Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105

Subsection (a)(iv) imposes a four-year statute of limitations on state fraud and tort claims.

Bailey v. Casper College · filed 1999-03-01(a)(iv)

On appellant’s state fraud and tort claims, the statute of limitations is four years. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv) (Michie 1997).

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) supplies a four-year limitations period for an injury to the plaintiff's rights that is not based on contract and is not otherwise enumerated, including the declaratory judgment claim at issue.

Cox v. City of Cheyenne · filed 2003-11-18(a)(iv)(C)

The statute of limitations governing declaratory judgment actions is that "applicable to ordinary actions at law and suits in equity." Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 337 (Wyo.1944). The statute of limitation for declaratory judgments is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-102 which provides that civil actions may be brought as prescribed by that chapter unless a different limitation is prescribed by statute in which case that limitation will govern. The statute of limitations prescribed by this chapter is four years. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 2003).

Section 1-3-105(a)(d)(i)(B) provides a four-year limitations period for an action to recover an interest in personal property; the period is triggered when the claimant knows or should know of the cause of action.

Platt v. Creighton · filed 2007-01-31(a)(d)(i)(B)

If Platt had retained an ownership interest in those cattle, then there is no question that he knew or should have known that he had a cause of action at that time. The district court correctly held that the four-year statute of limitations had been triggered and that Platt had, at the latest, until April 1, 2002, to commence litigation. Platt's Complaint was not filed until June 6, 2005, and, accordingly, his claims are barred.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) provides a four-year limitations period for an injury to the plaintiff's rights that does not arise on contract and is not otherwise enumerated, including the applicable period for this § 1983 claim.

Gee v. Pacheco · filed 2010-10-26(a)(iv)(C)

The most analogous Wyoming limitations provision is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (setting four-year limitations period for “[a]n injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated”), making the applicable limitations period four years. See Sullivan v. Bailiff, 867 F. Supp. 992, 996 (D. Wyo. 1994). This claim accrued on the date of the incident, see Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), so the court received the complaint just after the limitations period expired.

Subsection (a)(iv)(C) provides a four-year limitations period for an injury to a plaintiff’s rights that does not arise on contract and is not otherwise enumerated.

Gee v. Pacheco · filed 2010-12-02(a)(iv)(C)

The most analogous Wyoming limitations provision is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (setting four-year limitations period for “[a]n injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated”), making the applicable limitations period four years.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv) imposes a four-year limitations period on claims for fraud, trespass, and injury to personal property.

Rubeck v. Brammer · filed 2022-01-26(a)(iv)

The applicable ... limitations period for fraud, trespass, and injury to personal property is four years under Wyoming law. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv). The relevant events took place between 2009 and 2014. The district court properly concluded that Mr. Rubeck’s state law claims are time-barred.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) provides a four-year limitations period for the applicable personal-injury claim, triggered in Wyoming when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the cause of action.

Deloge v. Scott Homar, Laramie District Attorney and Cheyenne Police Department · filed 2013-03-19(a)(iv)(C)

In ruling on the timeliness of Section 1983 claims, federal law requires that state courts apply the statute of limitations applicable to a state personal injury claim, which in Wyoming is a four-year statute of limitations. See Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., ... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 2011). Because Wyoming is a discovery jurisdiction, this four-year period is “triggered when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause of action.” ... Even applying the more generous trigger date for the four-year statute of limitations, Mr. DeLoge filed outside the limitations period. The deadline for Mr. DeLoge to file his complaint was June 5, 2010, and he did not file until August 22, 2011, over a year late. The district court properly dismissed the complaint as time barred.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(D) sets a four-year limitation period for actions based on fraud.

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor · filed 1986-05-23(a)(iv)(D)

In Wyoming a four-year statute of limitations is applicable for actions based on fraud, § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(D), W.S.1977.

Section 1-3-105 supplies a four-year limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Brockman v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1 · filed 1993-06-09

The applicable state statute prescribes a four year period for such actions. Wyo.Stat. § 1-3-105 (1977). We hold that the two-year Wyoming statute applicable to actions seeking to impose liability based on a federal statute will not be applied in this case because it is hostile to section 1983 causes of action.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) gives strict liability claims a four-year limitations period running from the date of injury.

Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. · filed 1986-03-19(a)(iv)(C)

In Wyoming the general torts statute, § l-3-105(a)(iv)(C), W.S.1977, governs strict liability claims. It establishes a four-year limitations period which runs from the date of injury.

Section 1-3-105 supplies a four-year limitations period that bars a § 1983 claim filed more than four years after the alleged injury.

Johnson v. Griffin · filed 1996-08-21

However, we need not reach this issue since Johnson’s claim is barred by the longer four year period found in Wyo.Stat. § 1-3-105 (1988).

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) provides a four-year limitations period for personal injury suits, which governs § 1983 claims in Wyoming.

Yellowbear v. Newell · filed 2015-07-17(a)(iv)(C)

The limitations period for claims ... brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury suits, which is four years in Wyoming. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C)).

Section 1-3-105 bars an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim when all of the alleged distress-causing events occurred more than four years before the complaint was filed.

VanLente v. University of Wyoming Research Corp. · filed 1999-03-26

The district court clearly was correct in invoking the statute of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 (Michie 1997). All of the events that VanLente asserts structured his emotional distress occurred more than four years prior to the filing of his complaint. Consequently, his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was time barred.

Section 1-3-105 imposes a four-year limitations period for the claim at issue; equitable estoppel did not prevent its application where the insurer did not mislead the plaintiff or promise settlement.

Inman v. Boykin · filed 2014-07-29

Inman does not dispute that her cause of action was subject to a four-year statute of limitations pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105. Nor does Inman dispute the material facts underlying Boykin’s dispositive motion: ... 4) that Inman served a defective summons and complaint on Boykin on November 5, 2012; and 5) that Inman served a corrected summons and complaint on Boykin on December 12, 2012, 142 days after the filing of her complaint. ... The evidence submitted by Inman in opposition to Boykin’s motion does not satisfy her burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Boykin’s statute of limitations defense. ... We therefore conclude, as in Archuleta, that the facts of this case present no basis for application of equitable estoppel to preclude Boykin’s statute of limitations defense. ... Applying a summary judgment standard of review, we hold that the court properly denied Plaintiff Inman’s assertion of equitable estoppel and correctly ruled that Inman’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.

Section 1-3-105(a)(i)’s ten-year limitation for actions on written contracts does not apply to a governmental entity unless the legislature expressly includes it or inclusion is necessary by implication.

Montana-Dakota Utilities, Co. v. Wyoming Public Service Commission · filed 2014-08-19(a)(i)

In its third issue, MDU relies on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i), which provides that an action upon a written contract “can only be brought” within ten years after the cause of action accrues. ... Statutes of limitation generally may not be invoked against the State. ... A governmental entity such as the Commission is not subject to a statute of limitations unless it is shown that the legislature has expressly so stated, or that the statute includes the governmental entity by necessary implication. ... MDU has made no such showing.

The ten-year limitations period bars breach-of-contract claims filed more than ten years after the material breach, including missed monthly payments.

Lim v. Boone · filed 2022-04-15(a)(l)

Like the License Agreement, the Marketing Agreement plainly required monthly payments, the first of which was due in November 2009 and the last of which was due in July 2010. But Plaintiffs did not file suit until September 2020. Therefore, the district court correctly held that Count Two was also untimely under the ten-year statute of limitations.

Good-faith settlement negotiations alone do not estop a defendant from asserting the one-year limitation for assault and battery claims.

Turner v. Turner · filed 1978-07-27(a)(v)(B)

Also, the mere pendency of negotiations during the period of a statute of limitations, which are conducted in good faith with a view to ultimate compromise, is not of itself sufficient to establish an estoppel.

Section 1-3-105(a) sets an eight-year limit for actions on oral agreements and a ten-year limit for actions on written agreements.

Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc. · filed 1991-02-11(a)(i), (a)(ii)

It is obvious that even more so than the action on the assigned claim that the statute of limitations — either oral agreement eight years, W.S. 1-3-105(a)(ii), or ten years, W.S. l-3-105(a)(i) — had passed.

Section 1-3-105 does not bar a school district’s action for damages arising from public school construction when the district acts in its sovereign capacity to protect public rights.

LARAMIE COUNTY SCH. DIST. 1 v. Muir · filed 1991-04-09

The parties in this case have focused their arguments on the text of § 1-3-111, but our holding applies with equal force to § 1-3-105. ... We hold, then, that construction of a public school building by a school district is a sovereign activity and that a suit against a contractor, or more specifically against an architect, for damages arising out of that construction is brought to vindicate public rights. Under the principle, "nullum tempus occurrit regi," the applicable statutes of limitations cannot be invoked to bar the school district from bringing its action to protect the public rights that are presented in this manifestation of sovereign activities.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) requires a personal-injury action to be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues; the action here was untimely because service occurred after that period expired.

Ryel v. Anderies · filed 2000-04-07(a)(iv)(C)

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)Giv)(C), a personal injury action must be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues. ... When Ryel's complaint was filed on September 16, 1997, the four-year period specified in the statute of limitations had not expired, but Ryel did not obtain service of process on Anderies until August 27, 1998, seven months after the statute of limitations expired.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) imposes a four-year limitations period on an action for an injury to the plaintiff's rights that does not arise on contract and is not otherwise enumerated.

Swenson v. Lincoln County School District No. 2 · filed 2003-05-03(a)(iv)(C)

[t]he statute of limitations for [ADA and Rehabilitation Act] actions brought in the District of Wyoming is controlled by Wyoming’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C). That period is four years.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) supplies Wyoming’s four-year limitations period for injuries to a plaintiff’s rights not arising on contract or otherwise enumerated, while subsection (b)’s special childhood-sexual-assault period does not serve as the borrowed limitations period for Title IX and § 1983 claims.

Doe v. Board of Trustees of Sublette County School · filed 2024-03-13(a)(iv)(C), (b)

It is settled law in this circuit that the applicable statute for Wyoming is, as noted and applied by the district court, the four-year limitations period set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1–3–105(a)(iv)(C) (setting four-year limitations period for “[a]n injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated”). Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 2010). Varnell further held that the same limitations period that applies to claims under § 1983 also applies to claims based on Title IX. 756 F.3d at 1213. Furthermore, Varnell specifically rejected the notion that a special state limitations period applicable to claims of sexual abuse could serve as the borrowed limitations period for claims like those raised by both Varnell and the Does here. Id. ... This aspect of Varnell’s holding conclusively disposes of the Does’ assertion that the relevant limitations period is the one set out in Wyoming’s special limitations period for childhood sexual assault. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(b). Accordingly, especially given the Does’ failure to contest this issue in their opening brief, this court need not, and does not, consider the matter further.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) requires personal injury actions to be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues.

Hammons v. International Playtex, Inc. · filed 1988-01-14(a)(iv)(C)

Personal injury actions must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) provides a four-year limitation period for personal injury claims.

Streeter v. Amerequip Corp. · filed 1997-06-26(a)(iv)(C)

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is four years. The complaint was filed within that four-year time period.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) requires a negligence action to be commenced within four years after it accrues.

James v. Montoya · filed 1998-08-13(a)(iv)(C)

Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) requires appellants to commence their negligence action within four years from the time it accrued.

Under § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), a constitutional claim challenging term limits accrues when legislators are actually barred from seeking reelection or electors are actually unable to vote for their chosen candidates.

Cathcart v. Meyer · filed 2004-05-04(a)(iv)(C)

We hold that in the context of the present case, the appellant legislators’ causes of action did not accrue until they were actually faced with the reality of being foreclosed from seeking re-election, and that the appellant electors’ causes of action did not accrue until they were actually faced with the reality of not being able to vote for their chosen candidates.

The four-year period for noncontract injury claims begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of damage and its potential wrongful cause.

Barlage v. Key Bank of Wyoming · filed 1995-03-16(a)(iv)(C)

This contention is not consistent with Wyoming law which, in the area of tort injuries, can perhaps be summarized by the proposition that the occurrence of damage satisfies the requirement that the injured party knew or reasonably should have known of the potential of a wrongful act being the cause.

The four-year limitations period for wrongful execution and conversion claims after reversal of an execution judgment begins when the written appellate opinion is filed with the clerk.

Gillis v. F & a ENTERPRISES · filed 1997-03-19(a)(iv)(B)

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations governing appellants’ claims is four years, as provided by W.S. 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) (Supp.1996). ... We conclude that the statute of limitations on appellants’ claims for wrongful execution and conversion began to run when the judgment upon which appellees sold appellants’ property was reversed by this court. The decision reversing the judgment was effective on the date the court’s written opinion was filed with the clerk, June 27, 1991. Therefore, appellants’ filing on July 14, 1995, exceeded the four-year statute of limitations period and their claims are barred.

The four-year period for trespass, nuisance, and negligence claims begins when a plaintiff reasonably should discover injury or damage from the wrongful act.

Wilson v. Amoco Corporation · filed 1998-05-01(a)(iv)

This argument ignores that the statute of limitations is not triggered merely because Steiner previously released the same contaminant into the environment, or because Steiner closed its facility. The statute is triggered when a particular Plaintiff reasonably should have discovered any injury or damage arising from the contamination. Because there is no evidence before the Court sufficient to support the conclusion that these “North Casper” Plaintiffs reasonably should have known of any injury before June 10, 1992, the Court will not dismiss their state law claims or limit their damages time-frame for those claims.

The four-year limitations period permits recovery for property damage caused by recurring contamination within four years before suit, even when the owner knew of earlier contamination.

Wilson v. Amoco Corporation · filed 1998-05-21(a)(iv)

The parties agree that the statute of limitations requires these claims to be brought within four years of their accrual. ... Contrary to Amoco’s assertions, however, Plaintiffs knowledge does not warrant outright dismissal of their state law claims, but merely a limitation on the period of time for which they may recover damages. ... In any event, the Court here finds that Plaintiffs Chadderdon, Francis, and Wilsons, may recover for damage to their respective properties that occurred on or after June 10, 1992, four years before this suit was filed.

For a sexual assault claim involving later discovered psychic trauma, the three-year discovery period begins when the trauma was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, if medical science could not earlier recognize it or forecast its consequences.

McCreary v. Weast · filed 1999-01-25(b)(ii)

If the trial court or the jury is satisfied that psychic trauma has been proximately caused by a sexual assault upon a minor, and medical science could not recognize that trauma, or its final consequences could not be forecast, the period of limitations described in the statute does not begin to run until the damage is identified. The factual issue then to be resolved is whether a party such as Weast discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the psychic trauma.

Section 1-3-105(a)(1) gives a claimant ten years after accrual to bring an action on a written contract.

Swinney v. Jones · filed 2008-12-17(a)(1)

The allegations of the complaint, and the amended complaint, reflect that Sellers knew or should have known that the breach of contract occurred on September 15, 1998. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(1), they had ten years to initiate litigation. Sellers failed to bring their lawsuit within that time period. Their complaint and amended complaint clearly demonstrate that the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1-3-105 provides a ten-year limit for actions on written contracts; the court held that Wyoming’s two-year limit applied instead.

Johnson Oil Co. v. United States Department of Energy · filed 1982-09-21

We hold the two-year statute of limitations of Wyoming rather than the ten-year statute to be applicable here.

Section 1-3-105(a)(i) allows ten years from accrual to bring an action on a written contract.

DeWitt v. Balben · filed 1986-04-23(a)(i)

Under the statute of limitations (§ 1-3-103 or § 1-3-105) then, the plaintiffs had until the year 1988 in which to bring their action. The plaintiffs’ action commenced in 1983. We hold the action is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1-3-105(a)(i)’s ten-year period for actions on written contracts supplies the limitation period for an ERISA claim to recover contributions owed under a written agreement.

Trustees of the Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Construction Co. · filed 1988-06-24(a)(i)

We agree with the Trustees’ contention that the Wyoming ten-year statute of limitations for actions based on written contract is applicable in this case. Wyo. Stat. § l-3-105(a)(i) (1977).

Section 1-3-105 allows ten years after accrual to sue on a written promissory note when Wyoming’s limitation period governs.

Stanbury v. Larsen · filed 1990-12-10(a)(i)

Thus, we hold that, even when the note was executed in California in 1981 and then delivered by mailing to Wyoming, enforcement was controlled by the Wyoming statute of limitations, and Stanbury then had at least ten years to file suit from date of receipt which completed delivery.

Section 1-3-105(a)(i) provides a ten-year limitations period for an action on a note signed before Wyoming shortened the period for negotiable instruments in 1991.

S & S Diversified Services, L.L.C. v. Arguello · filed 1995-01-09(a)(i)

Therefore, the Court concludes that the applicable statute of limitations is ten years as prescribed by Wyo.Stat. § l-3-105(a)(i). Because this action was filed less then ten years after the note went into default, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1-3-105(a)(i) sets a ten-year limit for actions on written contracts; when an arbitration agreement incorporates that limit, an expired period bars an arbitration demand.

Pioneer Water & Sewer District v. Civil Engineering Professionals, Inc. · filed 1995-11-15(a)(i)

In this instance, there is no question but that the statute of limitations has expired whether we apply the general statute of limitations which applies to written contracts or the statute of limitations which applies to improvements to real property.

Section 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B) gives a claim for unjust enrichment based on services an eight-year limitations period.

Haney v. Bridge to Life, LTD., a Wyoming Corporation · filed 2020-03-24(a)(ii)(B)

The Wyoming statute of limitations for implied contracts is 8 years. Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B). Any claim for unjust enrichment related to services she provided in 2006 expired in 2014.

Section 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B) provides an eight-year limitations period for an action based on liability created by statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty.

Stephen Smith and Audrey Smith, husband and wife v. Board of County Commissioners of Park County, Wyoming · filed 2013-01-09(a)(ii)(B)

The period of limitations applying to inverse condemnation actions is that period found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B), a period of eight years.

Section 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B)’s eight-year limit for liabilities created by statute does not bar enforcement of periodic child support payments ordered by decree.

Hollingshead v. Hollingshead · filed 1997-07-18(a)(ii)(B)

The plain language of Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B) provides that it is a general statute of limitations to bar an action based upon a liability created by statute. ... We hold, however, that its application as a bar to the enforcement of periodic child support payments was erroneous.

Section 1-3-105 requires an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress action to be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues, and accrual occurs only after the plaintiff experiences severe emotional distress.

Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines · filed 2016-12-21

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105, an action for the intentional infliction of -emotional distress must be brought within four years "after the cause of action accrues.” ... A cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues only after the plaintiff experiences "severe emotional distress.”

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) gives intentional infliction of emotional distress claims a four-year limitations period.

Gustafson v. Bridger Coal Co. · filed 1993-09-21(a)(iv)(C)

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) provides that the four year statute of limitations shall apply to “[a]n injury to the rights of the plaintiff ... not herein enumerated.” This is where the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress must fall.

Section 1-3-105(a)(v)(D)'s one-year limitation for an action on a penalty or forfeiture does not apply when the statute providing the remedy prescribes a different limitation.

In the Matter of U.S. Currency Totaling $470,040.00: Robert Miller v. The State of Wyoming · filed 2020-03-03(a)(v)(D)

The one-year statute of limitations did not apply to Mr. Miller’s case because the forfeiture statute “prescribed” a “different,” albeit inexact, “limitation”—it required the State to institute forfeiture proceedings “promptly.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1049(c).

Subsection (a)(v)(D) provides a one-year limitation period for an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture; for the statutory double-damages claim considered here, the period begins after notice of default and the operator's failure to cure within 60 days.

Eog Resources, Inc., a Delaware Corporation v. Jjlm Land, Llc, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company · filed 2022-12-28(a)(v)(D)

We have yet to decide whether § 1-3-105(a)(v)(D) applies to causes of action under § 30-5-405(b) but, even assuming it does, JJLM’s suit was timely. ... Under the plain language of § 30-5-405(b), cited above, a cause of action for double damages does not accrue until (1) the operator fails to timely pay or underpays an installment, (2) the surface owner provides notice of the default, and (3) the operator fails to cure the default within 60 days of receiving the notice. ... The notice requirement does not toll the statute of limitations. Rather, the statute of limitations for double damages under § 30-5-405(b) does not begin to run until the surface owner provides notice and the operator fails to cure. ... The district court correctly decided EOG’s claim for double damages under § 30-5-405(b) was not barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in § 1-3-105(a)(v)(D).

Section 1-3-105 treats statutory interest on withheld mineral proceeds as compensatory, so the one-year limit for penalties does not apply.

Town Of Moorcroft, Wyoming v. Enron Oil Trading & Transportation Company · filed 1993-02-08(a)(v)(D); (a)(ii)(B)

The eighteen percent interest is compensation for that use. ... We hold that the one-year limitation period does not apply in this case. As a consequence, the action is timely.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) gives conversion claims a four-year limitations period, measured from when the fraud was known or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence rather than only from actual notice.

Retz v. Siebrandt · filed 2008-04-11(a)(iv)(B)

The statute of limitations on conversion is four years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)Giv)(B) (LexisNexis 2007). Although Wyoming counts the statute of limitations from the date of discovery of a claim, we have previously held that ... the words 'until the discovery of the fraud appearing in § 1-18 mean from the time the fraud was known or could have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable ... diligence. They do not necessarily mean until the party complaining had actual notice of the fraud alleged to have been committed.

Section 1-3-105 gives a depositor four years to bring a conversion claim after the depositor knows or should know from bank statements that money was transferred from the account.

O'Donnell v. Western National Bank of Casper · filed 1985-09-19

We do agree, however, that when the bank statements were sent to Mr. O’Donnell in 1977, he knew or should have known of the claimed conversion of moneys from his account by the bank which deposited them in the accounts of Enesco of Wyoming, Inc. Since no claim was brought within four years based upon that alleged conversion, the district court properly concluded that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in § 1-3-105, W.S.1977.

Section 1-3-105(a) does not categorically exclude the discovery rule in contract actions; its application depends on the facts and circumstances.

Redland v. Redland · filed 2015-02-26(a)

This Court did not in Richardson announce a blanket rule that the discovery rule never applies to contract actions, and the context provided above makes it clear that it depends on the facts and circumstances of any particular case.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) gives negligence claims a four-year limitations period, running from when the injured party knows or reasonably ought to know that damage resulted from the wrongful act.

Tolman v. Stryker Corp. · filed 2013-02-22(a)(iv)(C)

In Wyoming, the statute of limitations for a negligence claim is four years. ... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) ... (2011); ... Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., ... 716 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo.1986). ... “A cause of action in negligence accrues when the injured party knows or reasonably ought to know that some damage has resulted from the wrongful act.”

Section 1-3-105’s four-year limitation period for a negligence claim begins when damage first occurs, rather than when the allegedly negligent act takes place.

ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips · filed 1981-08-13

Accordingly, in the present case since no damage was shown to have occurred at least until the water seepage reported by the Bensons in the summer of 1977, if that was a result of ground instability and not a defective sump pump, the cause of action did not accrue until then. Therefore, the statute of limitations could not, under any circumstances shown in this case, have started running until that summer.12 The action was commenced September 19, 1979, *940well within the statute. The district court was correct in refusing to dismiss the action under § 1-3-105, W.S.1977, supra.

Section 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) supplies a four-year limitations period for a declaratory-relief action that is not otherwise covered by a specific limitations period.

Estate of Weeks v. Weeks-Rohner · filed 2018-09-27(a)(iv)(C)

Because Ms. Weeks-Rohner's action was not one for recovery of property, arising in contract, or otherwise enumerated in our statutes of limitation, ... Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-3-101 ... et. seq. ... (LexisNexis 2017), her claim was subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Section 1-3-105(a)(i) sets a ten-year limit for mortgage foreclosure actions, subject to Wyoming’s borrowing statute.

Baker v. First National Bank of Denver · filed 1979-11-29(a)(i)

This section is applicable to foreclosure actions rather than § 1-3-103, W.S.1977, which sets the same period of ten years on actions “for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments.”