Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) does not require a court to find that no suitable person is available or to favor a relative when permanent agency custody is in the child's best interest.

In re L.L. · filed 2024-10-23(D)(1)(d)

We also observe that a trial court that is evaluating a child’s best interest need not determine that no suitable person is available for placement. ... Moreover, courts are not required to favor relative placement if, after considering all the factors, it is in the child’s best interest for the agency to be granted permanent custody.

Section 2151.414 does not require clear-and-convincing proof that no suitable relative is available, make a nontermination placement controlling, or require that possibility to receive greater weight than other best-interest factors.

In re A.L. · filed 2024-10-24(D)

In any event, R.C. 2151.414 does not require the trial court to “find by clear and convincing evidence that no suitable relative was available for placement”; it “does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all controlling factor”; and it “does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors” in its best-interest analysis.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) makes a relative or other nontermination placement one factor among many rather than a dispositive alternative, and if permanent custody serves the child's best interest, relative legal custody necessarily does not.

In re C.J.F.-O. · filed 2024-12-30(D)(1)

In other words, the availability of placement options that would preserve parental rights is one factor among many, not a controlling consideration that automatically precludes termination. Indeed, if permanent custody serves a child's best interest, legal custody to a relative necessarily does not.

A juvenile court need not consider relative placement or find that no suitable relative exists before granting permanent custody.

In re J.H. · filed 2025-03-10(D)(1)

It is well-established that “the [permanent custody] statute does not require a juvenile court to consider relative placement before granting the motion for permanent custody.”

The reasonable-time ground in subsection (B)(1)(a) is inapplicable when the 12-of-22-month ground applies.

In re A.P. · filed 2022-05-04(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As we have noted in previous cases, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), by its terms, is inapplicable when a child has been in a children services agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period.

The reasonable-time and 12-of-22-month grounds are alternatives, and either independently supports the first prong when accompanied by a best-interest finding.

In re O.W. · filed 2022-01-10(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

Unsupported findings on some best-interest and subsection (E) factors do not defeat permanent custody when other supported findings satisfy both statutory prongs.

In re L.D. · filed 2019-12-06(D)(1), (E)

The magistrate’s findings regarding the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), (E)(9), and (E)(14) are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Regardless, the magistrate’s findings that the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), (c), (d), and (E)(10) were satisfied, and that it is in the best interest of L.D. to be placed in the permanent custody of JFS, are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Only one of Section 2151.414(B)(1)'s alternative circumstances must be established to satisfy the second prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re N.W. · filed 2018-11-13(B)(1)

Only one of those findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the permanent custody test. In re D.K.W., 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2014-02-001, 2014-Ohio-2896, ¶ 22. ... The parties do not challenge the juvenile court's finding that the children were in the agency's temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. Accordingly, this court will review whether sufficient credible evidence exists to support the juvenile court's decision that a grant of permanent custody to the agency was in the children's best interest.

The abandonment ground does not require a finding that no relatives can take custody; that relative-availability requirement belongs to the separate orphaned-child ground.

In re A.E.B · filed 2018-06-12(B)(1)(b), (B)(1)(c)

These are separate options. The option involving an abandoned child does not refer to whether there are relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody as does the provision regarding a child who was orphaned.

A finding that a child was abandoned independently satisfies the statutory first prong, making a finding that the child could not be reunited with the parent within a reasonable time unnecessary.

In re C.M. · filed 2017-07-17(B)(1)(b)

Because the trial court found Mother had abandoned the children, it was unnecessary to find that the children could not be reunited with Mother within a reasonable time.

Only one of Section 2151.414(B)(1)'s alternative findings is needed to satisfy the second prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re M.T. · filed 2017-04-10(B)(1)

Only one of those findings must be met for the second prong of the permanent custody test to be satisfied. Id. ... However, Father does not dispute the trial court's conclusion that M.T. was in the temporary custody of the agency for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period as of the date the agency filed for permanent custody. This finding was all that was necessary to satisfy the second prong of the permanent custody analysis.

The reasonable-time finding in subsection (B)(2) is not required when the agency moves for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413(A), rather than R.C. 2151.413(D)(2).

In re J.M.D. · filed 2014-04-09(B)(2)

As in that case, because WCCS filed its amended motion for permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(A) here, “the court was not required to enter a finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) that the child could not or should not be returned to either parent within a reasonable time.”

Section 2151.414(E) permits a comprehensive assessment of whether a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent, and its listed grounds do not irreconcilably conflict with one another.

In re B.S. · filed 2009-10-15(E)

R.C. 2151.414(E) obviously was intended to permit the juvenile court to examine the matter of whether an award of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child in the most comprehensive manner possible. When construed together, therefore, none of the provisions “irreconcilably conflicts” with another.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody under the parental-placement ground in division (a) even when the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground in division (d) is not satisfied, provided permanent custody is also in the child's best interest.

In Re Tucke, Unpublished Decision (8-22-2005) · filed 2005-08-22(B)(1)(a), (d)

The department agrees the children had not been in its temporary custody for the requisite period of time necessary to grant permanent custody based upon that specific ground. However, the trial court did not base its grant of permanent custody on the that ground. The trial court specifically granted permanent custody based upon its findings the children could not or should not be placed with mother within a reasonable pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). ... Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child. ... Accordingly, we find the trial court's determinations the children could not and should not be returned to mother, and the grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the children are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) provide alternative, independently sufficient grounds for permanent custody, and (B)(1)(d), rather than (B)(1)(a), applies when a child has been in agency temporary custody for at least 12 of 22 consecutive months.

In Re Canterucci Children, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2006) · filed 2006-09-25(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

Although the trial court made a finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), this subsection is not applicable to the case sub judice. Under subsection (B)(1)(a), the child must not have been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. In the matter currently before the court, the trial court specifically found that the children had been in the temporary custody of SCDJFS for a period in excess of twelve of the prior twenty-two consecutive months. {¶ 18} Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's finding that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is applicable to the facts of this case. Appellant does not challenge the trial court's finding under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). Further, since findings under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant SCDJFS's motion for permanent custody.

Subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) provide alternative, independently sufficient bases for granting permanent custody.

In Re Elder, Unpublished Decision (11-2-2006) · filed 2006-11-02(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant MCCS's motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) provide alternative grounds for permanent custody, and either finding is independently sufficient.

In Re Parks, Unpublished Decision (11-2-2006) · filed 2006-11-02(B)(1)

As findings under R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant MCCS's motion for permanent custody.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody ground in subsection (B)(1)(d) is satisfied, the court need not decide under subsection (B)(1)(a) whether the child can or should be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re R.L., 07ap-36 (7-12-2007) · filed 2007-07-12(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that the requirement of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) had been satisfied. Given that determination, however, the trial court was not obligated to address whether R.L. could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... Because the trial court sub judice properly determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that R.L. had been in the custody of FCCS for the requisite period of time under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), we need not consider its extraneous finding as to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a).

The findings in subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative grounds, either of which may independently support permanent custody when the statute's best-interest requirement is met.

In Re Dalton, 2007 Ap 0041 (10-24-2007) · filed 2007-10-24(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. Section 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and R.C. Section 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody.

Findings that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and that the child has spent twelve of the preceding twenty-two months in agency custody are alternative grounds, either of which independently supports permanent custody.

In Re Metts, 2007 Ca 00219 (3-3-2008) · filed 2008-03-03(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. In re Langford Children , Stark App. No. 2004CA00349, 2005-Ohio-2304 , at paragraph 17. We therefore conclude the trial court's finding that the children had been in temporary custody a period of time in excess of twelve of the prior twenty-two months with regard to this issue is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires a juvenile court to find only one of its four alternative conditions, so a finding under subsection (B)(1)(d) makes a subsection (B)(1)(a) finding unnecessary.

In Re T.F., 07ca34 (3-17-2008) · filed 2008-03-17(B)(1)

A juvenile court only needs to find one of the four conditions in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) before it grants a motion for permanent custody. This court has held that when R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) applies, "a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time." In re Berkley , Pickaway App. No. 04CA12, 04CA13, 04CA14, 2004-Ohio-4797 , ¶ 61 , citing In re Billingsley , Putnam App. Nos. 12-02-07 and 12-02-08, 2003-Ohio-344; In re Williams , Franklin App. No. 02AP-924, 2002-Ohio-7205; In re Dyal (Aug. 9, 2001), Hocking App. No. 01CA11. The R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) analysis is not necessary because of the plain wording of the statute. Id. Therefore, we do not need to consider the trial court's extraneous R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) finding. Its decision was proper based solely upon R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d).

Section 2151.414(B)(1) makes the findings in divisions (a) and (d) alternative, independently sufficient grounds for granting permanent custody.

In re N.D. · filed 2011-02-14(B)(1)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) provides alternative grounds for permanent custody, so a court may consider whether a child cannot and should not be placed with either parent even when the child has not been in agency custody for the prescribed period.

In re A.R. · filed 2011-12-19(B)(1)

The statute authorizing the court to grant permanent custody is in the disjunctive. If the child has not been in the temporary custody of the agency for the prescribed time, then the court may review whether the children cannot and should not be placed with either of the parents within a reasonable time.

Subsection (B)(1)(a) is triggered only when none of subsections (B)(1)(b) through (d) applies, so when the 12-of-22 condition in subsection (d) is met, a court need not address subsection (a) or the related subsection (E) analysis.

In re H.D. · filed 2014-01-23(B)(1)(a)

We have previously held that a trial court does not err in applying both R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (d). In re T.W., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-897, 2011-Ohio-903, ¶ 52; In re P.S., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1023, 2009-Ohio-1545, ¶ 7. Nonetheless, "[t]he plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) reveals that the subsection is only triggered when none of the remaining three subsections are triggered. * * * Because the facts trigger subsection (d), they cannot and do not trigger subsection (a)." In re Damron, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-419, 2003-Ohio-5810, ¶ 9. Thus, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), we must determine whether the trial court properly found the existence of the "12 of 22" factor. ... Therefore, although father specifically challenges the trial court's decision with respect to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), particularly the R.C. 2151.414(E) analysis, because we determine R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is applicable, we need not consider the trial court's findings and father's arguments with respect to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and 2151.414(E).

Because subsection (B)'s permanent-custody grounds are disjunctive, proof that a child was in agency custody for 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period eliminates any additional need to prove that the child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re E.C. · filed 2014-04-18(B)

However, because R.C. 2151.414(B) is written in the disjunctive, and because the parties agree that E.C. was in the custody of MCCS for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, MCCS was not required to also prove that E.C. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

An error in one subsection (E) finding is harmless when an unchallenged alternative subsection (E) finding independently supports the permanent-custody ground.

In re S.P. · filed 2014-11-12(E)

Thus, even assuming merit in mother’s challenge to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the trial court’s second and alternative finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) stands.

The subsection (B)(1) circumstances are alternative findings, so an unchallenged supported ground satisfies the first permanent-custody prong and makes alleged errors in other grounds nonprejudicial.

In re E.M. · filed 2015-12-21(B)(1)

Because the record supports an alternative finding on the first prong of the permanent custody test and Mother has not challenged that finding, Mother has failed to demonstrate prejudice regarding the trial court’s first prong finding.

One supported condition under R.C. 2151.414(E) is sufficient to establish that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re C.G. · filed 2016-02-03(E)

This court has previously explained that “the existence of only one of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) is sufficient to determine that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.”

The circumstances listed in subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e) are alternative findings, so any one of them independently satisfies the first prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re B.P. · filed 2017-05-22(B)(1)

Indeed, “[t]he factors contained within R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings, and only one must be met in order for the first prong of the permanent custody test to be satisfied.”

Only one of subsection (B)(1)'s five alternative findings is needed to satisfy the non-best-interest prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re L.W. · filed 2017-11-06(B)(1)

To satisfy part two of the permanent custody test, only one of the above five findings need be met.

An erroneous subsection (B)(1)(d) finding does not require reversal when another subsection (B)(1) ground supports permanent custody.

In re J.O. · filed 2018-03-14(B)(1)

In In re E.P., we went on to state that the juvenile court’s erroneous finding was not fatal so long as a ground other than R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) existed to support a grant of permanent custody.

An error in finding that children cannot or should not be placed with a parent does not require reversal when abandonment supplies an independent subsection (B)(1) ground for permanent custody.

In re J.B. · filed 2018-03-19(B)(1)

However, even if we found the trial court erred in finding the children could not or should not be placed with Father at this time or in the foreseeable future, such error would not require reversal of the permanent custody determination under the two-issue rule. The trial court had an alternate, independent ground for terminating parental rights, i.e., the children had been abandoned.

Subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are independently sufficient grounds for permanent custody, so premature use of the twelve-of-twenty-two rule is nonprejudicial when subsection (B)(1)(a) also supports the award.

In re L.D. · filed 2018-08-22(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

We have recognized that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant an agency's motion for permanent custody. ... We therefore find no showing of prejudicial error under these circumstances.

Subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are independently sufficient grounds for permanent custody, so premature use of the twelve-of-twenty-two rule is nonprejudicial when subsection (B)(1)(a) also supports the award.

In re K.D. · filed 2018-08-22(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

We have recognized that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant an agency's motion for permanent custody. ... We therefore find no showing of prejudicial error under these circumstances.

Abandonment under subsection (B)(1)(b) independently supports the first permanent-custody prong, making any error concerning the reasonable-placement ground in subsection (B)(1)(a) harmless.

In re C.H. · filed 2018-08-27(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(b)

Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the court's finding of abandonment under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), and any claimed error in regard to subparagraph (B)(1)(a), supra, would thus be deemed harmless.

The subsection (B)(1) circumstances are alternative findings, and any one independently satisfies the first permanent-custody prong.

In re B.J.P. · filed 2018-12-26(B)(1)

“The factors contained within R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings, and only one must be met in order for the first prong of the permanent custody test to be satisfied.”

Only one of subsection (B)(1)'s five enumerated circumstances is needed to satisfy the non-best-interest prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re S.M. · filed 2019-01-22(B)(1)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

A trial court's reliance on an unalleged first-prong ground is harmless when another ground was properly alleged, proven, and sufficient for permanent custody.

In re U.D. · filed 2019-02-13(B)(1), (E)

This Court has repeatedly recognized that, as long as the trial court properly found one of the alleged grounds for permanent custody, the parent suffered no prejudice by any error in the trial court’s alternative first prong findings.

The circumstances in section 2151.414(B)(1) are alternative grounds, so a supported twelve-of-twenty-two-month or abandonment finding is independently sufficient when accompanied by a best-interest finding.

In re M.G. · filed 2023-03-07(B)(1)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion ... for permanent custody. ... This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies only when no other first-prong factor is present, but a trial court does not err by treating subsections (a) and (d) as alternative bases for permanent custody.

In re E.V. · filed 2024-01-22(B)(1)(a), (d)

This factor only applies when the other factors are not present. ... However, a trial court does not err by applying both R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (d) as alternative bases for a grant of permanent custody.

An unsupported twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is harmless when abundant evidence supports the alternative section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) placement ground and permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re S.M. · filed 2024-03-15(B)(1)

We further conclude that while the juvenile court erred in finding, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that SM had been in the temporary custody of the agency for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, this error is harmless, as there is an abundance of evidence in the record to support the court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

An erroneous twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding does not preclude permanent custody when the agency pleaded and proved the alternative section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) placement ground through one or more subsection (E) factors.

In re T.T. · filed 2024-08-01(B)(1)(a)

Although the trial court made an erroneous finding, “that does not preclude us from finding that the trial court’s judgment [awarding permanent custody to the agency] is nevertheless correct.”

An erroneous twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding is harmless when abundant evidence supports the alternative section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) placement ground and permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re C.B. · filed 2024-11-08(B)(1)

We conclude that while the juvenile court erred in finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that C.B. had been in the temporary custody of the agency for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, this error is harmless, as there is an ... abundance of evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

A court may cite sections 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (d) as alternative permanent-custody grounds, and a supported reasonable-time placement finding makes any error in the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground harmless.

In re G.M. · filed 2024-11-14(B)(1)(a), (d)

A finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time, supported by clear and convincing evidence, obviates the need to wait 12 months before filing a permanent custody motion based on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), and renders a determination based on the 12 out of 22-month standard harmless.

When the undisputed evidence establishes twelve of twenty-two months under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the mutually exclusive conditions for applying subsection (B)(1)(a) are not met and the court need not consider that superfluous finding.

In re I.E. · filed 2024-11-21(B)(1)(a), (d)

The record clearly and convincingly establishes that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) has been satisfied. Consequently, the conditions for applying R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) have not been met. ... Because only one (B)(1) factor is needed, the first prong of the two-part analysis is satisfied, and we need not consider the trial court’s superfluous finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

Subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative, independently sufficient statutory grounds for permanent custody.

In re J.H. · filed 2025-11-19(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody.

The trial court need find only one subsection (B)(1) factor, so an unchallenged twelve-of-twenty-two finding is dispositive despite a challenge to another ground.

In re C.P. · filed 2025-12-22(B)(1)

Because the trial court need find only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the trial court's finding C.P. was in the custody of RCCS for thirteen of the prior twenty-months is dispositive without regard to whether the trial court properly found C.P. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time.

The trial court need find only one subsection (B)(1) factor, so an unchallenged twelve-of-twenty-two finding is dispositive despite a challenge to another ground.

In re A.P. · filed 2025-12-22(B)(1)

Because the trial court need find only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the trial court's finding A.P. was in the custody of RCCS for thirteen of the prior twenty-months is dispositive without regard to whether the trial court properly found A.P. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time.

Only one subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e) circumstance is necessary to satisfy the statutory-ground part of the permanent-custody test.

In re S.B. · filed 2026-03-20(B)(1)

Only one of these circumstances need to apply to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) allows a finding that a child spent 12 of 22 consecutive months in agency custody to serve as a ground for permanent custody without a separate finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In the Matter of heldt/woodson Children, Unpublished Decision (9-27-2004) · filed 2004-09-27(B)(1)

In this case, the trial court found that the children had been in the custody of SCDJFS for 12 of the last 22 consecutive months and that the children could not and should not be placed with either parent at that time or within a reasonable period of time. These findings are alternate grounds upon which to base the grant of permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and (d) respectively. Either of these findings, if supported by the evidence, is sufficient in and of itself to base a grant of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

When a court correctly finds abandonment elsewhere in its decision, failing to repeat that finding under Section 2151.414(E)(10) during the subsection (D)(1)(e) analysis is harmless.

In re N.L. · filed 2020-01-21(D)(1)(e), (E)(10)

Although the trial court was technically incorrect in stating that no evidence was presented on any of the (E)(7) through (11) factors, it elsewhere discussed abandonment and correctly determined that N.L. was abandoned. ... Thus, the trial court's failure to repeat that finding with respect to division (E)(10) of R.C. 2151.414 is at worst harmless oversight.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)'s required determination is satisfied when the trial court's findings substantially articulate that the children cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re K.M. · filed 2009-12-21(B)(1)

These findings can only lead to one logical conclusion that the children cannot be placed with Ronald within a reasonable time. As such, it is our conclusion that trial court’s finding in this instance substantially articulates the required statutory determination.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) does not require a permanent-custody judgment entry to use the statute's precise language when the court makes the required best-interest determination at the hearing and the entry substantially implements that determination.

In re R.C. · filed 2010-08-16(B)(1)

While we agree with the dissent that the court did not use the precise language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) in its entries, the statute does not require the use of these magic words.

A trial court need not make specific findings on every Section 2151.414(D)(1) best-interest factor, although fuller findings are the better practice.

In re D.F. · filed 2017-05-05(D)(1)

Moreover, although it would have been the better practice to make specific findings, the trial court was not required to make specific findings as to each best interest factor as appellant alleges.

A juvenile court need not enumerate every Section 2151.414(D)(1) best-interest factor, but the record must indicate that all necessary factors were considered.

In re G.C. · filed 2018-07-25(D)(1)

This court has held, “[w]hile a court does not have to enumerate each factor under R.C. 2151.414, ‘there must be some indication on the record that all of the necessary factors were considered.’ ” In re N.G., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-130684 and C-130685, 2014-Ohio-720, ¶ 12, quoting In re G.B., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1024, 2005-Ohio-3141, ¶ 17. On this record, we cannot find the court failed to consider the statutory best interest factors or engage in the requisite analysis.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) gives no individual best-interest factor greater weight, leaves factor weighting to the trial court, and requires consideration rather than express enumeration.

In re R.A.D. · filed 2021-02-10(D)(1)

No single factor is given greater weight or heightened significance. ... The weight to be given to the individual factors lies within the trial court’s discretion. ... As long as the court considered all the factors, it need not specifically enumerate those factors in its decision.

A juvenile court need not expressly find that subsection (E)(7) through (11) factors are inapplicable when the record contains no evidence that any applies.

In re T.J. · filed 2021-11-17(D)(1)(e)

Even though the trial court made no specific findings with respect to Section (D)(1)(e) of the statute, the record contains no evidence that any of those factors apply, and no party has argued otherwise. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the absence of a factual finding—that R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are inapplicable—does not demonstrate prejudicial error.

A trial court need not cite a particular subsection (E) factor expressly when its detailed findings and the record make clear which factors it relied upon.

In re T.P. · filed 2022-03-21(E)

In the instant case, the trial court did not explicitly cite to a single factor in R.C. 2151.414(E). However, the detailed findings in the October 27, 2021 judgment entry and the entire record in this matter make it apparent the trial court relied on several of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E), including R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), failure to remedy conditions and R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), chronic mental illness or intellectual disability.

A trial court need not cite a particular subsection (E) factor expressly when its detailed findings and the record make clear which factors it relied upon.

In re H.P. · filed 2022-03-21(E)

In the instant case, the trial court did not explicitly cite to a single factor in R.C. 2151.414(E). However, the detailed findings in the October 27, 2021 judgment entry and the entire record in this matter make it apparent the trial court relied on several of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E), including R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), failure to remedy conditions and R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), chronic mental illness or intellectual disability.

A juvenile court need not expressly discuss every subsection (D)(1) best-interest factor so long as the record shows it considered them.

In re T.H. · filed 2022-04-08(D)(1)

Mother seems to argue that the trial court should have discussed all the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e) factors, but that was unnecessary. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that a juvenile court is not required to expressly discuss each of the statutory best interest factors when it determines if granting permanent custody is appropriate. ... Consideration is all the statute requires. ... In this case, the trial court stated that it considered all the factors, but only expounded on three of them. There was no error there.

A trial court need not enumerate each subsection (D)(1) best-interest factor, but the record must indicate that it considered all required factors.

In re T.N. · filed 2022-08-11(D)(1)

While a trial court is not required to enumerate each R.C. 2151.414(D) factor, it must make some indication on the record that all the requisite factors were considered. ... None of the factors are entitled to greater weight than the other.

Subsection (D)(1) requires consideration of all relevant best-interest factors but does not require specific findings or a written discussion of every listed factor.

In re J.B. · filed 2022-10-31(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to make specific findings regarding each best-interest factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to include in its decision or judgment entry a written discussion of each of those factors.

A juvenile court need not expressly discuss every subsection (D)(1) factor; stating that it considered the factors is sufficient when the record does not show an omitted relevant factor.

In re Z.D.Y. · filed 2022-11-18(D)(1)(e)

As GCCS points out, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that juvenile courts do not have “to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). Consideration is all the statute requires.” ... Here, the court stated that it had considered all the factors, and that was sufficient.

Subsection (D)(1) requires consideration of the enumerated factors but not an express discussion of every fact, including cultural and language issues, when the judgment otherwise shows the required consideration.

In re Bil.I. · filed 2023-02-14(D)(1)

In the present case, by contrast, the juvenile court addressed all the specific enumerated factors under the statute. Accordingly, our decision in T.W. does not compel a remand of these cases. ... Based on our review of the evidence and testimony introduced at the hearing before the juvenile court, we find that despite the trial court's failure to expressly address the language and cultural issues present in these cases, there was competent, credible evidence to support the court's conclusion that granting permanent custody to FCCS was in the children's best interest.

A trial court need not state its consideration of every subsection (D)(1) factor or detail corresponding findings, but the reviewing court must be able to discern that the factors were considered.

In re E.T. · filed 2023-02-15(D)(1)

Although the statute requires the trial court to consider the best interest of the child, including the statutory factors and all relevant factors, there is no requirement that the court enunciate its consideration of each factor or detail its findings corresponding with each. ... A reviewing court, however, must be able to discern the trial court considered the factors.

A trial court's explicit findings under Section 2151.414(E) may establish by necessary implication the Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) conclusion that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re Z.G.A.A. · filed 2024-01-30(B)(1)(a), (E)

The trial court is required by the statute to find, by clear and convincing evidence, certain criteria have been met, and the trial court must state those findings on the record, such that it is clear to all parties the decision is supported by the facts. We find the trial court did so in the instant action. The trial court's explicit findings under R.C. 2151(E)(1), (4), and (11) create an implicit conclusion the trial court found R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) was applicable.

A mistaken citation to the abandonment subsection is a typographical error rather than an abandonment finding when the judgment's language clearly finds failure to remedy under Section 2151.414(E)(1).

In re M.P. · filed 2024-12-11(E)(1)

This Court must reasonably construe the quoted language to constitute a finding that Mother had failed to remedy the conditions that caused the removal of M.P. from her home and prevented his safe return to her custody. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).

A parent’s progress begun only after the permanent-custody motion does not require a child to wait when the parent showed little urgency for two years and the child needs permanency.

In re E.W. · filed 2018-10-01(D)(1)(d)

However, Mother only began demonstrating consistent progress on the case plan and genuine interest in reunification after the agency moved for permanent custody. ... E.W. needs permanency and cannot and should not wait until Mother is able to resolve her issues and make reunification with E.W. a priority.

Completing some case-plan requirements does not preclude permanent custody when the parents remain unable to provide a clean, safe home and meet the child’s basic needs.

In re B.S. · filed 2018-10-29(D)(1)

Though Mother and Father have completed some case plan requirements, it is well-established that the completion of certain case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody. ... In the present case, Mother and Father have been unable to show that they can provide B.S. with a clean and safe environment or provide for his basic needs.

Even substantial or complete case-plan participation does not prevent a finding that the parent failed to substantially remedy the problems that caused agency involvement.

In re D.M. · filed 2018-11-09(E)(1)

But even if she had substantially complied, this court has previously recognized, “that even where a parent has participated in his or her case plan and completed most or all of the plan requirements, a trial court may still properly determine that such parent has not substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement.” ... That is the case here.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) makes substantial remediation of the conditions causing removal—not completion of a case plan by itself—the controlling inquiry.

In re C.C. · filed 2010-03-04(E)(1)

A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification.

A parent’s successful completion of a case plan does not preclude permanent custody under subsection (E)(1), because the ultimate question is whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.

In re I.K. · filed 2011-09-08(E)(1)

[A] parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414[E](1) is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal. A parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed [—] the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself. Hence, the courts have held that the successful completion of case-plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.

Substantial compliance with a case plan does not preclude permanent custody when the parent has not substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal.

In re R.P. · filed 2011-10-14(E)(1)

Further, substantial compliance with a case plan, in and of itself, does not prove that a grant of permanent custody to an agency is erroneous. ... The dispositive issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but rather, whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal.

Under § 2151.414(E)(1), completing a case plan does not preclude a finding that a child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time when the parent failed to internalize and apply the services and thus did not remedy the conditions that caused removal.

In re JC · filed 2012-08-27(E)(1)

A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. ... The trial court found that appellant complied with the case plan. However, the evidence was undisputed that she did not remedy the problems which caused the children to be placed outside the home in spite of her compliance with the case plan. ... While appellant attended all programs made available to her, she was unable to internalize and apply the information she received.

Successful completion of a case plan does not preclude permanent custody because the plan is a means to the goal of safe and effective parenting, not the goal itself.

In re S.U. · filed 2014-11-21(D)(1)

Moreover, the case plan is simply a means to a goal, not a goal in itself, so that even successful completion of a case plan does not preclude a grant of permanent custody. In re Mraz, 12th Dist. Brown App. No. CA2002-05-011, 2002-Ohio-7278, ¶ 13. The evidence clearly indicates that despite some participation in parenting classes, appellant has not learned from the classes and is unable to safely and effectively parent the children.

Substantial case-plan compliance alone does not defeat permanent custody; the dispositive question under Section 2151.414(E)(1) is whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions that caused removal.

In re B.H. · filed 2014-12-29(E)(1)

Further, substantial compliance with a case plan, in and of itself, does not prove that a grant of permanent custody to an agency is erroneous. In re Watkins v. Harris, 9th Dist. Summit No. 17068, 1995 WL 513118(Aug. 30, 1995) at *9. The dispositive issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but rather, whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal.

Case-plan compliance does not preclude permanent custody when granting permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re T.J. · filed 2016-01-13(D)(1)

However, simply because a parent may have complied with a case plan does not preclude a trial court from awarding permanent custody to a children services agency when doing so is in the child’s best interest.

Even substantial completion of a case plan does not require reunification when the parent has failed to remedy the conditions that caused removal.

In re I.K. · filed 2016-02-24(E)(1)

While mother had made some progress, even substantial completion of a case plan does not, in and of itself, require that children be reunified with parents who have failed to remedy the conditions which led to removal in the first place.

Completing housing, income, and visitation objectives does not defeat permanent custody when a parent refuses needed mental-health and substance-abuse treatment and the child remains fearful and inadequately educated.

In re A.C. · filed 2016-03-04(D)(1)

The record does establish that Father completed several of his case plan objectives pertaining to housing, income, and regular visitation with A.C. Significantly, however, the record also establishes that Father refused to seek mental health and substance abuse treatment after being referred to a psychiatrist for his clearly delusional and erratic behavior. A.C. exhibited an ongoing fear of Father and believed that he was going to eventually hurt someone.

Case-plan completion is not dispositive when the parents have not progressed enough to provide a secure placement for the child.

In re J.G. · filed 2016-03-07(D)

As a factual matter, the record before this court supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that, while Jessica and Robert may have satisfied the case plan goals, they have not adequately satisfied those goals so as to be able to provide J.G. a secure placement.

A parent's refusal to complete court-ordered assessments, screening, releases, and income verification supports finding that custody to the parent is not in the child's best interest.

In re W.W.E. · filed 2016-06-23(D)(1)(d)

Appellant claims that he should not have been required to comply with the case plan because it was never established that the terms of the case plan were necessary for him. ... Appellant's contentions are without merit.

Completing case-plan requirements does not preclude permanent custody because the plan is a means to the goal rather than the goal itself.

In re T.P. · filed 2016-09-12(D)

A case plan is merely a means to a goal and not a goal in itself.

Case-plan compliance is relevant but not dispositive of best interest under § 2151.414(D), and a court may grant permanent custody even when a parent completed every case-plan objective.

In re T.D. · filed 2016-10-07(D)

Although Mother had completed most of her case-plan requirements, that fact is not dispositive with regard to the trial court’s best-interest determination. ... When the focus is on the child’s best interest, a trial court conceivably could terminate parental rights even if a parent completed all of her case-plan objectives. ... The case plan is simply “a means to a goal, but not the goal itself,” and other considerations still may justify an award of permanent custody to a children-services agency.

Substantial case-plan compliance does not preclude permanent custody because the plan is only a means to the statutory goal; the court must decide whether the parent remedied the removal conditions and whether permanent custody serves the child's best interest.

In re C.G. · filed 2017-03-13(D)(1)

For instance the Third District noted, “[s]ubstantial compliance with a case plan, without more, does not entitle a parent to custody.” ... Courts instead are to consider whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal. ... The Eighth District similarly held, “a parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed — the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.” ... Substantial compliance with a case plan does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.

Substantial compliance with a case plan, without more, does not entitle a parent to custody because case-plan progress is not the sole measure governing permanent custody.

In re A.M. · filed 2017-03-15(D)(1)

While parents’ progress is measured in part by completion of their case plan goals, the case plan is not the only measure by which a court determines whether to grant a motion for permanent custody. This court has previously emphasized that substantial compliance with a case plan, without more, does not entitle a parent to custody.

Once a Section 2151.414(B)(1) circumstance exists, the child's best interest controls, and a parent's case-plan compliance is relevant but not dispositive.

In re A.D.M. · filed 2017-04-11(D)(1)(d)

Once the court finds the existence of one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factors, the child’s best interest controls. D.A., supra, 2007-Ohio-1105, ¶ 11 (“Once the case reaches the disposition phase, the best interest of the child controls.”); In re K.J., 4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA14, 2008-Ohio-5227, ¶ 24 (stating that “when considering a R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the focus is upon the child's best interests, not upon the parent's compliance with the case plan”). A parent’s case plan compliance may be relevant to the extent that it affects the child’s best interest. E.g., In re T.J., 4th Dist. Highland No. 2016-Ohio-163, 2016 WL 228187, ¶ 36, citing In re R.L., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27214 and 27233, 2014-Ohio-3117, ¶ 34 (stating that “although case plan compliance may be relevant to a trial court's best interest determination, it is not dispositive of it”). However, a parent’s case plan compliance does not preclude a trial court from awarding permanent custody to a children services agency when doing so is in the child’s best interest.

Completing case-plan services does not by itself establish that a parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal.

In re G.C. · filed 2017-06-12(E)(1)

Moreover, successful completion of one's case plan is not dispositive of the issue of reunification.

Case-plan compliance may be relevant to the subsection (D) best-interest determination, but it is not dispositive.

In re G.A. · filed 2017-11-15(D)

Although Father completed some classes and treatment while he was incarcerated, most of his case plan compliance occurred after CSB had moved for permanent custody. Moreover, evidence of case plan compliance may be relevant to the trial court’s best interest determination, but is not dispositive.

In a legal-custody decision guided by subsection (D), case-plan compliance may inform the child’s best interest but is not dispositive.

In re A.J. · filed 2017-12-20(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... This Court has repeatedly stressed, however, that “evidence of case plan compliance may be relevant to the trial court’s best interest determination, but is not dispositive.”

Section 2151.414(D)(1) focuses on the child's best interests rather than the parent's compliance with a case plan.

In re P. K. · filed 2018-01-31(D)(1)

However, under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the focus is upon the child's best interests, not upon a parent's compliance with the case plan. See In the Matter of M.H.-L.T., 4th Dist. Washington No. 17CA12, 2017-Ohio-7825, ¶ 61, citing In re K.J., 4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA14, 2008–Ohio–5227, ¶24.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) focuses on the child's best interests rather than the parent's compliance with a case plan.

In re K. K. · filed 2018-01-31(D)(1)

However, under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the focus is upon the child's best interests, not upon a parent's compliance with the case plan. See In the Matter of M.H.-L.T., 4th Dist. Washington No. 17CA12, 2017-Ohio-7825, ¶ 61, citing In re K.J., 4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA14, 2008–Ohio–5227, ¶24.

Completion of case-plan services does not by itself require a finding that a parent has substantially remedied the conditions causing removal; the case plan is a means toward reunification, not the goal itself.

In re V.G. · filed 2018-02-26(D)

"[I]t is well-settled that the completion of case plan services alone does not equate to, or necessitate a finding that the parent * * * ha[s] substantially remedied the conditions that caused the removal of the child from the home." ... Rather, "the case plan is a means to the goal of reunification, but not the goal itself."

In a legal-custody decision guided by subsection (D), completing one’s own case-plan objectives is relevant but not dispositive when the parent fails to understand how to protect the children from the other parent’s substance abuse.

In re L.T. · filed 2018-04-18(D)

While it is relevant to the best interest determination, this Court has repeatedly recognized that a parent’s compliance with case plan objectives is not dispositive of the issue. ... Accordingly, while Father had fully complied with his own objectives, his attitudes and actions demonstrated that he did not understand what he needed to do to keep the children safe during their exposure to Mother.

Substantial case-plan compliance is relevant to best interest but does not automatically override the court’s best-interest determination, particularly when the parents still lack safe and sanitary housing.

In re H.J.H. · filed 2018-04-27(D)(1)

However, as the trial court correctly noted, “a parent’s case plan compliance, while it may be relevant to a best interest analysis, does not automatically override a trial court’s decision regarding what is in the child’s best interest.” ... The trial court acknowledged and applauded the parents’ effort on the case plan, with one exception: the inability to provide safe, sanitary housing.

In the best-interest analysis, case-plan completion is only a means toward reunification; the key question is whether the parent substantially remedied the concerns that caused removal.

In re D.E. · filed 2018-08-20(D)

Regardless, even if we were to agree that the record did support Father and Grandmother's claims, which we do not, it is well-established that "the case plan is 'simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.'" ... "[T]he key concern is not whether the parent has successfully completed the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the concerns that caused the child's removal from the parent's custody."

Even substantial participation in or completion of a case plan does not require a finding that the parent substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement.

In re B.M. · filed 2018-09-19(E)(1)

Even so, this court has previously recognized, “that even where a parent has participated in his or her case plan and completed most or all of the plan requirements, a trial court may still properly determine that such parent has not substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement.”

A parent's substantial case-plan compliance does not by itself require denial of an agency's permanent-custody motion under division (D).

In re S.T. · filed 2019-10-24(D)

"R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services agency's motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent's substantial compliance with the case plan."

Successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive of reunification because it is only one consideration in the child's best-interest analysis.

In re B.P. · filed 2020-07-15(D)(1)

The successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification.

Completing most or all case-plan requirements does not prevent a Section 2151.414(E)(1) finding when the parent has not substantially remedied the problems that caused agency involvement.

In re B.P. · filed 2020-08-19(E)(1)

The successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. ... Where a parent has participated in his case plan and completed most or all of the plan requirements, a trial court may still properly determine that such parent has not substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement.

Completing most or all case-plan requirements does not prevent a Section 2151.414(E)(1) finding when the parent has not substantially remedied the problems that caused agency involvement.

In re A.P. · filed 2020-08-19(E)(1)

The successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. ... Where a parent has participated in his case plan and completed most or all of the plan requirements, a trial court may still properly determine that such parent has not substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement.

In a legal-custody analysis guided by Section 2151.414(D), completing case-plan objectives is not dispositive because best interest focuses on the child.

In re C.W. · filed 2020-12-23(D)

Satisfying case-plan objectives is a means to an end, not an end unto itself. ... In short, the focus of a best-interest analysis is on the child, not the parent.

Section 2151.414(D) does not require denial of permanent custody solely because a parent substantially complied with the case plan; the court may weigh that compliance in the best-interest analysis.

In re A.S. · filed 2021-01-28(D)

Even if this court were to construe mother's securing appropriate housing as demonstrating a level of substantial compliance with the case plan, we are mindful that " 'R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services agency's motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent's substantial compliance with the case plan.' "

An agency need not prove complete failure on a case plan to establish that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re R.O. · filed 2021-03-03(D)(1)

Although Harris may have been making some progress with services as required by the case plan, we are compelled to note that MACPS was not required to prove that he completely failed in achieving the goals of the case plan.

Subsection (D) does not require denial of permanent custody merely because a parent substantially complied with a case plan.

In re E.S. · filed 2021-03-25(D)

R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services agency's motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent's substantial compliance with the case plan.

Subsection (D)(1)’s best-interest factors can support permanent custody even where a parent has partially complied with a case plan, because such compliance is relevant but not dispositive.

In re B.R. · filed 2021-07-08(D)(1)

{¶ 35} Mother B.R. has not demonstrated that the manifest weight of the evidence did not support the trial court's application of the best interest factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's decision to grant the motion for permanent custody. We overrule the assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.

When § 2151.414(D)'s factors guide a legal-custody decision, successful case-plan completion is not dispositive of reunification.

In re K.R. · filed 2021-10-07(D)

However, the successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification.

When § 2151.414(D)'s factors guide legal custody, successful case-plan completion is not dispositive of reunification and remains only one best-interest consideration.

In re G.B. · filed 2021-10-07(D)

However, the successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. In re W.A.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99813, 2014-Ohio-604. While it may be in Mother’s best interest to complete the case plan, this is only one factor for a trial court to consider what is in the best interest of the child, and, “in legal custody cases, trial courts should consider all factors relevant to the best interest of the child.”

A parent's failure to complete a reunification case plan may establish unwillingness or inability to provide adequate care despite some effort toward the objectives.

In re A.R. · filed 2021-10-08(B)(1), (D)(1), (E)

In sum, the record established that MCCS made every reasonable effort to reunite Mother with A.R. Mother's failure to complete the case plan, however, established that she was either unwilling or incapable of adequately caring for A.R.

Completing case-plan services does not itself establish that a parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused removal.

In re J.M. · filed 2021-11-08(D)

{¶63} As an initial matter, we note that "the completion of case plan services alone does not equate to, or necessitate, a finding that the parents have substantially remedied the conditions that caused the removal of the child from the home." In re R.K., 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2021-03-027 and CA2021-03-028, 2021-Ohio-3074, ¶ 24, citing In re S.M., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-01-003, 2015-Ohio-2318, ¶ 24.

A parent's completion of the case plan does not preclude permanent custody when the child's best interest supports an award to the agency.

In re J.M. · filed 2021-11-16(D)(1)(d)

Thus, a parent’s case plan compliance will not preclude a trial court from awarding permanent custody to a children services agency when doing so is in the child’s best interest. ... Although we do not discount appellant’s compliance with the case plan, her case plan compliance does not override the children’s best interests.

Completing some case-plan requirements does not preclude permanent custody when the statutory best-interest factors otherwise support it.

In re M.H. · filed 2022-01-10(D)(1)

Though Father completed some case plan requirements, it is well established that the completion of certain case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody.

Completing a case plan does not preclude permanent custody when the parent has not substantially remedied the conditions that caused removal, because the case plan is a means to that goal rather than the goal itself.

In re L.E. · filed 2022-03-01(E)

{¶66} A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal. In re Shchigelski, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 99–G–2241, 2000 WL 1568388(Oct. 20, 2000); In re McKenzie, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 95CA0015, 1995 WL 608285(Oct. 18, 1995). A parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed—the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself. Hence, the courts have held that the successful completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.

Substantial case-plan compliance does not establish a legally secure placement when sobriety, medication compliance, and parental capacity remain unresolved.

In re M.D. · filed 2022-05-02(D)(1)(d)

The crux of this troubling case is that S.D. has substantially complied with GCJFS’ case plan; however, she continues to struggle with her sobriety and prescription medication compliance, and she has demonstrated a lack of parental capacities.

Successful case-plan completion is not dispositive; the ultimate question is whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions causing removal.

In re M.M. · filed 2022-05-10(E)(1)

A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.

Successful case-plan completion is not dispositive; the ultimate question is whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions causing removal.

In re M.M. · filed 2022-05-11(E)(1)

A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.

Completing a case plan does not preclude permanent custody when the parent has not actually remedied the conditions causing removal; the plan is a means rather than the goal.

In re E.H. · filed 2022-05-18(E)(1)

A parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed—the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.

Even full case-plan completion does not bar permanent custody, because the plan is a means rather than the goal and other best-interest considerations may justify termination.

In re D.F. · filed 2022-05-27(D)

Case plans are “simply ‘a means to a goal, but not the goal itself,’ and other considerations still may justify an award of permanent custody to a children-services agency.” (Citations omitted.) Id., quoting In re J.H., 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2015-07-014, 2016-Ohio-640, ¶ 47.

Substantial compliance with a case plan does not require denial of permanent custody when the best-interest factors favor the agency.

In re V.W. · filed 2022-07-19(D)

Moreover, even though R.W. completed case plan elements, "R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services agency's motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent's substantial compliance with the case plan." ... Contrary to R.W.'s argument, the record supports the trial court's finding that he could not meet V.W.'s need for a legally secure permanent home.

Completing case-plan services does not preclude permanent custody when the parent fails to make the behavioral changes needed to provide a safe and stable home.

In re L.H. · filed 2022-08-10(D)(1)

L.H. was removed from J.H.’s home because she was in a violent relationship. She remained in a violent relationship with R.D., despite her completing the case-plan services. J.H. lacked stable housing. ... Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that J.H. failed to demonstrate that she could provide a safe and stable home for L.H.

Under subsection (E)(1), the issue is whether the parent remedied the conditions causing removal, not whether the parent substantially complied with the case plan.

In re D.H. · filed 2022-08-11(E)(1)

Substantial compliance with a case plan, however, is not solely dispositive. ... Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the issue is not whether Mother substantially complied with the case plan, but whether Mother remedied the conditions that caused the children’s removal.

Case-plan compliance may be relevant to a child's best interest, but it does not control the subsection (D)(1) determination.

In re K.C. · filed 2022-08-17(D)(1)

This Court has repeatedly held that, although case plan compliance may be relevant to the best interest of the child, it is not dispositive. ... As emphasized already, the parents’ lack of case plan compliance, although relevant, was not determinative of the trial court’s best interest determination.

The key inquiry is not technical case-plan completion but whether the parent substantially remedied the concerns that caused removal.

In re M.G. · filed 2022-09-12(D)(1), (E)(1)

"[T]he key concern is not whether the parent has successfully completed the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the concerns that caused the child's removal from the parent's custody."

Successful case-plan completion is not dispositive; the ultimate question is whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions causing removal.

In re J.N. · filed 2022-12-06(E)(1)

A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.

Case-plan compliance does not preclude permanent custody when custody is in the child’s best interest, because the subsection (D)(1)(d) focus is the child rather than the parent’s compliance.

In re T.B. · filed 2022-12-20(D)(1)(d)

Thus, a parent’s case plan compliance will not preclude a trial court from awarding permanent custody to a children services agency when doing so is in the child’s best interest. Id.

Completing a case plan does not preclude permanent custody; the ultimate question is whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions causing removal.

In re D.V. · filed 2023-01-26(A)(1)

A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal. ... A parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed—the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.

A few weeks of case-plan compliance late in a lengthy custody case does not outweigh unresolved concerns under the best-interest analysis.

In re W.R. · filed 2023-02-06(D)(1)

While Mother was in complete compliance with the case plan for the three weeks preceding trial, this is three weeks in an 18-month period since the children were initially removed, and a two-year period since the agency first became involved. Mother's seriousness about following the case plan is ultimately too little, too late.

Substantial compliance with services does not prevent permanent custody when parents fail to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary home conditions that caused removal.

In re K.K. · filed 2023-02-13(D)(1)(d)

Although Mother and Father were compliant with other services, they failed to secure a safe and stable home throughout these proceedings. ... Throughout the pendency of the case, Mother and Father's home continued to manifest the same problems that were apparent from the beginning of the case.

Under section 2151.414(E)(1), compliance with a case plan by itself does not necessarily establish that a parent substantially remedied the conditions causing removal or that reunification serves the child's best interest.

In re N.T. · filed 2023-04-20(E)(1)

Consequently, even if Mother complied with her case plan requirements, her compliance, standing alone, did not necessarily demonstrate that she substantially remedied the conditions that caused the children’s removal or that reunification is in the children’s best interest.

Successful completion of case-plan requirements does not preclude permanent custody when the section 2151.414(D)(1) factors show that permanency and a safe, secure environment are in the child's best interest.

In re K.T. · filed 2023-04-20(D)(1)

We recognize that both Father and Mother made substantial strides in the completion of their case plans. We nonetheless note that Palidar and the GAL were unpersuaded that either of them benefitted from the case plans. Further, this court has found that “successful completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.” ... We further note that while K.T. may have a good relationship with Father, this court has recognized that the best interest of the child requires permanency and a safe, secure environment, regardless of the strength of the child’s relationship with the biological parent.

A parent's progress does not prevent a finding under Section 2151.414(E) that the child cannot be placed with that parent within a reasonable time when clear and convincing evidence supports the statutory factors.

In re K.S. · filed 2023-06-02(E)

Although the record shows that mother and father have made progress, the record clearly and convincingly supports the juvenile court’s determination that the children could not be placed with mother or father within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, we hold that the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E) was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Satisfying some case-plan goals does not establish that a parent can provide the legally secure placement required by Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d).

In re L.R.-L. · filed 2023-06-22(D)(1)(d)

However, a finding that a parent has satisfied some case plan goals does not necessarily equate to a finding that the parent has the ability to assume custody of a child. In re T.M., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-943, 2020-Ohio-815, ¶ 31. That is the problem here.

Under section 2151.414(D)(1), completing case-plan requirements does not preclude permanent custody when the parent has not remedied the removal concerns or shown an ability to meet the child's special needs.

In re J.G. · filed 2023-08-07(D)(1)

We do not deny that Mother made some progress in her case plan, however, it is well established that even completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody. ... The main concern is not whether a parent has successfully completed a case plan, but whether the parent has “substantially remedied the concerns that caused the removal from the parent's custody.” ... In the present case, Mother has not remedied the concerns that caused removal, nor has she demonstrated an ability to care for J.G. and his special needs.

Completion of case-plan services alone does not require a finding that a parent remedied the conditions causing removal because the plan is a means to reunification, not the goal itself.

In re A.C. · filed 2023-08-08(D)(1)

As an initial note, it is well established that “the completion of case plan services alone does not equate to, or necessitate, a finding that the parents have substantially remedied the conditions that caused the removal of the child from the home.” ... “[A] parent can successfully complete the requirements of a case plan, but not substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed, as the case plan is 'simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.'”

Section 2151.414(D) does not require denial of permanent custody solely because a parent substantially complied with a case plan, because that compliance is only one relevant factor and does not establish an ability to assume custody.

In re K.C. · filed 2024-05-30(D)

Even assuming, as she claims, appellant made significant progress on her case plan throughout the course of this case, “ ‘R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services agency’s motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent’s substantial compliance with the case plan,’ as substantial compliance with a case plan is ‘but one of many factors the court may find relevant * * * in rendering its judgment.’ ” ... “[A] finding that a parent has satisfied some case plan goals does not necessarily equate to a finding that the parent has the ability to assume custody of a child.”

Satisfying some case-plan goals does not establish an ability to assume custody under section 2151.414(E)(1), particularly where sobriety and stable-housing concerns persist.

In re A.S. · filed 2024-05-31(E)(1)

While there was evidence that T.S. made progress on his case plan by testing negative for drugs and finding employment, his history of inability to maintain sobriety and lack of stable housing was of great concern to the trial court. A finding that a parent has satisfied some case plan goals does not equate to a finding that the parent has the ability to assume custody of a child.

Section 2151.414(D) does not require a court to deny permanent custody solely because a parent substantially complied with the case plan.

In re K.D. · filed 2019-03-26(D)

However, "R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services agency's motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent's substantial compliance with the case plan."

Section 2151.414(B) does not require a permanent-custody motion to allege that changing custody is in the child's best interests; that issue is considered at the hearing under section 2151.414(A)(3).

In Re Lucas · filed 1985-11-19(B)

It is further asserted that there is no averment that the change of custody would be in the child’s best interests. While this is an important ultimate factor to be determined by the court, it is not a fact or prerequisite to the change of permanent custody under R.C. 2151. 414(B) as noted above and does not constitute a specific ground for that determination. It is a matter for inquiry at the hearing under R.C. 2151.414(A)(3) but not an essential allegation of the motion.

Section 2151.414 requires a court to find by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory factor makes reunification within a reasonable time impossible or inappropriate, and then determine that permanent custody is in the child's best interest before awarding custody to an agency.

In Re Dylan C. · filed 1997-06-27(B), (E)

R.C. 2151.414(E) requires the trial court to find that the child cannot be placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents once the court has determined by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the eight factors exist. Once the trial court finds from all relevant evidence that one of the eight factors exists, it then must consider whether permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(B). Only then may it grant permanent custody of the child to the agency.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing proof of a qualifying (E) condition before permanent custody may be granted on placement grounds and requires consideration of all relevant evidence, including the (D)(1) through (D)(5) best-interest factors.

In Re Larson, Unpublished Decision (9-3-1999) · filed 1999-09-03(D), (E)

Permanent custody of a child may not be granted to a human services agency on the grounds that such child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be so placed, unless a trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the conditions enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist. ... The trial court was required to consider all relevant evidence, including but not limited to those factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1) through (D)(5). It is clear to this court that contrary to appellant’s contentions, the trial court considered and applied those factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D) to the facts presented in the case at bar.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of a qualifying factor for each parent and consideration of specified best-interest factors before permanent custody may be awarded.

In Re Mingle, Unpublished Decision (11-22-1999) · filed 1999-11-22(E) and (D)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) requires the presentation of clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the listed factors exist as to each parent before an award of permanent custody can be made. ... As cited to in Assignment of Error I, we find these facts to have been established by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D), the trial court is to consider various factors in determining the best interests of the child: ... Based upon the failure of appellant and Mr. Mingle to fulfill the case plan since 1996 and no viable alternative as to placement, we find the trial court did not err in granting permanent custody of the child to appellee.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; the best-interest determination must consider all relevant statutory factors.

In Re Brown Children, Unpublished Decision (12-16-2004) · filed 2004-12-16(B)(1)(a), (D)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) addresses under what circumstances a trial court may grant permanent custody. This statute provides as follows: ... "(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: ... "(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents. ... In determining the best interests of the children, R.C. 2151.414 (D) provides as follows: ... "(D) In determining the best interest of a child * * *, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: ... Based upon the testimony presented, we conclude there was competent, credible evidence upon which the trial court could find that it was in the children's best interests for permanent custody to be granted to the Agency. The trial court's decision is supported by the sufficiency of the evidence.

Section 2151.414 requires the court to consider five specified best-interest factors and to find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent before terminating parental rights.

In the Matter of Meadows, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2005) · filed 2005-09-20(D), (E)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) enumerates five factors the court must consider in determining whether it is in a child's best interest to terminate parental rights. Those five factors are: (1) the interrelationship of the child with others; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's need for a legally secure placement and whether such a placement can be achieved without permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) apply. Under R.C. 2151.414 (E), the court also must find that the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents. ... Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence that implementing a reunification plan would be futile, that Millard cannot or should not be placed with either parent, and that granting SCCSB permanent custody is in Millard's best interest, we overrule Mother's assignment of error.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a court deciding whether permanent custody is in a child's best interest to consider all relevant factors, including the child's relationships, wishes, custodial history, need for legally secure placement, and the applicability of factors in subsections (E)(7) through (11).

In the Matter of G.S., Unpublished Decision (5-23-2006) · filed 2006-05-23(D)

Having found one of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) existed, the trial court was then required to determine whether permanent custody was in the best interest of the children, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D). R.C. 2151.414 (D) provides that, in determining the best interest of the child, the court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.

Section 2151.414(D) and (E) require the court to consider the statutory best-interest and parental-placement factors, and clear and convincing evidence supported permanent custody where the children could not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time and permanent custody served their best interests.

In Re Coon, Unpublished Decision (10-13-2006) · filed 2006-10-13(D), (E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) directs the trial court to consider all relevant evidence in determining whether a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. ... We find the the record contains sufficient competent and credible evidence from which the trial court could determine, by clear and convincing evidence, the children cannot be placed with appellant within a reasonable time. ... R.C. 2151.414 (D) sets forth the factors the trial court should consider in determining the best interest of the child. ... We find the trial court's determination it is in the best interest of the children to be placed in the permanent custody of Children's Services is supported by sufficient, competent and credible evidence rising to the level of clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to consider all listed best-interest factors, but only one enumerated factor need favor permanent custody.

In Re T.G., 90392 (5-1-2008) · filed 2008-05-01(D)

When determining the best interest of the child, the court is required to consider all relevant factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (D). This court has found that only one of the enumerated factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody.

Sections 2151.414(B) and (D) permit permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, including evidence of the parent's lack of follow-through and attachment and the child's need for stability.

In Re Dunn, 2008ap030020 (7-28-2008) · filed 2008-07-28(B), (D)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) enables the court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D) sets out the factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. ... Because of appellant's lack of follow-through and lack of attachment to the child, we find the trial court did not err in its decision. {¶ 28} The best interest test is satisfied by the testimony of Personal and Family Counseling home base worker Kimberly Weitzman, Pathway community service provider Katrina Richards, appellee's social worker Beth Bertini, and therapeutic foster parent Christopher Barto, wherein they all opined the child's life would be turned around and become stable with permanent custody to appellee. T. at 65-66, 108-109, 202-204. {¶ 29} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in granting permanent custody of the child to appellee.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that the child is abandoned and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re B.J. · filed 2012-04-30(B)(1)(b)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child. ... For these reasons, we find that the trial court had sufficient, credible evidence before it to find by clear and convincing evidence that R.K. had abandoned B.J. We further find that the trial court’s decision that permanent custody to SCJFS was in B.J.’s best interest was not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.

R.C. 2151.414 permits termination of parental rights and an award of permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes a condition in division (B)(1)(a) through (d) and that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest after consideration of the division (D) factors.

In re S.H. · filed 2012-09-06(B)(1), (D), and (E)

In order to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a county agency, the record must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the following: 1) the existence of one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d); and, 2) permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. The court must consider the five factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) in making the latter determination. ... In this case, the juvenile court determined, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B), that the children had “been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period.” M.H. cannot dispute that this requirement was met. ... Because the “manifest weight” of clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s decisions in these cases, M.H.’s fourth assignment of error also is overruled.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence to support an order granting permanent custody.

In Re Bradford · filed 1986-01-28

We find that the trial court correctly looked at the evidence in this case and found that the child would continue to be a dependent child without adequate parental care. There was clear and convincing evidence presented to warrant the trial court in ordering the permanent commitment of the child to the Franklin County Children Services Board.