Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124

Section 26-15-124 claims are preempted when ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme governs.

Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. · filed 2002-05-29

We similarly hold that Moffett’s claim under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124 is preempted because it conflicts with ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits attorney's fees and interest when an insurer's refusal to pay is unreasonable or without cause.

Principal Life Insurance Co. v. Summit Well Service, Inc. · filed 2002-11-22(c)

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) (LexisNexis 2001) allows the award of attorney’s fees and interest where it is determined the insurance company’s refusal to pay is unreasonable or without cause. Costs are awardable under W.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) to the “prevailing party.” Having determined that payment of the policy proceeds to Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson was proper, we conclude no basis exists for awarding fees, costs, and interest to Mrs. Allen.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits discretionary awards of reasonable attorney's fees and prejudgment interest, including prejudgment interest on the statutory-fee award; the 14-day Rule 54(d)(2) filing deadline does not apply to a claim under the statute.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Tilden · filed 2008-04-16(c)

The unambiguous language of W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) does not place a 14-day filing deadline upon an application for fees in a case where the cause of action is for attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c). ... In short, there is no reason to require the filing of a motion for attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 26-15-124(c). ... Use of the word "may" suggests that the award of both attorney's fees and the award of interest are discretionary. ... That conclusion leads to the further conclusion that the "interest" mentioned in the statute is prejudgment interest, rather than interest on the judgment, because post-judgment interest at 10%, being mandated by law, is not discretionary. ... We affirm the order of the district court awarding prejudgment interest as part of the final judgment award.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits an award of attorney fees and 10% interest when an insurer unreasonably or without cause refuses to pay a covered loss, but entitlement requires a finding of that unreasonableness in the relevant action or proceeding.

Cornhusker Casualty Company v. Skaj · filed 2015-05-18(c)

More recently, the Wyoming Supreme Court has clarified that a claim brought under § 26-15-124(c) requires proof, inter alia, “that in [an] action or proceeding it was determined that the [insurer] refused to pay the full amount of loss covered by the policy . . . and that a determination was made in that action or proceeding that the refusal was unreasonable or without cause.” ... And, according to the Wyoming Supreme Court, establishing one’s entitlement to statutory attorneys’ fees “requires” proving that “a determination was made in [the relevant] action or proceeding that the [insurer’s] refusal was unreasonable or without cause.” ... Indeed, the court has explained that “[a]n element of the claim is that a finding of unreasonableness was made in a prior proceeding or action (if not, then in the current action).” ... No such finding has been made here, and we decline to make this finding sua sponte.

Section 26-15-124 permits prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees only for insurance policies issued for delivery in Wyoming or delivered in Wyoming, and requires proof that payment was withheld unreasonably or without cause.

Lexington Insurance Company v. Precision Drilling Company · filed 2020-02-26(c)

Addressing the merits of the issue, we agree with Lexington that Precision obtains no relief from § 26-15-124. ... The Lexington policies were issued in Texas, so the Wyoming insurance code, including § 26-15-124, is inapplicable. ... Precision also fails to show that Lexington’s refusal to reimburse Precision for the Jent settlement was unreasonable or without cause as required by § 26-15-124(c). ... Because Precision fails to show that the district court abused its discretion and fails to adequately show that Lexington unreasonably or without cause withheld payment, we affirm the district court’s holding that Precision is not entitled to prejudgment interest or attorneys’ fees under § 26-15-124(c).

Section 26-15-124(c) permits attorney’s fees when an insurer refuses to pay a covered loss unreasonably or without cause; those terms have their ordinary meaning, so a jury instruction using the statute’s language is sufficient.

Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1985-10-09(c)

The only question that the jury was asked to resolve was whether in the language of the statute, § 26-15-124(c), the refusal was “unreasonable or without cause.” Further defining or explaining for the jury the meaning of “unreasonable or without cause” is unnecessary. It would serve only to further confuse the issue. The terms have a plain meaning commonly understood. The company can refuse to pay if reasonable or for cause, but not otherwise. What appellants ask says no more. The instruction in the language of the statute was sufficient.

Section 26-15-124(c)'s claims payment provisions govern whether a surety separately owes part of a claimant's attorney’s fees.

Hoiness-LaBar Insurance v. Julien Construction Co. · filed 1987-10-08(c)

Judgment should be entered in favor of Julien against Allied in the sum of $1,940, and the trial court should determine under the claims payment provisions of § 26-15-124(c), W.S.1977 what, if any, part of the total attorney’s fees of $8,500 might be a separate obligation of Allied.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits attorney’s fees and interest for a third-party claimant only after liability is established by judgment or settlement and the insurer unreasonably refuses to pay the covered amount.

Herrig v. Herrig · filed 1992-12-28(c)

Accordingly, we interpret subsection (c), the only subsection arguably applicable to third-party claimants, to provide that a court may award attorney’s fees and interest under very limited circumstances. Those circumstances are when: (1) the third-party claimant has reduced his liability claim against an insured to judgment ... or has reached a settlement agreement with the insured and insurer; (2) the insurer subsequently has refused to pay the judgment or the settlement amount to the extent covered by the policy; and (3) the refusal to pay has been determined to be unreasonable or without cause in an action to collect on the judgment or to enforce the settlement agreement.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits attorney's fees when an insurer's refusal to pay the full amount of a covered loss is unreasonable or without cause.

Hutchinson Oil Co. v. Federated Service Ins. Co. · filed 1994-03-22(c)

Under Wyo.Stat. § 26-15-124(c), attorney's fees may be awarded if a refusal to pay the full amount of the loss covered by the policy is unreasonable or without cause. No evidence suggests that Federated's actions in refusing to provide coverage in this instance was unreasonable or without cause. Federated is entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits attorney’s fees and interest when an insurer unreasonably or without cause refuses to pay a justifiable claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Shrader · filed 1994-09-29(c)

We reaffirm that attorney’s fees and interest may be recoverable under Wyo.Stat. § 26-15-124(c) when an insurer unreasonably or without cause refuses to pay a justifiable claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits an attorney’s fee award for unreasonable delay in curing a covered title defect even when the insured suffers no actual damages.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Tilden · filed 2005-04-27(c)

We do not believe the legislature intended for the conduct of an insurance company that constitutes an unreasonable delay in claim settlement to be removed from the ambit of the statute simply because the insurance company can settle the claim by means other than payment of an amount for a monetary loss suffered by the insured. To use the present example, the fact that a title company can cure a title defect and thereby prevent its insured from sustaining actual damages does not excuse the company from liability under the statute for its unreasonable claim settlement practices prior to curing the title defect.

Subsection (c) allows a court to award attorney's fees and 10% annual interest when an insurer unreasonably or without cause refuses to pay the full amount of a covered loss.

Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants LLC · filed 2018-07-13(c)

In conjunction with their bad faith claims, AMC and Sunridge assert they are entitled to recover attorneys' fees and interest pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124. ... The Court has previously determined that the refusal to defend or pay was not unreasonable or without cause and did not support any cognizable bad faith claims. Having made this determination, the Court finds that AMC and Sunridge are not entitled to recover attorneys' fees or interest as to the bad faith claims in this case.

Section 26-15-124(c) allows attorney’s fees when an insurer unreasonably refuses to pay a covered loss; a reasonable denial defeats the fee claim.

Hurst v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2020-06-04(c)

We agree that Nationwide reasonably denied Plaintiffs’ claim. Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nationwide on Plaintiffs’ contingent claim for statutory attorneys’ fees.

Section 26-15-124 does not allow attorney’s fees when the policy does not cover the claimed loss.

Davis v. State · filed 1996-01-09(c)

The district court, therefore, properly dismissed cause of action 8 because, under the plain language of § 26-15-124, the statute does not apply when the policy does not cover a loss.

Section 26-15-124(e) permits attorney’s fees when an insurer unreasonably or without cause refuses to pay the full amount of a covered loss.

Kersh v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1994-03-07(e)

Under Wyo.Stat. § 26-15-124(e), at­ torney’s fees may be awarded if a refusal to pay the full amount of the loss covered by the policy is unreasonable or without cause. No evidence suggests that Federated’s ac­ tions in refusing to provide coverage in this instance was unreasonable or without cause.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits an attorney fee claim to proceed when the policy covers a Wyoming insured and its Wyoming refinery.

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. Infrassure · filed 2021-06-15(c)

In response, the parties filed a stipulated motion to remand to the district court for further proceedings on Sinclair Wyoming’s claim pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c). Because the Policy applies to—as relevant here—Sinclair Wyoming and its Wyoming refinery, the district court erred in entering summary judgment for Infrassure on the matter of attorney fees. We therefore reverse and grant the stipulated motion to remand.

Section 26-15-124(c) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees and 10% annual interest for an unreasonable, unjustified refusal to pay a covered loss, and it can apply when the policy is issued for delivery in Wyoming because both the insured and the risk are located there.

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company v. Infrassure, Ltd · filed 2021-05-10(c)

For purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-101(a)(ii), an insurance contract is “delivered” in Wyoming if it is actually or constructively delivered in Wyoming. For purposes of § 26-15-101(a)(ii), an insurance contract is “issued for delivery” where the policy was intended to be delivered. This Court holds that, absent an insurance contract unambiguously stating otherwise, if the location of the insured and the location of the risk to be insured are both in Wyoming, an insurance policy is intended to be delivered and is “issued for delivery” in Wyoming. ... Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-101(a)(ii), an insurance policy is “issued for delivery” in Wyoming where a Wyoming corporation – in this case Sinclair – is a named insured and the policy covers risks in Wyoming.

Section 26-15-124’s attorney’s fee provision does not apply to a policy neither issued nor delivered in Wyoming.

Crawford v. Infinity Insurance · filed 2001-03-30

It is undisputed that Infinity’s policy insuring Mr. Santiago was neither issued nor delivered in Wyoming. Therefore, this insurance policy is exempt from the attorney’s fee provision of Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124.

Section 26-15-124(c) provides a private right of action under its stated circumstances, but does not create one for unfair claim settlement practices under § 26-13-124.

Julian v. New Hampshire Insurance · filed 1988-09-02(c)

Although this court acknowledges that this section provides a private right of action under the stated circumstances, the court does not believe that it relates to a private cause of action under Wyo.Stat. § 26-13-124 (unfair claim settlement practices).

Subsection (c) provides a narrower remedy than an independent bad faith tort claim and does not preclude that claim.

McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance Co. · filed 1990-04-05(c)

It seldom is and would not be in Wyoming and we join the majority precept in rejection of statutory preemption. ... Clearly, the Wyoming statutes, W.S. 26-15-124(c) and 26-13-124, and the entire insurance code, W.S. 26-1-101 through 26-38-106, do not provide the same scope of remedies as found in the good faith and fair dealing independent tort remedy.

The forty-five-day period for accepting or rejecting and paying a claim begins when the insurer receives proofs of loss and supporting evidence.

Darlow v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1991-12-09(a)

The statutory period for the first-party insurance benefit payments begins when the insurer receives the proofs of loss and the supporting evidence.