Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.27

Section 2919.27(A)(1) supports a conviction when sufficient evidence shows that a person entered a residence in violation of a protection order.

State v. Brewer · filed 2013-01-30(A)(1)

Under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), “No person shall recklessly violate the terms of * * * [a] protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code * * *.” ... After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of violating a protection order proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order; calling protected persons despite knowing the order bars contact can satisfy its recklessness requirement.

State v. Szloh · filed 2013-03-22(A)(1)

Szloh was convicted of Violating a Protection Order. That offense is codified at R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), which states, in relevant part, that “no person shall recklessly violate the terms of any * * * protection order issued * * * pursuant to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code.” ... Thus, the jury could have found the essential element of recklessness proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating the terms of an issued protection order.

State v. Wisby · filed 2013-04-01(A)(1)

Wisby was convicted of violating a protection order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), which prohibits a person from recklessly violating the terms of any issued protection order. ... Based on this evidence, and when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable ... doubt.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) covers reckless violations of a civil protection order, including remaining within a prohibited distance instead of departing immediately after accidental contact.

State v. Vandyne · filed 2013-08-02(A)(1)

That evidence was sufficient to prove that Vandyne recklessly violated the CPO, in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1).

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order or consent agreement issued under the specified statutes; the defendant’s admission that he repeatedly violated the order supported his conviction.

State v. Riter · filed 2014-03-31(A)(1)

He was also convicted of one count of violation of temporary protection order pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), which states, “No person shall recklessly violate the terms of any of the following: [a] protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code.” ... We also note appellant admitted to violating the temporary protection order repeatedly. ... Appellant’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Circumstantial evidence can support a conviction for violating a protection order under section 2919.27(A)(1).

State v. Kinsworthy · filed 2014-05-27(A)(1)

In sum, the evidence established that Kinsworthy had access to the device from which the complaint was sent as well as the motive to send the complaint to harm his ex-girlfriend who had obtained a protection order against him. We do not find that the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Accordingly, Kinsworthy's conviction was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. In turn, Kinsworthy's convictions were also supported by sufficient evidence.

Section 2919.27 covers a violation of a no-contact protection order when the restrained person emails a third party intending the message to reach the protected person.

State v. Kemery · filed 2011-12-22

We concur with the trial court's analysis. There was no reason to subject the Downings to the ramblings of the email except to convey the message to Ms. Rowan in contravention of the mandates of the civil protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) covers reckless violations of a protection order's distance restriction even when the person does not speak to or threaten the protected person.

State v. Watts · filed 2012-12-10(A)(1)

Because the protection order contained distance provisions, the mere fact that Darrell did not speak to or threaten Patricia is not dispositive of whether he violated the order.

Section 2919.27(A) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order by entering its prohibited range or harassing a protected person when the order forbids that conduct.

State v. Weston · filed 2013-03-01(A)

Upon review of the record, we find the evidence and testimony introduced at trial sufficiently credible to establish Appellant violated the terms of the protection order by recklessly coming within the prohibited range set forth in the order, and verbally harassing Tingler.

Section 2919.27 criminalizes recklessly violating a protection order; initiating communication prohibited by the order can support a conviction.

State v. Glascoe · filed 2013-04-05

The statute at issue, R.C. 2919.27, criminalizes recklessly violating the terms of a protection order. ... Contrary to Glascoe’s argument, the testimony of Spain and Stefan supports a finding that he recklessly initiated in-person ... communication with her when he made the above-quoted remarks as they passed.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order; knowingly driving within the order’s stay-away boundary can establish recklessness.

State v. Hunter · filed 2013-04-12(A)(2)

Even if we accept Hunter’s version of the events, the evidence establishes that she was aware of the prohibition against coming within 500 feet of the Curington family, and that, despite this knowledge, she chose to drive on the roadway directly in front of the Curington residence. The evidence establishes that the roadway is a distance of about 150 feet from the house. Her testimony establishes that she was aware of the location of the Curington residence, and of the fact that going there would result in a violation of the protection order. Therefore, a reasonable finder of fact could find from this evidence that the essential element of recklessness was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 2919.27 requires proof that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order issued under R.C. 3113.31.

State v. Rodenberger · filed 2013-10-22

To convict appellant of violating a protection order in this case, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 3113.31. ... The jury did not lose its way in concluding that appellant recklessly violated the terms of the protection order against him with his actions on the morning of September 18, 2010.

A person recklessly violates a protection order by knowingly contacting the protected person and coming within the distance the order prohibits.

State v. Marker · filed 2014-09-05(A)(1)

However, despite the known risk of violating the protection order, he chose to be in contact and within 500 feet of Groves. This sufficiently demonstrates that Marker recklessly violated the protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) treats repeated calls to a protected person as reckless when the caller knows the protection order bars contact.

State v. Pesano · filed 2014-12-15(A)(1)

Finally, we find that in light of appellant’s acknowledgment he knew he was not supposed to have any contact with Jennifer, calling her more than once on January 6, 2014 was reckless pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(A)(1).

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits reckless violations of a protection order; tailgating the protected person and blocking her exit can satisfy that requirement.

State v. Bardos · filed 2016-12-12(A)(1)

The evidence presented at trial, when construed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to establish that Bardos recklessly violated the protection order. Even assuming arguendo that Bardos did not act recklessly during the incident at the Stop-N-Go, there is no question that Bardos acted with heedless indifference toward the dictates of the protection order when he tailgated E.D. on a public roadway and then subsequently blockaded her into the driveway at the nursing home.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) covers repeated attempts to call a person when a protection order prohibits initiating contact, even if the person does not answer.

State v. Dinka · filed 2015-01-12(A)(1)

The CPO at issue prohibits appellant from ... contacting or initiating contact with Howard. Appellant's repeated attempts to telephone Howard clearly satisfies the fact that appellant was initiating contact.

Section 2919.27 requires proof that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order.

State v. Sullivan · filed 2015-11-25

The statute under which Mr. Sullivan was convicted, R.C. 2919.27, requires a showing that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) can be violated recklessly by living and working within the distance prohibited by a protection order despite knowing where the protected person lives.

State v. Sims · filed 2018-03-02(A)(2)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a rational finder of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could find that Sims, with heedless indifference to the consequences, disregarded a substantial risk that his conduct in working and living within 500 yards of Beatty was likely to result in a violation of the protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order, including by contacting someone outside the times or subjects the order permits.

State v. Peric · filed 2019-03-29(A)(1)

As to both offenses, the foregoing evidence satisfies the elements of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), constituting reckless violations of the protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating the terms of a protection order issued under section 3113.31.

State v. Howard · filed 2018-09-14(A)(1)

The elements of violating a protection order are set forth in R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), which prohibits a person from recklessly violating the terms of a protection order issued under R.C. 3113.31.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) requires at least recklessness when a person violates a protection order; evidence that the person persisted in prohibited contact after being told to leave can support that finding.

State v. T.K. · filed 2019-05-21(A)(2)

We find that "viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a[] rational trier of fact could have found" the requisite criminal intent that T.K. acted at least "recklessly" when he violated the express terms of the ex parte protective order. Monroe at ¶ 47.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) requires a reckless violation of a valid protection order.

State v. Wisler · filed 2019-06-14(A)(2)

The essential elements of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) are that an accused recklessly violated a valid protection order.

Section 2919.27 does not require the State to prove that a protection-order violation was part of a scheme, plan or system.

State v. Fuchs · filed 2019-10-18(A)-(B)

Moreover, the State had no need to prove that Fuchs’s alleged violation of the order was part of a scheme, plan or system. See R.C. 2919.27(A)-(B).

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order; permission to text about children does not permit phone calls.

State v. Dinka · filed 2019-10-14(A)(1)

The volume and content of the voicemails surpasses even an expansive interpretation of the type of limited contact that was permitted by the express terms of the protection order. If appellant wanted to arrange a telephone call with the children, he was required to do so by text message.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) does not require a person protected by the order to feel fear when the order is violated.

State v. Thacker · filed 2020-04-06(A)(1)

It is not an element of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) that individuals protected by a protection order feel fear when a defendant violates the order.

Purposefully approaching a person protected by an order satisfies the recklessness element of violating that order.

State v. Gebrosky · filed 2020-12-30(A)(1)

In so doing, appellant satisfied the element of recklessness required for a violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1).

A person may recklessly violate a protection order by failing to read it and interfering with the protected person’s utilities after receiving the order.

State v. Crist · filed 2020-12-30(A)(1)

While appellant testified he never read the order, he acknowledged service of the order and it prohibited appellant from interfering with Austin’s right to occupy the residence by canceling utilities. The jury was entitled to disbelieve appellant’s testimony or conclude that failure to read the order was reckless. The jury could also have believed the officer who testified that he personally warned appellant that turning off the utilities would normally be a violation of any temporary restraining order and that appellant proceeded to act in violation of the order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order issued under R.C. 3113.31; evidence that a defendant breached the order’s distance restriction can support a conviction.

State v. Almeyda · filed 2021-03-19(A)(1)

R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) states, in relevant part, that “no person shall recklessly violate the terms of * * * a protection order issued * * * pursuant to * * * 3113.31 of the Revised Code.” ... The State’s evidence in this case was overwhelming and unrebutted. Given this, an assignment of error asserting that Almeyda’s conviction was not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence would be without potential merit.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) covers threatening statements made with heedless indifference to the risk that a protected person will hear them, even without an intent to threaten.

State v. K.A.T. · filed 2021-12-06(A)(1)

Appellant knew that there was a protection order in place and that he was not to threaten J.F. or his family. Nonetheless, he yelled threatening comments from his home so loudly that J.F. could hear them while he was in his own backyard. Whether appellant intended to threaten J.F. or not, his conduct demonstrated a “heedless indifference” to the risk that J.F. might hear these threatening words that were in violation of the protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) covers recklessly charging a vehicle toward a person protected by a civil stalking protection order that bars contact.

State v. Cephas · filed 2021-12-13(A)(2)

Cephas was convicted of violating the CSPO in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2). ... The trial court found that Cephas's conduct in using her vehicle to charge Abrams constituted a reckless violation of the CSPO. We agree.

Repeated calls that harass a protected person can violate a protection order under Section 2919.27(A)(1).

State v. Carnicom · filed 2021-05-14(A)(1)

In sum, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found that Carnicom violated the TPO by harassing a protected person, in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 2919.27 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order.

State v. Studer · filed 2021-09-13

Pursuant to R.C. 2919.27, to convict Studer of Violating a Protection Order, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did “recklessly violate the terms of * * * [a] protection order” issued under R.C. 3113.31.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order issued under R.C. 3113.31.

State v. Terry · filed 2021-11-15(A)(1)

To convict appellant for a violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), the state had to prove that appellant recklessly violated the terms of the protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 3113.31.

A person protected by a protection order need not feel fear for a violation of the order to occur.

State v. Estep · filed 2022-01-31(A)(1)

It is not an element of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) that individuals protected by a protection order feel fear when a defendant violates the order.

A person recklessly violates a protection order by entering the protected person’s residence or grounds even when that person is absent.

State v. Harvey · filed 2022-06-29(A)(1)

Harvey’s argument that he was not “reckless” because he knew his wife was not home when he drove up the driveway ignores the plain language that bars him from entering her residence and its grounds under any circumstance, even if she is absent or gives permission. Here, Harvey not only acted recklessly, but intentionally.

A prior conviction for violating a protection order can support an inference that a person recklessly violated it again by approaching the protected person without checking whether the order remained in effect.

State v. McGinnis · filed 2022-07-01(A)(1)

Since McGinnis had previously been convicted of violating the subject protection order, it could be reasonably inferred that he was aware of the existence of the order. Therefore, it could also be reasonably inferred that he disregarded a known risk that the protection order likely existed, and that he acted recklessly when he decided to approach the victim without first ascertaining the status of the order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order issued under section 3113.31; assuming the order was lifted without receiving the court’s decision can support a finding of recklessness.

State v. Devoll · filed 2023-10-02(A)(1)

That section provides in relevant part that no person shall recklessly violate the terms of a protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 3113.31. ... We find A.D.'s testimony overwhelmingly proves Devoll acted recklessly.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order; service of the order supported a finding of recklessness when Andrews later contacted the protected person.

State v. Andrews · filed 2023-11-22(A)(1)

Given that Andrews received service of the DVCPO on September 13, 2021, the jury did not lose its way when it concluded that she recklessly violated this order by repeatedly contacting M.K. on October 14, 2021.

A person recklessly violates a protection order by contacting protected persons while knowing the order bars that contact.

State v. Haugh · filed 2024-01-11(A)(1)

We find sufficient evidence that appellant’s conduct was reckless in contacting Mary and Jane Doe in violation of the CPO. Appellant knew of the existence of the CPO and blatantly disregarded its terms.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) covers contact with a protected person by text message in violation of a protection order.

State v. Jackson · filed 2022-08-12(A)(2)

The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Jackson contacted Mobley in August 2021 in violation of the protection order. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Jackson’s Crim.R. 29(A) motion.

A person violates subsection (A)(2) by contacting someone protected by an order with heedless indifference to the consequences or by disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of violating the order.

State v. Harrison · filed 2023-05-03(A)(2)

To prove recklessness, the state had to show that Harrison contacted Y.G. with “heedless indifference to consequences” or that he disregarded “a substantial and unjustifiable risk that” he was violating the protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) requires proof that a person recklessly violated a qualifying protection order; an unsupported belief that the order had been removed does not defeat that element.

State v. Stacy · filed 2023-10-30(A)(1)

In order to convict Stacy of Violating a Protection Order, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “recklessly violate[d] the terms of * * * [a] protection order issued * * * pursuant to * * * 3113.31 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2919.27(A)(1). ... The protection order was issued by the domestic relations court and Stacy received nothing from that court indicating that it had been removed. Given these circumstances, the verdict that Stacy acted recklessly with respect to the existence of the protection order is sound.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order issued under section 2919.26 or 3113.31.

State v. Andrews · filed 2024-05-06(A)(1)

Rather, given the plain language set forth within R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), to secure Andrews' conviction for two counts of violating a protection order in this case, the state was merely required to prove Andrews had, on two separate occasions, recklessly violated the terms of "[a] protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code."

Section 2919.27(A)(1) covers contact that violates a protection order without requiring the threatening pattern of conduct needed for menacing by stalking.

State v. Abdus-Salaam · filed 2024-07-22(A)(1)

Violating a Protection Order does not require what the Menacing by Stalking charge does, i.e. evidence that Abdus-Salaam knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct to cause E.R. to believe that he would cause physical harm to her or a family or household member or cause mental distress to E.R. or a family or household member of E.R. Abdus-Salaam violated the protection order by contacting E.R.

A prior conviction for violating the same protection order supports a finding that later contact with the protected person was reckless.

State v. Compston · filed 2024-06-07(A)(1)

Given that Compston had already been convicted of violating the DVCPO, he was certainly aware of the order, would have known of the consequences of disregarding it, and would have acted recklessly if he contacted L.B.

A defendant’s belief that a protection order was no longer active is relevant to whether the defendant recklessly violated it.

113703 · filed 2024-12-26(A)

Here, appellant should have had the opportunity to show that he was not disregarding the known risk of violating a protection order because he did not believe that the order was still active.

Section 2919.27(A)(1)’s recklessness requirement can be met when a person visits a place covered by a protection order despite knowing the protected person might still work there.

State v. Snodgrass · filed 2025-03-24(A)(1)

Stated otherwise, a jury could find that Snodgrass acted recklessly because he was aware of the chance that she still worked at McDonald’s yet chose to risk violating the protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits reckless violation of a protection order; an order barring entry into a streetcar operator’s place of employment covers streetcar platforms even when the protected person is absent.

State v. Bradford · filed 2024-06-12(A)(1)

Spell is employed as a streetcar operator, thus her place of employment includes the streetcars, and the grounds, which encompasses the platforms. Faulks’s testimony that she saw Bradford sitting on the platform at 12th and Vine Streets was sufficient to prove that he violated the protection order. ... However, the protection order prohibits Bradford from entering Spell’s place of employment and does not require Spell to be present.

A person who is a part owner of a protected person’s residence may still violate a protection order by returning to that property while the order remains in place.

State v. Sain-Dunham · filed 2024-08-23(A)(2)

Even if Sain-Dunham was on the deed to the property as a part owner, he was not permitted to return to the property while the protection order against him remained in place as long as it was P.D.’s residence.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order’s terms, including restrictions on how a protected person may be contacted.

State v. Dorsey · filed 2025-03-31(A)(1)

The State also presented evidence that Dorsey eschewed the OFW app on two occasions and instead contacted K.K. via email. To the extent that Dorsey was frustrated with K.K.’s use of the OFW app, the protection order did not provide for an exception where Dorsey was permitted to contact K.K. by way of email, meaning that his emails on September 26, 2023, and October 12, 2023, violated the terms of the protection order.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) covers social media posts that violate a protection order’s no-contact provision when the person posting knows the protected person will be notified.

State v. Dabbelt · filed 2025-05-09(A)(2)

Despite that prohibition, Dabbelt posted a Facebook message about N.D. with knowledge that Facebook would notify N.D. of the message. In so doing, Dabbelt initiated contact with N.D. through social media in violation of the order.

Tagging a protected person in a Facebook post violates a protection order barring social media contact when the person acts with heedless indifference to whether the post will reach them.

State v. Sutton · filed 2025-07-11(A)(2)

Sutton acted with heedless indifference to the consequences of posting about M.B. on Facebook as he did not pay attention to or have an interest in whether the post would lead to contact with M.B. It is evident that Sutton initiated contact with M.B. through social media, as she received a notification that he mentioned her on Facebook.

A person can recklessly violate a protection order by refusing to leave a residence when the order requires immediate departure.

State v. Cox · filed 2025-05-21(A)(1)

Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cox recklessly violated the terms of a protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 3113.31.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) prohibits recklessly violating a protection order; evidence that the defendant saw the protected person and remained within the prohibited distance can support a conviction.

State v. Yelton · filed 2025-07-07(A)(2)

As noted above, R.C. 2919.27(A) prohibits the reckless violation of a protection order. ... Given that evidence, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice as to its credibility determination that would require reversal of Yelton’s conviction relating to the protection order violation.

A person who knows he is subject to a protection order may recklessly violate it by going to the protected person’s workplace despite choosing not to read the order.

State v. Fisher · filed 2025-12-30(A)(1)

His decision, therefore, to not read the civil protection order and to go to her place of employment demonstrates a heedless indifference to the consequences, thereby ... undermining his claim of a viable defense to the charge of violating a civil protection order.

Section 2919.27(A) requires proof that the defendant recklessly violated a term of a protection order issued under section 3113.31.

State v. Brime · filed 2025-07-08(A)

To obtain a conviction, the state had to introduce evidence proving that appellant recklessly violated a term of a protection order issued pursuant to section 3113.31 of the Revised Code.

A violation under subsection (A)(2) requires a reckless breach of a protection order and either service of the order or constructive notice under subsection (D).

Lakewood v. Smith · filed 2025-07-10(A)(2)

To establish a violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), the City was required to establish (1) that Smith recklessly violated the terms of a protection order, and (2) that Smith either was served with the protection order or had constructive notice of the order as provided in R.C. 2919.27(D).

Section 2919.27(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of a protection order.

State v. Sherman · filed 2025-12-29(A)(1)

The R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) charge in this case required the State to prove that Sherman recklessly violated the terms of a protection order.

A short delay in leaving a protected person’s presence can violate a protection order that requires immediate departure.

State v. Diebert · filed 2025-07-25(A)(2)

Accordingly, even a short delay in leaving the protected person’s presence is sufficient to constitute a violation.

Repeatedly contacting a protected person despite knowing that a protection order bars contact supports the recklessness element of violating the order.

State v. Sheppard · filed 2025-08-04(A)(2)

The jury could reasonably conclude that Sheppard was aware of the risk his conduct posed and that he disregarded it. His own testimony supports such a finding: he knew the order was in place, understood its terms, and nonetheless chose to communicate with T.R. repeatedly.

A person acts recklessly under Section 2919.27(A)(2) by failing to leave immediately after accidentally encountering a protected person when the protection order requires immediate departure.

State v. Downton · filed 2025-10-27(A)(2)

Indeed, by failing to immediately depart from Walmart as required by the protection order when she accidentally encountered the victim and her husband, Downton disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of violating the protection order and therefore acted recklessly.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) requires a reckless violation of a protection order’s terms; repeated email responses can support an inference of recklessness.

State v. Bratton · filed 2025-12-22(A)(1)

To establish that Bratton violated a protection order pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), the State had to establish that Bratton “recklessly violated the terms of . . . [a] protection order issued . . . pursuant to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code[.]” ... In addition, since Bratton responded to six emails, it could readily be inferred that he acted, at the very least, recklessly.

A person may recklessly violate a protection order by disregarding a substantial risk that the order remains in effect, even if the protected person says otherwise.

State v. Booker · filed 2026-05-08(A)(1)

Therefore, even if Booker had been permitted to testify that her mother had told her the protection order was no longer in effect, the other evidence presented at trial established beyond a reasonable doubt that Booker disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that she was violating the terms of the protection order.

A prior conviction for violating a protection order must be proved to elevate the offense to a felony.

State v. Beeson, Unpublished Decision (8-23-2002) · filed 2002-08-23(B)(1)(b)

As part of its case-in-chief, and in order to elevate this offense to a felony, the State was required to prove that Defendant had previously been convicted of violating this protection order, which it did.

A prior conviction under § 2919.27 is an element that elevates a protection-order violation from a first-degree misdemeanor to a fifth-degree felony.

State v. Moissis, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2002) · filed 2002-09-20(B)(1)(b)

A review of the record reveals that the state presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had prior convictions under R.C. 2919.27 , violating a protection order and R.C. 2903.211 , menacing by stalking to elevate both from misdemeanor to felony status.

A prior conviction or guilty plea for violating a protection order is an element of the felony offense; a no-contest plea alone does not establish that element.

State v. Blackburn, Unpublished Decision (2-7-2003) · filed 2003-02-07(B)(1)(b)

This is a felony because appellant was found guilty of the enhanced version of the statute, an element of which is a prior conviction, or guilty plea, for violating a protective order or consent agreement. ... As a result of defense counsel's repeated failure to correct the trial court, the court instructed the jury that there was a stipulation for a conviction when there was, in fact, only a stipulation that there was a prior plea of no contest. ... These errors prevented the state from presenting sufficient evidence on the felony charge of violating a protection order.

Entering premises barred by a protection order after a prior conviction for violating that order constitutes a repeat violation under § 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(3).

State v. Salazar, Unpublished Decision (1-19-2007) · filed 2007-01-19(A)(1) and (B)(3)

The uncontroverted evidence in this case establishes that appellant went inside premises from which he was lawfully barred on January 20, 2006. Appellant had previously been convicted of violating the same protection order. Appellant violated R.C. 2919.27 (A)(1) and (B)(3).

A prior protection-order conviction alleged under section 2919.27 can be proved despite a missing case number on the certified judgment when testimony identifies the conviction.

State v. Cooperider, 2008ca0063 (12-18-2008) · filed 2008-12-18

State's Exhibit I is a certified copy of the municipal court's April 12, 2005 judgment entry of conviction for violating the civil protection order, but no case number is listed. ... We find Ms. Wilson's testimony eliminated any issue as to whether or not the conviction in State's Exhibit I was the one referenced in Count 2 of the indictment.

Section 2919.27(B)(2) makes violating a protection order a first-degree misdemeanor; its 180-day maximum sentence makes it a petty offense for plea purposes.

Youngstown v. Cohen, 07-Ma-16 (3-12-2008) · filed 2008-03-12(B)(2)

Cohen pleaded no contest to violating a protection order in violation of R.C. 2919.27 . It is a first-degree misdemeanor subject to a sentence of one hundred eighty days. R.C. 2919.27 (B)(2); R.C. 2929.24 (A)(1). Thus, it is a petty offense. Crim.R. 2(D).

A protection-order violation is a third-degree felony when committed while committing a felony.

State v. Pickens, 89658 (3-27-2008) · filed 2008-03-27(B)(4)

Although a charge of violating a protection order is normally a misdemeanor of the first degree, see R.C. 2919.27 (B)(2), the offense was elevated to a felony of the third degree because Pickens violated the protection order while committing a felony count of menacing by stalking. See R.C. 2919.27 (B)(4).

A protection order violation can be a third degree felony when the offender commits a felony during the violation, but the verdict must state the degree or the aggravating element to support that higher offense level.

State v. Peek · filed 2011-07-25(B)(4)

If an offender committed a felony while violating the protection order, his conviction is a felony of the third degree. R.C. 2919.27(B)(4). ... It does not contain the degree of the offense or state that the jury found an aggravating element of the offense. It, therefore, was only sufficient to convict Mr. Peek of the lowest level of the offense. ... We, therefore, conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that Mr. Peek’s conviction under Section 2919.27(A) of the Ohio Revised Code is a felony of the third degree.

Section 2919.27 prohibits reckless violation of a protection order and makes a repeat violation a fifth degree felony.

State v. Irvin · filed 2012-05-23

R.C. 2919.27 provides that no person shall recklessly violate the terms of a protection order, and violation of this section constitutes a fifth degree felony where the offender has previously violated this section. ... After reviewing the entire record, weighing the inferences and examining the credibility of witnesses, we cannot say that the trial court clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding Irvin guilty of violating a protection order and domestic violence.

Section 2919.27(A)(1) permits a finding of reckless violation when a person remains after learning that a protection order requires them to leave, even if the initial contact was accidental.

State v. Shockey · filed 2013-02-06(A)(1)

The protection order required Mr. Shockey to leave if he accidentally came into contact with T.H. Despite being aware that T.H. was there and being reminded that he had to leave, Mr. Shockey ... stayed for over an hour. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Mr. Shockey had recklessly violated the protection order.

A guilty plea to a third degree felony protection order violation admits that the violation occurred during the commission of a felony, so the state need not prove a predicate conviction.

Leonard v. Russo · filed 2012-05-25(B)(4)

Thus, when Lenard pleaded guilty to violating the protection order as a third degree felony, he admitted that he violated the order during the commission of a felony, and the state did not need to prove that or have a predicate conviction.

A prior conviction for violating a protection order raises a later violation from a first degree misdemeanor to a fifth degree felony, even when the prior conviction followed a no contest plea.

State v. Sheppard · filed 2012-12-07(B)(3)

Upon review, we find that the Mapes exception applies in the instant case, and Sheppard’s prior conviction for violation of a protection order based on a no contest plea was admissible in the instant case. Sheppard’s prior conviction was “made relevant” by R.C. 2919.27(B)(2) and (3) which state that violating a protection order is a misdemeanor of the first degree unless the offender has previously been convicted of violation of a protection order, which raises the level of the offense to a fifth degree felony.

A protection-order violation committed while the offender is engaging in a felony offense supports a third-degree felony conviction.

State v. Benitez · filed 2013-06-06(B)(4)

Moreover, the evidence presented as to the incident of January 8, 2012, sufficiently established that a violation of the protection order was committed while engaging in a felony offense, thus supporting the jury’s guilty verdict as to the enhancement of Count 1.

Section 2919.27(B)(4) makes a protection-order violation committed during a felony a third-degree felony.

State v. Coomer · filed 2015-11-09(B)(4)

By pleading guilty, Coomer admitted to violating a protection order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), which is a felony of the third degree according to R.C. 2919.27(B)(4) because the violation of the order occurred during the commission of a felony.

A prior conviction that elevates a protection order violation to a fifth-degree felony is an essential element of the offense and cannot be challenged through a pretrial motion to dismiss.

State v. Graham · filed 2016-12-30(B)(3)

A prior conviction is an essential element of the offense that the State must prove if the existence of that prior conviction elevates the degree of the offense. ... As Mr. Graham’s prior conviction was an essential element of the offense charged, it could not be contested through a pretrial motion.

Section 2919.27(B)(3)(a) requires the state to prove a prior protection order violation to establish the enhanced offense, making evidence of that conviction admissible.

State v. R.R.A. · filed 2019-12-09(B)(3)(a)

Here, unlike Hubbs, Appellant was charged with a violation of R.C. 2919.27(B)(3)(a), requiring the state to prove that he had previously been convicted of violating a protection order. Thus, as in Sims, evidence of Appellant’s prior convictions was proper.

A prior conviction for violating a protection order or consent agreement makes a new violation a fifth-degree felony, and the prior conviction is an element that must be tried to the jury.

State v. S.D.K. · filed 2021-01-14(B)(3)

R.C. 2919.27(B)(3) provides that violating a protection order is a fifth-degree felony if the offender has a prior conviction for violating a protection order or consent agreement. Such a prior conviction is therefore an essential element of the crime, and S.K. could not bifurcate the element or waive a jury trial on this element alone.

A protection order violation is a third-degree felony when the offender commits it while committing another felony.

State v. Risner · filed 2022-10-31(B)(4)

R.C. 2919.27(B)(4), which corresponds to Counts Three, Nine, and Thirteen, provides, “If the offender violates a protection order or consent agreement while committing a felony offense, violating a protection order is a felony of the third degree.”

A finding under subsection (B)(3) makes violating a protection order a fifth-degree felony, whichever of its listed circumstances applies.

State v. Mays · filed 2023-06-02(B)(3)

There is no other way to be found guilty of a fifth-degree felony under ... R.C. 2919.27, and a finding under (B)(3) does not allow a defendant to be found guilty of any level of violating a protection order other than a fifth-degree felony.

A prior conviction for violating a protection order is an element that elevates a subsequent violation to a fifth-degree felony.

State v. Wyatt · filed 2023-12-04(B)(3)

Ms. Wyatt was also charged with violating a CPO pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(3), which required the jury to find she had previously been convicted of violating a CPO and elevated the offense to a fifth-degree felony.

A prior conviction for violating a protection order makes a new violation a fifth-degree felony.

State v. Mays · filed 2024-09-25(B)(3)(c)

Under R.C. 2919.27(B)(3)(c), violating a protection order is a felony of the fifth degree when the offender previously has been convicted of violating a protection order.

A protection-order violation is a third-degree felony when the offender violates the order while committing a felony offense.

State v. Facemire · filed 2025-04-28(B)(4)

Here, it is apparent that the Violating a Protection Order charge was a third-degree felony under section (B)(4), since it was charged with the felony offense of Aggravated Burglary.

A third-degree felony conviction for violating a protection order can stand even if the jury acquits the defendant on a separate count charging the predicate felony.

State v. Anderson · filed 2025-08-20(B)(4)

Accordingly, Anderson’s argument that the verdict on menacing by stalking contained in count two necessitates reversal of his conviction for a felony-level violation of a protection order as charged in count one is without ... merit.

Section 2919.27(B)(4) makes violating a protection order while committing a felony a third-degree felony.

State v. Henderson · filed 2025-11-04(B)(4)

R.C. 2919.27 provides that a violation of “a protection order or consent agreement while committing a felony offense . . . is a felony of the third degree.”

A protection order violation and burglary are not allied offenses because their elements do not correspond in the abstract.

State v. Bates, Unpublished Decision (10-14-2002) · filed 2002-10-14(A)(1)

Viewing the elements of these two offenses in the abstract, it is evident that the elements do not correspond to such a degree that the commission of one crime will result in the commission of the other. Burglary involves using force, stealth, or deception to trespass in the habitation of any person when any person is present or likely to be present. Violation of a protection order requires only that the offender violate the terms of the order.

A violation of a protection order while committing a felony does not merge with menacing by stalking because either offense can be committed without the other.

State v. Durbin, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006) · filed 2006-09-29(A)(2), (B)(4)

The first offense can be committed by recklessly violating a protection order while committing a felony other than Menacing by Stalking. ... Because each of the offenses of which Durbin was convicted, as statutorily defined, can be committed without committing the other offense, they are not allied offenses of similar import, and the trial court did not commit error, plain or regular, by failing to merge her convictions.

Attempted violation of a protection order under § 2919.27(A)(2) does not necessarily involve burglary, so the offenses do not merge as allied offenses.

State v. Chamberlin, 12-06-14 (4-23-2007) · filed 2007-04-23(A)(2)

Violation of a protection order is defined as the following: "No person shall recklessly violate the terms of * * * [a] protection order issued pursuant to [R.C. 2903.213 or 2903.214]." R.C. 2919.27 (A)(2). ... Conversely, attempted violation of a protection order requires only that the offender attempt to violate the terms of the order. Thus, burglary would not automatically result from the attempted violation of a protection order and vice versa.

A third-degree felony protection-order violation charged as occurring while the offender commits another felony is based on the conduct constituting that felony.

State v. Williams · filed 2012-07-27(B)(4)

By charging Williams with third-degree felony violation of a protection order, the State explicitly and necessarily based the charge on his act of hitting her car, i.e., felonious assault.

A violation of a protection order under subsection (A)(2) merges with felonious assault when the same conduct and animus support both offenses.

State v. O'Brien · filed 2013-01-07(A)(2)

Upon comparing the elements of these two crimes, this court holds that they are allied offenses of similar import because the conduct which results in the commission of a felonious assault would also result in the commission of a violation of protection order, if such an order is in effect.

Section 2919.27(A) can be violated without causing or threatening harm, so its elements differ from those of felony domestic violence for double-jeopardy purposes.

State v. Lear · filed 2018-05-11(A)

Moreover, R.C. 2919.27(A) can be violated without causing or threatening to cause harm to the victim. We conclude, therefore, that the elements of felony domestic violence and violation of a protection order are not the same, thus the protection against double jeopardy will not be violated by successive prosecutions.

Section 2919.27 protects the person covered by a protection order, so a violation committed through the same conduct as aggravated burglary and assault against that person can merge with those offenses.

State v. Birchell · filed 2025-01-06(A)

We find the offense of violation of the protection order in the instant case, where the crime was committed by the same conduct as the crimes of aggravated burglary and assault, is an allied offense of similar import.

A protection order violation and a burglary may be punished separately when they cause distinct harms, including harm to the integrity of the judicial system.

State v. Hymer · filed 2025-05-12(A)(1)

But there is a second harm associated with Hymer's violation of the protection order. Specifically, by willfully disregarding a court order, Hymer caused harm to the integrity of the judicial system. ... Therefore, based on the specific facts and limited record in this case, we find that Hymer's burglary and violation-of-a-protection-order offenses created separate, identifiable harms.

The necessity defense does not excuse a protection-order violation when the claimed compulsion comes from a human source and the defendant has not pursued alternatives.

State v. Holmes · filed 2004-09-08

Based on Spingola and its progeny, the court herein finds that the necessity defense is inapplicable to the case at bar for the same reasons advanced by the Spingola court. Thus, whatever act allegedly compelled defendant to violate the court’s order, it was not of physical or natural origin. In addition, defendant advanced no evidence that he tried to comply with the court’s order that he stay away from his children by pursuing any alternatives other than having the children remain where they were.

A jury instruction for violating a protection order must address service of the order, but omitting that element is not plain error when the evidence of service makes a different verdict unlikely.

State v. Jackson · filed 2016-06-03(A)(2)

It is undisputed that the trial court made no mention of service or delivery when instructing them on the elements of the offense. However, given the above testimony, we cannot say that the outcome of his trial would have clearly been different but for the trial court’s omission.

Jurors must agree that the defendant recklessly violated a protection order, but need not agree on which conduct constituted the violation.

State v. Schell · filed 2017-05-03(A)(2)

The means by which Mr. Schell recklessly violated the terms of the protection order (i.e., taking pictures of D.B. while standing on his property, yelling and swerving at D.B. while driving on a public road, or circling back to pass D.B. a second time) do not require jury unanimity.

Section 2919.27(A)(2) covers violations of protection orders issued under sections 2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214; violations of orders issued under section 2919.26 fall under (A)(1).

State v. Raines · filed 2024-08-19(A)(2)

Raines was indicted on three VPO counts under R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), which only applies to protection orders issued pursuant to R.C. 2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214. However, the municipal court issued the DVTPO which formed the basis for the charges under R.C. 2919.26. Therefore, Raines should have been charged with three VPO counts under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), not R.C. 2919.27(A)(2).

Section 2919.27(A)(1) applies to a no contact consent agreement approved under section 3113.31 to resolve a dating violence protection order petition.

Wu v. Park · filed 2026-06-15(A)(1)

In its October 30, 2024 judgment entry denying Wu's Civ.R. 12(C) motion, the trial court noted because the no contact/consent agreement was filed and approved under R.C. 3113.31, it was enforceable under R.C. 2919.27 and Park's Count Two was a valid claim. Under our de novo review, we agree.