Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims, rather than the shorter one-year period applicable to Arizona state malicious prosecution and abuse-of-process claims.

Donahoe v. Arpaio · filed 2012-04-09

As Spaw essentially concedes in his reply (Doc. 330 at 7), under controlling authority, Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims, A.R.S. § 12-542, applies here.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which the court applied to bar claims that accrued more than two years before filing.

Garcia v. Leroux · filed 2017-04-21

The district court properly determined that Garcia’s action was time-barred because all claims against defendants accrued more than two years before Garcia filed his complaint. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 (one-year statute of limitations for actions against any public entity or public employee); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1999) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begin to accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury”).

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.

Alexander v. City of Mesa · filed 2017-09-07(1)

The district court properly dismissed Alexander’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the City and the United States as time-barred. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 (one-year statute of limitations for actions against public entities). At the latest, Alexander learned of the conduct that gave rise to his IIED claim when his conviction was overturned on December 21, 2010. But he did not commence this action until 2012; he voluntarily dismissed it in 2012; and he did not refile until 2014.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 actions in Arizona subject to tolling while a prisoner completes administrative exhaustion.

Edward Jones, Jr. v. Richardson · filed 2018-01-19

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Jones’s Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from an erroneous entry in Jones’s disciplinary record because, even with the benefit of tolling during the pendency of the administrative exhaustion process, Jones failed to file his claim within the applicable statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Canatella, 486 F.3d at 1132-33 (forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions; federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues, which is “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (the statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative exhaustion process).

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, with accrual and tolling applied as the court held here.

Benge v. Corizon Health LLC · filed 2019-10-08

In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. ... Because Benge specifically alleged that from January 2014 to November 2015, ADC Defendants failed to protect him, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until November 2015. ... As mentioned, the two-year statute of limitations must be tolled for the period that Benge was completing the mandatory administrative remedies at the prison.

Section 12-542 requires personal-injury claims to be filed within two years after the claims accrue.

Charles v. Carnegie · filed 2020-05-19

Claims involving a personal injury must be filed within two years of when the claims accrue.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, and claims accrue when the plaintiff realizes the injuries forming the basis of the claims.

Bonelli v. Grand Canyon University · filed 2020-11-03

As all the injuries occurred and were realized by Plaintiff more than two years before Plaintiff filed this action (January 20, 2020), the Court finds each claim in this action is barred by Arizona’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 12-542 establishes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims governed by Arizona’s personal-injury limitations period.

Anaya v. Zilles · filed 2021-02-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Anaya’s threat-to-safety claims against defendants Zilles, Rayner, and Peckins because the claims are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (setting forth two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (§ 1983 claims are subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (§ 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff first learns of the injury giving rise to the claim).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims in Arizona, which the court applied to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Andrich v. Phillis · filed 2021-06-07

In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (providing that actions for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues).

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims in Arizona.

Johnson 151089 v. Shinn · filed 2021-10-05(1)

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for Arizona section 1983 claims by applying the limitations period for personal injury claims, measured from the incident giving rise to the cause of action.

Ploof v. Arizona, State of · filed 2021-12-09

As articulated above, Arizona courts apply the statute of limitations established for personal injury claims to section 1983 actions, which is two years from the date the incident giving rise to a cause of action occurred. A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims in Arizona.

ABC Sand and Rock Company Incorporated v. Maricopa, County of · filed 2022-05-23

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Courts must borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985); Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974. “The applicable statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Arizona is two years.” A.R.S. § 12-542; Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974.

Section 12-542(1) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which may be equitably tolled when the plaintiff actively pursued a timely first action under sufficiently inequitable circumstances.

Roberts v. Gallagher · filed 2022-07-12(1)

In Arizona, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1). ... The 2020 Case, however, was not originally filed within the statute of limitations timeframe. Nonetheless, the Court will allow equitable tolling where, as here, Plaintiff actively pursued his judicial remedies in the first case during the statutory period but was only expressly allowed to amend his complaint in the 2020 Case.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, but the period is tolled for a claimant of unsound mind until the disability is removed.

Bride v. Basin Western Incorporated · filed 2022-12-07(1)

Arizona has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... However, a statute of limitations is tolled if a would-be plaintiff is of “unsound mind” when the cause of action accrues. ... Only “after removal of the disability” will the period begin to run. ... Unsound mind occurs when the “person is unable to manage his affairs or to understand his legal rights or liabilities.” ... The Court concludes Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged, for purposes of overcoming a 12(b)(6) challenge, that principles of equitable tolling may render his claims timely under Arizona law.

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury claims.

Roberts v. Gallagher · filed 2023-05-16(1)

The Court finds granting leave to file the third amended complaint would be futile because Plaintiff Donnay’s claims are barred by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.

Kirwin v. Kot · filed 2023-07-25

Accordingly, the Court applies the Arizona State statute for personal injuries, i.e., the two-year statute of limitation under A.R.S. § 12-542, and the date of accrual under Federal law, Maldonado, supra.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for Arizona personal-injury actions.

Macias v. Kaplan-Seikmann · filed 2024-01-08

Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, so “federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling . . . .” Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). Arizona’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. A.R.S. § 12-542. Though state law determines the limitations period, “[f]ederal law determines when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run for a § 1983 claim.” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015).

Section 12-542 sets a two-year limitations period for Arizona personal-injury claims, which the court borrowed for § 1983 claims.

Miller, Jr. 262220 v. Gordan · filed 2024-04-26

In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. A.R.S. § 12-542; see Byrd v. McKinney, 787 F. App’x 979 (9th Cir. 2019). Because Plaintiff’s proposed FAC alleges that he was assaulted on August 4, 2021, claims filed after August 4, 2023 are time barred unless an exception applies.

Section 12-542(1) requires common-law claims for injuries to a person to be brought within two years, subject to applicable tolling doctrines.

Brown v. Olde Fashioned · filed 2024-09-24(1)

Common law claims for “injuries done to the person of another” must be brought within two years. A.R.S. § 12-542(1). ... Because the allegations in the FAC show that the accident occurred over three years before the FAC was filed, and nothing in the FAC suggested a basis for tolling the two-year limitations period, the court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against the Bars as time-barred.

Section 12-542 gives Arizona personal-injury claims a two-year limitations period.

Stephens v. State of Arizona · filed 2024-10-24

Under Arizona law, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Id. at 952 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542). ... Stephens’s complaint was filed on June 8, 2022. Her § 1983 claim is therefore untimely if it accrued before June 8, 2020. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including Arizona § 1983 and IIED claims.

Doan · filed 2026-01-07

For § 1983 claims in Arizona, courts use the statute of limitations established for personal injury claims, which is two years from the date of the incident giving rise to a cause of action and is the same as the one applied to IIED claims. A.R.S. § 12-542; Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974; Cecala v. Newman, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2007) (applying the two-year limitation period of A.R.S. § 12-542 to an IIED claim).

Section 12-542 sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims in Arizona.

Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish · filed 2004-09-01

The applicable statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Arizona is two years. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Ogle v. Stewart · filed 2007-02-12

In § 1983 cases arising out of Arizona, this court applies the statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... The applicable statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Arizona is two years. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542.

Section 12-542(1) requires a personal-injury action to be filed within two years after accrual, and the action will not abate if process is issued and served within one year after filing.

Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hospital, Inc. · filed 1978-05-31(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that an action which is filed within the time limit provided by the statute does not abate unless the plaintiff fails to have process issued and served upon the defendant within one year after filing.

Section 12-542 gives tort or negligence claims a two-year limitations period, accruing when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the negligent conduct.

Sato v. Van Denburgh · filed 1979-06-28

There are, we believe, three statutes which might apply: A.R.S. § 12-542 which is the tort or negligence statute and provides for a two year statute of limitations; A.R.S. § 12-543, oral debt, three years; and A.R.S. § 12-550, the general limitation where “no limitation is otherwise prescribed,” four years. ... from the facts as alleged in the instant case, we believe that Sato’s cause of action sounds in negligence or tort, and that the two year statute limitations, A.R.S. § 12-542, will apply.

Section 12-542 bars ordinary-negligence claims brought more than two years after accrual, subject to tolling under § 12-502 for an incapacitated claimant.

Sahf v. Lake Havasu City Ass'n for the Retarded & Handicapped · filed 1986-06-17

Thus, as to Scrabeck, A.R.S. § 12-542 is not a bar to this litigation. ... Sahf s claim against Lake Havasu must, therefore, be viewed as one for ordinary negligence brought more than two years after the cause of action accrued. The claim is therefore barred by A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for a professional-negligence claim begins when the plaintiff knows or should know that the defendant's conduct caused actionable, ascertainable, non-speculative damages.

Tullar v. Walter L. Henderson, P.C. · filed 1991-02-21

The statute of limitations in this case started to run when Tullars knew or should have known Biltmore could not pay the purchase price according to the terms of the note. Tullars knew or should have known this fact when the December 1987 payment was not made or forthcoming in 1988. Tullars’ complaint, filed in August 1989, was within the two-year period permitted by A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542(B)'s tolling provision applies only when, after the alleged malpractice, the physician obtains information making the malpractice apparent and then fails to disclose it to the patient.

Russo v. Diethrich · filed 1980-07-29(B)

Such an interpretation was rejected in Landgraff v. Wagner, supra, which held that the tolling provisions of A.R.S. § 12-542(B) only come into effect where in the course of events following the alleged malpractice, the physician comes into possession of information which would make the malpractice apparent and thereafter does not disclose this to the patient. Under this interpretation and under the facts here, the tolling provisions of A.R.S. § 12-542(B) are not applicable.

Section 12-542's two-year limitation period for personal-injury claims begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and its causal connection to the defendant's product, without needing to know of the product's defect or the defendant's improper conduct.

MacK v. AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1983-06-30

Due to Rodriquez, and because a products liability claim does not raise the policy considerations involved in a professional malpractice case, this court concludes that, as with the majority of jurisdictions, this final element of requiring a plaintiff to have reason to know of the defendant’s improper conduct or defect in the product is not required in Arizona. In other words, in Arizona a cause of action accrues once the plaintiff knows of the injury and the causal connection between the defendant’s product and that injury.

Section 12-542(2), as interpreted under the discovery rule, accrues a wrongful-death claim when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both what caused the injury and which defendant caused it, rather than automatically at death.

Lawhon v. L.B.J. Institutional Supply, Inc. · filed 1988-05-17(2)

In Anson, this court held that A.R.S. § 12-542(2) is unconstitutional insofar as it mandates that a cause of action accrues at death. The court further held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions. ... When Anson is viewed in conjunction with Barrett, Liuzzo and Hickman, it becomes apparent that a cause of action “accrues” when the plaintiff discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has been injured by a particular defendant’s negligent conduct. The cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or should have known of both the what and who elements of causation.

Section 12-542(3) requires actions for trespass causing injury to another’s estate or property to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Drug, Cosmetic & Beauty Trades Service, Inc. v. McFate · filed 1971-02-013

The Smagaczes, on the other hand, argue the applicability of the six-year limitation of ARS § 12-548, relating to debts evidenced by or founded upon a contract in writing. ... In our view, the claims asserted by the Smagaczes against Trades Service concerned their “property” or “estate” and were fairly within the terms of subdivision 3 of ARS § 12-542, as construed and applied in Marsh v. Hawkins, 7 Ariz.App. 226, 229, 437 P.2d 978, 981 (1968). Accordingly, the two-year limitation period is applicable.

Section 12-542's two-year limitation applies to invasion-of-privacy claims because they involve personal injury and sound mainly in tort.

Hansen v. Stoll · filed 1981-09-24(1)

In determining what period of limitation applies, we look to the nature of the cause of action. Atlee Credit Corp. v. Quetulio, 22 Ariz.App. 116, 117, 524 P.2d 511, 512 (1974). Since invasion of privacy involves personal injury (mental distress), and sounds mainly in tort, we hold that it is governed by the two-year limitation of A.R.S. § 12-542. Cf. Sato v. Van Denburgh, 123 Ariz. 225, 227, 599 P.2d 181, 183 (1979) (action for negligent accounting). Having so determined, we further hold that Stoll’s claim for invasion of privacy is barred by this statute.

Section 12-542(2) requires a wrongful-death action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, with accrual at the injured party’s death; the health-care limitations provision in § 12-564 does not displace that rule.

Kenyon v. Hammer · filed 1983-05-12(2)

We reject appellees’ analysis for three reasons. First, we note that although in some jurisdictions the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action begins to run from the date of injury or negligent act, See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1151, 1173 § 6[b] (1964), the rule in the majority of jurisdictions, and in Arizona, is that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of death. Id. at 1154 § 3; Gomez v. Leverton, 19 Ariz.App. 604, 509 P.2d 735 (1973); Rogers v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 5 Ariz.App. 553, 429 P.2d 4 (1967). We do not believe that this rule was affected by the enactment of A.R.S. § 12-564, which clearly applies to actions for injuries, not wrongful death.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period governs tortious-interference-with-contract claims because its reference to injury to property includes intangible property.

Clark v. Airesearch Manufacturing Co. of Arizona, Inc. · filed 1983-11-15

We also agree with AiResearch that the two year statute of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-542 governs claims for wrongful interference with contract instead of the four-year limitation period in A.R.S. § 12-550 and therefore find that these claims were properly dismissed. ... By contrast, A.R.S. § 12-542 applies to injuries to “property” without limitation on the kind of property such as real, tangible, personal, and intangible personal property. Resort to the Arizona catch-all statute at A.R.S. § 12-550 is not necessary.

Subsection (3) applies to physical damage to existing property, but not to damage resulting from an implied warranty of habitability.

Woodward v. Chirco Const. Co., Inc. · filed 1984-01-12(3)

What is said by the Oregon court can just as well be directed to A.R.S. § 12-542(3). The latter statute applies to physical damage to existing property, not to damage resulting from an implied warranty of habitability.

Section 12-542(2) imposes a two-year limitation period for wrongful-death actions, and a prior timely action does not save or toll that period absent legislative authority.

Hosogai v. Kadota · filed 1984-07-10(2)

As a general rule, absent a “renewal” or “saving” statute allowing a state action dismissed on a ground other than upon the merits to be reinstituted within a specified period of time, the failure of the original action during the pendency of which the limitation period has run bars reinstitution of the action. ... Our legislature has not chosen to adopt a “saving” clause. Whether the period of limitation provided by A.R.S. § 23-542(2) is or is not to be tolled, or the action “saved” during the pendency of a prior timely filed action which is subsequently dismissed for reasons other than upon the merits, is clearly a question which should be addressed by the legislature and not the courts. We therefore decline to judicially except the instant case from the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitation period on wrongful-death claims, beginning on the date of death; when it overlaps with the medical-malpractice limitation period, the claimant receives the longer applicable period.

James v. Phoenix General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1986-08-28

On the other hand, by its terms A.R.S. § 12-542 can also be applied to this case since it is a claim for wrongful death, regardless of its origin in medical negligence. Thus, we are presented with a situation where arguably both statutes of limitation apply to the facts. Absent legislative indicia to the contrary,3 under these circumstances we see no reason to adopt a rigid approach of exclusive application of either of the two applicable statutes. In our opinion no conflict is created in applying both of these statutes to the wrongful death claim in this case, as long as the statutes are read to allow the plaintiffs the longer of the two limitation periods. Thus, we hold in this case that both A.R.S. §§ 12-542 and -564(A) are applicable to the appellants’ claim and that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the longer of the two periods of limitation.

Section 12-542(2) generally applies to wrongful-death claims and starts the two-year period at death, but the specific medical-malpractice limitations period in § 12-564(A) governs a wrongful-death claim arising from medical malpractice.

Kenyon v. Hammer · filed 1984-09-19(2)

The first is the general statute which applies to all wrongful death claims and which provides that an action for wrongful death accrues at the date of death and is barred two years thereafter. A.R.S. § 12-542(2). ... This analysis compels us to conclude that the applicable limitation period to both the bodily injury claim of Mrs. Kenyon and the wrongful death claim for the death of the Kenyon baby is set forth in A.R.S. § 12-564(A), which provides that a cause of action for medical malpractice must be commenced within three years “from the date of the injury.”

Section 12-542(2) does not govern wrongful-death actions based on medical malpractice because the statute's exception clause directs those claims to § 12-564(A).

James v. Phoenix General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1987-10-01(2)

The introductory language of § 12-542 specifically excepts §§ 12-551 and 12-564 from, its provisions. This exception clause was inserted into § 12-542 at the same time that §§ 12-561 and 12-564 were enacted. By operation of this exception clause, wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice are not governed by § 12-542(2), but rather are controlled by § 12-564(A). Accordingly, a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice “accrues as of the date of the injury” and must be “commenced and prosecuted within three years after the date of the injury.” § 12-564(A).

Section 12-542 gives negligent-misrepresentation claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the misrepresentation.

Tucson Electric Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1984-11-09

The statute then begins to run when plaintiff knew or should have known of the misrepresentation.

Section 12-542(2)'s two-year limitations period may be equitably tolled when a procedurally defective first wrongful-death action was timely and the court finds tolling warranted.**n 12-542(2)'s two-year limitations period for wrongful-death actions may be equitably tolled when the first action gave timely notice, caused no prejudice in defending the second action, and was prosecuted and followed by refiling reasonably, in good faith, and diligently.

Hosogai v. Kadota · filed 1985-02-20(2)

We conclude that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled in this case.

The two-year limitations provisions in § 12-542 do not control a claim whose liability is created by statute; a statutory dog-bite claim is governed instead by § 12-541(3).

Murdock v. Balle · filed 1985-02-21(2), (4), and (5)

References in a limitation statute to a particular fact situation are not necessarily determinative of which limitations period applies when statutory claims or liabilities unknown at common law are involved. In Day v. Schenectady Discount Corp., supra, this court held that the improper sale of the plaintiff’s repossessed mobile home was actionable under both common law conversion and Arizona’s Uniform Commercial Code. While the language of A.R.S. § 12-542(4) and (5) clearly encompass the Day fact situation, we held that this two-year statute of limitations governed only the common law count for conversion. The claim based on the UCC was held to be an action for a “liability created by statute” and governed by A.R.S. § 12-541(3). ... We conclude that Murdock’s cause of action did not exist but for A.R.S. § 24-521. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that the applicable statute of limitations is A.R.S. § 12-541(3) which barred Murdock’s claim.

Section 12-542 bars a personal-injury claim when the plaintiff knew the alleged cause of the injury more than two years before filing suit.

Mack v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., a Virginia Corporation · filed 1985-05-14

This appeal is from an order of the District Court granting summary judgment to defendant, finding plaintiff’s claim for damages allegedly caused by the insertion of a Daikon Shield barred by the Arizona two-year statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-542. ... We review the District Court’s decision as to the interpretation of the applicable Arizona law ... and affirm. ... Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that she knew the alleged cause of her injury more than two years before the filing of her complaint and no genuine issue of material fact remains. ... The Order Granting Summary Judgment is AFFIRMED.

The two-year limitations period for a negligence claim does not begin until the claimant sustains injury and is able to bring suit against the responsible parties.

Dryden v. Bell · filed 1988-02-09

The applicable statute of limitations was the two-year statute under A. R.S. § 12-542, and it could not begin to run in this case until 1) the Drydens sustained some injury from the alleged negligence of Naegle, Arizona Management Corporation v. Kallof, 142 Ariz. 64, 688 P.2d 710 (App.1984), and 2) until Drydens were able to bring suit against the Bells. Greismer v. Greismer, 116 Ariz. 512, 570 P.2d 199 (App.1977).

Section 12-542(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for trespass causing injury to another’s estate or property through a tortious or negligent act.

RANCH 57 v. City of Yuma · filed 1986-09-02(3)

A.R.S. § 12-542(3) is a two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for “trespass for injury done to the estate or the property of another.” This statute applies to suits involving injury to property, Hall v. Romero, 141 Ariz. 120, 123, 685 P.2d 757, 760 (App.1984), as a result of a tortious or negligent act. Sato v. Van Denburgh, 123 Ariz. 225, 227, 599 P.2d 181, 183 (1979). Trespass is any unauthorized physical presence on another’s property. State ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 111 Ariz. 582, 584, 535 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1975). In the instant case, the injury to Ranch 57’s property is alleged to have occurred by the passage of the zoning ordinances and not by the intentional or negligent physical presence of the City or County. Thus, A.R.S. § 12-542(3) is not applicable.

Section 12-542(2)'s two-year wrongful-death limitations period is subject to the discovery rule, and it cannot bar a claim before the plaintiff knew or should have known facts giving rise to it.

Anson v. American Motors Corp. · filed 1987-03-31(2)

After considering the equities, we hold that the statute of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-542(2) is unconstitutional, and apply the discovery rule in wrongful death actions. The two-year statute of limitations of A.R.S. § 12-542(2) will remain in effect except that the courts of this state shall follow the discovery rule as set out in Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra.

Under § 12-542(1), the limitations period for a personal-injury claim involving latent asbestos disease begins when the disease or physical injury manifests, not at exposure.

Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp. · filed 1988-01-15(1)

Arizona follows the “discovery rule” as far as the statute of limitations for personal injuries is concerned. See ... See also A.R.S. § 12-542(1). The statute of limitations does not begin to run until there is a manifestation of disease or physical injury.

Section 12-542(3) requires a tort action for injury to real estate to be filed within two years after accrual, and the discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers or should discover the injury.

Matusik v. Dorn · filed 1988-05-24(3)

A.R.S. § 12-542(3) governs tortious injury to real estate and provides that the cause of action must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. ... We hold that the discovery rule applies to tortious injuries to property. However, since appellants filed this case well after two years from the date they discovered the defects, summary judgment was properly granted as to this claim.

Section 12-542's two-year limitation does not bar a reinstated action when the original complaint was timely and the remand proceedings inject no new claim.

DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance · filed 1963-10-01

When an action is reinstated, the effect of the statute of limitations is to be determined by the date the complaint was originally filed, unless the result will be to inject a new claim.

Section 12-542(3)'s two-year limitation applies to negligent-misrepresentation claims involving injury to property.

Hall v. Romero · filed 1984-02-23(3)

We hold that the two-year limitation provided by A.R.S. § 12-542 applies to this suit.

Section 12-542's two-year period for personal-injury actions is subject to Arizona's common-law discovery rule, so accrual may be delayed in childhood sexual-abuse cases involving repressed memories until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the abuse; concealment or corroboration is not required.

Logerquist v. Danforth · filed 1996-10-03

A personal injury action such as this must be “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.” A.R.S. § 12-542. ... Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that time.” ... we agree with the decision in Doe to the extent it held that a plaintiff who allegedly was sexually abused as a child but during minority repressed all memories of the abuse until adulthood should have an opportunity to invoke the discovery rule.

Section 12-542’s two-year limitations period for a wrongful-death action begins when the plaintiff knew, or through reasonable diligence should have known, that the injury was caused by the defendant’s conduct.

In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. · filed 2002-04-29

Under Arizona law, the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that his or her injury was caused by the defendant’s conduct.

Section 12-542 gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that begins under the discovery rule when the client knows or should know of the attorney’s negligence and has ascertainable, non-speculative damages.

Cannon v. Hirsch Law Office, P.C. · filed 2009-07-14

In Arizona, legal malpractice claims are governed by the statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542 (2003), which provides that such claims must be brought “within two years after the cause of action accrues.” ... Arizona follows the “discovery rule” in determining the date the cause of action for a legal malpractice claim accrues. ... “Traditionally stated, this rule provides that a claim for attorney negligence cannot accrue until the client knows or should know of his attorney’s negligent conduct.” ... “A claim for legal malpractice accrues when: (1) the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the attorney’s negligent conduct; and (2) the plaintiffs damages are ascertainable, and not speculative or contingent.”

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for tort claims begins when the plaintiff knows of the injury under Arizona's discovery rule, and later damages from the same cause do not restart the period.

Tavilla v. Cephalon, Inc. · filed 2012-05-03

This dispute is not material, however, because Arizona law provides that the statute of limitations begins to run in tort actions from the time the injury is known.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period, and a negligence claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers or, through reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury and the defendant's negligent conduct.

Schirmer v. Avalon · filed 2020-07-14

The parties do not dispute that Helen had two years after her claims accrued to file an action. See A.R.S. §§ 12-542 and 46-455(K). ... The statute of limitations “protect[s] defendants and courts from stale claims where plaintiffs have slept on their rights.” ... Because a party is not allowed to “sleep on [their] rights” regarding an unknown claim, Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 322, ¶ 29 (1998), the discovery rule provides that “a cause of action does not ‘accrue’ until a plaintiff discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has been injured by the defendant’s negligent conduct,” Anson v. Am. Motors Corp., 155 Ariz. 420, 423 (App. 1987). Thus, “[a] cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or should have known of both the what and the who elements of causation.” Lawhon v. L.B.J. Institutional Supply, Inc., 159 Ariz. 179, 183 (App. 1988) (first emphasis added).

Section 12-542’s two-year limitations period is subject to the discovery rule: accrual occurs when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury caused by a particular defendant’s conduct.

Sohler v. Benjo · filed 2021-09-24

A complaint for personal injury or wrongful death must be filed within two years after the cause of action “accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-542. ... Under the discovery rule, “a cause of action ‘accrues’ when the plaintiff discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has been injured by a particular defendant’s conduct.” ... Here, the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations.

The two-year negligence limitation period begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the defendant’s conduct, and reasonable failure to discover the facts giving rise to the claim may toll the period.

Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan & Tenner · filed 1979-03-05

[U]nder the statute providing that negligence actions shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, the legislature intended that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of defendant’s conduct, and the statute of limitations begins to run at that time. A.R.S. Sec. 12-542; Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 14 Ariz.App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971).

Section 12-542's two-year period begins when a plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, injury caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct.

Tohono O'odham Nation v. Dutari · filed 1996-11-21

We also reject the Nation's argument that Arizona's two-year limitation period should have been tolled until March 1994, when an audit first disclosed the embezzlement.1 See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542. This two-year time limit begins to run "after the cause of action accrues[.]" Id. A cause of action is deemed to accrue when a plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that it has been injured by the defendant's wrongful conduct.

Former § 12-542(B) limited the discovery rule for medical malpractice claims.

DeBoer v. Brown · filed 1983-11-16(B)

We agree that in enacting the former A.R.S. § 12-542(B) (now A.R.S. § 12-564), our Legislature limited the broad discovery rule that had been adopted in Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 14 Ariz.App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971).

Section 12-542 gives a negligent misrepresentation claim two years, beginning when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the misrepresentation.

Bank of the West v. Estate of Leo · filed 2005-08-25

“The statute of limitations for a negligent misrepresentation claim is two years.” Hullett v. Cousin, 204 Ariz. 292, 297, 63 P.3d 1029 (2003) (citing Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542). ... The statutes of limitations for both negligent and intentional misrepresentation begin to run when the plaintiff knew or by reasonable diligence should have known of the misrepresentation. ... Nothing on the face of Apponaug’s proposed Third-Party Complaint indicates when the applicable limitations periods began to run.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, but dismissal is unwarranted when the complaint may establish that the claims are timely under the discovery rule.

Arvizu v. Medtronic Inc. · filed 2014-08-25

Defendants contend that the relevant statutes of limitations are two years after the cause of action accrues for personal injury actions (A.R.S. §§ 12-542 and 12-551), ... Plaintiffs do not dispute the applicability of these statutes, but note correctly that when a statute of limitations defense is raised in a motion to dismiss, the “complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” ... Although Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “were on constructive notice of the precise claims at issue” based on the labels of the Infuse Device (Doc. 20 at 22), the Court cannot conclude that it is “beyond doubt” that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claims, with the exception of Plaintiffs’ claim under the Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 12-542’s two-year limitations period does not bar a claim for economic loss merely because the complaint also seeks damages for personal injury or property damage.

Drew v. United Producers & Consumers Cooperative · filed 1989-08-01

Our reading of the products liability statute reveals no indication that a complaint arguably seeking both personal injury or property damages as well as purely economic or commercial damages is entirely time barred by A.R.S. § 12-542.

For wrongful death, the limitations period accrues on the injured party's death, so expiration of the decedent's personal-injury period before death does not bar the survivors' action.

Frongillo v. Grimmett · filed 1989-10-31(2)

Moreover, A.R.S. § 12-542(2) specifically states that an action for wrongful death accrues on the death of the party injured. ... We conclude, therefore, that A.R.S. § 12-611 has nothing to do with the accrual of an action for wrongful death or the period of limitation which governs the timeliness of the action. ... The explicit holding of James that wrongful death actions accrue from the date of the decedent’s death, together with the adoption of the majority rule as announced in footnote 16, govern the disposition of this case.

For wrongful-death actions, the two-year period generally accrues at the injured person's death, but courts must apply the discovery rule when the period would bar the action before it reasonably could be discovered.

Ruth Davis, Individually and as Special Administrator for the Estate of James R. Davis v. Dow Chemical Corp., a Delaware Corporation · filed 1987-06-05(2)

Therefore, as in Kenyon, invocation of the discovery rule is necessary to save the statute from constitutional infirmity. We hold that, under Arizona law, causes of action for wrongful death accrue at the death of the injured person unless application of the two-year period would abrogate the cause of action before it reasonably could be discovered. In those cases, Arizona courts "shall follow the discovery rule." Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 87, 688 P.2d at 979; Anson, slip op. at 15.

Section 12-542(2) requires a wrongful death action to be brought within two years after the injured person dies.

Cook v. Superior Court of Maricopa County · filed 1983-02-02(2)

A.R.S. § 12-542 states: ... “There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions: ... “2. For injuries done to the person of another when death ensues from such injuries, which action shall be considered as accruing at the death of the party injured.” ... Here, since the complaint abated and the statute of limitations passed before the amendment was made, the amendment cannot relate back to the original filing date and must be dismissed against petitioners.

For conversion claims, subsection (5) imposes a two-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Stebbins v. Sullivan · filed 2016-02-09(5)

Stebbins acknowledges that an action for conversion must be filed within two years of its accrual. ... Stebbins’ conversion claim accrued in May 2008 when Sullivan asserted rights to the patent by claiming it as compensation for unpaid wages and reimbursements and by refusing to sign the proffered assignment. The limitations period expired two years later — well before Stebbins filed his complaint.

Section 12-542(5) gives conversion claims a two-year limitations period, accruing under the discovery rule when the plaintiff is aware of the underlying facts.

Andrich v. Meyers · filed 2021-04-20(5)

Conversion claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. A.R.S. § 12-542(5). Under the discovery rule, such a claim accrues when the plaintiff is aware of the underlying facts. See, e.g., Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 588 (1995). Andrich’s proposed amended complaint alleged he became aware that the Meyers refused to return his property to him no later than January 8, 2015. Under the statute of limitations, Andrich had until January 8, 2017 to file a claim for conversion. By waiting until August 2018, Andrich missed the limitations period, meaning the claim was untimely.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for injury to a person or property or for conversion of property, but the court held it did not apply to this ERISA employment-injury claim.

Felton v. Unisource Corp. · filed 1990-01-24

The limitations period for injuries to a person or property or for conversion of property is two years after accrual. A.R.S. § 12-542. ... The Court declines to hold that this action constitutes a personal injury claim such that a two year limitations period should apply. This action constitutes an employment injury — an economic loss — and is clearly distinguishable from a personal injury matter.

Section 12-542(3) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for claims based on injury to property.

Hatch Development, LLC v. Solomon · filed 2016-06-21(3)

Solomon is correct that Hatch was not entitled to summary judgment on indemnity based on discharging a current obligation owed by Solomon because the two-year statute of limitations for property damage had run on the Hunts’ claim against Solomon. See A.R.S. § 12-542(3).

Arizona’s applicable statute of limitations is two years, so a personal-injury action filed within two years of accrual is timely.

Kenny v. Prisoner Transport Services, LLC · filed 2019-07-16

The applicable statute of limitations in Arizona is two years, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542, meaning Kenny’s suit would have been timely had he originally filed it there.

Section 12-542(1) and (3) impose a two-year limitations period for personal-injury and property-damage claims, subject to possible equitable tolling or estoppel when inequitable circumstances or inducement delayed suit.

Taylor · filed 2026-03-27(1), (3)

Under A.R.S. § 12-542, there is a two-year statute of limitations for “injuries done to the person of another” and “trespass for injury done to the estate or the property of another.” § 12-542(1), (3). The parties agree Plaintiff filed this action one day after the statute of limitations had tolled. See Doc. 42 at 5; Doc. 44 at 2. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is untimely. However, “[u]nder equitable tolling, plaintiffs may sue after the statutory time period for filing a complaint has expired if they have been prevented from filing in a timely manner due to sufficiently inequitable circumstances.” McCloud v. State, Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 217 Ariz. 82, 87, 170 P.3d 691, 697 (Ct. App. 2007). Equitable estoppel provides an exception to the statute of limitations where one party induces another party to forebear filing suit.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury tort claims, which the court applied to Ball’s § 1983 claim.

Ball v. State · filed 2025-10-02

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be brought within two years after accrual. ... A.R.S. § 12-542 (two-year limitations period for personal injury torts).

Section 12-542(5) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a conversion claim.

Gasho v. Wells Fargo Bank NA · filed 2019-11-20(5)

The statute of limitations in Arizona for a conversion action is two years. ... Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(5).

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for property-damage claims barred recovery because the claimed permanent loss existed by 1982 and no later-accruing damages were shown.

Roer v. Buckeye Irrigation Co. · filed 1991-01-24

As for the plaintiffs’ contention that there was some kind of continuous tort involved, allowing them to recover for damages incurred after the statute of limitations had run, this was not their theory in the trial court. Their claim was for a permanent and total loss of the use of the property because of permanent conditions caused by the defendants. The plaintiffs presented no evidence at trial that there were any damages accruing after 1982. Their theory was that the land was waterlogged and unfarmable in 1982.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on property-related tort claims, including Arizona right-of-publicity claims.

Takeguma v. Freedom of Expression LLC · filed 2021-02-10

But unlike false light claims, which aim to remedy reputational harm, “the right of publicity is in the nature of a property right.” Estate of Reynolds, 235 Ariz. at 82; see Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (“Restatement Third”) § 46, cmt. d (1995) (“The right of publicity protects the commercial value of a person’s identity.”). Under Arizona law, property-related torts are subject to a two-year limitations period. See A.R.S. § 12-542; Skinner v. Tuscan Inc., No. CV-18-00319-TUC-RCC, 2020 WL 5946868, at *8 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2020) (declining to apply a one-year limitations period to a right of publicity claim because the claim is of the nature of a property right). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for property-related torts, including claims based on a property right such as the right of publicity.

Pepaj v. Paris Ultra Club LLC · filed 2021-02-18

In Arizona, property-related torts are subject to a two-year limitations period. See A.R.S. § 12-542.

For an insurance bad-faith claim, the two-year limitations period under § 12-542 begins when the insurer intentionally denies, fails to process, or fails to pay the claim without a reasonable basis.

Ness v. Western Security Life Insurance · filed 1992-09-17

In Arizona, an insurance company commits bad faith when it (1) intentionally (2) denies, fails to process, or fails to pay a claim (3) without a reasonable basis for such action. ... The cause of action arises only when all three elements are present. A limitations period starts when the cause of action arises. ... Therefore, Ness’s cause of action did not arise, and the limitations period did not begin to run, until WSLIC had intentionally denied, failed to process, or failed to pay his claim without a reasonable basis.

Section 12-542 gives a two-year limitations period for Arizona bad-faith insurance claims, beginning when the claim accrues, which here was no earlier than an unequivocal written denial.

Walker v. AIU Insurance Company · filed 2023-12-11

Ness answered the question of when a claim arises—and limitations period begins to run—in the event of a questionable denial of a claim by an insurer. In that case, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated that the limitations period does not begin to run until an insurer provides an “unequivocal written denial” of a claim. Id.; see also Seltzer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2012) (confirming that “Ness supports the proposition that a claim accrues only upon the insurer’s ‘unequivocal written denial of the claim’” (quoting Ness, 851 P.2d at 125)). Here, the Walkers filed their claim on July 27, 2023, making the limitations period any conduct occurring after July 27, 2021. On May 21, 2021, Defendants issued the Walkers a notice of denial “pending investigation.” A notice of denial with a qualification like “pending investigation” is not an unequivocal written denial. Instead, Gallagher’s issuance of a notice of claim on August 24, 2021, accepting compensability but refusing to pay disability benefits is far more akin to an unequivocal determination. Like in Ness, a statement like “pending investigation” “holds out some hope to [the Walkers] that additional benefits might be paid.” Ness, 851 P.2d at 126. Accordingly, the statute of limitations did not begin to run on May 21, 2021, and at most began to run on August 24, 2021. Therefore, the bad faith claim is timely.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year tort limitations period for an Arizona insurance bad-faith claim; whether the discovery rule tolls it is a fact question.

Barten v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2014-07-01

Barton’s bad faith claim should be construed in accordance with Arizona law. Consequently, Arizona’s two-year tort statute of limitations applies to his claim. Restatement § 142(a); Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542.

Section 12-542’s limitations period may be equitably tolled when the plaintiff’s bankruptcy counterclaim was filed reasonably and in good faith, but whether those conditions are met can present a genuine issue of material fact.

Hydroculture, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand · filed 1992-09-17

Coopers and Hydroculture presented conflicting evidence as to when Hydroculture knew or should have known of Coopers’ alleged negligence and as to Hydroculture’s motives in filing the malpractice claim in bankruptcy court. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that these disputes present genuine issues of material fact as to whether Hydroculture acted reasonably and in good faith in filing its counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, a requirement for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The trial court therefore properly denied Coopers’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 12-542(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims and, where federal procedures do not require administrative exhaustion, for Rehabilitation Act and ADA Title II claims.

Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County · filed 1997-03-06(1)

We conclude that applying a statute specific to tort actions against governmental entities and employees conflicts with the Supreme Court’s preference for “a simple, broad characterization of all § 1983 claims [that] best fits the statute’s remedial purpose.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272, 105 S.Ct. at 1945. Therefore, we hold that the two-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 12-542(1) applies to appellant’s § 1983 claim. ... Accordingly, we follow the reasoning of Morse and apply the state’s general personal injury statute of limitations to a Rehabilitation Act claim. 973 F.2d at 125; see also Hall, 941 F.2d at 407-08. That Arizona statute is A.R.S. § 12-542, which provides for a two-year limitation period. ... Because the procedures for Title II and the Rehabilitation Act are the same and exhaustion of administrative remedies is required for neither, we conclude that the statute of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-542 should apply to appellant’s Title II claim.

Section 12-542 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which is borrowed for § 1983 claims in Arizona.

Normandeau v. City of Phoenix · filed 2005-04-12

The Supreme Court has determined that the relevant statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims, regardless of the facts or legal theory of the particular case, is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... In Arizona, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years, as is set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought against public officials.

Mathis v. Dannels · filed 2021-03-17

Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought against public officials.

Section 12-542’s two-year limitations period does not apply to this tort claim when another state has a more significant relationship to the parties and occurrence and its shorter limitations period bars the claim.

DeLoach v. Alfred · filed 1998-03-17

Paragraph 1 of revised § 142 is inapplicable because Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations does not bar the action. ... We therefore conclude that, based on revised § 142 and the undisputed facts of this case, Tennessee’s one-year limitation provision applies and bars the complaint filed in Arizona on June 19,1996.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period applies to a tort claim brought in Arizona against an Arizona defendant even when the injury occurred in Tennessee and the plaintiff resides in California.

DeLoach v. Alfred · filed 1998-06-09

Arizona’s two-year statute reflects the substantial interest underlying its policy requiring its citizens to answer for the harm they cause. ... Under the facts of this case, the Arizona limitations period applies to an Arizona defendant sued in Arizona by a California plaintiff for damages resulting from tortious conduct in Tennessee.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period applies to tort claims arising from conduct that occurs and produces injury in Arizona, even when no party is an Arizona domiciliary.

Jackson v. Chandler · filed 2003-01-17

Arizona has a substantial interest in applying its statute of limitations to torts arising from conduct that occurs in the state and produces injury in the state. Accordingly, the general rule by which the forum applies its own statute of limitations applies.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on professional-malpractice/negligence and wrongful-interference claims, running under Arizona’s discovery rule when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the negligent conduct or can first sue.

McManus v. American Express Tax & Business Services, Inc. · filed 1999-09-08

Arizona courts have uniformly held that professional malpractice/negligence claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-542. ... Likewise, Section 12-542 also governs claims for wrongful interference with contract. ... Under Arizona law, the determination of when a cause of action for professional negligence accrues is governed by the discovery rule. ... Pursuant to the discovery rule, the statute of limitations commences to run “when the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the defendant’s negligent conduct ... or when the plaintiff is first able to sue.” ... Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that McManus’ causes of action for accounting malpractice and tor-tious interference accrued on February 1, 1995. Because the instant action was not filed until March 13, 1997, more than two years later, these two causes of action are barred by A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 generally gives legal-malpractice claims two years from accrual, with accrual determined under Arizona’s discovery rule.

Keonjian v. Olcott · filed 2007-10-18

In Arizona, legal malpractice claims are generally governed by the statute of limitations for tort claims in A.R.S. § 12-542, which provides that such claims must be brought “within two years after the cause of action accrues.”

Section 12-542 requires an action for intentional interference with contract to be filed within two years after the claim accrues.

Vales v. KINGS HILL CONDOMINIUM ASS'N · filed 2005-12-22

The tort claim alleged in count three, intentional interference with contract, was required to be filed within two years of accrual pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-542 (2003).

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for claims alleging wrongful interference with contract.

Seitz v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. · filed 2008-02-11

In Arizona, claims for wrongful interference with contract have a two-year statute of limitations. See A.R. S. § 12-542; Clark v. Airesearch Mfg. Co., 138 Ariz. 240, 244, 673 P.2d 984 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1983). ... Because Plaintiffs alleged that they did not discover until July 2006, that Defendants were the tank water heater manufacturers that were pressuring Watts to end its relationship with Microtherm, the Court can not conclude that their claims were untimely when filed several months later in December 2006.

Section 12-542’s two-year limitations period follows the discovery rule: it does not begin until the plaintiff has enough knowledge to recognize that a wrong occurred and caused injury.

Ritchie v. Krasner · filed 2009-04-21

Even if Krasner did not waive this defense, Arizona follows the discovery rule. Under this rule, the statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff possesses a minimum knowledge sufficient to recognize that “a wrong occurred and caused injury.” ... The wrongful death claim arose within two years of the Ritchie s’ amended complaint, and there is substantial evidence to support the theory that Jeremy did not have reason to investigate his medical malpractice claim until well within the two-year limitation period. This action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on legal-malpractice actions, running from accrual of the claim.

Best Choice Fund, LLC v. Low & Childers, P.C. · filed 2012-01-06

In Arizona, a lawsuit alleging legal malpractice must be filed within two years of the date the cause of action accrues. A.R.S. § 12-542; ... NT’s harm became ascertainable upon issuance of the suspension order because it carried direct, harmful consequences: DOI ordered NT to immediately cease issuing new insurance and begin the process of cancelling existing insurance. ... The clock started ticking on the legal malpractice claim even though NT’s damages could have been eliminated or substantially minimized by future events. ... Because that date is more ... than two years before initiation of this lawsuit, application of the doctrine does not affect the propriety of the summary judgment, and we need not address the viability of the doctrine in Arizona.

Section 12-542 gives a legal-malpractice claim a two-year limitations period, running when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the attorney’s negligence and the resulting damages are ascertainable rather than speculative or contingent.

A-Plan v. Quarles & Brady · filed 2014-02-27

In Arizona, a legal malpractice claim must be filed no more than two years from the date (1) a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of an attorney’s negligent conduct, and (2) the damages from the conduct are ascertainable, and not speculative or contingent. Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 139, 927 P.2d 796, 799 (App. 1996); A.R.S. § 12-542; see also Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, 30 n.1, ¶ 15, 83 P.3d 26, 30 n.1 (2004) (recognizing the standard applicable in a legal malpractice action arising in a non-litigation context).

Section 12-542 requires a legal-malpractice action to be commenced within two years after the claim accrues, and accrual occurs under the discovery rule when the client suffers harm and knows or should have known that the harm resulted from the attorney's negligence.

Ainbinder v. Bodinet · filed 2016-10-18

"Legal malpractice actions are subject to A.R.S. § 12-542, which provides that an action must be commenced within two years after the claim accrues." ... "Pursuant to the discovery rule, a claim for legal malpractice accrues \"when the client has suffered harm and knows or should have known that the harm was a direct result of the attorney's [alleged] negligence.\""

Section 12-542(1) requires a medical-negligence claim to be filed within two years after accrual, with accrual governed by the discovery rule.

Kopacz v. Banner Health · filed 2018-07-05(1)

A medical negligence claim generally must be filed "within two years after the cause of action accrues." A.R.S. § 12-542(1). The date such a claim accrues is subject to the "discovery rule." See Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 314-17, ¶¶ 14-26 (2002). Under that rule, a claim accrues when the plaintiff has reason to connect her injury with a "causative agent" such that "a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault." Id. at 316, ¶¶ 22, 23; see also Wyckoff v. Mogollon Health All., 232 Ariz. 588, 591, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) ("[A] cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants' conduct.") (quotation omitted). ... On this record, the superior court did not err in concluding that Kopacz's cause of action accrued and limitations began to run no later than December 28, 2013. The court therefore did not err in finding that Kopacz's claim, filed more than two years after that date, was time-barred.

Section 12-542 requires tortious-interference claims to be filed within two years after accrual, which occurs when the plaintiff knew or should have known of interference that terminated the business relationship and caused damage.

Gordon Grado M.D. Incorporated v. Phoenix Cancer and Blood Disorder Treatment Institute PLLC · filed 2022-05-16

Claims for tortious interference must be “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues[.]” A.R.S. § 12-542; Clark v. Airesearch Mfg. Co. of Ariz., Inc., 673 P.2d 984, 987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). ... The statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s claim did not start running until Plaintiff’s patients terminated care with Plaintiff and Plaintiff knew or should have known that Defendants’ interference caused the termination.

Section 12-542 starts the two-year limitations period for accountant-malpractice claims when the cause of action accrues; in a tax-assessment malpractice case, accrual occurs when the taxing authority issues its formal assessment or notice of determination, not when an auditor makes preliminary statements.

CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C. · filed 2000-08-24

Section 12-542 requires certain actions to be “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.” ... Under § 12-542, “[t]he limitations period begins to run upon accrual.” ... We hold that CDT’s cause of action against ARL accrued in April 1996, when CSBE issued its notice of determination. CDT timely filed the action against ARL within two years of that date.

For a legal-malpractice claim arising from criminal litigation, the two-year period under § 12-542 begins when the criminal proceedings terminate favorably to the defendant.

Glaze v. Larsen · filed 2004-01-14

Unlike the California statute, A.R.S. § 12-542 has no arbitrary limit on the time in which legal malpractice claims can be brought. Rather, the only question is when the “cause of action accrues.” As noted above, the general rule is that a cause of action accrues when all of the elements of the cause are present and the plaintiff either knows or should have known of them. Because we hold that favorable termination of the criminal proceedings is an element of the cause of action for malpractice, it logically follows that the cause does not accrue until favorable termination occurs.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence and invasion-of-privacy claims; claims arising from publicly broadcast or posted material are time-barred when filed more than two years later and the discovery rule does not toll the period.

Henry v. Raycom Media, Inc. · filed 2006-12-08

The district court properly dismissed Henry’s action because his claims stem from the June 10, 2000, and February 21, 2001 television broadcast, and subsequent posting on the television station’s website, of a news story about him, and Henry did not file his complaint until October 5, 2004. See A.R.S. § 12-542 (statute of limitations for negligence and invasion of privacy is two years).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence and negligent-misrepresentation claims.

Silaev v. Swiss-America Trading Corp. · filed 2018-05-02

Additionally, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Silaev’s negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations under Arizona law. See Alaface v. Nat’l Inv. Co., 892 P.2d 1375, 1388 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “a negligent misrepresentation action brought on a negligence per se theory” is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set out in A.R.S. § 12-542).

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, barring conduct occurring outside that period.

London-Marable v. Boeing Company · filed 2009-11-19(1)

Most of the conduct at issue is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for an IIED claim. See Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (citing A.R.S. § 12-542(1)).

Section 12-542(1) and (3) impose two-year limitations periods for personal-injury malpractice and trespass causing injury to another's property; in litigation-malpractice cases, accrual is delayed until appellate review is exhausted or waived.

Kaufman v. Jesser · filed 2012-07-19(1), (3)

Arizona Revised Statute § 12-542(1), (3) prescribe a two-year limitations period “[flor injuries done to the person of another including causes of action for ... malpractiee[,]” and “[flor trespass for injury done to ... the property of another.” ... When an attorney’s misconduct occurs in the context of litigation, Arizona courts have held that the resulting malpractice claim does not accrue until the appellate process has been either fully exhausted or waived. ... Arizona law is clearly established that when an attorney’s misconduct occurs in the context of litigation, a resulting malpractice claim does not accrue until the appellate process has been either fully exhausted or waived because the “injury or damaging effect on the unsuccessful party is not ascertainable until the appellate process is completed or is waived by a failure to appeal.” ... Kaufman II was timely filed and is not barred by Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 12-542(1) requires a legal-malpractice claim to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Danko v. McCormick · filed 2023-08-22(1)

Thus, Danko’s claim against McCormick was barred by A.R.S. § 12-542(1), and the superior court correctly dismissed it.

Subsection (3) supplies a two-year limitations period for tort claims, including an intentional-interference claim, and the claim accrues when the wrongful conduct is known or reasonably should be known.

Fix v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2013-08-06(3)

Tort claims are governed by a two year statute of limitations. See A.R.S. § 12-542. “[A] tort claim accrues when a plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 185 Ariz. 174, 177, 913 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1996). It is undisputed that in June 2010 plaintiffs received notice that defendant was permanently closing the Crossing. At that point, plaintiffs knew or should have known that defendant’s conduct would affect their business. Therefore, the intentional interference claim began to accrue in June 2010. Because plaintiffs did not file their complaint until January 2013 (six months after the two-year statute of limitations expired), Count 7 is time-barred pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542(3) gives negligence-based tort claims a two-year limitations period, accruing when the claimant knows or, with reasonable diligence, should know of the wrongful conduct.

KnightBrook Insurance v. Payless Car Rental System, Inc. · filed 2014-09-03(3)

In Arizona, tort claims sounding in negligence are subject to a two-year limitations period. See A.R.S. § 12-542(3); ELM Ret. Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 246 P.3d 938, 941 (Ariz.Ct. App.2010). Arizona’s “discovery rule” tolls the limitations period “until the plaintiff possesses a minimum knowledge sufficient to recognize that a ‘wrong occurred and caused injury.’” Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 211 P.3d 1272, 1288 (Ariz.Ct. App.2009) (quoting Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 44 P.3d 990, 996 (2002)). “The discovery rule, however, does not permit a party to hide behind its ignorance when reasonable investigation would have alerted it to the claim.” Callaway, 246 P.3d at 941. Instead, a tort claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or “with reasonable diligence should know” of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 955 P.2d 951, 960 (1998). ... Plaintiffs’ emphasis on the July 1, 2010 letter is misplaced. The relevant date is not when Bovre had written confirmation from KMIS that he lacked SLI coverage, but when a reasonable person in Bovre’s position would have been on notice to investigate a claim for negligence. Walk, 44 P.3d at 996. The negligence claims accrued when Bovre was aware that Fisher had engaged in negligent acts or had made negligent misrepresentations. It is clear from the record that Bovre knew Fisher failed to “carefully complete” the rental agreement or made misrepresentations regarding the rental contract before June 24, 2010. Bovre’s decision to investigate these facts and -hire an attorney shows his awareness of their potential legal significance. The Court concludes that the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation accrued on or before June 24, 2010 and are time-barred. The Court will enter summary judgment on counts one and two.

Section 12-542(3) gives breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its cause, and its wrongful nature.

Wichansky v. Zowine · filed 2015-12-11(3)

In Arizona,' a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... The limitations period-begins to run when the plaintiff discovers the cause of action — that is, when the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, that he has been harmed, that the harm was caused by the defendant, and that the act or omission which caused the harm was wrongful.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including the negligence claim, and that period applies to the § 1983 claim under the forum-state rule.

Atkins v. Governing Board of Creighton School District · filed 2017-02-27

The district court properly dismissed Atkins’s equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as barred by Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations because Atkins filed this action eight years after the injury accrued. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two year statute of limitations for personal injury action). ... Dismissal of Atkins’s negligence claim was proper because it was barred by the statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two year statute of limitations for negligence claim).

Section 12-542(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence claims and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Knightbrook Insurance Co v. Payless Car Rental System, Inc. · filed 2015-04-17(3)

In Arizona, tort claims sounding in negligence are subject to a two-year limitations period. See A.R.S. § 12-542(3); ELM Ret. Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 246 P.3d 938, 941 (Ariz.Ct.App.2010). ... The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is two years. A.R.S. § 12-542(3); Crook v. Anderson, 115 Ariz. 402, 565 P.2d 908, 909 (Ariz.Ct.App.1977).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Isgro v. Wells Fargo · filed 2019-01-22

Each of Isgro’s tort claims is subject to a two- or three-year limitations period. ... Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 241 Ariz. 440, 444, ¶ 9 (App. 2017) (explaining the two-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 12-542 applies to breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and negligent misrepresentation claims).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Sweet v. Tomlinson · filed 2020-08-25

Claims for breach of the covenant of good-faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty have a two-year statute of limitations. See A.R.S. §12-542; Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 388 P.3d 834, 838 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017); see also Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (D. Ariz. 2012).

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for Title II ADA claims treated like § 1983 personal-injury claims.

Smith v. Sanderson Ford Incorporated · filed 2021-01-25

“For purposes of statute of limitations, claims under Title II are treated like the personal injury claims of § 1983 and are thereby subject to Arizona’s two year statute of limitations under A.R. S. § 12-542.”

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims in Arizona.

Danam v. Arizona Board of Education · filed 2021-08-10

Arizona is the forum, and Arizona courts “apply a two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 claims.” Id.; see also Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing A.R.S. § 12-542).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for the analogous state-law limitations period applied to this § 1981 claim.

Pittman v. Food Safety Net Services Limited · filed 2022-02-07

Because his claim concerns “mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts” rather than the “termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship,” it is subject to the most analogous state statute of limitations. In Arizona, the most analogous state statute of limitations is two years. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. Glendale Elementary Sch. Dist., No. CV-14-02083-PHX-ESW, 2017 WL 1787565, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2017); see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s alleged incident with Defendant was in August 2017. (Doc. 25 at 4.) Therefore, the pertinent issue is when Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued.

Section 12-542(5) sets a two-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for conversion of another person’s personal property.

Deutsch v. Mirbod · filed 2022-03-23(5)

Arizona law provides a two-year statute of limitations for actions seeking damages for conversion of the personal property of another.

For the tort claims at issue, § 12-542's two-year limitations period had expired by the time the motion to amend was filed, assuming a December 2020 accrual date.

Mountains of Spices LLC v. Lafrenz · filed 2023-03-17

Assuming an accrual date of the cause of action being December 2020 (when the Third Amended Complaint alleges the issues with loans were discovered (Doc. 82 at 14 ¶7)), the two-year statute of limitations had expired by the time the motion to amend was filed. See Tavilla v. Cephalon, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (D. Ariz. 2012) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542).

Section 12-542 requires covered claims to be brought within two years of the alleged discrimination.

Millia Promotional Services v. State of Arizona · filed 2024-04-12

We likewise find no error in the district court’s application of Arizona’s statute of limitations. For actions that were cognizable under the pre-1990 version of the 42 U.S.C. § 1981—like Millia’s claims based on alleged discrimination in contract formation—state tort law determines the limitations period. Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048 n.2. Arizona requires that such claims be brought within two years of the alleged discrimination. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542. The district court properly ruled that damages arising from DERS’s denial of Millia’s rate increase request and from Benjamin White’s comments were untimely because those events occurred more than two years before Millia initiated its suit. Millia claims that the limitations period should be tolled because it did not learn until later that these actions were apparently motivated by racial animus. But we have unequivocally stated that the statute of limitations accrues when the actual injury occurs and not when plaintiffs learn “that there was an allegedly discriminatory motive.” Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1051. The district court therefore properly barred damages arising from actions taken outside the limitations period.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for tort claims based on breach of the implied covenant when the parties have a special relationship involving public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.

Rozich v. MTC Financial Incorporated · filed 2025-01-03

Defendant is incorrect that Count Two is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. The implied covenant “arises by operation of law but exists by virtue of a contractual relationship” and is “as much a part of a contract as are the express terms.” Id. Thus, the statute of limitations for implied-covenant claims is generally the same six-year period that applies to contract claims. ... Although such claims have a two-year statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-542, they arise only “where there is a special relationship between the parties arising from elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.” Wells Fargo Bank, 38 P.3d at 29. ... Here, neither party contends that there was the sort of special relationship necessary to support such a claim (and trigger the two-year limitations period).

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury claims, and tolling or delayed accrual must be supported by sufficient pleaded facts.

Ronsick v. Epic Motorsports Corporation · filed 2025-09-19(1)

By arguing that his “post-crash condition establishes [that] the statute of limitations should be tolled,” (Doc. 17 at 6 (citation modified)), and that the “discovery rule applies,” (id. at 9 (citation modified)), Ronsick appears to not dispute that the statute of limitations for his claims is two years or that he was required to have brought suit by October 31, 2023 unless some form of tolling or delay in claim accrual applies. (See id. at 6–9.) Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1). ... Thus, because it is “apparent on the face of the complaint” that the statute of limitations ran on Ronsick’s claims, see Holt, 91 F.4th at 1017, and because Ronsick has not pled sufficient facts to establish that tolling or the discovery rule should be applied, the motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on the tort claims at issue, barring claims filed after that period expires.

Flores v. Johnson · filed 2022-08-04

Each of the remaining tort claims against Johnson and Fernstrom have a two-year statute of limitations. A.R.S. § 12-542; ... The statute of limitations expired no later than October 9, 2019. The Instant Complaint was filed on October 22, 2019. Accordingly, we find that the action is time-barred.

Section 12-542 gives property-based tort claims a two-year statute of limitations.

Longoria v. Kodiak Concepts LLC · filed 2021-03-23

Here, Count I is specifically denominated as a claim based on the “right of publicity.” The best reading of Reynolds and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 is that this is a property-based tort claim, not a personal injury-based tort claim. And under Arizona law, property-based tort claims are subject to A.R.S. § 12-542’s two-year statute of limitations, not A.R.S. § 12-541’s one-year limitations period.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period that barred the Hatches’ claims in this action.

Hatch v. Reliance Insurance · filed 1985-04-16

Dismissal on limitation grounds was proper. The statute of limitations of *415both Arizona, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542 (as amended 1978) (two year) and Texas, Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 5526 (Vernon’s 1979) (two year) would bar the assertion of the Hatches’ claims in this action.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action in Arizona.

Carrillo v. State of Ariz. · filed 1998-01-09

Furthermore, the Carrillos' lawsuit is barred as to all Appellees by the statute of limitations. In Arizona, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 cause of action is two years. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542 (1990); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.1991). The limitations period accrues when a party "knows or has reason to know of the injury." Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir.1994). The Carrillos filed their complaint on August 2, 1995, more than two years after their causes of action accrued.

For personal-injury claims, the statute's two-year period runs from accrual; under the discovery rule, accrual occurs when the claimant knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its underlying cause, including the relevant signs and knowledge in a toxic-mold case.

Wyckoff v. Mogollon Health Alliance · filed 2013-08-22(1)

A cause of action based on a personal injury must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. A.R.S. § 12-542(1). ... Under that rule, “a cause of action accrues ‘when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct.’” ... In other words, the statute begins to run not from the moment of the defendant’s injurious conduct, but when a claimant knows or should know she has been injured and when she likewise “knows or with reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.” ... The cause of action begins to accrue when the claimant experiences physical signs and symptoms of illness, knows that she has been exposed to mold, and knows that mold may present a health hazard.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, running here from July 18, 2022, when plaintiffs learned of the alleged harm and the defendant’s role in authorizing treatment.

Belcher v. Tasset · filed 2025-02-19

Thus, assuming “medical gaslighting” is a cognizable legal claim, the statute of limitations began to run as to Barr on July 18, 2022, when Plaintiffs’ learned that they had been harmed by the alleged medical negligence and that Barr had allegedly authorized the treatment on Charles Belcher’s behalf.

Section 12-542 generally gives a tort plaintiff two years from accrual, but accrual is delayed until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the tortious conduct.

Viall v. John Scott, Sr., and James R. Clark, Gene Hutchins · filed 1991-09-10

Clark argues that regardless of the relation back of the amendment, Viall's claim is barred by Arizona's statute of limitations. In Arizona, tort actions "shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrued." Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542 (West Supp.1990). Clark argues the cause of action accrued on either March 28, 1980, when the jury determined the loss occurred, or at the latest when he resigned on October 2, 1980. Though a cause of action generally accrues at the time the tort was committed, Jackson v. American Credit Bureau, Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 199, 531 P.2d 932 (1975), if the plaintiff neither knew nor reasonably should have known of the tortious conduct, the cause of action does accrue until that time. Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan & Tenner, 593 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir.1979), Kellogg v. Willy's Motors, Inc., 140 Ariz. 67, 680 P.2d 203, 206 (Ariz.App.1984). Thus, even if Clark's negligent conduct must have occurred prior to Clark's resignation, the pertinent date is the date Viall knew or should have known of the conduct. Appellants do not argue that Viall either knew or should have known of the loss of her silver prior to NACC's bankruptcy in September, 1982. Accordingly, Viall's action is not time-barred.

For a personal injury claim governed by § 12-542(1), an accident can put the injured person on notice to investigate a claim even when a driver denies fault.

Olariu v. Gibbons · filed 2015-06-30(1)

We conclude that sufficient information was present on the day of the accident to put Olariu on notice that he may have a claim against Gibbons. Gibbons’ denial of fault at the scene did not toll the statute, because the accident alone was sufficient to give Olariu reason to investigate whether Gibbons was at fault. The trial court did not err in finding that the cause of action accrued on the date of the accident in November 2010.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims, and the period is tolled while a prisoner diligently pursues required exhaustion through Arizona’s prison grievance process.

Borges313886 v. Napier · filed 2019-11-18

The statute of limitations for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by state law, see Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014), and the Arizona statute of limitations for personal injuries is two years, see A.R.S. § 12-542. ... But Defendants ignore that the statute of limitations was likely tolled during the time when Plaintiff was diligently seeking to exhaust his administrative remedies. ... “Federal courts in § 1983 actions apply the state statute of limitations from personal-injury claims and borrow the state’s tolling rules.” ... “Arizona law requires tolling the statute of limitations while a claimant pursues Arizona’s prison grievance process,” at least during any period where a prisoner-plaintiff diligently pursues required exhaustion. ... Defendants have offered no explanation for why that general rule would not apply here.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury, product-liability, and breach-of-express-warranty actions.

Williams v. Smith & Nephew Inc. · filed 2020-01-24

In Atizona, personal injury, product liability, and breach of express warranty actions have a two-year statute of limitations. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542; Inre Bos. Sci. Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:13-CV-14904, 2015 WL 1198545, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 16, 2015) (citing Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Co., 500 P.2d 314, 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)) (holding that a breach of express warranty claim related to an underlying personal injury claim is subject to a two-year limitations period).

Section 12-542(1) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which the court applied to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Benge v. Ryan · filed 2020-02-07(1)

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1); Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Vaughan, 927 F.2d at 478.

Section 12-542(1) provides Arizona's general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies to borrowed federal personal-injury claims.

Franco v. Mesa Public Schools · filed 2020-12-16(1)

Here, A.R.S. § 12-542(1) provides the general statute for personal injury actions, and so that two-year limit is the applicable statute of limitations for all of Plaintiff’s federal claims.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in Arizona and may be tolled while a prisoner exhausts the grievance process.

Benge v. Corizon Health LLC · filed 2021-02-18(1)

The applicable statute of limitations in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. ... In Arizona, the statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner exhausts the prison grievance process. ... Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Burgess, Hudson, and Summers are time-barred, and the Court will therefore grant their Motion for Summary Judgment.

Section 12-542(1) gives Arizona personal-injury actions a two-year statute of limitations.

Taylor, III v. Bradley-Green · filed 2022-02-09(1)

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542(1) sets a two-year limitations period for Arizona personal-injury actions.

Encinas-Solano v. United States Border Patrol · filed 2024-02-09(1)

The applicable statute of limitations in an action under Bivens is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Arizona’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1). Thus, to be timely, Plaintiff’s claims must have accrued no more than two years before her Complaint was filed. In other words, they must have accrued on or before May 15, 2021.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for Arizona personal-injury actions, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Coronado v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-04-02(1)

The applicable statute of limitations in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including the personal-injury limitations period used for § 1983 claims.

Brunner v. Yavapai, County of · filed 2025-02-24(1)

The applicable statute of limitations in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See A.R.S. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 requires breach-of-fiduciary-duty actions to commence within two years after the claim accrues.

Scott v. Arizona Center for Hematology and Oncology PLC · filed 2020-04-29

Actions for breach of fiduciary duty must commence within two years of the action’s accrual.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period barred the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim because it accrued when the deed was signed in 1977.

Trailhead v. Phoenix · filed 2023-10-03

As a result, the two-year limitations period has long since run. See A.R.S. § 12-542; Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 241 Ariz. 440, 444, ¶ 9 (App. 2017) (“A two-year limitations period applies to claims for breach of fiduciary duty.”). ... Because Nerison knew or should have known that the deed lacked a development restriction when she signed it in 1977, any breach of fiduciary duty claim against Lawyers Title arising out of a purported defect in the deed accrued at that time and ran two years later. ... We hold that Trailhead’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against Lawyers Title is time-barred, and so affirm summary judgment on that claim.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, subject to tolling for fraudulent concealment until discovery or when discovery reasonably should have occurred.

Tempe Woman's v. Loren · filed 2024-01-23

Breach of fiduciary duty claims are subject to a two-year limitations period. Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 241 Ariz. 440, 444, ¶ 9 (App. 2017) (citing A.R.S. § 12-542). ... Fraudulent concealment tolls the applicable limitations period “until such concealment is discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered.” ... The court therefore did not err in finding the breach of fiduciary duty claim was timely.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on the fiduciary-duty claim, accruing when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the facts underlying the claim and can connect the wrong to the defendant.

Weber v. Kory · filed 2025-04-17

Weber’s fiduciary duty claim is subject to a 2-year statute of limitations. A.R.S. § 12-542; see also Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 241 Ariz. 440, 444 ¶ 9 (App. 2017). ... For purposes of the statute of limitations, a claim accrues when a plaintiff “knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the cause.” Gust, 182 Ariz. at 588–89. The key inquiry is whether a plaintiff knew the defendant’s identity and could connect the wrong to that defendant. See Lawhon v. L.B.J. Inst. Supply, Inc., 159 Ariz. 179, 183 (App. 1988).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation and negligent supervision claims.

Blackburn v. S3 Investors Incorporated · filed 2020-11-20

Under Arizona law, the statute of limitations is one year for consumer fraud, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (A.R.S.) § 12-541, three years for common law fraud, see A.R.S. § 12-543, and two years for negligent misrepresentation and negligent supervision, see A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for negligent-misrepresentation claims.

Wiltse v. Wiltse · filed 2021-09-23

Accordingly, Dean’s claims for relief are all time-barred because he filed his complaint almost eight years after he was aware of Barbara’s alleged scheme. See A.R.S. § 12-542.5 (2 years for conversion); Alaface v. Nat’l Inv. Co., 181 Ariz. 586, 599 (1994) (citing A.R.S. § 12-542) (2 years for negligent misrepresentation); Est. of Kirschenbaum v. Kirschenbaum, 164 Ariz. 435, 437 (App. 1989) (citing A.R.S. §§ 12-542.5, -544.2) (2 years for constructive trust and 4 years for accounting); Coronado Dev. Corp., 139 Ariz. at 352 (citing A.R.S. § 12-543.3) (3 years for fraud and intentional misrepresentation); San Manuel Copper Corp. v. Redmond, 445 P.2d 162, 166 (App. 1968) (citing A.R.S. § 12-550) (4 years for unjust enrichment).

Section 12-542's two-year tort-claim limitations period is not extended by a later event that is not part of a series of closely related wrongful acts.

David-Rynn v. Uhs of Phoenix · filed 2022-09-15

But even if Rynn’s allegation that DCS wrongly took physical custody of another child could support a claim warranting relief, such an allegation would not extend the statute of limitations because it is not part of a series of closely related wrongful acts. See Watkins, 239 Ariz. at 172, ¶ 9; Floyd, 186 Ariz. at 413.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for negligent procurement of insurance begins when the negligent failure to obtain coverage causes actual, non-speculative harm, such as the insured's payment of its own defense costs.

Satamian v. Great Divide · filed 2024-04-09

The two-year statute of limitations period “does not commence until actionable negligence exists.” ... For accrual, negligence alone is insufficient—there must be actual damages. ... Thus, a cause of action for a negligent act does not accrue unless it results in immediate harm. ... At this point, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations period commences. ... Thus, under the two-year statute of limitations for negligence, A.C. Watercraft’s cause of action for negligent procurement accrued, as a matter of law, by May 2017, and expired by May 2019. See § 12-542.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for intrusion-upon-seclusion claims because invasion of privacy involves personal injury and sounds mainly in tort.

Arimilli v. Rezendes · filed 2025-03-11

Intrusion upon seclusion has a two-year statute of limitation. A.R.S. § 12-542; see also Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (“Since invasion of privacy involves personal injury (mental distress), and sounds mainly in tort, we hold that it is governed by the two-year limitation of A.R.S. § 12-542.”)

A wrongful death action generally must be filed within two years, but the discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the facts connecting the injury to the responsible party.

Pelchat v. Banner Health · filed 2025-11-24(2)

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-542(2), a wrongful death action must be brought within two years of the date of death. However, the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until “the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.” Satamian v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 257 Ariz. 163, 170, ¶ 13 (2024) (citation omitted). The facts underlying the cause include both the “what” and the “who” elements of causation. Walk, 202 Ariz. at 316, ¶ 22. And the statute of limitations is tolled until only after the plaintiff has a reason to connect those two elements “in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault.” Id.

Section 12-542(5)'s two-year limitations period governs establishing an embezzlement debt, but it does not bar a bankruptcy court from deciding whether an already established debt is nondischargeable.

Richardson v. Hidy Honda, Inc. (In Re Richardson) · filed 1998-06-26(5)

Arizona law provides a two-year statue of limitations for a cause of action for embezzlement. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542(5); Estate of Kirschenbaum v. Kirschenbaum, 164 Ariz. 435, 793 P.2d 1102, 1104 (App.Div. 2 1989). Debtor contends that because this action was not brought within the two-year period the debt for embezzlement is “extinguished.” This is not correct. The debt owned by debtor to Hidy Honda was memorialized under two successive promissory notes. Under any statute of limitations analysis, the debt remains fully enforceable, unless it is dis-chargeable in bankruptcy. ... In this case, as in McKendry, the debt has already been established so the state limitations period is immaterial. As discussed above, the complaint was timely filed within the period provided in § 523(c). Therefore the bankruptcy court correctly proceeded to determine the underlying nature of the debt.

Section 12-542’s two-year period for tort claims does not govern a declaratory action about insurance coverage that turns on contract interpretation.

Secura v. Sudhoff · filed 2020-03-03

Sudhoff next contends this action is barred by the two-year limitation period for tort claims. A.R.S. § 12-542. Arizona does not have a specific limitation period for declaratory relief actions; we, therefore, “examine the substance of the action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought” to determine the appropriate limitation period. ... Secura seeks a declaration that Gabriel was not an “insured” under the policy—a question of contract interpretation. The most comparable limitation period thus is the six years for claims based on a written contract. A.R.S. § 12-548.