Statute Annotations › Texas › Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023

Matters that may be considered in construing statutes: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Texas
Case notes
49
Cited in passing
190
Citing cases indexed
242
Case dates
1988–2012
Screened through
2015-11-30
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

239 citing cases reviewed of 242 in the citation index: 49 interpreted the section (annotated below), 190 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2015-11-30 may not have been reviewed yet.

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General statutory-construction factors

Section 311.023 provides the guiding principles for interpreting statutes, including consideration of public policy concerns and analogous statutory provisions.

Harris County v. DeWitt · filed 1994-05-19

The Texas Supreme Court has noted that the codified version of the Texas Tort Claims Act does not include the directive contained in the Act's earlier version that the Act be liberally construed. Univ. of Texas Medical Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 n. 3 (Tex.1994). The supreme court has stated that the guiding principles for interpreting the Act must now necessarily be those set out in the Code Construction Act. TEX.GOVT'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (Vernon 1990). Because the reasoning of our opinion today draws upon public policy concerns and analogous statutory provisions, we acknowledge here in advance that such avenues of interpretation are encouraged by the principles set out in the Code Construction Act.
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Section 311.023 permits a court construing a statute to consider the object sought to be attained, the circumstances of enactment, legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2000-07-10

Because the statute does not identify the account in which the "surplus money" is located, define what it means for the money to be "surplus," or provide a reference for the tax that disqualifies a county from transfering surplus money, we examine the legislative history. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0164 (1999) at 5 ("Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may consider the statute's legislative history."); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (1), (2), (3), (5) (Vernon 1998) (in construing a statute, court may take into account object sought to be attained, circumstances under which statute was enacted, legislative history, and consequences of a particular construction).
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Section 311.023 permits a court construing a statute or ordinance to consider the objective, circumstances, legislative history, common law, former provisions, and similar laws even when the text is not facially ambiguous.

Rosenblatt, Bernard as Applicant for AVW, Inc. D/B/A Adult Video Megaplexxx v. City of Houston · filed 2000-10-19

When construing a statute or ordinance, whether or not the statute is ambiguous on its face, we consider such matters as the object sought to be attained by the statute, the circumstances involved, the legislative history, the common law, former provisions, and laws on the same or similar subjects. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998); Castle v. Harris , 960 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); Grothues v. City of Helotes , 928 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, no writ).
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Section 311.023 permits prior law to be considered as an aid to construing a code provision, but it may not be used to alter or disregard the provision's express terms.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-03-01

Pursuant to the Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998), prior law may be considered as an aid to construction, so long as it is not "used to alter or disregard the express terms of a code provision." Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999). In this instance there is no substantive difference between the prior law and the code.
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When a statute is ambiguous, courts may consider the common law as an extratextual factor in determining its meaning.

Cuellar v. State · filed 1997-11-06(4)

When the language of a statute is not plain but instead rather ambiguous, courts are permitted to consider extratextual factors. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Among the extratextual factors that may be considered is the common law. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(4) (Vernon 1988).
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When construing a statute, courts may consider the circumstances under which it or a former statutory provision was enacted.

Opinion No. · filed 1999-04-28(2), (4)

As explained below, the enactment of these provisions as part of the substantive recodification of the Election Code in 1985 indicates that the legislature intended to limit the purposes for which chapter 19 funds could be used. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (2), (4) (in construing statute, may consider circumstances under which statute or former statutory provision enacted).
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Section 311.023 permits a court construing a statute to consider specified extratextual matters, including the statute’s object, circumstances of enactment, legislative history, former provisions, and the consequences of a proposed construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2000-10-17(1)-(5)

We may also consider, among other things, the circumstances under which a statute was enacted, former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects, and the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998).
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Section 311.023 authorizes courts construing an ambiguous statute to consider the objective sought, former statutory provisions and laws on the same or similar subjects, and the consequences of a particular construction.

Carole Keeton Rylander, Successor-in-Interest to John Sharp, Comptroller of Public Accounts; and John Cornyn, Successor-in-Interest to Dan Morales, Attorney General v. Fisher Controls International, Incorporated · filed 2001-04-26

In our attempt to find the intended meaning of the disputed statutory term, we are mindful that the Code Construction Act erects a presumption that a just and reasonable result was intended; and, the Act authorizes us to consider the objective sought to be obtained, former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects, and the consequences of a particular construction of the disputed term. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 1998).
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Section 311.023(1) permits courts to consider a statute's objective when interpreting it, even when the statute is unambiguous.

Travis County Attorney v. J.S.H. · filed 2001-01-11(1)

When interpreting a statute, whether or not ambiguous, a court may consider the object sought to be obtained. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(1) (West 1998).
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Section 311.023 permits courts construing a statute to consider legislative history, the object sought to be attained, and the consequences of a particular construction.

In Re Triantaphyllis · filed 2002-01-31(1), (3), (5)

In construing the statute, courts may consider the legislative history and "the object sought to be attained." In re Bell, slip op. at 3, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(1),(3) (Vernon 1998)). Courts may also consider the consequences of a particular construction. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(5).
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Section 311.023 permits a court construing a statute to consider the object sought to be attained, the circumstances of enactment, legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-06-11

The Code Construction Act directs that when construing a statute a court (and this office) may consider, inter alia , the "object sought to be attained"; the "circumstances under which the statute was enacted"; the "legislative history"; and, the "consequences of a particular construction." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998).
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Section 311.023 directs courts to consider a statute’s underlying object and the consequences of a particular construction when interpreting it.

COM'N v. Continental Cas. · filed 2002-08-08

The underlying object of a statute must inform a court's interpretation and application of that statute. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 1998). ... When interpreting a statute, we must be mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023; Korndorffer v. Baker, 976 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). ... A gap does not make sense in this statutory scheme.
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Former law and legislative history

Section 311.023(4) permits courts to consider former statutory provisions when construing a statute, even when the statute is unambiguous.

In the Matter of Francisco A. Fernandez and Maura M. Fernandez, Debtors. Francisco A. Fernandez and Maura M. Fernandez v · filed 1988-09-19(4)

Further, the Legislature in the Code Construction Act specifically allows us to look to former statutory provisions in construing a statute, whether or not the statute is ambiguous.
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Section 311.023 permits courts to consider prior law, the circumstances of enactment, and legislative history when construing a code provision even if it is not facially ambiguous, but those aids cannot override clear statutory text.

In Re AM · filed 2003-04-24

Under the Code Construction Act, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.001-311.034 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2002), which applies to the Texas Family Code, we may consider prior law, the circumstances under which the law was enacted, and legislative history, among other matters, to aid us in construing a code provision "whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998); Fleming Foods, 6 S.W.3d at 283. "But prior law and legislative history cannot be used to alter or disregard the express terms of a code provision when its meaning is clear from the code when considered in its entirety, unless there is an error such as a typographical one." Fleming Foods, 6 S.W.3d at 284.
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Section 311.023 permits a court construing a statute to consider the object sought to be attained and the consequences of a particular construction.

In Re KLV · filed 2003-05-15

In construing a statute, regardless of whether the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, we may consider the object sought to be attained and the consequences of any particular construction. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023; City of Dallas, 879 S.W.2d at 270.
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Section 311.023(4) permits a court construing a statute, even if it is not facially ambiguous, to consider common law or former statutory provisions.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-05-27(4)

Section 311.023 provides that, "[i]n construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider," inter alia , "common law or former statutory provisions." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (4) (Vernon 1998). ... Section 49.056(c) is to be construed in harmony with chapter 311 of the Government Code, the Code Construction Act, which permits us to consider whatever common law may bear on the question. Id.
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Section 311.023(4) permits a court construing a statute to consider former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-09-08(4)

However, the legislature's omission of language in the County Purchasing Act making contracts void is significant and must be given effect. ... see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (4) (Vernon 1998) (in construing a statute, a court may consider "former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects").
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Section 311.023 permits a court to consider legislative history and other contextual factors when construing a statute, even when the statute is not ambiguous on its face.

UNITED SERVICES AUTO. ASS'N v. Strayhorn · filed 2003-11-06

Because the code construction act prescribed such consideration when construing statutes enacted by the sixtieth or a subsequent legislature, and former articles 4.10 and 4.11 were originally passed before the sixtieth legislature, USAA believes that we are prohibited from considering any factors other than the words of the statutes as they appear on the page. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 1998). We note, however, that Texas courts developed a body of common law for construing statutes long before the legislature enacted the code construction act and often considered issues such as those objected to by USAA. ... Thus, USAA's argument is without merit.
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Section 311.023 permits a court to consider, even when a statute is unambiguous, the circumstances of enactment and legislative history in determining legislative intent.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-01-11

However, we determine legislative intent from the entire act and not just isolated portions. See id. ; see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998) (regardless of whether a statute is considered ambiguous, a court may consider, inter alia , the circumstances under which the statute was enacted and the legislative history).
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Administrative construction

Section 311.023(6) permits a court construing a statute to consider the administrative construction of that statute, whether or not the statute is ambiguous.

Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Texas Workforce Commission · filed 2004-05-20(6)

In construing a statute--whether it is ambiguous or not--we may consider the administrative construction of the statute.
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Section 311.023(6) permits a court construing a statute to consider the agency's administrative construction, including giving serious consideration to a reasonable interpretation by the agency charged with enforcement.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-08-17(6)

In construing a statute, . . . a court may consider among other matters the . . . administrative construction of the statute . . . .
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Object, consequences, and legislative purpose

When construing a statute, a court may consider the statute's objectives, legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-06-23(1), (3), (5)

We may also consider, among other things, a statute's objectives, its legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998); see also id . § 311.021(2)-(4) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . the entire statute is intended to be effective[,] a just and reasonable result is intended[, and] a result feasible of execution is intended . . . .").
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Section 311.023 permits a court to consider the listed statutory-construction factors whether or not the statute is facially ambiguous.

Purdin v. Copperas Cove Economic Development Corp. · filed 2004-07-21

The Code Construction Act provides the factors the court may consider: In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) legislative history; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; (6) administrative construction of the statute; and (7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998).
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Section 311.023 permits courts construing a statute to consider, among other things, the statute's objective, the circumstances of its enactment, and the consequences of a proposed construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-12-06(1)-(2), (5)

This indicates that the legislature intends reinvestment zones, and tax increment financing, to exist for predefined periods and does not intend chapter 311 to authorize cities to extend them indefinitely. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (1)-(2), (5) (Vernon 1998) (in construing a statute, a court may consider, among other things, the object sought to be attained, the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, and the consequences of a particular construction).
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Section 311.023 permits a court to consider former statutory provisions, administrative interpretations, the circumstances of enactment, and legislative history when construing a statute.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-10-13

Furthermore, in construing a statute, we may consider former statutory provisions on the same or similar subject, administrative interpretation, circumstances under which a statute was enacted, and the statute's legislative history, among other matters. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998).
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Section 311.023(3) gives a court discretion, rather than a duty, to consider legislative history when construing a statute.

City of San Antonio v. TPLP OFFICE PARK PROPERTIES, LTD. · filed 2004-11-09(3)

In support of its argument that the trial court erred, the City cites Texas Government Code 311.023 which states that a court "may" consider legislative history in construing a statute. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(3) (Vernon 1998). Office Park refutes the City's argument, pointing out that the language of the statute indicates a court "may," not "shall," consider the legislative history. The use of the word "may" creates discretion in the trial court, rather than imposing a duty upon it. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.016 (Vernon 1998).
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Section 311.023 permits courts to consider legislative history, among other factors, when construing a statute.

Tarkington Independent School District v. Ellis · filed 2006-08-31

In construing the meaning of "possession" under the Education Code, we are directed by the Code Construction Act to examine, among other factors, the legislative history of the relevant statutory provisions. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.023 permits a court construing a statute to consider the object sought to be attained, legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-04-05(1), (3), (5)

Construing the term "service area" in section 130.161(2) to permit a junior college district to unilaterally extend its statutorily defined service area merely by providing services outside that territory would defeat the legislature's painstaking effort in sections 130.162 through 130.211 to precisely delineate a fixed service area for each Texas junior college district. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (1), (3), (5) (Vernon 2005) (in construing a statute, a court may consider the object sought to be attained, legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction).
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Section 311.023 permits a court to consider specified contextual and historical factors when construing a statute, whether or not the statute appears ambiguous on its face.

Gerald Wood, Mark Lee Wood, and Dave Lynn Wood v. J. R. Walker, Armstrong County Sheriff, Commissioners' Court of Armstrong County, Texas, Armstrong County, Texas, and Peggy Meathenia · filed 2007-03-27

In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider the object sought to be attained, the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, the statute's legislative history, the common law or former statutory provisions, the consequences of a particular construction, the administrative construction of the statute, as well as the title, preamble, or emergency provisions of the enactment. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.023(4) permits courts to consider common law and former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects, when construing statutes.

TXU Generation Company, L.P. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas · filed 2005-05-19(4)

Indeed, both chapter 39 of PURA as a whole and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act seek to balance such interests. Compare Tex. Util. Code Ann. § 39.001(a) (West Supp. 2004-05), with Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15.04 (West 2002); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(4) (West 2005) (courts may consider "common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects").
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Section 311.023(6) permits courts to give serious consideration to an agency's construction of an ambiguous statute when determining legislative intent.

Myers v. State of Texas · filed 2005-07-12(6)

If the meaning of a provision is doubtful or ambiguous, the construction placed upon a statutory provision by the agency charged with its implementations is entitled to serious consideration. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(6) (West 2005); Texas Water Comm'n v. Brushy Creek Mun. Util. Dist. , 917 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1996).
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Section 311.023 permits a court construing a statute to consider, among other matters, the objective, enactment circumstances, legislative history, and common law or former statutes.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-09-30

The 1905 legislature that adopted the predecessor of the auditor's oath in section 84.007(b) could not have understood it to apply to interlocal contracts, and the oath provision has never been modified to include such contracts. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005) ("In construing a statute . . . a court may consider among other matters the: (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) legislative history; [and] (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects. . . ."). For these reasons, we conclude that a county auditor's oath that he or she will not be "personally interested in a contract with the county" does not speak to county contracts with other governmental entities.
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Section 311.023 permits courts construing a statute to consider the listed contextual matters, including legislative and statutory history, whether the statute is ambiguous or unambiguous.

in the Matter of the Guardianship of Jeremy Lynn Finley · filed 2007-04-19

Whether we find the statute ambiguous or unambiguous, the Texas Government Code provides that, in construing a statute, we may consider, among other matters, "the (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) legislative history; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; (6) administrative construction of the statute; and (7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005). Of these matters, the legislative and statutory history are particularly instructive.
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Section 311.023 permits courts to consider the statute's objective, legislative history, and the consequences of a proposed construction when ascertaining legislative intent.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-11-07

In attempting to ascertain the legislative intent behind a statute, we may consider, among other things, the object sought to be obtained, any legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005); see also Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278 , 280 (Tex. 1994); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0283 (2004) at 6.
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Section 311.023 directs courts to construe a statute to give effect to the object it seeks to attain.

State v. Oakley · filed 2005-12-16

Third, in accordance with section 311.023 of the code construction act, we must construe the waiver provision to give effect to the object sought to be attained by the statute.
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Section 311.023 permits a court to consider listed extrinsic factors, including legislative history, when determining legislative intent even if the statute is not ambiguous on its face.

the City of Houston v. Swinerton Builders, Inc. · filed 2007-06-21

However, even if the statute is not ambiguous on its face, the court may consider other factors to determine the Legislature's intent, "including the object sought to be obtained, the circumstances of the statute's enactment, the legislative history, the common law or former statutory provisions, and the consequences of a particular construction." Id. ; Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.023(5) permits a court construing a statute to consider the consequences of a particular construction, regardless of whether the statute is ambiguous.

Houston Independent School District v. Old Farms Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2007-07-26(5)

In construing a statute, whether it is considered ambiguous or not, the court may consider among other matters the "consequences of a particular construction." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(5); H & C Commc'ns v. Reed's Food Int'l, Inc. , 887 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1994, no writ).
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Clear text and limits on extrinsic aids

Section 311.023 permits courts to consider statutory-construction factors such as a statute's objective, enactment circumstances, legislative history, and consequences, but those factors do not authorize abandoning clear statutory text.

Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen · filed 2008-05-16

It is true, as the dissent emphasizes, that our construction of a statute's text may be informed by such considerations as "the object sought to be obtained, the circumstances under which the statutes were enacted, the legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2005); see Texas Lottery Comm'n, No. 03-07-00249-CV, 254 S.W.3d at 687 (Patterson, J. dissenting). This does not mean, however, that we are free to abandon the statutory text in favor of a contrary "construction" derived from these factors.
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Section 311.023 requires courts construing a statute to consider the object the statute seeks to attain and the common law and former statutory provisions.

State v. Montgomery County, Texas · filed 2008-07-31

We must consider the object sought to be attained by the statute in question and the common law and former statutory provisions. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005).
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Titles and captions

Section 311.023(7) permits courts to consider a statute's title when construing the statute.

City of San Antonio, Acting By and Through the San Antonio Water System v. Lower Colorado River Authority, et al. · filed 2011-07-29(7)

But the statutes at issue here do not. Rather, the titles of sections 271.152 ("Waiver of Immunity to Suit For Certain Claims") and 271.153 ("Limitations on Adjudication Awards") make clear that the Legislature intended the former to govern immunity from suit and the latter to govern liability. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(7) (West 2005) (court may consider statutes' titles in construing statutes).
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Section 311.023 authorizes a court to consider factors including a statute’s objective, enactment circumstances, and legislative history even when the statutory language is unambiguous.

Opinion No. · filed 2008-07-03(1)-(3)

However, even with unambiguous statutory language, a court is authorized by section 311.023 , Government Code, to consider other factors such as the object to be obtained, the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, and the legislative history. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (1)-(3) (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.023 permits courts to consider listed extrinsic aids, including legislative history and the consequences of a construction, when construing a statute whether its language is ambiguous or unambiguous.

in the Matter of the Marriage of Winfred Marbut and Charlotte Marbut and in the Interest of M. M., a Child · filed 2009-04-17

Whether we find the statute ambiguous or unambiguous, the Texas Government Code provides that, in construing a statute, we may consider, among other matters, "the (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) legislative history; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; (6) administrative construction of the statute; and (7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.023 permits courts construing a statute to consider its title or caption.

Janice Lee and Bob Lee v. Loftin · filed 2009-01-30

This construction of section 87.004 is informed by the plain language of the text, including its title, "Exceptions to Limitation on Liability." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.004 (Vernon 2005); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005) (permitting courts to consider the title or caption of a statute).
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Legislative history and amendments

Section 311.023 permits a court, when deciding whether a statutory amendment changed or merely clarified prior law, to consider legislative history and former statutory provisions.

Ex Parte Ellis · filed 2009-03-17

When determining whether an amendment such as that in question here was a change or clarification, we may review the legislative history and former statutory provisions. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2005).
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Section 311.023(6) allows a court to give great weight to an administrative agency's construction of an ambiguous statute when the agency is charged with administering it.

In Re RR, Jr. · filed 2009-03-19(6)

But construction of a statute by the executive department charged with its administration is entitled to great weight.
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Section 311.023(3) permits courts to consider legislative history, but it does not allow legislative debate statements to override unambiguous statutory language.

Hernandez v. Brinker International, Inc. · filed 2009-03-31(3)

The Code Construction Act permits consideration of legislative history, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(3) (Vernon 2005), but it does not permit elevating legislative debate statements over unambiguous statutory language.
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Section 311.023 makes statutory-construction aids, including legislative history, permissive; when the statutory language is unambiguous, the court may rely on the enacted text without resorting to those aids.

Amarillo 'Dillas Baseball Club, LLC v. Potter County, Texas · filed 2012-10-11

Whereas the Code Construction Act uses the permissive term "may" when describing what aids the courts may turn to when construing a statute, we think the better practice is to rely on the actual language used by the legislature, unless the statute at issue is ambiguous. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2005); Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex. 2006).
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Section 311.023(3) permits courts to consider legislative history when construing a statute.

Valentine Cantu v. Texas Workforce Commission · filed 2004-01-08(3)

When construing a statute, we may also consider legislative history as part of our efforts to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(3) (West 1998).
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Statutory construction—consequences of a particular construction

Section 311.023(5) permits a court construing a statute to consider the consequences of a particular construction, even when the statute is not facially ambiguous.

Destec Energy, Inc., Destec Operating Company, Cogen Lyondell, Inc., and Lyondell Petrochemical Company v. Houston Lighting & Power Company · filed 1998-04-02(5)

"In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: . . .(5) consequences of a particular construction." Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 1988). The trial court was well within its discretion in considering the effect on third parties and HL&P as consequences of its construction of the self-use exception in the Code.
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190 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Ex Parte Austin, the opinion does not cite, interpret, or apply Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(3). Its discussion of legislative intent and legislative history concerns former Article 42.12, §§ 3e and 3g(a), and resolves whether shock probation was available after a deadly-weapon finding. opinion →
Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., section 311.023 appears only in a dissent's criticism of the majority's construction of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(b); the court did not adopt that discussion or decide the meaning or application of § 311.023. opinion →
Wilburn v. State of Texas and the Attorney General, on Behalf of the Texas Employment Commission, the court recited § 311.023 as one of the interpretive tools used while construing the meaning of “debt” under Tax Code § 171.255. It did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how that statute independently applies. opinion →
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Tarrant County Appraisal District, the court cited § 311.023 as one authority supporting its general statutory-interpretation methodology, but it construed and applied Tex. Tax Code § 23.55(a), not § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Sharp v. Caterpillar, section 311.023(3) is cited only as general authority for considering legislative history in construing Tax Code section 171.109; the court does not decide what § 311.023(3) means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Holder v. Mellon Mortgage Co., the court cited § 311.023 only as general support for rules of statutory construction while interpreting a Houston city ordinance; it did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Arch Petroleum, Inc. v. John Sharp, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; Dan Morales, Attorney General of the State of Texas; and Martha Whitehead, Treasurer of the State of Texas, the court recites § 311.023(6) as a general statutory-construction principle but does not discuss or apply an administrative construction of the statute. The decision turns on the Texas Tax Code's definitions of debt, surplus, and contingent obligations. opinion →
City of Austin v. L. S. Ranch, Ltd., and Circle C Land Corp., the court cites § 311.023 only as supporting authority for a general list of statutory-interpretation considerations while construing a different statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion construes Human Resources Code § 50.023(e). Section 311.023(6) is cited only as supporting authority for the treatment of an agency's statutory construction; the opinion does not interpret or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion merely cites subsection (4) for the general proposition that courts may consider laws on the same or a similar subject when construing a statute. Its actual conclusion concerns the scope of personal-care services under the Health and Safety Code and the Board's rule, not the meaning or application of § 311.023. opinion →
Carole Keeton Rylander, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; and John Cornyn, Attorney General of the State of Texas v. B&A Marketing Company, by and through its Successor-in-Interest, Atlantic Richfield Company, the court cited § 311.023(6) only in a parenthetical string cite to support a general rule about deference to an agency's statutory interpretation. The court did not decide what § 311.023(6) means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(4) and (5) only for the general proposition that courts may consider similar laws and the consequences of a construction; it does not construe or decide any issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as a general interpretive aid while construing Government Code § 52.021(i); it does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(5) only as general support for considering the consequences of a statutory construction; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 311.023 requires. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(3) as support for the general proposition that legislative history may be considered, and separately cites § 311.023(6) regarding administrative construction. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself; the holding concerns the Natural Resources Code and the Railroad Commission's regulation. opinion →
Robert D. Berry and Andrew Dudney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; Texas Farmers Insurance Company; and Mid-Century Insurance Company of Texas, the court cited § 311.023 only as one of several authorities for its general statutory-construction methodology; it construed article 5.07-1 of the Texas Insurance Code, not § 311.023. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as a general list of statutory-construction factors supporting its interpretation of Election Code § 254.0401(e); it does not decide what § 311.023 means or how that statute applies. opinion →
William Cash Love v. State, the William Cash Love opinion itself concerns suspension of an appellate rule and does not discuss § 311.023. The statute appears only in an unrelated opinion appended to the text, where it is cited as general statutory-construction authority rather than applied to decide an issue in Love. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited only as a general reference for statutory-construction factors; the opinion does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Boudreaux v. State, the opinion cites § 311.023 only for a general list of statutory-construction aids while construing the Transportation Code offense; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(5) only as supporting authority for considering the consequences of a proposed construction while deciding the meaning and application of Local Government Code § 306.032; it does not construe or otherwise decide an issue about § 311.023. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(1) and (5) as authority for considering the object sought and consequences of a construction, but the court's actual analysis and conclusion concern Local Government Code § 152.013(b), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 311.023. opinion →
Fields v. Teamsters Local Union No. 988, the statute appears only in a footnote to the dissent as part of an observation about legislative intent; the court did not construe or apply § 311.023 in deciding the appeal. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction authority while interpreting the word "during" in § 659.0115; it does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as general interpretive authority while construing the House Bill 1983 savings clause and does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co. v. Heinrich, the court cited § 311.023 as general interpretive authority while construing Texas Family Code § 1.91; it did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Travis County Attorney v. J.S.H., the dissent cites § 311.023(1) only for a general interpretive principle while arguing the meaning and purpose of the expunction statute; it does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited only as general support for considering statutory-construction factors while interpreting chapter 283; the opinion does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as a general statement that legislative history may be considered when construing a statute; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023(5) is cited only for the general interpretive principle that a court may consider the consequences of a statutory construction. The opinion does not construe or decide anything about § 311.023; its holding concerns the express-authority requirement for county fees under Local Government Code § 118.011(c). opinion →
Schaefer v. Texas County & District Retirement System, the court cited § 311.023(6) to support a general statement about using administrative interpretations and other extrinsic aids. It did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies; the court's statutory construction concerned the retirement-system statutes. opinion →
Allen v. State, the opinion reports that the Court of Appeals applied statutory-construction rules found in the Texas Government Code, with § 311.023 supplied only in a footnote. The Court of Criminal Appeals does not construe, apply, or hold anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as general support for considering specified statutory-construction factors while deciding the meaning and application of Utilities Code § 39.9048; it does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.023 as support for a general rule about the weight given to an agency's contemporaneous statutory construction, but it does not interpret, apply, or decide what section 311.023 itself requires. opinion →
Jewel Dean Wickware, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Mark E. Wickware, Deceased; Wanda Beaumont; Jacqueline S. Wickware v. Dr. Helen Sullivan; Dr. Eugene Haddock; Dr. Robert LePere; Dr. A. Charles Rabinowitz; Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc.; Methodist Healthcare System of San Antonio, Ltd.; and FPA Medical Management of Texas, Inc., the court cited § 311.023 as a general rule of statutory construction while interpreting Article 4590i; it did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how that statute itself applies. opinion →
Steak & Ale of Texas, Inc. v. Borneman, the court cites § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction authority while deciding whether exemplary damages are available under the Dram Shop Act; it does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Cuellar v. State, section 311.023 appears only as a footnote citation supporting the general mention of extratextual statutory-construction factors; the court did not decide what § 311.023 means or how it applies. opinion →
Beaumont State Center v. Donald Kozlowski Anf of Byron Allen, the court cites § 311.023(5) only to recite a general statutory-construction principle while deciding the meaning and application of Chapter 321. It does not construe, apply, or otherwise decide anything about § 311.023(5) itself. opinion →
Maguire Oil Company v. City of Houston, the court cited § 311.023 as support for a general statement about statutory-construction factors while construing the Houston ordinance; it did not interpret or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 as general statutory-construction authority while interpreting the Insurance Code's prompt-payment disclosure provisions; it does not independently decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 311.023. opinion →
Hall v. Diamond Shamrock Refining Co., LP, the court cited § 311.023 only for the general interpretive principle that a statute's purpose may be determined by considering the object sought to be obtained, while deciding the constitutionality and application of the punitive-damages cap in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008. It did not construe or decide any issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Perez v. The City of Laredo, the court cites § 311.023 only as authority for a general statutory-construction rule about considering consequences and avoiding absurd results. Its actual holding construes Local Government Code §§ 143.028(b) and 143.031(a), not § 311.023. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(1) and (5) as general statutory-construction guidance while construing Tex. Occ. Code § 1704.252(9); it does not decide what § 311.023 means or how that statute applies. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 as support for the general proposition that courts may consider legislative history and related former statutes when interpreting an ambiguous statute. It does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
McAllen Police Officers Union v. Tamez, the court cites § 311.023 only for the general list of statutory-construction factors while interpreting Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 174.104; it does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
El Paso Independent School District v. John Sharp, Comptroller of Public Accounts, State of Texas, the court cites § 311.023(3) only as authority for considering legislative history while construing a different statute; it does not interpret or apply § 311.023(3). opinion →
In Re DRLM, the court cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction authority while deciding what Family Code § 263.405(b) requires; it does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
In Re WGS, section 311.023 is cited in the standard-of-review discussion as a general list of interpretive aids; the court construed Family Code provisions and did not decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
In Re SB, the court cites section 311.023 as general support for its statutory-construction methodology, but it does not construe or decide anything about section 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 for the general proposition that legislative history and other factors may be considered when a statute is ambiguous, but the court does not construe or decide anything about § 311.023 itself; it uses that rule while resolving the relationship between Utilities Code §§ 12.053 and 12.152. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 for a general statement of statutory-construction factors while deciding confidentiality under Health and Safety Code § 110.006(g); it does not decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only in a string cite identifying statutory construction aids; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Harris County Appraisal District v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., the court cited § 311.023 only as part of a general statutory-interpretation proposition; it did not construe or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
In Re EDL, the court cites § 311.023 as general statutory-construction authority while deciding whether a Family Code timing requirement is jurisdictional. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as part of a general statement of statutory-construction principles. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the meaning, requirements, or scope of § 311.023; the actual holdings concern unauthorized fees under the Tax Code and Property Code. opinion →
Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Gonzalez, section 311.023 is cited in a dissent as authority for interpretive factors used to construe other statutes. The majority did not adopt that reasoning or decide what § 311.023 means or requires. opinion →
in the Interest of K.L v. and K.J v. Minor Children, the court cited § 311.023 as one authority for a general rule of statutory construction while interpreting Texas Family Code § 152.314. It did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or operation of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Webb v. State, the court cited § 311.023 as general authority in describing possible extratextual sources while construing the Texas child-pornography statute; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Mohl v. State, the court cited § 311.023 as authority for a general list of extratextual interpretive sources while construing Texas Penal Code sections 43.25 and 43.26; it did not interpret, apply, or decide an issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Ball v. SBC Communications, Inc., section 311.023 is cited only as supporting authority for a general statement about statutory-construction factors. The court’s holding concerns Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.069, and it does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
in Re Matthew T. Hinterlong, the court cites § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction aid while construing the crime-stoppers provisions in Chapter 414; it does not interpret, define, or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Story, the court cited subsection (5) only as a statutory-construction canon while interpreting Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.175(b); it did not decide what § 311.023(5) means, requires, or how it independently applies. opinion →
Sergeant Enterprises, Inc. v. Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Successor-in-Interest to John Sharp, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas and Greg Abbott, Successor-in-Interest to John Cornyn and Dan Morales, Attorney General of the State of Texas, section 311.023(6) is cited as authority for a general rule of statutory construction concerning administrative interpretations. The court construed Tex. Tax Code § 171.110(e) and the Comptroller's rule, but did not construe, define, or decide the meaning or application of § 311.023(6). opinion →
In Re AJK, the court cited § 311.023(3) as part of its general discussion of statutory-construction principles, but it did not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself; the holding concerns the applicability of Family Code § 263.405. opinion →
Sterling Trust Company v. Roderick Adderley, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Elsie Westmoreland, et al., the court cited section 311.023(2) and (3) as general statutory-construction guidance while interpreting the Texas Securities Act. It did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of section 311.023 itself. opinion →
In Re Texas Windstorm Insurance Ass'n, the court cited § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction principle while deciding the meaning of a venue provision in the Insurance Code; it made no independent holding about § 311.023. opinion →
in Re Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, the court cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction aid while deciding the meaning of an Insurance Code venue provision; it does not construe or independently apply § 311.023. opinion →
United Services Automobile Association and USAA Life Insurance Company v. Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas, the statute is cited only in a footnote recounting USAA's rejected argument. The court did not adopt that interpretation of § 311.023; it instead relied on Texas courts' preexisting common-law rules of statutory construction. opinion →
In Re SJG, the court cites § 311.023 only as general authority for statutory-construction factors while construing Family Code § 263.405; it does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies independently. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as general support for considering statutory history while deciding the meaning of Transportation Code provisions; it does not construe or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
State v. Losoya, the opinion cites § 311.023 only as general authority for resorting to extratextual factors when interpreting an ambiguous statute. It does not construe or decide what § 311.023 means or requires; the substantive holding concerns Tex. Transp. Code § 502.404(a). opinion →
State v. Kingsbury, the court cites § 311.023 only as support for a general statutory-interpretation principle and does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Franks v. Woodville Independent School District, Tyler County Education District and Tyler County, the court quoted § 311.023 as part of a general statutory-interpretation framework and then decided the meaning and application of the Texas Property Tax Code provisions. It did not construe or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction aid while deciding the meaning and relationship of Education Code provisions; it does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as general support for considering legislative history while construing Tax Code § 6.05(f); it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, or scope of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
in Re: Donnie L. Fox, Relator, the court cites § 311.023(1) and (5) as a general statutory-construction principle while deciding the meaning and application of Texas Property Code § 51.007. It does not construe or decide any issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only parenthetically as authority for a general statutory-construction proposition in discussing Transportation Code § 521.126. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as an interpretive aid while construing the refund provision in Government Code § 41.258; it does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it independently applies. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited as a general statutory-construction canon in the standard-of-review discussion and as support for the analysis of Health and Safety Code chapter 245. The opinion does not decide what § 311.023 means or otherwise resolve an issue about that statute. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only for a general statutory-construction principle while deciding the meaning and application of Tax Code § 31.05(a); it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only to identify permissible considerations in construing another statute, § 351.043; it does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited only to state a general rule of statutory construction and support the opinion's analysis of Occupations Code § 301.002; the opinion does not decide an issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(6) only as a general statutory-construction principle supporting consideration of an agency's interpretation of its own rule; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Rudisill v. Arnold White & Durkee, P.C., the court cites § 311.023 as general authority for the interpretive aids it may consider while construing the Texas Business Corporation Act. It does not decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Drug Test USA, Quick Results, L.L.C. v. Buyers Shopping Network, Inc., the court cited § 311.023 only as a supporting authority for general statutory-construction principles; it did not interpret, apply, or decide what § 311.023 requires. opinion →
Anderson-Clayton Bros. Funeral Home, Inc. v. Strayhorn, the court cited § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction principle while construing Tex. Tax Code § 171.1121(b); it did not interpret, apply, or decide the meaning or requirements of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 as a general statement of statutory-construction principles while deciding the meaning of Labor Code § 21.556; it does not decide anything about the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction principle while interpreting Tax Code section 6.025(d); it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the meaning or requirements of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Buddy Gregg Motor Homes, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Board of the Texas Department of Transportation, the court cites § 311.023 as authority for a general statutory-construction principle while deciding the agency's jurisdiction under the motor-vehicle statutes. It does not construe or independently apply § 311.023. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited only for a general statutory-construction principle in the discussion of how to interpret Local Government Code section 214.212; the opinion does not decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of section 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(1), (3), and (5) as authority for considering statutory-construction factors, but it does not decide what § 311.023 means or requires; those factors are used incidentally to analyze the Tax Code's tax-abatement provisions. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.023 only as general authority for considering an agency's construction of a statute; it does not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of section 311.023 itself. opinion →
Group v. Vicento, the court cites § 311.023 only as general support for the legislative-intent principle in its statutory-construction discussion; it does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Bargas v. State, the court cites § 311.023(1) and (5) only as general statutory-construction principles while construing the expunction statute; it does not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
TXU Generation Co. v. Public Utility Commission, the citation appears only in the dissent, which invokes subsection (4) as a statutory-construction aid while arguing about PURA and antitrust law. The majority does not adopt that analysis or decide what § 311.023(4) requires, so this is not a holding about the cited statute. opinion →
Welch v. McLean, the court cited § 311.023 only in a footnote to support the observation that certain sources were not listed as statutory-construction aids; it did not interpret, apply, or decide what § 311.023 requires. opinion →
In Re UGV, the opinion cites § 311.023 only as one authority in a string cite for general statutory-construction considerations. The court construes and applies Tex. Fam. Code § 54.05(k), but does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited only as a general statutory-construction aid while the opinion construes Texas Election Code § 41.0052(a); the opinion does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff, the court cites § 311.023 as general statutory-construction authority while analyzing the meaning and application of Family Code § 4.105. It does not decide a dispute about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited and its text is reproduced as a general statutory-construction aid, but the opinion does not construe or decide what § 311.023 requires; the holding concerns Government Code § 791.011(d)(1). opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 as general statutory-construction guidance while deciding the meaning of a phrase in § 76.002; it does not construe, apply, or decide any issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Cities of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, the court cites § 311.023 only generally as part of the Code Construction Act while construing provisions of the Texas Utilities Code. It does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Cities of Corpus Christi, et al. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas and AEP Texas Central Company, the court cited § 311.023 only as a general code-construction reference while interpreting chapter 39 of the Utilities Code; it did not construe, apply, or decide any issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion recites § 311.023(1)-(2) as a general statutory-construction aid and cites it to support considering the circumstances surrounding Senate Bill 282. It does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
City of Laredo, Texas v. Webb County, Texas, the court cites § 311.023 as one authority for a general statement of statutory-construction methodology. The court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, or scope of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction authority and does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies; the actual construction concerns Health and Safety Code § 693.002. opinion →
Coyel v. City of Kennedale, Texas and Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Kennedale, Texas, the court cites § 311.023 only as authority for a general list of matters that may be considered when construing an ordinance; it does not construe or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.023 as a general statutory-construction canon while deciding the meaning of Education Code section 61.222; it does not construe or apply section 311.023 itself. opinion →
CenterPoint Energy Entex v. Railroad Commission of Texas, Victor Carrillo, Elizabeth A. Jones, Michael Williams, City of, the court cites § 311.023 only as part of its general statutory-construction standard. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, or scope of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023(6) as one supporting authority for considering an agency's construction of the Health and Safety Code; it does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Texas Property and Casualty Guaranty Association, for Paula Insurance Company, an Impaired Insurer v. National American Insurance Company and Clayton Mark Beck, the court cited § 311.023 only as support for a general presumption in statutory construction; it did not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited only as general background authority for statutory construction; the opinion does not interpret or apply that statute, and its conclusions concern jury-list confidentiality under other provisions. opinion →
CenterPoint Energy Entex v. Railroad Commission of Texas, Victor Carrillo, Elizabeth A. Jones, Michael Williams, City of, the court cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction canon in its standard-of-review discussion. The court does not construe, apply, or decide any issue about the meaning or requirements of § 311.023. opinion →
City of Waco, Texas v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas, the court cites § 311.023 only in a general statutory-construction discussion, alongside case authority, and does not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.023 as an interpretive aid while construing a different statute, Tex. Occupations Code § 1702.130(b); it does not decide the meaning, scope, or requirements of section 311.023 itself. opinion →
Herrera v. Seton Northwest Hospital and Francois A. Gordan, M.D., the court cited § 311.023 only as general support for using legislative history and former statutory provisions to construe § 74.351(a). It did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Griggs v. Triple S Industrial Corporation, the dissent cites § 311.023 as support for the general proposition that statutory-construction factors may be considered. The opinion does not construe, explain, or decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
CenterPoint Energy Entex v. Railroad Commission of Texas, Victor Carrillo, Elizabeth A. Jones, Michael Williams, City of, section 311.023 is cited only as a general statutory-construction authority in the standard-of-review discussion. The court decided issues under the Texas Utilities Code and did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Tarkington Independent School District v. Randy Ellis and Patricia Ellis, as Next Friend of J.M., the court cited § 311.023 only as a general instruction to consider legislative history while construing the Texas Education Code; it did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
McCollough v. McCollough, the court cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction authority while construing chapter 8 of the Family Code. It does not interpret, apply, or decide the scope of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction aid while construing provisions of the Texas Education Code; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Central Appraisal District, the only citation to § 311.023 is in the dissent's general recitation of statutory-construction factors. The court does not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 311.023; its holding concerns whether Tax Code § 42.29 mandates attorney's fees. opinion →
Canfield v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the court cited § 311.023(4) only as support for considering a similar statute while construing Tex. Tax Code § 32.06(i); it did not interpret or decide what § 311.023 requires. opinion →
Lucie Carr Armstrong, Jr. v. Sarita Storey Armstrong Hixon, the court cites § 311.023 only as part of a general summary of statutory-construction principles while deciding the meaning of adoption statutes and a will; it does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Walter v. State, the court cites § 311.023(4) only as authority for a general statutory-construction principle while deciding whether Articles 20.011 and 27.03 authorize setting aside an indictment. It does not decide what § 311.023 means or how that statute applies. opinion →
City of Harlingen v. Alvarez, the opinion cites § 311.023(1) and (5) as part of a general statement of statutory-construction principles while construing the civil-service provisions. It does not interpret, define, or otherwise decide what § 311.023 itself means or requires. opinion →
in Re Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited § 311.023(1)-(7) as a general statutory-interpretation aid while construing provisions of the Family Code; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Railroad Commission of Texas and Dos Republicas Resources Co., Inc. v. Theodosia Coppock, Juanita Alvarado, Guadalupe Davila, and Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas, the court cited § 311.023(6) as a general statutory-construction principle while deciding the meaning and application of Natural Resources Code § 134.072; it did not construe or rule on § 311.023(6) itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.023 is cited only as a general statutory-construction authority for considering a statute's purpose; the opinion does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Railroad Commission of Texas and Dos Republicas Resources Co., Inc. v. Theodosia Coppock, Juanita Alvarado, Guadalupe Davila, and Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas (on motion for rehearing), the court cited § 311.023(6) in its general statutory-construction discussion to support considering the agency's interpretation of a different statute. It did not interpret or apply § 311.023(6) itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only as a general reference to Code Construction Act aids to construction; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
City of Laredo, Texas v. Webb County, Texas, the court cites § 311.023 in a string cite as support for a general statutory-interpretation methodology; it does not interpret, apply, or decide the meaning or requirements of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Sotelo v. Interstate Financial Corporation, the court cites § 311.023 only as authority for a general statutory-construction principle; it construes and applies the Texas Finance Code, not § 311.023. opinion →
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Camacho, the court recited § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction aid while interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act's use of “skull”; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Southern Insurance Company v. Brewster, the court cited § 311.023(6) parenthetically as support for a general deference principle, but did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about that statute. The holding concerned workers' compensation notice and waiver under the Labor Code. opinion →
Terra XXI, LTD., Veigel Farm Partners, D/B/A Veigel Partners v. Harmon, the court cites § 311.023(1) and (5) as part of a general description of statutory-interpretation principles while construing Texas Property Code § 51.007. It does not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
State of Texas v. Neesley, Nancy N., section 311.023 is cited in footnote 15 as authority for the listed extratextual factors, but the court did not decide an issue about § 311.023; it used those factors while construing Texas Transportation Code § 724.012(b). opinion →
Gustavo Arias D/B/A Gus Trucking Service v. Brookstone, L.P. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the court cites § 311.023 only as an example of the Code Construction Act's external sources while construing Property Code § 53.055; it does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Wilfredo Aviles, M. D. and Wilfredo Aviles, M.D., P.A. v. Aguirre, the court cites § 311.023 in a general statement of statutory-interpretation principles, but it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
National Golf Operating, P.S., L.P. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, the court cited subsection (5) only as authority for considering the consequences of a proposed construction of Tex. Tax Code § 42.225(a); it did not construe or decide anything about § 311.023(5) itself. opinion →
Texas Orthopaedic Association, Texas Medical Association and Andrew M. Kant, M.D. v. Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners; Texas Podiatric Medical Association; and Bruce A. Scudday, D.P.M., the court cites § 311.023 only as a general reference to statutory-construction aids while stating that its analysis begins with the statutes' plain language. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 311.023; the holding concerns the validity of the podiatry rule. opinion →
Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation v. Insurance Council of Texas, Texas Mutual Insurance Company, Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, and Envoy Medical Systems, Inc., the court cites § 311.023 only as part of a general statement about tools for determining legislative intent. It does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 311.023 requires; the holding concerns the validity of an administrative rule under Labor Code provisions. opinion →
Gustavo Arias D/B/A Gus Trucking Service v. Brookstone, L.P. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, section 311.023 is cited and its statutory-construction factors are recited as general support for interpreting Property Code section 53.055; the dissent does not decide the meaning, scope, or application of section 311.023 itself. opinion →
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Company v. Irene Romo and Fenn Ratcliffe, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, the court cited § 311.023 only as authority for the general absurd-results canon while construing Tex. Insurance Code § 912.201; it did not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A., the court cites § 311.023 only for a general statutory-construction principle while deciding the separate venue question under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act; it does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Texas Orthopaedic Association, Texas Medical Association and Andrew M. Kant, M.D. v. Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners; Texas Podiatric Medical Association; and Bruce A. Scudday, D.P.M. (on motion for rehearing), the court cites § 311.023 only in a general statement of statutory-construction methodology. It does not interpret the statute, identify or apply any particular tool listed in it, or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
in the Matter of T. G., the court cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction aid while deciding the meaning and prospective application of other statutes; it does not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Academy of Skills & Knowledge, Inc., Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Charter Schools, USA, Inc., Appellee/Cross-Appellant, the court cited § 311.023 only as supporting authority for considering the title of Texas Education Code § 12.124. It did not independently construe, apply, or decide an issue about § 311.023; its holding concerned the prohibition on loans under § 12.124. opinion →
Gallagher Headquarters Ranch Development, Ltd., Christopher Hill and Julie Hooper v. City of San Antonio, Texas, Incidental: the court cites § 311.023 and subsection (6) only for a general statement of statutory-construction factors while deciding the meaning and effect of Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 334.041(b); it does not construe § 311.023 or decide its scope or application. opinion →
Ex Parte Ellis, the court cited § 311.023 as authority for considering legislative history and former statutory provisions while deciding whether an amendment to Penal Code section 34.01 changed or clarified that separate statute. It did not construe or decide what § 311.023 means or requires. opinion →
Thompson v. State, the court cited § 311.023 only as general support for statutory-construction principles while construing the Family Code and Penal Code provisions; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.023 only for a general proposition about considering legislative history, while deciding the meaning and application of Tax Code sections 313.008 and 313.032. It does not interpret or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Ex Parte John Dominick Colyandro, the court cited § 311.023 only in a footnote as one authority for examining legislative history while interpreting the money-laundering statute; it did not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Tara Partners, Ltd. v. City of South Houston, the court cites § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction source while interpreting the Texas Water Code; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Darlene Balas, as Next Friend of C. L. H., A. E. H. and L. P. H. v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation A/K/A Glaxosmithkline, the court cites § 311.023(4) as general support for statutory-construction principles while deciding the meaning of “children” under the Texas Wrongful Death Act. It does not decide a dispute about § 311.023(4) itself. opinion →
in Re: Knapp Medical Center Hospital, the court cited § 311.023(3) only as authority in a general statutory-construction discussion; it did not construe, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Choy v. Graziano Roofing of Texas, Inc., the court cited § 311.023 as part of a general statement of statutory-construction principles while deciding the meaning and application of separate Texas Property Code provisions governing construction trust funds. It did not independently construe or decide any issue about § 311.023. opinion →
Fort Worth & Western Railroad v. Enbridge Gathering (NE Texas Liquids), L.P., Incidental: the court cites § 311.023(1)-(5) as authority for considering legislative history, statutory objectives, and enactment circumstances while construing former Texas Utilities Code § 181.005; it does not interpret or decide the scope or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Ex Parte SC, the court cited § 311.023 as a general source of statutory-construction factors while construing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.01. It did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
The Cities of Allen, Argyle, Arlington, Bedford, Brownwood, Burkburnett, Burleson, Caddo Mills, Canyon, Carrollton, Cedar Hill, Clyde, College Station, Corral City, Crandall, Dimmitt, Eastland, Everman, Farmers Branch, Fate, Friona, Frisco, Grapevine, Haltom City, Harker Heights, Hereford, Highland Park, Honey Grove, Hurst, Irving, Kaufman, Keene, Keller, Killeen, Lake Worth, Lancaster, Lewisville, Mansfield, Midlothian, Parker, Ponder, Red Oak, Snyder, Stamford, Sulphur Springs, The Colony, Tyler, Wellman, Westlake and Wylie, Texas; and the City of Longview v. Railroad Commission of Texas; CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation; Atmos Energy Corporation; and Texas Gas Services Company, the court cited § 311.023 only as a general list of statutory-construction aids while construing the Gas Utility Regulatory Act's GRIP statute; it did not decide what § 311.023 means or how its requirements apply. opinion →
Treadway v. Holder, section 311.023 is cited only in the dissent as a general statement of statutory-construction factors; the majority does not construe, apply, or otherwise decide anything about that statute. opinion →
In the Interest of B.R., the statute is cited in a footnote only as a general reference to legislative history being a permissible construction aid. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 311.023; its actual analysis concerned the meaning of Family Code § 154.131. opinion →
City of Round Rock v. Rodriguez, the court cited subsections (6) and (7) only as authority for considering legislative history and statutory titles while construing Labor Code § 101.001; it did not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
State v. Hollis, the court cites § 311.023(3) and (4) as general statutory-construction authority while interpreting article 42.111; it does not decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
S & P CONSULTING ENGINEERS, PLLC v. Baker, the court cites § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction authority while deciding the meaning and effective date of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002; it does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
In Re Ezukanma, the court cites § 311.023 only as a general list of permissible statutory-construction aids while interpreting Family Code section 157.162(d); it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Carroll v. Humsi, the court cited § 311.023 only as general authority for statutory-construction principles while construing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a); it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Colbert v. State, the court cited § 311.023(4) as one general statutory-construction authority while construing Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 20.011 and 27.03; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023. opinion →
Commission on State Emergency Communications v. TracFone Wireless, Inc. and Virgin Mobile USA, LP., the court cited § 311.023(1) only as a general statutory-construction aid concerning legislative purpose while construing the Health and Safety Code's 9-1-1 fee provisions; it did not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
John H. Carney & Associates v. Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, the court cites § 311.023 only as a general statement of statutory-construction aids. It does not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 311.023; the holding instead concerns assignees' eligibility for a remedy under the Guaranty Act. opinion →
Comptroller v. LANDSFELD, the court cites § 311.023 only as general background for statutory-interpretation methodology while deciding whether Labor Code § 21.202 is mandatory and jurisdictional; it does not construe or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Chesser v. LIFECARE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, the opinion cites § 311.023(1) and (5) as part of a general recitation of statutory-construction rules; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
In Re KG, the court cited § 311.023 only as a general statutory-construction principle while interpreting Family Code sections 161.001 and 161.004. It did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how that statute itself applies. opinion →
Southwestern Electric Power Company v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, the court cited § 311.023 as a general statutory-construction source while deciding the PUC's authority under other statutes; it did not construe, apply, or decide anything specifically about § 311.023. opinion →
Travis County District Attorney v. M.M., the court mentions § 311.023(5) in a footnote for the general proposition that consequences may be considered in statutory interpretation. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue about § 311.023; the statute is cited only in service of interpreting the expunction statute. opinion →
Travis County District Attorney v. M.M., section 311.023(5) is cited only in a footnote as support for considering the consequences of a proposed construction. The court construed the former expunction statute, not § 311.023(5), and did not decide that subsection's meaning or application. opinion →
PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC d/b/a Trinity Care Center v. Michael Kumets, Pavel Kumets, and Strul Kumets, Individually and as next friend for Yevgeniya Kumets, the court quoted § 311.023 as a general list of statutory-construction aids, but its holding concerned the meaning of “injury” in the Texas Medical Liability Act and whether pure economic loss satisfies the health-care-liability-claim definition. It did not decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc. Joe H. Schneider Laura H. Schneider And Austin Design Group, the court cites § 311.023 as a general statement of permissible statutory-construction considerations, but does not interpret, define, or decide how § 311.023 applies. The decision instead construes Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002. opinion →
Saenz v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc., section 311.023 is cited parenthetically as support for a general statutory-construction principle; the court does not construe, explain, or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Texas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas, the court cites § 311.023 only as part of a general statement of statutory-construction principles; it does not analyze, apply, or decide the meaning or operation of that statute. opinion →
Texas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas, the court cited § 311.023 in a general statement of statutory-construction principles, but did not construe the statute or rely on it to decide the dispute. opinion →
Krause, Robert Randall, the statute appears only in a footnote citing it as authority for the general proposition that courts may consider extra-textual sources when a statute is ambiguous or would produce absurd consequences. The court did not interpret or apply § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Krause v. State, the court cites § 311.023(3) and (5) in a footnote as authority for a general statutory-construction principle, but the opinion construes and applies Tex. Transp. Code § 724.017 instead of deciding what § 311.023 means or requires. opinion →
Peraza, Osmin, the opinion cites § 311.023 only as authority for a general statutory-construction principle while addressing the constitutionality of a DNA record fee; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 311.023 itself. opinion →
Peraza, Osmin, the concurrence cites § 311.023 as authority for a general statement about statutory-construction factors, but the court does not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. The citation is incidental to the constitutional challenge concerning the DNA Record Fee. opinion →
Dos Republicas Coal Partnership v. David Saucedo, as Floodplain Administrator and County Judge of the Maverick County Co, the court merely cited § 311.023(1) as an interpretive aid while construing Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 134.072; it did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Dos Republicas Coal Partnership v. David Saucedo, as Floodplain Administrator and County Judge of the Maverick County Co, the court cites § 311.023(1) only as an interpretive aid while construing Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 134.072; it does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 311.023 itself. opinion →
England v. Janice Kolbe, as Guardian of the Estate of Edna Moon, section 311.023 is cited in a dissent's criticism of the majority's construction of a different limitations statute. The court did not adopt or decide what § 311.023 means or requires. opinion →
in Re: Brokers Logistics, Ltd. (f/K/A Brokers Logistics, Inc.) and Brokers Logistics Genpar, L.L.C. (General Partner of Brokers Logistics, Ltd.), the court cited § 311.023 only as one authority for a general statutory-construction principle while construing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004; it did not decide what § 311.023 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Garland, the court cited § 311.023 only for a general statement of statutory-construction methodology. Its actual ruling concerned the interpretation and application of article 42.20(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, not what § 311.023 means or requires. opinion →

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