42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102

Section 7102(c) treats wheel ruts on a ski slope as an inherent risk of downhill skiing.

Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc. · filed 2018-04-19(c)

We agree with the holding of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, and find that wheel ruts in the terrain are an inherent risk to the sport of downhill skiing.

Section 7102(c) treats skiing over a slope edge into off-trail terrain as an inherent risk of downhill skiing for which a ski resort owes no duty of protection.

Vu v. Ski Liberty Operating Corp · filed 2019-02-12(c)

The risk identified by the plaintiffs as causing Vu’s injuries is skiing off of a trail edge that was three to four feet above the natural terrain, which we conclude is inherent to the sport of downhill skiing.

Section 7102(c) preserves assumption of risk for downhill skiing, but a dispute over whether the trail edge was discernible can prevent a finding that an injury arose from an inherent risk as a matter of law.

Kozlowski v. JFBB Ski Areas, Inc. · filed 2019-12-12(c)

Thus, in a case where the discernibility of the trail edge is in dispute, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the accident was the result of an inherent risk of the sport of downhill skiing.

Section 7102(c)’s Skier’s Responsibility Act does not cover snowtubing.

AMADEO v. SPRING MOUNTAIN ADVENTURES, INC. · filed 2019-11-01(c)

Snowtubing clearly does not fall within the auspices of the Skier’s Responsibility Act.

Section 7102(c)(2) preserves assumption of risk in downhill skiing cases, eliminating a resort’s duty when an injury arises from an inherent risk such as a collision with a snowboarder.

Kupstas-Badurina v. JOHN DOES 1-10 · filed 2025-02-06(c)(2)

Because Plaintiff was 1) engaged in downhill skiing, and 2) injured by collision with another snowboarder, a risk inherent to the sport, the PSRA eliminates Defendant’s duty to Plaintiff as a matter of law and Plaintiff’s negligence claim fails.

Section 7102(c) bars a claim when a skiing or snowboarding injury results from a risk inherent to the sport, including losing control after a jump.

Birl v. Ski Shawnee Inc · filed 2026-01-02(c)

Because the risk was inherent to the activity, the District Court did not err in concluding that the PSRA barred Appellants’ claim.

Section 7102 applies prospectively and does not govern causes of action that arose before it took effect.

Wade v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co. · filed 1981-01-09

In the present case it is clear that the new law of comparative negligence is not dispositive because of the statute's prospective effect.

Section 7102’s comparative negligence rule does not govern an action that arose before the comparative negligence act was adopted.

West Penn Administration, Inc. v. Pittsburgh National Bank · filed 1981-08-07

This action arose prior to the adoption of the comparative negligence act and is thus governed by the doctrine of contributory negligence.

Section 7102 does not apply to a cause of action arising before its June 27, 1978 effective date.

Smith v. Chardak · filed 1981-10-02

Since this cause of action arose on September 3, 1974, Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence statute, The Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(89), effective June 27, 1978, as amended, October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 222(a), effective in 60 days; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102 (Pamphlet, 1981), has no bearing on the instant case.

Section 7102 applies only to causes of action arising after September 7, 1976.

City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co. · filed 1982-08-04

Although Pennsylvania has enacted a comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102, it is applicable only to causes of action which arise after September 7, 1976, the date of its enactment.

Amendments to Section 7102 eliminating joint and several liability do not apply to actions commenced before the amendments took effect.

Hennessy, P. v. Robertson, S. · filed 2014-10-24

The amendments to the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, which effectively eliminated joint and several liability, were not in effect when this action was commenced.

Section 7102 does not reduce damages for a plaintiff’s ordinary negligence when the defendant’s conduct is willful or wanton.

Krivijanski v. Union Railroad · filed 1986-09-26(a)

After considering the various arguments set forth, we hold that when willful or wanton misconduct is involved, comparative negligence should not be applied.

Section 7102(a) does not reduce a plaintiff’s recovery for contributory negligence when the defendant engages in wanton misconduct.

Honeywell, Inc. v. American Standards Testing Bureau, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Company · filed 1988-07-25(a)

The purpose of the Act plainly is to give negligent plaintiffs greater opportunity for recovery. We discern no intention to diminish a negligent plaintiff’s opportunity of total recovery against a defendant who engages in wanton misconduct.

Section 7102(a) does not permit willful or wanton misconduct by one party to be compared with another party’s negligence.

Arnold v. Leamy · filed 2004-07-19(a)

Where willful or wanton misconduct is involved, comparative negligence should not be applied since such conduct on the part of one party may not be compared with the negligence of another without ignoring the clear distinction between these different types of conduct.

Section 7102 does not apply when intentional sexual abuse directly caused the harm, even if the victim is alleged to have been negligent.

Hutchison Ex Rel. Hutchison v. Luddy · filed 2000-10-25(a)

Applying this concept to the case before us, we agree with Appellee that, since Luddy's acts of pedophilic sexual molestation were intentional, the doctrine of comparative negligence has no application here. The acts that directly caused the harm are, in essence, what must be compared. Luddy's intentional act and the alleged negligence of Hutchison are not equal forms of conduct. As we have stated supra, comparative negligence is only an appropriate consideration in matters where there is negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and the defendant involved in causing the harm that results, not where the conduct of one is willful.

Section 7102(a)’s comparative negligence rule does not reduce damages when only the defendant’s wanton conduct is at issue.

WOOD v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION · filed 2020-08-21(a)

Here, because Defendant’s wanton conduct is solely at issue, only Simpson’s wantonness, not his comparative negligence, is relevant.

Section 7102(a) applies to negligence actions and does not apply comparative negligence to strict products liability claims.

Staymates v. ITT Holub Industries · filed 1987-06-02(a)

It deals with the fact that Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Act subsumed the doctrine of contributory negligence (Vargus v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 510 F.Supp. 116, 119 (E.D.Pa.1981)), and, by its own terms, is applicable only to “actions brought to recover damages for negligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a).

Section 7102 does not reduce a plaintiff’s recovery in a strict products liability action based on the plaintiff’s comparative fault.

Remy v. Michael D'S Carpet Outlets · filed 1990-03-12

Thus, the law in this Commonwealth remains that the comparative fault of a plaintiff is irrelevant in products liability cases unless there has been an assumption of the risk, in which event there is a total defense. ... It follows that the trial court did not err when it refused to mold the verdict on Michael D’s claim in accordance with the provisions of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act.

Section 7102(a) does not bar recovery or reduce damages based on a plaintiff’s comparative negligence in a strict products liability action.

Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc. · filed 1992-12-04(a)

The argument that Fleck is barred from recovery under the Comparative Negligence Act in this strict liability case, where the jury expressly found that the product sold was defective, is utterly without merit. ... We hold that in a case brought under Pennsylvania product liability laws, a plaintiff’s comparative negligence is irrelevant either to bar recovery or to reduce the jury award.

Section 7102(a) does not bar recovery or reduce damages based on a plaintiff's comparative negligence in a strict product liability action.

Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools · filed 1992-12-31(a)

The argument that Fleck is barred from recovery under the Comparative Negligence Act in this strict liability case, where the jury expressly found that the product sold was defective, is utterly without merit. ... We hold that in a case brought under Pennsylvania product liability laws, a plaintiff's comparative negligence is irrelevant either to bar recovery or to reduce the jury award.

Section 7102's comparative negligence principles do not provide a defense to a strict product liability action under § 402A.

Kimco Development Corp. v. Michael D'S Carpet Outlets & Laramie Corp. · filed 1994-01-14

McCown was decided prior to the enactment of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102 (effective June 27, 1978), and we have yet to consider the precise issue at stake here. ... For the reasons set forth above, we hereby expressly adopt the rule that comparative negligence may not be asserted as a defense in § 402A strict product liability actions.

Section 7102’s comparative negligence principles do not apply to products liability actions; a plaintiff’s comparative fault cannot be used to apportion liability.

Kupetz v. Deere & Co., Inc. · filed 1994-05-23

Therefore, the law in this Commonwealth remains that the comparative fault of a plaintiff is irrelevant in products liability cases; if there has been an assumption of risk, however, in that event, there is complete defense.

Section 7102 requires liability to be apportioned equally among defendants in strict liability asbestos cases.

Roverano, W., Aplts. v. Crane · filed 2020-02-19(a.1)(1)

Accordingly, the plain language of the Fair Share Act indicates that liability is apportioned equally among strictly liable joint tortfeasors, and we reverse the Superior Court.

Section 7102 does not permit comparative negligence as a defense to a section 402A strict product liability claim.

Lasek v. West Bend Equipment Co. · filed 1995-02-27

The decision in McCown, supra was made prior to the enactment of Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Law (42 Pa.C.S. §7102) but the Supreme Court has recently considered the matter in light of the Comparative negligence Statute and held that comparative negligence may not be asserted as a defense in a section 402A strict product liability action. ... In paragraph 39, while the first line seems to indicate allegations of negligence, reading the new matter as a whole convinces us that the real intention of paragraph 39 is not to make a case for comparative negligence but to merely state the manner in which the defendants allege the plaintiff, John J. Lasek, assumed the risk of his own alleged injuries and damages and to further set forth what alleged intervening acts of the plaintiff operate as a superseding cause of the alleged injuries and damages to the plaintiff. We find all of that to be proper.

Section 7102(a) applies to negligence causing death, personal injury, or damage to tangible property; a purely financial loss from failure to procure insurance does not qualify.

Wescoat v. Northwest Savings Ass'n · filed 1988-10-06(a)

The statute does not apply to all actions for negligence, but only to those resulting in death or injury to person or property. Clearly, the plaintiffs suffered no injury to their person. We are also of the opinion that they suffered no damage to their property. There was no tortious episode that caused damage to their tangible property, real or personal, and we hold that such is required to bring the provisions of the Act into play.

Section 7102(a) applies to negligence claims, but not to an innkeeper liability claim based on the innkeeper’s common-law duty to safeguard guests’ property.

Nicholaides v. University Hotel Associates · filed 1989-06-27(a)

We believe the Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §7102 (Purdon 1982), passed in 1976, does not apply to plaintiffs claim brought pursuant to section 61. The act, by its own terms, applies “In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence.”

Section 7102(a) bars recovery when the plaintiff’s negligence exceeds the defendant’s; that bar also applies to a tenant’s warranty of habitability claim for physical injury.

Keck v. Doughman · filed 1990-03-19(a)

Here, the jury found appellant to be 58% contributorily negligent, thereby barring her from recovering under the theory of negligence. Because the jury found that her liability was greater than appellees’, this finding would also bar her from recovering under the warranty of habitability.

Section 7102(a) applies only when negligence causes death, personal injury, or damage to tangible property; it does not apply when negligence merely fails to uncover preexisting termite damage.

Rizzo v. Michener · filed 1990-12-28(a)

The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act only applies to negligence resulting in death or injuries to persons or damage to property. ... The failure to charge on the comparative negligence statute was proper as it was not applicable.

Section 7102(a) applies when the jury can determine and weigh the negligence of both parties.

Ferguson v. Panzarella · filed 1995-08-10(a)

Moreover, the Comparative Negligence Act is inapposite to plaintiff’s claim of negligent after-care because the Act presumes the jury’s ability to establish and weigh the negligence of both parties.

Section 7102(a) does not apply to negligence claims involving only financial losses; contributory negligence remains a complete defense to those claims.

COM. FEDERAL SAV. & LOAN v. Pettit · filed 1991-02-08(a)

However, Section 7102(a) of the Judicial Code, [10] commonly referred to as the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, only abolishes contributory negligence as an absolute defense in cases involving death, bodily injury or injury to property. Because CFSL has only incurred financial losses as a result of the Prothonotary's negligence, the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act has no application to this case.

Section 7102 did not apply to a legal malpractice claim arising from bond counsel’s advice on a redemption transaction.

KBF Associates L.P. v. Saul Ewing Remick & Saul · filed 1998-05-05

Accordingly, neither comparative nor contributory negligence apply in this case.

Section 7102(b)'s joint-defendant recovery provisions do not apply to fraud claims involving failure to disclose a defective septic system.

Keller v. Re/Max Centre Realty · filed 1998-10-26(b)

We find, as did the trial court, that the Act, by its express terms, is applicable only to actions sounding in negligence resulting in death or injuries to persons or damage to property, and that the Act is not applicable to claims for fraud involving failure to disclose a malfunctioning septic system.

Section 7102(a) does not apply to negligence claims seeking only monetary damages; contributory negligence may instead bar recovery.

Columbia Medical Group, Inc. v. Herring & Roll, P.C. · filed 2003-07-25(a)

We concluded that the statute is to be construed narrowly and that it “does not apply to all actions for negligence but only to those resulting in death or injury to person or property.” ... In the case sub judice, Appellants are seeking monetary damages only with regard to their negligence claims, and, as such, as in Gorski, we conclude that contributory negligence is applicable.

Section 7102 applies to negligence actions involving death or injury to person or property, but not to claims for purely monetary loss.

Beecham v. American Life & Casualty Insurance · filed 2003-12-19(a)

The Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §7102, applies only to negligence actions which result in death or injury to person or property and is inapplicable to negligence claims involving purely monetary loss which is unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage.

Section 7102(a) does not apply to negligence claims seeking only monetary losses rather than damages for death or injury to a person or tangible property.

Kane, A. & J. v. Atlantic States Ins. · filed 2018-11-01(a)

As monetary damage does not constitute damage to tangible property, which is necessary to invoke the Comparative Negligence Act, we find no fault with the trial court’s ruling that contributory negligence standards applied instead.

Section 7102(a) does not create a duty of care where none exists, so comparative negligence does not displace the occupied crossing rule.

Sprenkel v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1995-10-27(a)

More importantly, the enactment of the Comparative Negligence Act does not change the well established rule that negligence cannot be found where the law does not impose a duty.

Section 7102(a) allocates fault after a defendant’s duty is established; it does not create a duty to warn of a train occupying a crossing.

Krentz v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 2006-11-21(a)

Whereas duty is a question of whether any liability may attach to the defendant for the plaintiffs harm, comparative negligence is a method for determining how much responsibility should be allocated to the defendant in light of the plaintiffs conduct. ... Accordingly, we now hold that the Occupied Crossing Rule remains as valid today as it was when the former regime of contributory negligence prevailed.