Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-411

Section 33-411(A) does not make an improperly recorded instrument ineffective against a creditor or subsequent purchaser for value who had notice, including inquiry notice.

Jonas v. Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. · filed 1975-02-06(A)

The Trustee’s contention must fail for yet another reason. An admittedly improperly recorded instrument is not void as to a creditor or subsequent purchaser for value unless that person was “without notice” of the instrument. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 33-411(A). The district court found that the Trustee was put on inquiry notice with respect to the Wonderfair-Walgreen Lease. We agree.

Section 33-411 makes recording a deed constructive notice, but recording alone does not estop the recorder from asserting conflicting rights; estoppel may protect a later purchaser for value without actual notice.

Chantler v. Wood · filed 1967-10-16(A)

Recording a deed gives constructive notice to persons who might otherwise have acquired the position of bona fide purchasers, A.R.S. §§ 33-411, subsec. A, 33-412 and 33-416, County of Pinal v. Pomeroy, 60 Ariz. 448 at 455, 139 P.2d 451 (1943), however the facts of this case do not involve this principle of estoppel. The purpose of the recording statute is to create notice in the form of constructive notice so that a party or his transferee may not claim to be a subsequent purchaser for value without notice. As a result, one subsequent in time cannot be in a position to cut off prior equities by estoppel. However, the act of recording does not create an estoppel for the recorder against the holders of conflicting rights and equities and their transferees. Instead, recording prevents an estoppel from being asserted against the recorder by ©ne who is a subsequent purchaser for value without actual notice.

Section 33-411 protects subsequent purchasers for value without notice and treats an instrument as lawfully recorded—and thus capable of imparting constructive notice—only if it was previously acknowledged.

W. W. Planning, Inc. v. Clark · filed 1969-06-30(A), (B)

Surety was a “subsequent purchaser” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 33-411 when it acquired the mortgage from Kelly. Newman v. Fidelity Savings and Loan Ass’n, 14 Ariz. 354, 128 P. 53 (1912). The mortgage was executed to Surety for a valuable consideration. There is no evidence that Surety had actual notice of the interest reserved by Wright in the Wright-Kelly purchase agreement. Nor did Surety have constructive notice as contemplated by A.R. S. § 33-411. Before an instrument will be deemed to be lawfully recorded and to impart constructive notice it must have been acknowledged. A.R.S. § 33-411, subsec. B; Henderson v. Las Cruces Production Credit Ass’n, 6 Ariz.App. 549, 435 P.2d 56 (1968). Although the Wright-Kelly purchase agreement was notarized the instrument does not contain a certificate of acknowledgment as provided by A.R.S. § 33-507 and A.R.S. § 33-508. This fact is not significant in the decision of this appeal.

Subsection C permits instruments acknowledged in compliance with another state’s law to be recorded in Arizona without the authentication otherwise required by § 33-509.

Valley National Bank of Ariz. v. Avco Develop. Co. · filed 1971-02-17(C)

There is neither explicit or implied repeal of A.R.S. § 33-411 nor any change or modification by A.R.S. § 33-509, and the instruments in question having been acknowledged in compliance with the laws of California were entitled to be recorded in Arizona under the provisions of A.R.S- § 33-411, subsec. C.

Section 33-411(A) requires a security interest in an Arizona lease, as an instrument affecting real property, to be recorded in the county recorder’s office to be valid against the trustee or subsequent purchasers or creditors without notice.

In Re Le Sueur's Fiesta Store, Inc. · filed 1984-06-20(A)

Accordingly, as an “instrument affecting real property” a security interest in an Arizona lease is valid against the Trustee or subsequent purchasers or creditors without notice only if recorded in the County Recorder’s office rather than with the Secretary of State. A.R.S. §§ 33-411(A), 33-412(A); In re Wonderfair Stores, Inc., 511 F.2d, at 1214-15.

Section 33-411(B)'s acknowledgment requirement applies to instruments conveying an interest in real property, not to a lis pendens.

Continental Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utilities, LLC · filed 2011-06-01(B)

REEL also argues Continental’s and Premier’s liens "are extinguished” because the lis pendens were not "acknowledged as required by A.R.S § 33-411(B).” ... Thus nothing in the nature of a lis pen-dens indicates that it should be subject to § 33-41 l(B)’s acknowledgment requirement, and REEL’S argument that a lis pendens must be acknowledged lacks merit.

An unrecorded instrument affecting real property does not bind a subsequent purchaser who acquired without notice.

Continental Telephone Co. v. Blazzard · filed 1986-02-20

The Blazzards note correctly that, since they had no notice of it before they pur*6chased the property, it cannot be binding upon them as subsequent purchasers. A.R.S. §§ 33-411, 33-412.

Section 33-411 generally makes unrecorded deeds void against creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, but the court held that the trustee-sale statute's ministerial-act provision exempts trustee's sales from that rule.

LR Partners, L.L.C. v. Steiner (In Re Steiner) · filed 2000-07-20

Consequently the more logical interpretation of the intent of the “ministerial act” provision is to exempt trustee’s sales from the more general requirements of A.R.S. §§ 33-411 and 33-412, which provide that unrecorded deeds are “void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice.”

Section 33-411 protects subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice from instruments affecting real property unless the instruments are recorded as required.

Dunlap Investors Ltd. v. Hogan · filed 1982-06-22

We note also that the general recording statute in Arizona provides: “A. No instrument affecting real property is valid against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, unless recorded as provided by law in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the property is located.” A.R.S. § 33-411. (emphasis added) Because of the vagueness of the description of the easement in the Marco-Hogan grant, subsequent purchasers of the Marco parcel could not, even by searching back to the original grantor, have discovered the easement and were therefore “without notice,” constructive or otherwise, of the encumbrance.

Section 33-411(A) protects a subsequent purchaser for value without notice from an instrument affecting real property unless the instrument is recorded in the county recorder’s office.

Edwards v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc. · filed 1988-03-31(A)

A.R.S. § 33-411(A) provides: No instrument affecting real property is valid against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, unless recorded as provided by law in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the property is located. Failure to record the reversionary interest, in light of A.R.S. § 33-411(A), resulted in the loss of the Edwards’ reversionary interest.

Section 33-411(A) makes the recording of collateral assignments of both a deed of trust and the underlying note sufficient to establish a prior security interest.

United States v. Hoffman · filed 1992-02-20(A)

Those appellees to whom Kaphing assigned both an interest in the Classic deed of trust and the Western Palms note had, pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 33-411(A) and 33-706, a prior security interest by virtue of the recording of the collateral assignments.

Section 33-411 governs perfection of a security interest in real property evidenced by a deed of trust, but recording under it does not perfect a security interest in the promissory note secured by that deed of trust.

Rodney v. Arizona Bank · filed 1992-04-07(A)

We hold that Article Nine of Arizona’s Commercial Code applies to creation and perfection of a security interest in a promissory note, when the note itself is secured by a deed of trust in real property. Accordingly, recording the document assigning an interest in the note and the deed of trust that secures it under A.R.S. § 33-411 does not perfect the security interest in the note. This holding poses no conflict, in our opinion, with the rule that A.R.S. § 33-411 governs perfection of a security interest in real property, as evidenced by a deed of trust.

Section 33-411 provides that an assignment of rents treated as an interest in real property is perfected by recording it in the real-property records.

Scottsdale Medical Pavilion v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. in Rehabilitation (In Re Scottsdale Medical Pavilion) · filed 1993-09-27

The proper method of perfecting an assignment of rents in Arizona is by recording in the real property records as provided by A.R.S. § 33-411, which Mutual has done. Mutual’s interest in the rents is therefore perfected.

Section 33-411 permits a deed of trust containing the essential elements of a lien to be recorded even if it is incomplete.

Bisbee v. Security National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman · filed 1988-04-28

Although the Watson deed of trust was not complete, it was of a character entitled to be recorded pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-411, and, because it set forth the essential elements of the lien, it apprised readers of the nature of the transaction.

Section 33-411(B) requires prior acknowledgment for an instrument to be lawfully recorded, but that requirement does not apply to a lis pendens filed with an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien.

Fagerlie v. MARKHAM CONTRACTING CO., INC. · filed 2011-05-31(B)

The lot owners argue the notarization requirement is in A.R.S. § 33-411(B) (2007), which states: “An instrument shall not be deemed lawfully recorded unless it has been previously acknowledged in the manner prescribed in this chapter except in the case of master mortgages as provided in § 33-415.” This provision, however, applies to the recording of instruments “affecting real property” and appears in Article 2, Chapter 4 of Title 33, which governs the recording of “Conveyances and Deeds.” See AR.S. § 33-411(A) (2007). Also, A.R.S. § 12-1191 itself distinguishes between the filing of a lis pen-dens and the related “action affecting title to real property.” ... Furthermore, the purpose of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice to interested parties of litigation that may affect title to the property. A.R.S. § 12—1191(B); Farris v. Advantage Capital Corp., 217 Ariz. 1, 1, ¶ 1, 170 P.3d 250, 250 (2007). Here, the lack of notarization did not prevent the lis pendens from serving its intended purpose. For these reasons, we conclude that a lis pendens filed in conjunction with an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien need not be notarized.

Section 33-411(B)'s acknowledgment requirement applies to instruments conveying an interest in real property, not to a lis pendens.

CONTINENTAL LIGHTING & CONTRACTING, INC. v. PREMIER GRADING & UTILITIES, LLC · filed 2011-05-31(B)

Thus nothing in the nature of a lis pendens indicates that it should be subject to § 33-411(B)’s acknowledgment requirement, and REEL’s argument that a lis pendens must be acknowledged lacks merit.

Section 33-411(A) does not require a lis pendens filed in a mechanic’s-lien foreclosure action to include an acknowledgment.

Wang Electric, Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, LLC · filed 2012-07-31(A)

Smoke Tree argues Wang failed to comply with this requirement because the lis pendens it recorded was not acknowledged as required of an “instrument affecting real property.” See A.R.S. § 33-411(A), (B) (West 2012). This court expressly rejected this argument in two recent decisions. ... We agree with the reasoning of these cases and therefore hold Wang was not required to include an acknowledgment in the lis pendens.

Section 33-411(A) protects a subsequent purchaser for value without notice from an earlier unrecorded deed of trust, but a person without an enforceable purchase interest is not a purchaser entitled to that protection.

Wagner v. Bank of America · filed 2014-06-26(A)

If Wagner is not a “purchaser” he cannot claim that he is entitled to the protections afforded to a subsequent purchaser without notice pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-411(A).

Under § 33-411(B)–(C), an instrument affecting real property must be acknowledged to be lawfully recorded, and the savings clause for acknowledgment defects does not apply when there is no acknowledgment at all.

Tanner v. woloszyn/mcdaniels · filed 2023-06-15(B), (C)

In this case, we adopt the reasoning suggested by the dicta in Phipps and hold that, because the CC&Rs contained no acknowledgment, they do not fall within § 33-411(C). Absent the required acknowledgment, the CC&Rs were not properly recorded. Woloszyn, therefore, did not have constructive notice of their existence. Accordingly, the superior court erred by awarding judgment as a matter of law on this basis. Because issues of law preclude judgment, we need not address Woloszyn’s argument that issues of fact also preclude judgment.