Wis. Stat. § 801.50

Section 801.50(5) requires probation-revocation certiorari venue to be in the county of the relator’s last qualifying conviction, but does not require a particular circuit-court branch.

Drow v. Schwarz · filed 1999-05-05(5)

This provision mandates, for example, that the venue of a certiorari review of a probation revocation is the county in which the probationer was convicted of the offense for which he or she was on probation; the provision does not require that certiorari review of a probation revocation be conducted by any particular branch of the circuit court in the county of conviction.

Section 801.50(4)(b) places a habeas action concerning a nonconviction restraint on liberty in the county where the plaintiff is restrained, while subsection (4)(a) applies to relief from a conviction or sentence.

State Ex Rel. West v. Bartow · filed 2002-01-16(4)(b); (4)(a)

West's habeas petition did not seek relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence under which his liberty was restrained.

Section 801.50(4)(b) places venue for habeas challenges to conditions of confinement in the county where the inmate is confined.

State Ex Rel. Frederick v. McCaughtry · filed 1992-12-10(4)(b)

Attacks on conditions of confinement correspond to the petitions brought currently under sec. 801.50(4)(b), Stats. Thus, the liberty of the plaintiff is restrained in the county where the plaintiff is confined. As confinement is commonly understood to mean imprisonment or incarceration, we conclude that an inmate's liberty is restrained at the jail or prison in which the inmate resides.

Under § 801.50(3)(a), a plaintiff designates venue by specifying the county even when another law leaves no choice, because “the plaintiff still designates venue within the meaning of § 801.50(3)(a).”

Department of Natural Resources v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV · filed 2018-04-03(3)(a)

even when the latter statute eliminates any opportunity to choose a county, the plaintiff still designates venue within the meaning of § 801.50(3)(a).

Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(b) is an exception to § 801.50(3)(a), so an action relating to the validity or invalidity of a rule or guidance document is venued under § 227.40(1) and cannot also be venued under subsection (3)(a), even if it seeks injunctive relief.

Kormanik v. Brash · filed 2022-10-26(3)(a) and (3)(b)

The legislature chose to begin subsection (3)(a) with the phrase "Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c), . . . ."

When an action concerns the validity or invalidity of a rule or guidance document, subsection (3)(b) controls venue and subsection (3)(a) does not also apply, even if the action seeks injunctive relief.

Kormanik v. Brash · filed 2022-10-26(3)(a) and (3)(b)

Kormanik's lawsuit clearly "relat[ed] to the validity or [invalidity] of a rule or guidance document" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(b).

Section 801.50(1) generally says that a venue defect does not invalidate a judgment, but the more specific consumer-credit venue rule in § 421.401(2)(b) governs when the two conflict.

Kett v. Community Credit Plan, Inc. · filed 1999-07-09(1)

A defect in venue shall not affect the validity of any order or judgment.

Section 801.50 generally governs venue but does not apply to consumer-credit actions because § 421.401 is the specific venue statute.

Brunton v. NUVELL CREDIT CORP. · filed 2010-06-24801.50(2), (5m)

We conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 801.50 and 801.51, the general venue statutes, do not apply to actions arising from consumer credit transactions. Rather, the venue provision in Wis. Stat. § 421.401 applies.

A defect in venue under § 801.50 does not affect the court's competence and does not justify rejecting an arguably meritorious complaint before filing.

State Ex Rel. Hansen v. Circuit Court for Dane County · filed 1994-01-27

The Judicial Council has stated that the cure for a defect in venue is to change the place of trial, and that a defect in venue is not jurisdictional and does not affect the competence of the court. Judicial Council Note, 1983, § 801.50, Stats. Thus, we conclude that if a complaint has arguable merit, improper venue is not a basis upon which a circuit court may reject a request to waive filing fees.

Section 801.50(1)'s general rule that improper venue does not invalidate a judgment yields to the specific venue rule for consumer credit transactions.

Kett v. Community Credit Plan, Inc. · filed 1998-09-23(1)

We begin our analysis with the acknowledgment that, generally, a defect in venue is not jurisdictional and does not affect the validity of a judgment. ... However, we are convinced that here the legislature has made an exception to that rule, which is as follows: when the action arises out of a consumer credit transaction, a defect in venue deprives the court of authority to act and thus renders any judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. This is the plain meaning of § 421.401(2)(b), Stats. This statute is specific and thus takes precedence over the general statute, § 801.50(1).

Section 801.50(1) treats improper venue as a defect remedied by a change of venue rather than dismissal.

Johnson v. Berge · filed 2003-02-06(1)

And since Harris, we have concluded that when venue is improper, the appropriate response is a motion for a change of venue, not a motion to dismiss.

Section 801.50(9m) sets the county for certiorari review of a parole refusal, but the trial court may change venue pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.

Coleman v. Percy · filed 1980-06-03(9m)

The general venue statute relied upon by the court of appeals is, by its terms, “subject to the provisions for change of venue” which permit a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to change venue pursuant to a stipulation by the parties.

Section 801.50(6) permits venue for a libel action against a corporate publisher in a county where some part of the cause of action arose, including where the allegedly defamatory material was circulated and reputations may have been injured.

Voit v. Madison Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1984-01-04(6)

We hold that because some part of the plaintiffs’ cause of action arose in Waukesha county, Waukesha county is a proper place of venue under sec. 801.50(6), Stats.

Section 801.50(2)(c) permits venue where a defendant does substantial business in the county; statewide advertising and mailings alone did not meet that requirement here.

Enpro Assessment Corp. v. Enpro Plus, Inc. · filed 1992-09-09(2)(c)

Section 801.50(2)(c), Stats., requires that a defendant do "substantial business" in a county before it is found to be a proper venue. ... Because Chilton Enpro's business in St. Croix County was not substantial, the trial court should have transferred venue of this action to Calumet County.

Section 801.50’s rule placing venue where the defendant resides does not govern a petition to enforce an out-of-state custody or visitation judgment; venue lies where the judgment is filed.

In RE MARRIAGE OF SHARP v. Sharp · filed 1994-05-03(2)(c)

Section 801.50 provides for venue in the county of the defendant's residence. ... Nevertheless, we conclude that the ordinary rules of statutory construction point to § 767.025 as controlling.

Section 801.50(2) provides the general venue rule but yields when another statute provides for venue.

Hoffman v. Memorial Hospital of Iowa County · filed 1995-08-24(2)

Section 801.50, Stats., is the general venue statute used to determine the place of trial. However, § 801.50(2) states, "Except as otherwise provided by statute," indicating that § 801.50 is not the only venue statute.

Section 801.50(2)(a) permits venue for a special proceeding in the county where the claim arose unless another statute provides otherwise.

Klein v. Wisconsin Resource Center · filed 1998-04-01(2)(a)

Because Klein's challenge to the decision of the record custodian to release her personnel records arose in Winnebago County, venue there was proper.

Negligent contamination of well water is not an injury to real property requiring trial in the county where the property is located.

Mueller v. Brunn · filed 1982-01-05(1)(a)

Accordingly, because the type of tort alleged here does not fall clearly within the provisions of sec. 801.50(1) (a), Stats., we decline to denominate it as an injury to real property, and the action properly lies in the venue of Walworth county, where the defendants Brunn reside and where the action is now pending.