Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016

Section 311.016 provides that “may” grants discretion, permission, or a power.

Consolidated Reinforcement, L.P. v. Carothers Executive Homes, Ltd. · filed 2008-12-05(1)

Because it is not clear, however, ... and a trial court is given discretion when it grants a motion pursuant to section 150.002(d) to dismiss a claim with or without prejudice, we remand this claim to the trial court to reconsider Consolidated's motion to dismiss. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 150.002(d) (dismissal "may be with prejudice"); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (West 2005) ("`May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.").

Section 311.016(5) generally treats “may not” as a prohibition meaning “shall not,” unless the context or an express statutory provision requires a different construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2000-07-26(5)

Because the phrase "may not" in section 232.0015 means "shall not," we conclude that a county must except the types of subdivisions listed in sections (c), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), and (k) (in addition to subsections (b) and (h)) from section 232.001's platting requirement. Unless the context in which the phrase "may not" appears "necessarily requires a different construction or unless" a statute expressly provides a different construction, the phrase "imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with `shall not.'" Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (5) (Vernon 1998). Chapter 232 does not expressly provide a contrary definition.

Unless the context requires a different construction, “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-04-13(1)

But, as you note, the commissioners court's authority to establish a payroll deduction program under section 155.001 is discretionary. Under the permissive language of section 155.001(b), a commissioners court may decline to establish a payroll deduction program. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 155.001 (b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (commissioners court "may" authorize deduction); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) (Vernon 1998) (Code Construction Act) (unless context requires different construction, "`[m]ay' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power").

Section 311.016(1) makes “may” discretionary unless a different context requires a different meaning.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-06-10(1)

This provision, by its terms, allows but does not require the Commission to inspect a cemetery or crematory. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) (1998) ("`May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power[,]" unless a different context requires a different meaning.).

Section 311.016(1) says that “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power, with the context determining which meaning applies.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-06-24(1)

The Code Construction Act, chapter 311 of the Government Code, indicates that the word "may" can have one of two meanings unless the context requires a different meaning: "`May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) (Vernon 1998) (emphasis added); accord House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 884, 75th Leg., R.S., at 1 (1997). ... We conclude that the term "may" in section 623.011 of the Transportation Code authorizes the Department to issue the permits to qualifying applicants rather than authorizes the Department to determine whether it will issue a permit to a qualifying applicant. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) (Vernon 1998); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 623.011 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).

Section 311.016(5) provides that “may not” imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with “shall not,” while section 311.016(1) provides that “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Opinion No. · filed 2003-01-06(1), (5)

By its terms, section 2001.160(a) prohibits license transfer except as provided by the statute. See id. § 311.016(5) ("`May not' imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with `shall not.'"). Section 2001.160(b) requires prior Commission approval and directs the Commission to approve a "person" meeting the requirements of section 2001.160, rather than chapter 2001. While the term "person" in chapter 2001 generally is "an individual, partnership, corporation, or other group," Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2001.002(20) (Vernon 2002), the only "person" to which the licensee is authorized to transfer the license specifically under section 2001.160(c) is a corporation. Under the Code Construction Act, "`[m]ay' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) (Vernon 1998). Read in context, the term as used in subsection (c) grants a licensed bingo commercial lessor permission or power to transfer the license to a corporation formed or owned by the licensee; it does not grant the licensee the power or discretion to transfer the license to any "person" within the general meaning of that term.

The word “may” generally grants permission and gives the person addressed discretion rather than imposing a requirement.

In Re KLV · filed 2003-05-15

The use of the word "may" creates a discretionary authority or grants permission. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016. Thus, it is within an appellant's discretion whether or not he brings an appeal under this subchapter.

Section 311.016(1) provides that “may” generally creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-10-13(1)

The word "may" in a statute generally "creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) (Vernon 1998).

Subsection (1) provides that “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. State · filed 2005-02-17(1)

The word "may" creates a discretionary authority or grants permission or a power. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (West 1998).

Section 311.016(1) makes “may” discretionary, granting permission or a power.

Leonard v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas The Harris County-Houston Sports Authority Harris County And the · filed 2005-07-21(1)

The legislature's use of the term "may" denotes that the court has discretion, once it has made the required statutory findings, to declare a party a vexatious litigant. See Devoll ,155 S.W.3d at 502 (reviewing chapter eleven issues under abuse of discretion standard); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (West 2005) ("may" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power"); cf. Bocquet v. Herring , 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998) (declaratory judgment act gives trial court discretion in ultimate decision of whether to award attorney fees). Accordingly, we review the trial court's ultimate determination that Leonard is a vexatious litigant under an abuse of discretion standard.

Subsection (1) provides that, unless the context requires a different meaning, “may” in a Texas code creates discretionary authority in the trial court.

Alvarado v. Abraham A. Alecozay, M.D., Ph.D. and Southwest General Hospital · filed 2005-09-09(1)

Unless the context of its use requires a different meaning, the word "may" used in a Texas code "creates discretionary authority" in the trial court. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005).

Subsection (1) makes “may” discretionary rather than mandatory.

Debra Thomas and Stan Thomas v. Gearald Farris, Individually and D/B/A Farris Chiropractic Clinic · filed 2005-10-26(1)

We disagree. The word "may" creates discretionary authority. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005). By using the word "may," Section 74.351(c) plainly vests the trial court with discretion to grant an extension.

Subsection (5) treats “may not” and “shall not” as language that generally expresses a prohibition.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-11-18(5)

When the legislature intends to prohibit an entity from engaging in certain conduct, it generally uses the phrase "may not" or "shall not." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (5) (Vernon 2005) (defining certain terms and phrases) (Code Construction Act).

Section 311.016(1) provides that “may” ordinarily confers discretion rather than imposing a mandatory duty.

in Re: Covenant Health System, Relator · filed 2006-03-01(1)

The term "may" as used in subsection (c) vests the trial court with discretion to grant a 30-day extension. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1).

When a statute uses “may,” it generally grants discretionary authority rather than imposing a mandatory duty.

Becky Vanden Bosch, Individually and as Next Friend of Justin Maurice Evans, a Minor Child v. Aulds · filed 2006-04-25(1)

Section 74.351(c) provides in part that the trial court may grant one 30-day extension to the claimant to cure a deficiency in an expert report. The term "may" as used in subsection (c) vests the trial court with discretion to grant a 30-day extension. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005); Hardy v. Marsh, 170 S.W.3d 865, 870-71 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).

Section 311.016 provides that the word "may" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Opinion No. · filed 2006-06-20

Section 1001.402 uses the word "may" and thereby "creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 2005).

Under section 311.016(1), “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power, rather than imposing a requirement.

Curtis v. Kountz · filed 2006-09-21(1)

The statute states that the trial court "may" hold a hearing, but it does not require the trial court to do so before dismissing a claim. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005) ("'May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power."); Hardy v. Marsh , 170 S.W.3d 865, 870-71 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2005, no pet.) ("The use of the word 'may' in a statute shows that the provision is discretionary and not mandatory.").

Section 311.016 indicates that “may” ordinarily grants discretion rather than imposing a mandatory duty.

Burke v. Union Pacific Resources Co. · filed 2004-06-09

The word "may" indicates that such an action is at the discretion of the court.

Section 311.016 treats “may not” as a prohibition synonymous with “shall not,” unless context or another statute requires a different construction.

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, San Antonio River Authority, and… · filed 2008-07-31(5)

Under section 311.016 of the Code Construction Act, the term "'may not' imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with 'shall not,'" "unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 2005). The Commission, therefore, cannot grant the Foundation the water permit that it applied for, regardless of the trial court's actions in setting aside the Commission's denial order and remanding the application back to the Commission for further proceedings.

Section 311.016(5) provides that “may not” imposes a prohibition synonymous with “shall not,” unless the context or statute requires a different construction.

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. Galveston Bay Conservation · filed 2008-07-31(5)

Under section 311.016 of the Code Construction Act, the term "'may not' imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with 'shall not,'" "unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.016(1) provides that “may” generally creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Regent Care Center of El Paso, LP, D/B/A Regent Care Center of El Paso v. Melba Wallace Individually, and on Behalf of t · filed 2008-11-25(1)

The term "may," as used in subsection (c), vests the trial court with discretion to grant a thirty-day extension. See In re Covenant Health Sys. , 223 S.W.3d 423, 426 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2006, orig. proceeding); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) ("may" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power); Hardy v. Marsh , 170 S.W.3d 865, 870-71 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (use of the word "may" in a statute shows that the provision is discretionary and not mandatory).

Under § 311.016(1), “may” grants discretionary authority or permission rather than imposing a mandatory duty.

in the Guardianship of Armando Garcia Cardenas, an Incapacitated Person · filed 2010-06-24(1)

When describing the trial court's power to enter orders to permit additional discovery, rule 120a(3) utilizes the term, "may," which does not connote a mandatory duty. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005) ("'May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power."); Dallas County Cmty. College Dist. v. Bolton , 185 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2005); see also Burkhart v. Sedgwick Claim Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 13-08-00351-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6983, at *11 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, as noted above, it was within the sole discretion of the trial court to determine whether to grant appellant a continuance to procure additional discovery.

Section 311.016(5) provides that “may not” imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with “shall not.”

Institute of Cognitive Development, Inc. Develo-Cepts, Inc. And Carroll Stroman, D/B/A Bitter Creek Farm v.… · filed 1999-06-30(5)

In addition, under the Code Construction Act, the term "may not" "imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with 'shall not.'" Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(5) (West 1998).

Section 311.016 makes “may” discretionary and “shall” mandatory unless the context or another statute requires a different construction.

Opinion No. · filed 1999-11-10

Under the terms of the Code Construction Act, "`may' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power," while "`shall' imposes a duty." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 1998). In both cases, however, such constructions apply "unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute." Id . ... In our opinion, the proper way to harmonize these constitutional and statutory provisions is to conclude that, whether "may" or "shall" is used, the commissioners court is not under a mandatory duty to fill any of the positions in section 87.041.

Section 311.016(2) makes “shall” impose a duty unless the context necessarily requires a different construction.

Opinion No. · filed 1999-08-10(2)

While courts may in some instances construe the word "shall" as merely directory, particularly if the relevant provision does not "go to the essence of the act to be performed," Lewis v . Jacksonville Bldg . Loan Ass'n , 540 S.W.2d 307 , 310 (Tex. 1976), most uses of "shall" are mandatory. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon Supp. 1998) ("shall" imposes duty unless context "necessarily requires a different construction"). "Shall" in section 111.001, which prescribes not the form but the nature of the Comptroller's duty, is clearly mandatory.

Unless the context requires otherwise, “may” grants discretionary authority or permission, while “shall” imposes a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 1999-10-22

This part of the rule is also authorized, though not required, by section 42.072(d). See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 1998) (providing that unless the context requires otherwise, "may" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power, while "shall" imposes a duty).

Subsection 311.016(2) provides that “shall” ordinarily imposes a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 1999-11-03(2)

The word "shall" ordinarily imposes a duty, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon 1998), and we find no basis for reading this word as non-mandatory in subsection 262.027(a).

Subsection 311.016(2) provides that the word "shall" in a statute imposes a duty.

In Re Bishop · filed 1999-12-10(2)

Thus, section 263.401(c) imposed a mandatory duty on Respondent to either "render a final order or dismiss the suit on or before" September 28. Id.; In re Neal, 4 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 1998) (the term "shall" in a statute "imposes a duty").

Section 311.016(1) makes “may” permissive and discretionary, while § 311.016(2) makes “shall” mandatory and imposes a duty.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Public Utility Commission of Texas Cities of Austin · filed 2000-08-10(1), (2)

The Code Construction Act offers guidance on how to interpret the terms "may" and "shall": "(1) 'May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power. (2) 'Shall' imposes a duty." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (West 1998) (emphasis added). ... Only by relying on the Code Construction Act's alternate definition and interpreting "may" as it is used in section 58.059 to grant permission or power to the Commission to authorize a rate-group reclassification requested pursuant to section 58.058 do we harmonize the two sections.

Section 311.016(2) makes “shall” impose a duty unless the surrounding context necessarily requires a different construction.

Robinson v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-06-14(2)

Additionally, the Code Construction Act supports an interpretation of the word "shall" as mandatory. The Code Construction Act defines the words "may" and "shall" as follows: (1) "May" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power. (2) "Shall" imposes a duty. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 1998). The Code Construction Act further states the term "shall" imposes a duty "unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction...." Id. Taxpayers argue this is a situation where the context requires a different interpretation. We disagree. We must adhere to the strict interpretation of this Tax Code provision. As such, we find the rendition provision to be mandatory.

Section 311.016 distinguishes “may” as permissive from “shall” as mandatory.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-01-28(1), (2)

It does not require, although it permits, the adoption of such a code by "any city or town of this state" regardless of population. ... Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1), (2) (Vernon 1999) (distinction between "may" and "shall").

Section 311.016(2) means that “shall” imposes a duty unless the context or another statute requires a different construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-09-04(2)

Section 311.016 (2) of the Government Code declares that, "unless the context in which the word . . . appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute . . . `[s]hall' imposes a duty."

Section 311.016(2) defines “shall” as imposing a duty, but a mandatory duty does not necessarily make compliance jurisdictional.

In Re EDL · filed 2003-04-10(2)

The code construction act defines "shall" as follows: "`Shall' imposes a duty." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 1998). Courts generally construe "shall" as mandatory; however, it "may be and frequently is held to be merely directory." Chisholm v. Bewley Mills, 155 Tex. 400, 287 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex.1956); see also Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex.1999).

When a statute uses “shall,” it generally imposes a duty.

in the Interest of D. D. M., a Child · filed 2003-05-30(2)

Use of the term "shall" imposes a duty on the trial court to follow the statute by designating a fixed date. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 1998); see In re Bishop , 8 S.W.3d at 418-19.

Section 311.016(2) provides that “shall” imposes a mandatory duty on the actor to comply with the statutory requirement.

In Re DDM · filed 2003-07-31(2)

Use of the term "shall" imposes a duty on the trial court to follow the statute by designating a fixed date. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 1998); see In re Bishop, 8 S.W.3d at 418-19.

Section 311.016(2) generally makes “shall” impose a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-03-18(2)

Section 41.45(a) provides that, "[o]n the filing of a notice as required by Section 41.44, the appraisal review board shall schedule a hearing on the protest." Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 41.45 (a) (Vernon 2001). The Code Construction Act provides that the term "shall" generally "imposes a duty." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon 2005). 3 According to its plain terms, section 41.45(a), in using the term "shall," imposes a duty on an appraisal review board.

Section 311.016 provides that “may” creates discretionary authority or permission, while “shall” imposes a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-04-29(1)-(2)

The term "'[m]ay' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power," while "'[s]hall' imposes a duty." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1)-(2) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.016(1) provides that “may” generally creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power, while section 311.016(2) provides that “shall” imposes a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 2005-12-28(1), (2)

Although section 693.002(a)(1) states that a justice of the peace "may" permit organ removal, see id. ; see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) ("`May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power."), it is clear from section 693.002(a)(2)-(5) that a justice of the peace does not have unfettered discretion over this matter, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 2005) ("The following constructions apply unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute[.]").

Section 311.016(2) indicates that “shall” usually imposes a mandatory duty, so a statutory requirement phrased with “shall” is generally mandatory.

Opinion No. · filed 2006-08-02(2)

The word "shall" usually connotes a mandatory duty. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon 2005). Thus we believe a vendor must file a questionnaire even if the vendor has no business relationships or affiliations to disclose.

Section 311.016(1) makes “may” ordinarily discretionary, while section 311.016(2) makes “shall” ordinarily impose a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 2006-09-25(1), (2)

As we have noted, section 826.014 states only that a commissioners court "may adopt ordinances or rules that establish a local rabies control program in the county." Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 826.014 (a) (Vernon 2003). The word "may" ordinarily "creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (1) (Vernon 2005). Thus, Waller County is not statutorily required to enact an animal control ordinance. ... Another portion of chapter 826, however, declares that a "commissioners court . . . shall designate an officer to act as the local rabies control authority for the purposes of this chapter." Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 826.017 (a) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added). The word "shall" ordinarily "imposes a duty." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.016(2) provides that “shall” imposes a mandatory duty.

City of Harlingen v. Alvarez · filed 2006-11-16(2)

"Shall" imposes a duty. See id . ... The commission further has a duty to determine if the chapter and rules are being obeyed. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 143.009 (Vernon 1999); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.016(2) makes “shall” mandatory by imposing a duty.

Tejada Ex Rel. Tejada v. Rowe · filed 2006-11-22(2)

The terms of section 101.106(f) do not restrict its application to cases in which the governmental unit has been named as a defendant. In fact, section 101.106(f) requires that the suit against the employee must be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and substituting the governmental unit within thirty days after the employee files a motion to dismiss. See id.; see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 2005) ("`Shall' imposes a duty."). In addition, section 101.106(e) expressly addresses lawsuits filed against both a governmental unit and its employees.

Section 311.016(2) generally makes “shall” mandatory and duty-imposing unless the context necessarily requires a different construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2007-04-04(2)

The word "shall" in statutes is generally construed as mandatory, unless legislative intent suggests otherwise. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair , 984 S.W.2d 958,961 (Tex. 1999); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon 2005) ("`Shall' imposes a duty," unless it appears in a context that necessarily requires a different construction).

Section 311.016(2) means that “shall” imposes a mandatory duty.

Frank v. Liberty Insurance Corp. · filed 2008-04-11(2)

Subsection (a) of rule 102.5 unequivocally requires that the Commission, once it receives written notification that a claimant is represented by counsel or other representative, " shall " thereafter send copies of "all written communications" to both the claimant and the representative. 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 102.5(a) (emphasis added). "Shall" denotes a mandatory duty. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (West 2005); Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001).

Section 311.016 defines “may” as creating discretionary authority or granting permission or a power, while “shall” imposes a duty.

Don Zimmerman, William C. Ferguson, and Alan R. Weiss v. City of Austin Mayor Will Wynn · filed 2008-11-14(1)-(2)

It is true that the word "may" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power, while the word "shall" imposes a duty. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (West 2005); see also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n , 31 S.W.3d 631, 637-38 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000), aff'd , 92 S.W.3d 424 (2002).

Section 311.016(2) provides that “shall” imposes a duty.

Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, Texas · filed 2009-03-05(2)

We construe "shall" in this statute to impose a duty. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 2005).

The opinion uses § 311.016 to state that “shall” imposes a duty.

Andrade v. NAACP of Austin · filed 2009-04-10(2)

Pursuant to subsection (c) of section 122.038, the Secretary does not have discretion in her determination whether to deny or approve an application for a voting system. See id. § 122.038(c). She is only authorized to approve or disapprove a voting system based on the system's compliance with voting system standards. See id. § 122.032(a) (West 2003) ("For a voting system or voting system equipment to be approved for use in elections, the voting system in which the equipment is designed to be used must comply with the standards proscribed by Subchapter A."); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (West 2005) ("`Shall' imposes a duty.").

Subsection (2) treats “shall” as imposing a duty, while subsection (3) treats “must” as creating or recognizing a condition precedent.

Ballesteros v. Nueces County, Texas · filed 2009-05-14(2) (3)

The word "shall" imposes a duty. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (Vernon 2005). The statute further indicates that notice "must" be given by registered or certified mail. The word "must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(3) (Vernon 2005).

Subsection (2) provides that “shall” imposes a mandatory duty rather than granting discretion.

KEM Texas, Ltd. v. Texas Department of Transportation and Armando Saenz, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director · filed 2009-06-26(2)

The legislature's use of " shall issue a permit . . ." denotes a mandatory, non-discretionary duty.

Section 311.016 explains that using “shall” creates a duty.

McCuller C. Stephens, III v. State Bar of Texas · filed 2009-10-08

The use of the word "shall" imposes an affirmative duty on the petitioner to provide such notice. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (explaining that the use of "shall" creates a duty).

Section 311.016 provides that “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or power, while “shall” imposes a duty.

Clifton Alexander, Rob Acker, Joe Augeri, James Baker, Doug Boes, Brad Ballard, John Banning, Scott Bartell… · filed 2009-11-20

We find it significant that the statute uses the word "may," rather than "shall," in connection with the authorization of certification pay. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (West 2005) (in interpreting statutes, "may" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or power, while "shall" imposes duty).

Section 311.016(1) makes “may” discretionary, while section 311.016(2) makes “shall” impose a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 2010-03-22(1), (2)

The word "`may' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov' t Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005). Subsection (a) authorizes but does not require a municipality to order an election. Subsection (b), on the other hand, provides that "[o]n the determination by a governing body of a unit of election that a petition for withdrawal under this chapter is valid, the governing body shall order an election to withdraw the unit of election from the authority." TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 451.651 (b) (Vernon 2007) (emphasis added). 3 The word "`shall' imposes a duty." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon 2005). As a result, this provision requires a municipality to order an election if a valid petition is submitted in accordance with statute.

Section 311.016(2) provides that “shall” imposes a duty unless the context or another statute requires a different construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2000-08-31(2)

These statutes use the word "shall," indicating a mandatory duty to act; the context in which the word appears does not require a different construction.

Subsection (1) provides that “may” generally creates discretionary authority rather than a mandatory duty.

Clyde Murff Hardy and Barbara J. Hardy v. Denver C. Marsh, Jr., M.D. · filed 2005-08-17(1)

The word "may" creates discretionary authority. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.016(7) provides that the phrase “is not required to” negates a duty or condition precedent.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-08-01(7)

Furthermore, the exclusionary provisions of chapter 201 are unavailable with respect to deed restrictions modified under chapter 204 because section 204.005(a) specifically provides that an "association is not required to comply with Sections 201.009-201.012 [of the Property Code.]" Id. § 204.005(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (7) (Vernon 1998) (Code Construction Act) ("`Is not required to' negates a duty or condition precedent.").

“Shall” imposes a duty.

Opinion No. · filed 2002-12-17(2)

The language of section 10(a) of House Bill 3665 is mandatory: "The temporary board of directors shall call and hold an election in each county in the district . . . ." Act of May 25, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1362, § 10(a), 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3371, 3372. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (2) (Vernon 1998) ("`Shall' imposes a duty.").

Section 311.016(1) treats “may” as conferring discretion rather than imposing a mandatory duty.

in the Interest of Scotty Morgan Henry and Shelby Leann Henry, Children · filed 2003-06-17(1)

The term "may" as used in subsection (c) vests the trial court with discretion to grant a 30-day extension. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1).

Section 311.016(4) provides that the phrase “is entitled to” creates or recognizes a right, unless the context requires a different construction.

Opinion No. · filed 2004-09-01(4)

The Code Construction Act provides that the phrase "`is entitled to' creates or recognizes a right." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (4) (Vernon 1998) ("The following constructions apply unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute . . . ."). Accordingly, salary supplement court costs collected by Kerr County must be used to pay a salary supplement as provided by section 574.031(i).

Under § 311.016(3), the word “must” creates or recognizes a condition precedent.

Montgomery County Hospital District v. Tonya Smith · filed 2005-12-15(3)

Thus, the Legislature has expressly decreed that Whistleblower Act claimants "must" initiate the grievance or appeal process "before suing." The Code Construction Act states that the word "'[m]ust' creates or recognizes a condition precedent." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(3) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.016 provides that “may” generally grants permissive authority rather than imposing a mandatory duty.

Opinion No. · filed 2006-09-18

The word "may" usually "creates permissive authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 2005) (Code Construction Act); ... Thus, under section 109.003 a court may, but is not required to, assess the costs of the court reporter's record to the county.

Section 311.016(3) provides that “must” creates or recognizes a condition precedent.

Ballesteros v. Nueces County, Texas · filed 2007-08-31(3)

The word "must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent.

Section 311.016(3) provides that the word "must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent.

G. Michael Boswell and Property Owners Who Care-South Padre Island v. the Board of Adjustment and Appeals of the Town of · filed 2009-07-16(3)

The word "must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(3) (Vernon 2005).

Section 311.016(3) provides that “must” creates or recognizes a condition precedent.

Ultimate Ford, Inc., D/B/A Ultimate Ford Giddings And Weatherby Ford, Inc. D/B/A Ultimate Ford v. Motor… · filed 2010-08-27(3)

Although the Dealerships are correct that "must" used in a code denotes a condition precedent, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(3), it does not necessarily follow that, as the Dealerships assume, any non-compliance with the notice requirements by Ford must automatically invalidate the Division's ultimate good-cause determination.

“Shall” generally imposes a mandatory duty, but it may be construed as directory when that best fits the Legislature’s intent.

Corpus Christi Housing Authority v. Lara · filed 2008-07-17(2)

Under our rules of statutory construction, "shall" is generally construed to be mandatory, but may be directory when this interpretation is most consistent with the Legislature's intent. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 1998); Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist. , 925 S.W.2d 618, 629 (Tex. 1996).

Section 311.016(1) provides that “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Presiado v. Helen Sheffield, Steven Neal, Fernando Briseno, Howard Neil, Lloyd Massey · filed 2007-07-12(1)

The statute states that the trial court "may" hold a hearing, but it does not require the trial court to do so before dismissing a claim. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2005) ("'May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.")

Section 311.016 provides that “may” signifies discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

Steubing v. City of Killeen · filed 2009-08-05

The use of the word "may" in this context persuades us that the legislature wanted district courts to have discretion when deciding whether to require reinstatement. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016 (West 2005) (explaining that word "may" is used in statute to signify "discretionary authority or grant[] permission or a power").