made false and malicious statements about him. ... Bikkina has stated a legally sufficient claim for both actual malice and negligence.

Section 1714(a)’s duty of ordinary care applies to a shuttle operator’s decisions about where and how passengers board.

Huang v. Bicycle Casino, Inc. · filed 2016-10-19(a)

We will instead frame the issue as whether a shuttle operator owes its passengers a duty to exercise ordinary care in deciding where and how to board passengers.

Section 1714(a) presumes a duty of ordinary care, including for an occasional seller of equipment, unless policy factors justify an exception.

Amber De Jesus Avila v. Grinding and Polishing Machinery Corporation · filed 2021-07-19(a)

Based on the above, none of the Rowland factors are so compelling to overcome the clear policy preference in California that “everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill or skill in the management of his or her property or persons.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). That RC holds itself out as a mere “occasional seller” of OD Sanders does not change this because they could have cheaply avoided the Decedent’s injury by attaching a guard to the lathe.

Section 1714(a) imposes responsibility for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care, but a negligence claim requires evidence that the defendant breached a duty of care.

PUTIAN AUTHENTIC ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT CO., LTD v. Meta Platforms, Inc. · filed 2022-04-19(a)

Plaintiffs also invoke California Civil Code § 1714(a). ... Even if Meta owed Plaintiffs a duty beyond the confines of the parties’ written agreement, Plaintiffs do not substantiate a breach of that duty.

Section 1714(a) requires a psychiatric emergency clinician to use ordinary care when deciding whether probable cause supports a detention.

Doe v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-03-05(a)

LeBlanc owed a duty to exercise ordinary care in executing her responsibilities as a PERT clinician, which include authorizing detention only “upon probable cause.”

Section 1714’s duty of ordinary care can support a negligence claim when a business allegedly fails to safeguard stored personal information and the resulting breach causes actual costs.

In re San Francisco 49ers Data Breach Litigation · filed 2024-08-15

For present purposes, plaintiffs have alleged enough to state a negligence claim. “The general rule in California is that everyone is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person. In other words, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances.” Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 51 Cal. 4th 764, 771 (2011) (simplified); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person.”). As noted, plaintiffs say that the 49ers obtained and stored their PII without implementing reasonable safeguards against hacking and unauthorized access, and that they have incurred actual costs in following up on the hacking.

Section 1714(a) supports a negligence claim against individual train personnel alleged to have acted negligently.

Loewenthal v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2023-01-04(a)

Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). Plaintiff has pled that the Individual Defendants, who were the engineer and conductor of the train, acted negligently. Compl. ¶¶ 9-14. This is a facially valid claim.

Section 1714(a) requires a negligence plaintiff to prove harm caused by the defendant’s breach of duty.

Malan v. Martinez Refining Company LLC · filed 2025-09-30(a)

And to establish a negligence claim, Plaintiff likewise must prove, inter alia, that he was harmed by Defendant’s breach of duty.

Section 1714's ordinary-care rule is subject to statutory exceptions, including section 846's recreational-use immunity.

English v. Marin Municipal Water District · filed 1977-02-02

The case constitutes a recognition that statutory exceptions to section 1714 of the Civil Code are to be given effect.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Kenney v. Antonetti · filed 1931-01-08

Section 151 of the Motor Vehicle Act (Act 5128, Deering’s General Laws; Stats. 1923, p. 517) in part provides in substance that no person owning or controlling livestock shall voluntarily or negligently permit any of them to stray or remain unaccompanied upon a fenced public highway and section 1714 of the Civil Code in part provides in substance that everyone is responsible for an injury oeca sioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property. The fact that defendants’ horses were unattended upon the highway at night and the other facts adduced by the evidence, considered in the light of the above provisions and the further general rules of negligence applying at all times, clearly gave rise to an inference of negligence here and sufficiently established plaintiff’s prima facie case.

Section 1714 makes an owner responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Monroe v. East Bay Rental Service · filed 1952-06-11

No possible conflict can be found between sections 1714 and 1955, each of which defines different obligations of an owner of property. Each of them has equal force and dignity, and both necessarily must be read together.

Section 1714 makes a cattle owner liable for collision damages when negligent failure to keep cattle from straying onto a highway causes the collision, even on an unfenced highway in open range country.

Summers v. Parker · filed 1953-07-13

But a cattle owner who negligently fails to keep his cattle from straying upon a highway may be held liable in a civil action for damages arising from a collision with his livestock even at a point where the highway is unfenced, in open range country. (Jackson v. Hardy, 70 Cal.App.2d 6, 14 [160 P.2d 161]; Civ. Code, §1714.)

Section 1714 requires a property possessor to act as a reasonable person in managing property, and the plaintiff's status does not alone determine liability.

Anaya v. Turk · filed 1984-02-16

“The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.”

Section 1714(a) makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property or person.

Pultz v. Holgerson · filed 1986-08-26(a)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), provides: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.” (See also Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561].) A land possessor’s lack of knowledge of a dangerous condition is no defense to liability; he has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and must therefore inspect them.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or person, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent conduct.

Claxton v. Atlantic Richfield Company · filed 2003-04-30(a)

It is the basic policy of this state, as set forth by the Legislature in Civil Code section 1714, that everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by a want of ordinary care or skill in the management of one’s property. ... “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.”

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, without an exception for charitable purposes.

Malloy v. Fong · filed 1951-06-01

The declared public policy of this state, however, is contrary to that view: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person. ...” (Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 imposes a duty of ordinary care on a landlord handling repairs, and no exception to that duty was warranted here.

Minoletti v. Sabini · filed 1972-08-18

Rowland states that no exception should be made to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, unless clearly supported by public policy. In weighing the facts of this case against the “considerations” enunciated in Rowland we find no grounds upon which to base an exception to the principle of section 1714.

Section 1714 requires landlords to use reasonable care toward tenants; possession and control are factors in deciding negligence, not barriers to liability.

Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc. · filed 1973-12-06

But it is impossible to perceive any legitimate public interest that would be promoted by the creation of a landlord immunity exception to the code provision. That a landlord must act toward his tenant as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury, the probable seriousness of such injury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk, and his degree of control over the risk-creating defect, seems a sound proposition and one that expresses well the principles of justice and reasonableness upon which the law of torts is based.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property or person.

Uccello v. Laudenslayer · filed 1975-01-14

It should be emphasized that a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities. ... For this reason we hold that a landlord is under no duty to inspect the premises for the purpose of discovering the existence of a tenant’s dangerous animal; only when the landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, coupled with the right to have it removed from the premises, does a duty of care arise. ... Because we have assumed that respondent knew of the vicious propensities of the Cappell dog and because he could have abated the harboring of the dog on the premises by terminating the tenancy upon two weeks’ notice, appellant stated a cognizable theory of liability against respondent under Civil Code section 1714 and it was error to enter the judgment of nonsuit.

Section 1714(a) imposes no duty on a landlord to protect a third party from a tenant’s dog unless the landlord actually knows of the dog’s dangerous propensities and can control or prevent the harm.

Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management · filed 2006-10-16(a)

The general duty of care owed by a landowner in the management of his or her property is attenuated when the premises are let because the landlord is not in possession, and usually lacks the right to control the tenant and the tenant’s use of the property. Consequently, it is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant’s dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm.

Section 1714 requires a landlord with a judgment of possession to inspect the property when judgment is entered and at reasonable intervals afterward.

Stone v. CENTER TRUST RETAIL PROPERTIES · filed 2007-01-23

All landowners, including landlords, must use reasonable care to protect people who come onto their property. (Civ.Code, § 1714; CACI 1000, 1001, 1006) ... To strike the right balance between safety and disfavored self-help, we hold that Center Trust's duty to inspect attached upon entry of the judgment of possession in the unlawful detainer action and included reasonable periodic inspections thereafter.

Section 1714 requires a landlord with a judgment of possession to inspect the property when judgment is entered and at reasonable intervals thereafter.

Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc. · filed 2008-05-30

All landowners, including landlords, must use reasonable care to protect people who come onto their property. (Civ. Code, § 1714; CACI Nos. 1000, 1001, 1006.) ... To strike the right balance between safety and disfavored self-help, we hold that Center Trust's duty to inspect attached upon entry of the judgment of possession in the unlawful detainer action and included reasonable periodic inspections thereafter.

Section 1714 requires landlords to use reasonable care in managing their property, including areas and conditions beyond a dwelling’s habitability requirements.

Lewis Operating Corp. v. Superior Court · filed 2011-11-10

It is well established that a landlord must comply with the general obligation of Civil Code section 1714, which requires every person to take “reasonable care” in the management of his or her own property.

Section 1714(a) does not require a residential landlord to inspect leased property without reason to know an inspection is needed; liability for a dangerous condition arising during the tenancy requires actual knowledge and the right and ability to cure it.

People v. Garcia CA4/1 · filed 2015-10-27(a)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) sets forth the duty of a property owner toward others: "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person." ... The obligation to inspect arises "only if [the landowner] had some reason to know there was a need for such action." ... Applying the bright line rule, the Mamertos cannot be held liable to the Garcias because the Mamertos had no actual knowledge of the dangerous condition.

A landlord may breach the duty of care under section 1714(a) by failing to take reasonable steps to protect tenants from severe or pervasive sexual harassment.

Salisbury v. Hickman · filed 2013-09-24(a)

As for Ms. Salisbury’s negligence claims, it is conceivable that a landlord may breach his duty of care to his tenants by failing to take reasonable steps to protect his tenants from severe or pervasive sexual harassment.

Section 1714(a) requires landlords to use ordinary care in managing their property; a negligence claim must identify a breach of that duty and resulting harm.

Rothschild v. Gildred · filed 2025-03-04(a)

While landlords have a duty to use “ordinary care or skill in the management” of their property, Plaintiff does not specify that he is seeking to hold Defendants liable for breach of this duty. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a); see Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc., 163 Cal.Ap..4th 608, 612 (2008). Assuming that Plaintiff is claiming that Defendants, as his former landlord, had a duty to use reasonable care regarding their property, he fails to identify how Defendants breached this duty or how the breach harmed Plaintiff.

Section 1714 does not require a landlord to protect a tenant’s social guest from a sudden criminal attack by strangers when the landlord had no reason to anticipate it.

Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc. · filed 1976-11-10

It is conceded that in Rowland the Supreme Court held that the proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others (Civ. Code, § 1714). ... From the foregoing discussion it clearly appears that the principles outlined in Rowland fail to support the creation of a duty, and the relationship of the parties as well as sound public policy also militate against the imposition of liability upon the landlord in the instant case.

The 1978 amendments repudiated California's policy imposing liability for furnishing intoxicating beverages while leaving existing causes of action intact.

Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp. · filed 1979-05-23

The recent amendments to Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714 have a similar impact. The “current status” of California law with respect to liability based upon provision of intoxicating beverages is that it has been repudiated. Though an existing cause of action would not be nullified by the amendments, it is obvious that the impairment of such a repudiated policy has a minimal effect upon California’s governmental interest.

Section 1714(b) describes prior judicial interpretation of provider liability rather than granting substantive immunity.

Cory v. Shierloh · filed 1981-06-11(b)

Plaintiff correctly observes, however, that other provisions adopted by the 1978 amendments (namely, Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b) and Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602, subd. (c)) appear to apply only to injuries inflicted upon a third person by the intoxicated consumer. ... Yet the two cited provisions are not substantive grants of immunity but are merely descriptions of the “prior judicial interpretation” on the subject of the liability of the provider of alcoholic beverages.

Section 1714(b)'s 1978 amendment does not retroactively bar an accrued common law cause of action for negligent service of alcohol.

Fosgate v. Gonzales · filed 1980-07-08(b)

On appeal, however, Gonzales argues that the judgment on the pleadings can and should be sustained by a retroactive application of the 1978 amendments to Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714. ... However, in Coulter, supra, 21 Cal.3d, at pages 152-153, and Bernhard, supra, 16 Cal.3d, at page 325, our Supreme Court repeatedly indicated that the cause of action for negligent service of alcohol is grounded in the common law rather than being solely a statutory remedy (see Coulter, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 150-151, and Vesely, supra, 5 Cal.3d, at pp. 164-165). ... Thus, we conclude that since here, the facts giving rise to a cause of action for negligent service of alcohol occurred prior to January 1, 1979, the 1978 amendments should not be construed retroactively to bar Fosgate’s cause of action against Gonzales.

Section 1714 does not protect a social host who knowingly serves alcohol to a guest whose exceptional physical or mental condition makes the resulting risk foreseeable.

Cantor v. Anderson · filed 1981-11-25(b) and (c)

We hold, simply, that where a social host knows his guest is one who because of some exceptional physical or mental condition should not be served alcoholic beverages and is or should be aware of the risks included in providing such person with alcohol, the host is not protected by the provisions of section 1714, subdivisions (b) and (c).

Section 1714(b) treats alcohol consumption as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person, leaving a licensed seller immune when it sells alcohol to a sober minor who later injures a third party.

Rogers v. Alvas · filed 1984-10-12(b)

By declaring that the consumption of alcohol and not the sale or furnishing thereof is the proximate cause of injury inflicted by intoxicated persons, except for sales by licensed vendors to obviously intoxicated minors, the Legislature has redefined these torts, which is within its prerogative.

Section 1714 protects a social host from liability for injuries resulting from supplied alcohol but does not bar liability for other concurrent causes such as negligent entrustment.

Blake v. Moore · filed 1984-12-13(c)

This statutory shield interrupts simplistic “but for” logic even when the person supplied is plainly drunk. However, the statutory protection is a narrow “furnishing” one which should not be construed in a fashion which would preclude liability based on other concurrent causes.

Section 1714 makes consumption, rather than furnishing, alcoholic beverages the proximate cause of intoxication injuries and protects social hosts from liability for resulting damages.

Andre v. Ingram · filed 1985-01-29

In 1978, the pendulum swung back, The Legislature abrogated the Vesely line of cases; reinstated the rule that consumption, not furnishing, of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication; and provided that no social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be held legally accountable for damages or injury resulting from the consumption of such beverages. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 25602, 25602.1.)

Section 1714 makes alcohol consumption the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person and grants social hosts immunity from liability.

DeBolt v. Kragen Auto Supply, Inc. · filed 1986-06-11(b), (c)

Simply put, "the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person." (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b); Strang v. Cabrol, supra, 37 Cal.3d 720 at p. 725; Andre v. Ingram, supra, 164 Cal. App.3d 206 at p. 212; Rogers v. Alvas, supra, 160 Cal. App.3d 997 at p. 1004.) ... Social host immunity is applicable here. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (c).)

Section 1714(c) does not immunize an employer from respondeat superior liability for an employee’s alcohol consumption within the scope of employment.

Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc. · filed 1987-03-25(c)

Neither Civil Code section 1714 nor Business and Professions Code section 25602 immunizes the employer from respondeat superior liability. ... By its terms, subdivision (c) of Civil Code section 1714 limits the liability of any “social host.” ... If the facially broader language of section 25602 does not bar plaintiffs suit, then subdivision (c) of section 1714 does not either. ... Finally, we think that, in addition to being entirely congruent with the language and intent of sections 1714 and 25602, the result we reach is just.

Section 1714(b) and (c) give social hosts civil immunity for alcohol-related injuries.

Baker v. Sudo · filed 1987-09-14(b), (c)

First, the 1978 legislation added subdivisions (b) and (c) to Civil Code section 1714 to qualify the general principle (already expressed in subd. (a) of that section) that everyone is responsible for his own negligent or willful acts by giving civil immunity to “social hosts.”

Section 1714(c) protects social hosts who furnish alcohol from liability for injuries resulting from its consumption, including claims based on failure to supervise guests.

Biles v. Richter · filed 1988-11-30(c)

In this case we hold that the immunity from tort liability afforded a social host who furnishes alcohol (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (c)) cannot be circumvented by positing a duty upon the social host to supervise guests to whom he furnished alcohol.

Civil Code section 1714's 1978 amendments apply prospectively and do not retroactively eliminate accrued claims.

Sagadin v. Ripper · filed 1985-12-19(b), (c)

The issue at bench is whether Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714 apply retroactively. We conclude that they do not. In looking at the express language of section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714, we note the obvious. Neither piece of legislation contains the word retroactive.

Section 1714 bars liability for merely furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated person but does not foreclose a triable claim based on an undertaking to withhold the person's car keys.

Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1990-11-15(b)

As a direct response to these Supreme Court holdings, the Legislature amended sections 1714 and 25602 in 1978. ... As a result of those amendments, the court’s holdings were abrogated. Thus now, by statute, a defendant cannot be held liable in a civil action for merely furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated person who then injures someone else because of his intoxication. ... This case, however, presents a significant twist to that analysis and to the protection given by the Legislature to those in the alcohol industry. ... By statute, a tavern owner has no duty to the public insofar as his patrons’ consumption of alcohol affects those persons. However, Nolan’s testimony and the inference reasonably deducible from it, to wit, that Chandler placed his keys with the bartenders to keep himself from driving while under the influence, are sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether what occurred at the restaurant on the night of the accident makes section 324A of the Restatement applicable to this case. ... The plaintiff has submitted evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Saga’s restaurant and its patron, Chandler, had an arrangement or agreement on the night of the accident to the effect that the restaurant employees would not give Chandler’s keys back to him if he were under the influence of alcohol. If such an arrangement existed, Saga may have liability to plaintiff based upon the principles expressed in section 324A of the Restatement Second of Torts. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding Saga a summary judgment.

Section 1714(b) makes consumption rather than serving alcoholic beverages the proximate cause of injuries caused by an intoxicated person.

Leong v. San Francisco Parking, Inc. · filed 1991-09-30(b)

Section 25602, subdivision (c), and Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (b), expressly abrogate this part of Coulter in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.

Section 1714 makes consumption, rather than furnishing, alcoholic beverages the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication.

Cardinal v. Santee Pita, Inc. · filed 1991-10-10(b)

Thus in 1978, Civil Code section 1714 was changed to provide in pertinent part: "(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager [(1971) 5 Cal.3d 153], Bernhard v. Harrah's Club [(1976) 16 Cal.3d 313], and Coulter v. Superior Court [(1978) 21 Cal.3d 144] and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person." ... Cardinal thus, as a matter of law, cannot state a cause of action in light of the 1978 amendments.

Section 1714, together with California’s dram shop law, precludes potential coverage for claims based on furnishing alcohol when no exception to civil immunity applies.

United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Johnston · filed 2021-09-13

It is declared that there is no coverage for Defendants under the Policy with respect to the Underlying Action because: (1) there is no indication that Underlying Plaintiffs seek to impose liability upon Defendants “by reason of the selling, serving or furnishing of any alcoholic beverage,” thus precluding any potential for coverage under the Policy; and (2) even if the Underlying Plaintiffs were seeking to impose liability upon Defendants “by reason of the selling, serving or furnishing of any alcoholic beverage,” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602 precludes any potential for coverage under the Policy.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill.

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Abdullah · filed 1979-06-14

We agree with the Owens court that the issue of whether an automobile lender has made a negligent entrustment of his vehicle is more properly resolved by application of general principles of negligence. TTie most important general principle is contained in Civil Code section 1714, which provides, in part pertinent to the issue before us, that “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill. . . .”

Section 1714 imposes liability for harm caused by a person's want of ordinary care in managing property and does not permit wholesale immunity for natural conditions of land.

Sprecher v. Adamson Companies · filed 1981-12-07

On balance, however, it is clear that a departure from the fundamental concept that a person is liable for the harm caused “by his want of ordinary care ... in the management of his property . ... ” (Civ. Code, § 1714) is unwarranted as regards natural conditions of land.

Section 1714 imposes liability for harm caused by a person’s lack of ordinary care in managing property, including harm from natural conditions.

Moeller v. Fleming · filed 1982-10-01

On the basis of careful analysis of “the old common law rule” in light of more recent trends in tort doctrine the Supreme Court concluded that “it is clear that a departure from the fundamental concept that a person is liable for the harm caused ‘by his want of ordinary care ... in the management of his property .. ..’ (Civ. Code, § 1714) is unwarranted as regards natural conditions of land.” (30 Cal.3d at pp. 360, 362-371, 371.) “The question is whether in the management of his property, the possessor of land has acted as a reasonable person under all the circumstances. The likelihood of injury to plaintiff, the probable seriousness of such injury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk, the location of the land, and the possessor’s degree of control over the risk-creating condition are among the factors to be considered by the trier of fact in evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct.” (30 Cal.3d at p. 372.) ... Under the Sprecher standard it is conceivable that a trier of fact could find Fleming liable for suffering the roots of his tree to cause, with his knowledge, a dangerous condition on an adjacent public sidewalk. Fleming’s affidavits neither negated a necessary element of such a theory nor stated a complete defense to it. It follows that Fleming was not entitled to summary jugment.

Section 1714(a) requires ordinary care in managing property but does not impose a duty to remove an obvious tree hazard from a ski run.

Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Associates, Inc. · filed 1990-02-22(a)

With reference to the foregoing factual showing, Goldmine contends, as a matter of law, that its duty of care as operator of a ski area, arising under section 1714 of the Civil Code and under Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], “does not extend to protecting skiers from being injured through the inherent, obvious, and unavoidable risks of participating in the sport, including particularly a skier’s impacting obvious, avoidable natural obstacles such as trees solely as a result of the skier’s losing control of her movements on a ski run through no fault of the ski area [operator].” This contention imports the legal issue resolved by the trial court in Goldmine’s favor, namely whether its duty of care to plaintiffs extended to removal of the tree. ... As an original proposition, we would conclude that Goldmine was under no duty to warn that this particular tree, among the hundreds that border the several ski runs at Goldmine, presented a danger to plaintiff wife. The tree itself provided a warning to plaintiff of the implicit danger of a collision with it. A fortiori, Goldmine was under no duty to remove it.

Section 1714’s general duty of care is limited by primary assumption of risk: an instructor is not liable for injuries inherent in an activity absent intentional or sufficiently reckless conduct.

Saville v. SIERRA COLLEGE · filed 2005-11-28

“As a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another person. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.)” ... The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk is an exception to the general rule. ... Thus, due to the nature of the activity and the lack of evidence indicating the College acted recklessly in instructing the class, we conclude plaintiff’s allegations against the College in its role as instructor are barred by primary assumption of risk.

Section 1714's general duty of care is subject to primary assumption of the risk, but a sports participant may be liable for reckless conduct outside the sport's ordinary activity.

Lackner v. North · filed 2006-01-24

The general rule of duty is that each person has a duty to use due care to avoid injuring others by their careless conduct (Civ.Code, § 1714; Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 315, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 ( Knight )) and the duty owed by a property owner is to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on his or her property. ... The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk is one such exception. ... We disagree and find there is a triable issue of fact as to whether North's conduct was reckless.

Section 1714(a)'s ordinary-care duty may support liability for a sports injury when a participant's conduct is so reckless that it falls outside the sport's ordinary activity.

Mammoth Mountain Ski Area v. Graham · filed 2006-01-26(a)

Under general principles of negligence law, people have a duty to use “ordinary care” to avoid injury to others and may be held liable for negligent conduct that causes injury. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) A limitation to this general rule is the doctrine of “primary assumption of risk” that recognizes “in certain situations the nature of the activity at issue is such that the defendant does not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff to act with due care.” ... We therefore conclude there is a triable issue of fact whether David’s conduct was so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport of snowboarding.

Section 1714's general duty of care is limited by primary assumption of risk when a defendant owes no duty to protect a sports participant from a risk inherent in the sport.

Shin v. Ahn · filed 2006-07-21

Individuals generally have a duty to use care to avoid injuries to others and may be held liable for negligent conduct that causes injury. (Civ.Code, § 1714.) "In the context of active sports, however, the scope of this duty is limited by the assumption of risk doctrine. [Citation.]" ( Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 738, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 754.) This doctrine bars recovery by a plaintiff where, because of the nature of the activity involved and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendant is held to owe the plaintiff no duty of care.

Section 1714’s general duty of care is limited by primary assumption of risk: a skier’s employment by a resort does not create ordinary negligence liability for a collision inherent in skiing.

Towns v. Davidson · filed 2007-02-02

The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk is an exception to the general rule. ... Davidson's status as an employee of Mammoth did not bar operation of primary assumption of risk.

Section 1714’s ordinary duty of care is limited in golf by primary assumption of risk: a golfer’s careless shot is an inherent risk of the sport.

Shin v. Ahn · filed 2007-08-30(a)

We reject the duty analysis of the Court of Appeal and conclude that the primary assumption of risk doctrine regulates the duty a golfer owes both to playing partners and to other golfers on the course. ... Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others. (Civ.Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561.)

Section 1714's ordinary duty of care does not extend to risks inherent in a sporting activity when primary assumption of risk applies.

Truong v. Nguyen · filed 2007-11-05(a)

Our conclusion that the assumption of the risk doctrine applies to the negligence cause of action against Cu Van and relieved him of any duty to Rachael undercuts Plaintiffs claim of negligent entrustment.

Section 1714’s ordinary duty of due care governs a teacher’s potential liability for injuries in a seventh grade golf class.

Hemady v. Long Beach Unified School District · filed 2006-09-28

In this case, as we will discuss, we find the defendants’ potential liability must be determined pursuant to the prudent person duty of care rather than the Knight/Kahn limited duty of care.

Section 1714(a) establishes a general duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring others, subject to exceptions clearly supported by public policy.

Cohen v. NuVasive, Inc. · filed 2008-07-09(a)

The general rule is that each person has a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing injury to others. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561].) A departure from this fundamental principle is justified only if public policy clearly supports such an exception.

Section 1714 imposes a duty of ordinary care on a landowner who retains control of the property and permits a guard dog to roam where visitors may enter; the rule requiring a landlord’s actual knowledge of a tenant’s dangerous dog does not apply.

Salinas v. Martin · filed 2008-08-28

Therefore, the cases that decline to impose a duty of care unless a landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, coupled with the right to have it removed from the premises, are not dispositive. ... We conclude that as a matter of law respondent owed a duty of care to appellant.

Section 1714’s ordinary-care duty can extend to a name-brand drug manufacturer when it is foreseeable that a patient taking a generic equivalent will rely on the manufacturer’s product information.

Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. · filed 2008-11-07

We are not persuaded that the application of these factors supports a departure in this case from the general rule that all persons have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent harming others.

Section 1714(a)'s ordinary care rule supports a cemetery's duty to avoid burying a stranger in a reserved family plot adjacent to an interred family member.

Binns v. WESTMINSTER MEMORIAL PARK · filed 2009-02-26(a)

We conclude defendant's interment of plaintiff's mother in a plot adjacent to the space reserved for plaintiff created a special relationship with plaintiff giving rise to a duty to avoid mistakenly interring a stranger in his plot. ... Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), presents the general rule concerning a person's legal responsibility to others: "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself."

Section 1714’s duty of ordinary care can require a commercial truck driver to consider whether lawful parking creates an unreasonable risk to other motorists.

Lawson v. Safeway Inc. · filed 2010-12-30

As we take all of these circumstances into account, Wilburn was not as a matter of law excepted from the duty he would ordinarily bear to exercise due care in the operation of his vehicle simply because he was parked legally, and the issue of his negligence in choosing where to park was properly submitted to a jury.

Section 1714(a)’s duty of ordinary care applies to drivers who park alongside freeways, including toward motorists who may unintentionally leave the roadway.

Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. · filed 2011-02-28(a)

California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) ... We therefore decline to create a categorical rule exempting those parking alongside freeways from the duty of drivers to exercise ordinary care for others in their use of streets and highways.

Section 1714(a) makes people responsible for injuries caused by their lack of ordinary care, but public policy can limit that duty.

Tucker v. CBS Radio Stations, Inc. · filed 2011-04-29(a)

Every person is responsible for injuries caused by his or her lack of ordinary care. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561] (Rowland).) Exceptions to this general rule of liability apply only when supported by public policy. ... Balancing all of the Rowland factors discussed above, we conclude a common law duty of care should not be imposed on CBS or Boardman in the circumstances of this case.

Section 1714(a)'s general duty of care is limited by primary assumption of risk when eliminating an inherent risk would alter the nature of a recreational activity.

Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. · filed 2012-12-31(a)

“Although persons generally owe a duty of due care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a)), some activities—and, specifically, many sports—are inherently dangerous. Imposing a duty to mitigate those inherent dangers could alter the nature of the activity or inhibit vigorous participation.” ... We agree with the dissenting justice below, and the court in Beninati, that the primary assumption of risk doctrine is not limited to activities classified as sports, but applies as well to other recreational activities “involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.” (Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.)

Section 1714(a)’s general duty of care is limited by primary assumption of risk when a participant’s conduct creates only a risk inherent in weight training.

Cann v. Stefanec · filed 2013-06-24(a)

Weight training involves the risk that the weight will be dropped. As such, Stefanec‟s conduct after she lost her balance was not totally outside the range of ordinary activity of the sport. Contrary to Cann‟s argument, imposing liability for the conduct in this case would alter the fundamental nature of the activity.

Section 1714’s ordinary duty of care does not require a customer to protect a delivery driver from lifting injuries inherent in the job, including the risk of inaccurate package weights, when the customer does not increase that risk.

Moore v. William Jessup University · filed 2015-12-28(a)

Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, we conclude the risk of injury from lifting heavy boxes that may be labeled with inaccurate weight information was inherent in Moore’s job as a UPS delivery driver, and the University did not owe a duty to protect Moore from that risk; nor did the University increase the risk of harm to Moore.

Section 1714’s ordinary-care duty does not require a road owner or water district to protect a skateboarder from the inherent risks of downhill skateboarding when it has no organized relationship with the skateboarder.

Bertsch v. Mammoth Community Water District · filed 2016-06-01

As in that case, the defendants owed no duty to use due care not to increase the risks of skateboarding because there was no organized relationship between either of these defendants and Brett in relation to this activity.

Section 1714(a)'s duty of ordinary care does not require a participant to protect another from risks inherent in an activity they chose to join.

Swigart v. Bruno · filed 2017-06-22(a)

Primary assumption of risk is a defense that relieves a defendant of any duty to the plaintiff when the plaintiff is injured due to a risk that is inherent in an activity in which the plaintiff chose to participate.

Section 1714(a) generally requires a public utility to use reasonable care in managing its personal and real property.

White v. Southern California Edison Co. · filed 1994-05-31(a)

A public utility has a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of its personal and real property. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 655, 660-661 [262 P.2d 846].) A public utility may be liable to those persons injured as a result of its breach of this duty. (Ibid.) ... We are of the opinion that a public utility generally owes no duty to the motoring public for inoperable streetlights.

Section 1714’s ordinary-care duty applies to public utilities managing property, and foreseeability can raise a triable issue when a roadside light pole is struck.

Laabs v. Southern California Edison Co. · filed 2009-07-20

As a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and “is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances .. ..” (Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 112; see Civ. Code, § 1714.) This applies to public utilities, which have “a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of [their] personal and real property.” (White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.)

Section 1714(a) imposes a general duty of reasonable care on public utilities, but a utility has no duty to prevent a customer's losses from interrupted service absent a contract expressly providing service for a specific purpose.

Venoco, LLC v. Plains Pipeline, L.P. · filed 2020-07-31(a)

California law imposes a duty of care upon all individuals, including public utilities, “to exercise reasonable care in the management of [their] personal and real property.” White v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). But “[i]n the absence of a contract between the utility and the consumer expressly providing for the furnishing of a service for a specific purpose,” a public utility has no duty to prevent injuries to its customers that are the “result of an interruption of service or a failure to provide service.” ... As a customer harmed by the interruption of a ... service, Venoco could not recover damages caused by the interruption.

Section 1714 does not impose a duty on a vehicle manufacturer to prevent emotional distress to an owner who lends the vehicle to a close family member injured by a defect outside the owner’s presence.

Gu v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC · filed 2005-08-26(a)

For these reasons, our review of the Rowland factors supports our determination that the law does not impose a duty on BMW to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to owners of BMW vehicles, such as Yan, who lend their vehicles to close family members who are then injured out of the owner’s presence while using the defective vehicle.

Section 1714 permits a landowner to be liable to an independent contractor’s employee for an injury caused by a concealed premises hazard that the landowner knew or should have known about and failed to disclose.

Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. · filed 2005-12-19

A landowner cannot effectively delegate to the contractor responsibility for the safety of its employees if it fails to disclose critical information needed to fulfill that responsibility, and therefore the landowner would be liable to the contractor’s employee if the employee’s injury is attributable to an undisclosed hazard.

Section 1714 does not require a landowner to warn an independent contractor against using an access point the contractor chose when its unsuitability is open and obvious.

Gravelin v. Satterfield · filed 2011-11-15

The unsuitability of the roof extension for that purpose was open and obvious. ... Defendants were not required to warn plaintiff against using his chosen access point.

Section 1714's ordinary-care duty can support liability for negligently transmitting HIV when a person has reason to know of the infection; actual knowledge is not required.

John B. v. Superior Court · filed 2006-07-03

In this case, we conclude that the tort of negligent transmission of HIV does not depend solely on actual knowledge of HIV infection and would extend at least to those situations where the actor, under the totality of the circumstances, has reason to know of the infection.

Section 1714's negligence rules govern a volunteer rescuer when emergency medical care immunity does not apply; negligent aid may create liability if it increases the risk of harm.

Van Horn v. Watson · filed 2007-03-21

These appeals present the question whether the trial court correctly applied section 1799.102 to this case to find that Torti is entitled to summary judgment on the complaint, or whether it is Civil Code section 1714 and the law of negligence set out in cases such as Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137 that apply to Torti's acts at the accident. ... Rather, her liability to plaintiff must be evaluated under the standard set out in Williams v. State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 23, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137. ... As disputes of fact exist as to whether Torti's removal of plaintiff from the car was negligent and whether that negligence increased the risk of harm to plaintiff, summary judgment was not appropriate.

Section 1714(a) does not require a university willed body program that voluntarily returns cremains to ensure they are free from commingling under these circumstances.

Melican v. Regents of the University of California · filed 2007-05-23(a)

Considering all of the circumstances here, including the policy decisions underlying the Legislature’s treatment of willed body programs, we conclude UCI had no duty to ensure the remains of Melican were free from commingling before returning them to Melican’s family.

Section 1714’s general duty of care does not impose a preconception duty on an employer to an employee’s later-conceived child under the circumstances considered here.

Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc. · filed 2014-01-27

In view of all of the Rowland factors discussed above and the “overwhelming need to keep liability within reasonable bounds,” we conclude a common law duty of care should not be imposed on AMI in the circumstances of this case.

Section 1714 requires homeowners who knowingly rent a home with a maintained pool to use reasonable care to protect young children from drowning.

Johnson v. Prasad · filed 2014-02-25(a)

We hold as a matter of law that the homeowners here, who knowingly rented a home with a maintained pool, owed a duty of reasonable care to the four-year-old boy to protect him from drowning in the pool.

Section 1714 imposes a general duty of ordinary care on landowners in managing their property.

Edison v. United States · filed 2016-05-20(a)

In this case, California law imposes a general duty of care on the United States as a landowner. Section 1714 of the California Civil Code sets forth the basic policy governing landowner liability in Califonia.

Section 1714(a)'s general duty of care does not require a parking lot owner leasing space to a mobile food vendor to prevent an unforeseeable injury caused by a third party's intervening driving.

Sakai v. Massco Invs., LLC · filed 2018-02-08(a)

The Civil Code codifies the general duty of care. ... In sum, after considering all of the Rowland factors, we decline to hold that an owner of a parking lot, who leases that space out to a mobile food vendor, is, as a matter of policy, liable for all harm that occurs during the hours of operation of that vendor regardless of intervening acts by third parties.

Section 1714(a) generally requires each person to use reasonable care to avoid injuring others.

Univ. of S. Cal. v. Superior Court of Cnty. of L. A. · filed 2018-11-27(a)

As a general rule, each person has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing injury to others.

Section 1714(a)'s general duty of care does not impose a duty on a lender to carefully process a borrower's loan modification application.

Mazzone-Urie v. OneWest Bank FSB · filed 2024-11-25(a)

Here, the allegations in the complaint do not support a duty of care. To be sure, California Civil Code § 1714(a) provides that “everyone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary skill in the management of his or her property or person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a).

Section 1714’s duty of ordinary care requires a credit union to store customers’ personal and health information with care.

Jimenez Jr. v. OE Federal Credit Union · filed 2025-08-19

Accordingly, the Court finds that OEFCU had a duty to store Plaintiffs’ PII/PHI with care.

Section 1714’s general negligence principle does not create a duty for police to promptly identify a deceased missing person for the person’s relatives when the policy considerations weigh against that duty.

Shelton v. City of Westminster · filed 1982-12-24

"Although it is true that some exceptions have been made to the general principle that a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances, it is clear that in the absence of statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy. [Citations.]" (Italics added.) ... If we utilize the various policy considerations in the fact situation here, we conclude they militate against a finding of duty.

Section 1714’s general rule of liability for negligent conduct applies unless an exception is clearly supported by public policy.

FNS Mortgage Service Corp. v. Pacific General Group, Inc. · filed 1994-05-12

This recapitulation reveals two significant omissions in IAPMO’s argument. The first is its failure to recognize that it bears the burden of demonstrating that the exception from liability it seeks is “clearly supported by public policy.” ... A review of the considerations pertinent to duty listed in Rowland v. Christian affords no significant support for IAPMO’s claim for exemption from the ordinary rule of liability for negligent conduct.

Section 1714’s general negligence principles do not, by themselves, support a direct negligence claim against a public entity; the claim requires a specific statutory basis.

DE VILLERS v. County of San Diego · filed 2007-10-19

In Eastbum, the court reiterated the importance of distinguishing between vicarious liability and direct liability, noting that the latter requires identification of a “specific statute declaring [the entity] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care [by the agency in favor of the injured party], and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714.” ... Here, as in Munoz, there is no statutory basis for declaring a governmental entity liable for negligence in its hiring and supervision practices and, accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim against County based on that theory is barred by Eastbum and Zelig.

Section 1714(a) does not impose a duty on homeowners to supervise a guest’s young child when the child’s parent is present and responsible for supervision.

Padilla v. Rodas · filed 2008-02-29(a)

The criteria in Rowland militate against the imposition of a duty of supervision on Defendants. ... In sum, based on our analysis of the Rowland criteria, as well as the weight of authority of other courts which have addressed this issue, we conclude that Defendants had no duty to supervise Eddie under the circumstances here.

Section 1714’s duty of ordinary care extends to a health plan administrator whose handling of benefits may physically injure plan members, even without contractual privity.

Mintz v. Blue Cross of California · filed 2009-04-16(a)

As Rowland stated, “[a] departure from this fundamental principle [enunciated by section 1714] involves the balancing of a number of considerations . . . .” ... In sum, application of the Biakanja criteria show that a third party administrator of a health care plan owes a general duty of care to plan members to protect them from physical injury flowing from its administration of claims and benefits under the plan.

Section 1714(a) does not require an occasional seller of used machinery to warn later users beyond its immediate purchaser about safety risks or to modify the machinery for their benefit.

Garcia v. Becker Bros. Steel Co. · filed 2011-04-18(a)

Here, however, whatever duty an occasional seller may owe its immediate purchaser, we agree with the trial court that Becker Bros, owed no duty to Garcia—an employee of the purchaser who bought the machinery from the bank which repossessed it from the buyer who bought the slitter line from Becker Bros.—to pass along correspondence received from the manufacturer or to modify the slitter line, particularly in light of the California Code of Regulations provisions mandating that his employer safeguard the workplace as necessary.

Section 1714(a)’s ordinary-care duty applies to product manufacturers; a foreseeable risk from a machine’s intended use does not justify a categorical exception to that duty.

Bettencourt v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. · filed 2012-05-04(a)

On the facts plaintiffs allege, Hennessy has failed to justify imposition of a categorical no-duty rule.

Section 1714(a)’s general duty of ordinary care can apply to a manufacturer after it sells a product; courts use the Rowland factors to decide whether an exception applies.

Hughes v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2024-03-15(a)

But the court reached its ruling by applying the Rowland factors to create an exception to section 1714(a)’s general rule; it did not rule that section 1714(a) becomes inapplicable once a company sells its product to a third party. ... Absent strong reason to believe that the California Supreme Court would apply a different framework to the scenario presented here and in Modisette, this framework controls.

Section 1714’s ordinary care duty did not require ranchers to fence cattle away from a private easement road without evidence that a reasonable rancher would take that precaution.

Thomas v. Stenberg · filed 2012-05-29(a)

Additionally, there was no evidence suggesting that a reasonable rancher would not allow cows to graze in pasture bisected by a private road, or that he or she would have taken steps to guard against any danger that a cow with a young calf might pose to persons driving on that road.

Section 1714(a) limits the duty of care when a person brings an injury upon himself or herself willfully or through a lack of ordinary care.

QDOS, Inc. v. Signature Fin., LLC · filed 2017-11-29(a)

Indeed, the statute governing the scope of duties of care specifically provides that no duty of care will lie where the putative plaintiff "has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself." ( Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)

Section 1714(a) generally imposes a duty of reasonable care, but public policy limits a gym’s duty to investigate repeated harassment complaints before removing a member.

Floyd v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC. · filed 2025-05-23(a)

A general presumption exists that 24H owed Mr. Floyd a duty of reasonable care. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). ... However, in the circumstances here, public policy factors warrant limiting this duty. Specifically, the strong countervailing interest in protecting the safety of other members (i.e. preventing future harm) particularly where members are in close physical quarters warrants limiting the presumptive duty of reasonable care in removing an individual repeatedly accused of harassment from the premises.

Section 1714 permits a mortgagee to hold a third party liable for negligent impairment of its security interest; a defendant seeking summary judgment must show that it acted with ordinary care or skill.

Fait v. New Faze Development, Inc. · filed 2012-06-27

In light of the principle that a third party generally can be held liable for negligent impairment of security, defendants bore the burden of demonstrating here in support of their motion for summary judgment why the “individual (non-borrower) defendants” could not be held liable for that tort under the facts of this case. ... Defendants failed to show in their motion that, as a matter of law, each of these individuals acted with ordinary care or skill with respect to the security interest in the property when they did these things.

Section 1714 requires property owners to use ordinary care to prevent injury to others.

Hall v. Aurora Loan Services · filed 2013-04-26

Under Civil Code section 1714, all people, including property owners, are required to use ordinary care to prevent injury to others.

Section 1714(a) requires restaurant owners to exercise reasonable care when black widow spiders pose a risk of injury to patrons.

Coyle v. Historic Mission Inn Corp. · filed 2018-06-15(a)

Accordingly, the general rule of duty applies. ( Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) Restaurant owners have a duty to exercise reasonable care in relation to black widow spiders posing a risk of injury to patrons on the restaurant premises.

Section 1714 codifies a property owner's general duty to use ordinary care in managing property to avoid exposing others to unreasonable harm.

Carter v. National Railroad Passenger · filed 2014-08-08(a)

This general duty is codified in California Civil Code § 1714, which provides that “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in ■ the management of his or her property....”

Section 1714's general duty rule concerns a defendant's management of its own person or property and did not govern this contractor's maintenance of the City's equipment.

Lichtman v. Siemens Indus. Inc. · filed 2017-11-02

When the duty question concerns "the management of [a defendant's] person or property," courts look to Civil Code section 1714. ... This case does not involve defendant's management of its own property. Accordingly, our inquiry does not involve a determination as to whether public policy supports an exception to the general duty rule.

Section 1714(a) establishes a general duty to use ordinary care; an exception requires clear public policy support or a statutory provision.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation · filed 2017-12-21(a)

We invoke the concept of duty to limit “ ‘ “ ‘the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act,’ ” ’ ” yet we do so only where public policy clearly supports (or a statutory provision establishes) an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714.

Section 1714 establishes a general duty of care, but public policy can support an exception for a category of cases.

Modisette v. Apple Inc. · filed 2018-12-14(a)

As explained further below, we ultimately conclude that this normative inquiry supports finding an exception to the default duty of care set out in section 1714.

Section 1714(a) makes people responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing their property or person.

Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. · filed 2019-06-24(a)

The underlying principle, set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), is that "[e]veryone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person...."

Section 1714 supplies a general duty of ordinary care when officers remove and detain a person during a search.

Woods v. City of Hayward · filed 2020-03-13

Defendants’ duty arises from the basic duty of care codified at section 1714 of the California Civil Code, that “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714; see also Kesner, 1 Cal. 5th at 1142 (“California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (citation omitted)).

Section 1714 requires those who own or occupy property to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition.

Staats v. Vintner's Golf Club, LLC · filed 2018-08-01(a)

As a consequence of this general duty, those who own or occupy property... have a duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition.

Section 1714(a) establishes a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others.

Walters v. County of Contra Costa · filed 2020-09-16(a)

California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.