Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233

Section 31-5-233(e)'s thirty-day suspension period was superseded by a later statute requiring a ninety-day suspension.

DEPT. OF REV. & TAX., MVD v. Shipley · filed 1978-05-24(e)

The first issue, having to do with which period of suspension is proper, calls up the question as to whether the thirty-day suspension period provided by § 31-129(e), was repealed by implication through the enactment of § 31-276.26. ... Since § 31-276.26 took effect later than the amendments to § 31-129 (fn. 4, supra), we hold that the ninety-day period of suspension is the sanction which is to be imposed.

Section 31-5-233(e) does not justify refusing to restore driving privileges after an unlawful license suspension.

State, Department of Revenue & Taxation, Financial Responsibility Division v. Kraus · filed 1985-10-10(e)

The complaints filed by Kraus and Buchan successfully challenged the agency’s interpretation of the statute, § 31-5-233(e), W.S.1977, upon which the agency’s refusal to restore their driving privileges was based. ... The refusal of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue and Taxation to restore driving privileges which were unlawfully suspended was properly overturned by the district courts in their respective orders.

Section 31-5-233(f)(v) requires a hearing on removal of an ignition interlock device when the applicant makes a prima facie showing of good cause.

Schneider v. The State of Wyoming · filed 2022-03-02(f)(v)

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(f)(v) requires the court to hold a hearing to give the applicant an opportunity to show good cause after he has made a prima facie showing for relief.

Section 31-5-233(b)'s presumption of intoxication applies only in criminal actions or proceedings, not civil damages actions.

Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Sinclair · filed 1978-09-01(b)

A reading of our statute, § 31-129(b), supra, discloses that the presumptions contained therein are applicable only "upon the trial of any criminal action or proceeding." We hold the trial court committed error in giving this instruction, leaving only a question as to whether Combined was prejudiced thereby.

A blood alcohol level of .168 raises the section’s presumption of intoxication and can support a conviction despite conflicting evidence.

Norwood v. City of Sheridan · filed 1979-04-10(b)(iii)

This percentage of blood alcohol raises a presumption of intoxication under the applicable statute. § 31 — 5—233(b)(iii), supra. ... We find, under the facts and these rules which delineate the scope of appellate inquiry when sufficiency of the evidence is in issue, that there was adequate, even though conflicting, evidence in the record which would allow the court to find and hold that the defendant violated § 31-5-233, supra, and § 31-5-1103, supra.

Section 31-5-233 does not require proof of unsafe driving, though driving behavior may help show whether alcohol made the driver incapable of driving safely.

Olson v. State · filed 1985-04-11

Proof of unsafe driving is not required although such is competent evidence to be considered with all of the other evidence in determining whether the driver is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a degree that he is incapable of safely driving.

Section 31-5-233(a) requires evidence that the defendant consumed alcohol, but does not require a blood test.

Walston v. State · filed 1985-08-08(a)

In order to establish a violation under § 31-5-233(a), it is not required that a blood test be given, but there must be evidence that the defendant consumed alcohol.

Section 31-5-233(a) requires intoxication to a degree that renders a person incapable of safely driving; being less able to drive safely is insufficient.

Redland v. State · filed 1989-01-06(a)

We agree that it was error for the court to give the challenged instruction, as there is obviously a substantial difference between a standard of "less able" to safely drive a motor vehicle and "incapable" of safely driving a motor vehicle.

Subsection (b)(ii) prohibits driving while alcohol or a controlled substance renders a person incapable of driving safely; the State must prove that impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Glazier v. State · filed 1992-12-22(b)(ii)

Section (b)(ii) prohibits driving if the person is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving. ... Therefore, the prosecutor did what the statute requires and proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was incapable of driving safely because he was operating the motorcycle while under the influence.

Section 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) requires proof that a person drove or had actual control of a vehicle, was incapable of safely driving, and was under the influence of alcohol.

Venegas v. State · filed 2012-10-30(b)(iii)(A)

Venegas was charged with driving under the influence in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) - (LexisNexis - 2011). Thus, the State was tasked with proving that Venegas drove or had actual control of his vehicle, that he was incapable of safely driving, and that he was under the influence of alcohol.

Section 31-5-233 treats intentionally inhaled glue, aerosol, or other toxic vapor that impairs safe driving as a controlled substance.

Breazeale v. State · filed 2011-01-24(a)(i)(B)

But the prosecution's basic theory, as reflected in the jury instructions, was that Mr. Breazeale was under the influence of "glue, aerosol or other toxic vapor which, when intentionally inhaled or sniffed, results in impairment of an individual's ability to drive safely." This language is taken from the definition of a controlled substance found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(a)(i)(B). The record contains ample evidence from which a rational jury could find that Mr. Breazeale was under the influence of a controlled substance after he inhaled the "canned air."

Section 31-5-233(b) prohibits driving after consuming or ingesting alcohol above the legal limit or to a degree that makes safe driving impossible; it does not cover alcohol produced inside the body.

Michaels v. STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF TRANSP. · filed 2012-03-06(b)

Giving the words in the statute their plain and ordinary meaning, we hold the version of 31-5-233(b) in effect at the time of Mr. Michaels arrest prohibited a person from driving after consuming or ingesting alcohol over the legal limit or to a degree rendering him incapable of safely driving. There simply is nothing in the unambiguous language of the statute to indicate it was meant to cover alcohol that was not consumed or somehow ingested.

As it stood in April 2010, § 31-5-233(b) covered driving after consuming or ingesting alcohol above the legal limit or to a degree that made driving unsafe; it did not cover alcohol produced inside the body.

Michaels v. State ex. rel. Department of Transportation · filed 2012-03-06(b)

We hold the OAH incorrectly interpreted the law when it ruled 81-5-283(b) makes no distinction between alcohol that is consumed and alcohol that appears in the body by some other means.

Subsection (b) does not require a driver to know he is under the influence to be guilty of driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration.

Melander v. State of Wyoming · filed 2016-09-08(b)

But the crime to which Melander pled guilty does not require that he knew he was under the influence: ... Therefore, even if we accept the facts as he alleges, he would not be innocent of this crime.

A conviction under § 31-5-233(b)(i) can rest on circumstantial evidence that the defendant drove while his blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.08%.

Hyatt v. State · filed 2018-07-30(b)(i)

This conclusion, taken in concert with the evidence that Mr. Hyatt's truck was being driven recklessly through Rock River, was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that Mr. Hyatt was legally intoxicated and driving his truck at the time the REDDI report was made. ... The State's evidence sufficiently supported its charge that Mr. Hyatt drove under the influence of alcohol (fourth or subsequent offense within ten years), in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(i).

Under the 1981 version of § 31-5-233(d), a judge could suspend a DWUI sentence if the defendant agreed to complete a prescribed alcohol treatment program.

Taylor v. State · filed 1983-02-24(d)

Section 31-5-233(d), W.S.1977 (Cum. Supp.1981), provided that the judge may suspend the sentence if the defendant agrees to pursue and complete an alcohol treatment program as prescribed by the judge. At the initial sentencing the judge recognized that appellant had an alcohol problem and directed that he attend and successfully complete an in-patient treatment program. At the resentencing the court found that appellant had made no attempt to avail himself of an in-house alcohol treatment program. It is obvious that the court considered this to be an aggravating circumstance, because, in view of the evidence, appellant needed in-patient treatment for his alcohol problem.

A judge may determine prior convictions for sentence enhancement under § 31-5-233 unless statutory language requires a jury.

Jaramillo v. City of Green River · filed 1986-05-28

We hold that with respect to such sentence enhancement proceedings under the state statute or a similar city ordinance, unless the statutory language so requires, a right to a jury trial with respect to the existence of prior convictions does not exist.

A municipal DWUI conviction counts as a prior conviction for the section’s mandatory seven-day jail sentence on a subsequent conviction.

City of Casper v. Cheatham · filed 1987-07-21

A first offense conviction of DWUI in municipal court advances the defendant to a position where a second conviction provides not a potential jail sentence, but a mandatory sentence of seven days in jail. The first offense conviction is the basis for the subsequent seven-day jail sentence.

Section 31-5-233(d) allows a judge to suspend imprisonment for a first or subsequent DWUI conviction if the defendant voluntarily completes an alcohol education or treatment program.

Norman v. State · filed 1987-12-22(d)

We hold that the plain language of § 31-5-233(d) allows suspension of imprisonment conditioned upon the defendant voluntarily completing an alcohol education or treatment program for either first time or subsequent convictions.

Section 31-5-233(e) permits extended probation for offenders sentenced under subsection (h) for driving while under the influence causing serious bodily injury.

Jones v. State · filed 2002-03-01(e)

It is not difficult to conclude that the legislature's intent was to permit long-term probation for DWUI offenders in order that violators could receive long-term substance abuse treatment. ... While subsection (h) does not repeat this language, it is unreasonable to think that the legislature meant long-term treatment to be available for low misdemeanor violators of subsection (e), but not for high misdemeanor violators of subsection (h). We find that it is available for both.

Section 31-5-233(e) measures the five-year period for repeat DUI sentencing by qualifying conviction dates, which may differ from the dates of the offenses.

Robison v. State · filed 2011-01-19(e)

It can be distilled from the foregoing statute that the actual date of the unlawful conduct to be punished, where multiple offenses are being considered, may have nothing to do with determining the five-year period that applies. ... After careful review of the record on appeal, we hold that the district court's sentence did not constitute an illegal sentence or a sentence that was otherwise erroneous as a matter of law.

For felony enhancement under § 31-5-233(e), the inquiry concerns the validity of a prior conviction; an alleged denial of counsel at sentencing does not address that conviction’s validity.

Derrera v. The State of Wyoming · filed 2014-06-13(e)

Whether Mr. Derrera may have been deprived of his right to counsel at his sentencing does not address the constitutionality of his conviction, which is the focus of our inquiry concerning the validity of his felony enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e).

Section 31-5-233(e) sets no mandatory minimum jail term for a first DWUI offense and requires a seven-day minimum for a second offense.

Wofford v. City of Laramie · filed 2016-06-10(e)

The state statute governing driving while under the influence does not include a mandatory minimum sentence for a first-time offender, and requires a seven-day mandatory minimum sentence for a second offense. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e) (LexisNexis 2015).

Section 31-5-233(e) measures the ten-year period for enhanced DWUI penalties backward from the date of the last offense.

Ramirez v. State · filed 2016-12-28(e)

Our conclusion is that the statute unambiguously provides that the look-back period for enhanced DWUI penalties is measured back in time, up to ten years, from the last offense.

Section 31-5-233(e) measures the ten-year period for a fourth-offense felony DWUI from the dates of the offenses, rather than the convictions.

Rhoads v. State · filed 2018-12-20(e)

The fourth offense felony DWUI looks back to the conduct not convictions in determining if four DWUIs have occurred within the ten-year lookback period.

Subsection (e) enhances punishment for repeat DWUI violations; prior offenses are not separate elements of the crime.

Protz v. State · filed 2019-03-01(e)

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e) is a sentence enhancement provision, providing graduated penalties for subsequent DWUI violations.

Section 31-5-233(e) unconstitutionally directs courts to collect drivers’ licenses and issue temporary licenses, functions belonging to the executive branch.

State Ex Rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz · filed 1983-12-12(e)

The provisions in § 31-5-233(e), supra, for collection of a driver’s license by the court and for the issuance of a temporary driver’s license by the court are unconstitutional in that they violate Art. 2, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution by directing the exercise of powers properly belonging to the executive branch of the government to the judicial branch.

Section 31-5-233(a) makes having actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated a separate offense from driving while intoxicated, even when the vehicle is not moving.

Adams v. State · filed 1985-04-09(a)

We conclude that the legislature intended that the present law cover factual situations not covered by the earlier statute, and more particularly, that the legislature intended that the law should apply to persons having control of a vehicle while not actually driving it or having it in motion. The new statute defines two different offenses, “driving a vehicle” while intoxicated and “having actual physical control of a vehicle” while intoxicated.

Section 31-5-233(b) permits a DWI conviction for a person in actual physical control of a vehicle even if the person is not driving it.

Haskins v. State · filed 1997-11-13(b)

Under the law of the state of Wyoming, therefore, a person can be convicted of DWI even if he is not driving the vehicle in question.

Section 31-5-233(b) separately prohibits driving while intoxicated and having actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated.

Schnitzer v. Director of Revenue · filed 2009-10-20(b)

Given that the Wyoming statute under which Schnitzer was convicted covers two distinct offenses, only one of which is prohibited by Missouri’s driving while intoxicated law, Director was required to establish that Schnitzer was convicted of driving, not merely having physical control of, a vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 31-5-233 permits prosecution and cumulative punishment for injury-producing driving under the influence and aggravated assault and battery arising from the same incident.

Nowack v. State · filed 1989-05-09(g)

The fact that two statutes may provide different penalties for the same proscribed conduct does not constrain prosecution under either statute. ... We are satisfied that the legislature contemplated two separate types of conduct in the statutes and intended cumulative punishments.

In an aggravated driving under the influence prosecution, the jury may consider the victim’s conduct when deciding whether the defendant’s violation caused serious bodily injury.

Buckles v. State · filed 1992-04-16(h)

The issues in this case that lead to reversal are (1) whether a defendant who is charged with aggravated vehicular homicide or aggravated driving under the influence is entitled to have an instruction given to the jury that it may consider the actions of the driver victim when reaching its conclusion as to whether the conduct of the defendant is the cause of the death of or injury to the victims, and (2) whether the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of the use of a controlled substance by Stegena. Our answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative, and the product of that decision is that the trial court must be reversed.

DUI causing serious bodily injury does not merge with aggravated assault and battery for sentencing when each offense requires proof of a distinct element.

James v. State · filed 2012-03-09

Independent of his otherwise reckless driving, James was guilty of causing serious bodily injury while under the influence of alcohol. Thus, we conclude that James committed two separate and distinct criminal acts against each of his two victims, and that the district court appropriately imposed consecutive sentences for those separate offenses.

Section 31-5-233(a)(v) includes tribal DUI ordinances among other laws prohibiting driving while under the influence, so a tribal DUI conviction may support license revocation.

Pogue v. Allison · filed 1994-02-16(a)(v)

Section 31-5-233 (1989 Supp.) defines the phrase to mean "a statute of another state, the United States or a territory or district of the United States or an ordinance of a governmental entity of this or another state or of an Indian tribe which prohibits driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor...." It appears, therefore, that a conviction for driving under the influence pursuant to Tribal law may support the revocation of a driver's license.

Section 31-5-233 includes tribal DUI ordinances in its definition of other laws prohibiting driving under the influence, allowing a tribal DUI offense to support suspension of a Wyoming driver’s license.

Brandt v. United States · filed 1994-05-09(a)(v)

Section 31-5-233 (1989 Supp.) defines the phrase to mean “a statute of another state, the United States or a territory or district of the United States or an ordinance of a governmental entity of this or another state or of an Indian tribe which prohibits driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor....” ... Therefore, this Court con­cludes that under the Wyoming Statutes, BIA agents have the authority to compel the surrender or suspension of a person’s Wyo­ming driver’s license.

A Michigan conviction for driving while visibly impaired qualifies as a prior conviction for the fourth-offense felony enhancement under § 31-5-233(e).

Spreeman v. State · filed 2012-06-20(e)

Because Wyoming's enhancement provision, contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 81-5-2383(e), does not incorporate the elements of driving while under the influence of alcohol set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 81-5-2383(b)0), (b)G), or (b)@ii), we must conclude that Appellant's Michigan conviction for driving while visibly impaired may be used to enhance the current conviction to a felony.

Section 31-5-233(b) provides alternative ways to commit one DUI offense, so proof of both supports only one conviction and sentence.

Stalcup v. The State of Wyoming · filed 2013-09-27(b)

When a statute describes alternative means of committing the same offense, it will support only one conviction and one sentence even if the evidence shows that the statute was violated in both ways. ... Consistent with this rule, the district court should have entered only one conviction and sentence for DUI.

Subsection (b)(iii) permits a DUI conviction for alcohol impairment that makes a person incapable of driving safely, even when the jury does not find a blood alcohol level of 0.08% or higher under subsection (b)(i).

Young v. State · filed 2016-07-12(b)(iii)

Mr. Young was not found guilty under that theory. He was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol “[t]o a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving,” in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5- 233(b)(iii). There was evidence to support that finding.

Section 31-5-233(b)(iii)(C) prohibits driving when the combined influence of alcohol and a controlled substance makes a person incapable of driving safely and gives adequate notice that this conduct is illegal.

Guilford v. State · filed 2015-11-23(b)(iii)(C)

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(iii)(C) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Guilford’s conduct, and he has not carried his burden of showing his trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in failing to present evidence relating to the concentration of alcohol and THC in his blood.

Section 31-5-233(j) requires a district attorney to prosecute citations for a first offense of driving under the influence.

Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Leigh Anne G. Manlove, Wsb 6-3441 · filed 2023-04-04(j)

Additionally, she dismissed several matters initiated by a citation, including citations for a first offense of driving under the influence, which she was required by statute to prosecute. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(j) (LexisNexis 2021).