75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802

Section 3802(d)(1) does not require proof of impairment; section 3802(d)(2) does.

Com. v. Kling, J. · filed 2026-01-16(d)(1)

We agree that the section 3802 verdicts in this case appear to be inconsistent with the homicide by vehicle while DUI charge, as the only substantive difference between the (d)(1) and (d)(2) violations is proof of impairment.

Section 3802(d)(2) allows drug impairment to be proved from the totality of the circumstances, including a driver’s appearance and field sobriety performance, without a blood sample.

Com. v. Norris, M. · filed 2025-10-03(d)(2)

Drug usage and impairment are assessed under the totality of the circumstances. ... Thus, there was sufficient evidence at trial to establish Norris was impaired by drug usage. She admitted to drug use, see N.T., 5/17/24, at 109-11, appeared dazed with glossy, bloodshot eyes, see id. at 46, and struggled in the field sobriety tests, see id. at 50. This evidence satisfied the impairment element of the statute.

Section 3802(d)(2) permits a drug-impaired-driving conviction based on circumstantial evidence of unsafe driving and observable impairment, even without expert opinion.

Com. v. Lavery, T. · filed 2026-01-12(d)(2)

Finally, we conclude that even without Trooper Treadway’s expert opinion, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction based on the totality of the circumstances and the facts that were within the ordinary knowledge of a layperson. ... In combination, this circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the factfinder to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Lavery was impaired by drugs to such an extent that he was unable to safely drive.

Section 3802(d)(1) requires proof of an enumerated controlled substance or its metabolite in the driver’s blood, but does not require impairment.

Com. v. Douglas, C., III · filed 2025-10-07(d)(1)

Appellant correctly indicates that section 3802(d)(1) does not require that a driver be impaired; it requires proof only that Appellant’s blood contained an enumerated controlled substance or a metabolite of the ... controlled substance.

Section 3802(d)(2) requires proof that drug impairment existed while the person drove; evidence of impairment only afterward is insufficient.

Com. v. Washington, K. · filed 2026-03-10(d)(2)

However, the Commonwealth did not establish that impairment was before or during the time Washington drove his vehicle.

Section 3802(d)(2) allows drug impairment to be proved through circumstantial evidence, including erratic driving, field sobriety test performance, and refusal of blood testing.

Com. v. Saccoach, A. · filed 2026-03-12(d)(2)

We emphasize that the totality of the circumstances, including Appellant’s erratic driving, performance on the SFSTs, and subsequent refusal to submit to blood testing, provided adequate circumstantial evidence of Appellant’s usage of a controlled substance.

Section 3802(d)(2) covers drugs that are not controlled substances when they impair a person’s ability to drive safely.

Com. v. Walsh, E. · filed 2026-03-16(d)(2)

Accordingly, we conclude the term “drugs” as used in section 3802(d)(2) is not limited to controlled substances.

Section 3802(d)(2) does not require expert testimony or laboratory testing to prove that drugs impaired a person's ability to drive safely; circumstantial evidence can establish impairment.

Com. v. Miller, M. · filed 2026-03-25(d)(2)

However, we note again that there simply is no requirement that the Commonwealth adduce expert testimony to establish this element of the offense.

Section 3802(d)(1) prohibits medical marijuana users from driving after consuming any amount of marijuana, regardless of how they consumed it.

Com. v. Stalford, D. · filed 2026-04-20(d)(1)

While Appellant asserts that Trooper Tamecki could have smelled burning oil or wax, medical marijuana users cannot operate a vehicle after consuming any amount of marijuana, regardless of the method of consumption.

Section 3802(d)(2) does not require a drug to be detected in the defendant’s body to sustain a conviction.

Com. v. Brown, S. · filed 2026-06-03(d)(2)

Further, although Brown did not submit to any drug testing, we ... emphasize that there is no requirement that a drug must be detected in the defendant’s body in order to sustain a conviction under section 3802(d)(2).

Section 3802(d)(2) requires proof that drug use impaired the driver’s ability to drive safely; observations and field sobriety tests can establish impairment.

Com. v. King, L. · filed 2026-06-24(d)(2)

Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that King had used marijuana to a degree that impaired his ability to safely drive when Trooper Pisker stopped him.

Section 3802(d)(2) does not require expert testimony to prove drug-impaired driving.

Com. v. Westerfer, J. · filed 2026-06-26(d)(2)

This argument is of no avail, because Griffith held that expert testimony is not required for a conviction under § 3802(d)(2), and because Officer Honick’s training and experience is similar to what the courts found acceptable in Griffith, Spence, and Nestor.

Section 3802(d)(1)(ii) excepts medically prescribed Schedule II substances, including methadone, from its DUI prohibition.

Boni v. Zoning Hearing Board · filed 2007-01-31(d)(1)(ii)

However, it is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature has specifically addressed this objection by allowing an exception from the DUI law for persons taking a Schedule II substance (which methadone is) that is “medically prescribed.” See 75 Pa.C.S. §3802 (d)(l)(ii).

Section 3802(d)(2) requires expert testimony connecting a prescription drug in a driver’s blood to impaired driving ability.

Commonwealth v. Eggert · filed 2010-07-26(d)(2)

Accordingly, this court was fully aware of the effects that 170 nanograms of Oxycodone per millileter had on appellant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle, Dr. Barbieri’s expert opinion was legally sufficient.

Section 3802(d)(2) does not require a driver’s blood alcohol content to exceed the legal limit for a drug impairment DUI charge.

Harvard v. Cesnalis · filed 2020-09-01(d)(2)

Under Pennsylvania law, a person’s BAC need not be above the legal limit for a DUI charge, however, we note that Cesnalis could observe that Harvard was a large man.

Section 3802’s driving element may be proved through circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Sabol, A. · filed 2024-07-02(a), (c)

Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude the officers’ testimony was so unreliable or as a matter of law that it could not support circumstantial evidence of the driving element of Sabol’s convictions.

Section 3802(d)(2) requires the Commonwealth to prove that the accused was the person who drove, operated, or controlled the vehicle.

Com. v. Perry, D. · filed 2024-05-10(d)(2)

Thus, the Commonwealth must establish that the accused was the “individual” or “person” who drove, operated or was in control of the vehicle.

Sections 3802(a)(1) and (c) allow circumstantial evidence to establish that a person drove after drinking, even without direct evidence of when the driving occurred.

Com. v. Geist, J. · filed 2023-12-15(a)(1), (c)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence was sufficient to prove that Geist had driven to the parking lot immediately prior to the arrival of the police. It was also sufficient to prove that the intoxicated state Geist was in when the police arrived was the result of his having imbibed alcohol before he drove there.

Sections 3802(a)(1) and (c) require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove, operated, or actually controlled the vehicle's movement.

Com. v. Monnett, R. · filed 2022-09-22(a)(1), (c)

As Appellant correctly indicates, under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) and (c), the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter alia, that Appellant was driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of the motorcycle.

Actual physical control of a vehicle under Section 3802(a)(1) can be established through wholly circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams · filed 2008-01-03(a)(1)

The Commonwealth can establish that a defendant had “actual physical control” of a vehicle through wholly circumstantial evidence.

Section 3802(a)(1) reaches an intoxicated person asleep at the wheel of a parked vehicle when the circumstances establish actual physical control of the vehicle.

Commonwealth v. Bangert · filed 2009-11-13(a)(1)

Based on these facts, the court determines, based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle at the time of his arrest.

Section 3802(c) permits actual physical control of a vehicle to be proved by circumstantial evidence, including its location, a running engine, and evidence that the driver had driven there.

Com. v. Toland · filed 2010-05-25(c)

Here, the evidence established that appellant was asleep in the driver's seat of the vehicle with the motor running and the headlights illuminated. There was a cold, unopened six-pack of beer on the floor behind the driver's seat. Niemeyer's is described in the affidavit of probable cause as a "store" and there is no indication that it sells alcoholic beverages. A reasonable inference could be made that appellant drove to that location. Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude, as the finder of fact, that appellant was in actual physical control of the movement of the motor vehicle.

Section 3802(c)’s actual physical control element can be proved by circumstantial evidence supporting an inference that the intoxicated person drove the vehicle to its location.

Commonwealth v. Tolano · filed 2010-05-25(c)

A reasonable inference could be made that appellant drove to that location. Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude, as the finder of fact, that appellant was in actual physical control of the movement of the motor vehicle.

Section 3802 requires evidence that the accused drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of a vehicle’s movement; evidence of intoxication alone does not establish a prima facie DUI case.

Commonwealth v. Huffman · filed 2010-08-13(a)(1), (c)

In order to establish a prima facie case for driving under the influence, the Commonwealth must have demonstrated that the individual was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving. See 75 Pa.C.S. §3802(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S. §3802(c). ... Because evidence of a vital element is lacking, i.e. that the defendant was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle, there is no indication that the defendant was engaged in the criminal behavior for which he was arrested.

Section 3802 requires proof that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle, which the Commonwealth may establish through circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Plum · filed 2011-02-08

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802 requires the commonwealth to establish that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. ... The commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle.

Section 3802(b) permits a DUI conviction when circumstantial evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove the vehicle.

Com. v. Shaffer, K. · filed 2014-09-23(b)

Shaffer was convicted of DUI, homicide by vehicle, and homicide by vehicle while DUI. Shaffer contends that the proof for each of these crimes was insufficient because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was ... driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence proves otherwise. ... This evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Shaffer was the driver of the vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 3802 requires evidence of driving, operating, or actual physical control; starting a parked car alone does not establish actual physical control.

Commonwealth v. Kaylor · filed 2015-01-07(d)

Showing that an intoxicated defendant started a parked car, without more, is not enough to prove actual physical control necessary to sustain driving under the DUI conviction.

Section 3802’s actual physical control requirement can be satisfied by circumstantial evidence, including an impaired person found behind the wheel of a running car parked askew on a city street.

Com. v. Bombaro, D. · filed 2015-01-28(a)(1), (d)(1), (d)(3)

However, based upon the totality of the circumstances viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we agree that there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s convictions. More specifically, the car was parked at a slight angle on a city street with the engine running and Appellant was found unconscious in the driver’s seat.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the accused drove, operated, or had actual physical control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol; eyewitness and video evidence can establish that control.

Com. v. Joyce, F. · filed 2015-02-02(a)(1)

In addition to Miller’s testimony, video surveillance tape corroborated his testimony by showing that no one else exited the vehicle from the time it pulled into the parking lot. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, the totality of the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant exhibited actual physical control over his vehicle by driving the vehicle into the parking lot and being the only person in the vehicle throughout the encounter.

Section 3802’s driving or operating element can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence that the accused owned the vehicle, possessed its keys, and admitted operating it.

Com. v. Hull, J. · filed 2015-02-04

Therefore, the evidence was more than sufficient to conclude that Hull had operated the Buick. Accordingly, because Hull only challenged the finding that he operated the Buick on the night in question, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Hull’s convictions for DUI.

For a DUI conviction under the jury instruction given, a person is in actual physical control when the evidence shows the person was in a position to manage the vehicle’s movement.

Com. v. Peck, P. · filed 2015-03-04

There is no question that the evidence produced at trial supports a determination that Peck was in a position to manage the movement of the car at the time and place alleged. Peck was behind the wheel, had started the car, turned on the headlights, and had his foot on the brake. The only thing left to actually move the car was to put it in gear.

Actual physical control under Section 3802 can be established when an intoxicated person is found asleep across the bench seat of a running truck.

Com. v. Peters, K. · filed 2015-05-04(a)(1), (b)

Peters distinguishes these cases from the instant matter because rather than slumping over the steering wheel, he tipped over sideways onto the bench seat of his truck. We find this difference to be immaterial, and agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Peters was in actual physical control of the vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 3802(a)(1)'s actual physical control element may be proved through circumstantial evidence that the defendant controlled the vehicle while intoxicated.

Com. v. Marte, J. · filed 2015-07-02(a)(1)

Here, as in Devereaux, the evidence is not so weak or inconclusive that the circumstances could not lead a fact-finder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Marte was in actual, physical control of the motor vehicle while he was intoxicated.

Section 3802(c) requires evidence that the defendant drove, operated, or exercised actual physical control of a vehicle’s movement; a running engine in a parked vehicle alone is insufficient.

Com. v. Jablonski, L. · filed 2015-08-31(c)

Without evidence that Jablonski had exercised actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle, the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of DUI.

For a § 3802 DUI conviction, the absence of keys on the defendant after he exits the vehicle does not make testimony that he drove insufficient; the keys may have been left in the ignition.

Com. v. Douglass, T. · filed 2015-07-17

Douglass’s sufficiency contentions are meritless. First, when Douglass exited his vehicle to approach the officer it is a reasonable inference that, in ... his drunken stupor, Douglass left the keys in the ignition.

Section 3802(a)(1) and (c) allow driving, operating, or actual physical control to be proved through circumstantial evidence without an eyewitness.

Com. v. George, C. · filed 2015-10-14(a)(1), (c)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the vehicle to sustain her DUI convictions.

Under Section 3802(a)(1) and (c), a person may have actual physical control of a vehicle while it is stopped; the Commonwealth need not prove the vehicle was moving.

Com. v. Jenkins, T. · filed 2015-11-20(a)(1), (c)

At issue is whether Appellant maintained “actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle” for the purpose of both provisions. ... We have been clear that the Commonwealth need not to prove that “the vehicle was in motion at the time of the incident[.]”

Section 3802(c) covers an intoxicated driver who attempts to move a vehicle even if the vehicle remains stuck.

Com. v. Patterson, M. · filed 2016-01-22(c)

Thus, there is no requirement that Appellant actually succeed in moving the vehicle for a determination to be made that Appellant operated or was in actual physical control of the vehicle for purposes of the DUI statute.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows actual physical control of a vehicle to be proved through wholly circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Provance, D. · filed 2016-02-11(a)(1)

The Commonwealth can establish that a defendant had “actual physical control” of a vehicle through wholly circumstantial evidence. ... The credible evidence supports Provance’s convictions of the above-mentioned crimes.

Section 3802(b)'s driving element may be proved through circumstantial evidence, including physical evidence identifying the driver.

Com. v. Beatty, J. · filed 2015-10-16(b)

The physical evidence also proves that Beatty was the driver.

Section 3802(a)(1) includes actual physical control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol; a person asleep in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle can satisfy the control element.

Com. v. Montgomery, R. · filed 2016-02-24(a)(1)

The crime of driving under the influence of alcohol requires that the Commonwealth prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an individual was “driv[ing], operat[ing] or . . . in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). Here, based upon a totality of the circumstances, there was sufficient evidence that Montgomery was in actual physical control of the Jeep where: he was found sleeping in the vehicle on a public road in front of a bar with its engine running, keys in the ignition, flashing lights activated, radio blaring, with a cold, opened bottle of beer in the center cup holder.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows driving or operating a vehicle while impaired by alcohol to be proved through circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Neally, A. · filed 2016-05-17(a)(1)

Having reviewed the briefs of the parties and the certified record, we conclude that the trial court opinion, authored by the Honorable Thomas R. Campbell, fully and thoroughly addresses this argument. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/15, at 1-12 (finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Neally had been involved in a low speed, single vehicle accident, and that his location, inconsistent statements, and the absence of the claimed third-party driver were sufficient circumstantial evidence that he had operated the motorcycle while intoxicated). We therefore affirm on this basis.

Section 3802 permits proof of operating a vehicle while intoxicated through circumstantial evidence, including an intoxicated person in the driver’s seat of a running car stopped in a roadway.

Com. v. Chess, W. · filed 2016-06-09(a)(1), (c)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant was “operating” the vehicle while intoxicated.

Under § 3802(a)(1) and (b), evidence that an intoxicated person sat behind the wheel of a running vehicle can establish actual physical control when the circumstances support an inference that the person drove it there.

Com. v. Ulen, T. · filed 2016-09-19(a)(1), (b)

The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question ... presented. ... evidence demonstrated Appellant was in actual physical control of vehicle, and permitted inference Appellant had driven herself to that location; ... thus, evidence ... was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions for DUI general impairment, DUI high rate of alcohol, and driving while operating privilege is suspended).

Under Section 3802(a)(1) and (c), circumstantial evidence and a defendant’s admission can establish that the defendant drove or operated a vehicle.

Com. v. Nelson, J. · filed 2016-06-22(a)(1), (c)

The circumstantial evidence alone, when looked at in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was driving the vehicle and that is bolstered by his admission that he did so. ... The record supports the court’s analysis, which we accept.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires evidence that the accused drove, operated, or controlled the vehicle; ownership, possession of the keys, and presence nearby did not establish a prima facie case when another occupant could have been driving.

Com. v. Kinder, J. · filed 2016-07-18(a)(1)

At best, after affording the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the evidence established a prima facie case that Appellee was in the vehicle at the time of the crash. Placing Appellee in the driver’s seat, however, was a hurdle that no factfinder could accomplish under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

Section 3802(b) treats operation of a vehicle as actual physical control, determined from the totality of the circumstances.

Com. v. Nguyen, B. · filed 2017-02-14(b)

The term “operate” requires evidence of actual physical control of the vehicle based upon a totality of the circumstances.

Circumstantial evidence that a person drove or controlled a vehicle while intoxicated can establish a prima facie case under § 3802(a)(1) and (c).

Com. v. Starry, M. · filed 2016-09-29(a)(1), (c)

The location of the vehicle in this case, along the side of the road and crashed into a tree, supports an inference that the car was driven there and supports a finding of actual control. The fact that Appellee was found alone in that vehicle also supports the inference that she was the individual who drove it to that location, thereby reflecting her control of the vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant drove, operated, or physically controlled a vehicle while impaired; direct and circumstantial evidence can establish vehicle control.

Com. v. Thomas, A. · filed 2016-11-22(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, was sufficient to establish that Thomas “drove, operated, or was in actual physical control” of the vehicle.

Section 3802 does not prohibit a mere intention to drive while intoxicated when the person has not yet driven or operated the vehicle.

Com. v. Lentz, R. · filed 2016-10-21

However, we do not accept the trial court’s implicit legal conclusion that this language was crafted in order to construe the DUI statute as prohibiting the mere intent to drive while intoxicated. Instead, that language simply articulates that the Commonwealth is not required to present evidence in the form of a direct observation of a DUI defendant’s driving in order to obtain a conviction for DUI.

Section 3802(a)(1) and (b)’s operation requirement can be proved by an officer’s observation of the defendant in a vehicle that moves from the middle of the road into a curb.

Com. v. Crisafi, T. · filed 2017-01-30(a)(1), (b)

Thus, we conclude that the trial court was well within its purview to conclude that Officer Dudick’s testimony was sufficient to establish that Appellant operated the vehicle in question based upon the officer’s eyewitness observations of Appellant, the location of her car in the middle of the road, and the movement of the vehicle as he approached it.

Under § 3802(a)(1) and (c), sitting in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle, together with evidence of travel, can establish actual physical control of the vehicle.

Com. v. Garcia, A. · filed 2017-09-15(a)(1), (c)

Under the totality of the circumstances, the trier-of-fact could have reasonably inferred from Appellant’s location in the driver’s seat, with the engine running, that he had been in actual physical control of the vehicle as he and his daughter traveled from Maryland to State College.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits actual physical control of a vehicle to be proved through circumstantial evidence, including a running engine, the vehicle’s location, and evidence that the person drove after drinking.

Com. v. Paolini, M. · filed 2018-03-22(a)(1)

It is reasonable to infer, based on the circumstantial evidence, that Appellant was parked outside of a closed CVS store, and she drove her vehicle to the CVS after drinking alcohol at the Brickhouse Tavern.

Section 3802 permits proof of actual physical control through circumstantial evidence, including the vehicle’s location and evidence that the defendant drove it.

Com. v. Pistorius, D. · filed 2018-07-09(a)(1), (b)

When viewed in its entirety, the circumstantial evidence, particularly the suspect location of the vehicle, indicates beyond a reasonable doubt Pistorius operated the vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows actual physical control of a vehicle to be proved through circumstantial evidence under the totality of the circumstances.

Com. v. Matula, M. · filed 2018-07-27(a)(1)

Under a totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the Commonwealth circumstantially proved that Matula was in “actual physical control” of her vehicle; she was clearly in a position to regulate its movements.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires driving, operating, or actual physical control of a vehicle while impaired; sitting intoxicated in a parked vehicle with its engine off did not establish probable cause for actual physical control on these facts.

Com. v. Givler, B. · filed 2018-07-30(a)(1)

These facts, in particular that Appellee was sitting intoxicated in a parked vehicle with the engine off, do not support a conclusion that Officer Jackson reasonably believed Appellee was in actual physical control over his vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 3802(a)(1)’s actual physical control element may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including the vehicle’s location, damage, and keys in the ignition.

Com. v. Mangan, T. · filed 2018-08-31(a)(1)

Taking all of these factors together, the Commonwealth met their burden regarding [Mangan] being in actual physical control of the vehicle. ... Accordingly, we affirm this issue on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

Section 3802 permits proof of driving, operating, or actual physical control through circumstantial evidence even when no officer saw the defendant drive.

Com. v. Gatewood, T. · filed 2018-09-24

These facts provided ample evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the Sienna.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows actual physical control of a vehicle to be proved through circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Winowitch, R. · filed 2018-10-16(a)(1)

As the Commonwealth may show that a defendant was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle “through wholly circumstantial evidence,” ... we affirm Appellant’s conviction of DUI.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows actual physical control of a vehicle to be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including the vehicle’s position and running engine.

Com. v. Bologna, M. · filed 2018-10-22(a)(1)

Thus, the totality of the circumstances including the location and position of the vehicle and the running engine, support an inference that Defendant had driven his vehicle while intoxicated into the parking lot of the Turkey Hill, and that Defendant was in actual control of a motor vehicle at the time of his arrest.

Under § 3802(a)(1) and (c), a person can be in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated even when its engine is off.

Com. v. Noltee, J. · filed 2018-12-24(a)(1), (c)

Thus, upon review of the evidence presented, we conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to establish that Appellant was in actual physical control of the machinery of the motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) and (c).

Section 3802(d) permits proof that a defendant drove, operated, or controlled a vehicle through circumstantial evidence, without an eyewitness to the driving.

Com. v. Antunez, N. · filed 2019-05-21(d)

Our review confirms that there was sufficient evidence for the jury and trial court to conclude – without hearing eyewitness testimony but considering circumstantial evidence – that Appellant drove, operated and was in control of her vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows circumstantial evidence to establish that an intoxicated person drove or had actual physical control of a vehicle.

Com. v. Petros, C. · filed 2019-05-24(a)(1)

The circumstantial evidence enumerated by the trial court is sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, and it was the prerogative of the trial court as fact-finder to resolve any doubts about Appellant’s guilt.

Section 3802(d)(1)(i)'s actual physical control element may be proved from the totality of the circumstances even without evidence that the vehicle's engine was running.

Com. v. Armstrong, J. · filed 2019-07-23(d)(1)(i)

As to the actual physical control aspect, while the evidence presented at the stipulated trial does not indicate whether the engine was running, the totality of the circumstances sufficed for the fact -finder to conclude that Armstrong was in actual physical control.

Section 3802’s actual physical control element can be proved through circumstantial evidence; an officer need not observe the defendant driving.

Com. v. Nunez-Avalos, J. · filed 2019-08-14(a)(1), (c)

Here, the totality of circumstances established that Appellant was in actual physical control of the vehicle.

Section 3802(d) covers a person in actual physical control of a vehicle with an unprescribed Schedule II drug in the bloodstream or while drugs impair safe operation; a running engine, the car’s position in drive, and its location can establish control.

Com. v. Hoffer, C. · filed 2019-10-29(d)(1)(ii), (d)(2)

The photographic evidence also showed that the car was in a suspect position on the road, which supports the inference that Hoffer was driving and, further, demonstrates that he had actual physical control of the vehicle. ... Based on the foregoing evidence, as well as the reasonable inferences derived therefrom, the jury could have found Hoffer guilty on both counts of driving under the influence of a controlled substance.

Section 3802(a)(1)'s actual physical control element may be established by circumstantial evidence, including a running vehicle in the roadway with the defendant in the driver's seat.

Com. v. Jackson, S. · filed 2019-11-26(a)(1)

Here, reviewing all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, including the officers’ trial testimony, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Jackson was in actual physical control of his vehicle at the time he was apprehended by the officers.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits the Commonwealth to prove that a defendant operated a vehicle through circumstantial evidence.

Com. v. Dutter, S. · filed 2020-03-10(a)(1)

The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed June 27, 2019, at 3-7) (finding: ... that circumstantial evidence demonstrated Appellant drove the vehicle; thus, evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions for DUI, driving without a license, and driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked.) Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.

Sections 3802(a)(1) and (c) require the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of a vehicle.

Com. v. Correa-Poole, K. · filed 2020-07-28(a)(1), (c)

In our view, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial. The trial court found persuasive Newman's eyewitness testimony that Appellant was in control of the motorcycle and that both Appellant and Tracy admitted at the scene that Appellant was the driver. The record supports this evidence and the weight that the trial court chose to place on this evidence does not shock our conscience.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that the accused drove or actually controlled a vehicle while intoxicated; merely sitting in a vehicle while intoxicated is insufficient.

Com. v. Simpson, L. · filed 2020-08-28(c)

To sustain a conviction for DUI, the Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated; it is not sufficient to establish that the accused was merely sitting inside a vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 3802’s actual physical control element can be established by the totality of the circumstances, including a running engine, illuminated headlights, and an admission of driving.

Com. v. Jordan, K. · filed 2020-10-16(a)(1), (c)

Here, the totality of the circumstances showed Appellant was in control of the vehicle because the engine was running, the headlights were on, Appellant was awake and seated in the driver’s seat, and a police officer testified that Appellant admitted to driving her vehicle.

Section 3802(c) does not require evidence that a vehicle was moving to prove operation or actual physical control.

Com. v. Dirosa, J. · filed 2021-04-06(c)

However, while the Commonwealth was required to show that the Appellant was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the prosecution did not need to present evidence that the vehicle was in motion.

Section 3802(a)(2)’s two-hour requirement may be proved by evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle within two hours of a blood draw.

Com. v. Issoufou, Z. · filed 2021-05-11(a)(2)

Our review of the record confirms that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence from which the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, could reasonably infer that Appellant had been in actual physical control of his vehicle within two hours of his blood draw.

Circumstantial evidence can prove that a defendant drove while under the influence of a controlled substance.

Com. v. Corbett, F. · filed 2021-04-22(d)(1), (d)(2)

The circumstantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict-winner, supports a finding that Corbett drove the car while intoxicated.

Section 3802(b) permits a conviction based on circumstantial evidence that an intoxicated driver had actual physical control of a vehicle, even if the vehicle was immobilized when police arrived.

Com. v. Maldonado, R. · filed 2022-02-17(b)

The evidence of record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Appellant had been in “actual physical control” of her vehicle while intoxicated.

Section 3802(d) permits proof of actual physical control from the totality of the circumstances, including a defendant’s presence in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle with the keys in the ignition and evidence that he drove while intoxicated.

Com. v. Yorgey, A. · filed 2022-03-16(d)

We reject Appellant’s contention that his conviction hinged on his operating the gear shift to place the car in drive and back into park. Rather, how he was situated – in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition and car turned on – placed him in control of “the machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of the vehicle’s movement[.]” Toland, supra.

Circumstantial evidence can establish that an impaired defendant operated a vehicle under § 3802(a)(1).

Com. v. Smith, Z. · filed 2022-07-26(a)(1)

We agree with the Commonwealth that this evidence was sufficient to conclude that Appellant was operating the vehicle on the night in question.

Section 3802 permits actual physical control of a vehicle to be proved through circumstantial evidence, including a running engine and an admission of drinking before driving.

Com. v. Bathurst, G., Jr. · filed 2023-01-06(a)(1)-(2), (b)

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his operation and physical control of his truck. ... Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant parked his truck in the pull-off with its rear lights on. ... The trooper saw keys in the ignition and the engine was running. ... As the record supports the trial court’s findings, we discern no error.

Section 3802(a)(1) and (c) require proof that the defendant drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the vehicle’s movement.

Com. v. Foster, J. · filed 2023-07-17(a)(1), (c)

Under both Appellant’s convictions for DUI (general impairment and highest rate of alcohol), the Commonwealth was required to prove that Appellant drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the movement of his vehicle.

Under Section 3802(c) and (d)(3), circumstantial evidence that an impaired person drove, operated, or had actual physical control of a vehicle can support a DUI conviction.

Com. v. Velazquez, W. · filed 2023-08-02(c), (d)(3)

As in Brotherson, Dirosa, and Toland, we conclude that the evidence in this case was sufficient to prove that Appellant operated, drove, or was in actual physical control of his vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant drove, operated, or controlled the vehicle while alcohol rendered the defendant incapable of safe driving; circumstantial evidence may establish who drove.

Com. v. Pearson, J. · filed 2023-10-10(a)(1)

Here, Appellant did not present any evidence to corroborate his version of events. Unlike Price, there is nothing in the record to indicate the trial court, sitting as finder-of-fact, deemed the Commonwealth’s evidence insufficient. In sum, Appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI does not merit relief.

Section 3802 permits proof that a person drove, operated, or had actual physical control of a vehicle through circumstantial evidence, even when the person is found away from the vehicle.

Com. v. Barton, C. · filed 2023-10-17(a)(1), (b)

Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that because he was not discovered in or near the vehicle the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was driving, operating, and/or in actual control of his vehicle.

Section 3802 requires evidence that an intoxicated person exercised control over a vehicle’s movement; sitting in the driver’s seat with the keys alone is insufficient.

Com. v. Dourlain, B. · filed 2024-05-09(a)-(d)

Namely, Pennsylvania’s DUI statute requires evidence that the intoxicated individual exercised control over the movement of the vehicle whereas Ohio’s PCVUI statute only requires the intoxicated individual to be in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with possession of the ignition keys—behavior this Court has expressly held to be insufficient to establish DUI under Pennsylvania law.

Section 3802(c) requires proof that a person drove, operated, or had actual physical control of a vehicle and had a blood alcohol content above .16% within two hours.

Com. v. Bista, S. · filed 2024-05-13(c)

We agree with counsel that, under the totality of these circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Bista had physical control of her vehicle while her BAC was over .16% and therefore that Bista’s sufficiency claim is frivolous.

Section 3802(d)’s driving or actual physical control element may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including the vehicle’s location, its registration, the defendant’s proximity, and the defendant’s admissions.

Com. v. Tuszynski, S. · filed 2024-09-05(d)

The location of the car, its registration to Appellant, the proximity of Appellant to the car, and Appellant’s admissions to Trooper Swanson support an inference that Appellant drove the vehicle.

Section 3802(d)(2) covers impaired driving inferred from the position of a running vehicle in a public parking lot and the driver’s statements, even when no officer saw the vehicle move.

Com. v. Cravener, S. · filed 2025-08-08(d)(2)

While the instant case does not feature an abundance of evidence reflecting the timeline of Appellant’s actions leading up to his police encounter, the position of Appellant’s truck running in the parking lot at the time of the police encounter, combined with his statements about his actions prior to the officer’s arrival, supported the inference that Appellant engaged in intoxicated driving prior to Corporal Hogue’s arrival.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a finding of actual physical control when a person in a parked vehicle has the keys in the ignition, handles the gears, and revs the engine.

Com. v. Wike, T., Jr. · filed 2025-11-04(a)(1)

Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the facts that Wike fumbled with the gears, revved the engine, and had the keys in the ignition, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Wike was operating the vehicle as he had actual physical control over the vehicle.

Section 3802(d)(2) requires proof that a person drove, operated, or physically controlled a vehicle while impaired by drugs; an admission of driving and circumstantial evidence can establish physical control.

Com. v. Warrington, B. · filed 2026-02-24(d)(2)

Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that Warrington drove to the Walmart on June 10, 2021 and was in actual physical control of his vehicle.

Eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the driver can establish the driving element of a general impairment DUI conviction under section 3802(a)(1).

Com. v. Mendez Collado, J. · filed 2020-07-02(a)(1)

We see no reason to disrupt the court’s determination as the trier of fact. See Jones, supra. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions.

A DUI conviction under § 3802(d)(2) merges with aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI for sentencing purposes, so the separate DUI sentence must be vacated.

Com. v. Mack, T. · filed 2024-09-04(d)(2)

Following our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s convictions for DUI and aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI should have merged for sentencing purposes.

A sentence for DUI under § 3802(b) merges with a sentence for aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI because the aggravated assault offense includes every element of DUI.

Com. v. Pawlowski, S., Jr. · filed 2023-02-10(b)

Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence for DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b), and affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects.

A DUI offense under subsection (d)(2) does not merge for sentencing with fleeing or eluding a police officer or resisting arrest because the offenses’ statutory elements are not completely subsumed within one another.

Com. v. Milan, E. · filed 2022-11-14(d)(2)

Here, even assuming that the offenses in the Second Case arose from a single criminal act, Appellant still would not obtain relief because DUI, fleeing/eluding a police officer and resisting arrest do not have any statutory elements in common.

A DUI-highest-rate conviction under § 3802(c) merges with a DUI homicide conviction for sentencing purposes.

Com. v. Ritter, A. · filed 2022-10-07(c)

However, at CR-846-2020, we vacate Ritter’s sentence with respect to her conviction for DUI-highest rate and merge her convictions for DUI-highest rate (Count 20) and DUI homicide (Count 1) for sentencing purposes.

Section 3802(b)’s high-rate-of-alcohol offense merges into aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI for sentencing when both convictions arise from the same criminal act.

Commonwealth v. Schmohl · filed 2009-05-26(b)

we conclude that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence for Appellant’s conviction of DUI — high rate of alcohol — because this ... offense merged with AA-DUI for purposes of sentencing.

A conviction under § 3802(c) does not merge with involuntary manslaughter for sentencing because each offense has an element the other lacks.

Commonwealth v. Allen · filed 2011-07-12(c)

The element of “causing the death of another” is not included in the elements of DUI, and the elements of driving while under the influence of alcohol are not included in the elements of involuntary manslaughter. Though both convictions arose out of the same set of facts, one can commit DUI without committing involuntary manslaughter, and vice-versa.

A Section 3802(c) DUI conviction merges for sentencing with homicide by vehicle while DUI and aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI when the offenses arise from the same criminal act.

Commonwealth v. Tanner · filed 2013-02-15(c)

As such, for sentencing purposes, Appellant’s DUI conviction merged with both her homicide by motor vehicle while DUI and aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI convictions.

A DUI conviction under Section 3802 merges for sentencing with third-degree felony fleeing when the DUI supplies an element of the fleeing offense.

Com. v. Kimmel, L. · filed 2014-08-29(a)(1)

Fleeing-F3 includes the element of committing DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a.2)(2)(i), similar to homicide by vehicle while DUI and aggravated assault while DUI.

Section 3802 does not permit separate penalties under multiple subsections for a single DUI act; the sentences must merge.

Com. v. Mitchell, B. · filed 2015-05-12

The subsections of § 3802 are not separate offenses, and a defendant may not be subjected to multiple penalties for violating more than one subsection of the statute by a single criminal act.

A conviction for highest-rate DUI under subsection (c) merges with aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI for sentencing when both arise from one incident.

Com. v. Brooks, T. · filed 2015-07-08(c)

We agree with the parties and the trial court that aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI and DUI – highest rate of alcohol, should have merged for sentencing purposes.

Two general impairment DUI counts based on the same conduct merge for sentencing when one also alleges refusal of chemical testing.

Com. v. Gauthier, L. · filed 2016-04-11(a)(1)

The two counts Gauthier was charged with were based upon the same conduct, with one count including refusal to submit to chemical testing. In this circumstance, the two counts should have merged for sentencing purposes.

Section 3802(d)(1)(i) and (d)(2) have different elements, so violations of both do not merge for sentencing.

Com. v. Hynes, D. · filed 2016-07-06(d)(1)(i), (d)(2)

Therefore, the trial court correctly held that Hynes’ section 3802(d)(1)(i) violation does not merge with his section 3802(d)(2) violation.

Subsections 3802(d)(1)(iii) and (d)(2) have different elements, so convictions under them do not merge for sentencing.

Com. v. Grooms, M. · filed 2016-09-19(d)(1)(iii), (d)(2)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge Appellant’s Subsection 3802(d)(1)(iii) violation with his Subsection 3802(d)(2) violation.

Section 3802(a)(1) supports one general impairment DUI conviction for the same conduct, even when additional sentencing factors apply.

Com. v. Williams, A. · filed 2016-12-30(a)(1)

In the instant matter, the trial court erred in convicting Williams of three counts of DUI based on the same conduct.

A conviction under § 3802(d)(3) merges with aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI for sentencing when both arise from a single criminal act.

Com. v. Kemp, S. · filed 2017-02-17(d)(3)

For purposes of a merger analysis, we detect no difference between the subsection of the DUI statute at issue in Tanner, Section 3802(c), and the subsection at issue herein, Section 3802(d)(3). ... Accordingly, for purposes of an aggravated assault-DUI conviction, the specific subsection of the DUI statute charged is immaterial.

When one act violates § 3802(a)(1), enhancements under § 3804 do not create additional DUI offenses; the Commonwealth should charge one § 3802 count and list the enhancements as subparts.

Commonwealth v. Farrow · filed 2017-07-27(a)(1)

In the future, where a single DUI offense is subject to enhancements, the Commonwealth should file a criminal information that sets forth a single count under § 3802. ... Enhancements under § 3804 may be added as subparts or subparagraphs, as appropriate.

A § 3802(c) DUI conviction merges into an aggravated-assault-while-DUI conviction for sentencing when both rest on the same driving act.

Com. v. Fuller, S., Jr. · filed 2022-04-27(c)

Moreover, all the statutory elements of the crime of DUI—highest rate of alcohol are completely subsumed by the elements of aggravated assault while DUI. Compare 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c) with 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1(a); see Commonwealth v. Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1047 (Pa.Super. 2013) (same). Accordingly, Appellant’s DUI conviction merges with his conviction for aggravated assault while DUI.

At the relevant time, refusing a blood or breath test did not create a separate Section 3802 offense or add an element to DUI general impairment; it supplied a sentencing enhancement under Section 3804(c).

Com. v. Gehr, D. · filed 2020-02-26(a)(1)

It was well- settled at the relevant time that DUI-refusal neither constituted a separate crime from DUI-general impairment nor added an element to the offense at Section 3802. Rather, it simply supplied a sentencing enhancement, provided at Section 3804(c), upon a conviction under Section 3802 where refusal to submit to a blood or breath test occurred.

Section 3802(a)(1) covers operating a bicycle while impaired by alcohol because a bicycle is a vehicle.

Bilka v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing · filed 2014-05-28(a)(1)

A bicycle is a "vehicle” for purposes of prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances.

Section 3802 DUI convictions cannot stand when the only proved roadway operation is a de minimis bicycle crossing.

Com. v. Miller, T. · filed 2025-08-07

We conclude that, although Appellant “operated” his “vehicle” in a “highway” or “trafficway” when he crossed the street, he did so for such a de minimis distance that the trial court erred in convicting Appellant of the DUI offenses.

Section 3802(a)(1) covers operating a motorized e-bike while intoxicated because the e-bike meets the statutory definition of a vehicle.

Com. v. Wagner, G. · filed 2025-09-19(a)(1)

Like former Section 3731, Section 3802 makes it a crime for a person to “drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle” while intoxicated. ... Moreover, Wagner’s motorized e-bike undoubtedly meets the definition of a vehicle under the statute.

Section 3802(e) requires proof that a minor drove, operated, or controlled a vehicle and had a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.02 percent within two hours.

Com. v. Wandel, C. · filed 2014-08-08(e)

Thus, in order for a person to be in violation of section 3802(e), the Commonwealth must prove that the person was a minor,2 was driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle, and had a BAC of .02 percent or higher within two hours after driving, operating, or controlling the vehicle.

Section 3802(b) is a lesser-included offense of Section 3802(c) when the trial evidence supports a conviction at the lower blood alcohol range.

Commonwealth v. Houck · filed 2014-09-26(b)

Based on the foregoing, we hold Section 3802(b) of the DUI statute was a lesser-included offense of Section 3802(c), given the facts established at trial.

A BAC above subsection (a)(2)’s stated range can support a conviction under that subsection as a lesser included DUI offense.

Com. v. Moody, J. · filed 2015-05-15(a)(2)

Accordingly, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to return a verdict of guilty of DUI with a BAC between .08% and .10%.

Section 3802(a)(2)'s lower BAC offense is a lesser-included offense of the high rate of alcohol offense in § 3802(b).

Com. v. Ressman, J. · filed 2021-04-26(a)(2)

That means the general impairment BAC offense in § 3802(a)(2) is a lesser-included offense of the high rate of alcohol DUI offense outlined in § 3802(b).

Section 3802(d)(2) applies in a parking lot customarily open to public vehicular travel because the lot is a trafficway.

Com. v. Konyves, L. · filed 2014-10-17(d)(2)

The provisions of Section 3802 “shall apply upon highways and trafficways throughout this Commonwealth.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3101(b). ... As the trial court points out, these circumstances “suggest that the parking lot is customarily used by at least certain members of the public, and that it can be used for vehicular traffic. Therefore, accepting Officer Schuck’s testimony as credible, the Commonwealth proved that … [Appellant] was operating a vehicle on a trafficway for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Trial Court Opinion 6/2/2014, at 12-13. We agree with the trial court’s assessment and hold that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Section 3802(a)(1) supports a DUI conviction for impaired driving on a trailer park road that qualifies as a trafficway.

Com. v. Helman, H., Jr. · filed 2015-10-22(a)(1)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Commonwealth established that the trailer park road was a trafficway for purposes of section 102. ... Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that it was sufficient to support a conviction of DUI-general impairment.

Section 3802 applies in a parking lot routinely used by members of the public, even when the property is marked private.

Commonwealth v. Lees · filed 2016-03-24

The evidence given at the hearing by Appellee and the Commonwealth’s witnesses showed members of the public routinely used the Montgomery Village parking lot, satisfying the public use requirement of a trafficway under the DUI statute.

Section 3802 applies to driving on a private road that is open to public vehicular travel as a matter of right or custom.

Com. v. Merritts, T. · filed 2017-02-28

Thus, we conclude that it "is open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel as a matter of right or custom[,]" and therefore is a trafficway for purposes of Chapter 38 of the Vehicle Code.

Section 3802(a)(1) applies to driving under the influence on a highway or trafficway.

Com. v. Ramey, W. · filed 2018-01-23(a)(1)

As discussed above, the evidence was sufficient to convict Ramey of DUI not only based on his admissions and circumstantial evidence that he operated his vehicle on a highway, but also because the road leading to Outdoor World constitutes a trafficway.

Section 3802(a)(1) applies to impaired driving in a business parking lot regularly open to the public because that lot is a trafficway.

Com. v. Nichelson, L. · filed 2018-07-16(a)(1)

Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the parking lot in which Appellant’s vehicle was driven was owned by The Elbow Room and Tony’s Pizza, both of which are businesses that are open to the public. ... This Court has held that such a public parking lot is a ‘trafficway’ for purposes of the DUI statute. ... Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his DUI conviction is meritless.

Section 3802(d)(2) applies to drug-impaired driving in a mall parking lot open to the public for shopping because that parking lot is a trafficway.

Com. v. Anton, C. · filed 2020-01-13(d)(2)

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101(b) modifies Section 3802(d)(2). ... In this case, the Commonwealth produced evidence that Appellant was operating his vehicle “in a parking lot of a mall that [was] open to the public for shopping.” See Proctor, 625 A.2d at 1224. Thus, “there was sufficient evidence for the [factfinder] to conclude that the parking area was a trafficway,” as that term is defined in the Vehicle Code. Appellant’s claim to the contrary fails.

Section 3802(d) requires proof that the vehicle was operated on a public highway or trafficway; a public highway’s easement qualifies.

Com. v. Raker, J. · filed 2021-06-24(d)

Thus, in order to demonstrate that a person violated the DUI law, the Commonwealth must produce sufficient evidence that the vehicle was operated on a public highway or trafficway. ... The facts in the instant case are readily distinguishable, as Raker was operating his vehicle on the easement of a public highway, not on a private road.

Section 3802(a)(1)’s trafficway requirement can be satisfied by driving in a publicly accessible shopping center parking lot.

Com. v. Johnson, I. · filed 2026-06-09(a)(1)

Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, clearly established that Appellant drove or operated her vehicle on a “trafficway” as required by the MVC. ... This Court has recognized that an individual’s operation of a vehicle in a publicly accessible shopping mall parking lot constitutes operation on a “trafficway.”

Section 3802(d) prohibits driving with marijuana or its metabolite in the blood and driving when the combined influence of alcohol and a drug impairs the ability to drive safely.

Com. v. Stine, S. · filed 2024-10-21(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)

Based on the foregoing, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Stine’s blood contained marijuana and its metabolites while he operated his vehicle and that his ability to safely drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle was impaired by the combined influence of alcohol and marijuana.

Section 3802(a)(1) and (c) allow circumstantial evidence of impaired driving, including observations soon after driving and a blood alcohol test within two hours, to establish the DUI offenses.

Com. v. Ashmunn, P. · filed 2014-12-24(a)(1), (c)

Instantly, the jury was presented with enough evidence to find all of the elements of these DUI offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

Evidence of impaired driving, a .148 percent blood alcohol concentration, and cocaine metabolites in the driver’s blood was sufficient to sustain convictions under Section 3802.

Com. v. Brown, B. · filed 2015-01-07

Brown was convicted of violating Motor Vehicle Code sections 3802 and 3362. ... The evidence set forth above, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to sustain each of Brown’s convictions.

Circumstantial evidence that a driver used a Schedule I controlled substance before parking can support a conviction under Section 3802(d)(1)(i).

Com. v. Kerstetter, N. · filed 2015-01-12(d)(1)(i)

Drawing inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, as we must, we conclude that the record contains sufficient circumstantial evidence that Appellant was intoxicated before he parked at the Remodeler’s Workshop.

Section 3802 supports DUI convictions when the evidence establishes that alcohol made the driver incapable of safe driving and a blood test within two hours shows a BAC of at least 0.16%.

Com. v. Gibson, L. · filed 2015-02-24(a)(1), (c)

A blood test was taken within two hours of driving, as required by statute, and Gibson was determined to have a BAC of 0.263%. ... Therefore, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish that Gibson was, indeed, the driver of the Blazer that damaged Mieczkowski’s car, she “operated” or had “actual physical control” of the car, and she had imbibed a sufficient amount of alcohol that rendered her incapable of safe driving.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving when alcohol has rendered the driver incapable of driving safely; signs of intoxication and conduct during the stop can establish that impairment.

Com. v. White, J. · filed 2015-02-27(a)(1)

The above evidence is plainly sufficient to prove that Appellant drove a vehicle “during the time when he [] was rendered incapable of safely doing so due to the consumption of alcohol.”

Under § 3802(a)(1), evidence of unsafe driving and signs of intoxication can support a general impairment conviction.

Com. v. Aaron, J. · filed 2015-03-04(a)(1)

Thus, under our standard of review, and pertinent caselaw, it is beyond serious dispute that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction.

Section 3802(d)(2) permits a conviction for drug impaired driving based on observations of impairment and failed field sobriety tests, even without a blood test.

Com. v. Steffie, A. · filed 2015-04-23(d)(2)

We conclude that the claims raised in Appellant’s brief are meritless and that the trial court’s opinion, filed on August 25, 2014, meticulously and accurately explains why Appellant’s ... claims fail. Therefore, we adopt the trial court’s opinion as our own.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a general-impairment conviction based on the totality of the circumstances, even without blood alcohol evidence.

Com. v. Olszewski, J. · filed 2015-06-15(a)(1)

Rather, we must assess the totality of the circumstances, and the various points of proof that were in fact offered by the Commonwealth, and view that quantum of evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Having done so, and even if we give no attention whatsoever to the blood alcohol content evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to enable a fact finder to convict Olszewski of DUI—general impairment.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits proof of impaired driving through evidence of a crash and signs of intoxication; subsection (c) requires a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.16% within two hours after driving.

Com. v. Kurtz, J. · filed 2015-07-06(a)(1), (c)

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the trial court that there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for the general impairment DUI offense. ... This timeline establishes that Kurtz’s BAC was over the 0.16% limit within two hours after he had last driven his car.

Evidence of drinking, unusual driving, and performance on field sobriety tests can support a conviction for DUI general impairment under Section 3802(a)(1).

Com. v. Marshall, M. · filed 2015-08-07(a)(1)

In considering the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was ample and sufficient evidence to support Marshall’s DUI conviction.

Section 3802(a)(2) requires proof that the driver’s blood alcohol concentration was at least .08% but less than .10% within two hours of driving.

Com. v. Smith, W. · filed 2015-08-18(a)(2)

The Commonwealth established that Appellant’s blood was drawn within two hours of having been in control of the vehicle. Further, Appellant’s BAC of .085% is within the .08-.10% range, fully satisfying the elements of the offense.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving after drinking enough alcohol to be incapable of driving safely; erratic driving, an admission of drinking while driving, visible intoxication, and failed sobriety tests can prove a violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Com. v. Gentile, L. · filed 2015-08-21(a)(1)

Several eyewitnesses testified to Appellant’s erratic driving. One eyewitness testified that Trooper Wolfe arrived at Appellant’s home within eight minutes of Appellant’s arrival. Trooper Wolfe testified that Appellant admitted consuming alcohol during his drive, that Appellant was obviously intoxicated, and that he failed field sobriety tests. This evidence is more than sufficient to establish Appellant’s violation of § 3802(a) beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a finding of alcohol-impaired driving based on evidence such as speeding, physical signs of intoxication, failed field sobriety tests, and a physician’s assessment.

Com. v. Blackwell, T. · filed 2015-10-02(a)(1)

Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence – in particular, her speeding, the odor of alcohol in her vehicle, her flushed features, her glassy and bloodshot eyes, her slurred speech, her demeanor during the traffic stop, her inability to perform field sobriety tests satisfactorily, her combativeness at the time of arrest, her refusal to take a blood draw while saying “this is bullshit”, and the physician’s conclusion that she was intoxicated -- establishes Blackwell’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for DUI under section 3802(a)(1).

DUI convictions under these subsections can withstand a weight-of-the-evidence challenge when officers observe traffic violations and signs of impairment.

Com. v. Wilson, N. · filed 2015-09-17(a)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3)

Therefore, there was ample evidence for the jury to convict Appellant of three counts of DUI.

Section 3802(d)(2) permits a drug-impaired driving conviction based on evidence of erratic driving, failed sobriety tests, and drugs in the driver’s system, even when the drug levels are therapeutic.

Com. v. Moulis, W. · filed 2015-10-30(d)(2)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for DUI.

A defendant’s statement admitting that he smoked marijuana before driving can be sufficient evidence of a violation of subsection (d)(1)(i).

Com. v. Brown, W. · filed 2015-11-06(d)(1)(i)

The jury clearly believed this statement, and the statement was sufficient to establish that Appellant violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i).

Section 3802(d)(2) prohibits driving when drugs, including a combination of prescription drugs, impair the ability to drive safely.

Com. v. Melograna, F. · filed 2015-11-09(d)(2)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and granting the Commonwealth all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, the trial court was free to conclude that Melograna had not taken his medication as directed by his physician, that he had supplemented his medication with another prescription drug, and that the combination of substances rendered him incapable of safely driving his truck. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving when alcohol renders a person incapable of driving safely, and subsection (a)(2) prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.08% but less than 0.10% within two hours of driving.

Com. v. Tomsic, P. · filed 2016-04-21(a)(1)-(2)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to prove Appellant operated a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol to render him incapable of safely operating the vehicle and that his BAC was at least .08 percent within two hours of his operation of the vehicle.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows circumstantial evidence to prove that a person drove after drinking enough alcohol to be incapable of driving safely.

Com. v. Dixon, R. · filed 2016-06-09(a)(1)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s DUI convictions.

Section 3802(a)(1) prohibits driving when alcohol makes a person unable to drive safely, and subsection (b) prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours of driving.

Com. v. Schmitz, M. · filed 2016-06-21

Put simply, based on the evidence as summarized above establishing Appellant’s involvement in the accident, her dangerous driving thereafter, the officers’ observations as to the odor of alcohol on Appellant and her swaying, her performance on the field sobriety tests, the results from the ... blood draw, and her inculpatory statements, the evidence was sufficient to support her DUI convictions.

Section 3802(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant drove after drinking enough alcohol to become incapable of safely driving; officer observations and field sobriety tests can support that finding.

Com. v. Smith, F. · filed 2016-07-11(a)(1)

Based on the record before us, and viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to show that appellant was operating a motor vehicle after consuming a sufficient amount of alcohol to render him incapable of safe driving and, therefore, sustain his DUI conviction.

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a general-impairment DUI conviction based on evidence that alcohol made the driver incapable of driving safely, including erratic driving, signs of intoxication, and refusal of a breath test.

Com. v. Bayler, Z. · filed 2016-07-14(a)(1)

Having done so in this case, we easily conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of DUI under section 3802(a)(1).

Section 3802(a)(1) permits a general impairment conviction when evidence of drinking, speeding, and impaired performance on field sobriety tests establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Com. v. Keppel, S. · filed 2016-07-20(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude there was sufficient evidence adduced for the trial court to find Appellant guilty of DUI-general impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 3802(a)(1) allows proof of impaired driving through the driver’s admissions, an officer’s observations, and field sobriety tests, even when the officer did not see the driving.

Com. v. Saltsman, J. · filed 2016-07-22(a)(1)

This admission, when combined with Officer Dickerson’s observation of Appellant’s impaired state, as well as Appellant’s inability to pass the field sobriety tests, was sufficient to support Appellant’s DUI conviction.

A blood alcohol result can support a conviction under § 3802(a)(2) when the evidence reasonably shows that the sample remained unimpaired; proof that the phlebotomist mixed the sample is unnecessary.

Com. v. Phillips, R. · filed 2016-09-30(a)(2)

We also note the Commonwealth did not need to prove the sanctity of the blood sample by showing the phlebotomist mixed it; the Commonwealth established a reasonable inference that the sample was unimpaired until it was brought to court.