Wis. Stat. § 100.18

Section 100.18 does not impose liability for secretly retaining interest on a security deposit when no interest was actually earned.

Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A. · filed 1997-01-17

Because Bank One did not earn interest on the security deposits, there was none to disclose. Consequently, Bank One did not violate the federal Consumer Leasing Act by failing to disclose earned interest. Nor did the Bank engage in an unfair or deceptive act under the Wisconsin Consumer Fraud Act by secretly retaining interest on the deposits. Summary judgment is thus granted on Count III (the Wisconsin Consumer Fraud Act claim), and on the portion of Count I’s Consumer Leasing Act claim relating to interest on security deposits.

Section 100.18 prohibits public advertisements containing untrue, deceptive, or misleading factual assertions; silence is not actionable, and unverifiable advertising puffery is not an actionable factual assertion.

Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc. · filed 2004-03-26(1) and (11)(b)2

Accordingly, because a nondisclosure is not an "assertion, representation or statement of fact" for purposes of the DTPA, and because the only affirmative assertions alleged in the amended complaint are mere puffery, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.

Section 100.18(1) requires a public representation about purchasing merchandise to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and commercial puffery or a mere implication is not actionable.

Uebelacker v. Paula Allen Holdings, Inc. · filed 2006-11-02(1)

To state a claim under the statute, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant made advertisements, announcements, statements or representations to the public relating to the purchase of merchandise; (2) the advertisements, announcements, statements or representations were untrue, deceptive, or misleading; and (3) plaintiff sustained a pecuniary loss because of the advertisements, announcements, statements or representations. ... Mere implication, however, does not amount to the use of false, deceptive or misleading words as required under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). ... As a matter of law, statements amounting to puffery are not actionable under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).

Section 100.18(1) bars public advertisements, statements, or representations containing an assertion or statement of fact that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and factual disputes about injury and deception can require the claim to proceed past summary judgment.

Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Discount, Inc. · filed 2008-06-06(1)

Wisconsin Statute § 100.18(1) prohibits the making “to the public” of an advertisement, statement, or representation which “contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.” ... In sum, because genuine issues of material fact exist, and neither party has demonstrated that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Standard Process’s claims of false advertising and misrepresentation in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and Wis. Stat. § 100.18, the court is obliged to deny both parties’ motions for summary judgment on those claims.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits marketing statements containing assertions, representations, or statements of fact that are untrue, deceptive, or misleading; a claim requires a public representation intended to induce an obligation, its untruth, deceptiveness, or misleading nature, and material pecuniary loss.

Loeb v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc. · filed 2019-02-06(1)

A cause of action pursuant to Section 100.18 requires proof of three elements: "(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was 'untrue, deceptive or misleading,' and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff."

Section 100.18 prohibits public advertising or sales statements that are false, deceptive, or misleading; a literally true statement can still violate the statute if it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material respect.

Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc. · filed 2021-06-30

The Act “generally prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations or statements of fact in public advertisements or sales announcements.” Tietsworth v. Harley‐Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 244 (Wis. 2004). Claims arising under the Act have three required elements: “(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.” Novell v. Migliaccio, 749 N.W.2d 544, 553 (Wis. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Silence—an omission to speak—is insufficient to support a claim” under the Act and thus it applies “only [to] affirmative assertions, representations, or statements of fact that are false, deceptive, or misleading.” Tietsworth, 677 N.W.2d at 245. Like other state consumer protection statutes, the Act can be violated “even if [the representation] is not literally false.” Beardsall, 953 F.3d at 973. Rather, “a label is deceptive if it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material respect.” Id. The Act thus “may be satisfied by proof that a statement is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer, even if the statement is literally true.” Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2014). ... Champion’s representations that its food is made with fresh regional ingredients are not clearly misleading—its food does, in fact, contain some ingredients that are fresh and sourced regionally. Weaver thus needed to offer something more than his own testimony. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Section 100.18 misrepresentation claims require proof of intent to sell or induce.

Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. · filed 2008-07-10

In contrast, § ATCP 110 and Wis. Stat. § 100.18 misrepresentation claims do indeed require proof of intent to sell or induce.

A § 100.18(1) claim requires an untrue representation made with intent to sell property or induce its purchase, in addition to the statute's other elements.

Reuben v. KOPPEN · filed 2010-03-10(1)

The court defined deceptive trade practice to include an element of intent, specifically: Was the untrue representation made with the "intent to sell the Okauchee Lake property or with the intent to induce the purchase of the Okauchee Lake property?" This element is necessary for the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 cause of action, but is not an element of the strict liability misrepresentation covered by special verdict Question No. 3.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits misleading representations in bills or other documents, even when they are not traditionally considered advertisements, if they induce the public to enter an obligation relating to a service.

MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell Inc. · filed 2013-01-23(1)

We therefore conclude that the phone bills and representations therein that induced MBS to pay for services it did not authorize are among the kind of misleading representations that Wis. Stat. § 100.18 prohibits.

Section 100.18(1) requires an actionable untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation and does not impose liability for silence or a fraudulent omission.

Milford v. Roehl Transport Inc · filed 2023-03-14(1)

More specifically, mere silence or even a fraudulent omission cannot trigger DPTA liability. ... Accordingly, Milford’s DPTA claim fails because it is premised on Roehl’s failure to disclose in the Training Agreement that it would take various deductions from the wages earned by employees is a based on an omission, which cannot support a DTPA claim. ... Such a nondisclosure “is not an ‘assertion, representation or statement of fact’ under Wis Stat. §100.81(1).”

Section 100.18(1) covers false or misleading advertising that results in pecuniary loss.

Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co. · filed 1995-06-26(1)

American Cyanamid's protests notwithstanding, this case clearly deals with allegations that American Cyanamid engaged in false and misleading advertising resulting in pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs. These are exactly the type of allegations that fall within the purview of sec. 100.18(1), STATS.

Section 100.18(1) allows a claim about real estate advertisements to proceed to trial when competing inferences about their meaning affect whether they are untrue, deceptive or misleading.

Rach v. Kleiber · filed 1985-03-25(1)

We conclude that competing inferences exist as to the meanings of these representations. Therefore, the issue of whether these representations are untrue, deceptive or misleading under sec. 100.18(1), Stats., is not one appropriately decided on a motion for summary judgment. Consequently, we hold that summary judgment was also inappropriate as to Rach’s cause of action under sec. 100.18 (1).

Genuine factual disputes about a broker's statements and actions can preclude summary judgment on liability under § 100.18.

Lambert v. Hein · filed 1998-04-22

Based on the competing affidavits, we conclude that the trial court properly denied summary judgment on this issue. Based on the genuine issues of material fact which exist regarding Re/Max's actions, we further conclude that the trial court properly denied summary judgment on the issue of Re/Max's liability due to deceptive advertising.

Section 100.18(1) permits a claim based on an advertisement for services that could reasonably be construed as misleading.

American Medical Transport of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Curtis-Universal, Inc. · filed 1988-12-21(1)

Plaintiffs’ cause of action alleging a violation of sec. 100.18, Stats., states a claim. Additionally, when reasonable inferences in support of plaintiffs’ contentions are considered, the sticker could be construed to be misleading as alleged.

Section 100.18(ll)(b)2 directs a reasonable-attorney-fee award to the person suffering pecuniary loss, although a contingent-fee agreement may control its ultimate disposition.

Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C. · filed 1998-05-06(ll)(b)2

A statutory award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18 belongs to the person suffering the pecuniary loss. However, the ultimate ownership of that award may be controlled by the terms of the contingent fee agreement between the parties. Under the terms of this contract, the plaintiffs are entitled to 60% of those attorney fees.

Section 100.18(11)'s attorney-fee remedy cannot be circumvented by settling directly with a represented claimant who has assigned the right to collect those fees, without the lawyer's presence or consent.

Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales · filed 2012-10-16(11)

To permit one side to go behind the backs of the other side's lawyers in order to get a settlement that removed the fee-shifting incentives that prompted the lawyers to take the case, would nullify the legislative fee-shifting scheme.

Section 100.18(ll)(b)2 permits a prevailing party to recover costs and attorneys’ fees, so a demand for those remedies in a DTPA action is not subject to being stricken as redundant or immaterial.

American Orthodontics Corp. v. Epicor Software Corp. · filed 2010-10-25(ll)(b)2

... Further, the DTPA provides that a prevailing party may recover costs and attorneys’ fees. Wis. Stat. § 100.18(ll)(b)2. Thus, the demand is not “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous” and will not be stricken.

Section 100.18(11)(b)2 gives the right to recover reasonable attorney fees to the person suffering pecuniary loss—the client—not the attorney, who may recover directly from the defendant only if the client clearly assigned that right and the defendant had notice of the assignment.

Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales · filed 2014-07-15(11)(b)2

Nonetheless, the legislature has determined that an award of attorney's fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11) belongs to the "person suffering pecuniary loss." ... Thus, statutory attorney's fees belong to the client and not the attorney.

Section 100.18(11)(b) supplies authority for attorney fees when the parties’ arbitration rules permit fees authorized by law.

ARBITRATION BETWEEN WINKELMAN v. Kraft Foods, Inc. · filed 2005-01-27(11)(b)

In this case, that authority is supplied by Wis. Stat. § 100.18, which in turn also satisfies the exception to the American Rule allowing fee shifting if a statute provides for it.

Section 100.18(11)(b)2 allows attorney fees only for pecuniary loss caused by a violation of § 100.18.

Zeller v. Northrup King Co. · filed 1985-05-15(11)(b)2

Section 100.18(11) (b)2, Stats., allows recovery of attorney fees by a person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation of sec. 100.18. Here there was no violation, and therefore the trial court improperly relied upon sec. 100.18(11) (b)2 in awarding reasonable attorney fees.

Section 100.18 entitles a party who prevails on appeal in an intentional misrepresentation action to reasonable appellate attorney's fees.

Radford v. J.J.B. Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 1991-05-01(11)(b)2

We similarly hold that a party who prevails on appeal in an intentional misrepresentation case brought under sec. 100.18 is likewise entitled to reasonable appellate attorney's fees.

Section 100.18(5) requires a business to post a conspicuous salesroom sign identifying the owner of the merchandise, property, or service offered to the public, and § 100.18(11)(b) requires proof of pecuniary loss to recover damages for a violation.

Reusch v. Roob · filed 2000-03-14(5), (11)(b)

Roob argues that the presence of his Wisconsin seller's permit on a piece of furniture satisfies this requirement. We disagree. ... It determined that the manner and method in which the permit was exhibited was not evident enough to be "conspicuous." We cannot conclude that the trial court was clearly in error in arriving at this determination. Thus, we reject Roob's claim in this regard. ... Our conclusion notwithstanding, a plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b), requires proof of pecuniary loss because of any violation of § 100.18. We have found no proof in the record of pecuniary damages resulting from this sign violation and therefore reject any damages claim based upon a § 100.18(5) violation.

Section 100.18 protects an individual purchaser as part of “the public” and permits recovery of direct and ascertainable consequential losses, including actual interest payments caused by the misrepresentation, when proven with reasonable certainty.

Jersild v. Aker · filed 1991-09-30(1), (11)(b)2.

More importantly, the defendants cannot question the validity of the stated proposition — one person can, indeed, constitute “the public” for purposes of § 100.18, see State v. Automatic Merchandisers, Inc., 64 Wis.2d 659, 664, 221 N.W.2d 683 (1974) (§ 100.18 construed to apply to factual representations made in private conversations to individual private purchasers). ... The same is true for § 100.18. On a successful § 100.18(1) claim, the defrauded party is entitled to recover the “pecuniary loss” caused by the misrepresentation, as specified in Wis.Stat. § 100.18(1 l)(b)2. Given the remedial purpose of § 100.18 (and absent contradictory Wisconsin authority), the court is compelled to provide the term “pecuniary loss” a broad construction — requiring consideration both of direct and ascertainable indirect or consequential damages as necessary to make the defrauded party “whole.”

Section 100.18 applies to leases and permits claims by nonresidents when the deceptive representation was made in Wisconsin, but a damages action requires actual pecuniary loss proximately caused by the deception.

Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A. · filed 1996-02-12(1), (11)(b)(2)

This Court finds that the statute applies on its face to leases. ... This Court’s review of the statute leads to the conclusion that the Act may be violated so long as the allegedly deceptive or misleading representation was “ma[de], publish[ed], disseminate[d], eirculate[d], or placed before the public, in [Wisconsin]” and the citizenship of the individual receiving the deceptive or misleading statement is of no consequence. ... Thus, we find that a suit for damages under § 100.18 requires a showing of actual pecuniary loss and that a mere showing of a misleading or deceptive statement or representation will not support a cause of action. In the instant case, Demi-tropoulos has not alleged that he has suffered any actual pecuniary loss, let alone a loss that was proximately caused by any misleading or deceptive statement.

Section 100.18(11)(b) requires pecuniary loss caused by a deceptive trade practice, and benefit-of-the-bargain loss may satisfy that requirement without proof that the product malfunctioned.

Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc. · filed 2003-03-04(11)(b)

The requirement that the pecuniary loss be caused by a violation of the DTPA is encompassed by the reliance element of fraudulent concealment. ... No Wisconsin court has ever held that DTPA plaintiffs must suffer any type of damage other than the benefit of the bargain losses Tietsworth seeks here. ... Because Tietsworth pled all elements of a DTPA claim in his complaint and because engine failure is not needed to assert a DTPA claim, his complaint states an appropriate claim for violation of the DTPA.

Section 100.18(1) requires a plaintiff to show that a deceptive misrepresentation caused a pecuniary loss.

Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc. · filed 2010-07-14(1)

First, among other things, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) requires the plaintiff to show that the deceptive misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to suffer a “pecuniary loss.”

Section 100.18 applies to deceptive representations about services even when the business involves food products, and its pecuniary-loss element broadly includes monetary losses such as business-value diminution, not just purchase-price damages.

Create-A-Pack Foods Inc v. Batterlicious Cookie Dough Company · filed 2022-10-13(1)

While Walmart’s alleged misrepresentation in Gallego clearly concerned its food products, Create-A-Pack’s alleged misrepresentations concern its co-packing services. ... Thus, Gallego does not bar Create-A-Pack’s § 100.18 claim. ... Rejecting the trial court’s limited definition of pecuniary loss, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that, “although Wis. Stat. § 100.18 does not define ‘pecuniary loss,’ the plain meaning of the term is broad enough to encompass any monetary loss, including the full purchase price, subject to claimant’s proof.” ... Section 100.18’s definition of “pecuniary loss” encompasses such alleged monetary losses. ... Therefore, Create-A-Pack’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on Batterlicious’s § 100.18 claim will be denied.

Section 100.18(1) does not require reasonable reliance on a misrepresentation, but the plaintiff must show or plausibly allege that the misrepresentation materially induced a pecuniary loss.

Crosby v. OneTouchPoint Inc · filed 2024-09-23(1)

While a violation of Section 100.18(1) does not require that the plaintiff show that he or she reasonably relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation, the plaintiff must show (or at this stage, plausibly allege) that the misrepresentation materially induced a pecuniary loss. The Consolidated Complaint does not plausibly allege such a causal connection between OneTouchPoint’s alleged misrepresentations and any pecuniary loss by Plaintiffs.

Section 100.18(11)(b)2. permits a person who suffers pecuniary loss because of a violation to recover that loss and related costs, and the court held that increased property taxes from an undisclosed reassessment could be pursued as pecuniary damages when supported with reasonable certainty.

Shister v. Patel · filed 2009-10-28(11)(b)2.

We agree that under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 and, if successful, his tort claims against Bhagwanjee/Coldwell, Shister is entitled to pursue damages for the amounts paid due to the increased property assessment.

Section 100.18(1) permits recovery of monetary pecuniary loss, including in some circumstances the full purchase price, but it does not authorize contract rescission.

Mueller v. Harry Kaufmann Motorcars, Inc. · filed 2014-12-23(1)

In sum, based upon Wis. Stat. § 100.18's plain language and particularly the deterrent purpose of the statute as recognized in our case law, we conclude that a "pecuniary loss" can include monetary remedies like the cost of repair or diminution in value and may also include the possibility of a full refund of the purchase price. A "pecuniary loss" does not, however, include rescission, as a non-monetary remedy.

Section 100.18(ll)(d) allows a court, in its discretion and before final judgment, to order restitution for pecuniary loss caused by the violation when satisfactory proof of the loss is submitted.

State v. Going Places Travel Corp. · filed 2015-04-14(ll)(d)

Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(ll)(d) provides that, when the State establishes a violation of § 100.18, "[t]he court may in its discretion, prior to entry of final judgment make such orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person any pecuniary loss suffered because of the acts or practices involved in the action, provided proof thereof is submitted to the satisfaction of the court."

Section 100.18 permits full-refund damages in some circumstances to further its remedial and deterrent purpose, but a full refund is inappropriate when consumers received most of the value of a less-than-premium product.

Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc · filed 2020-07-08

The language of the WDTPA permits, and its purpose encourages, a plaintiff to pursue full refund damages in certain circumstances. ... These seem like the circumstances contemplated by Mueller in which a full refund would be inappropriate.

Section 100.18 requires a causal connection between a misleading representation and pecuniary loss; incidental costs of obtaining a promised mail-in rebate do not establish that loss.

Rikkers v. Menard Inc · filed 2021-11-08

All of Rikkers’ claims require proof of pecuniary loss. See K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Wis. 2007) (finding Wis. Stat. §100.18 “requires a causal connection between the untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation and the pecuniary loss”); ... In this case, Rikkers has suffered no pecuniary loss because he got exactly what he bargained for. ... As a result, all of Rikkers’ claims must fail.

A private claim under § 100.18 requires a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss.

Valente v. Sofamor, S.N.C. · filed 1999-04-29(11)(b)

Therefore, the plaintiffs’ cannot show a causal connection between the defendants’ alleged conduct and any pecuniary loss suffered as a result of their continued back pain. Accordingly, they fail to state a claim under § 100.18(ll)(b).

Section 100.18(11)(b)2 requires proof beyond the advertisement itself that the violation caused the plaintiff pecuniary loss.

Tim Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Linscott · filed 1987-10-21(11)(b)2

We interpret sec. 100.18(11)(b)2 as requiring some proof beyond the content of the advertisement itself to establish that the plaintiff was in fact damaged by it.

Section 100.18(11)(b)3 requires an action to be commenced within three years after the unlawful act or practice and is a statute of repose, so the period runs from the false representation rather than the plaintiff's injury.

Kain v. Bluemound East Industrial Park, Inc. · filed 2001-09-12(11)(b)3

Therefore, the fraudulent representation statute is a statute of repose.

Section 100.18(11)(3) requires an action to be brought within three years of the unlawful act, operates as a statute of repose, and is not tolled by American Pipe.

Rouse v. H.B. Fuller Company · filed 2024-10-18(1), (11)(3)

The WDTPA prohibits the making of false statements in connection with the sale of goods and services. Wis. Stat. § 100.18. ... Any action under section 100.18 must be brought no more than “3 years after the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice which is the subject of the action.” Id. § 100.18(11)(3). ... For purposes of determining when the statute of limitations runs, the focus of the inquiry is not when a plaintiff discovers the harm; rather, it is when a defendant engages in the conduct prohibited by section 100.18. ... The WDTPA is a statute of repose. ... Thus, American Pipe tolling does not apply.

Section 100.18(ll)(b)3 imposes a three-year statute of repose running from the defendant’s unlawful act, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the injury or wrongdoing.

Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance v. Banc of America Securities LLC · filed 2003-03-31(ll)(b)3

Consequently, with respect to the alleged misrepresentations at issue in the plaintiffs’ Complaint, the limitations period began to run at the time that Banc of America allegedly made the misrepresentations, not when the misrepresentations were discovered by the plaintiffs or when they purchased the January 26, 2000 block of securities.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits untrue, deceptive, or misleading representations made to the public to induce a purchase or contract, while § 100.18(11)(b)3 imposes a three-year repose period running from the false representation rather than the injury.

Galveston LFG, LLC v. BIOFerm Energy Systems, LLC · filed 2023-08-21(1), (11)(b)3

The statute prohibits a person or firm with intent to offer anything for sale or hire from making any representations to “the public” that are “untrue, deceptive or misleading.” Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). Because the statute provides a three-year statute of repose “after the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice,” Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)3, a cause of action under § 100.18 accrues at the time of the false representation, not at the time of injury. Kain v. Bluemound E. Indus. Park, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 640, 645 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).

Section 100.18 requires an untrue, deceptive, or misleading statement made with the intent to sell something and protects sophisticated commercial entities as well as consumers.

Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp. · filed 1997-05-27

The elements of a § 100.18 claim include: 1) an advertisement, announcement, statement or representation; 2) made with the intent to sell a product, service or anything; 3) which contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. ... Contrary to defendant’s urgings, plaintiff has adequately set forth the basis of its § 100.18 claim in its complaint. ... That is all that is required to state a claim under § 100.18. ... Whether the state legislature passed § 100.18 with the primary intention of protecting consumers as opposed to commercial entities makes no difference. The plain language of the statute contains no indication that plaintiff should be prevented from availing itself of the law’s protection merely because it is a sophisticated business. The state supreme court has permitted commercial entities to recover under this statute in the past.

Section 100.18 creates an independent cause of action for deceptive real-estate statements made to the public, is not barred by the economic-loss doctrine, and does not cover statements made to a contracting party after contract formation.

Kailin v. Armstrong · filed 2002-02-28(1), (ll)(b)2-3

Read together, the above subsections plainly define the elements for a cause of action, with its own statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(ll)(b)3, and without reference to common law misrepresentation claims. ... There is no indication in these subsections, or any of the other many and detailed subsections that make up § 100.18, that the legislature intended to add a remedy for common law misrepresentation claims rather than to create a distinct statutory cause of action. ... We conclude the economic loss doctrine does not apply to claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. ... Once the contract was made, the Kailins were no longer "the public" under the statute because they had a particular relationship with Armstrong — that of a contracting party to buy the real estate that is the subject of his post-contractual representation. ... Therefore, we conclude that the Kailins1 claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is limited to representations that were made prior to the acceptance of the offer to purchase and that otherwise meet the requirements of the statute.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits advertising that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading and requires pecuniary loss caused by the misleading advertising for a claim.

Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc. · filed 2005-09-15(1)

The elements of a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 are: (1) the defendant advertised the product; (2) the advertising was misleading; and (3) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the misleading advertising. ... Finally, sections 100.18(1) and 100.182(2) of the Wisconsin statutes require an untrue, deceptive or misleading advertisement, announcement, statement or representation.

Section 100.18 requires a public advertisement, announcement, statement, or representation about purchasing merchandise that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading and causes pecuniary loss; it does not protect product manufacturers from paying commissions on sales.

Land's End, Inc. v. Remy · filed 2006-09-01

To prove a false advertising claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18, plaintiff must show that (1) defendants made advertisements, announcements, statements or representations to the public relating to the purchase of merchandise; (2) the advertisements, announcements, statements or representations were untrue, deceptive or misleading; and (3) plaintiff sustained a pecuniary loss because of the advertisements, announcements, statements or representations. ... Plaintiff itself may have been subject to misrepresentations regarding the source of the customers directed to them through defendants’ typosquatting scheme; however, such misrepresentations cannot be characterized as statements made “to the public relating to the purchase of merchandise.” Wis. Stat. § 100.18. The purpose of § 100.18 is “to protect the residents of Wisconsin from any untrue, deceptive or misleading representations made to promote the sale of a product” to a consumer. ... It is not designed to protect product manufacturers from paying commissions on the sale of their own products, however unearned those commissions may be.

Section 100.18 requires a public representation intended to induce an obligation, an untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation, and pecuniary loss; reasonable reliance is not an element, but unreasonable reliance may show the representation did not materially induce the loss.

Watson v. Larsen-Berryhill · filed 2023-03-20

The elements of a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 are: “(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) that the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) that the representation caused the plaintiff a pecuniary loss.” ... Watson must prove that Larsen-Berryhill’s statements on the RECR were untrue; that is, he must prove that she was aware of the defects she did not disclose. ... The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that reasonable reliance is not an element of that claim. ... However, the fact finder “may consider the reasonableness of a person’s reliance on a misrepresentation in determining whether there had been a material inducement.” ... That is, a plaintiff may not be able to prove that the representation materially induced or caused a pecuniary loss if his reliance on the representation was unreasonable. ... Watson’s unreasonable reliance also defeats his claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 because Larsen-Berryhill’s representations regarding the condition of the basement did not materially induce him to buy the house.

Section 100.18(1) requires a public representation made with intent to induce an obligation, that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and that causes the plaintiff pecuniary loss.

Pagoudis v. Keidl · filed 2023-04-04(1)

The elements of this claim are: (1) the defendant made a representation to the public with intent to induce an obligation; (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading; and (3) the representation caused the plaintiff a pecuniary loss.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits marketing statements containing untrue, deceptive, or misleading assertions of fact and requires a public representation, falsity, and material pecuniary causation; the plaintiff must be a member of the public or intended audience.

Clark Technology LLC v. Corncob Inc · filed 2019-09-10(1)

The purpose of the WDTPA “is to deter sellers from making false and misleading representations in order to protect the public.” Novell v. Migliaccio, 749 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Wis. 2008). Toward that end, Section 100.18 prohibits the use of marketing statements for products or services which “contain[] any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.” Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). A cause of action pursuant to Section 100.18 requires proof of three elements: “(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was ‘untrue, deceptive or misleading,’ and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.” Novell, 749 N.W.2d at 553. ... In addition, Section 100.18(1) “does not provide a cause of action for one vendor against a competitor for representations the competitor made to third parties.” Grice Eng'g, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (W.D. Wis. 2010); see also Spacesaver Corp. v. Marvel Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663–64 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (“[I]f § 100.18 extends to misrepresentations made to nonparties, application of the statute becomes almost nonsensical.”). A WDTPA plaintiff must be a member of the “public” or, at least, of the audience to whom the misrepresentation is directed, to bring a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). Here, Plaintiffs have not adduced facts to create a jury question as to whether they—or anyone, for that matter—were misled by Corncob’s advertisements containing the Leachbuster falsely labeled as a Corncob I. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ WDTPA claim.

Section 100.18 supports a tort-based statutory misrepresentation claim, and a corporate principal cannot personally assert the corporation’s claim without proof of personal misleading and personal damages.

Create-A-Pack Foods Inc v. Batterlicious Cookie Dough Company · filed 2023-06-15

The last sentence further disclaims any other warranty, but Batterlicious’s claim under Wis. Stat. 100.18 does not sound in warranty, but tort, see MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 01-C-177-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15387, at *14 (W.D. Wis. Sep. 6, 2001). It is a statutory misrepresentation claim related not to the quality of the products that Create-A-Pack Foods produced but rather to the capabilities of Create-A-Pack Foods as a manufacturer. Therefore, Batterlicious’s claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is not barred by the Limited Warranty provision of the Terms and Conditions of Sale. ... The Levys have not presented any evidence that they were personally misled (as distinguished from their role as principals of Batterlicious) or that they personally suffered any damages as part of any misrepresentation (as distinct from Batterlicious). Therefore, Create-A-Pack Foods’ motion for a judgment as a matter of law with respect the Levys’ claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is granted.

Section 100.18(1) covers representations made in a sales promotion even when the transaction did not begin with media advertising.

Bonn v. Haubrich · filed 1985-02-06(1)

We conclude that coverage under sec. 100.18(1) is not limited to transactions involving media advertising in the first instance.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits untrue, deceptive, or misleading representations made to induce the public to enter a business transaction.

MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. · filed 2002-08-16(1)

Under the economic loss doctrine, Wisconsin law bars tort claims which seek only ‘economic losses’ related to the commercial transaction. ... Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted as to plaintiffs claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (third count), common law fraud (fourth count) and Wis. Stat. §§ 895.80 and 943.20 (sixth count).

The economic loss doctrine does not bar a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.

Dow v. Poltzer · filed 2005-04-04

In the end, based on the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Kailin, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ § 100.18 claim based on the economic loss doctrine must be denied.

A false advertising claim under § 100.18 is not barred by the economic loss doctrine.

Below v. Norton · filed 2006-11-21

Because the economic loss doctrine does not bar Below's claim of false advertising misrepresentation in violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18, we reverse that portion of the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.

Section 100.18(1) reaches intentional inducement of even a private purchaser to buy securities through untrue, deceptive, or misleading factual representations, and a claim requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Jersild v. Aker · filed 1991-06-10(1)

The statute governing civil liability for fraudulent representations in connection with the marketing of goods and services, Wis.Stat. § 100.18(1), prohibits persons from, among other things intentionally inducing the public to purchase securities, either directly or indirectly, by an “announcement, statement or representation containing] any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.” Although the statute seems to have been enacted to protect the public from fraudulent advertisements and other marketing practices, the section has also been applied to factual representations made in private conversations to private purchasers, see State v. Automatic Merchandisers, Inc., 64 Wis.2d 659, 664, 221 N.W.2d 683 (1974) (one person may constitute “the public” under § 100.18). ... On the other hand, it may be shown at trial that Mr. Jersild was aware of all basic facts. For now, the court is satisfied that even if the plaintiffs knew that the corporation was in a shaky financial condition, under Wisconsin common law and under Wis.Stat. § 100.18, the defendants were not entitled to view that as a license to commit a fraud upon them. The court concludes that the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendants acted intentionally and induced the plaintiffs to purchase the stock, that the plaintiffs relied upon facts as represented (or as omitted) by the defendants in deciding whether to purchase the stock, and that the plaintiffs ultimately suffered a pecuniary loss as a result. This would entitle the plaintiffs to recovery on their claims both under Wis.Stat. § 100.18, which requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and common law fraud, which requires clear and convincing proof.

Section 100.18(1) protects members of “the public”; a party with a particular, long-term business relationship with the defendant is outside that protected class.

Uniek, Inc. v. Dollar General Corp. · filed 2007-02-21(1)

If this relationship does not “distinguish” plaintiff from “the public,” then virtually nothing would. In other words, if “the public” has any limiting scope on Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), plaintiffs claim is one that must be excluded. Because current Wisconsin case law adheres to the view that “the public” does restrict the beneficiaries of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), I must grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 100.18(1) protects the public from deceptive representations intended to induce a purchase or obligation, and a person with a particular ongoing relationship with the representer is not part of “the public.”

Bates v. State of Wisconsin-Department of Workforce Development · filed 2009-06-23(1)

I need not address them all because there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in plaintiffs favor on the first element of a statutory fraudulent representation claim. Even assuming that defendants made untrue, deceptive or misleading statements to plaintiff, the undisputed facts require the conclusion that plaintiff was not a member of “the public.” ... In this case, the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff had a particular relationship with the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation that distinguishes him from “the public” for purposes of the Act. Plaintiff sought out the Division’s services in 2004 initially not because the Division was advertising business loans for small businesses, but because plaintiff wanted help finding a job in the field of architecture. In November 2005, plaintiff agreed to an individualized plan that would assist him in finding such employment. In January 2006, plaintiff decided that he wanted to be self-employed and start his own small business using his architecture skills: In July 2006, his employment plan was updated to include business consultation services. Plaintiff agreed to meet certain requirements in preparing a business plan and the Division agreed to provide a range of services to help him reach self-employment through his proposed business. It was in the fall of 2006 that potential misrepresentations were made about providing plaintiff funds for office space and equipment. By then his relationship with the Division was particular enough to distinguish him from “the public.” He had been working with it for two years and since January 2006 had been involved in a back-and-forth relationship with it about his business plan. Any statements defendants made to plaintiff regarding the funding of his business occurred after he had accepted their general services to help him start a small business. Thus, plaintiff was no longer a member of “the public” when the alleged false statements about providing him start-up money were made.

A plaintiff is not a member of “the public” under § 100.18(1) when the parties have a particular relationship, as shown here by their significant, longstanding dealings.

MDS Enterprises, Inc. v. Mid-State Truck Service, Inc. · filed 2021-02-25(1)

In this case, the undisputed facts show that, at the time of the 2016 trade, the parties had a particular relationship that precluded MDS’s membership in “the public” under WIS. STAT. § 100.18(1).

Whether a buyer is a member of “the public” under § 100.18(1) can be a question of fact for the jury.

K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc. · filed 2007-06-12(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err because whether K&S was a member of "the public" under § 100.18(1) presented a question of fact that the court properly submitted to the jury.

Section 100.18 requires a representation to materially induce the plaintiff’s decision to act, but it need not be the sole motivation.

MADCAP I, LLC v. McNamee · filed 2005-06-02(11)(b)2

The representation must be "a material inducement," but it "need not be the sole or only motivation for the plaintiffs decision to act."

Section 100.18(1) can apply when a private statement is made to an individual who is treated as a member of the public, and continued use of a product—not a further purchase—can satisfy the statute’s inducement requirement.

Hackel v. National Feeds, Inc. · filed 2013-12-09(1)

While the Act does not define this term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a private statement made to an individual may constitute a statement to the public. ... The court finds that plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was a member of the public in support of his § 100.18 claim. The parties were not in a contractual relationship and Hackel was under no obligation to make future purchases from National. ... Finally, National contends that Hackel was not “induced” to act based on Sanders’ alleged statement, because he did not make any further purchases after Sanders’ visit, but further purchases are not required; continued “use” of the product is sufficient to trigger the plain language of the Act.

Section 100.18(1) requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant made a materially harmful deceptive representation to the public, and a party with a particular contractual relationship to the defendant is not a member of the public for this purpose.

Robichaud v. Engage2Excel, Inc. · filed 2019-05-10(1)

In order to state a claim under the WDTPA, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.” ... Applying the above standard to the case at bar, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not a member of the public for purposes of the WDTPA. Plaintiff complains of post-merger actions of Defendants. The post-merger actions happened after Plaintiff became a stockholder in E2E. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Kailin, held that the WDTPA is not intended to cover the Parties’ actions after they enter into a contract. The Court finds that the Parties had a particular relationship. Thus, Plaintiff is not a member of the public and therefore cannot state a claim under the WDTPA.

Section 100.18 protects a purchaser from false, deceptive, or misleading representations made by a home seller, even when the representation was made to only one prospective purchaser, and permits recovery of pecuniary loss, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.

Below v. Norton · filed 2008-07-01(ll)(b)2

Furthermore, we reiterated that a statement that was made to only one individual could qualify for the protections afforded by § 100.18.

Section 100.18(1) does not treat a plaintiff as part of “the public” when a longstanding business relationship and an existing, even unrelated, contract create a particular relationship with the defendant.

Brilliant DPI Inc v. CIT Technology Financing Services Inc · filed 2021-06-23(1)

But the fact of a current contractual relationship between Brilliant and Konica in the form of the Konica Minolta bizhub printer lease, combined with their longstanding business relationship, sufficiently distinguishes this case from Hackel. Thus, given its longstanding business relationship with Konica and its current, albeit unrelated, contract regarding a separate printer, Brilliant was not a member of “the public” at the time Konica made any alleged misrepresentations regarding the EFI printers. ... Therefore, the court will grant Konica’s motion for summary judgment as to Brilliant’s claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (ECF No. 63, ¶¶ 41-49 (Cause of Action No. 1)).

Section 100.18 does not protect a plaintiff whose particular or long-running business relationship with the defendant distinguishes it from the public the statute protects.

ProSynthesis Laboratories, Inc. v. Eurofins Microbiology Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2023-05-11

As Eurofins notes, Unjury must be a member of “the public” within the meaning of the DTPA. Unjury does not qualify as a member of “the public” under § 100.18 if Unjury has a “particular relationship” with Eurofins that would “distinguish” Unjury from “the public which the legislature intended to protect.” ... But even if this court disregards this 2017 agreement, Unjury does not qualify as a member of “the public” because it alleges that it had used Eurofins to test its products on many prior occasions for the past several years.

Section 100.18 requires a plaintiff to be a member of the public, and a particular, ongoing relationship with the defendant can place the plaintiff outside the statute’s public-protection requirement.

Gaughan v. New American Funding LLC · filed 2024-09-24

“Claims arising under [§ 100.18] have three required elements: ‘(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.’ ... ‘The only clear line is that a party is not a member of “the public” under § 100.18 once it enters into a contract with the defendant.’ ... However, discovery has revealed that Defendant’s contact with Plaintiff was not truly a “cold call,” leading the Court to conclude that no reasonable juror could deem Plaintiff a member of “the public” at the time of the alleged misrepresentations. ... Thus, because no reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff was a member of “the public,” his § 100.18 claim fails.

Section 100.18(1) covers private sales representations to individual prospective purchasers who have no special relationship with the seller; those purchasers are members of the public.

State v. Automatic Merchandisers of America, Inc. · filed 1974-10-01(1)

While the representations were made privately to prospective purchasers their only relationship to the defendants was that they had responded to advertisements in the classified sections of newspapers. These persons were members of “the public” as that term is used in this statute.

An advertised promise to hold HMO subscribers harmless may be a representation to the public under § 100.18, and collecting from their assets despite that promise may violate the section.

Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hospital · filed 1999-05-25

A jury could reasonably conclude that the hospital's contractual agreement to hold subscribers harmless from payment, with full knowledge that the plan is marketed and that the HMO advises its subscribers that they will be held harmless for hospital costs, may be a representation made to the public within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, a jury could reasonably find that the hospital's attempt to collect payment from assets the Dorrs were entitled to is a violation of its representation to hold subscribers harmless and therefore is a violation of § 100.18.

Section 100.18 applies to commercial transactions and prohibits untrue, deceptive, or misleading representations made to induce an obligation that cause monetary loss.

Slane v. Emoto · filed 2008-01-09(1)

The conclusion that the books are noncommercial in nature also defeats plaintiffs claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18, for that statute applies by its terms to commercial transactions.

Section 100.18 may apply to property sellers even when their real estate brokers are exempt from liability, and the sellers may be liable if they contributed to the broker's false representation.

Ricco v. Riva · filed 2003-07-23(1), (12)(b)

In conclusion, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 100.18 may be applied to the Rivas and that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether and, if so, when the Rivas made false representations to the Riccos.

Section 100.18 prohibits an untrue, deceptive, or misleading statement about a real-estate purchase that causes pecuniary loss, and a seller's failure to disclose known basement-wall cracks may violate the statute even when the buyer waived a home inspection.

Malzewski v. Rapkin · filed 2006-08-08

A reasonable jury could find that those cracks and the attempted efforts at remediation should have been disclosed, and that failure to do so violated Wis. Stat. § 100.18 even though the Malzewskis waived their right to have the property inspected.

Section 100.18 covers deceptive or misleading representations connected to a commercial transaction, requiring a link to the purchase, sale, hire, use, or lease of specified goods or services or related terms.

Thermal Design, Inc. v. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. · filed 2011-04-04(1)

Under the plaintiffs construction of the statute, a statement or representation could relate to the use of “anything.” This cannot be, however, because § 100.18 is not designed to protect Wisconsin residents from misrepresentations relating to just anything. Section 100.18 is designed to protect Wisconsin consumers from misleading representations concerning commercial transactions. Thus, the scope of § 100.18, as reflected by its plain language, is more narrow than Thermal Design’s construction, which is to say that statements or representations have to pass more muster than relating only to use of anything. Instead, such statements or representations must relate to the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of real estate, merchandise, securities, service or employment or to the terms or conditions thereof. What is missing from the plaintiffs argument is any link between the allegedly false statements or representations and their relationship to the “purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of such real estate, merchandise, securities, service or employment.”

Section 100.18(1) prohibits public advertisements, announcements, statements, or representations containing untrue, deceptive, or misleading assertions of fact.

Copley v. Bactolac Pharmaceutical, Inc. · filed 2021-03-10(1)

Plaintiff Norman Skare, a Wisconsin resident, alleges that Bactolac violated Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practice Act, which prohibits any “‘advertisement, announcement, statement or representation ... to the public,’ which contains an ‘assertion, representation or statement of fact’ that is ‘untrue, deceptive or misleading.’” Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 245 (Wis. 2004) (quoting Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1)). The complaint does not allege that Bactolac advertised, announced, stated, or represented anything to the public with respect to ADEG; as with Claim IX, the Court concludes that affixing a label designed by NaturMed does not qualify.

Section 100.18(1) does not require a plaintiff to plead untrue, deceptive, and misleading representations as separate theories.

Blitz v. Monsanto Co. · filed 2018-04-13(1)

In short, neither the statute nor Wisconsin case law suggests that a plaintiff must choose between one of three parallel tracks or otherwise plead untrue, deceptive or misleading representations differently.

Section 100.18 may support a claim based on a title insurance commitment that a reasonable person could find deceptive or misleading.

Milbrandt v. Huber · filed 1989-02-21

We conclude that the terms of the title insurance commitment, as partially reproduced above, may be construed by a reasonable person to be deceptive and misleading. ... We thus conclude that summary judgment was improperly granted to US Title on the claims related to the title policy commitment, and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 100.18(1) covers a real estate broker’s misrepresentations to prospective buyers if proven.

Grube v. Daun · filed 1992-11-11(1)

We hold that the misrepresentations by Thiel alleged in the Grubes' complaint, if proven, are "deceptive advertising" within the scope of sec. 100.18; therefore, the complaint also states a claim under this section.

Section 100.18(11)(b) imposes a three-year limitations period on a statutory fraudulent-representation claim.

Charles H. Kuiper, Sr., Mae E. Kuiper, and Charles A. Kuiper, Jr., D/B/A Charles H. Kuiper & Son Farms v. American Cyana · filed 1997-12-05(ll)(b)

We agree with the district court that the Kuipers filed their statutory claim for fraudulent representation after the three-year limitations period had expired. Wis. Stat. § 100.18(ll)(b).

Section 100.18(11)(b)(3) provides a three-year limitations period that is not dependent on the date of discovery.

Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC · filed 2018-02-07(11)(b)(3)

Wisconsin law provides for a three-year statute of limitations, also not dependent upon the date of discovery.

Section 100.18 claims are not shown to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations when the court cannot determine when the alleged violation occurred and therefore cannot determine whether the claim relates back within the limitations period.

Brilliant DPI Inc v. CIT Technology Financing Services Inc · filed 2020-05-19

However, without knowing for certain when this occurred, the court is not able to determine whether it relates back to three years prior to the filing date of the original complaint on May 24, 2018. ... Accordingly, the court is not able to conclude that the claim for intentional interference with business relations and the claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 are barred by statute of limitations.

Section 100.18 requires a public representation intended to induce an obligation that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading and causes pecuniary loss; its three-year limitations period runs from the defendant’s conduct, without a discovery rule, and post-purchase statements do not support the claim because the buyer is no longer part of the public.

Himan v. Thor Industries, Inc. · filed 2022-03-08

The WDTPA prohibits a “representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.” Wis. Stat. § 100.18. To prevail on a WDTPA claim, a plaintiff must prove three elements: 1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation; 2) the representation was untrue, deceptive, or misleading; and 3) the representation caused the plaintiff pecuniary loss.

Section 100.18 claims have a three-year limitations period running from the unlawful act, but the discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or should discover with reasonable diligence, both the injury and its possible causal connection to the defendant's conduct.

Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co. · filed 1996-02-15

Even if the Kuipers claims were not preempted, their statutory claim for fraudulent advertising under Wis.Stat. § 100.18 is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for claims under this statute is three years and begins to accrue from “the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice which is the subject of the action.” Wis.Stat. § 100.18. The representation at issue here, i.e., Spangenberg’s 1987 statement that corn could be planted as a follow crop to a SCEPTER application, clearly occurred more than three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. However, because a claim under § 100.18 is a fraud cause of action sounding in tort, Wisconsin’s “discovery rule” applies. Under that rule, a cause of action does not accrue until “the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis.2d 397, 410, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986). Here, by their own admissions, the Kuipers were aware of an injury to their corn crops shortly after they were planted in 1988, and were informed by an ACC rep in 1989 that similar damage to them 1989 crop was likely due to SCEPTER carryover. Moreover, in December of 1989, and again in March of 1990, the Kuipers submitted a claim to ACC alleging that the injury to their 1988 corn crop was caused by SCEPTER carryover. Thus, more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint (April 30, 1993), the Kuipers were aware that they had been injured and that the injury may have been caused by ACC’s conduct. The claim is therefore untimely.

A deceptive marketing claim under § 100.18 is subject to a statute of limitations.

Berres v. Artifex, Ltd. · filed 1998-10-08

Berres claims in eount.five of his complaint that Artifex deceptively marketed its bone screw devices in violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18. Defendants argue, and Judge Gordon held in Staudt, that this claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff apparently concedes this point, as he fails to mention the statute of limitations anywhere in his response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Because the court agrees with Judge Gordon’s analysis on this point, see id. at 1030-31, the court will grant partial summary judgment for the defendants on count five of the complaint.

Section 100.18(11)(b)3 requires a false advertising action to be filed within three years of the alleged unlawful act, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the injury.

Selzer v. Brunsell Brothers, Ltd. · filed 2002-08-29(11)(b)3

Wisconsin's false advertising statute, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(ll)(b)3, provides that "[n]o action may be commenced under this section more than 3 years after the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice which is the subject of the action." ... This is so regardless of whether Selzer knew of his injury by 1991.

A § 100.18(11)(b)2 claim requires a causal connection between an illegal marketing practice and pecuniary loss, and the three-year period in § 100.18(11)(b)3 may be met under a continuing-tort theory only when a misleading statement was received within three years before suit.

Werner v. Pittway Corp. · filed 2000-03-17(11)(b)2, (11)(b)3

As explained in the order entered August 18, 1999, if plaintiffs’ claims are to survive the three-year period of limitation established by § 100.18(ll)(b)3, plaintiffs must show that defendants engaged in a continuing course of misconduct and that one of their acts fell inside the three years prior to filing of this lawsuit. To do so, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they received one of defendants’ allegedly misleading statements sometime during the five-day period between January 22, 1996 (three years before the filing of this lawsuit) and January 26, 1996 (the day of the fire) so as to fall within the “continuing tort” theory. This is essential in order to establish a “causal link” between the misleading statements and their injuries.

Section 100.18(11)(b)(3) imposes a three-year limitations period that can serve as the analogous state period for laches in a Lanham Act trademark case.

Wisconsin Cheese Group, Inc. v. v & v Supremo Foods, Inc. · filed 2008-03-12(11)(b)(3)

In this case, plaintiff identifies § 100.18(ll)(b)(3) of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act as the analogous state statute, which defendant does not dispute. That statute imposes a three-year limitations period.

Section 100.18(11)(b)3 requires an action to be commenced within three years after the alleged unlawful act or practice occurred.

Leitzke v. Magazine Marketplace, Inc. · filed 1992-04-09(11)(b)3

However, Leitzke's second cause of action does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted because it is barred by sec. 100.18(11)(b)3 which provides in part: "No action may be commenced under this section more than 3 years after the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice which is the subject of the action."

Section 100.18(11)(b)3 requires an action to be filed within three years of the unlawful act; the discovery rule does not extend that period.

Skrupky v. Elbert · filed 1994-11-01(11)(b)3

The statute of limitations here, § 100.18(1 l)(b)3, provides: "No action may be commenced under this section more than 3 years after the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice which is the subject of the action." ... This claim, therefore, was not timely made and must be dismissed.

Section 100.18 does not require proof of reasonable reliance as an element of a misrepresentation claim, but the reasonableness of reliance may bear on whether the representation materially induced the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss.

Novell v. Migliaccio · filed 2008-05-28

Based on the plain language of § 100.18, the statutory purpose of protecting the public by deterring sellers from making false representations, and the cases interpreting the statute, we determine that reasonable reliance is not an element of a § 100.18 cause of action.

Section 100.18 requires proof of an untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation made to induce a sale and resulting pecuniary loss; reliance itself is not required, but causation is.

Haley v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co. · filed 2017-07-11

To recover for a violation of the WDTPA, plaintiffs-appellants must prove that Kolbe, in order to induce a sale, made a representation that was untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and caused pecuniary loss. ... However, the absence of a reliance requirement does not relieve plaintiffs of the need to establish causation—i.e., that the alleged misrepresentation somehow caused them loss. ... Also, as the district court rightly noted, the only representations to which plaintiffs-appellants point as establishing the first prong of the above test (i.e., representations that the windows were of “high quality,” etc.) are vague puffery, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs-appellants.

Section 100.18 requires a plaintiff to allege a qualifying public representation made with the specified intent, that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and pecuniary loss; allegations that the representation factored into the purchase can sufficiently plead the reliance-related third element at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Harris v. Rust-Oleum Corporation · filed 2022-03-30

Specifically, Rust-Oleum asserts that Harris has failed to plead adequately the third element of a DPTA claim both because her complaint contains no allegation that she actually read and relied upon the allegedly false statements and because she purchased RainBrella numerous times over several years. The Court, however, finds that Harris has alleged enough for her claim to survive. Although her complaint is somewhat perfunctory, particularly with regards to reliance upon the allegedly false statements, it nonetheless provides enough facts to put Rust-Oleum on notice as to the nature of her claims. Harris alleges that RainBrella prominently displayed statements on its packages, packages Harris then purchased, that those statements were false, and that, had she known they were not true, she would not have purchased the product. Drawing all inferences in Harris’s favor, it is clear that she is alleging that Rust-Oleum’s representations about RainBrella’s quality factored into her purchasing decision, thus satisfying the third requirement of a claim under the DPTA.

Section 100.18 does not require a purchaser to prove reasonable reliance on an untrue representation to establish causation of pecuniary loss.

K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection MacHinery Sales, Inc. · filed 2006-06-22(1), (11)(b)2

Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18 does not require reasonable reliance.

Section 100.18 requires a deceptive representation to induce the plaintiff to act; lost sales resulting from representations to customers do not satisfy its causation requirement.

Spacesaver Corp. v. Marvel Group, Inc. · filed 2009-06-01(1)

Thus, even if I assume that defendant’s alleged misrepresentations to the government “caused” plaintiff to lose sales (because the government would have purchased from plaintiff in the absence of the misrepresentations), that is not the type of causation contemplated by the statute.

Section 100.18 broadly prohibits corporations from engaging in deceptive marketing practices through untrue, deceptive, or misleading representations, and its claim elements are essentially the same as intentional misrepresentation.

Shepherd Investments International, Ltd. v. Verizon Communications Inc. · filed 2005-06-01

Plaintiff also alleges that by making false statements, defendant violated Wis. Stat. § 100.18. Section 100.18 is a broad remedial statute prohibiting corporations from engaging in deceptive marketing practices by making “untrue, deceptive or misleading” representations. Wis. Stat. § 100.18. The elements of a § 100.18 claim are essentially the same as those of an intentional misrepresentation claim.

Section 100.18 requires a plaintiff to prove a public representation intended to induce an obligation, that was untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and that caused pecuniary loss; in this context, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant's trademark infringement deceived him.

Rice v. Reading For Education LLC · filed 2019-10-07

To prevail on a claim under § 100.18, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation caused the plaintiff a pecuniary loss. ... Accordingly, I will follow the district-court cases and conclude that, to prevail on a claim under § 100.18, Rice must show that RFE’s trademark infringement deceived him. Obviously, however, Rice could not plausibly allege that he was deceived by RFE’s trademark infringement, for he knows whether or not he is the source of the Squishy Zoo toys. Accordingly, Rice’s claim under § 100.18 will be dismissed.

Section 100.18 requires proof that the defendant used untrue statements to sell wares to the public; misleading consumers about products’ authenticity and quality, when it influences purchases and harms the plaintiff, states a claim.

Standard Process, Inc. v. AVC Infinite, LLC · filed 2020-01-09

Standard Process has also stated a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used untrue statements to sell its wares to the public. United Concrete & Const., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc., 2013 WI 72, ¶ 15, 349 Wis. 2d 587, 836 N.W.2d 807; see also State v. Am. TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 292, 304, 430 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1988). ... Here, Standard Process has stated a claim for deceptive trade practices. First, Defendants used the Standard Process Trademarks to advertise and promote products in an effort to lead consumers to believe that they were selling genuine Standard Process Products that came with all the benefits of genuine Standard Process Products, including original packaging, freshness, and other quality controls. ... Second, Defendants knowingly advertised and sold non-genuine products to consumers for a profit when those goods did not conform to the same quality controls as Standard Process products, allowing Defendants to profit off consumers who relied on those representations. ... Third, Defendants’ use of the Standard Process Trademarks to advertise and sell the products that did not conform with Standard Process’s quality controls influenced customers to purchase the products Defendants sold. ... Fourth, Standard Process has been harmed as a result of Defendants’ deceptive trade practices.

Section 100.18(9) requires a plan or scheme to avoid selling as advertised; using commissioned sales representatives alone does not establish one.

Meyer v. LASER VISION INSTITUTE, LLC · filed 2006-03-01(9)

However, the use of commissioned sales representatives is not determinative evidence of a bait-and-switch plan or scheme.

A clear and specific integration clause that disclaims reliance on the seller's representations bars a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).

Peterson v. Cornerstone Property Development, LLC · filed 2006-06-13(1)

Accordingly, the integration clause governs and bars Peterson's claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).

Section 100.18 requires a public, intentional representation that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading and materially causes pecuniary loss; an integration clause does not bar the claim unless it specifically disclaims reliance on the representation.

Subtractus Inc v. Best Graphics Inc · filed 2019-10-09

To state a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant made a representation to “the public” with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was “untrue, deceptive or misleading,” and (3) the representation materially caused a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. ... Unlike in Peterson, Ampersand never agreed that it was not relying on any representation by Best Graphics in entering into the contract. For this reason, Ampersand’s § 100.18 claim does not fail as a matter of law and Best Graphic’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

Section 100.18(1) permits liability for a deceptive affirmative representation in a sale contract despite as-is and exculpatory clauses, and its protection extends to a prospective purchaser who has not yet entered a binding contract.

Fricano v. Bank of America NA · filed 2015-12-23(1)

We can perceive of no reason — and the Bank offers none — why falsely induced "as is" and exculpatory clauses should necessarily bar, as a matter of law, liability for deceptive statements made in violation of Wisconsin's deceptive trade practices statute. ... One of the necessary elements of a Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) claim is that the representation be made to "the public." ... A person remains a member of "the public" until a "particular relationship" exists between that person and the defendant. ... Thus, once a person has made a purchase or entered into a contract, any statements made thereafter cannot be said to have caused that person to make that purchase or enter into that contract. ... Thus, there was no contract at the time the Bank misrepresented its knowledge of the condition of the property.

Section 100.18(1) requires the plaintiff itself to be materially induced by the defendant's representation; a competitor cannot recover merely because representations to customers caused it to lose sales.

Grice Engineering, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc. · filed 2010-03-04(1)

Wisconsin courts divide a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) into three elements: (1) the defendant made a representation to “the public” with the intent to induce an obligation: (2) the representation was “untrue, deceptive or misleading”: and (3) the representation materially caused a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. ... In this case, plaintiff does not allege that it was “induced” to do anything by defendant; it alleges that “customers” were induced to “alter[ ] their purchase decisions” by defendant’s misrepresentations. Thus, even if I assume that defendants’ alleged misrepresentations “caused” plaintiff to lose sales (because customers would have purchased interior soffit products from plaintiff in the absence of the misrepresentations), that is not the type of causation contemplated by the statute. Therefore, I conclude that plaintiffs deceptive trade practices’ claim must be dismissed.

Section 100.18 requires a causal connection between an alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s damages, and allegations that the advertisements factored into the purchase can suffice at the pleading stage.

Earls, Barry v. Menard, Inc. · filed 2020-12-11(11)(b)

Neither case supports Menards’ argument. In Spacesaver, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s Wisconsin-law consumer-fraud claim because it was based on an invalid legal theory—that a defendant could violate the statute by inducing a third party to act to the plaintiff’s detriment—not because the plaintiff had insufficiently alleged that it had been induced to act by the defendant’s misrepresentations. See Spacesaver, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 663–64. ... At the pleading stage, it is reasonable to infer from these allegations that the advertisements materially induced or proximately caused the plaintiffs to make their purchases. Plaintiffs will bear a higher burden at summary judgment, but Menards identifies no authority under any state’s law that requires, at the pleading stage, more than what plaintiffs have alleged.

Section 100.18 prohibits affirmative deceptive assertions but provides no remedy for a failure to disclose material facts.

State v. McGuire · filed 2007-05-02

We disagree, however, because § 100.18 prohibits only affirmative assertions, not a failure to disclose, ... whereas omitting information supports a claim under Wis. Stat. § 551.41(2).

Section 100.18 requires a deceptive, false, or misleading representation of fact made to induce a purchase and does not impose liability for mere nondisclosure.

Goudy v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA · filed 2010-03-24(1)

Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18, the deceptive trade practices act, prohibits sellers from making deceptive, false or misleading representations or statements of fact to prospective buyers. ... There are three elements to a claim under § 100.18: (1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation; (2) the representation was "untrue, deceptive or misleading"; and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. ... We reject Goudy's contention because § 100.18 does not encompass a duty to disclose. However, Goudy also points to Winnebagoland's affirmative representation that the vehicle was covered by the manufacturer's warranty. On this basis, we agree that material issues of fact exist as to whether Winnebagoland violated § 100.18.

Section 100.18(1) reaches affirmative, untrue, deceptive, or misleading factual representations about advertised prices; related omissions may show why a representation is misleading, but omissions alone are not actionable.

Murillo v. Kohl's Corp. · filed 2016-06-24(1)

The Court concludes that the affirmative representations allegedly being made by Kohls regarding its “regular prices”—both in brick-and-mortar stores and online—comprise the heart of the plaintiffs’ WDTPA claim, and these representations are indeed actionable representations of fact under Section 100.18.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits affirmative false, deceptive, or misleading assertions, representations, or statements of fact, but does not impose a duty to disclose.

Naparala v. Pella Corp. · filed 2015-05-19(1)

“Silence — an omission to speak — is insufficient to support a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). The WDTPA does not purport to impose a duty to disclose, but, rather, prohibits only affirmative assertions, representations, or statements of fact that are false, deceptive, or misleading.”

Section 100.18(1) prohibits only affirmative false, deceptive, or misleading assertions, representations, or statements of fact; omissions and silence are not actionable and the statute imposes no duty to disclose.

COHEN v. SUBARU CORPORATION · filed 2022-03-10(1)

Omissions are not actionable under the WDTPA. Blitz v. Monsanto Co., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1052 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (“Because the statute prohibits only assertion[s], representation[s] or statement[s], it does not prohibit omissions.” (citing Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1)); Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 245 (Wis. 2004) (“Silence—an omission to speak—is insufficient to support a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). The DTPA does not purport to impose a duty to disclose, but, rather, prohibits only affirmative assertions, representations, or statements of fact that are false, deceptive, or misleading.”). Plaintiffs therefore cannot ground their WDTPA claims in Denso’s failure to disclose the Defect.

Section 100.18 treats a lessor’s nondisclosure as potentially deceptive when its silence implies compliance with Wisconsin law despite retaining interest legally owed to lessees.

Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A. · filed 1996-05-13

And, in view of this presumption, Bank One’s alleged silence as to its “policy and practice of failing to disclose the retention of interest on security deposits,” Amend. Compl. ¶32, could be found to be deceptive under Wisconsin’s consumer fraud statute, because that • silence could be understood to imply that Bank One indeed complies with the dictates- of Wisconsin’s commercial code when in fact it does not.

Section 100.18(1) requires a public advertisement, announcement, statement, or representation containing an untrue, deceptive, or misleading assertion of fact, and does not cover fraudulent omissions or nondisclosures.

Hepper v. Theoharis · filed 2022-06-16(1)

To assert a WDTPA claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has, with the specified intent, made an “advertisement, announcement, statement or representation . . . to the public,” which contains an “assertion, representation or statement of fact” that is “untrue, deceptive or misleading,” and that the plaintiff sustained a pecuniary loss as a result of the “assertion, representation or statement of fact.” Wis. Stat. §100.18(1). Importantly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has confirmed that “[a] nondisclosure is not an ‘assertion, representation or statement of fact’ under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).” Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 245 (Wis. 2004). The WDTPA does not, therefore, contemplate claims based on allegedly fraudulent omissions. Id.

Section 100.18(1) treats an act such as painting over evidence of a leaky basement as capable of being a deceptive representation that the basement did not leak.

Novell v. Migliaccio · filed 2010-04-27(1)

The only issue on this appeal is whether painting a basement wall can be a misrepresentation under § 100.18(1) if a jury believes that the painting was done to hide evidence that the basement leaked. We hold that it can and that there are genuine issues of material fact whether the Migliaccios painted their basement and, if so, thus misrepresented the basement's condition.

Section 100.18 applies to commercial transactions and protects Wisconsin residents from deceptive representations made to promote the sale of a product.

Thermal Design, Inc. v. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. · filed 2014-06-18

Yet the purpose of section 100.18 is to “protect the residents of Wisconsin from any untrue, deceptive or misleading representations made to promote the sale of a product.” ... More simply put, section 100.18 “applies by its terms to commercial transactions.” ... ASHRAE’s actions were not part of a commercial transaction.

Section 100.18 does not cover misrepresentations in the sale of food; those are governed by § 100.183.

Gallego v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2005-10-20(1)

As we have explained, Wis. Stat. § 100.18 deals with misrepresentations in the sale of "real estate," non-food "merchandise, securities, employment or service," while Wis. Stat. § 100.183 applies to misrepresentations "regarding articles of food."

Section 100.18(1) requires a deceptive advertisement to be made in Wisconsin, and a company-wide advertising scheme established and disseminated from Wisconsin can satisfy that requirement even when a consumer sees the advertisement elsewhere.

Le v. Kohls Department Stores, Inc. · filed 2016-02-08(1)

The Court concludes that Le alleged sufficient facts to maintain his claim under the WDTPA. ... On the one hand, the statute’s language requires that actionable statements under the WDTPA be “made” in Wisconsin. ... However, the ordinary meaning of the verb “to make” is “[t]o cause (something) to exist.” ... Here, Le alleges that Kohls’ principal place of business is in Wisconsin and its “acts, practices and policies pertaining to the advertising, marketing, and sale of merchandise.. .were established and emanated from Wisconsin.” ... Moreover, Le alleges that Kohls’ scheme was executed “company-wide” across all of Kohls’ stores. ... Thus, even if Le “saw” Kohls’ allegedly deceptive statements in California, the advertisements that comprise the basis of Le’s claims indeed were “made,” and then “disseminated,” by Kohls from its Wisconsin headquarters. Kohls’ motion to dismiss Le’s WDTPA claim will, therefore, will be denied.

Section 100.18(1) applies to deceptive advertising only when the representation is likely to reach and induce action by a purchaser in Wisconsin; the relevant location is where the advertising occurs, not where the advertiser is physically located.

T&M Farms v. CNH Industrial America LLC · filed 2020-09-21(1)

For these reasons, I conclude that the Wisconsin DTPA does not apply unless a person makes a deceptive representation that is likely to reach and induce action by a purchaser in Wisconsin. Because there are no cotton farms in Wisconsin, CNH’s marketing statements regarding the Module Express were unlikely to reach or induce action by a Wisconsin resident. Accordingly, those statements are not within the scope of the Wisconsin DTPA, and the plaintiffs’ claims under § 100.18(1) will be dismissed.

Section 100.18(1) prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations or statements of fact in public advertisements or sales announcements, and a claim requires a public representation intended to induce an obligation, an untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation, and material pecuniary loss.

In re FCA US LLC Monostable Electronic Gearshift Litigation · filed 2017-11-15(1)

“Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), [] generally prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations or statements of fact in public advertisements or sales announcements.” ... “There are three elements in a § 100.18 cause of action: (1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, déceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.”

Section 100.18 does not require reliance, but requires proof that the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.

Fox, Yvonne v. Iowa Health System · filed 2019-07-25

A claim under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.18, is similar to a claim for common law misrepresentation, except that plaintiffs do not need to prove reliance. Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, ¶ 48, 309 Wis.2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544. Instead, they must prove that “the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff[s].”

Section 100.18(1) prohibits untrue, deceptive, or misleading representations made to induce an obligation when they materially cause the plaintiff pecuniary loss; a single representation to a single person can suffice, and the economic loss doctrine does not bar the claim.

Create-A-Pack Foods Inc v. Batterlicious Cookie Dough Company · filed 2022-03-09(1)

Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is “part of Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the purpose of which is ‘to protect consumers from untrue, deceptive or misleading representations to promote the sale of a product.’ It is also intended ‘to deter sellers from making false and misleading representations in order to protect the public.’” ... “A claim under § 100.18(1), has three elements: (1) the defendant made a representation to one or more members of the public with the intent to induce an obligation; (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading; and (3) the representation materially induced a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.” ... “A single representation to a single person is enough to trigger § 100.18(1)’s protections.” ... The economic loss doctrine does not bar claims brought under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. ... As explained above, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Create-A-Pack filled Batterlicious’s orders on time and whether it correctly packaged Batterlicious products. Therefore, Create-A-Pack’s motion for summary judgment as to the defendants’ § 100.18 claim is denied.

Section 100.18(1) requires a public, untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation made with intent to induce an obligation and materially causing pecuniary loss.

In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation · filed 2017-06-30(1), (ll)(b)

To state a claim under the statute, then, a plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) the defendant made a representation to ‘the public’ with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was ‘untrue, deceptive or misleading,’ and (3) the representation materially caused a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.”

Section 100.18 permits a misrepresentation claim to proceed when the alleged seller's statement is a specific, ascertainable factual representation rather than puffery.

United Concrete & Construction, Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc. · filed 2013-07-12

Incontrovertibly, then, Red-D-Mix had the opportunity to rebut the claim before the circuit court, and this argument is meritless. The statements were not puffery, and United therefore had a colorable claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.

Section 100.18(1) does not apply to debt collection because it protects consumers in the sale of products and services.

Scheunemann v. J.C. Christensen & Associates, Inc. · filed 2011-07-18(1)

This statute is inapplicable to the present case. The statute’s purpose is to protect consumers in the sale of products and services, not in the collection of debts.

Section 100.18 creates a standalone cause of action that is not barred by the economic loss doctrine, may protect a single member of the public, and is pleaded under the general rather than fraud-specific standard.

Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Company · filed 2020-01-09(1)

Concerning Hinrichs' statutory claims, we conclude first that the economic loss doctrine does not serve as a bar to claims made under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. ... We conclude second that one person can be "the public" for purposes of § 100.18(1) and decline Dow's invitation to overrule Automatic Merchandisers. ... Finally, we conclude that the heightened pleading standard set forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) for claims of fraud does not apply to claims made under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 and that Hinrichs' complaint states a claim under the general pleading standard.

A claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 does not involve fraud for pleading purposes and is not subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened particularity requirement.

Osowski · filed 2026-02-10

As an initial matter, I agree with the court’s reasoning in Green v. Olympus Grp., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 3d 799 (E.D. Wis. 2025) that Rule 9(b) does not apply to a claim for violation of Wisconsin’s DTPA. Id. at 803–04. In Green, the court noted that in Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Wisconsin’s own heightened pleading standard for fraud does not apply to § 100.18. Id. The court found that while federal pleading standards apply to state law claims in federal court, given the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that a § 100.18 claim does not involve fraud, “it would at least violate the spirit of comity and respect that federal courts ordinarily afford state courts to hold, contrary to Hinrichs, that a § 100.18 claim is one for fraud that must be pleaded with particularity.” Id. at 804. Thus, Michael’s motion to dismiss as to Count III is denied.

Section 100.18 requires a plaintiff to prove a public representation intended to induce an obligation, its falsity, deceptiveness, or misleading nature, and resulting pecuniary loss; § 100.18(11)(b)2 permits recovery of pecuniary loss plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.

King, Malcolm v. Link Wild Safaris, LLC · filed 2021-01-25(11)(b)2

To prevail on his claim under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.18, King must prove three things: (1) LWS made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation; (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading; and (3) the representation caused King a pecuniary loss. ... Because it is undisputed that LWS made a false representation that caused King pecuniary loss, King is entitled to summary judgment on his § 100.18 claim. Under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2, King is entitled to recover his “pecuniary loss, together with costs, including reasonable attorney fees.” ... Therefore, he is entitled to an award of $65,772.59 plus attorney’s fees and costs in an amount to be determined.

Section 100.18(1) requires a public representation intended to induce an obligation, that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and that materially induces the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss.

Rustic Retreats Log Homes Inc v. Pioneer Log Homes of British Columbia Inc · filed 2021-06-17(1)

The elements of a § 100.18(1) claim are: “(1) the defendant made a representation to one or more members of the public with the intent to induce an obligation; (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading; and (3) the representation materially induced a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.”

Section 100.18 requires proof that the defendant made a public representation intending to induce an obligation, that the representation was untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and that it caused the plaintiff pecuniary loss.

Cota v. Ralph Lauren Corporation · filed 2022-05-19

To prevail on a § 100.18 claim, Cota must prove three elements: “(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) that the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) that the representation caused the plaintiff a pecuniary loss.” ... Without such allegations, Cota has failed to plausibly allege that RLC “made a representation to the public with an intent to an induce an obligation” or that any such representation was “untrue, deceptive or misleading.”

Section 100.18 prohibits businesses from making untrue, deceptive, or misleading representations to the public that are intended to induce an obligation and materially cause the plaintiff pecuniary loss.

The Goat LLC v. Advanced Wholesale LLC · filed 2024-04-12

However, Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations establish Defendants’ liability for deceptive trade practices under § 100.18. “To state such a claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used untrue statements to sell its wares to the public.” Standard Process Inc. v. AVC Infinite, LLC, No. 18-CV-849-WMC, 2020 WL 103841, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 9, 2020) (citing United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc., 836 N.W.2d 807, ¶ 15 (Wis. 2013) and State v. Am. TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Wis. 1988)). In other words, “[c]laims arising under [§ 100.18] have three required elements: ‘(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.’” Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc., 3 F.4th 927, 934 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Novell v. Migliaccio, 749 N.W.2d 544, ¶ 49 (Wis. 2008)). Plaintiffs plead that Defendants have used and continue to use the infringing marks and trade dress to advertise and promote their products with the purpose of capitalizing on Plaintiffs’ goodwill and reputation. Plaintiffs plead that Defendants did so to earn a profit from unsuspecting consumers, and that Plaintiffs have lost sales and been damaged as a result. Thus, Plaintiffs have established Defendants’ liability under § 100.18.

Section 100.18(1) requires a public advertisement, announcement, statement, or representation made with the specified intent, containing an untrue, deceptive, or misleading assertion of fact, that causes the plaintiff pecuniary loss.

Okeke v. Nantomah · filed 2025-08-29(1)

To state a claim under this statute, the plaintiffs must establish that “the defendant has, with the specified intent, made an ‘advertisement, announcement, statement or representation . . . to the public,’ which contains an ‘assertion, representation or statement of fact’ that is ‘untrue, deceptive or misleading,’ and that the plaintiff has sustained a pecuniary loss as a result.” ... These allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to establish a claim under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices statute. The court will grant default judgment for the plaintiffs on the third cause of action in the complaint.

Section 100.18 requires a public representation intended to induce an obligation, that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and that materially causes the plaintiff's pecuniary loss; an omission alone is insufficient.

Negron v. Ascension Health · filed 2025-09-23

On Count XIV, claims arising under the WDTPA have three elements: “(1) the defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.” Giasson v. MRA - Mgmt. Ass'n, Inc., 2025 WL 1025173, at *18 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 7, 2025). Notably, the WDTPA applies only to affirmative assertions; an omission is insufficient. Id.

Section 100.18(11)(a) permits the state to bring an action to enjoin a violation in any court with equity jurisdiction; a reference to filing in circuit court does not make that forum exclusive.

United States of America v. Consumer Law Protection, LLC · filed 2023-09-22(11)(a)

Based on this language, and in the context of venue, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims must be brought in state circuit court and not this court; essentially, “may means must.” ... The Court is not convinced by Defendants’ limited argument. ... And, the word may is permissive, not exclusive; there is no limiter like the word only (as in, the state may only file suit in circuit court or the state may file suit only in circuit court).

Section 100.18’s prohibition on untrue, deceptive, or misleading advertising gives adequate notice and is not facially void for vagueness.

Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren · filed 1973-10-03

The plaintiff attacks the statutory words “untrue, deceptive or misleading [advertisements or representations]” as being so imprecise as to be constitutionally vague. ... Therefore, with regard to the “imprecision” or “notice” perspective from which this “facial vagueness” attack must be considered, I conclude that the statutory terms and the whole statutory scheme are reasonably geared toward notice and workable precision.

Section 100.18(2) requires an advertisement offering a combination sale to state the actual price to be paid; a price posted at the seller’s premises does not suffice.

State v. Amoco Oil Co. · filed 1980-06-27(2)

We conclude, as did the circuit court, that sec. 100.18(2), Stats., requires that the actual price or amount which is to be paid for the property sold must be included in the advertisement itself.

Section 100.18(11)(d) permits the state to join a contract assignee in an enforcement action to obtain relief for injured consumers, even when the assignee is not alleged to have committed the prohibited acts.

State v. Excel Management Services, Inc. · filed 1983-03-29(11)(d)

Consistent with such a purpose would be a construction of the language in secs. 100.18(11) (d) and 100.20(6) as allowing the state to name as a defendant in a complaint the same party who individuals, if they had brought an action, could name. We conclude that the purpose underlying these statutes requires a construction of the statutes which allows First Savings to be joined as a party defendant in this action.

Section 100.18(9)(a) prohibits an advertisement made as part of a plan or scheme whose purpose is not to sell the merchandise as advertised.

State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc. · filed 1987-06-04(9)(a)

Section 100.18(9) does not prosecute a seller’s state of mind. It prosecutes a seller who makes, publishes, etc., an advertisement, announcement, statement or representation of any kind which is part of a plan or scheme, the purpose of which is not to sell the merchandise as advertised. The statute therefore requires an act accompanied by a particular state of mind.

Section 100.18(9)(a) requires a plan or scheme not to sell the advertised product; an incentive to sell more profitable products alone is insufficient.

State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc. · filed 1988-11-02(9)(a)

The complaint does not allege anything except that there were incentives for American to try to sell the more expensive models and that, in fact, it stocked and sold more of those models. All profit motivated retailers recognize these incentives and hope to sell their more profitable items, if possible. Section 100.18(9)(a), Stats., cannot be interpreted to make unlawful such an incentive. The statute requires a plan or scheme which is not demonstrated in this complaint.

Restitution under § 100.18(11)(d) invokes the court’s equitable powers, allowing it to consider a claim despite noncompliance with a restitution order’s filing requirements.

Lueck's Home Improvement, Inc. v. Seal Tite National, Inc. · filed 1987-12-30(11)(d)

Restitution under secs. 100.18(ll)(d) and 553.54(2)(a), Stats., invokes the court’s equitable powers. ... The trial court failed to appreciate that its equitable powers permitted it to allow Lueck’s claim despite Lueck’s failure to comply with the filing requirements of the restitution order.

Section 100.18 does not provide a jury trial to determine liability in a State enforcement action.

State v. Ameritech Corp. · filed 1994-05-26

But as the State concedes, neither § 100.18, Stats., nor the WCA specifically provides for a jury trial to determine a party's liability. Nor are there any references to § 100.18 or the WCA in any procedural statutes which permit parties to request a jury. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court correctly granted Ameritech's motion to strike the demand for a jury.