Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective, and subsection (3) presumes that it intended a just and reasonable result.

Grunsfeld v. State · filed 1991-06-04(2), (3)

Courts must also presume that the legislature intended that effect be given to the entire statute. Ex parte Austin, 746 S.W.2d 226, 236 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 1988). The legislature is presumed to have intended a just and reasonable result and to have favored the public interest over any private interest. Lindsay v. Papageorgiou, 751 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist] 1988, writ denied); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(3), (5) (Vernon 1988).

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective, so an interpretation that gives the statute effect is preferred over one that would nullify it.

Opinion No. · filed 1999-07-14(2)

As a general matter, when forced to choose between an interpretation of a statute which will nullify it and one which will make it effective, our task is to construe it so that it will be effective. See State v . Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516 , 520 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (en banc) (courts presume that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) (presumption that "entire statute is intended to be effective").

Section 311.021(1) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended statutes to comply with the Texas and United States Constitutions.

Opinion No. · filed 1999-12-08(1)

We must presume that the legislature intended section 311.005(a)(5) to comply with the constitution. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (1) (Vernon 1998) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is intended."). Therefore, we construe section 311.005(a)(5) to permit the designation of only those areas that the city determines are "unproductive, underdeveloped, or blighted" within the meaning of article VIII, section 1-g(b).

Section 311.021 presumes that the entire statute is effective, that a just and reasonable result is intended, and that the public interest is favored over any private interest.

Opinion No. · filed 2000-10-17(2), (3), (5)

See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2), (3), (5) (Vernon 1998) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: . . . (2) the entire statute is intended to be effective; (3) a just and reasonable result is intended; . . . (5) public interest is favored over any private interest.").

Section 311.021 requires courts to presume that the Legislature intended statutes to comply with constitutional requirements, remain effective, produce just and reasonable results, be feasibly executed, and favor the public interest over private interests.

Glazer's Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Heineken USA, Inc. · filed 2001-06-29

When the constitutionality of a statutory provision is at issue, the appellate court must follow section 311.021 of the Texas Code Construction Act. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021 (Vernon 1998); Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex.1990) (orig.proceeding); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex.1983). In following this provision, we presume that the legislature, in enacting a statute intended: (1) to comply with the state and federal constitutions, (2) for the entire statute to be effective, (3) a just and reasonable result, (4) for the result to be feasibly executed, and (5) to favor public interest over any private interest.

Section 311.021 presumes that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result and a result feasible of execution when enacting a statute.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-11-26

Furthermore, it would not be reasonable to construe section 57.002 to require a court to grant every motion or request for an interpreter. For example, the legislature would not have intended to require courts to appoint interpreters when the witness or party clearly does not require one or has requested the appointment of an interpreter in bad faith. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (Vernon 1998) (in enacting a statute, it is presumed that "a just and reasonable result is intended" and "a result feasible of execution is intended") (Code Construction Act).

Section 311.021(3)-(4) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended a reasonable result and a result feasible of execution when construing statutory language.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-12-17(3)-(4)

Further, in reading statutory language, we are to presume that a reasonable result and one feasible of execution is intended. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (3)-(4) (Vernon 1998).

Section 311.021(2)-(4) directs interpreters to presume that statutes are effective, produce just and reasonable results, and are feasible of execution.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-03-13(2), (3), (4)

We are instructed by the Code Construction Act to avoid such consequences as this in the interpretation of a statute, if it is possible to do so. See id. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 1998) (entire statute intended to be effective); (3) (just and reasonable result intended); (4) (result feasible of execution intended).

Section 311.021(3) presumes that the Legislature intends a just and reasonable result when enacting a statute.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-03-15(3)

Moreover, given that an unsuccessful applicant's livelihood may be at stake and the applicant may not appeal to district court until exhausting the administrative hearing process, it seems more likely that the legislature intended to set a precise time frame for the hearing date rather than to set a precise time frame for the hearings officer to schedule the hearing with no outside limit on the hearing date. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.021 (3) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . a just and reasonable result is intended."), 311.023(1), (5) ("In construing a statute, . . . a court may consider . . . the . . . object sought to be attained" and the "consequences of a particular construction[.]") (Vernon 1998).

Section 311.021 directs courts to presume that a statute is constitutional and that the legislature intended a result feasible of execution.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-05-18

Generally, if a statute's meaning is unambiguous, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. Id. Furthermore, we presume that, inter alia , a statute is constitutional and that a result feasible of execution is intended. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.021 presumes that the entire statute is effective, that a just and reasonable result is intended, and that the public interest is favored over private interests.

McElroy v. City of Temple, Texas · filed 2006-03-16

Furthermore, under McElroy's interpretation, any temporary absence could be a "vacancy" requiring promotion under section 143.036, rendering section 143.038, which permits temporary assignments, superfluous. There is a presumption that the entire statute is intended to be effective, a just and reasonable result is intended, and public interest is favored over any private interest. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (West 2005).

Section 311.021(2)-(3) creates presumptions that the entire statute is effective and that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result.

Opinion No. · filed 2007-02-21(2)-(3)

In construing a statute, a court must, among other things, "presume that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result" and "construe all portions of a statute . . . to be effective, if possible." City of Seabrook v. Port of Houston Auth. , 199 S.W.3d 403 , 430 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. filed); see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2)-(3) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the Legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and a just and reasonable result.

Gustavo Arias D/B/A Gus Trucking Service v. Brookstone, L.P. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2008-04-03(2)

Section 311.021 provides, inter alia , that when the Legislature enacts a statute, "it is presumed that . . . (2) the entire statute is presumed to be effective " and " a just and reasonable result is intended ." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added).

Section 311.021 requires courts to presume that statutory provisions are intended to be effective and that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result.

Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A. · filed 2008-05-15(2)(3)

In construing the State's venue provisions with the UEFJA, we must presume the Legislature intended both chapters of the Code to be effective and further intended a just and reasonable result. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2)(3) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.021 directs courts construing a statute to presume that constitutional compliance, effectiveness of the entire statute, a just and reasonable result, feasible execution, and the public interest are intended.

Mike Geeslin, Commissioner of Insurance, and Texas Department of Insurance v. State Farm Lloyds · filed 2008-05-22

In construing a statute, we presume that: (1) compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is intended; (2) the entire statute is intended to be effective; (3) a just and reasonable result is intended; (4) a result feasible of execution is intended; and (5) public interest is favored over any private interest. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (West 2005).

Section 311.021(3) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result when construing a statute.

in the Matter of the Marriage of Winfred Marbut and Charlotte Marbut and in the Interest of M. M., a Child · filed 2009-04-17(3)

Similarly, we are not to construe a statute in such an absurd way as to flout the presumption that the Legislature enacted the statute intending a just and reasonable result. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(3) (Vernon 2005); see also Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).

Section 311.021(1) directs that statutes be presumed to comply with the state and federal constitutions.

Opinion No. · filed 2000-06-29(1)

Because McIntyre may be read narrowly, and in accordance with the Texas Supreme Court's declaration that "we should, if possible, interpret statutes in a manner to avoid constitutional infirmities," Osterberg v . Peca , 12 S.W.3d 31 , 51 (Tex. 2000), as well as the directive of section 311.021 (1) of the Government Code to the same effect, we presume it to be constitutional in all other respects.

Section 311.021 requires courts to presume statutes constitutional and construe them consistently with the constitution when possible.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-06-05

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and they will be construed to be consistent with the constitution if possible.

Section 311.021(1) requires courts to presume that the Legislature intended statutes to comply with the United States and Texas Constitutions and to avoid interpretations that would make a statute constitutionally infirm.

in the Interest of Silas J. Hurd & Monique C. Hurd, Minor Children · filed 2003-04-28(1)

Third, we must also presume that the legislature intended to comply with the United States and Texas Constitutions. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §311.021(1) (Vernon 1998). Consequently, interpretations of an edict which render it constitutionally infirm must be avoided.

Section 311.021 supports a presumption that the Legislature acted reasonably and did not enact an unconstitutional statute.

In Re Commitment of Richards · filed 2006-09-14

When an appellant alleges that a statute is unconstitutional, we begin with a presumption that the Legislature did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (Vernon 2005); In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 645; HL Farm Corp. v. Self, 877 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. 1994); Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985); Spring Branch Indep. School Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. 1985). Thus, in a habeas proceeding, Richards bears the burden of proving his allegation that the statute as applied to him is unconstitutional or that a restraint is unreasonable because it is not related to the statute's commitment goals.

Section 311.021(1) requires courts to presume that a statute complies with constitutional requirements and places on the challenger the burden to show otherwise.

John L. Pierce, II v. Texas Racing Commission · filed 2006-10-17(1)

When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with a presumption that it is constitutional, and the party challenging a statute's constitutionality has the burden of proving that the statute fails to meet constitutional requirements.

Section 311.021(1) presumes that the Legislature intended a statute to be constitutional, supporting a construction that avoids constitutional infirmities.

Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, and Nicole Oria, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director// Ell · filed 2015-08-28(1)

See id. at 742 (citing Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex.1990)); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(1) (West 2005) (establishing presumption that the Legislature intended for statutes to be constitutional); but see id. § 311.027 (West 2005) (providing that statutory references to a statute or rule applies to revisions or amendments to the statute or rule). In this case, we would similarly construe section 201.002(a)(4) so as to avoid the potential constitutional infirmities and hold that it references the version of the CPT Codebook in effect on the date of its enactment, May 27, 2005.

Section 311.021(2) requires courts to presume that the Legislature intended every part of a statute to remain effective, avoiding interpretations that make statutory language redundant or meaningless.

City of Midland v. Sullivan · filed 2000-09-28(2)

Significantly, this retention of immunity due to the exercise of discretionary power is not found in Section 101.060(a)(2) or (a)(3). If Section 101.056 applies to Section 101.060 in its entirety as suggested by the City, then subsection (a)(1)'s language regarding discretionary action is redundant and the legislature's decision not to include this same language in subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) is rendered meaningless. In interpreting a statute, we must presume that the legislature intended for the entire statute to be effective. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2)(Vernon 1998).

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective, so courts reject an interpretation that would render statutory language meaningless.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-03-13(2)

The Commission's construction of section 136.003(b)(3) conflicts with this express legislative statement and, moreover, would render it meaningless. ... Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) (in enacting a statute, it is presumed that "the entire statute is intended to be effective") (Code Construction Act).

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-05-12(2)

Reading section 12.101(a) according to its plain language, the phrase "a facility of a commercial or nonprofit entity" means the facility of a private entity. Section 12.101(a) separately lists the facility of "a school district." If a public entity were included within the term "nonprofit entity," the reference to a school district would be redundant. See Chevron Corp. v. Redmon , 745 S.W.2d 314 , 316 (Tex. 1987) (Texas Supreme Court "will give effect to all the words of a statute and not treat any statutory language as surplusage if possible") (citing Perkins v. State , 367 S.W.2d 140 , 146 (Tex. 1963)); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) (in enacting a statute, it is presumed that "the entire statute is intended to be effective") (Code Construction Act).

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective when construing legislation.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-09-08(2)

Section 2002.055(3) does not expressly state that tickets must be sold or offered for sale only for the printed ticket price, but the printed-ticket-price requirement would have no meaning if this provision were construed to permit organizations to sell tickets at any price provided that some price is printed on the tickets. Accordingly, we construe section 2002.055(3) to require an organization (and its representatives) 4 to sell and offer for sale tickets only for the printed ticket price. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . the entire statute is intended to be effective.").

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the Legislature intended an entire statute to be effective.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-01-28(2)

In our opinion, sections 253.011 and 281.002 are cumulative, and a commissioners court in a county with a population of 50,000 or less may acquire an interest in a road under either section 253.011 or 281.002. 8 See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) (stating that the legislature is presumed to have intended an entire statute to be effective).

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-08-31(2)

This provision must mean that an ESD may be created with a maximum property tax rate of less than ten cents on the $100 valuation. Otherwise, the ESD board could not possibly seek to increase the maximum tax rate and the above provision would be meaningless. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) (presumption that the entire statute is intended to be effective).

Section 311.021(2) directs courts to interpret a statute so that every section is given effect.

Stanford v. City of Lubbock and Lubbock Fire Fighter and Police Officer Civil Service Commission · filed 2007-07-26(2)

This appeal involves statutory interpretation of certain sections of the Firefighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Act. (2) Legislative intent is determined from an entire act (3) and not simply from isolated portions. Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1998), citing, Acker v. Texas Water Com'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1990). Therefore, we interpret statutes so as to give effect to every section. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005); Jones, 969 S.W.2d at 432.

Section 311.021(3) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended the law to achieve a just and reasonable result.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-01-05(3)

Based on our presumption that the legislature intends the law to achieve "a just and reasonable result," Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (3) (Vernon 1998), we conclude that the Board lacks jurisdiction to investigate alleged misconduct committed within the scope of a person's employment by an exempt facility, regardless of the geographic location at which the alleged misconduct occurred.

Section 311.021(3) directs courts to presume that a just and reasonable result is intended by a statute.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-11-06(3)

We are charged by the Code Construction Act with presuming that "a just and reasonable result is intended" by a statute. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (3) (Vernon 1998).

Section 311.021(2) directs that the entire statute is intended to be effective.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-02-20(2)

Indeed, were section 622.012 and the various other specific weight limitations of chapter 622 to be treated as exceptions to the power of the commission to set particular limitations on specific highways and bridges, the second sentence of section 621.102(a) would be meaningless. We are enjoined not to construe statutes so that their language is meaningless. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) (entire statute intended to be effective).

Section 311.021(3) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result when construing statutes.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-07-09(3)

Interpreting a civil-service commission's rule-making authority to exclude the power to reconsider its own decisions and to provide remedies when the commission concludes its previous decision was wrong would thwart the legislative intention to provide county employees an avenue other than litigation to redress grievances. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.021 (3), .023(3), (5) (Vernon 1998) (directing construer to presume legislature intended just and reasonable result, and permitting construer to consider legislative objective and consequences of particular construction).

Section 311.021(3) presumes that the Legislature intends a just and reasonable result when construing a statute.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-08-28(3)

The alternative construction would effectively refer to "[a]n honorably retired commissioned officer of the Department of Public Safety who is a . . . retired state employee and who holds . . . ." This construction repeats the word "retired" and assumes that a commissioned Department of Public Safety officer may not be a state employee. We believe it is improbable that the legislature intended such a construction, and we decline to adopt it. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (3) (Vernon 1998) (stating presumption that legislature intends "just and reasonable result"); id . § 311.023(5) (authorizing court to consider, when construing statute, particular construction's consequences).

Section 311.021(3) presumes that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result, supporting an interpretation that avoids making a statutory confidentiality scheme virtually meaningless.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-02-10(3)

If we were to conclude that section 431.116 could be used to gain access to information expressly made confidential by chapter 110, House Bill 915 would be rendered virtually meaningless. The Code Construction Act declares that "[i]n enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . a just and reasonable result is intended." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (3) (Vernon 1998). A court will not read a statute in a manner that will lead to a foolish or absurd result when another alternative is available.

Section 311.021(4) presumes that the Legislature intends a statutory result that is feasible to execute.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-05-11(4)

Subsection (c) does not expressly require a governing body to adopt a separate resolution to request the resale of each property that the taxing unit acquires. And we decline to imply such a cumbersome requirement in the absence of any indication in the statute of that intent. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (4) (Vernon 1998) (Code Construction Act) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . a result feasible of execution is intended. . . .").

Section 311.021 directs courts construing statutes to presume that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result.

Case name unavailable · filed 2007-01-11

Even still, when the relevant provisions of various state and federal statutes and rules, the Commission's contracts, and its section 1915(b) waiver are read in conjunction with one another, the most logical interpretation is that the Commission is obligated to retroactively disenroll beneficiaries who have become ineligible to participate in a STAR MCO or CHIP MCO based on their SSI eligibility. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (West 2005) (in construing statutes, presume that just and reasonable result was intended); Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn , 90 S.W.3d 697, 706 (Tex. 2002) (must attempt to harmonize statute's various provisions); Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins , 47 S.W.3d. 486, 493 (Tex. 2001) (must consider statute as whole and must presume legislature intends entire statute to be effective and that just and reasonable result is intended).

Section 311.021(5) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended the public interest to prevail over a private interest.

Ranger Insurance Company v. Ward · filed 2003-05-29(5)

If the statute is unambiguous, we look to the plain meaning of the words to determine the legislative intent, and we examine the entire statute to find the legislative intent of a specific provision. Id . Courts favor public interest over any private interest. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(5) (Vernon 1998).

Subsection (5) presumes that, when a statute is enacted, the public interest is favored over the private interest.

Ball v. SBC Communications, Inc. · filed 2003-06-25(5)

In enacting a statute, it is presumed that the public interest is favored over the private interest. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(5) (Vernon 1998). The position advocated by Ball runs counter to this presumption.

Section 311.021(2) presumes that every statutory word, phrase, clause, and sentence serves a purpose and should be given effect when reasonably possible.

In Re Keeter · filed 2003-08-04(2)

When we construe a statute, we begin with a presumption "that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible." State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); accord Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 1998). Thus, if a statute refers to a subsequently repealed statute or rule, "the meaning and scope of the referencing statute do not change, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary." In re R.J.J., 959 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Tex.1998).

Section 311.021(2) directs courts to construe statutes so that every provision is given effect.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-09-29(2)

In order to give effect to this exception, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (1998) (entire statute intended to be effective), we must find that it is not necessary under the terms of section 11.064 for all board positions to be on the ballot in the election following the proposed redistricting.

Section 311.021(2) directs courts to presume that the Legislature did not intend to enact a meaningless provision.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-03-03(2)

We must presume that the legislature did not intend to adopt a meaningless provision. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998); Barr v. Bernhard , 562 S.W.2d 844 , 849 (Tex. 1978) (stating that "every word in a statute is presumed to have been used for a purpose . . . and that the Legislature did not intend to do a useless thing by" adopting a "meaningless provision").

Section 311.021(3) presumes that the Legislature intends a just and reasonable result when enacting a statute.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-04-01(3)

Although chapter 2001 does not expressly authorize an exempt organization to possess gambling paraphernalia, it would not be reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended to provide exempt organizations with a defense to prosecution for conducting bingo games but not for possessing the equipment necessary to engage in such authorized conduct. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.021 (3) (Vernon 1998) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . a just and reasonable result is intended[.]"), ... .

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective, supporting an interpretation that gives effect to every word and phrase.

International Truck And Engine Corporation v. Bray · filed 2004-06-03(2)

Third, Texas courts avoid interpreting statutory language as superfluous. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 1998); Bd. of Adjustment v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424, 432 (Tex.2002). Courts "must attempt to give effect to every word and phrase if it is reasonable to do so." Abrams v. Jones, 35 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Tex.2000). Several provisions within section 2301.476 refer to "franchised dealers." E.g., Tex. Occ.Code Ann. § 2301.476(d), (f), (g). Were we to equate "dealer" with "franchised dealer" in section 2301.476, these references to franchised dealers would become superfluous.

Section 311.021 presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective and that a reasonable result is intended, so courts reject an interpretation that would make an express public-records provision ineffective.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-05-07(2)-(3)

The legislature has distinguished between ownership records and customer information by providing in section 31.039 that ownership records are public records and providing in section 11.030 that customer information is not public information. Given that the legislature has clearly provided that ownership records are public records, it is not reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended them to be a subset of customer information, which is not subject to the Public Information Act. ... See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998) (in enacting a statute, it is presumed that the entire statute is intended to be effective).

Section 311.021(2) directs that, when possible, statutes be construed so that every part is effective.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-12-20(2)

In construing a statute, the legislature directs that, where possible, the statute be construed so that every part is effective. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2) (Vernon 1998).

Section 311.021(3) presumes that the Legislature intended a just and fair result when it enacted a statute.

Buddy Gregg Motor Homes, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Board of the Texas Department of Transportation · filed 2005-11-17(3)

When the legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed the legislature intended a just and fair result. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(3) (West 2005).

When statutory provisions appear to conflict, courts should construe them harmoniously where possible, giving effect to each.

City of Laredo, Texas v. Webb County, Texas · filed 2005-12-01

If an apparent conflict exists between two provisions, where possible, we must construe the provisions in a harmonious manner, giving effect to each. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (West 2005); In re J.M.R ., 149 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.).

Section 311.021(4) supports presuming that the Legislature intended a law to produce a result feasible of execution.

Opinion No. · filed 2006-04-13(4)

Because it would be impossible under this construction for a court clerk to comply with section 62.0132, and because we presume the legislature in writing a law intends a result feasible of execution, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (4) (Vernon 2005), we must conclude that the legislature did not intend for jurors' names to be information that is confidential under section 62.0132, when the names appear on a jury list.

Section 311.021(4) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended a statute to produce a result feasible of execution.

TPCIGA, for Reliance National Indemnity Company v. Magdalena Ford Morrison A/N/F of Eric Ford · filed 2006-05-12(4)

It is suggested that a child may be considered an eligible child by simultaneously meeting more than one condition of eligibility under section 408.182(f)(1). However, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to render ineffective section 408.183 pertaining to the duration a child is to receive death benefits. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(4) (West 2005) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that a result feasible of execution is intended.").

Section 311.021(1) presumes that the Legislature intended statutes to comply with the Texas and United States Constitutions, supporting a constitutional construction when statutory language has competing interpretations.

Garcia v. State · filed 2006-09-29(1)

We are "obliged to assume that the Legislature intended the interpretation which secures the statute's constitutional application." Id .; see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(1) (West 2005) (when legislature enacts statute, "it is presumed that compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is intended"). We accordingly construe "harass" in a manner consistent with the construction adopted by the supreme court in Benton .

Section 311.021(2) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective.

Werline v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company, Inc. · filed 2006-12-18(2)

When two provisions govern the same subject matter, an effort should be made to harmonize and give effect to both provisions. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker , 87 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tex. 2002). We are to presume that "the entire statute is intended to be effective." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005). As discussed above, Vondergoltz renders subsection (a)(3) meaningless and essentially rewrites the statute.

Section 311.021(1) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended statutes to comply with the Texas and United States Constitutions.

Garcia v. State · filed 2006-12-29(1)

"Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [the court's] duty is to adopt the latter." State v. Edmond , 933 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co. , 213 U.S. 366 (1909)). We are "obliged to assume that the Legislature intended the interpretation which secures the statute's constitutional application." Id .; see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(1) (West 2005) (when legislature enacts statute, "it is presumed that compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is intended"). We accordingly construe "harass" in a manner consistent with the construction adopted by the supreme court in Benton .

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the Legislature intended every part of a statute to be effective, unless the statute's context requires a different construction.

Mauro v. State · filed 2007-04-18(2)

Unless the statute's context requires a different construction, we must presume that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.05(b); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005). ... Because statutory construction rules require that we construe a provision to render the entire statute effective, we conclude that by expressly allowing prosecution under both statutes, the legislature intended to allow the State to exact multiple punishments.

Section 311.021 directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective.

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Hutcheson · filed 2007-09-27

It is presumed that the entire statute is intended to be effective. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (Vernon 2005). ... A reading of the statute that allows anyone to draw a blood specimen and affords redress-if any-only after the fact renders section 724.017 ineffective in carrying out the Legislature's health and safety concerns. Such an interpretation is against our rules of statutory construction. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021.

Section 311.021(3) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result and therefore to avoid absurd statutory constructions.

in the Matter of the Guardianship of Jeremy Lynn Finley · filed 2007-04-19(3)

Similarly, we are not to construe a statute in such an absurd way as to flout the presumption that the Legislature enacted the statute intending a just and reasonable result. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(3) (Vernon 2005); see also Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).

Section 311.021(3)-(5) directs courts to presume that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable, feasible result that favors the public interest.

in Re Myron D. Lester · filed 2008-05-15(3)-(5)

We also presume the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result that is feasible of execution and favors the public interest over any private interest. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(3)-(5) (Vernon 2005). In consideration of these construction aids, we conclude the Legislature likely intended "proper court" to mean a court in a county consistent with the counties to which the Legislature directed courts to send mandatory transfers in the same chapter of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 155.201(b); 155.204(c).

Section 311.021 supports construing statutes so that their provisions remain effective, rather than adopting a construction that renders related provisions meaningless.

Matthews v. Robert Scott, State Commissioner of Education and Dallas Independent School District · filed 2008-08-28

The Commissioner found that any other construction would render meaningless the provision for appointing a management team to direct actions. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021. We agree with the Commissioner's interpretation. The clear import of the education code's management team provision is to allow the Commissioner to remedy problems in districts that have fallen short of performance measures in limited areas where the consequences to the district--and the students attending school there--could be disastrous. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 39.071, 39.072(a), 39.131(a)(8). It would make no sense to allow the Commissioner to appoint a management team to remedy a district's problems, only to have that team be disregarded by the board of trustees. Such a construction would render education code sections 39.131 and 39.135 meaningless. See id. §§ 39.131, 39.135; Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021. Accordingly, if the record shows that the management team took steps to direct, approve, or disapprove board action, the board of trustees' actions thereafter cannot undermine the management team's will.

Section 311.021(1) directs courts construing statutes to presume that the Legislature intended compliance with the Texas Constitution.

Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Walter Roy Hancock D/B/A Capri Club · filed 2008-10-09(1)

In construing a statute, we presume that compliance with the state constitution is intended. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(1) (Vernon 2005). The Texas Constitution grants power to the Legislature to enact laws regulating the sale of mixed beverages, as follows: ... Thus, the constitution grants the power of regulation and grants the Legislature the power to pass laws allowing the sale of mixed beverages; however, that power is subject to the power of the people to authorize the sale of mixed beverages in the affected voting unit (here, a municipality).

Section 311.021(2) directs courts to presume that the entire statute is intended to be effective.

in Re Hope Rampy · filed 2009-05-26(2)

Such a construction would render (b)(2)'s six-month requirement meaningless. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.021(2) (we presume that the entire statute is intended to be effective), .023(5) (we consider, among other factors, the "consequences of a particular construction."); cf. In re Kubankin , 257 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Tex. App.--Waco 2008, orig. proceeding) (rejecting similar argument that "would render the six-month requirement of section 157.373 meaningless").

Section 311.021 requires courts to presume that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective when choosing between statutory interpretations.

Key Science & Technology Associates, Inc., D/B/A Key Associates v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality · filed 2009-07-08

We reject Key's interpretation of Code section 334.306(b)(7) because it nullifies other Code sections, leads to absurd results, and contradicts the Commission's reasonable interpretation of the Code. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (presumption that entire statute is intended to be effective); Buddy Gregg Motor Homes , 179 S.W.3d at 608 ("A statute should not be construed in a way that leads to absurd conclusions when there is a more reasonable interpretation."); id . at 602 ("When an administrative agency is charged with a statute's enforcement and also construes the statute, the agency's construction of the statute is entitled to serious consideration as long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain meaning of the statute.").

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the Legislature intended every part of a statute to be effective, so provisions should be construed together rather than rendered meaningless.

State v. Posey · filed 2009-10-20(2)

Courts must also presume that the Legislature intended that effect be given to the entire statute. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005); see Ex parte Forward , 258 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Ex parte Austin , 746 S.W.2d 226, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (Clinton, J., concurring). ... By referring to "this article," Section 6(a)(1) encompasses the entirety of Article 42.12, including the authority and limitations in place with respect to judge-ordered community supervision.

Section 311.021 presumes that, when construing statutes, the public interest is favored over any private interest.

Steubing v. City of Killeen, Texas · filed 2009-07-10

See also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (West 2005) (explaining that when construing statutes, courts presume that "public interest is favored over any private interest"). Although those statements were made in reference to a determination regarding whether a municipality could appeal an examiner's decision, we believe that those same considerations compel a remand of an examiner's decision in appropriate circumstances rather than an automatic reinstatement as urged by the dissent.

When enacting a statute, the public interest is presumed to be favored over any private interest.

In Re Ezukanma · filed 2011-03-09(5)

The legislature has determined that it is more important that past due child support be paid—even in the face of a motion to enforce—than for nonmovant parents to be punished by criminal contempt in such situations. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(5) (Vernon 2005) (providing that in enacting a statute, it is presumed that public interest is favored over any private interest).

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the entire statute is intended to be effective, supporting rejection of an interpretation that would produce an absurd result.

Texans Uniting for Reform and Freedom v. Amadeo Saenz, Jr., P.E. · filed 2010-08-20(2)

We can quickly conclude that the legislature did not intend to incorporate the first definition of "political" in subsection (c). Assuming that meaning of "political" in subsection (c), the provision would prohibit state employees from using their official authority or influence or permitting the use of a state agency program to achieve a purpose related to government or the conduct of government. The legislature could not possibly have intended to mandate governmental inaction, and we must reject such a construction. See T.C.R. v. Bell County Dist. Atty's Office , 305 S.W.3d 661, 671-72 (Tex. App.--Austin 2009, no pet.) (discussing "absurd results" limitation on textual literalism, whereby we reject constructions that legislature could not possibly have intended); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2), (3) (we are to presume that "the entire statute is intended to be effective" and that "a just and reasonable result is intended").

Section 311.021(2) presumes that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective.

King v. Bank of New York and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2008-07-17(2)

In reading statutes, we are to presume that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005). The definitions of "last known address" in section 51.0001 are applicable to the whole of chapter 51; however, section 51.002 is the only section in the chapter where the phrase is used. Section 51.0021 only applies to section 51.002. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 51.0021. There is no reason to read these two sections as conflicting. (5) Combined, they require that the notice be in writing, and that it be submitted in a reasonable manner. Notice that was reasonably submitted but unwritten, as well as notice that was written but unreasonably submitted, would fail statutory requirements.