Statute Annotations › Wisconsin › Wis. Stat. § 632.32

Wis. Stat. § 632.32

Motor vehicle insurance policies: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Wisconsin
Case notes
156
Cited in passing
74
Citing cases indexed
551
Case dates
1980–2022
Screened through
2023-04-07
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-23
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

230 citing cases reviewed of 551 in the citation index: 156 interpreted the section (annotated below), 74 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2023-04-07 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Wis. Stat. § 632.32?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1993-03-24 United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kleppe reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling that a workers' compensation offset violates subsection (4)(a) only when it drops coverage below the statutory minimum. Source
  • 1995-07-15 Wisconsin Act 21 added § 632.32(5)(f)–(j), permitting specified anti-stacking, reducing, and drive-other-car clauses; Teschendorf v. State Farm Insurance Companies explains the change to reducing clauses. Source
  • 2009-11-01 Wisconsin Act 28 made underinsured motorist coverage mandatory and restricted anti-stacking, reducing, and drive-other-car clauses in the 2009–2011 version of § 632.32. Source
  • 2011 Wisconsin Act 14, § 15c, repealed former § 632.32(2)(e), as Brey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company explains. Source
  • 2011-11-01 Wisconsin Act 14 made underinsured motorist coverage optional again, allowed specified anti-stacking and reducing clauses, and repealed former § 632.32(6)(d); Belding v. DeMoulin explains the change to stacking. Source
  • 2012-04-20 Wisconsin Act 224 exempted commercial liability policies whose incidental motor-vehicle coverage is limited to non-owned vehicles from the UM, UIM, and medical-payments offer requirements; commercial automobile liability policies remain subject to them. Source

Uninsured motorist coverage and eligibility

Section 632.32(4)(a) requires an insured seeking uninsured motorist coverage to prove the uninsured motorist’s causal negligence and the insured’s damages.

Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance · filed 1984-03-27(4)(a)

Sec. 632.32(4) (a), Stats., [7] requires insurers to provide uninsured motorist coverage "[f]or the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles." (Emphasis added.) An insured is legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured motorist only after sustaining the burden of proving (1) causal negligence on the part of the uninsured motorist, and (2) damages.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) does not require an insured to occupy a vehicle listed in the policy to receive uninsured motorist coverage.

Welch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1985-01-31(4)(a)

There is no requirement in the uninsured motorist statute that the insured be occupying an insured vehicle at the time of an accident.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) requires automobile liability insurers to provide uninsured motorist coverage that includes an insured's medical expenses from an accident with an uninsured motorist.

Employers Health Insurance v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin · filed 1990-02-07(4)(a)

In addition, sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., statutorily requires an automobile liability insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage to its insureds, which includes an insured's medical expenses when involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) requires uninsured motorist coverage but does not make the insurer liable as the uninsured driver’s insurer or give it primary responsibility relative to a health insurer.

Employers Health Insurance v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin · filed 1991-05-13(4)(a)

The uninsured motorist law does not require that General Casualty provide liability insurance for Klein, the tortfeasor; General Casualty does not, as a result of the statute, stand in the shoes of the tortfeasor. The uninsured motorist coverage required by statute does not convert the insurance company into a tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) requires uninsured motorist coverage in each policy; a fleet policy that lists vehicles and assesses a separate premium for each is treated as a separate policy for each vehicle.

Carrington Ex Rel. Nathan v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 1991-07-30(4)(a)

We agree that a fleet policy which lists the individual vehicles and assesses a separate premium for each, regardless of whether this information is contained in one or several policies, is in effect a separate policy for each vehicle.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) requires an antique automobile policy to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the policyholder and specified relatives even when they are not occupying a covered vehicle.

St. Paul Mercury Insurance v. Zastrow · filed 1992-02-13(4)(a)

We hold that the St. Paul automobile policy cannot, for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, limit the coverage of Zastrow and his wife and son to the coverage accorded occupants of vehicles. This holding is mandated by the text of sec. 632.32(4)(a), which requires every policy to include uninsured motorist coverage, and the public policy underlying sec. 632.32(4)(a), which puts the injured party in the same position as if the uninsured tortfeasor had been insured.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) does not require uninsured motorist coverage to remain in force after cancellation when only liability coverage continues under the financial responsibility law.

Nutter v. Milwaukee Insurance · filed 1992-02-27(4)(a)

Nutter argues that, because sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., requires uninsured motorist coverage for "[e]very policy of insurance," his post-cancellation coverage must include the uninsured motorist coverage. We disagree. Nutter's post-cancellation coverage includes only a "motor vehicle liability policy," which is limited to liability insurance.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) requires uninsured motorist coverage but does not require underinsured motorist coverage.

Schwochert v. American Family Mutual Ins. · filed 1987-06-18(4)

This uninsured motorist coverage was mandatory under sec. 632.32(4), Stats. Underinsured motorist coverage has not been made mandatory under sec. 632.32(4) or any other statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(1) requires uninsured motorist coverage in liability policies issued or delivered in Wisconsin.

American Family Mutual Insurance v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1988-12-21(1)

Section 632.32(1), Stats., mandates uninsured motorist insurance for “every policy of insurance issued or delivered in this state” on account of insured’s liability for loss or damage caused by accident.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) does not invalidate a policy’s exclusion of underinsured motorist coverage for a vehicle owned by the insured’s household.

Koshiol v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1992-09-15(4)

Section 632.32(4) does not contain a public policy invalidating either the "underinsured motor vehicle" definition or the drive-other-car exclusion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) permits insurers to broaden uninsured motorist coverage to include underinsured vehicles.

Sobieski v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1993-12-22(4)(a)

This argument, however, ignores the fact that while uninsurance has its "traditional" definitions, and while these "traditional" definitions are codified by our statutes on uninsurance, an insurer is always free to broaden its definition of uninsurance.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) does not require a commercial fleet policy naming a corporation or government entity as the insured to include all its employees as named insureds.

Mayer v. City of Amery · filed 1994-05-17(4)(a)

While Wisconsin courts have concluded that the legislative purpose behind § 632.32(4)(a), STATS., is to put the injured in the same position as if the uninsured tortfeasor had been insured, and in turn have concluded that UM coverage is personal and portable, there is nothing to indicate that the legislature intended this reasoning to be extended to require commercial fleet policies, where the named insured is a corporation or government entity, to include all of its employees as named insureds. To construe § 632.32(4)(a) as requiring such would lead to an unreasonable result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) protects an injured person's contractual subrogee under uninsured motorist coverage, and an insurer cannot exclude all subrogated claimants.

WEA Ins. Corp. v. Freiheit · filed 1994-12-07(4)(a)

American Family seeks to circumvent the mandates of § 632.32(4)(a), STATS., by excluding all subrogated parties from recovering under its uninsured motorist provision. This it cannot do under the law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) permits an uninsured motorist policy to require physical contact with an unidentified vehicle for hit-and-run coverage, although insurers may offer broader coverage.

Klimstra v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co. · filed 1995-03-27(4)

Although under Minnesota law, the physical contact requirement is unenforceable as violating Minnesota’s uninsured motorist statute, the contact requirement is enforceable under Wisconsin law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) requires uninsured motorist coverage when an insured is legally entitled to recover from an uninsured driver; a policy cannot require the insured to be hit or struck by a vehicle.

Trampf v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co. · filed 1996-01-17(4)

This section establishes the UM coverage required in every motor vehicle policy issued. Under subsec. (4), a UM policy must provide coverage in any instance where the insured is legally entitled to recover from the uninsured driver for injuries.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)1 requires uninsured motorist coverage when an allegedly negligent vehicle owner or operator lacks liability insurance, even if another alleged tortfeasor is insured.

Hull v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1998-12-15(4)(a)1

We hold that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) requires UM coverage whenever either the owner or the operator of a motor vehicle is allegedly negligent and is not covered by liability insurance.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2b requires physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the vehicle whose driver seeks uninsured motorist coverage.

Smith v. General Casualty Insurance · filed 1999-09-07(4)(a)2b

We conclude from the foregoing, that UM coverage exists under the statute only when there is physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the vehicle whose driver is seeking UM coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) does not prohibit arbitration of uninsured motorist claims.

Jones v. Poole · filed 1998-02-18(4)

While § 632.32(4), Stats., does not authorize arbitration, neither does it prohibit it.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i)1 permits a reduction for payments made by or on behalf of a tortfeasor, but not for payments from the insured’s own uninsured motorist coverage.

Janssen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2002-02-12(5)(i)1

We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)l unambiguously refers to payments made by and on behalf of tortfeasors, and not to payments made pursuant to the insured's own uninsured motorist coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) requires uninsured motorist coverage only when the injury has a causal connection to the uninsured vehicle’s inherent use.

Sentry Insurance v. Schrank · filed 2005-09-22(4)

Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4) mandates uninsured motorist coverage for the protection of persons legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. ... There is no UM coverage, however, unless there is a causal connection between the accident producing the injury and the inherent "use" of the vehicle. ... We conclude Schrank's injuries did not arise out of the use of Castona's truck.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) requires uninsured motorist coverage for a person riding in a covered vehicle to apply in the same manner as coverage for the named insured, so an other-insurance clause cannot make the rider’s coverage excess while the named insured’s is primary.

Progressive Northern Insurance v. Hall · filed 2006-02-07(3)(a)

Thus, the policy does not provide uninsured motorist coverage for "any person using" a vehicle in the same manner as such coverage is provided for the named insured. Accordingly, we conclude that Progressive's "other insurance" clause violates § 632.32(3)(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) does not require uninsured motorist coverage when the allegedly negligent vehicle operator is covered by liability insurance.

Blum Ex Rel. Studinski v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co. · filed 2008-12-04(4)(a)

We conclude § 632.32(4)(a) does not require coverage where, as here, the alleged tortfeasor is the operator of the vehicle and is covered by liability insurance.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3) extends uninsured motorist coverage to people using vehicles described in the policy's uninsured motorist agreement, but does not require coverage for an employee's personal vehicle described only in the liability agreement.

Mittnacht v. St. Paul Fire & Casualty Insurance · filed 2009-03-04(3)

The UM protection required by § 632.32(3) to these described autos does not extend to John's personal non-owned vehicle because it is not described in the UM insuring agreement.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) does not require uninsured motorist coverage when the only allegedly negligent party is an insured driver.

Blum ex rel. Studinski v. 1st Auto & Casualty Insurance · filed 2010-07-14(4)

Because Blum alleged negligence only on the part of the insured driver, § 632.32(4) does not mandate UM coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run accidents

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires uninsured motorist coverage for an accident involving an unidentified vehicle only when there is physical contact.

Hayne v. Progressive Northern Insurance · filed 1983-11-01(4)(a)2.b.

Section 632.32 (4) (a) 2.b. mandates coverage only for "hit-and-run" accidents involving an unidentified motor vehicle. The clear statutory language of sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. reflects a legislative intent that the statute apply only to accidents in which there has been physical contact.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2b requires the unidentified vehicle itself to be involved in the physical contact for hit-and-run uninsured motorist coverage.

Wegner v. Heritage Mutual Insurance · filed 1992-12-02(4)(a)2b

Although Sandra would like us to read these requirements disjunc-tively, we hold that the only reasonable reading of the statute is that the unidentified vehicle must be involved with the physical contact.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)(1) includes a vehicle as uninsured when neither its owner nor its operator has liability insurance.

Hemerley v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1985-11-07(4)(a)(1)

In view of that purpose, we construe "uninsured motor vehicle" in sec. 632.32(4)(a)(1), Stats., to include a vehicle, neither the owner nor the operator of which is insured by liability insurance.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.a treats a vehicle as uninsured when its liability insurer becomes insolvent, even if a guaranty association provides coverage.

Fritsche v. Ford Motor Credit Co. · filed 1992-09-24(4)(a)2.a

We therefore conclude that because, in the language of the policy and the statute, the McMullen vehicle was insured by a bodily injury liability policy at the time of the accident but the company is insolvent, the McMullen vehicle was uninsured despite Iowa Insurance Guaranty Association's coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4) requires uninsured motorist coverage when an unidentified vehicle propels a detached part of an unidentified vehicle into the insured's vehicle.

Theis v. Midwest Security Insurance · filed 2000-02-22(4)(a)2.b

We hold that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) requires that the uninsured motorist clauses of an insurance policy provide coverage when a detached piece of an unidentified motor vehicle is propelled into the insured's motor vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires uninsured motorist coverage when an unidentified driver starts a chain reaction collision, because contact through an intermediate vehicle satisfies the hit-and-run physical contact requirement.

Smith v. General Casualty Insurance · filed 2000-12-19(4)(a)2.b.

Accordingly, based upon these policy concerns and the language of the statute, we conclude that when an unidentified driver is involved in a chain reaction collision, the physical contact requirement for a "hit- and-run" is satisfied and coverage is mandated under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) does not treat a vehicle as uninsured when its liability coverage exceeds Wisconsin's required minimum limits.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Gillette · filed 2001-05-24(4)(a)

Unrau's vehicle is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" under WlS. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) or under the plain, unambiguous language of State Farm's policies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires physical contact for mandatory uninsured motorist coverage involving an unidentified vehicle; miss-and-run accidents do not qualify.

Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. Romanshek · filed 2005-06-07(4)(a)2.b.

Therefore, we reaffirm that the phrase "hit-and-run" in § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires physical contact in an accident involving an unidentified vehicle and does not apply to miss-and-run accidents.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.b. can require uninsured motorist coverage when an unidentified vehicle hits another vehicle and flees, even without contact with the insured vehicle.

DeHart v. Wisconsin Mutual Insurance · filed 2006-05-23(4)(a)2.b.

Accordingly, the physical contact requirement can be satisfied by a hit between the unidentified vehicle and the Brewer vehicle.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires both a hit by an unidentified vehicle or its part and a hit to the insured's vehicle by another vehicle or its part for hit-and-run uninsured motorist coverage.

DeHart v. Wisconsin Mutual Insurance · filed 2007-07-10(4)(a)2.b.

We conclude that the physical contact element for a "hit-and-run accident" under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires: (1) a "hit" by the unidentified motor vehicle, or part thereof, and (2) a "hit" to the insured's vehicle by another vehicle or part thereof, but not necessarily by the unidentified vehicle. Since Wendy's vehicle was not "hit," § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. does not mandate UM coverage in this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires uninsured motorist coverage when a claimant proves that an unidentified vehicle left the accident scene without providing identifying information, even if its driver stopped first.

Zarder v. Humana Insurance · filed 2009-02-18(4)(a)2.b.

Therefore, as an alternative means of affirming the circuit court's decision denying judgment for Acuity, we hold that under WIS. STAT. § 632.32(4)(a), a "hit-and-run" occurs when the claimant can sustain the burden of proof to show that an unidentified motor vehicle left the accident scene without providing identifying information.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)2.b requires uninsured motorist coverage when an identified vehicle propels a part left by an unidentified vehicle into the insured's vehicle, even if the part was at rest before being struck.

Tomson v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2009-09-01(4)(a)2.b

Accordingly, because all of the requisite elements of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b are met here and had the truck that dropped the wheel assembly been identified, the Tom-sons could have sued that truck's carrier, thus, § 632.32(4)(a)2.b requires uninsured-motorist coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Uninsured motorist offsets and exclusions

Law changed since Wisconsin Act 21 (effective July 15, 1995) added § 632.32(5)(i), permitting reducing clauses for payments made by or on behalf of a legally responsible person when the amended section's conditions are met.

When a policy defines underinsured motorist coverage as uninsured motorist coverage, § 632.32(4)(a)'s uninsured motorist protections bar a clause reducing coverage by payments made on behalf of the tortfeasor.

Kuhn v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1995-05-23(4)(a)

Under the case law, Allstate is held to its characterization of UIM coverage as UM coverage; therefore Wisconsin law applicable to UM coverage applies to UIM coverage under this policy. ... Applying law governing UM coverage to this case, we conclude that the reducing clause is invalid.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3) invalidates an exclusion that denies uninsured motorist coverage because the insured was injured in a non-owned vehicle during employment.

Vidmar v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1980-10-24(3)

As in Roe, the thrust of the exclusion is to limit the place where injury occurs. Such a limitation is violative of the statute and therefore invalid.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Wisconsin Act 21 (effective July 15, 1995) added § 632.32(5)(i) and (j), permitting specified workers’ compensation reducing clauses and drive-other-car exclusions that the earlier version barred.

Section 632.32(4)(a) prohibits uninsured motorist policy clauses that reduce coverage by workers’ compensation benefits or exclude coverage while the insured occupies a vehicle furnished for regular use.

Niemann v. Badger Mutual Insurance · filed 1988-01-12(4)(a)

We hold that the reducing clause and "regular use” exclusionary clause are contrary to the uninsured motorist statute, sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) does not extend uninsured motorist coverage on an uninvolved vehicle to a passenger insured only because they occupied the vehicle involved in the accident.

Martin v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1988-12-14(3)(a)

We disagree with the Martins contention that this differing treatment is prohibited by secs. 632.32(3)(a) and 632.32(6)(b)2a, Stats. ... The uninvolved auto’s policy, however, is not subject to the statute because the Martins are not covered by it; not being occupants they were not occupancy insureds.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Wisconsin Act 21 (1995) authorized specified reducing clauses in § 632.32(5)(i); the former categorical bar does not govern clauses that comply with the amended statute.

Section 632.32(4)(a) makes a clause reducing uninsured motorist benefits unenforceable if the reduction would be unavailable to the tortfeasor.

United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kleppe · filed 1993-03-24(4)(a)

We hold that pursuant to sec. 632.32(4), Stats., a clause which reduces compensation available to an insured under a UM policy is void and unenforceable, as a matter of law, if such reduction would be unavailable to a tortfeasor.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed this Court of Appeals decision in United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kleppe (Mar. 24, 1993), holding the offset unenforceable under the then-current law regardless of the statutory minimum.

Section 632.32(4)(a) is violated by a workers' compensation offset only if it reduces uninsured motorist coverage below the statutory minimum; the effect could not be decided before the insured's damages were known.

United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kleppe · filed 1992-01-14(4)(a)

Kleppe would be in the position of the insured in Niemann only if UF&C seeks to reduce the UM coverage below the statutory mínimums. Absent that result in the present circumstances, sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., is not violated.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)1. does not bar an uninsured motorist policy clause reducing benefits by amounts paid on behalf of a jointly liable motorist.

Mullen v. Coolong · filed 1986-07-17(4)(a)1

We conclude that sec. 632.32(4)(a)l. does not bar Horace Mann's reducing clause.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) makes a policy clause void when it effectively reduces required uninsured motorist coverage by offsetting those payments against liability coverage.

Nicholson v. Home Insurance Companies, Inc. · filed 1987-05-12(4)(a)

Any policy provisions effectively reducing the coverage required by the statute are void. We therefore hold that the clause in the Home Insurance policy that seeks to reduce payments made under its liability policy by any amounts paid out under its uninsured motorist coverage is void under sec. 632.32(4)(a) and is therefore unenforceable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i)2. permits a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage only for worker's compensation payments paid or payable to the insured or the insured's heirs or estate.

Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos. · filed 2004-12-07(5)(i)2.

Although § 632.32(5)(i)2. does not explicitly state that the payments must be paid or payable to the insured under any worker's compensation law, these words are implied from the context of the overall statutory scheme in which they occur. We conclude that § 632.32(5)(i)2. unambiguously includes only those payments paid or payable to the insured or the insured's heirs or estate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i)2. permits an insurer to reduce uninsured motorist policy limits by worker's compensation payments made to or on behalf of the insured, the insured's heirs, or the insured's estate, but not by payments made to the State's Work Injury Supplemental Benefit Fund.

Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Companies · filed 2006-07-07(5)(i)2.

We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. does not allow an insurer to reduce uninsured motorist policy limits by worker's compensation payments that are not made to or on the behalf of the insured, the insured's heirs, or the insured's estate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Stacking uninsured motorist coverage

Law changed since 1995 Wis. Act 21, § 4 added § 632.32(5)(f), allowing policies to prohibit stacking and overturning Landvatter on that point, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in Estate of Dorschner, cluster 1581954 (2001).

Section 632.32(3), read with section 631.43(1), permits stacking uninsured motorist insurance coverages.

Landvatter v. Globe Security Insurance · filed 1980-12-09(3)

Accordingly, we conclude that sec. 631.43 (1) must be read together with sec. 632.32(3) to permit the stacking of uninsured motorist insurance coverages.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since 1995 Wis. Act 21, § 4 added § 632.32(5)(f), permitting policies to prohibit stacking; this pre-amendment stacking rule no longer controls when an authorized anti-stacking clause applies, as Estate of Dorschner, cluster 1581954 (2001), explains.

Section 632.32(4)(a), together with section 631.43(1), bars an insurer from excluding a resident relative who owns a car from stacking uninsured motorist benefits under a family member’s policy.

Hulsey v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1987-12-16(4)(a)

We conclude that while there is ample justification for excluding relatives from asserting liability protection on collateral provisions of an insurance policy when they own their own cars, public policy prohibits excluding this class of relatives from being covered under their relative’s policy for the purpose of stacking uninsured motorist benefits.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(f) does not require an anti-stacking provision to use the statute's exact wording.

Hanson v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1999-01-12(5)(f)

This statute contains no indication that magic language is required or that a policy must parrot the statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(f) permits an antistacking clause without requiring the policy to copy the statute’s wording.

Gragg v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2001-10-03(5)(f)

There are no such special elements required under § 632.32(5)(f) governing monetary limits of recovery.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(f) permits antistacking clauses that prevent adding uninsured motorist coverage limits from different policies for one accident, and does not violate substantive due process as applied here.

Schroeder v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2001-12-27(5)(f)

Schroeder argues that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(f), as applied to the circumstances of this case, is unconstitutional under Wis. Const, art. I, § 1 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ... We disagree.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(f) permits an anti-stacking provision that falls within its terms even if the policy does not repeat the statute's wording.

Sugden v. Bock · filed 2002-01-31(5)(f)

We agree with American Family that the language in the policy falls within Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(f). We have repeatedly noted that an anti-stacking provision in an insurance policy need not be a word-for-word mirror of the statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(f) permits a policy to prohibit stacking underinsured motorist coverage limits without repeating the statute’s wording.

Remiszewski v. American Family Insurance · filed 2004-08-04(5)(f)

This anti-stacking provision is authorized under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(f), and Remiszewski does not argue otherwise. ... We reject Remiszewski's argument. Even absent the underlined language, the anti-stacking provision clearly conveys that regardless of the number of policies held by a claimant, American Family's coverage will not exceed the UIM máximums.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(f) allows a policy to prohibit adding coverage limits that apply to different motor vehicles; it does not apply to multiple insureds covered for one vehicle.

Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Bauer · filed 2007-03-20(5)(f)

First, there is no need to consult legislative history in this case because Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(f) clearly limits its application to addition of limits applying to different motor vehicles.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since 2011 Wis. Act 14, § 23 repealed former § 632.32(6)(d) and restored permission for anti-stacking clauses under (5)(f), as Belding v. DeMoulin, cluster 2652568 (2014), explains; this rule applies to the 2009–2011 period.

During its 2009–2011 effective period, § 632.32(6)(d) barred drive other car exclusions from preventing insureds from stacking uninsured motorist coverage limits for up to three vehicles they owned and insured.

Belding v. DeMoulin · filed 2013-01-16(6)(d)

In conclusion, the law in place from November 1, 2009, until November 1, 2011, is that "drive other car" exclusions during that period could not prevent insureds from stacking together their UM coverage limits for up to three vehicles owned and insured by the same insured.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the 2009-10 version of § 632.32(6)(d), a policy cannot use a drive-other-car exclusion to prevent stacking uninsured motorist coverage for up to three vehicles owned and insured by the policyholder.

Ronald E. Belding, Jr. v. Demoulin · filed 2014-02-07(6)(d)

Applying this legislative test, we conclude that pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d), State Farm cannot use the drive-other-car exclusion in the Beldings' policy to prevent them from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three vehicles owned and insured by them.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 632.32(6)(d) permits insurers to limit both inter-policy and intra-policy stacking of underinsured motorist coverage to three vehicles.

Westra v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2013-06-18(6)(d)

As written, § 632.32(6)(d) plainly and unambiguously allows insurers to restrict both inter- and intra-policy stacking of underinsured motorist coverage to three vehicles.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Underinsured motorist coverage

Section 632.32(3)(a) does not extend increased underinsured motorist coverage limits purchased for named insureds to permissive users.

American Hardware Mutual Insurance v. Steberger · filed 1994-09-27(3)(a)

This case presents an issue of first impression: whether § 632.32(3)(a), STATS., the omnibus statute, applies to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage so that a permissive user is entitled to the increased coverage limits purchased for specifically named insureds under a policy endorsement. We conclude that the omnibus statute does not apply in such circumstances.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) requires uninsured motorist coverage but does not require underinsured motorist coverage.

Demmer v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-01-16(4)(a)

What distinguishes the case at bar from WEA is the fact that while UM policies are required by statute ... in Wisconsin, see § 632.32(4)(a), Stats. (1991-92), UIM policies are not.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m)(d) requires accepted underinsured motorist coverage of at least $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident; the statutory minimum is read into a policy that states a lower limit.

Brunson v. Ward · filed 2001-07-06(4m)(d)

However, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(d), in effect at the time Brunson purchased his policy, required UIM coverage of at least $50,000. By operation of law, the higher level of coverage is "read in," even though it was not reflected in the premium paid.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(b)1 bars excluding relatives by blood or marriage from liability coverage, but does not bar excluding a relative who owns a car from UIM benefits under another household member's policy.

Peabody v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-05-28(6)(b)1

We conclude that American Family's definition of "relative" excluding Peabody from coverage as an insured and thereby preventing her from recovering UIM benefits under her father's policy is not contrary to § 632.32(6)(b)l.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i)1 permits an insurer to reduce underinsured motorist payments by amounts paid by legally responsible sources if the policy clearly explains that those payments count toward a fixed recovery limit.

Dowhower v. West Bend Mutual Insurance · filed 2000-06-30(5)(i)1

When we consider these cases in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1, we conclude that an insurer may reduce payments made pursuant to a UIM policy by amounts received from other legally responsible persons or organizations, provided that the policy clearly sets forth that the insured is purchasing a fixed level of UIM recovery that will be arrived at by combining payments made from all sources.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits UIM reducing clauses that comply with its terms without making coverage illusory.

Sukala v. Heritage Mutual Insurance · filed 2000-11-09(5)(i)

We now conclude that under § 632.32(5)(i) and Dowhower, UIM reducing clauses like those at issue here can no longer be considered to render coverage "illusory."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 bars an occupancy restriction that excludes a named insured from underinsured motorist coverage; such a restriction also fails as a drive other car exclusion when it does not meet subsection (5)(j)'s conditions.

Mau v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund · filed 2001-12-21(6)(b)2.a., (5)(j)

We conclude that the occupancy requirement violates both Wis. Stat. §§ 632.32(6)(b)2.a. and 632.32(5)(j). The occupancy requirement violates the prohibited provision in § 632.32(6)(b)2.a. because, if applied, the occupancy requirement excludes coverage for a named insured. The occupancy requirement also violates § 632.32(5)(j). The occupancy requirement has the same effect as a "drive other car" exclusion and, because it does not meet all three conditions of § 632.32(5)(j), the occupancy requirement is invalid under Wisconsin law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m)(a)1 does not require a self-insured city to offer underinsured motorist coverage to its employees.

Van Erden v. Sobczak · filed 2003-02-25(4m)(a)1

Accordingly, we conclude that although WIS. STAT. § 62.67 requires the City to provide UM coverage to its employees, § 62.67 does not transmute the City into "[a]n insurer writing policies" under § 632.32(4m)(a)1. Rather, because the City is a self-insured entity, § 632.32(4m)(a)1 is inapplicable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(g) permits an insurer to limit underinsured motorist coverage for an injured pedestrian to the highest single limit available for an insured vehicle.

WPS & Community Health Plan of Wisconsin v. Church Mutual Insurance · filed 2003-03-18(5)(g)

Moreover, the legislature has specifically provided that an insurance company may enforce the provision at issue here when the underinsured individual is a pedestrian. See Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(g): A policy may provide that the maximum amount of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage available for bodily injury or death suffered by a person who was not using a motor vehicle at the time of an accident is the highest single limit of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, whichever is applicable, for any motor vehicle with respect to which the person is insured.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m)(a)1. applies to umbrella policies covering motor-vehicle liability and requires one notice of available underinsured-motorist coverage with a brief description.

Rebernick v. Wausau General Insurance · filed 2004-12-14(4m)(a)1.

Thus, by virtue of both §§ 632.32(1) and 632.32(4m)(a)1., § 632.32(4m) applies to each policy. ... WISCONSIN STAT. § 632.32(4m) is not ambiguous: if a covered insurance policy does not provide underinsured-motorist coverage, the insurer must notify the insured of its "availability" and must give to the insured "a brief description of the coverage."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m)(a)1. requires notice of available underinsured motorist coverage for an umbrella policy covering motor vehicle liability; notice given with a related primary policy may satisfy that requirement when the umbrella policy also alerts the insured to the available coverage.

Rebernick v. Wausau General Insurance · filed 2006-03-30(4m)(a)1.

In sum, we determine that American Family was required to notify the Rebernicks of the availability of UIM coverage under their umbrella policy pursuant to § 632.32(4m). However, we also determine that, given the particular circumstances of this case, American Family notified the Rebernicks of the availability of UIM coverage under that policy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(e) permits a policy to exclude a resident relative from UIM coverage because the relative owns a motor vehicle, even when the exclusion incidentally affects a blood relative.

Vieau v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2006-04-19(5)(e)

We further conclude that American Family's "own-other-car" definitional exclusion is valid under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) as Vieau is excluded from his mother's UIM coverage because he owns his own motor vehicle and not because he is related by blood to the named insured.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

When multiple people injured in one accident have separate UIM policies, a policy cannot deny UIM coverage by comparing policy limits without considering how much the insured actually receives from the tortfeasor's insurer.

Welin v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2006-06-30(4m), (5)(i)

We conclude that when a tortfeasor injures more than one person in a single occurrence and the injured persons are not insured under the same UIM policy, a definition of an underinsured motor vehicle that compares the injured person's UIM limits to the limits of a tortfeasor's liability policy without regard to the amount the injured person actually receives from the tortfeasor's insurer is invalid under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) and (5)(i).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits a UIM reducing clause, but the clause is unenforceable if the policy as a whole fails to clearly explain how payments from other sources reduce the insured’s recovery.

Badger Mutual Insurance v. Schmitz · filed 2002-07-10(5)(i)

We conclude that although the reducing clause in the UIM provisions of the insurance policy issued by American Merchants to Dennis Schmitz comports with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), it does not, when viewed in the context of the entire policy, clearly set forth that the insured is purchasing a fixed level of UIM recovery arrived at by combining payments from all sources. The reducing clause is therefore ambiguous and unenforceable, and renders the UIM coverage illusory.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits UIM coverage limits to be reduced only by payments from legally responsible parties, workers’ compensation, or disability benefits.

Hanson v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY. · filed 2002-10-29(5)(i)

At the outset, we determine the reducing clause does not comply with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i). The public policy of this state, as reflected in this statute, is to allow insurers to reduce UIM liability only by amounts paid to the insured by or on behalf of persons or organizations legally responsible for the injury suffered, or by worker's compensation or disability benefits law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A reducing clause permitted by § 632.32(5)(i) is unenforceable if the policy as a whole does not clearly explain its effect to a reasonable insured.

Dowhower Ex Rel. Rosenberg v. Marquez · filed 2003-01-15(5)(i)

As we have already noted, the reducing clause comports with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) and itself creates no ambiguity. ... Thus, the reducing clause's effect is not crystal clear within the context of the whole policy. ... Accordingly, the UIM provisions are ambiguous and must be construed against West Bend and in favor of coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits a reducing clause for underinsured motorist coverage, but the clause is unenforceable if its effect is unclear in the context of the whole policy.

Gohde v. MSI Insurance · filed 2003-03-04(5)(i)

Similarly, there is no dispute here that the reducing clause complies with § 632.32(5)(i). Our question then becomes whether the clause is ambiguous within the policy. We conclude it is.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits uninsured motorist coverage to be reduced by worker's compensation payments without requiring the policy's reducing clause to mirror the statute's wording.

Myers v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin · filed 2005-02-02(5)(i)

There is no "magic language" required by § 632.32(5)(i) and a reducing clause does not have to mirror the language of the statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits an insurer to reduce underinsured motorist coverage limits by payments made by or on behalf of the party responsible for the injury or death.

Klinger v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 2005-04-20(5)(i)

Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) allows for the reduction of a TOM limit of liability for payments made by, or on behalf of, the responsible party.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(b)2.a. prohibits denying UIM coverage to a named insured because the insured was not occupying a covered auto.

Ruenger v. Soodsma · filed 2005-03-31(6)(b)2.a.

We conclude that a construction of the introductory language requiring Ruenger to occupy a covered auto in order to have UIM coverage is prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(b)2. as construed and applied in Mau. It follows that Rural may not rely on this language to deny Ruenger UIM coverage under the business policy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) authorizes UIM policies that reduce the coverage limit by the tortfeasor’s liability insurance limit.

Pitts v. Revocable Trust of Knueppel · filed 2005-06-29(5)(i)

This type of policy has been authorized by the legislature, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), and upheld by this court.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m) requires notice of available underinsured motorist coverage for umbrella endorsements; failure to give notice can warrant retroactive reformation if the insured would have bought the coverage and pays the appropriate premium.

Stone v. Acuity, a Mutual Insurance · filed 2006-08-15(4m)

Accordingly, the Stones are entitled to have their umbrella endorsement reformed to provide, upon their payment of an appropriate premium, umbrella underinsured-motorists coverage retroactive to 1999, when Acuity first offered that coverage and should have sent to the Stones the requisite § 632.32(4m) notice.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i)1. permits an insurer to reduce the limit of underinsured motorist coverage by amounts paid by a legally responsible tortfeasor, regardless of that tortfeasor’s underinsured motorist status.

Marotz v. Hallman · filed 2007-07-10(5)(i)1.

Based on the plain language of the statute and the context in which it appears, we hold that § 632.32(5)(i)1. does allow an insurer to reduce the limit of UIM liability by the amount paid by a non-UIM tortfeasor.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m) requires notice of available underinsured motorist coverage under a motor vehicle liability umbrella policy; failure to give notice requires reading in coverage of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.

Stone v. Acuity · filed 2008-04-11(4m)

In sum, relying on precedent, we conclude that by failing to provide the Stones with notice of the availability of UIM coverage as part of their umbrella insurance, Acuity violated the notice provision of § 632.32(4m). We further determine that where an insurer fails to provide notice of the availability of UIM coverage as part of an insurance policy, the appropriate remedy is to read in the level of coverage necessary for the policy to conform to § 632.32(4m)(d) — $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m) requires insurers issuing umbrella policies with excess automobile liability coverage to offer underinsured motorist coverage and give written notice of its availability.

Nault v. West Bend Mutual Insurance · filed 2008-05-20(4m)

However, we conclude Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) required West Bend to offer excess UIM and give the Naults notice that excess UIM coverage was available as part of its umbrella policy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 632.32(6)(d)'s stacking requirement does not apply to a single policy without separate premiums attributable to each vehicle.

Bodish v. West Bend Mutual Insurance · filed 2014-06-10(6)(d)

Because Milwaukee County paid only one premium in this case, and not separate premiums for each vehicle in its fleet, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d) is inapplicable because there is no coverage to stack.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(2)(d) permits insurers to limit underinsured motorist coverage to insureds who sustain bodily injury or death.

Brey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2022-02-15(2)(d)

Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(d) precludes insurers from affording coverage to only those insureds who are injured in an auto accident.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i)1. permits UIM insurers to reduce coverage limits by payments from legally responsible tortfeasors, regardless of their UIM status.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Bailey · filed 2007-07-10(5)(i)1.

Based on the plain language of § 632.32(5)(i)l., UIM insurers may reduce the limit of UIM liability by amounts an insured receives from or on behalf of tortfeasors, regardless of the payors' UIM status.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits separate UIM insurers to each reduce their coverage by the full liability payment from the same tortfeasor.

Progressive Northern Insurance v. Kirchoff · filed 2008-06-04(5)(i)

We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) permits two independent UIM carriers with two separate policies to each reduce their respective UIM coverages by the liability limits paid by a single tortfeasor.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since 2011 Wis. Act 14, §§ 26, 29 repealed former § 632.32(6)(g) effective November 1, 2011, as Botdorf v. Krebsbach, cluster 8238949 (2013), notes; its bar on reducing clauses applied only during the 2009–2011 period.

Section 632.32(6)(g), as effective November 1, 2009, prohibited reducing clauses in policies issued or renewed from that date; an endorsement adding a vehicle counted as a policy issued when the endorsement took effect.

Botdorf v. Krebsbach · filed 2013-07-30(6)(g)

In sum, the endorsement issued by Allstate, effective November 11, 2009, constituted a "polic[y] issued" after November 1, 2009. ... As such, the reducing clause included in that policy is contrary to the law in effect at the time the policy was issued and is therefore invalid.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(2)(d) allows an insured with a valid damages claim to seek underinsured motorist coverage for uncompensated damages even when a municipal liability cap limits recovery from the tortfeasor.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Hunt · filed 2014-10-02(2)(d)

Thus, in the context of a case involving the statutory municipal liability cap, we conclude that an insured is "legally entitled to recover" damages where he or she can demonstrate a claim for damages against a tortfeasor for which the insured is not fully compensated, despite the fact that all of these damages are not recoverable due to the statutory cap.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(e) saves a UIM exclusion that prevents coverage from supplementing liability coverage under the same policy when its effect on passengers is incidental to that purpose.

Pierce v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. · filed 2016-09-29(5)(e)

As we shall see, we agree with Mid-Century and decide this case based on the savings provision in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e). ... Similarly, here, the exclusion at issue prevents the passengers from "piggybacking" UIM coverage onto liability coverage under the same policy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(i) permits UIM clauses that reduce coverage by amounts received from an underinsured tortfeasor.

Allstate Insur Co v. Keca, Donna E. · filed 2004-05-20(5)(i)

In 1995, the Wisconsin Legislature passed a statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), specifically allowing for UIM re- ducing clauses that operate to decrease the amount of the insured’s total damages subject to UIM coverage from the insurer by any amounts received from the underinsured tortfeasor. ... A reasonable insured reading these provisions would understand that the insured purchased a fixed level of UIM recovery which will be arrived at by combining payments made from all sources.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Medical payments and subrogation

Section 632.32(4)(b) gives an insurer that pays medical benefits subrogation rights to the extent of its payments.

Rimes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1982-03-02(4)(b)

Sec. 632.32 (4) (b), Stats., expressly provides that medical payments insurers are subrogated to the rights of its insured to the extent of their payments.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

An insurer that pays medical expenses under its policy is subrogated to its insured's recovery rights to the extent of those payments.

Jones v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1997-06-24(4)(b)

When an insurer makes payments to or on behalf of its insured under the medical-payments portion of its policy, it is subrogated to its insured's right to recover "to the extent of its payments."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a)3 does not create an exception to the underlying tort’s statute of limitations for an uninsured motorist insurer’s subrogation claim.

Schwittay v. Sheboygan Falls Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2001-05-09(4)(a)3

Sheboygan Falls argues that these cases do not apply because they did not involve an uninsured motorist claim which, according to Sheboygan Falls, is specifically protected by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)3. We disagree. The language of these cases is all-encompassing and does not allow for an exception in an uninsured motorist situation.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(bc) lets a named insured reject medical payments coverage, so that coverage is not required by law in an automobile insurance policy.

Sec. Health Plan of Wis. Inc. v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. · filed 2018-10-25(4)(bc)

For the reason that § 632.32(4)(a)2., as viewed in isolation, requires certain coverage because of a law, the language of § 632.32(4)(bc) necessarily leads to the conclusion that medical payments coverage is not "required by law" in the American Family automobile insurance policies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Omnibus liability coverage

Section 632.32(6)(b) gives injured third parties rights under an automobile liability policy despite the named insured’s misrepresentations in the insurance application.

Rauch v. American Family Insurance · filed 1983-11-30(6)(b)

We conclude therefore that sec. 632.32(6) (b), Stats. gives third parties rights in liability insurance contracts which are not dependent on the validity of the contract between the insurer and the named insured.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(2)(b) requires an additional insured to receive the same liability coverage as the named insured, including the policy’s dollar limit.

Miller v. Amundson · filed 1984-01-10(2)(b)

We conclude that INA must provide $100,000 coverage each to Vera and Judith. This result satisfies the requirements of sec. 632.32(2) (b).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) covers users of vehicles described in the policy and does not require a non-owner policy to cover permissive users of vehicles it does not describe.

Cardinal v. Leader National Insurance · filed 1990-09-12(3)(a)

Section 632.32(3)(a), Stats., provides coverage for persons other than the named insured who are "using any motor vehicle described in the policy." The omnibus statute does not apply in this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(b) does not extend omnibus coverage to a person legally responsible for the use of a vehicle that is not described in the policy.

Mills v. Wisconsin Mutual Insurance · filed 1988-06-09(3)(b)

We conclude that "the motor vehicle” referred to in par. (b) of sec. 632.32(3), Stats., refers back to "any motor vehicle described in the policy” in par. (a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(2)(c) requires automobile liability insurance coverage for uses of a motor vehicle beyond its operation.

Hake v. Zimmerlee · filed 1993-07-27(2)(c)

Thus, through sec. 632.32(2)(c), Stats., the legislature requires automobile liability insurance policies to provide coverage for more than the "operation" of a motor vehicle, as indicated by its use of terms such as "using" a motor vehicle.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) requires separate coverage up to the policy limits for a negligent driver and a negligent entruster-owner when both are actively negligent.

Iaquinta v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1993-12-07(3)(a)

Because negligent entrustment arises out of an act of negligence that is separate from the negligence of the entrustee, and does not arise vicariously or through imputation of negligence, we conclude that both the negligent entruster and the entrustee are actively negligent. Thus, our rationale in Miller controls the outcome of this case; Allstate must provide coverage, up to the stated limits, to both Rasmussen and Monroe.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(b) does not require separate liability limits for a negligent driver and an owner whose liability rests on imputed negligence.

Landsinger v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1987-10-29(3)(b)

We conclude that the omnibus statute does not have that effect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3) applies to a named insured even if it does not own the vehicle, but it requires coverage for a driver only if the policy covers that vehicle.

Kettner v. Wausau Insurance Companies · filed 1995-02-21(3)

Therefore, despite the fact that the school district did not own the bus, the omnibus statute would apply to the school district as the named insured on the insurance policy. ... Section 632.32(3), STATS., applies only to vehicles covered under the insured's policy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3) does not preclude omnibus coverage merely because the named insured does not own the vehicle.

Greene Ex Rel. Schoone v. General Casualty Co. · filed 1997-11-19(3)

Simply because Riekkoff Installation does not own the vehicle does not preclude coverage under the omnibus statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(b)1 applies to named operator policies issued under Wisconsin’s financial responsibility laws and prohibits excluding the insured’s spouse from coverage.

Bindrim v. Colonial Insurance · filed 1994-01-05(6)(b)1

Accordingly, we conclude that sec. 632.32(6)(b)l, Stats., is unambiguous and clearly applies to all policies issued in Wisconsin except as otherwise provided, including those issued pursuant to the financial responsibility laws. Therefore, Colonial's policy which restricts coverage to the named insured, Giuliano Degano, violates the mandate of sec. 632.32(6)(b)l by effectively excluding his wife Susan from coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 requires a motor vehicle policy to provide an insured’s spouse the same coverage as the insured, even when the policy satisfies financial responsibility requirements, subject to exclusions allowed by subsection (5)(e).

Bindrim v. B. & J. Insurance Agency · filed 1995-02-24(6)(b)1

In conclusion, we hold that the plain and unambiguous language of sec. 632.32, Stats., the Omnibus Coverage Statute, requires an insurer to provide the same coverage for the spouse of the insured as it provides for the insured regardless of the compliance of the insurance policy with the Financial Responsibility Statutes, except as allowed by sec. 632.32(5)(e).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(b) does not require separate liability limits for people whose liability for a driver’s negligence is only vicarious.

Folkman v. Quamme · filed 2003-07-16(3)(b)

However, in cases of vicarious liability, § 632.32(3)(b) does not extend policy-limits protection to both the tortfeasor and the person or persons vicariously liable for the tortfeasor's wrongdoing.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) does not require payment of two bodily injury liability limits when only one insured or additional insured was negligent.

Severude v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2001-12-28(3)(a)

Here, there is only one negligent insured or additional insured: Sonya. Accordingly, laquinta and § 632.32(3)(a) do not require that American Family pay twice the bodily injury liability limits.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) applies to uninsured motorist coverage and prohibits giving non-relative occupants only excess coverage when the named insured receives primary coverage.

Progressive Northern Insurance v. Hall · filed 2004-12-21(3)(a)

Providing different levels of UM coverage for non-relative occupants is prohibited by § 632.32(3)(a); nothing in § 632.32(5)(e) alters that prohibition.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(b)(1) does not require coverage for a permissive user who is not a household member related to the named insured by blood or marriage.

McKillip v. Bauman · filed 2005-06-22(6)(b)(1)

Here, Ohlfs is not a member of a household related by blood or marriage to Bauman and therefore § 632.32(6)(b)(l) does not apply.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) does not require separate policy limits for a permissive driver and a named insured whose liability is based solely on the driver's imputed negligence.

LaCount Ex Rel. LaCount v. General Casualty Co. · filed 2006-02-08(3)(a)

We hold that paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) does not require an insurance policy to provide separate limits of liability to both a person permissively using the covered vehicle and the named insured who is liable by statute for imputed negligence (as a sponsor for a minor's driver license) for the minor's negligent operation of a vehicle.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) requires coverage only when the vehicle is described in the policy and its use is for purposes and in the manner described in the policy.

Venerable v. Adams · filed 2009-04-28(3)(a)

Thus, for the omnibus statute to require coverage, two factors must be met: (1) the motor vehicle operated by Bryan must be a "motor vehicle described in the policy"; and (2) the use of the rental vehicle must be "for purposes and in the manner described in the policy." Neither factor is present in this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(2)(h)’s definition of “using” a vehicle does not cover someone who has not yet begun to guide or control it.

Jackson v. Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corp. · filed 2014-06-10(2)(h)

Jackson, by her own undisputed testimony, was not controlling the car at the time of the accident and had not, in fact, begun to guide the vehicle into traffic. ... We conclude that Jackson was not using the vehicle at the time of her injury, and we therefore reverse the court of appeals.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Permission to drive

Section 632.32 permits an automobile insurance policy to limit coverage to use with the insured's permission, even when the driver is a family member.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Kelly · filed 1986-05-23(5)(a)

In contrast, there is nothing in the legislative history or case law to support State Farm's contention that the prohibition against family exclusion clauses, sec. 632.32(6)(b)l, overrides the permissive use proviso authorized by sec. 632.32(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(a) permits an adult member of a vehicle owner's household to give himself permission to drive when a corporation is the named insured and the insurer knowingly covers the employee's family car.

Home Insurance Co. v. Phillips · filed 1993-03-03(5)(a)

We conclude that the owner of a car should be treated as the named insured for the purpose of awarding third-party coverage. We therefore reverse the judgment. Our holding is confined to situations such as this case, when the named insured is a corporation and the insurer knows that the automobiles are owned by its employees and are used by the employees' families for personal purposes.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 requires coverage when an adult member of the insured's household drives the insured vehicle, because that member can give themselves permission even if the named insured denied it.

Arps v. Seelow · filed 1991-06-05(3)(a), (5)(a)

The combination of secs. 632.32(3)(a) (the omnibus coverage clause) and 632.32(5)(a), Stats, (the permissive use limitation), requires coverage of any person using the vehicle with permission of an adult member of the insured's household. ... Because the omnibus statute requires a broad construction of permission, adult members of the household must be deemed capable of giving themselves permission to drive.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(a) permits a motor vehicle policy to limit coverage to use authorized by the named insured.

Hinz v. Leet · filed 1995-09-26(5)(a)

Section 632.32(5)(a), Stats., provides, in part, that "[a] policy may limit coverage to use that is with the permission of the named insured." Lied's policy with Transportation provided coverage for persons using covered vehicles with Lied's permission. Leet did not have Lied's permission to drive its truck.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a)'s permissive use provision applies to insurance policies, not to a self-insured rental agency that issued no policy.

Boatright v. Spiewak · filed 1997-10-28(3)(a)

The offensive construction can be avoided and the statutes harmonized by concluding that the permissive use provision of the omnibus statute applies to insurance companies that issue insurance policies and § 344.51, Stats., applies to vehicle rental agencies, whether they file a bond, insurance policy, or self-insure.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(3)(a) extends umbrella policy coverage to a permissive user of a covered vehicle even when the policy was issued to someone other than the vehicle's owner.

Dorbritz v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-05-17(3)(a)

Here, the statute by its plain language provides coverage for Lember. The policy was issued to "owner[s]" Albert and Mary Habersbrunner. Lember was "any person," and Lisa Habersbrunner's car was "any motor vehicle described in the policy."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 requires coverage for a person who loads an insured vehicle with the policyholder’s permission, even when the policyholder is injured during the loading.

Blasing v. Zurich American Insurance · filed 2013-01-03(3)(a)

The omnibus statute requires that any permissive user of an insured's vehicle must be extended coverage in the same manner as coverage is extended to the policyholder. American Family has failed to demonstrate that the application of this requirement to the facts before us is an absurd result. We conclude that American Family has a duty to defend and indemnify Menards.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Policy scope and minimum coverage

Section 632.32’s omnibus coverage requirement applies only to vehicles covered by insurance issued or delivered in Wisconsin.

Grabski v. Finn · filed 1986-03-18(3)(a)

The problem in relation to this situation is that Wisconsin’s section 632.32 applies only to vehicles covered by insurance issued or delivered in Wisconsin. This “omnibus” statute does not apply to the Universal policy which was delivered in Michigan.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(b)1’s ban on family exclusions applies to policies issued in Wisconsin, so it does not invalidate a family exclusion in a policy issued in Illinois.

Belland Ex Rel. Rosenberg v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1987-06-10(6)(b)1

In Knight v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 821, 825, 239 N.W.2d 348, 351 (1976), under facts similar to those here, the supreme court held that no issue of a conflict of laws existed between Illinois and Wisconsin since the policy was issued in Illinois and Wisconsin law only applies to policies issued in this state. ... Likewise, we conclude that we are not faced in this case with any genuine issue of a conflict of laws because the policy in this case was issued in Illinois to an Illinois resident, Robert Belland, insuring a motor vehicle maintained and garaged in Illinois. Consequently, we enforce the family exclusion clause under the Illinois law in effect on the policy issuance and accident dates.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 sets minimum requirements for motor vehicle liability policies; an insurer may provide uninsured motorist coverage beyond those requirements, including coverage for vehicles outside the statute’s definition of a motor vehicle.

Fletcher v. AETNA CASUALITY & SURETY CO. · filed 1991-10-29(2)(a)

Section 632.32 merely sets forth the minimum requirements for automobile and motor vehicle liability insurance policies in Wisconsin. ... Aetna's implicit argument is apparently that its policy was meant to mirror the minimum requirements of the law and that the statute does not require UM coverage for vehicles principally designed for off-road travel. We disagree with this contention. If Aetna intended to exclude all off-road vehicles, it should have said so unequivocally.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 does not impose a duty to defend or restrict an insurer’s contractual right to limit that duty.

Novak v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1994-03-15

No Wisconsin statute prescribes a duty to defend or restricts its contractual limitation. Section 632.32, Stats., regulating motor vehicle insurance policies, provides no such duty and contains no such limit upon the right to contract.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) requires uninsured motorist coverage in qualifying insurance policies but does not apply to a self-insured vehicle owner that has issued no policy.

Classified Insurance Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car of Wisconsin, Inc. · filed 1994-07-26(4)(a)

We conclude that § 632.32(4)(a), Stats., is inapplicable to Budget as a self-insured entity under § 344.16, STATS.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 does not require uninsured motorist coverage under an out-of-state rental agreement for a vehicle neither registered nor principally garaged in Wisconsin, even if the agreement is an insurance policy.

Janikowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1994-09-13(1), (4)

Even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the rental agreement was an insurance policy, the lease agreement is neither "a policy of insurance issued or delivered in this state," nor a "policy of insurance . .. that insure [s] ... [a] motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) does not require a self-insured rental car company to provide uninsured motorist coverage as part of optional insurance sold to renters.

Prophet v. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR CO., INC. · filed 2000-07-05(4)(a)

Classified establishes that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) is "inapplicable to ... a self-insured entity." ... No statute requires Enterprise, a self-insured entity, to provide uninsured motorist coverage as part of the optional insurance it offers its customers.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4m)(a)1 does not require a self-insured city to offer underinsured motorist coverage to its employees.

Van Erden v. Sobczak · filed 2004-02-17(4m)(a)1

Accordingly, we conclude that although WIS. STAT. § 62.67 requires the City to provide UM coverage to its employees, § 62.67 does not transmute the City into "[a]n insurer writing policies" under § 632.32(4m)(a)1. Rather, because the City is a self-insured entity, § 632.32(4m)(a)1 is inapplicable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(4)(a) does not require uninsured motorist coverage in umbrella liability policies exempted by the insurance commissioner under § 631.01(5).

Etter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2008-10-15(4)(a)

Wisconsin Stat. § 631.01(5) is clear. It permits the Commissioner to exempt insurers from including UM coverage in umbrella policies. The Commissioner did just that with Wis. Admin. Code § Ins 6.77(4)(a). The Etters' policy was not required to provide UM coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 applies to a motor vehicle liability policy only if the policy was issued or delivered in Wisconsin.

Sisson v. Hansen Storage Co. · filed 2008-06-24(1)

A precondition to the application of § 632.32 is, however, that the insurance policy be "issued or delivered in this state." Sec. 632.32(1) ("Except as otherwise provided, this section applies to every policy of insurance issued or delivered in this state against the insured's liability for loss or damage resulting from accident caused by any motor vehicle, whether the loss or damage is to property or to a person."). Acuity does not dispute that the Harco policy was neither issued nor delivered in Wisconsin. Accordingly, § 632.32 does not apply.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 applies to policies issued or delivered in Wisconsin; filing a certificate of insurance with the state does not constitute delivery of the policy there.

Great West Casualty Co. v. Robbins · filed 2016-08-16(1)

The Danielson court construed the word “delivered” from § 632.32 to mean that a policy is “delivered” when it is sent to the policyholder. We decline to adopt Robbins’s more expansive reading, as the estate has not directed us to any Wisconsin state precedent interpreting “delivered” in the way it suggests.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The 2009 amendments to § 632.32 apply only to policies issued or renewed on or after November 1, 2009; an elasticity clause does not extend them to an earlier policy.

Wolf v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2015-03-04

In accordance with the legislature's explicitly mandated effective date, the changes in the law simply did not exist for policies that were renewed or issued before November 1, 2009. Wolfs policy could not "conflict" with a law that only applied to renewed or issued policies after November 1, 2009, which hers was not.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Policy exclusions

Section 632.32(6)(a) permits a motor vehicle handler’s policy to exclude coverage for an injury caused by a fellow employee when both employees work for the named insured and their employer must provide worker’s compensation coverage.

Gorzalski v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1988-07-19(6)(a)

While the supreme court in Dahm decided this issue in the context of applying a statute other than sec. 632.32(6)(a), Stats., its analysis is equally applicable in this case. ... There is no dispute that both Luebbe and Gorzalski were employes of Tolkan and that Tolkan was required to provide workmen’s compensation coverage. Therefore, the coemploye exclusion in Frankenmuth’s policy violated no rule of law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(c) permits a motor vehicle handler's insurer to restrict coverage for permissive users only if the policy spells out the restriction.

Carrell v. Wolken · filed 1992-12-23(5)(c)

We read into this intent a presumption that additional insureds may avail themselves of a policy unless (1) the statute allows a restriction, and (2) the policy takes advantage of this authorization by spelling out how the additional insured is to be restricted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(e) permits policy exclusions not prohibited by subsection (6) or other applicable law; subsection (6) does not address territorial limitations.

Quevillon v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1993-05-11(5)(e)

Section 632.32(5)(e), Stats., provides: "A policy may provide for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other applicable law." Subsection (6) contains no reference to territorial limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 permits an auto policy to exclude vehicles maintained solely for use on the insured's premises as mobile equipment.

Rea ex rel. Wargo v. Transportation Insurance Co. · filed 1995-01-25(5)(e)

Nothing in § 632.32 prohibits the exclusion of "mobile equipment."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(c) permits an insurer of a motor vehicle handler to restrict coverage for others when its policy invokes the restriction and other valid and collectible insurance applies; handler status depends on the insured's full range of activities.

Binon v. Great Northern Insurance · filed 1998-03-25(5)(c)

We also conclude that the trial court properly looked to the entire spectrum of activities and services provided by Arrow Motors when determining that Arrow Motors was a "motor vehicle handler" within the meaning of § 632.32(2)(b), STATS. As such, coverage under Federal's and Universal's policies was properly restricted under § 632.32(5)(c) because Philadelphia's policy already covered the Binons' claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(c)'s motor vehicle handler exception restricts coverage only when the insurer invokes it in the policy.

Henry v. General Casualty Co. · filed 1999-03-23(5)(c)

The garage operations provision does not invoke the motor vehicle handler exception; rather, as the trial court determined, the policy limits the exclusion to the definition of an insured under the auto hazard provision. Therefore, under § 632.32(3)(a), Stats., Johnson has the same coverage as a named insured under the policy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(a) requires a policy providing motor vehicle liability coverage to insure a motor vehicle handler’s officer while driving a customer’s vehicle, even when an endorsement limits that coverage.

Heritage Mutual Insurance v. Wilber · filed 2001-09-05(6)(a)

Using the same reasoning as Bindrim, we conclude that even though the Heritage policy is a general liability policy, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) applies. ... Because Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a) applies and because the requirements for coverage have been met, Wilber is covered as a matter of law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(e) permits territorial exclusions from uninsured motorist coverage when subsection (6) and other applicable law do not prohibit them.

Clark v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-05-21(5)(e)

In conclusion, the legislature clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent through enactment of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) to allow insurance companies to provide exclusions not otherwise prohibited by law. Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(6) expressly prohibits certain exclusions but does not prohibit territorial exclusions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(j) does not unconstitutionally impair an existing insurance contract when it restores a drive other car exclusion and the contract conforms to statutory law.

Roehl v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-09-23(5)(j)

The parties' insurance contracts included the elasticity clause which conformed the policies to the prevailing statutory law. Thus, the parties anticipated possible legislative adjustment to their agreement. With that understanding in place, it can hardly be said that the legislature's subsequent resuscitation of the "drive other car" exclusion impaired the parties' agreement. Therefore, the legislative enactment of § 632.32(5)(j), Stats., did not unconstitutionally impair the Roehls' insurance contracts with American Family.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(j) permits a drive other car exclusion only when the vehicle meets all three listed conditions.

Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1999-03-23(5)(j)

A reading of the statute reveals that an insurance company is prohibited from excluding coverage when an insured is driving a different vehicle than that listed on the policy, unless the exclusion meets the three listed criteria.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(j) permits a drive other car exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage only when the vehicle meets all three statutory conditions, including ownership by the insured or a qualifying household member.

Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2000-05-16(5)(j)

In sum, we conclude that because Endorsement 44 fails to satisfy the statutory requirements of a permissible "drive other car" exclusion under Wis. Stat. 632.32(5)(j), it is prohibited under Wisconsin law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(e) permits automobile policies to exclude motorcycle coverage because subsection (6) does not prohibit that exclusion.

Beerbohm v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 2000-04-20(5)(e)

However, § 632.32(5)(e) provides that an automobile policy "may provide for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other applicable law." Section 632.32(6) does not prohibit policy provisions excluding motorcycle coverage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(b)2.a does not prohibit an exclusion for a non-owned vehicle used by someone working in a car business; it protects specified people injured in or on the insured vehicle.

Gulmire v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 2003-12-23(6)(b)2.a

However, § 632.32(6)(b)2.a only prohibits excluding coverage for certain individuals relating to the insured vehicle. Thus, considering that the exclusion bars coverage for a non-owned vehicle, it is not prohibited by § 632.32(6)(b)2.a.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(c) allows a motor vehicle handler's policy to restrict coverage for drivers other than the handler or its officers, agents, or employees when those drivers have other valid and collectible insurance, if the restriction is written into the policy.

Pemper v. Hoel · filed 2004-02-24(5)(c)

Additionally, the language contained in Milwaukee Mutual's insurance policy endorsement contains almost verbatim the language Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(c) allows and refers to the correct statutory levels of coverage. We fail to see a deficiency in the language that would preclude applying the restriction.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(a) requires a policy issued to a motor vehicle handler to cover an employee using a customer's vehicle, even if the policy excludes injuries to coemployees.

Rocker v. USAA Casualty Insurance · filed 2006-03-30(6)(a)

We conclude that under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(a), General Casualty is required to provide coverage to Cousins because he was using a motor vehicle owned by a customer doing business with Octopus, and therefore, the coemployee coverage limitations in General Casualty's comprehensive insurance policy are invalid.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32 permits an exclusion with a permissible main purpose even if it incidentally denies coverage or benefits to a relative of the insured.

Vieau v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-01-19(5)(e), (6)(b)1

Together, these subsections indicate that exclusion could deny benefits or coverage to someone related to the insured and still be permitted as long as that denial was an incidental effect of a permissible main purpose.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(6)(b)4 prohibits exclusions based on unlawful use of a motor vehicle, but an intentional acts exclusion remains effective when it only incidentally excludes unlawful acts.

N.B. v. Wausau School District Board of Education · filed 2007-05-02(6)(b)4

Policy concerns aside, the statute makes it clear that the prohibition is limited to those insurance provisions that exclude acts because they are unlawful.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(j) permits a drive other car exclusion for a loss involving a vehicle owned by the insured or a household relative when the vehicle is neither listed in the policy nor covered as a newly acquired or replacement vehicle.

Nischke v. Aetna Health Plans · filed 2008-11-04(5)(j)

Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) has not eviscerated the general prohibition against "drive other car" exclusions, but it does permit a particular type of "drive other car" exclusion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 632.32(5)(j) permits a drive other car exclusion when the vehicle is owned by the named insured, is not described in the policy, and is not covered as a newly acquired or replacement vehicle.

Lisowski v. Hastings Mutual Insurance · filed 2009-01-28(5)(j)

We agree with him that such an exclusion, sometimes called a "drive other car exclusion," can be valid only where it complies with the three specific requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j). ... Even if the covered auto language is so characterized, however, it is valid because it complies with the three specific requirements of the statute: It is owned by the named insured, is not described in the policy under which the claim is made, and is not covered as a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 156, oldest cases first.

74 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Bacheller v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance, the court cites the section to explain the insurance consequence of a vehicle sale, then decides whether ownership could have transferred under vehicle title law. opinion →
Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., a concurrence cites the section to explain why the insured’s spouse is protected by the policy; the court does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Vidmar v. American Family Mutual Insurance, the court cited the section as a limit on uninsured motorist exclusions but decided coverage by interpreting the policy. opinion →
Germanotta v. National Indemnity Co., the court cites the section in a footnote as an additional objection to a hypothetical reading of the policy while deciding coverage under § 344.51. opinion →
Tahtinen v. MSI Insurance, the court cited § 632.32(3) while recounting another decision, but resolved the stacking dispute by construing § 631.43(1). opinion →
Rural Mutual Insurance v. Peterson, the court identifies the section as the current version of a statute discussed in an earlier case while deciding whether a reimbursement clause is enforceable under a different statute. opinion →
Parks v. Waffle, the court mentions the section in discussing the insurer’s argument, then resolves coverage under Welch and sec. 631.43(1). opinion →
Estate of Logan v. Northwestern National Casualty Co., the court cites the automobile passenger-coverage provision to distinguish an earlier case while deciding whether a malpractice policy exclusion is enforceable. opinion →
Estate of Logan Ex Rel. Fink v. Northwestern National Casualty Co., the court cites the section to explain its earlier automobile insurance decision in Rauch, then distinguishes that decision from this professional liability dispute. opinion →
Kaun v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance, the section appears only in the dissent; the majority decides the effect of an underinsured motorist clause in the insurance policy. opinion →
Wood v. American Family Mutual Insurance, the court mentions § 632.32(4) while deciding whether stacking under § 631.43(1) requires statutorily mandated coverage. opinion →
Agnew v. American Family Mutual Insurance, the court mentions sec. 632.32 only to identify the statute involved in a prior case. opinion →
Shannon v. Shannon, the court declined to decide the section’s effect because the claim did not involve automobile liability. opinion →
Mullen v. Coolong, the court mentions the section while recounting earlier litigation and decides whether Mullen can obtain relief from judgment under sec. 806.07. opinion →
Keane v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., the court mentions the section in General Casualty's argument about limiting uninsured motorist benefits but does not decide that issue. opinion →
Berna-Mork v. Jones, only the dissent invokes section 632.32(4); the majority decides the compensation insurer’s reimbursement rights under section 102.29(1). opinion →
Muehlenbein v. West Bend Mutual Insurance, the court cites the section to explain the coverage required in the underlying automobile policy while deciding whether a separate umbrella policy provides coverage. opinion →
Millers National Insurance v. City of Milwaukee, the court cites the section for the coverage limits incorporated by § 66.189 while deciding a subrogation claim under that separate statute. opinion →
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Seidenspinner, the court distinguished an earlier interpretation of the section while deciding the scope of an insurance policy’s arbitration clause. opinion →
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court cites the Wisconsin provision to contrast it with the Minnesota law governing the dispute. opinion →
Kulekowskis v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., the court mentions § 632.32 while summarizing an earlier decision and resolves this dispute by construing the insurers' policies. opinion →
Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Board, the court cites § 632.32(5)(i)2 as an example of a statute using both “paid” and “payable” while interpreting § 40.65. opinion →
Weimer v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., the court mentions § 632.32(5)(f) as a later-enacted exception and discusses its effect on this case only hypothetically. opinion →
Binon v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance, the court cites the section as a reference to Wisconsin’s minimum coverage requirements while interpreting an ambiguous insurance policy. opinion →
Ennis v. Western National Mutual Insurance, the court mentions the section to explain the potential stacking of uninsured motorist limits, but resolves the case by interpreting the policy's liability exclusion. opinion →
Hoffman v. Economy Preferred Insurance, the court cites the section to explain coverage for a permissive user, then decides whether a judicially created conspicuous language rule applies. opinion →
Taylor v. Greatway Insurance, the court notes the later UIM notice and coverage requirements of the section, which did not govern the 1993 accident. opinion →
Mau v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, the court discussed whether the section permits an occupancy restriction but certified that question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court without deciding it. opinion →
Mullenberg v. Kilgust Mechanical, Inc., the court mentioned § 632.32 as a comparison but expressly declined to decide whether the motor carrier statute incorporates it. opinion →
Harkrider v. Posey, the court quotes a Wisconsin decision about the section while deciding a question under Oklahoma insurance law. opinion →
Transportation Insurance v. American Family Mutual Insurance, the court cites § 632.32(5)(i) while describing an earlier decision about reducing clauses, then decides whether the policies' definition makes coverage illusory. opinion →
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., the court cites the Wisconsin provision as a comparison while deciding whether Minnesota law permits different liability limits for a driver and vehicle owner. opinion →
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Marquez, the court mentions § 632.32 only in a citation to a Wisconsin decision while applying New Mexico’s uninsured motorist statute. opinion →
Taylor v. Greatway Insurance, the court cites the section while discussing earlier rulings, but decides coverage under the policy’s definition of an underinsured vehicle. opinion →
Danner v. Auto-Owners Insurance, the court cites the section as background while deciding a bad faith claim involving underinsured motorist coverage. opinion →
Danbeck v. American Family Mutual Insurance, the court describes the section’s UIM coverage requirements in a footnote while deciding what an insurance policy’s exhaustion clause means. opinion →
Stubbe v. Guidant Mutual Insurance, the court cited the section as authorizing reducing clauses but interpreted the insurance policy’s language instead. opinion →
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, the dissent cites § 632.32(5)(f) as an example of legislation responding to a court's interpretation of insurance policy language. opinion →
Fischer v. Midwest Security Insurance, the court declined to address arguments under the section because its interpretation of the insurance policy resolved the appeal. opinion →
Dowhower v. Marquez, the court mentions a challenge to the section but decides that the policy’s reducing clause is unenforceable because the policy is contextually ambiguous. opinion →
Commercial Union Midwest Insurance v. Vorbeck, the court cites the section as background while deciding whether the policy's reducing clause is contextually ambiguous. opinion →
Metlife Auto & Home v. Palmer, the court mentions the section in a footnote describing a change in Wisconsin law while deciding a New Jersey insurance dispute. opinion →
Gohde v. MSI Insurance, the court cites the section while recounting an earlier ruling, then decides whether the policy is ambiguous. opinion →
Bellile v. American Family Mutual Insurance, the court notes Bellile’s agreement that the reducing clause conforms to the section, then decides whether the insurance policy is contextually ambiguous. opinion →
Sukala v. Heritage Mutual Insurance, the court mentions § 632.32(5)(i) while recounting an earlier appeal, but decides whether to reopen the judgment under § 806.07(1)(h). opinion →
Praefke v. Sentry Insurance, the court cites the section as background on UIM policies while deciding whether the vehicle met the policy’s definition of an underinsured motor vehicle. opinion →
Kontowicz v. American Standard Insurance, the court cites the section's coverage requirement to explain its decision about interest on third-party claims under § 628.46. opinion →
Hansen v. Degnitz, the court mentions the section in describing a cross-appeal it did not reach. opinion →
Varda v. Acuity, the court cites the section's definition of motor vehicle to support its interpretation of a homeowner's policy exclusion. opinion →
Sukala v. Heritage Mutual Insurance, the court mentions the section while deciding whether later case law justified reopening a final judgment. opinion →
Mueller v. McMillian Warner Insurance, the court cites the section as an example of garaging language while interpreting a homeowner's policy. opinion →
Elchehimi v. Nationwide Insurance Co., the court lists the section among other states' physical-contact statutes while deciding coverage under Texas law. opinion →
Dempich v. PEKIN INSURANCE COMPANY, the court cites the section as authorization for reducing and anti-stacking clauses while deciding whether the particular policy clauses are ambiguous and enforceable. opinion →
Gresens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the court notes Gresens' argument under the section but expressly declines to address it. opinion →
McNeil v. Hansen, the court mentions § 632.32 while recounting its earlier Rocker decision and decides the worker's compensation exception in § 102.03(2). opinion →
Avery v. Diedrich, the court mentions the section as a later legislative change while deciding an insurance agent’s common-law duty to procure requested coverage. opinion →
Gulf Underwriters Insurance v. Great West Casualty Co., the court mentions § 632.32 only to explain that an earlier decision did not decide whether it invalidated the policy exclusion. opinion →
Sanders v. Estate of Sanders Ex Rel. Gruetzmacher, the court recounts its earlier Stone decision under § 632.32(4m)(d) while deciding whether Sanders waived her right to appeal. opinion →
Gillund v. Meridian Mutual Insurance, the court cites § 632.32(5)(i) only to note that it superseded an earlier decision on other grounds while resolving coverage under homeowners' policies. opinion →
Zarder Ex Rel. Menard v. Humana Insurance, the court found coverage under the insurance policy and declined to examine the section’s requirements. opinion →
Dennis Langwith And Ben Langwith, Individuals v. American National General Insurance Company, A Corporation American Nat, the court mentioned the section only to note that it superseded a cited case on other grounds while deciding the insurance agent’s duty under agency principles. opinion →
Day v. Allstate Indemnity Co., the court cites another case’s application of the section as an example while discussing when policy provisions violate public policy. opinion →
Blumenfeld v. Jeans, the court cites the section while deciding whether the insurer waived subrogation in its settlement agreement. opinion →
Orlowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the court cites the section when reporting Orlowski's argument about a reducing clause, but does not decide the clause's effect. opinion →
Bethke v. Auto-Owners Insurance, the court cites the section to identify the statutory minimum for optional UIM coverage while deciding whether the policy covers the accident. opinion →
Johnson v. Masters, the court mentions the section while discussing an earlier case as an analogy for interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.40. opinion →
Blasing v. Zurich American Ins. Co., the court resolved coverage under the insurance policy and expressly declined to decide the question under § 632.32. opinion →
Jackelen v. Russell, the court resolved coverage under the policy and declined to decide whether the exclusion complied with the section. opinion →
Shugarts v. Mohr, the court quotes the section's definition as background while deciding when the insurance policy required proof of a UIM claim. opinion →
The Manitowoc Company, Inc. v. Lanning, the court cites § 632.32(5)(i)1. only as an example of how another case interpreted the word “any” while deciding an employee non-solicitation dispute. opinion →
Secura Supreme Insurance Company v. The Estate of Daniel Keith Huck, the court resolved the insurer's liability under the policy; only a two-justice lead opinion construed § 632.32(5)(i). opinion →
ACUITY v. Estate of Michael Shimeta, the court cited the section for background on UIM reducing clauses while deciding what Acuity's policy language meant. opinion →
Brill v. Mid-Century Insurance Company, the court cites Wisconsin's permission for reducing clauses as background while deciding whether Minnesota insurance law reforms the Wisconsin policy. opinion →
Meyer v. Norgaard, the court cites the section’s uninsured motorist coverage requirement while deciding whether the insurance agent had a duty to advise the Meyers about higher coverage limits. opinion →

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under Wis. Stat. § 632.32. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace