Wis. Stat. § 134.90

Section 134.90 treats whether information is generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means as relevant to trade secret status, and comparable competitor information can be circumstantial evidence on that issue.

Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hydro Technologies, Inc. · filed 1993-04-08(1)(c)1.

In my opinion, under both Wis.Stat. § 134.90 and the first factor of the Restatement test, evidence of the types of competitor information in Nalco’s control is relevant to the critical issue of deciding whether the defendants possess Nalco trade secrets—a factor in deciding the larger question of whether the defendants misappropriated Nalco trade secrets. If Nalco possesses information on its competitors, “generally known” in the water treatment industry and obtained by “proper means,” and that information is similar to such competitor information properly acquired by the defendants about Nalco, then such competitor information retained by Nalco would be probative circumstantial evidence useful to the defendants at trial.

Section 134.90(1)(c) allows a unified compilation of publicly known elements to qualify as a trade secret if it meets the other statutory requirements.

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company v. Ronald Pribyl, James Harvey, Thomas Skrtic, and Accu-Tech Plastics, Incorpor · filed 2001-08-20(1)(c)

Yet, when all the cleaning procedures, temperature settings, safety protocols, and equipment calibrations are collected and set out as a unified process, that compilation, if it meets the other qualifications, may be considered a trade secret.

Section 134.90 supplies the governing standard for deciding whether a customer list is a trade secret; the earlier Restatement-based test does not control.

American National Property & Casualty Co. v. Graham · filed 2005-05-19

But that was before Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has a set of criteria different from the Restatement of Torts for determining whether something is a trade secret. Wis. Stat. § 134.90.

A process described only in general terms will usually be widely known and thus fail to qualify as a trade secret; the claimant must identify the protected details.

Bondpro Corporation v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc. · filed 2006-09-12(1)(c)(1)

One expects a trade secret to be rich in detail, because a process described in general terms, (squeeze insulation materials draped on the male mold with heat and air pressure rather than pressing the male mold into a female mold containing the materials) will usually be widely known and thus not worth incurring costs to try to conceal and so not a trade secret.

Information is not a trade secret under § 134.90 merely because it is commercially valuable; its secrecy must give it independent economic value.

Forst v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. · filed 2009-03-11(1)(c)

As described by the Wisconsin Trade Secrets Act, “trade secret” means any information that: 1) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Wis. Stat. § 134.90. ... Further, after reviewing the subject documents, the court does not independently conclude that the information derives independent economic value from remaining unknown, or that competitors could obtain economic value from its disclosure.

Section 134.90 can protect a unified manufacturing process as a trade secret even when individual components are not secret.

Centrifugal Acquisition Corp. v. Moon · filed 2012-02-02(1)(c)

Balestrieri’s attempt to divide various aspects of the Proprietary Process into “secret” and “non-secret” categories does not undermine the status of the entire, unified process as a trade secret.

Section 134.90’s definition of trade secret covers the proprietary operational materials the court ordered sealed.

Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen · filed 2015-03-20(1)(c)

... the court nonetheless is persuaded that these materials contain trade secrets, as defined under Wisconsin law, Wis. Stat. § 134.90(c).

A claimant under § 134.90 must identify the alleged trade secret with enough specificity to show that particular information meets the statutory definition.

Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC · filed 2017-03-15(1)(c)

Defendants’ criticism reveals a larger problem with Kuryakyn’s claims: Kuryakyn offers vague, generalized descriptions of its purported trade secrets without demonstrating that any specific piece of information meets the statutory definition of trade.secret.

Customer information readily ascertainable from a phone book or by asking at a business is not a trade secret under § 134.90(1)(c).

SYSCO Food Services of Eastern Wisconsin, LLC v. Ziccarelli · filed 2006-08-28(1)(c)

That being the case, the customer information that is the subject of the confidentiality covenant would not constitute a trade secret.

Customer information filtered into a valuable list of likely insurance buyers can qualify as a trade secret under § 134.90(1)(c) when the statutory requirements of economic value and reasonable secrecy efforts are met.

American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Roth · filed 2007-05-07(1)(c)

Both conditions are satisfied. ... In any event, the customer information in the database is a trade secret.

Information that can be determined without undue experimentation under patent law is not necessarily readily ascertainable under the trade secret definition in § 134.90.

Metso Minerals Industries, Inc. v. FLSmidth-Excel LLC · filed 2010-05-13(1)(c)

For defendants to prevail under this line of reasoning, the court would have to hold that if Metso’s dimensions and tolerances are able to be determined without “undue experimentation” then they must be “readily ascertainable.” However, given the difference in the two standards, the court has no basis for making such a finding.

Section 134.90(1)(c) allows a compilation of otherwise public data to qualify as a trade secret.

Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL · filed 2010-09-27(1)(c)

Thus, even if plaintiffs Master Collection and Spreadsheet were simply compilations of otherwise public data, that alone would not foreclose the claim as a matter of law.

A customer list and related worker information do not qualify as trade secrets under § 134.90(1)(c) when they were not kept sufficiently secret and could be reconstructed through public sources or independent recruiting.

Staffworks Group-Wisconsin Inc v. Service First Staffing Inc · filed 2020-06-29(1)(c)

And with respect to what it inputted, Nicolet has failed to show that its customer list or related information was kept sufficiently secret or was impossible to duplicate.

Section 134.90(1)(c) permits a trade secret claim to survive dismissal when the plaintiff sufficiently alleges control over an economically valuable process kept secret.

ProClip USA, LLC v. Ebert, Steven · filed 2022-02-25(1)(c)

Accepting all the facts in the pleading as true, however, ProClip has sufficiently alleged control over a process of economic value that the company has kept secret.

Section 134.90(1)(c) requires a claimant to identify information that qualifies as a trade secret to show a likelihood of success on a misappropriation claim.

PFS Investments Inc. v. Thompson, Timothy · filed 2023-03-02(1)(c)

As the court discussed with the parties during the preliminary injunction hearing, Primerica has not shown a likelihood of success on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim, having failed to identify any information that Thompson took from Primerica that would qualify as a trade secret under Wisconsin or federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (federal definition of “trade secret”); Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c) (Wisconsin definition of “trade secret”).

Section 134.90(1)(c) requires information to derive independent economic value from secrecy and to be subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy to qualify as a trade secret.

Norwood · filed 2026-01-06(1)(c)

Wisconsin statutes define “trade secret” as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process” that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons” and “is the subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the circumstances.” Wis. Stat. §134.90(1)(c). The amended complaint contains no allegations that the Blowout Feature is a trade secret or that it has been subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy. The amended complaint does not state a claim for unjust enrichment or trade secret misappropriation under Wisconsin law.

Retaining customer names and contact information alone does not constitute trade secret misappropriation under § 134.90 when that information is readily ascertainable.

Allstate Insurance Company v. Deanna Freeman · filed 2026-01-07(1)(c)

Customer names and contact information on their own are readily ascertainable, so retaining this type of information wouldn’t amount to misappropriation of trade secrets.

Section 134.90(1)(c) does not protect information freely given to anyone who requests it because that information is not subject to efforts to maintain its secrecy.

Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hydro Technologies, Inc. · filed 1993-07-16(1)(c)

The Nalco product bulletins at issue are indisputably freely given to any person who requests such information from Nalco. Thus, product bulletins are not trade secrets because the information contained in them is not “subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy.”

Section 134.90(1)(c) requires reasonable efforts to keep information secret; ordinary facility access restrictions and passwords alone do not establish those efforts.

Maxpower Corp. v. Abraham · filed 2008-04-29(1)(c)

It is not enough simply to restrict access to the facility and require passwords; these are normal business practices in any business. An employer must use additional measures to protect the confidentiality of information he considers to be a trade secret.

Section 134.90(1)(c)(2) requires reasonable efforts to keep information secret; an assumed confidential relationship does not establish reasonable efforts when the owner takes no affirmative precautions.

Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp. · filed 2010-09-03(1)(c)(2)

Here, the court concludes that, even assuming that the parties had a relationship with implications that the information shared between the parties would be confidential, the undisputed evidence, even when construed most favorably toward the plaintiff, does not indicate that FS took reasonable precautions with respect to its proprietary information.

Section 134.90 requires reasonable efforts under the circumstances to keep information secret; taking no protective steps defeats trade secret protection.

Fail-Safe, LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp. · filed 2012-03-29(1)(c)2.

FS failed to take reasonable protective measures for its claimed trade secret under the circumstances, and thus cannot claim trade secret protection. To qualify as a trade secret under Wisconsin law, the claimed trade secret—that is, the proprietary information—must be the “subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the circumstances.” Wis. Stat. § 134.90 (2011).

Section 134.90(2) permits a duty to keep information confidential to arise from an implicit agreement, but minority shareholder status alone does not establish that duty.

Starsurgical Inc. v. Aperta, LLC · filed 2014-08-14(2)

Although Wittmann’s role as minority shareholder did not ipso facto create a duty of confidentiality, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Star, a reasonable jury could find an implicit agreement between the Wittmanns and Star to keep the financial data and the FDA approval information confidential.

Section 134.90(1)(c) allows custom designs and pricing to qualify as trade secrets when their owner takes reasonable steps to keep them secret.

Rustic Retreats Log Homes Inc v. Pioneer Log Homes of British Columbia Inc · filed 2022-04-18(1)(c)

Even absent waiver of this argument, Pioneer presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Pioneer took steps to maintain the secrecy of its custom designs and pricing that were reasonable under the circumstances.

A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief under § 134.90 must present meaningful evidence that the information at issue qualifies as a trade secret.

Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hydro Technologies, Inc. · filed 1992-05-07(1)(c)

Nalco Chemical failed to adduce any meaningful evidence demonstrating the existence of any of trade secrets under the protection of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, Wis.Stat. § 134.90 (defining “trade secret” as, among other things, information that obtains some independent economic value from not being generally known to others).

Section 134.90 requires a claimant to identify the specific means claimed as trade secrets when those means provide product features also found in competing products; listing the features alone is insufficient.

IDX Systems Corp. v. Epic Systems Corp. · filed 2001-07-31(1)(c)

Listing product functionalities as trade secret areas is insufficient, particularly here, where it is conceded that the functionalities are not trade secrets and exist in competing products. Where plaintiff seeks to protect as trade secrets specific means of providing common features those specific means must be identified.

Section 134.90 requires a plaintiff claiming trade secret misappropriation to identify the alleged trade secret with enough specificity to distinguish it from general knowledge.

McGee, Conor v. Oshkosh Defense, LLC · filed 2019-09-30

Similarly, he has not alleged what trade secret was appropriated under the Wisconsin Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Wis. Stat. § 134.90, dooming this claim as well.

Section 134.90 does not require a plaintiff to identify the specific information constituting a trade secret at the pleading stage, although that specificity is required to prevail.

Community Hospital Partners, LLC v. Marshfield Clinic Health System, Inc. · filed 2023-03-09

To prevail on its claim, CHP will be required to identify the specific information it contends is a trade secret. But that specificity isn’t required at the pleading stage.

Section 134.90 permits a trade secret claim when the plaintiff alleges misappropriation of valuable information that is not generally known or readily ascertainable and that the plaintiff took reasonable steps to protect.

Kunes Country Automotive Management Inc v. Walters · filed 2024-05-10(1)(c)

Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants misappropriated valuable information that was not generally known or readily ascertainable that Plaintiffs took reasonable steps to protect. That is sufficient to state a claim under Section 134.90.

Under § 134.90, identifying software as the alleged trade secret is sufficient to give notice at the pleading stage.

Eternix Ltd. v. CivilGEO, Inc. · filed 2024-06-05

In cases involving software, identifying the software as the trade secret is sufficient to provide notice.

A claimant must identify the alleged trade secret with enough specificity; identifying the 75 pages of code claimed as secret satisfies that requirement.

Woodland Tools Inc. v. Fiskars Brands, Inc. · filed 2024-08-26

Fiskars has clearly identified the information it claims as its trade secrets: the 75 pages of code in the html files that Koch emailed to himself in the final three weeks in which he worked at Fiskars.

A trade secrets claimant must identify each asserted secret specifically enough for a reasonable jury to determine whether it satisfies the elements of a trade secret.

Eternix Ltd. v. CivilGEO, Inc. · filed 2025-04-23

A plaintiff asserting a trade secrets claim must identify each asserted trade secret with enough specificity to allow a reasonable jury to find that it meets each element of a trade secret.

Section 134.90(2)(a) covers breach of an implied promise to use a client’s trade secrets solely for the client’s benefit; an express written confidentiality agreement is unnecessary.

LC v. Bartell, R.J. · filed 2006-02-22(2)(a)

And breach of an implicit promise to hold information for the client’s sole benefit in turn violates the Trade Secrets Act, Wis. Stat. §134.90(2)(a).

Section 134.90(2)(a) treats breach of an implied promise to keep a client’s information for the client’s sole benefit as a trade secrets violation.

Hicklin Engineering, L.C., Cross-Appellee v. R.J. Bartell and R.J. Bartell & Associates, L.L.C. · filed 2006-02-22(2)(a)

And breach of an implicit promise to hold information for the client’s sole benefit in turn violates the Trade Secrets Act, Wis. Stat. § 134.90(2)(a).

Section 134.90 permits a lawful possessor of a trade secret to sue for its misappropriation without owning the secret.

Metso Minerals Industries, Inc. v. FLSmidth-Excel LLC · filed 2010-05-07(2)

Wisconsin’s version of the UTSA does not expressly require trade secret ownership in order to bring suit for misappropriation.

Section 134.90 permits trade secret misappropriation liability when a person has reason to know the conduct is improper; actual knowledge or intent is not required.

Air Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Air Power, LLC · filed 2013-01-03(2)(a), (2)(b)2.

Finally, under Wis. Stat. § 134.90, trade secret misappropriation can occur when a person knows or has reason to know his or her actions are improper. Wis. Stat. § 134.90(2)(a), (b)2. The statute does not require actual knowledge or intent.

Section 134.90(2) requires evidence that the defendant knew of, acquired, disclosed, or used the claimed trade secret to sustain a misappropriation claim.

North Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Machine & Tool Inc. · filed 2017-07-06(2)

Contrary to North Highland's assertions, the evidence in the record fails to establish that Wells had knowledge of, let alone "acquired," "disclosed," or "used" the bid amount.

Section 134.90(2) does not require proof of monetary damages to establish a trade secret misappropriation claim.

DF Institute, LLC v. Dalton Education, LLC · filed 2020-08-11(2)

Proof of monetary damages isn’t an element of a trade secrets misappropriation claim. As discussed above, a trade secrets claim has two elements: (1) the defendant acquired, used, or disclosed the plaintiff’s information through improper means; and (2) the information at issue qualifies as a trade secret. 18 U.S.C. § 1639(5); Wis. Stat. § 134.90(2). So the court cannot grant summary judgment to Dalton simply because Kaplan can’t prove damages.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction for trade secret misappropriation must clearly identify and make a prima facie showing of its proprietary rights, even when disclosure could cause serious harm.

Automated Packaging Systems, Inc. v. Sharp Packaging, Inc. And Paul Scarberry · filed 1989-12-11(1)(c)

Automated's argument that it will be seriously harmed if Sharp discloses Automated's trade secrets is inherently true in any trade secret case. That does not, however, relieve a party from clearly identifying and prima facie proving its proprietary rights to obtain a preliminary injunction.

Section 134.90(3) allows injunctive protection of trade secrets against use, and a movant must show a likelihood that the defendant is using the claimed trade secret.

Vital State Canada, Ltd. v. DREAMPAK, LLC · filed 2003-12-30(3)

Wisconsin has statutory law that recognizes an action for injunctive protection of trade secrets against use. Wis. Stat. § 134.90(3) (2001-02).

An injunction to eliminate the commercial advantage from trade-secret misappropriation requires proof that the violator presently derives that advantage.

Jarosch v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2011-09-16(3)(a)3.

Because there has been a failure of proof in demonstrating that the plaintiffs are presently deriving a “commercial advantage” from their misappropriation, no injunction will be issued.

Section 134.90 allows prospective injunctive relief and damages even after the defendant returns the information.

Cargill Incorporated v. Bingenheimer · filed 2020-03-19(3)(b)-(c), (4)

Bingenheimer also argues that because he returned all of Cargill’s information, Cargill has no additional remedy under the relevant trade secret statutes. This is incorrect; Cargill could still be granted further injunctive relief and damages. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (remedies); Wis Stat. § 134.90(3)(b)-(c) (prospective injunctive relief); Wis Stat. § 134.90(4) (damages).

Section 134.90(4)(b) leaves punitive damages for willful and malicious trade secret misappropriation to the court’s discretion, so omitting a jury instruction on willfulness is harmless when the court would not award punitive damages.

Sokol Crystal Products, Inc. v. Dsc Communications Corporation, F/k/a Digital Switch Corporation, Cross-Appellee · filed 1994-02-09(4)(b)

But the statute says that if a misappropriation is willful and malicious, “the court may award punitive damages” (emphasis supplied). The district court, in refusing a willfulness instruction, said that there is “nothing in the record to demonstrate that the act was malicious.” R.O.A. 211:181. It is therefore clear that the court would not have awarded punitive damages, and thus that failing to give the instruction (even if it was error) was not prejudicial.

Section 134.90(4) permits actual-loss damages for consequential losses caused by trade-secret misappropriation, including lost sales from a defective product incorporating the secret.

World Wide Prosthetic Supply, Inc. v. Mikulsky · filed 2001-05-15(4)

This evidence is admissible because it is relevant to plaintiffs potential claim for actual loss under WlS. STAT. § 134.90(4), which can include consequential damages.

Section 134.90(4)(a) allows actual-loss damages for lost profits caused by misappropriation, including profits lost when defective products incorporating the trade secret are distributed.

World Wide Prosthetic Supply, Inc. v. Mikulsky · filed 2002-03-19(4)(a)

In sum, we determine that "actual loss" in § 134.90(4)(a) includes lost profits allegedly resulting from Voyager's manufacture and distribution of defective products incorporating World Wide's trade secret.

Section 134.90(4) permits unjust enrichment damages for misappropriation of trade secrets.

Epic Systems Corporation v. Tata Consultancy Services Limi · filed 2020-08-20(4)

Unjust enrichment damages are available as a remedy for a defendant’s misappropriation of trade secrets, Wis. Stat. § 134.90, and are also available as a remedy for Wisconsin tort claims, see Pro-Pac, Inc. v. WOW Logistics Co., 721 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2013).

Section 134.90(4) permits damages based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment from misappropriating trade secrets.

Epic Systems Corporation v. Tata Consultancy Services Limi · filed 2020-11-19(4)

And Epic’s claims for trade secrets, fraudulent misrepre‐ sentation, and unfair competition all allow recovery of dam‐ ages on a theory of gain to the defendant. Wis. Stat. § 134.90(4) (damages for a violation of Wisconsin’s trade secrets act in‐ clude “unjust enrichment caused by the violation”); Pro‐Pac, 721 F.3d at 786 (restitutionary damages, i.e. damages based on the defendant’s benefit, are recoverable “as compensation for tort claims”).

A request for punitive damages and attorney fees under § 134.90(4)(b) and (c) can be denied on summary judgment when the movant presents no evidence of actual damages or use of the data.

Rob's Automotive, LLC v. Lazarz · filed 2021-01-13(4)(b), (c)

Plaintiff also requests summary judgment for punitive damages of $28,398.98 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 134.90(4)(b) and (c), an award of attorneys’ fees, and a determination that the debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) as larceny. ... No facts have been presented to prove either that Plaintiff has suffered any actual damages or that Defendant has used the data. ... Summary judgment is denied on the claim for any actual damage amounts as none have been demonstrated. Summary judgment is also denied with respect to the claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.

Section 134.90(4)(c) permits discretionary attorney’s fees for willful and deliberate misappropriation, which requires intentional conduct but no intent to harm.

Rustic Retreats Log Homes Inc v. Pioneer Log Homes of British Columbia Inc · filed 2022-03-22(4)(c)

As written under the Wisconsin statute, attorney’s fees may be awarded so long as the conduct was intentional, without the added intent to harm that “malicious” provides.

Section 134.90(4)(c) permits a prevailing defendant to recover fees for a trade secret misappropriation claim brought in bad faith; an unsuccessful preliminary injunction request alone does not establish bad faith.

Marsden · filed 2025-12-09(4)(c)

A prevailing defendant may recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred defending against a trade secrets misappropriation claim brought in bad faith. Wis. Stat. §134.90(4)(c); 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5305(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D). ... Plaintiffs’ pursuit of injunctive relief in this case does not rise to the level of bad faith.

Section 134.90(6)(a) does not displace a tort claim for inducing breach of a nondisclosure agreement because enforcing the agreement does not conflict with trade-secret law.

Idx Systems Corporation v. Epic Systems Corporation, University of Wisconsin Medical Foundation, Mitchell Quade, and Mic · filed 2002-04-01(6)(a)

Enforcement of a non-disclosure agreement does not conflict with trade-secret law, and thus preventing third parties from inducing breach of such an agreement does not conflict with trade-secret law.

Section 134.90(6) displaces state law civil remedies based on misappropriation of a trade secret.

BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp. · filed 2004-05-28(6)

To the extent that plaintiff is bringing a state law claim based upon defendant’s alleged improper use of plaintiffs trade secrets, the claim is displaced by Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6), the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

Section 134.90(6)(a) displaces an unjust enrichment claim only if the claim is based on information that qualifies as a statutory trade secret; whether it does can require factual development.

Genzyme Corp. v. Bishop · filed 2006-12-01(6)(a)

At this stage, the Court does not possess sufficient factual information to conclude as a matter of law that the allegedly received and retained information (which serves as the factual basis for count two of plaintiffs amended complaint) constitutes a trade secret. In the end, it may and as a result count two may be preempted by Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6)(a).

Section 134.90(6) displaces civil tort remedies for misappropriation of a statutory trade secret but leaves other civil remedies available for misuse of confidential information that does not qualify as a trade secret.

Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski · filed 2006-07-13(6)

We conclude that § 134.90(6)(a) does not preclude all other civil remedies based on the misappropriation of confidential information, if the information does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret under § 134.90(1)(c).

Section 134.90(6) does not displace other tort claims at the pleading stage when discovery may show that the information is not a statutory trade secret.

Radiator Express Warehouse, Inc. v. Shie · filed 2010-04-22(6)

At the motion to dismiss stage, the court will not dismiss the other claims based on abrogation, as discovery could prove that the information at issue in the plaintiffs first cause of action falls short of the statutory definition of “trade secret” within the meaning of the WITSA, forcing the plaintiffs to try to recover other civil tort claims not grounded in trade secret.

Section 134.90(6)(b)2 preserves common-law claims for misappropriation of confidential information when the information is not a statutory trade secret.

Hanson v. LOPAREX, INC. · filed 2011-08-15(6)(b)2

There is no dispute that a common-law claim for misappropriation of confidential information remains valid despite Wisconsin’s enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as long as the common-law claim is not based on the misappropriation of a "trade secret” as defined under that statute.

Section 134.90(6)(a) preempts a common law misappropriation of trade secrets claim based on alleged trade secrets.

Rustic Retreats Log Homes Inc v. Pioneer Log Homes of British Columbia Inc · filed 2021-06-17(6)(a)

Accordingly, Pioneer’s common law misappropriation of trade secrets claim is preempted by Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6)(a).

Section 134.90(6)(a) displaces conflicting civil remedies for trade secret misappropriation, limiting a Wisconsin Computer Crimes Act claim to non-trade-secret information.

Danaher Corporation v. Lean Focus LLC · filed 2021-07-28(6)(a)

Because Wisconsin’s adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act “displaces conflicting tort law, restitutionary law and other law of [Wisconsin] providing a civil remedy for misappropriation of a trade secret,” Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6)(a), this claim only covers non-trade secrets.

Section 134.90(6)(b)(2) preserves civil tort claims based on misuse of confidential information that is not a trade secret.

Genzyme Corp. v. Bishop · filed 2006-10-31(6)(b)(2)

Taking plaintiffs allegations as true (which the Court must at this stage) counts six through eight of plaintiffs complaint expressly allege misuse and exploitation of confidential or proprietary non-trade secret information and the Wisconsin Supreme Court has determined that these types of claims remain available under Wis. Stat. § 134.90.

An action under § 134.90 is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

PTP OneClick LLC v. Avalara Inc · filed 2019-09-27

Three-year statutes of limitations govern both the DTSA and the WUTSA.

A claim for misappropriation under § 134.90 has a three-year limitations period running from when the misappropriation was discovered or should have been discovered.

Status Solutions, LLC v. JNL Technologies, Inc. · filed 2021-07-08

The statute of limitations for a misappropriation of trade secrets under Wis. Stat. 134.90 is also 3 years from the date the alleged misappropriation was discovered or should have been discovered. Wis. Stat. § 893.51(2).