Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109

In a tort case, each defendant is responsible for the proportionate share of total fault that the jury assigns.

Rudy v. Bossard · filed 2000-02-28

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (LEXIS 1999) indicates that each defendant in a tort case is responsible for his proportionate share of the total fault as determined by the jury.

Section 1-1-109(d) makes each defendant liable only for its proportionate share of the total damages, abolishing joint-and-several liability in a simple-negligence case even when the claimant is free of fault.

Anderson Highway Signs & Supply, Inc. v. Close · filed 2000-05-04(d)

Applying Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(d), it is clear the district court erred in assigning to Anderson the obligation of paying 100% of the Closes' damages. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute dictates that Anderson is only responsible for 50% of the damages, in proportion to its percentage of fault.

Section 1-1-109(a) compares a plaintiff’s negligence separately with each person from whom the plaintiff seeks recovery.

BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF CTY., ETC. v. Ridenour · filed 1981-02-03(a)

First, the simple language of the statute is that the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence will be compared to the percentage of negligence attributed to "the person against whom recovery is sought."

Section 1-1-109(a) compares a plaintiff’s negligence individually with each person from whom recovery is sought; the plaintiff cannot recover from a person whose negligence is no greater than the plaintiff’s.

Board of County Commissioners v. Ridenour · filed 1981-02-03(a)

After carefully reviewing these arguments, we conclude that the legislature in enacting the Comparative Negligence Act adopted the “Wisconsin Rule.” We have reached this conclusion for several reasons. First, the simple language of the statute is that the percentage of the plaintiff’s negligence will be compared to the percentage of negligence attributed to “the person against whom recovery is sought.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 1-1-109(d) limits each defendant’s liability to the percentage of fault assigned to that defendant, so a defendant receives no credit for sums paid by settling parties.

Haderlie v. Sondgeroth · filed 1993-12-15(d)

Credit would not be given because the amount of judgment for which each defendant is liable is always limited by the percentage of fault assigned to that defendant. Therefore, as a matter of law, Haderlie can have no credit upon the judgment for sums paid by others because Haderlie, if and when he pays 100 percent of this judgment, will not pay more than the “percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him” by the jury in its verdict finding him 100 percent at fault.

Section 1-1-109(a)(i) permits the jury to apportion fault among all parties and nonparties whose acts proximately caused the claimant's injury.

Smyth v. Kaufman · filed 2003-04-30(a)(i)

It is also well established, however, that, under Wyoming's comparative fault scheme, a jury is entitled to apportion the fault of all those whose acts proximately caused injury to the claimant-parties and nonparties alike. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2001).

Section 1-1-109 requires the fact finder to determine the percentage of negligence attributable to everyone at fault, including nonparties.

Cities Service Co. v. Northern Production Co. · filed 1985-08-23

With the adoption of comparative negligence, § 1-1-109, W.S.1977, a method was provided for determining the percentage of negligence attributable to each participant which was a cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. The percentage of negligence of everyone at fault, including non-parties, should be determined by the fact finder in arriving at the 100 percent of negligence that caused the injuries.

Section 1-1-109 makes comparative-fault evidence relevant to reducing damages, but does not define or alter a defendant’s initial duty.

Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. · filed 2003-12-22

Third, the Wyoming comparative fault statute has no effect on the application of the learned intermediary doctrine. ... Wyoming’s comparative fault scheme, on the other hand, presents evidence of another’s negligence “in order to reduce damages; [it] in no way defines or affects the scope of the defendant’s initial duty.”

Section 1-1-109 removes absolute defenses based on a plaintiff’s negligence but does not create new duties of care for defendants.

Sherman v. Platte County · filed 1982-04-05

Comparative negligence only abrogated absolute defenses involving the plaintiff’s own negligence in bringing about his or her injuries. See Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979). However, it did not impose any new duties of care on prospective defendants.

Section 1-1-109 apportions negligence damages but does not create new duties of care or abrogate the natural accumulation and obvious danger rules.

Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc. · filed 1994-02-08(a)

We find support for the Sherman and O’Donnell decisions in the language of Wyoming’s comparative negligence statute, WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988). ... The plain language of the statute cannot be read to impose new duties of care on prospective defendants.

An immune entity may still be an “actor” whose proximate fault the jury must apportion under Wyoming’s comparative-fault scheme.

Pinnacle Bank v. Villa · filed 2004-11-30(a)(i), (a)(iv), (c)(i)(A), and (e)

As can be seen by the plain language of this statute, the Wyoming legislature has decided that the jury must determine the percentage of fault attributable to each “actor.” § 1-1-109(c)(i)(A). ... The definition of “actor” includes an entity whose fault is determined to be the proximate cause of the injury whether or not a party to the litigation. ... While the State is not here subject to strict liability, it can act in a negligent manner by failing to use reasonable care. We therefore conclude that the State can be at “fault” and, therefore, fits the definition of “actor.” ... For these reasons, we conclude that the State, even though immune, can be included in the jury’s comparative fault analysis.

Section 1-1-109 permits a nonparty actor to be placed on the verdict form when the actor's fault proximately caused the injury, but assigning fault requires proof of negligence, including duty, breach, proximate cause, and actual loss.

Glenn v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2011-09-09(a)(i), (a)(iv)

As noted above, under Wyoming's comparative fault statute, a non-party actor may be placed on the verdict form if the actor's fault is determined to be a proximate cause of injury. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2011). ... Because the definition of "fault" includes acts or omissions "that are in any measure negligent," one who seeks to include a non-party actor on the verdict form must prove that the actor was negligent by showing (1) the actor owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the actor breached the duty, (8) the actor's breach was the proximate cause of injury or loss to the plaintiff, and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss. See Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, 111, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wy0.2002).

The statute requires the jury to apportion fault among every actor whose proximate conduct contributed to the harm, including nonparties, so each defendant is liable only for its proportionate fault.

Jtl Group, Inc., D/B/A Knife River, a Wyoming Corporation and Roadworx Industries, Llc, a Wyoming Limited Liability Comp · filed 2022-06-07(c)(i)(A), (a)(i)

Our comparative fault statute mandates the jury to determine “the percentage of fault attributable to each actor.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2021) (emphasis added). An “actor” is defined as “a person or other entity, including the claimant, whose fault is determined to be a proximate cause of the death, injury or damage, whether or not the actor is a party to the litigation[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(a)(i). “‘Fault’ includes acts or omissions, determined to be a proximate cause of death or injury to person or property, that are in any measure negligent, or that subject an actor to strict tort or strict products liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse or alteration of a product[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(a)(i). As seen by the plain language of the statute, the Wyoming legislature determined it is the jury’s responsibility to apportion the percentage of fault attributable to each “actor,” which facilitates the legislature’s objective to hold each defendant liable only for his proportion of fault.

Subsection (b) bars a claimant from recovering when the claimant's contributory fault is more than 50 percent of the total fault of all actors.

Parrish v. Groathouse Construction, Inc. · filed 2006-03-22(b)

As long as Mr. Parrish’s fault remains greater than fifty percent, he is not entitled to recovery under Wyoming’s comparative fault statute. ... Under Wyoming’s comparative fault statute, a claimant cannot recover for an injury unless "the contributory fault of the claimant is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1 — 1—109(b) (Lexis-Nexis 2005).

Section 1-1-109 does not permit a jury in a fraud case to compare the victim’s negligence with the perpetrator’s intentional conduct to reduce the perpetrator’s liability.

Erdelyi v. Lott · filed 2014-04-11

Absent clear statutory language showing the legislature intended the negligence of a fraud victim to be compared to the conduct of the perpetrator, thereby potentially reducing the latter’s liability for his intentionally wrongful acts, we decline to hold that § 1-1-109 is a proper matter for a jury instruction in a fraud case.

The statute requires the jury to assign each actor a percentage of fault, defines actor and fault broadly, and reduces a plaintiff’s damages in proportion to the plaintiff’s fault.

Steven F. Ludlow · filed 2015-03-24(c)(i)(A), (a)(i), (a)(iv), (b)

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2013) provides that a jury should determine “the percentage of fault attributable to each actor.” The term “actor” is defined as “a person or other entity, including the [plaintiff], whose fault is determined to be a proximate cause of the death, injury or damage, whether or not the actor is a party to the litigation.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(a)(i). The term “fault” is defined to include “acts or omissions, determined to be a proximate cause of death or injury to person or property, ... This system is commonly referred to as comparative fault. ... We have already concluded that the evidence of Ms. Wise’s fault was sufficient to justify the district court’s denial of her motion for judgment as a matter of law. It is also sufficient to support the district court’s decision to instruct the jury on comparative fault. ... This was not an unequivocal admission of 100% of the fault that eliminated comparative fault as an issue to be determined by the jury. The district court properly instructed the jury on comparative fault.

A plaintiff’s negligence may be submitted to the jury under comparative negligence only when substantial evidence supports it.

Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich · filed 1978-06-22

The same rule would apply with respect to the negligence of a plaintiff in a comparative negligence context. ... We hold that the trial court ruled correctly in refusing to submit the question of Todorovich’s negligence to the jury insofar as the operation of his motor vehicle was concerned.

Comparative negligence is ordinarily a jury question, and a court may decide the plaintiff’s share of negligence on summary judgment only in rare cases.

Connett Ex Rel. Connett v. Fremont County School District No. 6 · filed 1978-07-11

The comparison of causal negligence under such a statute, is peculiarly a jury function, and only in rare cases is it permissible for a court to hold that a plaintiff’s conduct reflects at least 50 percent of the negligence.

Section 1-1-109 requires negligence liability to be assessed by comparative fault percentages; parties cannot replace that standard with a contractual gross-negligence requirement.

Tate v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1982-06-08

Since the enactment of the comparative negligence statute, § 1-1-109, W.S.1977,1 the determination of liability in a negligence case must be considered with reference to comparative negligence on a percentage basis. ... The public policy, then, as established by the comparative negligence statute is to abolish “gross” as a measure of negligence in negligence actions. The parties to this action cannot change the state policy by contract.

Section 1-1-109 leaves the comparison of negligence to the fact finder when the evidence permits differing opinions.

Cline v. Sawyer · filed 1980-10-23

Unless the evidence is such that it can reasonably lead to one conclusion, the question of negligence is primarily a question of fact, and the duty to make the comparison of negligence as required by the comparative negligence statute is for the fact finder if the evidence can result in a difference of opinion.

Section 1-1-109 requires the jury to determine each party's percentage of fault separately when a plaintiff's contributory negligence is at issue.

Martinez v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 1983-08-18

Under Wyoming law the jury must determine the percentage of fault of each party when the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs is at issue.

Section 1-1-109 requires the jury to determine each party’s percentage of fault separately when a plaintiff’s contributory negligence is at issue.

Martinez v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1983-08-18

Under Wyoming law the jury must determine the percentage of fault of each party when the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs is at issue.

Section 1-1-109 compares a plaintiff’s negligence with total fault at trial, but possible plaintiff negligence does not require a trial to apportion liability without a material factual question about the defendant’s negligence.

Radosevich v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1989-07-03

This negligence is compared to the total fault under W.S. 1-1-109 if there is a trial. ... Appellant contends that a jury trial is needed to compare the negligence of the parties. While it appears from the materials presented in support of summary judgment that the plaintiff in this case may have been negligent, negligence of the plaintiff alone does not automatically require a trial to apportion liability. There must be a question of material fact in regard to defendants’ negligence; negligence of a defendant will not be presumed merely because a plaintiff was injured.

Section 1-1-109(b)(i)(B) did not require an instruction about the employer’s immunity where the jury was told how the decedent’s percentage of fault affected recovery, at least under plain-error review.

Furman v. Rural Electric Co. · filed 1994-02-18(b)(i)(B)

The trial court gave an instruction describing Wyoming’ comparative fault scheme and alerting the jury that if it found decedent over fifty percent at fault then Furman will recover nothing. We recently found a similar instruction adequate for compliance with Wyo.Stat. § l-l-109(b)(i)(B). Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703 (Wyo.1993). Therefore, we find no plain error by the trial court in failing to inform the jury that the Highway Department was immune from suit.

Section 1-1-109(b) allows a plaintiff who is partly at fault to recover proportional damages only if the plaintiff's fault is not more than 50% of the total fault.

Otten v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2023-02-13(b)

Applying this to a situation where both the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent, the basics of comparative negligence are governed by statute. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b). Under the statute, a plaintiff who bears some fault for his injury may recover proportional damages so long as his fault “is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors.” Id.

Section 1-1-109(b) permits recovery when a claimant's contributory fault is 50 percent or less, reduces damages proportionally, and bars recovery when the claimant's fault exceeds 50 percent; it applies broadly to negligence actions unless another statute expressly limits it.

Bunning v. Romero · filed 2026-04-09(b)

Under this subsection, a plaintiff, even if at fault to some degree for the injury for which he’s seeking to recover damages, may still recover those damages if his contributory fault is not more than fifty percent of the total fault of all actors. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b); see also Schneider Nat., Inc., 843 P.2d at 569. However, a plaintiff is barred—prohibited or prevented—from recovery if his contributory fault is more than fifty percent of the total fault of all actors. See Parrish, ¶ 13, 130 P.3d at 506 (“[a]s long as Mr. Parrish’s fault remains greater than fifty percent, he is not entitled to recovery under Wyoming’s comparative fault statute.”) ... If the Wyoming Legislature intended to preclude the application of § 1-1-109 to violations of § 31-5-222, it would have expressly included plain clear language to that effect. It did not. Thus, § 1-1-109 applies to Mr. Bunning’s case.

Section 1-1-109 applies only when the plaintiff is contributorily negligent; a plaintiff free from negligence has no reduction in recovery.

Palmeno v. Cashen · filed 1981-04-22

Under its own terms, § 1-1-109, supra, becomes operative in those cases only where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent. Where the plaintiff is found to have been free from negligence, the statute does not apply. If the plaintiff’s negligence is found to be nil, then his recovery is not diminished.

Section 1-1-109's comparative negligence procedure applies only when the evidence supports finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent.

Martinez v. City of Cheyenne · filed 1990-05-04(b)(i)(A)

This statute is limited to its invocation “in those cases only where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent.” Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163, 166 (Wyo.1981). If the evidence does not disclose negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the statute does not apply.

Section 1-1-109 requires the jury to compare willful conduct with negligence when apportioning fault.

Board of County Commissioners Ex Rel. Teton County Sheriff's Department v. Bassett · filed 2000-07-25

We have a duty to effectuate this intent, and therefore, hold that willful conduct must be compared with negligence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109.

Section 1-1-109 permits a jury determination of comparative fault against derivative defendants when the alleged actor's negligence is established.

Beavis Ex Rel. Beavis v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital · filed 2001-03-26

Although the parties spend little time discussing comparative fault, we believe this case must be analyzed consistently with the Wyoming Comparative Fault Statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (Lexis 1999), in order to uphold the legislative mandate on comparative fault.

Comparative-negligence standards under § 1-1-109 preserve the sudden-emergency doctrine as a circumstance for the jury's apportionment of fault.

Roberts v. Estate of Randall · filed 2002-07-26

Now that comparative negligence standards apply, we continue to see that such circumstances are relevant to a jury’s proper apportionment of fault and hold that comparative negligence statutes have not eliminated the necessity of the sudden emergency doctrine.

Section 1-1-109 applies to tort claims involving personal injury or property damage, not to a breach-of-contract action.

Fuentes v. JEDNAT · filed 2010-04-02

The adoption of comparative fault mandates that the trier of fact determine issues of proximate cause and allocate liability accordingly.

Section 1-1-109 does not provide a basis for apportioning liability in a breach-of-contract action because it applies to tort claims for personal injury or property damage.

Strong Construction Inc. v. City of Torrington · filed 2011-05-23(a)(iv)

Although Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 has been extended to strict tort liability and products liability actions since the decision in Phillips, the statute does not provide any indication that comparative fault is applicable to a breach of contract action.

Section 1-1-109(a) applies only to negligence claims; it neither bars nor reduces recovery for breach of contract or fiduciary duty in a legal malpractice action.

Jackson State Bank v. King · filed 1993-01-06(a)

We are in accord with Miles’ position that the plain and unambiguous language of § l-l-109(a) demonstrates that the statute applies only to those causes of action arising out of negligence. It does not extend to those that are based upon a theory of contract or a theory of breach of fiduciary duty. It follows that the statute does not serve as a bar to those claims by Miles, nor can it be invoked to reduce his recovery by any percentage of fault.

Section 1-1-109(a) does not apply to legal malpractice claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Jackson State Bank, a Wyoming Banking Corporation, and Maurice E. Miles v. King · filed 1993-04-23(a)

This case was tried and instructed under the assumption that the comparative negligence statute applied. The answers to the certified questions make clear that this assumption was incorrect.

Section 1-1-109 does not permit an intentional tortfeasor to shift responsibility to the victim by invoking the victim's comparative fault.

Alexander Vincent Ray Cave v. The State of Wyoming · filed 2022-03-01

Applying our reasoning in Erdelyi, we conclude it would be against public policy to allow an intentional tortfeasor like Mr. Cave to “escape liability for his wrongful conduct by shifting the responsibility to [his] victim.”

Section 1-1-109(a) treats assumption of risk as contributory negligence to be apportioned, rather than as an absolute defense.

Brittain v. Booth · filed 1979-10-17(a)

Accordingly, assumption of risk, as a form of contributory negligence is not an absolute defense to a negligence action, but is a basis for apportionment of fault.

Section 1-1-109(a) forbids an obvious-danger instruction from automatically barring recovery; the jury must assess the parties’ comparative negligence.

Cervelli v. Graves · filed 1983-04-06(a)

Instruction 10 in effect resurrects contributory negligence as a bar to appellant’s recovery. Our comparative negligence statute, see fn. 5, clearly forbids any such bar to appellant’s recovery.

Section 1-1-109 permits the trier of fact to consider a known and obvious danger when determining the plaintiff’s percentage of negligence; the danger does not automatically bar recovery.

O'DONNELL v. City of Casper · filed 1985-03-18

We hold that the known and obvious danger rule does not negate the City’s duty to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition and in reasonably good repair, and that the obvious danger of the streets may be considered by the trier of fact to determine plaintiff’s percentage of negligence.

Section 1-1-109 treats assumption of risk as a form of contributory negligence for the jury to apportion, rather than as a complete bar to recovery.

Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co. · filed 1989-09-01

With the advent of comparative negligence legislation, however, assumption of the risk, as a form of contributory negligence, became a basis for an apportionment of fault and no longer operated as a complete bar to recovery.

Section 1-1-109 treats assumption of risk as a basis for apportioning fault rather than an absolute bar to recovery.

Walters v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc. · filed 1992-10-13

Under Wyoming’s comparative negligence statute, Wyo.Stat. 1-1-109 (1988), assumption of risk has been held to be a form of contributory negligence. ... Assumption of risk is now a basis for apportioning fault. ... For these reasons, the Court rejects the defendant’s argument that assumption of risk should be a bar to recovery.

Section 1-1-109 leaves comparison of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s negligence to the jury even when the danger was obvious to the plaintiff.

Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1986-05-01

Even if the danger was perfectly obvious to appellant, it is the function of the jury, under the comparative negligence statute, to compare his negligence with that of Chevron.

Section 1-1-109 limits damages according to comparative fault, including fault based on a party’s assumption of risk.

Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC · filed 2014-10-21

Furthermore, the Court’s instruction on comparative negligence addressed these concerns, and required the jury to allocate fault for acts or omissions determined to be a cause of the injury. Fault includes and embraces, among other things, assumption of risk by a party. The recovery of damages is limited in accordance with the comparative fault statute. See e.g., Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109.

Section 1-1-109(b)(ii) limits a spouse’s loss-of-consortium recovery by the injured spouse’s percentage of causal negligence.

Weaver v. Mitchell · filed 1986-03-18(b)(ii)

The trial court should have reduced the award to Marilynn Mitchell by the percentage of fault attributed her husband, Preston Mitchell. A cause of action for loss of consortium is a derivative action, and the causal negligence of the injured spouse limits recovery of the claiming spouse under the comparative negligence statute, § 1-1-109(b)(ii), W.S.1977.

Section 1-1-109 leaves equitable implied indemnity available and permits negligence indemnity to be allocated according to comparative fault.

Horowitz v. Schneider National · filed 1993-05-03

The Wyoming Supreme Court has determined that the common law indemnity action has survived the advent of comparative fault, albeit in a different form. ... In a negligence action, "indemnity liability is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to their comparative degree of fault." ... Following the rules announced by the Wyoming Supreme Court, this complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1-1-109 does not bar an express contractual indemnity claim based on a negligently breached duty owed independently to the third-party plaintiff.

Diamond Surface, Inc. v. Cleveland · filed 1998-08-17

We further find that a claim for express indemnity, under limited circumstances, survives the adoption of comparative fault in Wyoming.

Section 1-1-109 leaves equitable implied indemnity available; negligence-based indemnity is allocated according to comparative fault.

Horowitz ex rel. Estates of Horowitz v. Schneider National, Inc. · filed 1993-05-03

The certified questions raised issues concerning the proper role, if any, of common law indemnity following Wyoming’s adoption of a comparative fault statute in 1986. The Wyoming Supreme Court has determined that the common law indemnity action has survived the advent of comparative fault, albeit in a different form. ... Following the rules announced by the Wyoming Supreme Court, this complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1-1-109 requires apportionment of damages even after a default judgment establishes a defendant’s liability.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Colley · filed 1994-03-24(b)(i) or (ii)

This argument ignores the obligation of the state district court to make an allocation of damages after granting a judgment by default. While the judgment entered by the state district court established Dyer’s liability for his actions, as a matter of law, the apportionment of damages required by Wyo.Stat. § 1-1-109(b)(i) or (ii) (1988) remains to be determined.

Section 1-1-109 allows a defaulted defendant to contest whether the event caused the claimed damages; even a defendant assigned all the fault owes nothing if that fault caused no damages.

Schaub v. Wilson · filed 1998-12-21(b)(ii), (d)

This analysis leads us back, not to the right to litigate proportionate fault, as to which Wilson must be foreclosed since no claim of Schaub’s negligence is available to him, but to the application of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1 — 109(b)(ii), which charges the trial court with determining the total amount of damages. Pursuant to the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 1 — 1—109(d), Wilson is liable only for the proportion of the total dollar amount determined as damages in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him. We do not understand the statute to assume that damages can exist in a vacuum, but the damages the trial court is charged with determining must have been incurred in the event as to which recovery is sought. Even though Wilson is charged with one hundred percent of the fault, if no damages were caused by Wilson’s fault, no recovery can be had.

Section 1-1-109 makes each actor’s percentage of fault part of the damages calculation, so a defendant in default may participate in discovery and proceedings concerning fault before judgment.

McGarvin-Moberly Construction Co. v. Welden · filed 1995-06-29

Because, by our comparative negligence statute, the question of fault is inextricably intertwined with the amount of damages that may be awarded against any defendant, we perceive the trial court’s initial ruling that McGarvin-Moberly could “participate fully in the discovery process and on issues concerning proximate cause and damages * * * ” was the correct ruling.

Section 1-1-109 does not apply to strict liability claims, so it cannot reduce strict liability damages according to the plaintiff's share of fault.

John Zierke and Debbie Zierke v. Agri-Systems · filed 1993-05-03

We reject this argument, based upon the Wyoming Supreme Court's recent and clear pronouncements on the applicability of § 1-1-109 to strict liability in Phillips; Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 567, 583 (Wyo.1992); and Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1095, 1097 (Wyo.1993).