Wis. Stat. § 806.07

Section 806.07(1)(a) allows relief from a default judgment for excusable mistake or neglect when the defendant also shows a meritorious defense.

Maier Construction, Inc. v. Ryan · filed 1978-01-03(1)(a)

Under sec. 806.07, Stats., the question addressed to the court on the motion to vacate the judgment was whether that mistake and that neglect were excusable. For a defendant to be entitled to relief, he must not only demonstrate that the judgment against him was obtained as the result of excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, but also that he has a meritorious defense to the action.

Section 806.07(1)(a) permits relief for excusable neglect by a lawyer when the client prudently retained the lawyer, relied on the lawyer, and made reasonable inquiries about the case.

Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. Wiegel · filed 1979-12-04(1)(a)

Mistakes, ill advice, or other failures of a lawyer may constitute excusable neglect on the part of the client, when the client has acted as a reasonable and prudent person in engaging a lawyer of good reputation, has relied upon him to protect his rights, and has made reasonable inquiry concerning the proceedings.

Section 806.07(1)(a) permits a court to reopen a judgment when its excusable inadvertence caused the judgment to misstate its intended decision.

In Re Paternity of Mth v. Agr · filed 1987-07-28(1)(a)

Because the judgment clearly did not reflect the court’s intent, and the court’s inadvertence in signing the order was excusable, we conclude that the subsequent order to reopen, pursuant to sec. 806.07(1)(a), was not an abuse of discretion.

A party seeking relief under § 806.07 after missing a hearing must establish excusable neglect.

Herlache v. Blackhawk Collision Repair, Inc. · filed 1997-11-11(1)(a)

Heritage did not file a formal motion to vacate the order under § 806.07, Stats. ... Heritage does not argue on appeal that it established excusable neglect at the hearing and we conclude, as a matter of law, it did not.

Section 806.07(1) permits a court to deny a motion for default judgment when it determines that it would have to vacate the judgment on the same grounds.

Shirk v. Bowling, Inc. · filed 2001-04-11(1)

To preserve judicial time and resources, a circuit court properly denies a motion for default judgment, if it determines that it would be compelled to reopen that judgment if the party opposing the motion brought a motion to vacate under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1).

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits relief from a judgment when extraordinary circumstances justify reopening it; a court may deny a proposed default judgment if it would reopen that judgment under the section.

Johns v. County of Oneida · filed 1996-04-09(1)(h)

We conclude that a trial court properly exercises its discretion in denying a motion for default judgment when it determines the judgment would be reopened under § 806.07, Stats.

Section 806.07(1) requires a court granting relief from an order to identify an enumerated ground and explain its reasoning; a finding of unfairness alone is insufficient.

In RE MARRIAGE OF MOGGED v. Mogged · filed 1999-12-28(1)

While § 806.07(1) contemplates that the court may grant relief from an order upon such terms as are just or fair, its decision must be supported by one or more of the enumerated grounds and an expression of its reasoning process.

Section 806.07(2) requires a motion for relief from judgment within a reasonable time and imposes a one-year limit for certain grounds.

Matter of Plunkett · filed 1995-07-11(2)

Consequently, even assuming the grounds on which Emerald would have sought relief from the judgment were not subject to the one year limitation contained in Wis.Stat. § 806.07(2), the amount of time that has elapsed (whether measured from the date the foreclosure action was commenced, the date of the judgment of foreclosure and sale, or the order confirming the sheriff’s sale), in conjunction with the facts of the case, cannot qualify as a “reasonable time” within which to seek relief from judgment.

Section 806.07(1)(a) requires a party seeking to vacate a default judgment to present a meritorious defense sufficient to survive judgment on the pleadings.

J.L. Phillips & Associates, Inc. v. E&H Plastic Corp. · filed 1998-04-24(1)(a)

We hold that a party moving to vacate a default judgment pursuant to § 806.07(l)(a) must set forth a meritorious defense — that is, a defense good at law which requires no more and no less than that which is needed in a timely-filed answer to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits a trial judge to vacate a judgment and correct findings when the judge concludes, in the exercise of discretion, that the earlier decision was erroneous.

In Matter of Estate of Smith · filed 1978-04-05(1)(h)

Because we conclude the trial judge had the power under sec. 806.07(1) (h), Stats., to give relief from the prior judgment, the question posed is whether he abused his discretion. ... These statements, which appear in the record, demonstrate an appropriate exercise of discretion; and, accordingly, the trial judge’s decision to vacate the prior judgment will not be set aside.

A motion for relief under § 806.07(2) must be brought within a reasonable time; a delay of almost three years was untimely on these facts.

Ennis v. Ennis · filed 1979-01-30(2)

Since the motion was brought almost three years after judgment was entered, it was not timely and should have been dismissed. ... We hold that her motion for relief was not brought “within a reasonable time” after judgment was entered within the meaning of sec. 806.07(2), Stats.

Section 806.07(2) requires a motion based on excusable neglect to be filed within a reasonable time, even if it is filed within one year of the judgment.

Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Krist · filed 1981-11-03(2)

Sec. 806.07 (2) requires that the motion be brought in a timely fashion and in any event not more than one year after the judgment was entered if the motion for opening the judgment is based on excusable neglect. That Krist’s motion was brought within one year of the judgment does not render the motion timely.

Section 806.07(1)(g) allows prospective relief from a judgment when its continued application is no longer equitable.

Town of Seymour v. City of Eau Claire · filed 1983-03-08(1)(g)

Section 806.07(1) (g), on its face, only requires that a judgment no longer be equitable.

Section 806.07 permits a court to deny relief from a judgment even when a change in law may justify relief.

In RE MARRIAGE OF TOZER v. Tozer · filed 1984-10-09

Although the change in the law regarding military pensions may justify relief from the judgment pursuant to sec. 806.07, Stats., the trial court was not required to grant such relief.

Section 806.07(1)(a) does not permit relief from a default judgment when the moving party fails to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

Gaertner v. 880 CORP. · filed 1986-04-23(1)(a)

Since we conclude that 880 was not entitled to relief from the default judgment because it failed to show that the judgment was a product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, we do not consider whether 880 had a meritorious defense.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits a court to treat a reconsideration motion filed before judgment as a motion for relief from judgment when it identifies legal error or issues left unresolved.

Starke v. Village of Pewaukee · filed 1978-10-03(1)(h)

The Smith case is ample authority for a judge under sec. 806.07 (1) (h) to correct erroneous conclusions of law or to address, issues not properly dealt with under the original judgment. ... It does not strain legal logic to convert an unheard motion, filed and scheduled for a hearing prior to the signing of a judgment, into a sec. 806.07 motion to give relief from a judgment.

Section 806.07(1)(h) gives courts broad discretion to grant relief from a judgment when good cause and the interest of justice warrant it.

Conrad v. Conrad · filed 1979-11-06(1)(h)

We conclude the wife has shown good cause for relief from the judgment entered in the case. The record supports the conclusion that in the interest of justice she should have been granted relief. Sec. 806.07(1) (h), Stats., gives the court broad discretionary authority to grant relief from a judgment.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits relief when extraordinary circumstances justify it, even if the claim also fits subsection (a), (b), or (c).

State Ex Rel. MLB v. DGH · filed 1985-02-27(1)(h)

We hold today that even if a claim sounds in sec. 806.07(1) (a), (b), or (c), it can be granted under subsection (h), if the circuit court concludes that extraordinary circumstances exist which justify relief from a prior judgment, order or stipulation.

Section 806.07(1)(h) allows relief for extraordinary circumstances but does not relieve a party of the consequences of purposely avoiding a lawsuit.

Welty v. Heggy · filed 1985-04-18(1)(h)

The defendant’s excusable neglect or reasonable prudence may be relevant to a motion under sec. 806.07 (1) (h), Stats., insofar as they help establish or are accompanied by extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. ... The “[a]ny other reasons” ground for relief cannot operate to relieve a party from the consequences of its purposeful avoidance of a lawsuit.

Section 806.07(1)(h) does not provide relief in a federal foreclosure proceeding to challenge final state tax assessments.

United States v. Tauer · filed 1987-04-28(1)(h)

Moreover, neither § 806.07(l)(h) Wis.Stats. nor Fed.R.Civ.Pr. 60(b) is available to them in this proceeding.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits relief from a judgment in extraordinary circumstances, but simple legal error correctable on appeal does not qualify.

Marriage of Mathewson v. Mathewson · filed 1986-12-04(1)(h)

Simple legal error, correctable by appeal, is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits relief after the one-year limit applicable to subsections (a), (b), and (c) only when extraordinary circumstances justify it.

Brandt v. Brandt · filed 1991-03-21(1)(h)

Roberta may "circumvent" the one-year time limit only if she can show that extraordinary circumstances justify the court's exercise of its discretion under sec. 806.07(1) (h), Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits relief from a divorce property judgment for extraordinary circumstances, but discharge of a property settlement debt in bankruptcy does not qualify.

SPANKOWSKI (ZUERCHER) v. Spankowski · filed 1992-11-04(1)(h)

We are constrained to hold that the family court abused its discretion in reopening the judgment. Relief may be had under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., if extraordinary circumstances exist.

Section 806.07(1)(h) requires extraordinary circumstances for relief; a claimed change in the law does not suffice to relitigate an appeal.

Kovalic v. DEC INTERNATIONAL · filed 1994-06-23(1)(h)

Despite Kovalic's assertions of extraordinary circumstances, we conclude that Kovalic's motion was nothing more than an attempt to relitigate his previous appeal. Despite his arguments to the contrary, Kovalic has shown at best that the law has changed, and that he now wants to take advantage of those changes. We would ordinarily stop here, for that is insufficient to obtain relief under § 806.07, STATS.

Section 806.07(1)(h) requires extraordinary circumstances to reopen a judgment or settlement when the facts could also support relief under a specific subsection.

Matter of Settlement for Personal Injuries Konicki · filed 1994-06-23(1)(h)

Where, as here, relief from a judgment or settlement is sought under the catch-all provisions of § 806.07(l)(h), Stats., based on facts that would also ... justify relief under specific subsections of the statute — such as those dealing with "[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," or "[n]ewly-discovered evidence" — relief will be granted only where "extraordinary circumstances" are present.

Section 806.07(1)(h) requires extraordinary circumstances to justify relief from a judgment; a party’s lack of diligence in preserving its rights can support denial of relief.

Anderson v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1996-01-30(1)(h)

The trial court articulated a compelling reason for its conclusion that "extraordinary circumstances" did not exist for granting relief to the City — namely, that the City was not diligent in preserving its rights. Accordingly, we will not reverse the trial court; it did not erroneously exercise its discretion under § 806.07(1), Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits relief from an order when extraordinary circumstances justify it; courts need not consider every factor listed in M.L.B.

State v. Sprosty · filed 2001-09-27(1)(h)

The list of factors in M.L.B. is not exclusive.

Section 806.07(1) gives trial courts discretion, on motion, to relieve a party from a stipulation.

Burmeister v. Vondrachek · filed 1979-01-09(1)

Sec. 806.07 (1), Stats., grants trial courts discretionary authority to relieve a party, on motion, from a stipulation.

Section 806.07 governs relief from court-approved stipulations; a court modifying support arrears must exercise its discretion before relieving a party of a stipulated obligation.

O'BRIEN v. Freiley · filed 1986-03-05

The trial court's failure to address the stipulation ... compels us to direct the trial court to properly exercise its discretion in light of sec. 806.07, Stats., relating to relief from stipulations.

Section 806.07 permits discretionary relief from a divorce property division judgment when a subsequent change in law provides a basis for relief.

Thorpe v. Thorpe · filed 1985-03-05

Although a property division is not subject to the court’s continuing jurisdiction and may not be modified based on a change of circumstances under sec. 767.32(1), Stats., sec. 806.07 gives the court discretionary authority to grant relief from the judgment. ... The subsequent change in the law regarding military pensions provided a basis for the exercise of the court’s discretion.

Section 806.07(1)(h) leaves a request for blood tests before reopening a paternity judgment to the trial court's discretion.

T.E.D. v. P.S.G. · filed 1992-07-14(1)(h)

A motion for blood tests preparatory to a motion to reopen a paternity judgment under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., is addressed to the trial court's discretion.

Section 806.07 provides the procedure for seeking to reopen a divorce judgment that determines paternity.

In Re Paternity of Nathan T. · filed 1993-01-12

The appropriate remedy in this case is for Max to move the trial court to reopen the divorce judgment under sec. 806.07, Stats.

Section 806.07 does not permit relief from a stipulated final order merely because the law may have changed after the parties settled.

Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1994-08-10(1)(f)

Consequently, the Homeowners Association's only avenue was to seek relief from the final order under § 806.07, Stats. ... Relief from a stipulation may be granted only if the moving party shows that the stipulation was the result of fraud, mistake or misrepresentation. ... Settlements result from a willingness to compromise a dispute, and we cannot sanction relief from them merely because the legal climate subsequently changed.

Section 806.07(1)(h) allows a court to consider a change in the law as a basis for discretionary relief from judgment.

Majorowicz v. Allied Mutual Insurance · filed 1997-07-29(1)(h)

The trial court had the authority to consider a change in the law as a basis for granting relief under § 806.07(l)(h), Stats.

Section 806.07 provides relief from a court-approved custody and placement stipulation that finally resolves those issues while divorce proceedings remain pending.

In RE MARRIAGE OF KELLER v. Keller · filed 1997-10-01

We affirm the family court's ruling that the parties' stipulation and the court's ensuing order approving the stipulation resolved the custody/placement issue with finality such that Nancy was required to seek relief pursuant to § 806.07, STATS.

Section 806.07(1) permits a court to consider modifying a consent order on just terms for mistake, adverse-party misconduct, or another reason justifying relief.

State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc. · filed 2002-07-25(1)

It was not error for the court to frame its analysis in terms of Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) because that provides for modification "upon such terms as are just"; and paragraphs (l)(a) — mistake, (l)(c) — misconduct of an adverse party, and (h) — "any other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment," together encompass all the arguments Pep-pertree was asserting for modification.

Section 806.07 does not apply to an action if trial began before January 1, 1976.

Hoppmann v. Reid · filed 1979-01-09

The revised statutory provision for relief from judgment, sec. 806.07, Stats., applies to all actions pending or commenced on or after January 1, 1976, except those actions in which trial has commenced prior to January 1, 1976. Sec. 801.01(3) (b), Stats. Trial in this case was held August 1, 1975.

Section 806.07 cannot provide relief from final orders that ended a probate proceeding before January 1, 1976.

In Matter of Estate of Goldstein · filed 1979-10-09

Thus, sec. 806.07, Stats., referred to in both parties’ briefs, would not apply to this case because the special proceeding was neither pending nor commenced on or after January 1, 1976.

Section 806.07(2) requires a motion to vacate a judgment to be filed within a reasonable time, even when it is filed within the one-year maximum.

Rhodes v. Terry · filed 1979-06-29(2)

Thus, the question to be answered is not whether the motion was brought within the one-year time period, but whether the motion was made within a “reasonable time” pursuant to sec. 806.07, Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(h) cannot be used to vacate a judgment and grant a new jury trial after the deadline in section 805.16 has passed.

Manly v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1987-04-09(1)(h)

But once a trial court loses its authority to set aside a verdict for its failure to take action within the time prescribed by sec. 805.16, it cannot achieve the same result by vacating the judgment under sec. 806.07(l)(h).

Section 806.07(1)(h) does not authorize relief from judgment to extend an expired appeal period based on counsel’s assumptions and inaction.

Eau Claire County v. Employers Insurance of Wausau · filed 1988-07-19(1)(h)

Under the circumstances, therefore, we conclude that sec. 806.07(l)(h) does not authorize the trial court to essentially expand the time for appeal when the time for such appeal had passed.

Section 806.07(2) does not allow a court to extend the time to appeal a final judgment by vacating and reentering it.

American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Inc. v. Thompson · filed 1990-03-29(2)

A trial court cannot extend the time to appeal a final judgment by vacating and reentering the judgment.

Section 806.07(2)'s one-year deadline runs from entry of judgment, not from the date of trial.

Marriage of Steinbach v. Gustafson · filed 1993-05-13(2)

His complaint seems to be that because the judgment was not entered until several weeks after the trial, the motion should be considered untimely because the trial took place more than one year prior to Gustafson's motion. The statute, however, runs from the entry of judgment, not from the date of trial.

Section 806.07(2) requires a motion under subsection (1)(h) to be brought within a reasonable time, determined case by case from all relevant factors.

State Ex Rel. Cynthia M.S. v. Michael F.C. · filed 1994-02-23(2)

Determining whether motions under sec. 806.07(l)(h), Stats., have been made within á reasonable time requires a case by case analysis of all relevant factors. This analysis should be guided by the fact that while respect for the finality of judgments is an important concern, the purpose of sec. 806.07(l)(h) is to allow courts to do substantial justice when the circumstances so warrant.

Section 806.07(2) leaves the original judgment final while a motion to reopen or vacate it is pending.

Appleton Chinese Food Service, Inc. v. Murken Insurance · filed 1994-06-07(2)

After trial, it filed a motion pursuant to § 806.07, Stats., to reopen and vacate the judgment based on this argument. That motion is a separate proceeding requiring a separate appeal. The original judgment is still final while Murken's motion is pending, see § 806.07(2), and thus we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Section 806.07(2)'s one-year limit for seeking relief under subsection (1)(a) cannot be tolled or extended.

Miro Tool & Mfg., Inc. v. Midland MacHinery, Inc. · filed 1996-10-23(2)

We conclude that the one-year maximum time limit set out in § 806.07(2), STATS., cannot be tolled or extended under any circumstances for purposes of relief under § 806.07(1)(a).

Section 806.07(2) requires a motion for relief to be made within a reasonable time, assessed by balancing finality of judgments against substantial justice.

EPF CORP. v. Pfost · filed 1997-04-02(2)

In addition, Judge Mueller ruled that Commonwealth's application for relief did not comply with the "reasonable time" requirement of § 806.07(2), Stats. This analysis requires that we balance two competing factors: the need for finality of judgments and the ability of a court to do substantial justice when the circumstances so warrant. ... We conclude that Commonwealth slept on its rights. The equities weigh far more heavily in favor of EPF. We affirm Judge Mueller's further ruling that Commonwealth's application for relief under § 806.07, Stats., was untimely.

Section 806.07(2) requires a motion to reopen a judgment within a reasonable time; a sixteen-year delay may be unreasonable when the relevant information was available earlier.

In RE MARRIAGE OF HUTJENS v. Hutjens · filed 2002-05-14(2)

Because the trial court properly concluded that the amended judgment was unambiguous and that Betty's motion to reopen the judgment more than sixteen years after its entry was not within a reasonable time under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(2), we affirm the order.

Section 806.07(2) requires a motion for relief to be filed within a reasonable time; for reconsideration of a juvenile waiver order, that time ends when a criminal complaint is filed.

State v. VAIRIN M. · filed 2002-07-10(2)

Moreover, § 806.07(2) requires that a motion for relief under the statute be filed within a reasonable time. What constitutes a "reasonable time" is undefined by the statute and may differ depending on context. In the context of a motion for reconsideration of a waiver into adult court, we determine that a reasonable time is the time the criminal court assumes jurisdiction as the result of the filing of a criminal complaint.

Section 806.07(1)(a) permits relief from a judgment based on mistake only if the motion is brought within one year of the judgment.

Bank One Wisconsin v. Kahl · filed 2002-11-12(1)(a)

The statute, however, allows courts to grant relief from á judgment based on mistake only if the motion was brought within a year of the original judgment. Here, Bank One waited eighteen months to bring the motion. The court could not grant relief under § 806.07(l)(a).

Section 806.07(1)(b) and (h) do not authorize relief from judgment or a remand for additional testimony in judicial review of an agency decision under chapter 227.

CHICAGO & NWRR v. Labor & Ind. Rev. Comm. · filed 1979-08-16(1)(b), (1)(h)

We conclude that we have no power to remand to the circuit court or to the commission for the taking of additional testimony or to relieve appellant from the judgment pursuant to sec. 806.07(1) (b) or (h), Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(b) and (h) do not authorize relief from a judgment or a remand for additional testimony in judicial review of an agency decision under chapter 227.

Chicago & North Western Railroad v. Labor & Industry Review Commission · filed 1979-08-16(1)(b), (h)

We conclude that we have no power to remand to the circuit court or to the commission for the taking of additional testimony or to relieve appellant from the judgment pursuant to sec. 806.07 (1) (b) or (h), Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(g) and (h) does not permit relief from a judgment entered in a chapter 227 review of an administrative decision.

Charter Manufacturing Co. v. Milwaukee River Restoration Council, Inc. · filed 1981-05-26(1)(g), (1)(h)

We conclude that sec. 806.07(1) (g) and (h), Stats., does not permit a court to grant relief from a judgment entered in a ch. 227, Stats., review of an administrative decision.

Section 806.07 does not provide an alternative procedure for reopening default judgments in small claims actions.

Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Kletsch · filed 1980-03-26

Sec. 806.07, Stats., which provides for relief from judgments in other types of civil actions, does not provide an alternative procedure for reopening default judgments in small claims actions.

Section 806.07 does not provide relief from default judgments in small claims eviction actions governed by chapter 299.

King v. Moore · filed 1980-03-26

In our opinion this section provides no relief from default judgments entered in eviction actions tried under ch. 299, Stats.

Section 806.07 does not grant courts the power to reconsider their decisions; that power is inherent.

Wiegel v. Capital Times Co. · filed 1988-04-21

The power to reconsider a decision is not granted by sec. 806.07. It is among the court’s inherent powers.

Section 806.07 does not govern a motion to reconsider a nonfinal ruling in a pending case.

Fritsche v. Ford Motor Credit Co. · filed 1992-09-24

We see no reason why a trial court, having concluded that a prior nonfinal ruling in a pending case is wrong, cannot correct that error by reconsideration. We conclude that Iowa's motion is not governed by sec. 806.07.

Section 806.07 does not govern reconsideration of a nonfinal ruling in a pending case.

Mallon v. Campbell · filed 1993-07-08

We conclude that [the respondent's] motion is not governed by sec. 806.07[, Stats.]" ... As the order denying the Mahons’ discovery motion was nonfi-nal, we follow Fritsche and hold that the trial court could properly decide the motion on its merits.

Section 806.07(1)(a) and (h) permit a trial court, in its discretion, to vacate an order confirming a foreclosure sale when erroneous judgment figures prevented an informed bid.

Family Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Barkwood Landscaping Co. · filed 1980-01-08(1)(a), (1)(h)

Authority to grant relief pursuant to sec. 806.07 (1) (a) and (1) (h), Stats., rests in the discretion of the trial court.

Section 806.07 permits a trial court to vacate a judgment it entered after a trial.

Tesky v. Tesky · filed 1982-02-23

Here, the trial court retained full power to vacate the judgment it entered after the first trial. See sec. 806.07, Stats.

Relief under section 806.07 rests in the circuit court’s discretion, and an order denying relief is reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion.

Shuput v. Lauer · filed 1982-11-02

Authority to grant relief pursuant to sec. 806.07, Stats. 1979-80, rests within the discretion of the circuit court. On appeal from an order denying a motion for relief from a judgment, the circuit court’s decision will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.

Section 806.07 leaves relief from a judgment, order, or stipulation to the trial court’s discretion; an appellate court upholds the decision if the court exercised that discretion on a reasonable basis.

Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory · filed 1988-11-10(1)(a), (h)

Whether to grant relief under sec. 806.07, Stats., is within a trial court’s discretion, and we will not reverse for an abuse of discretion if the record shows that the trial court exercised its discretion and that there is a reasonable basis for the trial court’s decision.

Section 806.07(1) permits relief from a dismissal on just terms, including an award of costs and attorney’s fees incurred preparing again for trial.

Kenosha County v. Town of Paris · filed 1988-12-07(1)

In addition, sec. 806.07(1), Stats., allows a court to grant relief from a judgment of dismissal “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just.” The trial court concluded that “just terms” included the town’s expenditures to again prepare for trial. In view of the fact that the county’s attorney had forgotten about and was unprepared for trial, we cannot conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to award costs and fees.

Section 806.07 provides a way to seek relief from a default judgment in the trial court; failing to seek that relief can waive the issue on appeal.

Olson v. Dunbar · filed 1989-02-08

The record reveals no evidence of any motion to reopen that default judgment under sec. 806.07, Stats. ... In sum, we deem these issues waived for Mozelle’s failure to seek a continuance from the trial court and her failure to seek relief, in the trial court, from the resultant default judgment.

Section 806.07(1) allows a court to deny relief from judgment when counsel’s neglect was not excusable and refusing relief was a reasonable exercise of discretion.

Price v. Hart · filed 1991-12-17(1)(a), (1)(h)

Under these circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded that the failure of Fireman's Fund's attorney to plead and prove policy limitations was neglect, but not excusable. ... Although we may not have made the same decision as the trial court on this issue, on this record we cannot say that the trial court acted unreasonably in exercising its discretion by denying Fireman's Fund's motion to vacate the order for judgment under sec. 806.07, Stats.

A party’s motion under section 806.07 permits the court to correct an order to that party’s disadvantage as well as to its advantage.

Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Coyle · filed 1989-02-14

Once Coyle invoked the trial court’s discretion under sec. 806.07 to amend the decision, the court had the power to correct it to the disadvantage of Coyle as well as to its advantage.

Section 806.07(1) leaves relief from a judgment to the court’s discretion even when grounds for relief exist; the court may weigh factors against reopening it.

In RE MARRIAGE OF JOHNSON v. Johnson · filed 1990-07-31(1)

A finding that there are grounds to reopen the judgment does not necessitate reopening it. As part of its exercise of discretion, the trial court may consider factors that would militate against granting relief.

Section 806.07(1)(h) leaves relief from a paternity judgment to the trial court's discretion even when extraordinary circumstances are shown.

In Re Paternity of Lsg · filed 1992-07-14(1)(h)

Even if the trial court determined that Patrick had presented extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify relief under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., whether to grant relief is still discretionary with the trial court.

Section 806.07(1)(h) gives circuit courts broad discretion to grant relief from a judgment when equitable circumstances justify it, without requiring the circumstances present in Mullen II.

Schwochert v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1993-01-12(1)(h)

Mullen II merely set forth one example of an appropriate exercise of discretion and did not, in any way, limit the circuit court's authority to grant relief pursuant to sec. 806.07, Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits a successor judge to exercise the court’s discretion to vacate a partial summary judgment for reasons justifying relief.

Godfrey Co. v. Lopardo · filed 1991-08-28(1)(h)

Section 806.07(l)(h), Stats., gives a trial court discretion to order relief for "[a]ny . . . reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Judge Carlson succeeded to Judge Race's discretionary authority to vacate his own partial summary judgment.

Section 806.07(1) gives a court discretion to reopen a judgment for a justified reason, but repeating an argument the court has already considered does not warrant relief.

Mathias v. St. Catherine's Hospital, Inc. · filed 1997-07-30(1)

Section 806.07(1), Stats., gives a court discretion to reopen a judgment for any justified reason. However, as should be clear from our analysis above, the trial court exercised its discretion when it ruled on the impact of the proffered evidence and concluded that the evidence would not change the result. Bringing the same argument under a different statutory section ignores the trial court's prior careful consideration of this claim.

Section 806.07(1)(h) requires courts to balance finality and fairness when deciding whether to grant relief from a judgment.

Teubel v. Prime Development, Inc. · filed 2001-11-07(1)(h)

We find that the court made a proper effort to strike a balance between finality and fairness as is required under § 806.07(1)(h).

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits a court to rescind an adverse finding without changing the ultimate order and to act on its own motion if both parties have adequate notice.

Gittel v. Abram · filed 2002-04-25(1)(h)

We hold that the trial court had the authority under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(h) to rescind the portion of its Decision and Order regarding undue influence even though that did not change the ultimate order that the estate should proceed intestate. We also hold the trial court had the authority to do so on its own motion as long as both parties had adequate notice.

Section 806.07(2)'s reasonable-time requirement does not apply to motions to vacate void judgments or orders.

Neylan v. Vorwald · filed 1984-11-08(2)

We conclude that the "reasonable time" requirement of sec. 806.07(2), Stats., does not apply to void judgments or orders.

Section 806.07(2)’s reasonable-time requirement does not apply to motions to vacate void judgments.

Neylan v. Vorwald · filed 1985-05-29(2)

Section 806.07(2), Stats., requiring motions to vacate orders or judgments to be brought in a “reasonable time” does not apply to void judgments.

Section 806.07(1)(d) permits a court to vacate a judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Pettygrove Ex Rel. Scholl v. Pettygrove · filed 1986-07-22(1)(d)

Although unstated in the record, it is apparent that the trial court's decision to set aside the judgment was based on sec. 806.07(l)(d), Stats. This subsection authorizes a court to vacate a void judgment. A judgment is void if the court rendering it lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction. ... Because John's cause of action was still pending at the time of his death, the trial court did not err in vacating its subsequent judgment of divorce.

Section 806.07(1)(d) places the burden on a party seeking to vacate a judgment as void for defective service to produce credible evidence of the defect.

In RE MARRIAGE OF EMERY v. Emery · filed 1985-06-28(1)(d)

The circuit court in the instant case properly placed the burden upon Mr. Emery, who sought to vacate the judgment, to produce credible evidence to show that Ms. Emery did not exercise reasonable diligence in her attempt to personally serve him.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits equitable relief from a default judgment for extraordinary circumstances, but the factors used to assess other judgments need not establish such circumstances for a default judgment.

Sprayer Supply, Inc. v. Feider · filed 1986-09-17(1)(h)

However, the M.L.B. factors are simply not necessarily relevant to whether extraordinary circumstances exist as to a default judgment, because some or all of the listed factors are present in almost every default judgment situation.

Section 806.07(1)(d) permits a court to vacate a void judgment in its discretion, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Datronic Rental Corp. v. DeSol, Inc. · filed 1991-08-20(1)(d)

Under sec. 806.07(l)(d), Stats., the trial court may exercise its discretion to vacate a void judgment. We will reverse a trial court's determination under sec. 806.07 only if we find an abuse of discretion.

Section 806.07(1)(d) permits discretionary relief from a void judgment, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Leasefirst v. Hartford Rexall Drugs, Inc. · filed 1992-02-26(1)(d)

Section 806.07(1)(d), Stats., gives the trial court discretion to grant relief from a void judgment. We will reverse a trial court's determination under sec. 806.07 only if we find an abuse of discretion.

Section 806.07(1)(d) does not allow relief from a judgment as void when the party waived the statute of frauds defense by failing to plead it.

Weber v. Weber · filed 1992-05-28(1)(d)

However, the judgment herein is not void because the defendants waived the statute of frauds defense. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to vacate the judgment under sec. 806.07(1)(d), Stats.

Section 806.07’s reasonable-time requirement does not apply to motions to vacate void judgments or orders.

Tridle v. Horn · filed 2002-07-31(2)

Finally, Horn's motion to vacate pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d) does not fail as untimely, despite the three-year span between the judgment and her motion, because the "reasonable time" requirement of § 806.07 does not apply to void judgments or orders.

Section 806.07(1)(g) does not permit relief from a paternity judgment merely because HLA testing became available after trial.

State Ex Rel. RAS v. JM · filed 1983-07-19(1)(g)

We hold that the recent advent of HLA testing is not grounds for relief from a pre-HLA judgment and affirm.

Section 806.07(1)(h) permits discretionary relief from a judgment when a change in controlling law and unusual circumstances make relief necessary to accomplish substantial justice.

Mullen v. Coolong · filed 1990-02-21(1)(h)

Good cause was therefore shown for relief under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., and the record supports the trial court's determination that such action was necessary to accomplish substantial justice.

Section 806.07(1)(h) generally does not justify relief from a final judgment based solely on a later change in the judicial view of the law.

Schwochert v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1991-12-05(1)(h)

The Schwocherts have not shown any "unique facts" which would make inapplicable the general rule that a change in the judicial view of an established rule of law is not an extraordinary circumstance which justifies relief from a final judgment under sec. 806.07(1) (h), Stats.

Section 806.07(1)(h) allows a judgment to be reopened after a change in law only in extraordinary circumstances; overruling precedent alone is insufficient.

Brown v. Mosser Lee Co. · filed 1991-09-12(1)(h)

And while any litigant in that position may well see inequity in such a result, the overruling of prior precedent has never been considered grounds for reopening preexisting judgments based in whole or in part on that precedent.

Section 806.07(1)(g) allows relief only in equitable actions whose decrees have prospective effect.

Nelson v. Taff · filed 1993-03-04(1)(g)

We conclude that sec. 806.07(1)(g), Stats., applies only to equitable actions in which the decree has a prospective effect. Because this is an action at law, relief under sec. 806.07(1)(g) is not available to defendants.

Section 806.07(1)(g) requires a change in circumstances that makes the prospective application of a judgment no longer equitable.

Connor v. Connor · filed 2001-05-18(1)(g)

Thus, under the clear language of this statute, a change in circumstances is specifically contemplated which makes the judgment no longer equitable.

Section 806.07(1)(f) permits relief when a judgment underlying a later judgment, order, or stipulation is reversed or vacated; a later change in unrelated precedent does not qualify.

Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowner's Ass'n · filed 1995-06-20(1)(f)

A judgment entered in a wholly separate case is not a "prior judgment" under sec. 806.07(l)(f). The statute contemplates relief when a prior judgment has actually served as the basis for a subsequent judgment, order, or stipulation and the prior judgment has been reversed or otherwise vacated. The statute does not authorize relief from a judgment on the ground that the law applied by the court in making its adjudication has been subsequently overruled in an unrelated proceeding.

Section 806.07(1)(g) permits reconsideration of a prospective injunction when substantially changed circumstances make its continued application inequitable.

Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Kliesmet · filed 1997-06-25(1)(g)

A circuit court may grant relief from a judgment or order when " [i] t is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." § 806.07(l)(g). ... We conclude that the increase in the degree of overcrowding at the Jail constitutes a substantial change in circumstances, and that the circuit court was therefore justified in reexamining the 1987 permanent injunction.

A motion for relief from a void judgment under § 806.07(1)(d) is a special proceeding, so a frivolous motion may support an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Wengerd v. Rinehart · filed 1983-08-26(1)(d)

We conclude that an order on a motion for relief from a judgment under sec. 806.07 (1) (d), Stats., is entered in a special proceeding. Accordingly, if the motion is frivolous, costs and reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded under sec. 814.025(1), Stats.

Section 806.07 requires a patients compensation panel to consider a motion for relief from its dismissal order.

State Ex Rel. Lewandowski v. Callaway · filed 1984-04-12

We therefore hold that because the panel has a duty under secs. 655.17(1), Stats., and 806.07 to consider Lewandowski’s motion to reopen to determine whether it should grant him relief from its order dismissing his claim, Lewandowski has a clear and specific legal right to have the panel consider his motion.

A motion to vacate a judgment for excusable neglect under § 806.07(1)(a) occurs within the underlying action.

Wellens v. Kahl Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 1988-03-30(1)(a)

We conclude that a motion to vacate a judgment on the ground of excusable neglect occurs in the context of the underlying action. Given this conclusion, the order granting the motion to vacate the judgment is not appealable because additional proceedings will be forthcoming with the filing of the responsive pleading.

Section 806.07 relief requires a motion invoking the trial court’s discretion to relieve a party from a judgment or order for specified reasons.

Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Coyle · filed 1988-04-28

We reject Anchor’s theories. Anchor did not move the court to exercise its discretion under sec. 806.07, Stats., and the court did not do so. A motion under sec. 806.07 invokes the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court to relieve a party from a judgment or an order for very specific reasons.

Section 806.07(1) does not require a formal motion when the parties settle a dispute over a mistaken satisfaction of judgment through a court-approved stipulation.

In re Bult · filed 1989-02-21(1)

Nevertheless, this is precisely Mr. Bult’s argument — the stipulation which resolved the dispute over whether New London had a right to foreclose was void because New London did not present a “formal” motion requesting that the court vacate the satisfaction of judgment. This argument has no merit. ... It would be absurd to read the statute to say that court approved settlements are meaningless and unenforceable.

Section 806.07(1) permits relief only from an existing judgment, order, or stipulation.

Schmidt v. Smith · filed 1991-03-14(1)

Section 806.07, permits relief from judgments, orders and stipulations, under certain conditions. However, the trial court did not purport to act under sec. 806.07. Nor could it. At the time of the court's decision, there was no "judgment, order or stipulation" from which Smith could be relieved.

Relief under § 806.07(1) was improper when neither party moved to modify the judgment and neither had notice or an opportunity to argue the motion.

In RE MARRIAGE OF LYMAN v. Lyman · filed 1994-04-19(1)

Regardless of the parties' arguments on the issue of whether the trial court could grant relief under § 806.07, Stats., and without expressing any opinion on that matter, we find most persuasive John's argument that the court should not have proceeded under § 806.07 because neither party had filed a motion for modification under § 806.07, neither party had notice that such a motion would be entertained, and neither party was prepared to argue that motion.

Section 806.07 requires a party who failed to appear at a probate hearing to obtain relief from the resulting order before presenting arguments on the merits.

In Matter of Estate of O'Neill · filed 1994-06-29

Because Daniel chose not to appear in the action until after his rights were adversely affected, he first needed to obtain relief from the order under §§ 879.31 and 806.07, STATS., before the court could consider his arguments on the merits.

Section 806.07(1)(b) permits relief from a stipulation for newly discovered evidence only when the party seeking relief meets the requirements of § 805.15(3).

Kocinski v. Home Insurance Co. · filed 1988-11-29(1)(b)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kocinski did not satisfy her burden under Rule 806.07(1)(b), Stats.

Section 806.07 requires newly discovered evidence to be likely to change the outcome before it can support relief from an order.

In Matter of Recall of Redner · filed 1989-11-28

One of the requirements under sec. 806.07 is that the new evidence would probably change the outcome of the case. ... This allegation that the cir-culators' oath was not in proper form does not meet this standard.

Section 806.07(1)(b) requires genuinely new evidence; a later report that reassesses previously available information does not qualify.

State v. Williams · filed 2001-05-30(1)(b)

Implicit in the filing for relief from judgment or order due to newly discovered evidence is the idea that the evidence is, in fact, new; the evidence must have come to the State's attention after the court's original order. ... Merely recycling and reformulating existing information into a new format does not generate new evidence.

Section 806.07 permits denial of a motion to vacate prior orders when the new evidence would not change the result.

Foss v. Madison Twentieth Century Theaters, Inc. · filed 1996-06-27

We join the trial court's reasoning. Goodrich's statement cannot save the complaint from dismissal. We affirm the trial court's exercise of discretion under § 806.07, Stats.

Section 806.07(2) permits an independent equitable action for relief from a judgment based on fraud without requiring an allegation of fraud on the court.

Walker v. Tobin · filed 1997-02-19(2)

It is clear that § 806.07(2), STATS., allows a party to commence an independent equitable action and we so hold.

Section 806.07(2) permits an independent action to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court, but inexcusable negligence and delay bar equitable relief.

Dekker v. Wergin · filed 1997-09-17(2)

Dekker fails to allege facts which satisfy the elements of an independent action. Accordingly, Dekker's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 806.07(1)(a) permits a court to vacate and reinstate an order when the record shows it intended to send notice to the parties but mistakenly failed to do so and later acknowledges the mistake.

Edland v. Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins. Corp. · filed 1997-06-12(1)(a)

In light of the circuit court's intention, reflected in the record, to send notice of its decision and order to the parties, and its subsequently acknowledged mistake in failing to send the notice, we conclude that such failure constitutes a "mistake" for purposes of § 806.07(1)(a).

Section 806.07(1)(a) permits reopening a judgment when a party's mistake about existing law was justifiable and excusable under the circumstances.

State v. Schultz · filed 1999-01-20(1)(a)

Section 806.07, Stats., authorizes a court to relieve a party from judgment on various specified grounds, including mistake. ... Schultz's justifiable and excusable mistake constitutes a sufficient reason to reopen the judgment.

Section 806.07(1)(a) does not permit relief merely because an attorney failed to anticipate the collateral legal consequences of settlement language.

MILW. WOMEN'S MEDICAL SERV. v. Scheidler · filed 1999-05-04(1)(a)

However, the trial court applied the term too broadly since virtually any failure on the part of an attorney to predict and appreciate the potential collateral legal consequences of his or her own proposed settlement language results, at least in part, from inadvertence. The adoption of such an all-encompassing definition of inadvertence in § 806.07(1)(a), STATS., would deprive its coequal statutory term "excusable neglect" of most of its meaning.

Section 806.07(1)(a) permits relief from a default judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; prompt action alone does not establish excusable neglect.

Carmain v. Affiliated Capital Corp. · filed 2002-10-02(1)(a)

A party is entitled to relief from the default judgment if the judgment was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(a). ... Finding no excusable neglect was a proper exercise of the circuit court's discretion.

Section 806.07(1)(a) authorizes a circuit court to relieve a party from a judgment because of mistake or inadvertence; appellate courts have no equivalent rule.

State Ex Rel. Fuentes v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals · filed 1999-05-14(1)(a)

Under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(a), a circuit court is authorized to "relieve a party.. .from a judgment" because of mistake or inadvertence. ... There is no equivalent to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(a) in the rules of appellate procedure for either the court of appeals or this court.