Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.04

If section 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(ii) applies by analogy to a dependency custody modification, consent to a child’s integration into a new home may come from the prior legal custodians as the closest analogs to residential parents, rather than from a biological parent who lacks custody.

In re L.M. · filed 2011-06-30(E)(1)(a)(ii)

Therefore, even if the “residential parents” were required to consent to the integration of L.M. and J.J. into M.M. and M.M.’s home, the record reflects the existence of such consent. P.C. and D.C., the closest analog to “residential parents” here, did consent to the integration of L.M. and J.J. into M.M. and M.M.’s family.

Section 3109.04 governs custody determinations arising from a divorce decree that identifies the child as issue of the marriage, even when one spouse is not the child’s biological parent.

Hull v. Hull · filed 2012-02-27(A)

Irrespective of Appellant’s arguments as to the parental status of Appellee, the present custody dispute arises from a divorce proceeding under the jurisdiction of the domestic relations court through R.C. 3109.04. R.C. 3109.04(A) provides that “in any proceeding pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of a child, * * * the court shall allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage.” (Emphasis added.) In the divorce decree between Appellant and Appellee, the decree stated I.H. was born as issue of the marriage. Accordingly, a custody determination pursuant to R.C. 3109.04 is applicable to the present case because the custody question arises from a domestic relations matter. The trial court correctly utilized the best interests of the child standard found in R.C. 3109.04.

Section 3109.04(B) sets no minimum notice period before a court interviews a child in chambers about custody.

In re C.D. · filed 2012-09-20(B)

Moreover, despite Stitt's arguments that the trial court did not give her adequate notice of the interview, R.C. 3109.04(B) does not provide that the court must give a certain amount of notice to the parties before it interviews the minor child.

Section 3109.04(C) permits a court to order a custody evaluation but does not require it to follow the resulting recommendations.

Eatherton v. Behringer · filed 2012-11-13(C)

While R.C. 3109.04 gives trial courts the ability to order investigations of the parents and child, it does not require the trial court to follow the recommendations contained within the resulting report.

Section 3109.04(C) gives the trial court discretion to order psychological evaluations of parents in a child custody case.

Masten v. Masten · filed 2016-08-31(C)

The use of the word “may” in the statute clearly indicates that the decision whether or not to order psychological evaluations is left to the discretion of the trial court.

Section 3109.04(C) abrogates any common-law right to refuse a psychological examination when allocation of custody is at issue.

Tassone v. Tassone · filed 2021-11-16(C)

Thus, to the extent that a common-law right against psychological examination existed, R.C. 3109.04(C) abrogated it where allocation of custody is at issue.

Section 3109.04(C) permits a domestic relations court to order an evaluation of parents and children while deciding a motion to modify parental rights.

State ex rel. J.R. v. Jones · filed 2022-12-21(C)

In the course of deciding a motion to modify parental rights, a court may order an evaluation of the parents and children. R.C. 3109.04(C); Civ.R. 75(D).

Section 3109.04(C) permits psychiatric evaluations to aid custody decisions; their use does not require a separate examination of a party’s capacity to enter a custody agreement.

Schultz v. Schultz · filed 2023-05-22(C)

Mr. Schultz confuses the need for psychiatric evaluations to be used as a tool in determining the best interest of children in custody proceedings and modifying supervised visitation with a mental status examination to determine the capacity to enter into contractual agreements. The fact that the parties and the court determined the need for the first is not evidence of a mandate for the second.

Section 3109.04(C) permits a court allocating parental rights to order parents to undergo psychological examinations and abrogates any common-law right to resist such an examination when custody is at issue.

Conomy v. Conomy · filed 2026-01-12(C)

Thus, to the extent that a common-law right against psychological examination existed, R.C. 3109.04(C) abrogated it where allocation of custody is at issue. ... We agree with the reasoning set forth in Tassone.

Section 3109.04(C) permits a court to order a mental examination without a showing of good cause.

Tassone v. Tassone · filed 2020-06-02(C)

Unlike ... Civ.R. 35(A), R.C. 3109.04(C) does not require that good cause be shown for a mental examination.

Section 3109.04(I)(2) applies to modification or termination of shared parenting plans and does not govern modification of child support orders.

Brose v. Copeland · filed 2013-08-05(I)(2)

The trial court’s reliance on R.C. 3109.04(I)(2) in this matter was improper because the statute only applies to the modification or termination of shared parenting plans under R.C. 3109.04(E), which was not requested or at issue here. By its plain terms, the statute does not cover the modification of child support orders pursuant to R.C. 3119.79(A), which is the statute implicated here.

Section 3109.04 governs child custody cases in domestic relations courts and does not govern an application for a limited medical guardianship under § 2111.06.

In re S.H. · filed 2013-08-27

R.C. 3109.04 dictates the rules and procedures for domestic relations courts to follow in child custody cases. ... However, the case at bar is not a custody dispute at all. Rather, Schimer filed an application requesting to be appointed as guardian of S.H. for medical purposes pursuant to R.C. 2111.06.

Under a shared parenting order, a parent retains parental rights even without physical possession of the child and may entrust temporary custody to a third party during that parent’s parenting time.

Ferreri v. Ferreri · filed 2013-09-30(L)(5)

According to the Revised Code and the Shared Parenting Plan, Jack retains full parental rights regardless of whether the minor child is in his physical possession. That includes the right to entrust the temporary custody of the minor child to third parties, such as, in the present case, the paternal grandparents.

In deciding whether shared parenting serves a child’s best interest, a court may find it infeasible when the parents cannot communicate and cooperate effectively.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2014-11-17(F)(2)(a)

Both parties testified, and their testimony shows that both harbor hostility toward the other and are unable to effectively communicate and cooperate. The trial court determined that due to the parties’ communication difficulties, shared parenting is not feasible. The court had to designate one of the parties the child’s residential parent and it concluded, based upon all of the evidence and testimony before it, that appellee should be the child’s residential parent. We are unable to state that the court reached an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision.

Under subsection (F)(2)(a), imperfect parental cooperation does not preclude shared parenting when the evidence shows the parents can cooperate.

Bond v. de Rinaldis · filed 2016-06-09(F)(2)(a)

Undisputedly, the parties are not models of cooperation. The trial court recognized this when it referred to the parties' "differing parenting and communication styles." However, despite their past behavior, the trial court concluded that both parents were intelligent enough to recognize that cooperation was in Andrew's best interest. The evidence supports this conclusion and shows that the parties are capable of cooperation. We thus find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the parties have the capacity to cooperate given their shared love for Andrew.

Section 3109.04 requires courts assessing shared parenting to consider whether the parents can cooperate and make joint decisions; repeated unilateral decisions affecting the child can support ending shared parenting.

Via v. Boyle · filed 2025-12-01(F)(1)(j)

The statutory framework explicitly mandates consideration of "the ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly." R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j). When one parent repeatedly makes significant decisions affecting the child without consulting the other parent, the court properly concludes that shared parenting no longer serves the child's best interests.

Section 3109.04(F)(1)(j) requires courts assessing shared parenting to consider whether the parents can cooperate and make decisions jointly, including when one parent makes unilateral decisions affecting the child.

Via v. Boyle · filed 2026-02-02(F)(1)(j)

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j) specifically requires courts to consider "the ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly." When one parent makes unilateral decisions affecting significant aspects of the child's daily life, whether motivated by religious conviction or other reasons, shared parenting becomes unworkable.

Section 3109.04(B) authorizes a court to order parents and children to participate in family therapy when allocating parental rights and responsibilities in the children’s best interest.

O'Malley v. O'Malley · filed 2013-11-27(B)

Therefore, because the court was authorized to order the parents and children to participate in family therapy for the purposes of allocating parental rights and responsibilities, its Interim Order is a valid enforceable court order.

Section 3109.04(F)(1)(j) requires consideration of a parent’s residence outside Ohio, but nonresidence alone does not deprive the parent of custody.

Hurst v. Hurst · filed 2014-10-27(F)(1)(j)

Although R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j) requires a trial court to consider whether a parent has established a residence outside of Ohio, "nonresidence alone should not deprive a parent of custody."

Section 3109.04(F)(1)(j) requires courts to consider a parent’s residence outside Ohio when deciding custody, but nonresidence alone does not deprive a parent of custody.

Neckles v. Ruthrauff · filed 2022-09-14(F)(1)(j)

Although R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j) requires a court to consider whether a parent has established a residence outside of Ohio, generally “nonresidence alone should not deprive a parent of custody.”

Section 3109.04(A)(1) does not require the legal custodian and residential parent to have exclusive authority over non-emergency medical decisions; that authority may be shared with the other parent.

Nicola v. Nicola · filed 2015-08-31(A)(1)

For obvious reasons, the legal custodian and residential parent of children in divorce proceedings is normally vested with the power to make non-emergency medical decisions. However, this is not a requirement of the law. The power may be shared between the legal custodian and residential parent, and the other parent.

Section 3109.04(A)(1) gives the residential parent and legal custodian primary, but not exclusive, parental rights and responsibilities, so a court may give the other parent sole authority over nonemergency medical decisions.

Carr v. Carr · filed 2016-09-26(A)(1)

R.C. 3109.04(A)(1) plainly provides that the residential parent and legal custodian of the child is granted primary allocation of parental rights and responsibilities regarding the child, and not the sole allocation of these rights and responsibilities. Thus, while under R.C. 3109.04(A)(1) and "[f]or obvious reasons, the legal custodian and residential parent of children * * * is normally vested with the power to make non-emergency medical decisions[,] this is not a requirement of the law. The power may be shared between the legal custodian and residential parent, and the other parent." Nicola v. Nicola, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2014-L-062, 2015-Ohio-3540, ¶ 13. R.C. 3109.04(A)(1) contemplates that a trial court may do exactly what was done here. We therefore find no abuse of discretion.

Section 3109.04(A)(1) gives the residential parent primary, but not exclusive, parental rights and responsibilities, permitting the court to give the other parent final authority over medical decisions.

Sejka v. Sejka · filed 2017-01-02(A)(1)

Pursuant to the statute, the residential parent and legal custodian of the child, Mother in this case, is granted primary allocation of parental rights and responsibilities regarding the child; the statute expressly does not allocate parental rights and responsibilities exclusively to one party. ... In light of the above, and considering our role as a reviewing court, we find that the trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in determining that Father was to have final medical decision-making authority over the minor child.

Section 3109.04(A)(1) permits a court to name one parent the residential parent and legal custodian while assigning the other parent an enumerated area of responsibility for the children.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2021-09-01(A)(1)

Accordingly, it is possible for one parent to be the residential parent and legal custodian and for the other parent to have an enumerated area of responsibility with respect to the children without it constituting the hybrid allocation of parental rights and responsibilities that this Court concluded in Tustin violated the statute.

Section 3109.04(F)(1) does not require a trial court to analyze each best-interest factor individually when no party requests findings of fact and conclusions of law under Civ.R. 52.

Savage v. Savage · filed 2015-12-14(F)(1)

Because Thacker did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Civ.R. 52, the trial court did not need to engage in a factor-by-factor analysis of the R.C. 3109.04 best-interest standards. Hopkins at ¶ 17, citing In re E.W., 4th Dist. Washington No. 10CA18, 10CA19, and 10CA20, 2011-Ohio-2123, ¶ 22.

Section 3109.04(F) requires consideration of the child’s best-interest factors, but absent a Civ.R. 52 motion the court need not make specific findings on each factor in its judgment.

Baker-Chaney v. Chaney · filed 2017-06-26(F)

Further, absent a Civ.R. 52 motion, a trial court need not make specific findings correlating to R.C. 3109.04(F) in the judgment entry.

Section 3109.04(B)(1) requires a court allocating parental rights and responsibilities to consider the children’s best interests, but does not require an express finding to that effect.

Riddle v. Riddle · filed 2019-10-28(B)(1)

Even if Nicole had filed a Civ.R. 52 motion, the wording of R.C. 3109.04(B)(1) does not require the trial court to make an express finding that the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities is in the children’s best interest.

Section 3109.04(F)(1) requires a court deciding legal custody to consider the applicable best-interest factors, but does not require specific findings on each factor.

In re J.M. · filed 2020-03-06(F)(1)

In any event, with regard to the best-interest factors, we note that the trial court was not required to make its own specific findings. It was required only to “consider” the best-interest factors.

Section 3109.04(F) requires the court to consider relevant best-interest factors when allocating parental rights, but does not require a specific finding for each factor in its judgment entry.

In re Z.L. · filed 2022-04-14(F)

Although a trial court is required to “consider” the R.C. 3109.04(F) factors, it is not required to make specific findings for each factor in its judgment entry.

Section 3109.04 does not require a trial court to specifically list or cite each best interest factor, so long as its findings permit meaningful appellate review.

In re J.A.S. · filed 2022-07-21

Pursuant to Ohio law, the trial court is not required to specifically list or cite to each factor set forth in determining the best interest of the child, including those listed in R.C. 3109.04, or any other factor the trial court deems relevant. Rickman v. Rickman, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 15CA014, 2016-Ohio-132. A trial court may substantially comply with these statutes if there are sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit this Court to conduct a meaningful review.

When weighing a parent’s planned move out of state as a best interest factor, the court must account for testimony that the parent will stay if the child cannot move.

Barton v. Porter · filed 2017-03-23(F)(1)(j)

On remand, the trial court shall weigh the best interest factors given the fact that appellant will not relocate without C.P.

Section 3109.04 does not require a court to give specific reasons when it declines to follow a guardian ad litem’s custody recommendation.

R.E. v. H.F. · filed 2017-05-12

Father would have us require the court to defer to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem unless it articulates specific reasons why it is not following the recommendation. R.C. 3109.04 does not mandate such a procedure, and father has cited no case law to support his position.

Section 3109.04(B)(2)(a) leaves appointment of a guardian ad litem to the trial court’s discretion when the court does not interview the child.

Canada v. Blakenship · filed 2018-12-03(B)(2)(a)

Thus, the matter being purely within the discretion of the trial court, and absent an interview of the child, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem.

Section 3109.04(F)(2)(e) makes the guardian ad litem’s recommendation one factor the court may consider when deciding whether shared parenting is in the child’s best interest.

In re A.B.M. · filed 2019-08-08(F)(2)(e)

The recommendation of the GAL is only one of the factors the trial judge may consider under R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(e).

Section 3109.04(B)(2)(a) leaves appointment of a guardian ad litem for an in camera interview to the trial court’s discretion when neither parent requests one.

Singer v. Singer · filed 2019-12-23(B)(2)(a)

Accordingly, when neither parent requests the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the in camera interview, it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to appoint a guardian ad litem.

In deciding whether shared parenting serves a child’s best interest, a court considers the guardian ad litem’s recommendation but is not bound by it.

Tellis v. Tellis · filed 2021-06-11(F)(2)(e)

Furthermore, the trial court was not bound by the recommendation of the GAL regarding the shared parenting plan. In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it found a shared parenting plan to be in the children’s best interest.

Section 3109.04(B)(2)(a) does not require appointment of a guardian ad litem when the court does not interview the child.

Whitesed v. Huddleston · filed 2021-07-13(B)(2)(a)

Here, the trial court did not conduct an interview of the child and therefore the provisions governing the appointment of a guardian ad litem under R.C. 3109.04(B) were not triggered.

Section 3109.04(F)(2)(a) requires a court considering shared parenting to assess the parents’ ability to cooperate, not their prior success at doing so.

Teufel v. Teufel · filed 2017-07-07(F)(2)(a)

Furthermore, though we agree that effective cooperation is important in shared parenting, the statute requires only that the trial court consider the parties’ ability to cooperate effectively, not their prior success in doing so.

Section 3109.04 does not require in camera interviews to remain confidential from parents.

Covell v. Covell · filed 2018-09-04(B)(2)(c), (B)(3)

Even though the trial court interpreted “sections (2)(c) and (3) of R.C. 3109.04 to mean that the in camera interviews are to remain confidential,” we find this erroneous4 interpretation to be immaterial because the Father’s failure to request a review of the in camera interviews, or a copy of the transcripts results in waiver of the issue on appeal.

Section 3109.04(B)(3) does not bar a child's attorney from obtaining the court's transcript of the child's in camera interview.

In re A.M.R. · filed 2017-12-21(B)(3)

Moreover, we find nothing in the unambiguous language of R.C. 3109.04(B)(3) to suggest that counsel is precluded from having access to the transcript of the in camera interview.

Section 3109.04(B)(2)(c) allows a court to deny a parent access to transcripts of a child’s in camera interview for appeal while the appellate court independently reviews the interview.

In re Z.W. · filed 2025-04-21(B)(2)(c)

We find such reasoning to be sound, given the restrictions contained in R.C. 3109.04(B)(2)(c), and particularly as our own independent review of the in camera interviews on appeal serves to protect both the rights of the parents involved in the cases as well as preserving the privacy of the children who were interviewed. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Johnathon’s request for the interview transcripts for purposes of appeal.

Section 3109.04(B) does not require a child’s in camera interview transcript to remain confidential from the parents.

Covell v. Kloos · filed 2018-08-22(B)

Even though the trial court interpreted “sections (2)(c) and (3) of R.C. 3109.04 to mean that the in camera interviews are to remain confidential,” we find this erroneous4 interpretation to be immaterial because the Father’s failure to request a review of the in camera interviews, or a copy of the transcripts results in waiver of the issue on appeal.

Section 3109.04(F)(1)(d) requires a court deciding custody to consider whether the child has adjusted well to the child’s school and community.

In re G.W. · filed 2024-04-24(F)(1)(d)

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(d) required the juvenile court to consider only whether G.W. had adjusted well to her school and community.

Section 3109.04(F)(1)(d) permits the custody court to weigh a child’s adjustment to home, school, and community, including a parent’s efforts to obtain educational services.

In re. O.S. · filed 2025-03-07(F)(1)(d)

When considering the Children’s adjustment to their homes, school, and community (R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(d)), the trial court described all of the efforts Father took to engage the Children in school and community activities. It also recounted Father’s efforts to obtain special education services from their school. Conversely, the trial court noted that while Mother had previously provided the Children’s primary care, Mother had not sought special education services or enrolled the Children in community activities. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion as Mother only enrolled the Children in community activities for a brief period and never sought to enroll them in education services.

In an initial custody decision, the child’s primary caregiver deserves strong consideration under the best-interest factors, but that role has no presumptive weight over other relevant factors.

In re O.M. · filed 2018-06-01(F)(1)

But while the primary caregiver should be given strong consideration, the factor has no “presumptive quality,” Maxwell at 306.

A parent’s history as the child’s primary caregiver is relevant to the best-interest analysis but creates no presumption favoring that parent.

In re K.J.F. · filed 2023-09-28(F)(1)

We agree this bond and continuation of care is paramount to a child’s development and relevant when assessing the best interest of the child. However, it is not a presumption in the law or one of the listed factors in R.C. 3109.04(F).

Section 3109.04(F)(1)(c) makes a child’s interaction and relationship with a sibling a factor in determining the child’s best interests.

Murray v. Murray · filed 2018-08-13(F)(1)(c)

We find no abuse of discretion. A child’s “interaction and interrelationship” with her siblings is a recognized factor in determining the child’s best interests. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c). There was evidence in the record that Eve is capable of and has actually cared for Annika in the absence of other supervision.

Section 3109.04(B)(1)'s best-interest duty prevents parents from using a shared parenting plan to remove the court's continuing authority over the allocation, enforcement, or modification of parental rights.

In re Z.N.T. · filed 2019-03-18(B)(1)

Paragraph N of the shared parenting plan removed the resolution of future disputes from the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction over the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, or the enforcement or modification thereof, and restrained or otherwise inhibited the juvenile court's nondelegable duty to determine that which is in a child's best interest.

Section 3109.04 governs allocation of parental rights and approval of shared parenting plans; without a shared parenting decree, section 3109.051 governs parenting time for the nonresidential parent.

Todd v. Todd · filed 2019-04-01

In a divorce proceeding, R.C. 3109.04 governs the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and decision to approve a shared parenting plan; however, R.C. 3109.051 governs the decision to grant parenting time to the nonresidential parent if the court has not issued a shared parenting decree.

Section 3109.04(E)(1)(a) does not govern modifications to parenting time or visitation when one parent is the legal custodian.

Bohannon v. Lewis · filed 2022-07-13(E)(1)(a)

As an initial matter, we note that the trial court and the parties rely on R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) for the parenting-time analysis. However, “when one parent is the legal custodian, modifications to visitation or parenting time are not governed by R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). Rather, such modifications are subject to R.C. 3109.051.”

Section 3109.04(E)(1)(a) requires a change in circumstances before a court may modify a shared-parenting decree, so a court need not reach the child’s best interests when that threshold is unmet.

In re E.M. · filed 2025-05-21(E)(1)(a)

After considering the record before us, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that there had not been a change in circumstances for purposes of R.C. 3109.04(E). Therefore, we do not reach the best interest analysis here.

Section 3109.04(F)(1) does not govern modifications to parenting time when one parent is the legal custodian, but using its best-interest factors is harmless when the findings address the relevant factors under section 3109.051(D).

Tyra v. Griffith · filed 2025-03-19(F)(1)

We hold that the trial court’s mistaken reliance on R.C. 3109.04(F) was harmless. The trial court’s findings track the relevant best-interest factors under R.C. 3109.051(D) and are supported by the evidence at the hearing.

A shared parenting plan in a divorce must be filed at least thirty days before the parental-rights hearing, but the filing deadline is directory and the trial court may excuse a late plan.

Sivertsen-Kuhn v. Kuhn · filed 2019-08-30(G)

According to R.C. 3109.04(G), “[t]he plan for shared parenting shall be filed with the petition for dissolution of marriage, if the question of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children arises out of an action for dissolution of marriage, or, in other cases, at a time at least thirty days prior to the hearing on the issue of the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children.” As noted, Keith’s petition was filed on January 11, just two days before the January 13, 2017 final divorce hearing, and, therefore, was untimely. We have held that this requirement is “directory, not mandatory,” and that a trial court has “discretion to relieve a party of the statutory deadline and grant” the request to untimely file a shared parenting plan.

Section 3109.04(G) requires a shared-parenting plan to be filed at least 30 days before the hearing, but the deadline is directory; a late filing may be accepted if the other party had an adequate opportunity to respond.

Rummelhoff v. Rummelhoff · filed 2020-05-13(G)

As this court has previously recognized, this requirement is directory and not mandatory. See Siegel at ¶ 8. Therefore, where a shared-parenting plan is not filed within the statutory deadline, the critical inquiry is whether a party had an adequate opportunity to respond to the plan. Id. at ¶ 10.

A trial court may exercise discretion over a shared parenting plan filed after the statutory deadline, subject to the parties’ due process rights.

In re B.D. · filed 2021-10-25(G)

Although some Ohio appellate courts have held that it is within the trial court’s discretion to exercise flexibility in applying R.C. 3109.04(G), this flexibility is limited to the parties’ right to due process.

Section 3109.04(G)'s thirty-day deadline for filing a shared-parenting plan is directory; a court may accept a late plan when the opposing party has a fair opportunity to address it.

Manhema v. Manhema, Unpublished Decision (11-9-2005) · filed 2005-11-09(G)

R.C. 3109.04 (G) requires a party to file a shared-parenting plan either with the petition for dissolution of marriage, or at least thirty days prior to the hearing on the issue of parental rights and responsibilities. But Ohio courts have held that the statute is directory, not mandatory. ... Where Mr. Manhema knew that shared parenting was an issue for trial and chose not to submit a proposal either before trial or following the court's suggestion, Mr. Manhema's due-process rights were not violated by the court's adoption of Mrs. Manhema's plan.

Section 3109.04 allocates parental rights between presumptively fit parents based on the child’s best interest; designating one parent as residential parent does not itself establish that the other is unsuitable.

In re R.P. · filed 2020-03-23

Notably, the trial court’s 2017 designation of Father as the residential parent under R.C. 3109.04 was explicitly based on the best interest of the child. The trial court did not make a legal determination that Mother was an unfit or unsuitable parent. Consequently, at that time, Mother retained her fundamental parental rights to R.P.

The best interest standard in § 3109.04 does not apply to a custody dispute between a parent and a nonparent; the court must first find the parent unsuitable.

Baten-Sica v. Ramos · filed 2023-05-03

In a dispute between a parent and a nonparent for custody, the best interest standard set forth in R.C. 3109.04 does not apply.

Section 3109.04 does not govern temporary allocations of parental rights in protection-order proceedings because those proceedings are not custody proceedings under the statute.

Alomari v. Almajali · filed 2020-09-08

The Ohio Supreme Court has in fact "expressly rejected" the argument that a reference in R.C. 3109.04 "to the allocation of parental rights 'in any proceeding' included the temporary allocation of such rights in a protection-order proceeding." Id. at ¶ 36, citing State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 83 Ohio St.3d 551 (1998).

Section 3109.04(D)(2) permits transfer to juvenile court only if the court finds that designating neither parent as residential parent and legal custodian is in the child’s best interest.

Cotner v. Coey · filed 2020-12-02(D)(2)

In this case, while the trial court found it was in the best interest of the children to place them into shelter care, the trial court did not find it was in the best interest of the children for neither parent to be the designated residential parent and legal custodian of the children. Thus, the trial court did not make the required finding for transfer pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(D)(2).

Section 3109.04(D)(2) generally permits a custody case to be transferred to the juvenile division, but it cannot expand that division’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Stalnaker v. Stalnaker · filed 2023-08-30(D)(2)

R.C. 3109.04(D)(2) and R.C. 3109.06 generally authorize one division of a county court of common pleas to transfer a custody case to the juvenile division under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, those statutes do not define, and cannot expand, the subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile division of a county’s court of common pleas.

Section 3109.04 does not govern whether a court must interview a child in chambers in a permanent custody proceeding.

In re J.B. · filed 2021-03-16

We cannot, as mother urges us, apply R.C. 3109.04 to determine whether the trial court erred in not interviewing the children in chambers. If we did so, mother's request would have rendered an in-camera interview mandatory, not discretionary. This outcome would contravene In re C.F., which held that a trial court may refuse a parent's request for an in-camera interview of a child in a permanent custody proceeding.

Section 3109.04(F) does not supply the best-interest factors for an agency’s permanent-custody motion; R.C. 2151.414(D) governs that determination.

In re E.J. · filed 2024-06-26(F)

The juvenile court also explained that, in making a custody determination, the magistrate must consider the factors set out in R.C. 3109.04(F), rather than R.C. 2151.414(D). ... The court additionally cited the wrong statute in its entry.

Section 3109.04(B) requires a child interview on a party’s request concerning the child’s wishes and concerns about custody, but does not require an interview to investigate the source of alleged disparaging statements.

Bajaj v. Green · filed 2021-09-10(B)

In determining the child’s best interest for purposes of allocating parental rights and responsibilities and of resolving any issues related to the making of that allocation, “the court, in its discretion, may and, upon the request of either party, shall interview in chambers any or all of the involved children regarding their wishes and concerns with respect to the allocation.” R.C. 3109.04(B). ... Given the nature of the issue, the trial court was not statutorily required to conduct an in camera interview of M.J.B. regarding her statements.

Section 3109.04 permits a domestic relations court that retained jurisdiction to determine custody of a child over eighteen if the child is under a legal disability.

C.S. v. R.S. · filed 2021-10-04

Given our decision that the trial court does have jurisdiction to determine custody in this case if V. is found to be under a legal disability, it must make a determination as to legal disability.

Section 3109.04(E)(1)(a) permits modification of a prior allocation of parental rights only upon a change of circumstances, a finding that modification serves the child’s best interest, and a determination that its benefits outweigh the harm.

Steele v. Steele · filed 2021-10-15(E)(1)(a)

Thus, before a court may modify a prior allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, it must consider: (1) whether a change of circumstances occurred, (2) whether modification is in the child's best interest, and (3) whether the benefits that result from the change outweigh any harm.

A shared-parenting order requires a pleading or motion for shared parenting and a proposed shared-parenting plan; language sharing decision-making authority does not by itself make an order designating one parent the sole legal custodian a shared-parenting decree.

In re A.M. · filed 2021-10-15(A)(2)

Although the parties’ agreed-upon language about decision-making perhaps suggests shared parenting, Mother remains the sole legal custodian. We note too that a shared-parenting order must be preceded by a pleading or motion by one or both parties for shared parenting and the submission of a proposed shared-parenting plan. R.C. 3109.04(A)(2).

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) permits a court to modify a shared-parenting plan on its own initiative when the modification furthers the child’s best interest.

In re J.M. · filed 2022-07-13(E)(2)(b)

A trial court may modify the terms of a shared-parenting plan on its own initiative under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) when the modification furthers the best interest of the child.

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) allows a court to modify the terms of an approved shared parenting plan at a parent’s request when the modification serves the child’s best interest.

Schaible v. Schaible · filed 2022-12-28(E)(2)(b)

Pursuant to that statute, the domestic relations court may modify the "terms" of a shared parenting plan "approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared parenting decree" upon the request of "one or both of the parents under the decree" so long as "the court determines that the modifications are in the best interest of the children."

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) permits modification of a shared parenting plan when the court finds the modification is in the child's best interest.

Blevins v. Figueroa · filed 2022-06-06(E)(2)(b)

However, a trial court may modify the terms of a “shared parenting plan” if the court determines the modifications are in the child's best interest.

Section 3109.04(G) requires a court to award custody to one parent when no shared parenting plan has been filed.

Robinson v. Robinson · filed 2023-04-14(G)

However, as the trial court noted, Joseph never filed a shared parenting plan, and the court was required, pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(G), to award custody to one of the parties.

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) permits a court to remove a right-of-first-refusal term from a shared parenting plan when the modification is in the children’s best interests.

H.C. v. P.C. · filed 2023-06-23(E)(2)(b)

R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) provides that the terms of the plan for shared parenting may be modified so long as the modification is in the best interest of the children. ... Under the factual circumstances of this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion to modify the Shared Parenting Plan to eliminate the right of first refusal.

Section 3109.04 requires a parent to file a shared parenting plan before a court may award shared parenting.

In re M.C. · filed 2024-04-01(A)(1)

Without the filing of the plan, the trial court lacked the authority to award shared parenting.

A parent’s move and unilateral school change can satisfy the change-in-circumstances requirement for modifying a shared parenting plan when they substantially disrupt the child’s school travel and activities.

In re A.E.F. · filed 2024-06-10(E)(1)(a)

Despite the flexible work schedules that both parties had, Mother’s unilateral decision to change schools significantly increased travel time to accommodate A.E.F.’s schooling. ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding a change in circumstances.

Section 3109.04(E) permits a court to modify a shared parenting plan when necessary to serve the children’s best interests.

Conner v. Thompson · filed 2025-09-04(E)

Under Ohio law, a court may modify a shared parenting plan if the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the children involved. See R.C. 3109.04(E); Watson v. Watson, 2023-Ohio-3719, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) allows a court to modify the terms of a shared parenting plan based on the child’s best interests without finding a change of circumstances when the modification does not alter the shared parenting designation of parental rights and responsibilities.

Connelly v. Connelly · filed 2025-10-28(E)(2)(b)

If the trial court is merely modifying the terms of the shared parenting decree pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), the trial court need not find a change of circumstances but rather need only consider the best interest of the child.

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) permits modification of a shared parenting plan’s parenting-time terms when the change serves the child’s best interests and the supporting findings rest on competent, credible evidence.

In re J.W. · filed 2025-11-05(E)(2)(b)

We overrule the first assignment of error where the juvenile court adopted mother’s proposed shared parenting plan with certain modifications “to support the best interest of the Child” under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), and the juvenile court’s findings regarding J.W.’s adjustment to father’s home, father’s ability to accommodate a “2-2-5-5” schedule, father’s increased participation in J.W.’s life during the pendency of the proceedings, and father’s willingness to communicate with mother were all supported by competent, credible evidence.

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) permits modification of a shared-parenting plan without a showing of changed circumstances.

In re J.R.P. · filed 2026-03-12(E)(2)(b)

A modification of the terms in a shared-parenting plan pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) does not require a showing of a change in circumstances.

Section 3109.04(E)(2)(b) does not require a finding of changed circumstances to modify the terms of a shared-parenting plan.

In re M.W.H. · filed 2026-04-30(E)(2)(b)

However, the juvenile court was not required to make this finding under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b).

Section 3109.04(G) requires a shared parenting plan to address all statutory factors relevant to the child’s care.

Montei v. Montei · filed 2013-12-06(G)

The trial court abused its discretion in adopting a shared parenting plan that did not address all of the ... statutory factors required by R.C. 3109.04(G).

Section 3109.04(F)(2) requires a court deciding whether shared parenting serves a child’s best interests to consider additional factors, including the parents’ ability to cooperate and make joint decisions.

In re M.C. · filed 2021-10-18(F)(2)

R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) provides additional factors to those stated above that a court must consider when determining whether a shared parenting agreement is in the best interests of the children.

Section 3109.04(F)(2) requires consideration of the shared parenting factors, but the court need not expressly state that it considered them when its decision analyzes relevant evidence.

Woodmansee v. Woodmansee · filed 2025-10-10(F)(2)

The fact that the trial court did not explicitly state that it considered the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the trial court did not consider them.

When neither parent requests shared parenting in a pleading or pretrial motion and no shared parenting plan is submitted, Section 3109.04(A)(1) requires the court to allocate primary residential and legal custody to one parent.

Pruitt v. Pruitt · filed 2022-06-17(A)(1)

Neither had requested shared parenting in their pleadings or any pretrial motion, nor was a shared parenting plan submitted to the court. Under these circumstances, the trial court was required to allocate residential and legal custody of J.P. primarily to one parent.

Section 3109.04 does not govern modifications of legal custody in dependency, neglect, or abuse cases; those modifications are governed by section 2151.42(B).

In re J.B. · filed 2022-12-14

We have already explained above that modifications of legal custody in dependency/neglect/abuse cases are governed by R.C. 2151.42(B), not R.C. 3109.04, which addresses modifications of shared parenting orders and awards of parental rights and responsibilities.

Section 3109.04(B) does not require an in camera interview in a dependency case governed by R.C. Chapter 2151.

In re I.T. · filed 2023-08-28(B)

This statutory section does not control these proceedings because this action is controlled by R.C. Chapter 2151 due to the fact it originated as a dependency case. Thus Aaron’s reliance on R.C. 3109.04(B) is misplaced, and it does not mandate anything here as he suggests.

Section 3109.04(E)(1)(a) governs custody disputes arising from divorce actions in domestic relations court; modification of a juvenile court’s award of legal custody to a nonparent after a dependency adjudication falls under section 2151.42.

In re S.T. · filed 2025-04-17(E)(1)(a)

At the outset, we note that the magistrate and the juvenile court applied R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) in their analyses of mother’s motion for legal custody. However, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) applies to custody disputes arising out of divorce actions in domestic relations court, usually between parents. See In re Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 96 (1997).

Section 3109.04(B)(1) does not require a juvenile court to interview a child in a permanent-custody proceeding when there is no existing custody decree and the court is not exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

In re A.R. · filed 2025-09-18(B)(1)

In this case, there was no existing custody decree, and consequently, the juvenile court was not exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the juvenile court was not required to comply with R.C. 3109.04.

When deciding whether shared parenting is in a child’s best interest, a court must consider all factors in § 3109.04(F)(1) and (F)(2).

Harsha v. Harsha · filed 2024-06-06(F)(1), (F)(2)

In determining whether shared parenting is in the child’s best interest, the court must consider all of the R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (2) factors.

Section 3109.04(F)(2) requires consideration of the statutory best-interest factors when a parent requests shared parenting.

In re I.D. · filed 2025-01-23(F)(2)

In support of its conclusion, the juvenile court specifically considered and addressed the requisite factors contained in R.C. 3109.04(F).

A request for shared parenting requires the court to consider the additional best-interest factors in § 3109.04(F)(2).

Fatokun v. Fatokun · filed 2025-03-31(F)(2)

A request for shared parenting also triggers additional best-interest factors that a court must consider under R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) and R.C. 3119.23.

Prior disputes about parenting time do not determine whether shared parenting serves a child’s best interest under § 3109.04.

Peoples v. Peoples · filed 2025-05-09(B)(1)

The fact that the parties had previous disputes about parenting time is neither novel in divorce proceedings nor determinative of the issues of custody and the child’s best interest.

Section 3109.04 requires a court deciding whether shared parenting serves a child’s best interest to consider the listed factors and weigh the evidence.

Sajja v. Atluru · filed 2025-12-23(F)(1), (F)(2)

The trial court considered all the factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (F)(2) in conjunction with all the evidence presented during the multi-day trial on this matter, made specific findings of fact, and weighed the evidence to determine that shared parenting with Atluru as the school- placement parent was in A.A.’s best interest.

Section 3109.04(F)(2) supplies factors for deciding whether shared parenting is in a child’s best interest.

S.L. v. L.R. · filed 2026-01-13(F)(2)

We do not find an abuse of discretion by the trial court here. The magistrate properly considered the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) and determined that shared parenting was in the best interests of K.L.

Section 3109.04(F)(2) applies when deciding whether shared parenting is in a child’s best interest, but not when modifying only an existing parenting-time schedule.

Kuchera v. Pfalzgraf · filed 2026-04-03(F)(2)

Because the magistrate was determining whether the parties’ parenting-time schedule should be modified, and not whether shared parenting was in C.K.’s best interest, R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) was not applicable.

Section 3109.04(F)(2)(e) makes the guardian ad litem’s recommendation a factor in deciding whether shared parenting is in a child’s best interest.

Shields v. Shields · filed 2024-12-23(F)(2)(e)

Moreover, the ... guardian ad litem’s recommendation, which is also a factor to be considered, R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(e), was very similar to Husband’s shared parenting plan.

Section 3109.04 permits a court deciding whether shared parenting is in a child’s best interest to give greater weight to the parents’ inability to cooperate than to other factors.

Snider v. Snider · filed 2025-01-13(F)(2)

Importantly, even though the trial court placed greater emphasis on certain factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (2)—namely, the factor relating to ... the parents’ inability to cooperate—it was permitted to do so.

Section 3109.04(E)(1)(a) does not control modification of which parent may claim a dependent child for tax purposes; R.C. 3119.82 governs that decision.

In re Z.E.W. · filed 2024-10-25(E)(1)(a)

This argument seems to be based on R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), but the controlling statute is R.C. 3119.82.

Section 3109.04(A) regulates who may attend a child’s in-camera interview but does not give the child or a parent a statutory right to counsel.

Lowe v. Compton · filed 2025-07-23(A)

This statute merely regulates who is permitted to be present at the in-camera interview, it does not provide any statutory right to counsel for either Mother or Z.C. to enforce.

Section 3109.04(C) requires that a psychological evaluation report be available for parental review but does not require the court to give a parent a copy.

Callan v. Callan · filed 2026-03-11(C)

R.C. 3109.04(C) does not specify the manner in which the report must be made available to the parties. While Husband argues that he should have been provided copies of the reports, nothing in the statute required the trial court to provide copies to the parties.

Section 3109.04(F)(3) bars a custody preference based on a parent's financial status but permits consideration of employment decisions that affect a child's best interests.

Selby v. Selby, 06 Be 55 (12-14-2007) · filed 2007-12-14(F)(3)

It has been held that R.C. 3109.04 (F)(3) does not prohibit the court from considering economic decisions that a party has made, such as employment decisions, that have an impact on the best interests of the children, and that such consideration by the trial court is not tantamount to considering the financial status of the parties.

R.C. 3109.04 sets out the best-interest standard for custody disputes between two parents, rather than disputes between a parent and a nonparent.

Holbrook v. Holbrook, 22320 (5-2-2008) · filed 2008-05-02

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the standard for resolving a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent is different from the best interest standard set forth in R.C. 3109.04 , which deals with custody disputes involving the allocation of parental rights between two parents.