Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits a governmental entity to appeal an interlocutory order when its sovereign immunity claim is based on an individual's assertion of qualified or official immunity.

City of San Juan v. Gonzalez · filed 2000-06-01(a)(5)

A governmental entity is only entitled to appeal from an interlocutory order pursuant to section 51.014 (5) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code when its claim of sovereign immunity is "based on" an individual's assertion of qualified or official immunity.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal of a sovereign-immunity claim based on an individual's assertion of qualified immunity.

Montanez v. City of Three Rivers · filed 2000-06-08(a)(5)

In this case, a sovereign immunity claim may be based on an individual's assertion of qualified immunity and falls within the scope of § 51.014(5).

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment based on official immunity, but not sovereign immunity.

Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles v. Feinblatt · filed 2002-05-02(a)(5)

Our review is limited to the trial court's denial of the Board's plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2002). Although a denial of a motion for summary judgment that is based on official immunity is an appealable interlocutory order, a denial of a motion asserting sovereign immunity is not. See id. § 51.014(a)(5).

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on an employee’s official immunity and limits review to that immunity and sovereign immunity based on it.

City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corporation · filed 2003-02-20(a)(5)

The entity may therefore bring an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(5) for the denial of a summary judgment motion which asserts sovereign immunity "based on" the official immunity of its employees. ... In such an interlocutory appeal, however, the appellate court is strictly limited to determining the question of official immunity and the governmental entity's sovereign immunity to the extent that it is based on such official immunity.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits a governmental unit to appeal the denial of summary judgment when its motion is based on an employee’s assertion of immunity.

Thomas v. White Ex Rel. White · filed 2003-03-20(a)(5)

For BISD to pursue an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(5), the motion for summary judgment must have been based upon an assertion of immunity by its employee.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal of a sovereign immunity claim based on a government employee’s assertion of official immunity.

County of Hidalgo and Deputy Sheriff Carlos Perez in His Official and Individual Capacities v. Gonzalez · filed 2004-02-26(a)(5)

To that extent, a sovereign immunity claim may be “based on” an individual’s assertion of official immunity and falls within the scope of section 51.014(a)(5) of the civil practice and remedies code.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an Arkansas police officer's immunity-based summary judgment motion because “the state” includes Arkansas.

Glenn Martin Greenwell and the City of Texarkana, Arkansas v. April Nicole Brown Davis · filed 2005-11-22(a)(5)

Further, we do not believe the word "the" changes the meaning of "state" in Section 51.014. Although "the" is singular, it does not necessarily limit the phrase "the state" to Texas. Therefore, we conclude the phrase "the state" includes Arkansas and an interlocutory appeal may be taken from the denial of Greenwell's motion.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment when the motion asserts official immunity or its elements.

Baylor College of Medicine v. Hernandez · filed 2006-07-27(a)(5)

Because appellants’ motion for summary judgment is not based on the assertion of official immunity, section 51.014(a)(5) does not authorize us to consider the interlocutory appeal of the order denying the motion.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a government employee’s motion to dismiss that asserts an immunity defense.

Enes Kanlic, M. D. v. Meyer · filed 2007-07-26(a)(5)

Meyer argues that this Court does not have interlocutory jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5), because Dr. Kanlic did not raise the issue of immunity in the trial court. ... Because Dr. Kanlic raised an immunity defense in the trial court, through his motion to dismiss under section101.106, this Court has interlocutory jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court erred in denying his motion.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal when a governmental employee’s immunity claim is denied on a motion to dismiss.

Leslee Lanphier, R. N., and Rebecca Francis, R. N. v. Tania Avis, A/K/A Tania Greer · filed 2008-01-10(a)(5)

The fact that the nurses followed the directive of the applicable provision of the statute (as it is worded) by asserting that claim in the form of a motion to dismiss should not preclude review of their claim of immunity. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the nurses' interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 51.014(a)(5).

Section 51.014(a)(5) allows an interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment based on official immunity only by an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision; an independent contractor does not qualify as a state employee.

Cen-Tex Childcare, Inc. F/K/A Mesa Family Services, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2011-03-31(a)(5)

We hold that we do not have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s interlocutory order denying Cen-Tex’s motion for summary judgment based on official immunity because Cen-Tex is not an officer or employee of the state.

Section 51.014(a)(5) lets a party with standing appeal denial of a motion based on a state employee’s immunity, even if the party is not that employee.

the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston v. Anita Crowder Individually · filed 2011-04-14(a)(5)

Nonetheless, under the plain meaning of section 51.014(a)(5) and under a prior holding of the Supreme Court of Texas, if a party has standing to seek dismissal based upon the assertion of immunity by such an individual, then that party can appeal under of section 51.014(a)(5) even though the party is not such an individual.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits a party with standing to appeal denial of a motion based on a state employee’s asserted immunity, even if that party is not the employee.

UNIV. OF TX. HEALTH SCIENCE CTR. v. Crowder · filed 2011-09-29(a)(5)

Nonetheless, under the plain meaning of section 51.014(a)(5) and under a prior holding of the Supreme Court of Texas, if a party has standing to seek dismissal based upon the assertion of immunity by such an individual, then that party can appeal under of section 51.014(a)(5) even though the party is not such an individual.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental employee’s immunity-based motion to dismiss under section 101.106(f).

Luchak v. McAdams · filed 2012-02-01(a)(5)

Thus, if an interlocutory appeal is allowed by section 51.014(a)(5) from the denial of a motion to dismiss under subsection (e), it necessarily follows that an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss under subsection (f) is also allowed by section 51.014(a)(5).

Section 51.014(a)(5) does not allow a registered accessibility specialist to appeal an interlocutory order denying immunity-based summary judgment because the specialist is not a state officer.

Rogers v. Robert Orr and Walkcon, Ltd. · filed 2013-08-01(a)(5)

We hold that Rogers is not a state ―officer‖ for purposes of bringing an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of immunity.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction by a government employee sued in her official capacity.

Newman v. Bryan · filed 2013-10-09(a)(8)

Newman is an employee of a governmental unit—the MPISD. And, as explained below, she was sued in her official capacity as the MPISD’s financial benefits advisor. ... In accordance with Koseoglu, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Newman’s interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a governmental employee’s immunity, regardless of the procedural vehicle used to assert it.

Pishko v. Yurttas · filed 2013-10-31(a)(5)

Yurttas is incorrect: Section 51.014(a)(5) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows an appeal from an interlocutory order that “denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5). The Supreme Court of Texas has held that section 51.014(a)(5) authorizes interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 101.106(e) because section 51.014(a)(5) encompasses any order denying assertion of an employee’s immunity regardless of the procedural vehicle through which such assertion is raised.

Section 51.014(a)(5) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal by a privately commissioned peace officer who is neither a state officer or employee nor entitled to be treated as one.

William Marsh Rice University and Gary Spears v. Rafaey · filed 2013-11-07(a)(5)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Spears is not an officer or employee of the state and that he is not entitled to be treated as if he were such an officer or employee for the purposes of section 51.014(a)(5). Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over Spears‘s appeal under section 51.014(a)(5).

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits interlocutory review of an officer’s assertion of immunity, but does not permit review of arguments unrelated to immunity.

Jerry Sanchez, Timothy Wiliams, and Jose Estrada v. Boone · filed 2019-03-19(a)(5)

Accordingly, the officers’ first point is not an “assertion of immunity,” and we lack interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) to address it.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a Rule 91a motion asserting an officer’s or employee’s immunity when the motion challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Edinburg Housing Authority, Dr. Martin Castillo, Gabriel Salinas, Simon Garza, Marissa Chavana, and Juan Guzman v. Rodol · filed 2021-02-25(a)(5)

We conclude, however, that we do have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over the Commissioners’ individual claims and that we need not resort to a mandamus review. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5). Section 51.014(a)(5) of the civil practice and remedies code allows interlocutory appeal for the denial of a “motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state.” See id. And even though this appeal arises from a Rule 91a motion and not a summary judgment motion, under the Reaves line of authority, we have appellate jurisdiction over claims asserted in a Rule 91a motion that challenge the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(5) and (a)(8) permit interlocutory appeals from immunity-based summary judgment denials involving governmental officers or employees and from orders granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.

City of San Antonio; San Antonio Police Department; Joe Vidal, Individually and in His Official Capacity; And Daniel Moy · filed 2026-05-27(a)(5), (a)(8)

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits interlocutory review of an order that “denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state,” and section 51.014(a)(8) allows interlocutory review of an order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit[.]” ... This case falls into both categories.

Section 51.014(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order refusing a temporary injunction, but an order denying a temporary restraining order is not appealable under it.

DANNY RAY HARRIS vs. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE · filed 1993-07-29(4)

Pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(4) (West Supp. 1993), a party may appeal an interlocutory order that refuses a temporary injunction. An order denying a temporary restraining order, however, is not a refusal of a temporary injunction and, therefore, is not appealable.

Section 51.014(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from refusal of a temporary injunction, but not from denial of a temporary restraining order.

JERNIGAN vs. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE · filed 1993-08-25(4)

Pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(4) (West Supp. 1993), a party may appeal an interlocutory order that refuses an application for temporary injunction. An order denying a temporary restraining order, however, is not a refusal of a temporary injunction and, therefore, is not appealable.

Section 51.014 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from a family protective order.

Normand v. Fox · filed 1997-03-05

The family protective order does not fall within the parameters for interlocutory review under Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Section 51.014(a) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from a temporary restraining order or orders based on it.

In Re Cornyn · filed 2000-09-07(a)

We deny the motion for two reasons. First, no interlocutory appeal lies from the TRO or the orders based on it. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

Section 51.014 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from a temporary restraining order.

University of Texas at Austin v. Yeo · filed 2002-03-22

See, e.g. , Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (West Supp. 2002); Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.098(a) (West Supp. 2002). No statutory provision provides that temporary restraining orders are appealable orders.

Section 51.014(a) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a temporary restraining order.

Chambles v. Jorge Valencia, Angela Rodriguez, Terry Wall, Renee Cox, and Wichita Valley Rehabilitation Hospi · filed 2004-07-01(a)

Interlocutory orders, such as a temporary restraining order, are generally not appealable absent statutory authorization, and no statute permits the interlocutory appeal of the denial of a temporary restraining order.

Section 51.014 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order.

Nikolouzos v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital · filed 2005-03-17

While an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary injunction is allowed, no statutory provision permits an appeal from a temporary restraining order. ... see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp.2004-05) (specifically permitting appeal of interlocutory orders in ten instances, but not including the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order).

Section 51.014 does not permit an interlocutory appeal from an order allowing a party to proceed under a pseudonym.

Topheavy Studios, Inc. and Gathering of Developers, Inc. v. Doe · filed 2005-08-11

However, the trial court's granting of Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym is an interlocutory order that is not appealable at this time.

Section 51.014(a) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order transferring a habeas corpus petition to another district court.

Petersen v. Owens · filed 2006-03-20(a)

On February 21, 2006, the clerk of this Court notified the parties that it appeared that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal from the district court’s order finding appellant’s suit to be a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and transferring the case to the 23rd District Court of Brazoria County. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2005); Fox v. Wardy, No. 08-04-0361-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 5882 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 28, 2005, pet. denied) (appeal of transfer order dismissed for want of jurisdiction). ... Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a temporary injunction.

Champion v. State · filed 2009-03-04(a)(4)

Because Champion's motion requests an injunction for an indefinite time period, does not request a hearing, and requests relief that would alter the status quo, we conclude that his motion for emergency relief was a request for a temporary injunction. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Champion's motion is appealable.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a temporary injunction, but not from an order granting or denying a temporary restraining order.

Westbrook v. Fondren · filed 2009-09-10(a)(4)

However, while an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary injunction is allowed, no statutory provision permits an appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to modify or dissolve a temporary injunction, including one labeled a temporary restraining order if it functions as a temporary injunction.

Harris County Medical Examiner Luis Arturo Sanchez, M.D. v. Saghian · filed 2009-10-08(a)(4)

Pursuant to section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, we have jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal of the court’s October 17, 2007 order denying Dr. Sanchez’s motion to dissolve or modify the October 16, 2007 order only if that order “grants or overrules a motion to modify or dissolve a temporary injunction.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon 2008). Since, as we hold above, the October 16, 2007 order is a temporary injunction, we also have jurisdiction over that portion of Dr. Sanchez’s appeal complaining of the ancillary court’s refusal to modify or vacate that order.

Section 51.014 does not permit an interlocutory appeal from a temporary order following an adversary hearing.

in the Interest of B.W., a Child · filed 2010-12-16

The October 7 order is a non-appeable interlocutory order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(e) (Vernon 2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon 2008).

Section 51.014(a)(4) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal of a temporary restraining order.

Gregory R. Mattox and Barbara Wilkerson v. Clifford Jackson and Eleanor Jean Jackson · filed 2011-02-03(a)(4)

This section does not provide for appellate review of a temporary restraining order.

Section 51.014(a) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an agreed temporary conservatorship order.

G. A. J. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-02-02(a)

Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code specifically provides for the appeal of certain interlocutory orders, but the order attached to appellant’s notice of appeal does not fall within one of section 51.014’s categories of approved orders.

Section 51.014(a)(4) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from an order that merely enforces an existing temporary injunction.

Michael J. DeLitta Axiom Medical Consulting, LLC Axiom Professionals, LLC Axiom Properties, LLC And DelCom Properties, L · filed 2014-11-07(a)(4)

We do not have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s decision to enforce a temporary injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4).

Section 51.014 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a temporary restraining order.

Perry v. New Penn Financial APD/Austin Police Dept. Constable Pct. 5 Bharath Vasudevan And Hill Country P · filed 2017-11-02

No statute authorizes litigants to take an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a temporary restraining order.

Section 51.014(a) does not authorize an immediate appeal from an order transferring a case from one district court to another.

in the Matter of Lawrence Adams · filed 2018-07-26(a)

The trial court’s “Order of Transfer” is neither a final judgment nor an interlocutory order for which an appeal is authorized by statute and is therefore not an appealable order.

Section 51.014 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a guardian.

in the Matter of the Guardianship of Joe Poag, an Incapacitated Person · filed 2020-04-08

Further, there is no statutory provision authorizing an appeal from this interlocutory order. See generally TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014 (main interlocutory appeal statute).

Section 51.014 does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order.

in Re Robert Joseph Yezak · filed 2021-01-29

“Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction.” Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d at 352-53; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. No statutory provision permits an appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits appeals from orders granting temporary injunctions or denying motions to dissolve them, but not from orders denying motions to dissolve temporary restraining orders.

Darrell Buchanan and Canon House Builders, LLC, Vigor Testosterone and Weight Loss, PLLC, John Leondike, Lala Rodriguez, · filed 2025-11-25(a)(4)

Section 51.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction and from an order denying a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction, but it does not permit an appeal from an order denying a motion to dissolve a TRO.

A party challenging the initial appointment of a receiver must appeal within twenty days of the appointment order.

Fortenberry v. Cavanaugh · filed 2008-11-26(a)(1)

Given the nature of a receivership, a party's ability to seek termination or modification, and the policy reasons behind the twenty-day time limit to appeal, we conclude that the Fortenberrys were required to appeal the appointment of the receiver within twenty days from the October 27, 2006, order.

Section 51.014(1) permits an appeal of the original receivership order within 20 days, while subsection (2) permits an appeal after denial of a motion to vacate filed within 20 days of that order.

Sclafani v. Sclafani · filed 1994-02-10(1), (2)

A motion to vacate a receivership must be brought within 20 days of the order establishing the receivership. Once a receivership order is entered, a party opposed to the order may appeal the order directly, bringing his or her appeal within 20 days (consistent with section 51.014(1) and Tex.R.App.P. 42(a)(3)). Alternatively, the party may first move the trial court to vacate its order, and then upon denial of the motion, appeal the motion’s denial (consistent with section 51.-014(2) and Tex.R.App.P. 42(a)(3)).

Section 51.014(a)(2) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate an order appointing a receiver.

Robert T. O' Donnell v. Vargo · filed 2018-01-29(a)(2)

An order denying a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver is an appealable interlocutory order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(2) (West Supp. 2017).

Section 51.014(a)(8) generally confines review of an interlocutory governmental immunity appeal to the immunity ruling; when the order merges into a final judgment and the issues overlap, the court may address merits arguments.

Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District and Uvalde County v. Texas Tribune, ABC News, the Associated Press, CBS · filed 2025-07-16(a)(8)

For example, in an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, appellate review is generally confined to the trial court’s ruling on governmental immunity and doesn’t include review of the merits of the underlying claims. ... Given the overlap of issues and the lack of clear guidance, we will address the parties’ merits arguments in the interest of judicial efficiency.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit’s jurisdictional plea to jurisdictional grounds, even when the plea is raised in a summary judgment motion.

The City of Castle Hills v. Robinson · filed 2024-02-28(a)(8)

In an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(8), an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider summary judgment grounds other than those concerning the jurisdictional plea.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal of a temporary injunction, but review is limited to the portion granting or denying injunctive relief.

Michael Easton and Maria Easton v. Brasch · filed 2009-02-19(a)(4)

When a portion of an order is injunctive, and another portion is not, we may review only that portion granting or denying injunctive relief and may not address the other portions.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an appellate court reviewing a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction to address ripeness even when the plea did not raise it.

Harris County Municipal District Number 156 v. United Somerset Corporation · filed 2008-09-04(a)(8)

We hold that we have jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal to address ripeness, even though that matter was not part of the plea to the jurisdiction before the trial court.

Section 51.014(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a temporary injunction, but that appeal does not permit review of other non-appealable interlocutory orders.

Reliance Title Company v. State Board of Insurance · filed 1994-11-02(4)

Because the appeal is an interlocutory one from the denial of a request for temporary injunction, the only issue before this Court is the denial of injunctive relief. A party may not use the appeal of an appealable, interlocutory order to obtain review of non-appealable interlocutory orders.

Section 51.014(5) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment to the qualified-immunity ground.

Ronald E. Wolfington Paul Mikulin And Cindy Petras v. McKinzie · filed 1994-12-07(5)

In this interlocutory appeal, we may consider the denial of the motion only on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a denied plea to the jurisdiction when the plea challenges jurisdiction over all claims against the defendant.

Aledo Independent School District v. Choctaw Properties, L.L.C. · filed 2000-03-22(a)(8)

We believe it does not serve the legislative purposes for which interlocutory appeals of pleas to the jurisdiction were allowed to fragment the appeal on less than the entire case against a defendant. In this instance Aledo has alleged that the district court does not have jurisdiction of any of Choctaw's claims against Aledo; thus, the interlocutory appeal is proper.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits a governmental unit to appeal an order granting or denying its plea to the jurisdiction even when the plea is based on grounds other than sovereign immunity.

City of Austin v. L. S. Ranch, Ltd., and Circle C Land Corp. · filed 1998-06-11(a)(8)

Therefore, a governmental unit that has been sued is not limited to the issue of sovereign immunity, but may file a plea to the jurisdiction on any appropriate basis. ... The language of section 51.014(a)(8) does not contain the suggested limitation. ... We conclude that the present interlocutory appeal was proper under section 51.014(a)(8).

On an interlocutory appeal from a special appearance ruling under § 51.014(a)(7), factual determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion and legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

Magnolia Gas Company, L.L.C. and MKP Production Company, L.L.C. v. Knight Equipment & Manufacturing Corporation · filed 1998-09-23(a)(7)

Thus, the abuse of discretion standard is more appropriate than factual sufficiency review, at least in the interlocutory setting.

Section 51.014(a)(8) allows interlocutory review of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, but does not authorize review of the case’s merits before final judgment.

Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley · filed 1999-12-16(a)(8)

We decline to permit TxDOT to use this interlocutory appeal as a vehicle to circumvent the bounds set by the statute in order to obtain judicial review of the merits of Sunset Valley's case before the district court has rendered a final judgment.

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a special appearance; the appeal can include review of a discovery sanction that made the same jurisdictional finding.

Charly Publishing Ltd. v. Erickson · filed 2000-10-05(a)(7)

However, when the trial court overruled the Charly companies’ special appearances, it rendered an appealable interlocutory order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) (West Supp. 2000). ... Because the factual bases of the two court orders are identical and because the court can entertain an interlocutory appeal of the special appearance order, this Court will review that portion of the discovery sanction resulting in the factual determination alongside the denial of the companies’ special appearances.

Section 51.014(a)(6) permits a media defendant to appeal the denial of a summary-judgment motion based at least partly on free-speech grounds, with review extending to every claim raised in the motion.

Cox Texas Newpapers, L.P. D/B/A the Austin American-Statesman v. Wootten · filed 2001-07-26(a)(6)

Moreover, in the interest of judicial economy, we may consider on appeal any claim raised in the media defendant's motion and denied by the trial court, so long as the motion was based at least in part on free-speech grounds. Delta Air Lines , 949 S.W.2d at 429. Because the Statesman asserts in part that its actions are protected as conduct of a free press, the trial court's denial of the Statesman's motion for summary judgment is reviewable in its entirety.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits interlocutory review of a summary-judgment denial based on official immunity, but does not give the appellate court jurisdiction over unrelated issues raised in the motion.

Nueces County v. Morales · filed 2001-11-21(a)(5)

Interlocutory appeal is only available for assertion of immunity, and not other issues advanced in a motion for summary judgment. ... We hold that this Court has jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of summary judgment, but only to the extent that the denial of summary judgment was based on a finding that the individual appellants were not entitled to official immunity.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction to review of the ruling on that plea.

Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v. Paul J. Pitonyak, Jr. · filed 2002-07-25(a)(8)

This appeal is strictly limited to our review of the trial court's ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014 limits interlocutory review to matters for which it permits an appeal, even when other issues raised below could dispose of the case.

Arthur Ware, Individually and as Potter County Judge v. Terry Miller, Potter County Constable, Precinct 2 · filed 2002-08-08(a)

It is well established that in an interlocutory appeal, we may only address those matters for which such an appeal is permitted by section 51.014.

Section 51.014(a)(5) limits interlocutory review of a summary judgment denial based on immunity to the immunity issue.

Fernandez, Michael Joseph v. Rivera · filed 2002-08-30(a)(5)

However, our interlocutory review of the denial of Fernandez's motion for summary judgment is limited to determining whether he is immune from the claims presented by Rivera.

Section 51.014(a)(3)'s limited interlocutory appeal of a class certification order does not prevent review of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Warner-Lambert Co. v. Mills · filed 2003-09-11(a)(3)

The fact that the instant cause is before us under an otherwise limited right-of-appeal is of no import. As the Texas Supreme Court has observed, § 51.014(a)(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not supplant the constitutional requirement that a reviewing court have subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits interlocutory review to the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction.

Nueces County, Texas, (Former) Commissioner Roy Hinojosa and (Former) County Judge Richard Borchard v. Thornton · filed 2004-03-04(a)(8)

The appeal is limited to our review of the trial court's ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2003); Ferguson , 97 S.W.3d at 213.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction; the narrow exception is strictly construed to limit review to that ruling.

Bexar Metropolitan Water District v. City of Bulverde, Texas Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority City of Boerne And City of · filed 2004-11-18(a)(8)

Because the statute authorizing interlocutory appeals is a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable, we must give it a strict construction. ... Thus, we will limit our discussion to the narrow issue that is before us, the question of whether the trial court erred in denying BexarMet's plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment based on a public officer's immunity, with review limited to the immunity ruling.

the City of Laredo and Agustin Dovalina, III v. Leal · filed 2004-12-29(a)(5)

Our jurisdiction over Leal's procedural and substantive due process claims extends only to the trial court's order denying of Dovalina's motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp.2004) (expressly permitting appeal from order denying motion for summary judgment based on assertion of immunity by individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state). We therefore do not address the parties' arguments on the merits of these claims.

An interlocutory appeal from a temporary injunction does not permit review of the trial court’s denial of a summary judgment motion.

Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. City of Sunset Valley, Texas Save Barton Creek Association, Inc. and Save Our Springs Allia · filed 2004-12-09(a)(4)

The arguments concern matters that were raised in its motion for summary judgment that was denied. We do not review the trial court’s denial of that motion in this interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction only as to grounds the trial court ruled on.

HOUSTON MUN. EMP. PENSION SYSTEM v. Ferrell · filed 2005-05-20(a)(8)

In the present case, HMEPS's appeal is limited to the specific "interlocutory order" of the county court at law denying its "plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(8). Because the trial court, in its interlocutory order, expressly denied HMEPS's motion to dismiss solely on the basis of immunity and did not rule on the grounds asserted in HMEPS's third and fourth issues, we hold that no interlocutory appeal based on these additional grounds is authorized.

Section 51.014(a)(5) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an immunity-based summary judgment motion to the immunity question.

Texas State Technical College v. Ralph Cressman, Paula Schnizer, Joe Magourik, Greg Mosby and Jimmy Daws · filed 2005-08-03(a)(5)

However, the scope of this interlocutory appeal is limited by section 51.014(a)(5) to the immunity question.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, but does not authorize review of a separate Chapter 2251 claim.

Longview Independent School District v. Vibra-Whirl, Ltd. · filed 2005-08-04(a)(8)

We have jurisdiction concerning the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as authorized by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. art. 51.014(8). There is no statute authorizing appellate jurisdiction of an interlocutory order concerning the Chapter 2251 claim.

Section 51.014 does not permit individual defendants to pursue an interlocutory appeal when the only order before the court denies a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction.

Elgin Independent School District, Emilia Lopez and Dora Morua v. R. N., a Minor Child by Victoria Newman, Individually · filed 2006-03-02(4), (8)

In the context of this record and our limited jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(4), (8) (West Supp. 2005), there are no issues properly before us that the individual defendants would have standing to raise. Thus, to the extent Lopez and Morua are appealing, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(5) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on an officer’s or employee’s immunity claim, but does not authorize review of grounds unrelated to immunity.

Castillo v. Flores · filed 2006-03-02(5)

Second, to the extent that the order denying summary judgment was based on a ground other than official immunity, we have no subject-matter jurisdiction to review it in this interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit interlocutory review of a jurisdictional claim that was neither included in the plea to the jurisdiction nor considered by the trial court.

Austin Independent School District v. Lowery · filed 2006-11-30(a)(8)

Although subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time in an appeal from a final judgment, section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code does not grant this Court jurisdiction to review claims that were neither included in the plea to the jurisdiction nor considered by the district court.

Section 51.014(a)(6) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the portion of an order granting summary judgment.

Cox Texas Newspapers, L.P. D/B/A the Smithville Times Cox Texas Partners, Inc. D/B/A the Smithville Times And Tyanna Tyl · filed 2007-02-13(a)(6)

Interlocutory appeal of the portion of the order granting appellants' summary judgment motion is not permitted by section 51.014(a)(6).

Section 51.014(a)(6) permits interlocutory review of a denied summary judgment only as to claims challenged on free speech grounds.

Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF Inc. D/B/A Brand FX Body Company · filed 2007-03-29(a)(6)

Having concluded that we have jurisdiction to review by interlocutory appeal only the portion of the trial court’s order denying summary judgment on Brand FX’s claims that Astoria challenged on free speech grounds, we dismiss Astoria’s appeal except as it relates to Brand FX’s business disparagement, false advertising, and tortious interference claims.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from the grant of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction; failing to take that appeal does not prevent an appeal after final judgment.

in Re James A. Roughley · filed 2007-03-30(a)(8)

All that Relator has lost is the opportunity to pursue an interlocutory appeal from TDCJ’s dismissal under section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code. ... The failure to pursue an interlocutory appeal does not prevent a party from pursuing an appeal after the trial court renders a final, appealable judgment or order.

Section 51.014(4) limits an interlocutory appeal of a temporary injunction to challenging that injunction; it does not provide a way to seek dismissal or a stay of the entire suit.

In Re AutoNation, Inc. · filed 2007-06-29(4)

The interlocutory appeal was necessarily limited to challenging the anti-suit injunction against litigating the dispute in Florida or elsewhere, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(4), while the mandamus petition to this Court seeks dismissal of the entire Texas action, or alternatively a stay of the suit.

An interlocutory appeal from the denial of a temporary injunction reviews whether the trial court abused its discretion, not the merits of the underlying case.

Production Instruments Sales and Service, Inc. D/B/A Croft Services and Energy Maintenance Services Group I, LLC v. Fran · filed 2007-11-29(a)(4)

In an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of an application for temporary injunction, we decide only whether the court abused its discretion: we do not resolve the merits of the underlying case.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits an interlocutory appeal to review of the trial court’s ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction filed below.

City of Dallas v. Heard · filed 2008-04-22(a)(8)

Although subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal, our jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal is only to review the trial court’s ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction filed below.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits an interlocutory appeal to review of the ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction that was filed; the appellate court cannot consider grounds outside that plea.

UNIVERSITY OF TX SW. MED. CTR. v. Gentilello · filed 2008-07-18(a)(8)

Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the grant or denial of the plea to the jurisdiction that was filed. ... We do not have jurisdiction to consider grounds outside those raised in the plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(5) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction to jurisdictional issues; it does not permit review of fair market value or issues raised in partial summary judgment proceedings.

State v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. · filed 2008-09-11(a)(5)

We lack the jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal to reach the State’s contentions concerning the proper fair market value of Clear Channel’s billboard structure or other issues presented in connection with the partial summary judgment proceedings.

Section 51.014(a)(8) allows an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a governmental unit's plea to the jurisdiction, but does not authorize review of factual questions about the merits of the claim.

Texas Southern University v. Gilford · filed 2009-01-08(a)(8)

Pursuant to section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, we have no jurisdiction to determine fact questions regarding TSU's duty to Gilford as either an invitee or as a licensee, and we decline to do so.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a ruling on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, but review is limited to grounds raised in the plea and considered by the trial court.

Robert Scott, Commissioner of Education v. Alphonso Crutch Life Support Center · filed 2009-07-02(a)(8)

Because section 51.014 is a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable, we strictly construe what may be considered in an interlocutory appeal. ... Since neither the Commissioner’s arguments concerning education code section 7.057 nor his arguments concerning ultra vires claims were included in the Commissioner’s plea to the jurisdiction, the district court did not consider the arguments and did not issue any interlocutory order in response to the arguments. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction in this appeal to consider whether the School may rely on section 7.057 of the education code for jurisdiction or whether the Commissioner acted within his statutory authority.

Section 51.014(a)(6) permits appeal of an entire order denying summary judgment when the other claims depend on defamation claims and are therefore based in part on them.

Patricia Vice and Kathie Slotter v. Daniel J. Kasprzak, Patricia C. Kasprzak and Katherine D. Kasprzak · filed 2009-10-01(a)(6)

Because the Kasprzaks' claims for conspiracy and invasion of privacy are dependent upon their defamation claims, and thus are "based in part" upon their defamation claims, we hold that the trial court's denial of Vice and Slotter's motion for summary judgment is appealable in its entirety under section 51.014(a)(6).

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a temporary injunction, but review of a noncompete covenant’s enforceability is limited to what is needed to decide whether temporary relief was warranted.

Sadler Clinic Association, P.A. v. Nora C. Hart · filed 2010-01-14(a)(4)

In an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a temporary injunction based on a covenant not to compete, the appellate court addresses the enforceability of the covenant provisions only to the extent that they affect the analysis of whether the three elements required for issuance of a temporary injunction have been satisfied.

Section 51.014(d) limits agreed interlocutory appeals to controlling questions of law.

CSFB 1998-P1 Buffalo Speedway Office v. Amtech Elevator Services, Co. · filed 2010-08-19(d)

This complaint, by its very nature, could not have been brought in the previous appeal, because it is not “a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and because the total amount of attorney’s fees CSFB incurred in defending against Bridwell’s claims and prosecuting its claims against Amtech could not be determined on interlocutory appeal while the trial court still had jurisdiction and litigation was ongoing.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the appeal does not reach arguments omitted from the plea and never ruled on by the trial court.

Robert Scott, Commissioner of Education v. Alphonso Crutch LSC Charter School, Inc. · filed 2010-08-20(a)(8)

Because section 51.014 is a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable, we strictly construe what may be considered in an interlocutory appeal. ... Since the Commissioner’s arguments concerning the School’s equal protection claim were not included in the Commissioner’s plea to the jurisdiction, the district court did not consider the arguments and did not issue any interlocutory order in response to the arguments.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits interlocutory review to the grant or denial of the plea to the jurisdiction that was filed.

Creekstone Community Association, Inc. v. Houston Housing Authority, Individually and D/B/A/ Housing Authority of the Ci · filed 2010-12-16(a)(8)

We do not consider the merits of the case; our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the grant or denial of the plea to the jurisdiction that was filed.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an appellate court, in these circumstances, to consider a jurisdictional ground that was not raised in the plea to the jurisdiction.

Texas State Board of Public Accountancy v. Carl Bass, Thomas Bauer and Patricia Grutzmacher · filed 2011-01-14(a)(8)

At least under the circumstances present here, we conclude that we do possess jurisdiction to address the Board's assertions relating to Heinrich and the proper defendants in an ultra vires suit even if that ground was not raised in the Board's plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits interlocutory review of a plea to the jurisdiction to grounds raised in the plea and considered by the trial court.

Plano Miller Club, Inc., a Not-For-Profit Texas Corporation And Adventure Plus Enterprises, Inc., D/B/A the… · filed 2011-01-14(a)(8)

We are limited, however, to considering the ground the State advanced in the trial court. See id . ("Although subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time in an appeal from a final judgment, section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code does not grant this Court jurisdiction to review claims that were neither included in the plea to the jurisdiction nor considered by the district court.").

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction, but the limited jurisdiction in that appeal does not permit the appellate court to render a take-nothing judgment to effectuate a settlement.

Hays Consolidated Independent School District v. Drake · filed 2010-12-10(a)(8)

This is an interlocutory appeal from a district court order denying a plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West 2008). ... Given the limited scope of our subject-matter jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal, we grant the joint motion only to the extent of rendering judgment dismissing this appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a ruling on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, but does not permit review of a res judicata defense.

the City of Houston v. Joslyn M. Johnson, Individually and as for the Estate of Rodney Johnson · filed 2011-08-16(a)(8)

We therefore lack jurisdiction to address that argument in this interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit interlocutory review of claims that were neither raised in the plea to the jurisdiction nor considered by the trial court.

Carlos Diaz De Leon, Daniel Marquez, Kimo Sylva and Gabriel Morales v. City of El Paso, Texas and Officer Rodriguez-Acev · filed 2011-10-26(a)(8)

We decline to address these new arguments. "Although subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time in an appeal from a final judgment, section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code does not grant this Court jurisdiction to review claims that were neither included in the plea to the jurisdiction nor considered by the [trial] court."

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits interlocutory review of a governmental unit’s jurisdictional challenge but does not permit review of factual arguments about the merits.

Rufus F. Banks v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2012-03-08(a)(8)

Because our review is limited to the “pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry,” we hold that this Court lacks jurisdiction to address the factual arguments the District designated as “on the merits.”

Permission for an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(d) must identify the controlling question of law in the trial court's order, as required by Rule 168.

Long v. State of Texas · filed 2012-07-25(d)

Rule 168 of the rules of civil procedure, which implements section 51.014(d), provides: ... The permission must identify the controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion , and must state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. ... Rule 168 plainly requires the court, in the portion of the order that grants permission to appeal, to identify the controlling question of law at issue.

Section 51.014 interlocutory appeals are considered using the live pleading on file when the trial court entered the appealable order.

Denton County Electric Cooperative, Inc. D/B/A CoServ Electric v. Nicole Hackett, Individually and on Behalf of Others S · filed 2012-05-10

And, generally, under civil practice and remedies code section 51.014, we consider the live pleading on file at the time the trial court entered its appealable interlocutory order.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction and allows the appellate court to consider a newly raised challenge to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Garcia v. Kubosh · filed 2012-06-18(a)(8)

This Court has interpreted section 51.014(a)(8) as granting interlocutory jurisdiction over newly-raised challenges to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the case in which the appealed-from order was issued. ... Thus, in this interlocutory appeal, we consider the Sheriff and Attorney General’s contention that sovereign immunity from suit deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the bondsmen’s surviving claim.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a governmental unit’s jurisdictional challenge, but limits appellate review to jurisdictional issues rather than the merits.

Spring Branch Management District v. Valco Instruments Company, L.P. and Property Redevelopment IV, L.P. · filed 2012-07-12(a)(8)

Because our review is limited to the “pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry,” we hold that this Court lacks jurisdiction to address the factual arguments the District designated as “on the merits.”

An interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is limited to grounds considered by the trial court.

Dimmit County Memorial Hospital v. CPM Medical, LLC · filed 2012-04-25(a)(8)

Our review of the plea to the jurisdiction should be limited to what was considered by the trial court.

Section 51.014(a)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but declining that appeal does not prevent a challenge after final judgment.

Brawley v. Huddleston · filed 2012-12-06(a)(1)

Huddleston additionally argues that Gilda’s first issue is unpersuasive because she did not pursue an interlocutory appeal of the order appointing a receiver, as she could have done, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.507 (West 2006), but Huddleston directs us to no authority holding that Gilda’s decision to not pursue an interlocutory appeal of the order appointing a receiver somehow prohibits her from raising the same issue now in a direct appeal after a final judgment has been entered. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (stating that a person ―may‖ appeal from an interlocutory order under certain circumstances).

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits an interlocutory appeal from a governmental unit’s summary judgment motion to review of the motion as a plea to the jurisdiction.

Mesquite Independent School District v. Mendoza · filed 2013-06-03(a)(8)

Our jurisdiction over this appeal, however, is limited to reviewing the motion for summary judgment as a plea to the jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, but does not permit review of a separate, otherwise nonappealable jurisdictional ruling.

Bedell v. State · filed 2013-06-05(a)(8)

There is no final trial-court order or judgment in the record, and section 51.014 does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an individual’s motions asserting that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over him in an agency’s collection claims against him.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law and a showing that immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation; interpreting an unambiguous contract does not necessarily meet those requirements.

Trailblazer Health Enterprises, LLC and Blue Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina v. Boxer F2, L.P. · filed 2013-09-23(d)

Appellants have not shown that they meet this standard. First, while the interpretation of an unambiguous contract provision is a question of law and not of fact, we do not find the interpretation of the provision at issue here to be a “controlling issue of law.” Second, as appellee points out in its response, there are several other issues in the litigation; there is no evidence that the ultimate termination of the litigation would be advanced by allowing this appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction to issues properly raised in that plea.

KIPP, Inc. v. Whitehead · filed 2014-08-12(a)(8)

KIPP’s interlocutory appeal, however, is limited to those issues properly raised in its plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2013).

Section 51.014 limits an interlocutory appeal to the order before the appellate court; the appeal does not give the court jurisdiction over the entire case.

Beaumont Independent School District, Timothy Chargois, Patricia Lambert, Sybil Comeaux, and Jessie Haynes v. Rey · filed 2014-10-09

Although they are nominally appellants, Reynolds’s claims against Lambert, Comeaux, and Haynes are outside the scope of the order that is before this Court in an accelerated appeal. As a result, this Court cannot determine whether those claims present a justiciable controversy at this time.

Section 51.014(d) requires a trial court’s written permission before a party may petition the appellate court for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Faire v. FMP SA Management Group · filed 2015-06-03(d)

Faire argues this court should grant her petition as a matter of judicial economy, but her petition does not allege that she first obtained permission from the trial court that is required by the statute she cites. ... Because Faire failed to show she complied with the statutory requirements, we deny her petition for permission to appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(7) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a special appearance, and the appellate court may also address whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying cause.

Industrial Product Formulators of America, Inc. v. Rockford Business Interiors, Inc. · filed 2015-10-14(a)(7)

Although Formulators has invoked our jurisdiction solely under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(7), which is addressed to an interlocutory order that “grants or denies the special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,” we have jurisdiction to address whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying cause.

An interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(9) can include review of an otherwise unappealable summary-judgment order to the extent that ruling bears on the validity of the appealable order.

Verticor, Ltd. v. Wood · filed 2015-11-13(a)(9)

Our statutory grant of jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal also extends to reviewing the district court’s otherwise-unappealable interlocutory summary-judgment order, to the extent that ruling bears upon the validity of the appealable order.

Section 51.014(d) permits interlocutory appeal when an order involves a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and immediate appeal may materially advance the litigation’s end.

Kyle Anderson, M.D. v. Suzanne Stiniker, as Administrator of the Estate of Mike Stone and as Guardian of the Person and · filed 2016-06-15(d)

We find that the order Anderson seeks to appeal does involve a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Subsection (d) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal of a controlling legal issue on which the trial court did not substantively rule.

Adam M. Borowski, M.D., Brian D. Bull, M.D., and Hillcrest Family Health Center v. Karen Ayers, Individually and as Repr · filed 2016-10-12(d)

The trial court did not deny their summary judgment motion on this ground, and subsection 51.014(d) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal when the trial court does not substantively rule on the controlling legal issue being appealed.

Section 51.014(a)(1) limits an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing a receiver to the receiver appointment.

Ortiz v. Ortiz · filed 2016-10-20(a)(1)

We do not consider Juan’s argument because our jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal extends only to the trial court’s appointment of a receiver.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not permit a court to consider a request to vacate an underlying tax assessment in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.

Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts for the State of Texas Glenn Hegar, Individually and in His Official Capaci · filed 2017-04-13(a)(8)

We further do not consider appellees’ request to vacate the underlying tax assessment in this interlocutory appeal from the denial of appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8).

Section 51.014(d) limits a permissive interlocutory appeal to the controlling issue of law identified in the trial court’s order.

Texas Windstorm Insurance Association v. Jones · filed 2016-12-15(d)

The scope of the permissive appeal is thus ... limited to consideration of this controlling issue.

Section 51.014(d) limits review in a permissive interlocutory appeal to the controlling legal question identified by the trial court.

Lakes of Rosehill Homeowners Association, Inc. v. David Bruce Jones, Gregory Kaspar, Patricia Kaspar, Wendell Budisalovi · filed 2018-06-12(d)

The parties may not add to the trial court’s description of the controlling legal question. ... We granted the Association’s petition for permission to appeal to address one controlling question of law identified by the trial court. We therefore do not address other matters argued in the parties’ briefs.

Section 51.014(a)(12) does not permit interlocutory review of a TCPA constitutional challenge when the trial court did not rule on that challenge in its order denying a motion to dismiss.

Anna Abatecola, Robert Abatecola, Hi-Tech Concrete Pumping Services PCD, LLC and Abatecola Leasing v. 2 Savages Concrete · filed 2018-06-26(a)(12)

This court recently held that we have no interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over such a challenge when the trial court’s interlocutory order denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss under the TCPA does not include a ruling on constitutionality. ... The trial court did not rule on the constitutional challenges in its August 4, 2017 order denying the motion to dismiss or otherwise. Consequently, we cannot consider 2 Savages and Lowry’s argument that the TCPA is unconstitutional on interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(7) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a special appearance to whether the trial court erred in denying it.

Momentum Engineering, LLC, James C. Larsen and Fran Larsen v. Tabler · filed 2018-08-23(a)(7)

The parties disagree about whether Momentum was intentionally deceptive regarding its contacts, but in this interlocutory appeal, we have jurisdiction only to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Momentum’s special appearance. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (West Supp. 2017).

Section 51.014(f) permits the court to limit a permissive appeal to the controlling question of law identified by the trial court.

David D. Scott and Mary J. Scott v. Robert G. West, Thyra West, Judith C. Clark, Sallie Clingman, Gregory P. Miller, Gay · filed 2018-09-20(f)

We will determine only the narrow issue identified by the trial court as the controlling question of law: “the question of whether Plaintiffs or Defendants have the legal duty to repair or replace the subject retaining wall.” To the extent Appellants seek to expand the issue or to obtain a broader ruling, that relief is denied.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an appellate court reviewing the denial of a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction to consider jurisdictional arguments raised in a summary judgment motion.

Human Services of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Goffney · filed 2018-09-27(a)(8)

The substance of the arguments contained in Spindletop’s motion for summary judgment also implicate jurisdiction, so we consider those as part of our review of Spindletop’s plea to the jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal when a governmental unit’s Rule 91a motion results in dismissal on sovereign-immunity grounds, but does not permit review of a separate dismissal on nonjurisdictional grounds in the same order.

Johnson v. State of Texas, Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2018-11-20(a)(8)

And the trial court granted appellees’ challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity and dismissed Johnson’s tort claims. Accordingly, we hold that we have jurisdiction to review the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Johnson’s tort claims on the basis of sovereign immunity. ... Although the trial court, in its order, dismissed Johnson’s claim for violation of his constitutional rights, neither Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014, nor any other statute, permits an interlocutory appeal from that portion of the trial court’s order.

Section 51.014(d) requires a trial court order granting permission for an interlocutory appeal; an order merely abating the case pending appeal does not suffice.

BPHC, LLC, as Successor in Interest of KORR, LLC v. Perkins Sr. · filed 2019-01-24(d)

The abatement order does not suffice to grant permission under section 51.014(d).

Section 51.014(d) requires the trial court’s permission for a permissive appeal to be stated in a written order.

Lennie Jackson, Individually and Derivative of BL Enterprise LLC v. Patten Law Firm · filed 2019-03-05(d)

The trial court’s permission must be stated in a written order. Hebert v. JJT Const., 438 S.W.3d 139, 142 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Because appellant has not shown that the trial court granted him permission to appeal, there is no basis for appeal and we deny appellant’s petition for permission to appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(8) permits an interlocutory appeal of a ruling on a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction, but that appeal does not reach a challenge to the potential recovery of exemplary damages.

State v. Jimmy Glen Riemer, Richard Coon, Jr., June Meetze Coon Trust, Hap Johnson Realty Co., LLC, and W.R. Edwards, Jr · filed 2019-03-07(a)(8)

For that reason, the State’s final issue challenging the potential recovery of exemplary damages lies outside the scope of our limited interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.

Section 51.014(a)(6) permits an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a summary judgment motion on both covered and noncovered grounds when the motion is based in part on a covered media claim or defense.

Dallas Symphony Association, Inc. A/K/A Dallas Symphony Orchestra v. Reyes · filed 2019-03-08(a)(6)

A fair reading of Section 51.014(a)(6) allows the Orchestra to appeal from the order denying the motion on its defenses to both Reyes’ defamation claim and his tortious interference claim.

Section 51.014(a)(5) allows an interlocutory appeal only to the extent the challenge is based on an assertion of official immunity.

Jerry Sanchez, Timothy Wiliams, and Jose Estrada v. Boone · filed 2019-03-19(a)(5)

We thus are bound to follow our precedent in Hernandez: that we have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals under section 51.014(a)(5) only to the extent that they are “based on the assertion of official immunity.”

Section 51.014(a)(12) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss, but including forum and venue challenges in that motion does not make those separate challenges appealable.

Cliff Santellana and Gulf-Tex Roofing & Services, LLC D/B/A Gulf-Tex Roofing & Services v. Centimark Corporation · filed 2019-04-02(a)(12)

Although we have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the denial of a motion to dismiss under the TCPA, and Santellana and Gulf-Tex included forum and venue arguments in their motion to dismiss, Santellana’s and Gulf-Tex’s improper forum and venue arguments are separate and independent grounds for dismissal or transfer, respectively.

Section 51.014(a)(5) permits an interlocutory appeal based on an assertion of official immunity, but does not give the appellate court jurisdiction to consider unrelated challenges to the claim.

Jerry Sanchez, Timothy Wiliams, and Jose Estrada v. Boone · filed 2019-05-16(a)(5)

This argument—based on the lack of evidence to support Boone’s theft claim—is not an assertion of immunity. See id. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address this issue. See id.

Section 51.014(a)(12) permits interlocutory review of an order denying a TCPA motion to dismiss, but not a separate order ruling on evidentiary objections.

Ray v. Fikes · filed 2019-12-05(a)(12)

Our interlocutory, appellate jurisdiction allows review of only the trial court’s order denying Ray’s TCPA motion to dismiss, not the trial court’s separate order sustaining and overruling Ray’s evidentiary objections to Gallagher’s affidavit.

Section 51.014 does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a summary judgment motion or a private party’s plea to the jurisdiction without authorization for an appeal as of right or a certified permissive appeal.

A-Medical Advantage Healthcare Systems, Associated, Kevin Williams, M.D., Advantage Medical Clinic, Inc., John Zacharias · filed 2019-12-31

As Appellants have not established that they are entitled to either an “interlocutory appeal as of right” or a “permissive interlocutory appeal” as to the denial of their motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction, we have no jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ first and second issues.

In a permissive appeal under Section 51.014, an unbriefed interlocutory ruling unrelated to the certified controlling questions is outside the scope of review.

MRC Permian Company/Point Energy Partners Permian LLC TJ Bar, LLC Tubb Memorial, an Oregon Limited Partnership PlainsCap · filed 2021-04-28

The trial court’s granting of Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s estoppel claim does not appear to be dependent upon our answers to any of the controlling questions of law raised by the trial court and certified by this Court, nor was the issue briefed by either party. As a result, this ruling by the trial court remains an interlocutory order not subject to review in this appeal.

Section 51.014(d) limits a permissive interlocutory appeal to the controlling legal questions identified by the trial court.

City of Houston, Texas v. Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Association, Local 341 · filed 2021-05-06(d)

These two issues are not within the scope of this permissive interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) permits an interlocutory appeal only when the trial court’s order expressly grants permission and identifies the controlling question of law.

Estate of James Tenison, Diane Tenison, Administrator of Estate and Next of Kin, Diane Tenison, Individually, Margie Ten · filed 2021-07-26(d)

The order must explicitly state that the trial court grants permission to appeal and identify the controlling question of law.

Section 51.014(a)(8) does not authorize interlocutory review of a lost-wages offset issue that does not challenge the trial court’s jurisdictional ruling.

City of Richland Hills, Texas v. Childress · filed 2021-09-16(a)(8)

To the extent the City asks us to hold that, if the case proceeds, the trial court must offset Childress’s lost wages by amounts from her current employment and City retirement, we do not have authority to reach this argument in this interlocutory appeal. This argument does not involve a challenge to the trial court’s ruling on the jurisdictional issue, and the City cites no other law giving us authority to review this issue in an interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(d) requires a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for disagreement and a showing that an immediate appeal may materially advance the end of the litigation.

Jarman v. Belinda Dianne Jarman Brown Cosby and Cheryl Lynn Jarman Foster · filed 2021-10-28(d)

To be to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise entitled be appealable, the requesting party must establish that (1) the order to be appealed involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and (2) an immediate appeal from the order “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d); see also Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(a), (e)(4); Tex. R. Civ. P. 168. After reviewing the petition, the record, appellees’ response, and appellant’s reply, we conclude that the petition does not meet the requirements for a permissive interlocutory appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(12) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a TCPA dismissal motion only as to claims addressed by that motion.

Cecilia Soo and Ken Soo v. Timothy G. Pletta, Trustee, for and on Behalf of the Ann H. Pletta and Timothy G. Pletta Revo · filed 2022-01-14(a)(12)

Because the Soos have not filed any such motion,21 Pletta’s slander claim was unaffected by the denial by operation of law of the Soos’s TCPA motion and is not properly before us in this appeal.

Section 51.014(a)(12) permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss, but does not permit review of dismissal arguments unrelated to the TCPA.

Gilani v. Thomas Wayne Rigney and Rigney Financial Services, LLC · filed 2022-03-10(a)(12)

We have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction solely over a review of the trial court’s denial of Gilant’s motion to dismiss filed under the TCPA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(12). Gilani’s dismissal arguments that are not based on the TCPA fall outside this narrow grant of appellate jurisdiction and we may not address them in this appeal.

Section 51.014(d) permits review of the certified legal issue and all fairly included subsidiary and ancillary issues once a permissive interlocutory appeal is accepted.

Elephant Insurance Company, Llc v. Lorraine Kenyon, Individually and as of the Estate of Theodore Kenyon · filed 2022-04-22(d)

In doing so, permissive appeals are resolved according to the same principles as any other appeal, including addressing all fairly included subsidiary issues and ancillary issues pertinent to resolving the controlling legal issue.

Section 51.014(a)(9) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to serve an expert report; that appeal can include review of a related deadline modification when the dismissal ruling turns on it.

Oluwatosin L. Ajao M.D. v. Allison Turner Hall · filed 2022-08-02(a)(9)

Although the modification of the expert-report deadline pursuant to the Emergency Orders is not “an extension under Section 74.351,” there is no authority making an emergency modification ruling independently appealable. Here, however, the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ajao’s motion to dismiss turns on whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Hall’s motion to modify the deadline. On these facts, our review of modification ruling falls within the scope of the statutorily authorized appeal of the order denying Ajao’s motion to dismiss.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal of the injunctive portion of an order that grants both injunctive and non-injunctive relief.

in the Estate of Soledad Banegas Shultz · filed 2022-09-08(a)(4)

Our jurisdiction to hear this appeal is limited to the appeal of an interlocutory order that grants or denies a request for temporary injunctive relief. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(4). When an order grants both temporary injunctive relief and non-injunctive relief, we possess interlocutory jurisdiction only over the injunctive portion of the trial court’s order.

Section 51.014(a)(12) permits a TCPA nonmovant’s cross-issue about attorney’s fees to be considered in an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss.

Zidan v. Alexander Zidan F/K/A Mohammed Zidan · filed 2022-11-30(a)(12)

We conclude we have interlocutory jurisdiction to consider Alex’s cross- issue. ... After noting the case presented a slightly different posture than in D Magazine, the court determined it would consider the nonmovant’s cross-appeal in light of D Magazine, the language of section 51.014(a)(12)34 and TCPA section 27.008(b),35 and in the interest of judicial economy. See Weller, 2020 WL 3582885, at *4. We do so here as well.

Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal of a ruling on a temporary injunction or a motion to dissolve one, but does not extend appellate jurisdiction to other parts of the same order.

Shawn Deane Gruss, as Independent of the Estate of Maurita J. Gallagher And Nuclear Sources and Services, Inc. v. Gary W · filed 2023-02-14(a)(4)

In addition, under binding precedent, an appeal under section 51.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code of the parts of an order or judgment in which the trial court grants or refuses a temporary injunction or grants or denies a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction does not give this court interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over other parts of the order or judgment.

Section 51.014(a)(9) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying relief sought under Section 74.351(b), but the appeal reaches only the order identified in the notice of appeal.

Kraig Pepper, D.O. v. Wilson · filed 2023-03-16(a)(9)

Although the Doctor filed an appeal invoking Section 51.014(a)(9), he did so of only one order that denied relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b)—the order denying the motion to dismiss based on the sole ground that the report was untimely.

Section 51.014(a)(15) does not authorize review of a separate partial summary judgment order when that order does not affect the validity of the appealable ruling on Section 97.002 immunity.

Austin Materials, LLC v. Christina Rosado, as Guardian for Sonia Troche, an Incapacitated Person Julizandra Cedeno Lyzan · filed 2023-05-26(a)(15)

We conclude that the validity of the trial court’s order denying Austin Materials’ motion for summary judgment based on Section 97.002 is not affected by its ruling that Austin Materials owed Troche a duty. Our jurisdiction under Section 51.014(a)(15) therefore does not extend to reviewing the trial court’s partial-summary judgment order.

Section 51.014(a)(12) permits review of attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions decided in an order denying a TCPA motion to dismiss.

Doe v. Cruz · filed 2023-08-09(a)(12)

We have jurisdiction to consider attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions because the trial court awarded fees to Cruz pursuant to the TCPA and denied Doe’s request for costs, fees, and sanctions pursuant to the TCPA in the trial court’s order denying Doe’s TCPA motion; we exercise our jurisdiction over these issues in the interest of judicial economy. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12) (authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order that “denies a motion to dismiss filed under [the TCPA]”); D Mag. Partners, L.P., 529 S.W.3d at 442 (addressing attorney’s-fees issue in interlocutory appeal from denial of TCPA motion “in the interest of judicial economy”).

Section 51.014(a)(12) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a TCPA motion to reviewing whether the trial court properly denied that motion.

Noble Capital Venture Fund, LLC TXPLCA, LLC And Noble Capital Ventures, LLC v. Revelry on the Boulevard, LLC Revelry Kit · filed 2023-08-17(a)(12)

To the extent Noble’s argument implicates the underlying merits of the litigation (including whether Lochrie Investments LLC was removed as manager of RKB), we lack jurisdiction to address those issues because we have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction solely to review whether the trial court properly denied Noble’s motion to dismiss filed under the TCPA.

Section 51.014(a)(12) allows an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a TCPA motion to dismiss, including review of TCPA fees, costs, and sanctions decided in that order.

Doe v. Cruz · filed 2023-11-29(a)(12)

We have jurisdiction to consider attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions because the trial court awarded fees to Cruz pursuant to the TCPA and denied Doe’s request for costs, fees, and sanctions pursuant to the TCPA in the trial court’s order denying Doe’s TCPA motion; we exercise our jurisdiction over these issues in the interest of judicial economy. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12) (authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order that “denies a motion to dismiss filed under [the TCPA]”); D Mag. Partners, L.P., 529 S.W.3d at 442 (addressing attorney’s-fees issue in interlocutory appeal from denial of TCPA motion “in the interest of judicial economy”).

Section 51.014(a)(12) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a TCPA motion to dismiss, but does not permit an appeal from an ancillary evidentiary ruling in the same order.

Mark Shepard, Brock Shepard, Christopher Newhouse, Westley Hinton, Skydancing Consultants Associates, Inc., and Structur · filed 2024-02-22(a)(12)

The trial court’s order sustaining the objection to Mark Shepard’s affidavit is an ancillary ruling contained within the same written interlocutory order that partially denied the appellants’ TCPA motion. We lack jurisdiction to consider this challenge, and we dismiss the appeal from the trial court’s evidentiary ruling.

Section 51.014(a)(12) limits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a TCPA motion to issues involving that motion.

Weldon v. the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity · filed 2024-03-07(a)(12)

Her second through fifth issues ask questions that do not involve a TCPA dismissal motion and that are therefore beyond the scope of this narrow interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(12).