Statute Annotations › North Carolina › N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16

Civil penalty for unfair or deceptive acts: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
North Carolina
Case notes
159
Cited in passing
190
Citing cases indexed
166
Case dates
1975–2025
Screened through
2026-04-15
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-20
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

349 citing cases reviewed: 159 interpreted the section (annotated below), 190 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-04-15 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1977 Chapter 707 amended § 75-16; the current provision directs entry of judgment for three times the damages fixed by the verdict. Source
  • 1981-04-07 Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, rejected the earlier rule that bad faith or intent to deceive was required for a private treble-damages claim under § 75-16; after a § 75-1.1 violation and injury, trebling is automatic. Source

Treble damages

An unfair act or practice alone is sufficient ground for assessing treble damages under § 75-16.

Wilder v. Squires · filed 1984-05-15

An unfair act or practice is a sufficient ground, in and of itself, upon which to assess treble damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1981).
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages for an unfair or deceptive trade practice, but the plaintiff must elect treble damages or punitive damages and cannot recover both.

Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. · filed 1989-06-06

Plaintiff would then elect to recover either punitive damages or treble damages. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover both treble and punitive damages under § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 requires damages awarded for an unfair or deceptive act under Chapter 75 to be trebled.

Barbee v. Atlantic Marine Sales & Service, Inc. · filed 1993-12-21

The court, having found that the defendant’s acts constituted an unfair and deceptive practice, properly trebled that amount and entered judgment thereon.
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Section 75-16 requires damages for an unfair or deceptive practice under § 75-1.1 to be trebled.

Barbee v. Atlantic Marine Sales & Service, Inc. · filed 1994-08-02

The injury plaintiffs suffered because of the breach of warranty was compensated by the award for the Chapter 75 claim against defendant. Indeed, the jury found that the plaintiffs had suffered precisely the same amount of damages, $59,577.55, for each of those claims. The court, having found that the defendant’s acts constituted an unfair and deceptive practice, properly trebled that amount and entered judgment thereon.
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Section 75-16 permits trebling actual damages resulting from unfair trade practices.

Britt v. Jones · filed 1996-07-02

The unfair trade practices statute limits the recovery of damages to four years preceding institution of suit and permits trebling of those damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.2 (1994); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1994). The trial court found that plaintiff had sustained actual damages of $2,900 based on defendant’s unfair trade practices, which finding was supported by competent evidence. The court properly concluded that plaintiff was entitled to treble that amount, or $8,700. Plaintiff has not received a double recovery.
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Section 75-16 gives a business injured by a Chapter 75 violation a private right of action and treble damages, requiring proof that the conduct was in or affecting commerce, unfair or deceptive, and proximately caused actual injury.

Southern Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Osborne · filed 1997-09-02

Section 75-16 of the General Statutes provides a business injured by another person in violation of Chapter 75 with a right of action, and recovery of treble damages for such injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1994). In order to prevail in an action for unfair and deceptive trade practices under Chapter 75, the claimant must show that (1) the acts or practices in question are “in or affecting commerce”; (2) the acts or practices in question had the capacity or tendency to deceive or were unfair; and (3) the claimant suffered actual injury as a proximate result of the other party’s acts or practices.
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Section 75-16 allows a private cause of action for a violation of § 75-1.1 and mandates treble damages.

Gray v. North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1999-01-19

Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 allows a private cause of action for violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, and mandates the imposition of treble damages.
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Section 75-16 requires trebling compensatory damages awarded for a Chapter 75 violation when the plaintiff elects Chapter 75 remedies, but does not support trebling contract damages absent a finding that the conduct causing those damages violated Chapter 75.

US f/u/b S&D Land v. D'Elegance Mgmt Ltd · filed 2000-07-13

Mitchell also contends that the award should be trebled pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. We agree. ... Accordingly, Mitchell is entitled to an award of $300,000 in the Chapter 75 cause of action. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 gives any person, firm, or corporation injured by another's unlawful act a right of action and requires treble damages when damages are awarded.

State Ex Rel. Easley v. Rich Food Services, Inc. · filed 2000-08-29

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1999) allows any person, firm or corporation injured by the act of another to “have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.”
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Section 75-16 requires trebling only of damages the fact finder determines were proximately caused by a § 75-1.1 violation.

Edmondson v. American Motorcycle Ass'n · filed 2001-02-02

North Carolina General Statutes § 75-16 provides that if damages are assessed with respect to a § 75-1.1 claim, "judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. The phrase "treble the amount fixed by the verdict" as found in § 75-16 provides only for the trebling of damages determined by the fact finder to be the proximate result of a § 75-1.1 violation. See Gray, 529 S.E.2d at 685.
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Section 75-16 requires courts to treble damages once they determine that an act violates the UTPA.

South Atlantic Ltd. Partnership v. Riese · filed 2002-03-22

Once the court has established that an act constitutes a violation of the UTPA, it must automatically treble the damages.
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Section 75-16 requires damages assessed for an injury caused by a UDTPA violation to be trebled.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C. · filed 2005-10-18

Under the UDTPA, plaintiff was awarded lost profits and the value of benefit defendants received, two different types of damages permitted under the UDTPA. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (“If any person shall be injured or the business of any . . . corporation shall be broken up ... or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, ... if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.”).
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Section 75-16 provides consumers a private cause of action for injuries caused by Chapter 75 violations and requires recovered damages to be trebled.

Page v. Lexington Insurance · filed 2006-04-18

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2005) creates a cause of action to redress injuries caused by violations of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes and provides that any damages recovered shall be trebled. These two statutes establish a private cause of action for consumers.
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Section 75-16 gives a person injured by a violation of section 75-1.1 a private cause of action and authorizes treble damages.

Printing Services of Greensboro, Inc. v. American Capital Group, Inc. · filed 2006-11-07

Section 75-16, which establishes a private cause of action for any person injured by another’s violation of section 75-1.1, specifically authorizes the award of treble damages.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages as the remedy for a substantive Chapter 75 unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Jones v. Harrelson & Smith Contractors, LLC · filed 2006-12-19

A UDTP claim is a substantive claim, the remedy for which is treble damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2005). Chapter 75 is not a remedial scheme for other substantive claims.
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Section 75-16 trebles compensatory damages, and a plaintiff must elect between those trebled damages and punitive damages without electing against the entire Chapter 75 claim.

United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall · filed 1991-04-16

Plaintiffs may in proper cases elect to recover either punitive damages under a common law claim or treble damages under N.C.G.S. § 75-16, but they may not recover both.
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In a § 75-16 action, the jury determines the facts and the court decides as a matter of law whether the conduct was unfair or deceptive.

Kron Medical Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Associates, Inc. · filed 1992-09-01

In actions under sections 75-1.1 and 75-16, “it is ordinarily for the jury to determine the facts, and based on the jury’s findings, the court must then determine as a matter of law whether the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.”
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Section 75-16 treble damages serve both punitive and remedial purposes.

Leftwich v. Gaines · filed 1999-08-17

treble damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1994) are given for both punitive and remedial purposes, ... we remand this matter on the issue of attorney fees as to Gaines only.
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Section 75-16 entitles a person injured by another’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices to treble damages.

Shepard v. Bonita Vista Properties, LP · filed 2008-08-05

A person damaged by another’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices is entitled to treble damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2005).
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Section 75-16 requires treble damages when a defendant violates the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Linsenmayer v. Omni Homes, Inc. · filed 2008-11-18

We find no error in the absence of specific findings that would justify treble damages as the trial court previously found for plaintiffs on the issue of liability for unfair and deceptive trade practices and found treble damages to be statutorily appropriate. “If the trial court finds that the defendant has violated the UTPA [North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act], it must award treble damages[.]” ... The arbitrator was bound by law to treble the damages and was not required to make findings already established by the trial court.
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Section 75-16 automatically trebles damages for a violation of § 75-1.1, and profits may serve as a rough measure of actual damages subject to trebling.

Belk, Incorporated v. Meyer Corporation, U.S. · filed 2012-05-09

"Treble damages are assessed automatically upon a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. ... Moreover, Belk’s profits on the disputed cookware, which the district court treated as actual damages, properly constitute a "rough measure of the plaintiff’s damages" subject to trebling under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. ... Thus, the district court was entitled to treble the award of profits.
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Section 75-16 permits a plaintiff, in a proper case, to elect treble damages instead of common-law punitive damages, but not recover both.

Kingsdown, Inc. v. Hinshaw · filed 2016-02-17

“Plaintiffs may in proper cases elect to recover either punitive damages under a common law claim or treble damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16, but they may not recover both.”
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Section 75-16 trebles damages assessed for injury caused by a violation of Chapter 75.

Pee Dee Elec. Membership Corp. v. King · filed 2018-03-15

Plaintiff’s actual damages of $96,623.06 shall be trebled pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16, and Plaintiff shall have and recover against TriTech and AccuKing, jointly and severally, the total amount of $289,869.18, plus interest on said amount as provided by law.
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Section 75-16 requires damages for a violation of Chapter 75 to be trebled, and the court applied that rule to both nominal and compensatory damages awarded for unfair trade practices.

HONGDA CHEM USA, LLC v. SHANGYU SUNFIT CHEMICAL COMPANY, LTD. · filed 2020-03-10

3. Hongda is liable to Sunfit for violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 for damages distinct from the breach of contract damages in the amount of $1 trebled to $3 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16; ... 4. The conduct of the Third-Party Defendants, as found by the jury, was unfair or deceptive, in commerce, and injured Sunfit in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; ... 5. The Third-Party Defendants are liable to Sunfit for violations N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 in the amount of $9,867,035 trebled to $29,601,105 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16; ... 6. Hongda fraudulently transferred $1,000,000 and $750,000 to DravCo, Inc. (“DravCo”) on September 17, 2012 and September 26, 2012, respectively, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.1 et seq. (2012).
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages for a violation of North Carolina's unfair and deceptive trade practices law.

Floyd v. On the Rox Entertainment LLC · filed 2020-10-13

North Carolina’s unfair and deceptive trade practice law provides for treble damages, which in this case amounts to $1,653,539.70. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 entitles a plaintiff who proves unfair or deceptive trade practices to treble damages.

Floyd v. On the Rox Entertainment LLC · filed 2021-06-03

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-16, Plaintiff is further entitled to treble damages for unfair and deceptive trade practices, which in this case amount to $37,998.00. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages to any person injured by another's violation of Chapter 75.

Central National Gottesman Inc. v. Nakos Paper Products, Inc. · filed 2021-08-11

The Act was later amended to extend an award of treble damages to any person injured by the acts of another in violation of Chapter 75. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 requires automatic trebling of damages for a violation of § 75-1.1.

Belk, Incorporated v. Meyer Corporation, U.S. · filed 2012-05-08

Treble damages are assessed automatically upon a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 requires damages awarded for unfair trade practices to be trebled.

Djarum v. Dhanraj Imports, Inc. · filed 2012-03-14

Damages assessed for unfair trade practices ... rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for ... the amount fixed by the verdict.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (emphasis added).
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Section 75-16's treble-damages remedy is not a statutory penalty for purposes of venue under § 1-77(1).

Caldwell v. Smith · filed 2010-05-04

In their brief, plaintiffs argue that their complaint seeks recovery of a penalty sanctioned by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2009) for Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices. ... to the present case, plaintiff's claim pursuant to Chapter 75 does not constitute a claim for recovery of a penalty such that venue would be proper in the county where the cause of action arose.
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Section 75-16 requires damages for violations of Chapter 75, including state antitrust and unfair-trade-practices violations, to be trebled.

WILLIAMS v. THE ESTATES LLC · filed 2022-06-02

As required by statute, the damages awards as to Issues 2, 5, and 8 must be trebled. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16; see, e.g., Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243, 400 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1991). For the defendants’ Chapter 75 violations, they are jointly and severally liable to Mr. Williams in the amount of $105,000 ($35,000 trebled), to Mr. da Costa and Ms. de Leon jointly in the amount of $150,000 ($50,000 trebled), and to Mr. Gustafson in the amount of $30,000 ($10,000 trebled).
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Section 75-16 requires treble damages when a defendant violates the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Software Pricing Partners, LLC v. Geisman · filed 2022-08-31

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16, courts must treble damages if a defendant violates the UDTPA.
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Section 75-16 requires treble damages when the court determines that a violation of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act has occurred.

Smith v. Race Engines Plus, LLC · filed 2022-12-28

Where the Court determines that a violation of the Act has occurred “judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-16. ... Where an unfair and deceptive trade practice claim is found, an award of treble damages is mandatory. ... Based on the foregoing, the damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of REP’s violations of the Act must be trebled, and the Court awards damages in the amount of $252,000.00 based on REP’s violations of the Act.
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Section 75-16 authorizes treble damages only for the person, firm, or corporation injured by the unfair trade practice.

Jones v. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2023-09-25

Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 provides treble damages only the “person, firm, or corporation” injured by the unfair trade practice alleged. N.C.G.S. § 75-16. As the court has explained, IOC is not such an entity.
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Section 75-16 requires damages awarded for a UDTPA violation to be trebled.

B & M Realty, LLC v. Elam · filed 2025-04-24

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 of the UDTPA, these damages shall be trebled to $1,133,650.53.
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Section 75-16 requires courts to treble damages for a UDTPA violation.

DENC, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insuran · filed 2022-04-18

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16, courts must treble damages if a defendant violates the UDTPA.
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Section 75-16 requires trebling of damages proximately caused by a UDTPA violation, including contract damages when the same conduct supports both claims.

DENC, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. · filed 2022-04-18

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16, courts must treble damages if a defendant violates the UDTPA.
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Section 75-16 mandates treble damages for damages proximately caused by a UDTPA violation.

Foodbuy, LLC v. Gregory Packaging, Inc. · filed 2022-08-04

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16, courts must treble damages if a defendant violates the UDTPA.
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Section 75-16 authorizes treble-damage recovery for antitrust violations on the same terms as the federal antitrust statute.

Nash County Board Of Education v. The Biltmore Company · filed 1981-01-12

In this suit, however, under the state statute, modeled as it is after the federal statute and offering the same right to recover treble damages as the federal statute, there is not the ground for denying res judicata effect to the state court judgment stated in Hayes and Cream Top. ... But this point is unimportant here and raises no bar to the application of res judicata in this case, for the North Carolina statute again is identical in the plaintiff's right of recovery under the Sherman Act, if successful: It can secure treble damages on the same terms under both statutes.
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Section 75-16 gives a person injured by a violation of North Carolina's antitrust laws the right to recover treble damages.

Nash County Board of Education v. Biltmore Co. · filed 1981-01-12

The state and federal statutes upon which the two actions are based are identical in language except in the requirement of the federal statute, but not of the state statute, of a showing of interstate commerce. In both cases, the evidence will be identical and the damages recoverable and the relief available the same. ... In this suit, however, under the state statute, modeled as it is after the federal statute and offering the same right to recover treble damages as the federal statute, there is not the ground for denying res judicata effect to the state court judgment stated in Hayes and Cream Top. There is accordingly no sound reason under Hayes and Cream Top for denying res judicata effect in this case to the earlier state court judgment.
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Section 75-16's treble-damages remedy is punitive, intended to punish unfair and deceptive acts and practices affecting commerce.

Jones v. Wilson (In Re Wilson) · filed 1987-05-05

The judgment as trebled cannot be excepted from discharge in its entirety because N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-16 is an attempt by the North Carolina legislature to punish persons who engage in unfair and deceptive acts and practices affecting commerce.
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Section 75-16 requires treble damages for injuries resulting from violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Petersen v. State Employees Credit Union (In Re Kittrell) · filed 1990-05-31

Section 75-16 mandates treble damages for injuries resulting from violations of this section, and § 75-16.1 awards attorney’s fees to a party injured by the willful violation of this section.
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Section 75-16 requires treble damages for parties found liable under the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Peoples Security Life Insurance Company v. Monumental Life Insurance Company B. Larry Jenkins Ronald J. Brittingham Thomas R. Jenkins Willard E. Hines · filed 1993-04-20

N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-16 requires the imposition of treble damages against parties who are found liable under the NCUTA.
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Section 75-16 trebles an amount only when damages are assessed; restitution awarded after rescission is not subject to trebling.

Winant v. Bostic · filed 1993-09-27

By the terms of § 75-16, only “if damages are assessed” is the amount trebled. Because damages were not assessed, but rescission elected, we conclude the amount should not have been trebled.
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Section 75-16 permits trebling only of actual damages resulting from violations of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, not actual or statutory damages awarded for parallel federal copyright violations.

Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Aeropower Co. · filed 1994-09-06

Second, the state treble damages provision only authorizes the trebling of actual damages found to have resulted from violations of the state Act. It does not purport to authorize trebling of either actual or statutory damages found recoverable for parallel violations of federal copyright law. Copyright infringement is not itself a violation of the state Act. Indeed the Copyright Act preempts any legal or equitable right under state law which is “equivalent” to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright, so that state law could not in fact make copyright infringement a violation of the state Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages based on the damages actually suffered from a violation of Chapter 75, not three times the amount of a promotional prize.

In Re American Family Enterprises · filed 2000-09-11

Section 75.16 prescribes the remedy for violations of these other sections, but it is treble the damages suffered, not treble the prize.
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Section 75-16 requires damages for a Chapter 75 violation to be trebled and treats that trebling as punitive, so additional punitive damages are unavailable for the same unfair-trade-practices conduct.

X-It Products, LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc. · filed 2002-06-25

The North Carolina Consumer Protection Statute provides guidance as to the proper remedy for violations of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. This Act provides that: If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up or destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person or firm or corporation shall so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16. This statute does not have a punitive damages provision, and North Carolina courts have interpreted this to indicate that since the statute is punitive in nature, no additional punitive damages may be recovered for violations of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages for unfair and deceptive practices, serving both punitive and remedial purposes.

Morgan v. AT & T CORP. · filed 2005-02-15

As an award under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16 (2003) provides treble damages for unfair and deceptive practices, not purely compensatory damages, a monetary award under the statute would not provide a discounted rate to plaintiff, but rather would both punish defendant for unethical practices and provide remediation for plaintiff's harassment.
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Section 75-16 entitles a person injured by a Chapter 75 violation to recover treble damages.

Memo Money Order Co. v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 2007-05-23

The court trebles the $1598.08, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16, for a total of $4794.24.
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Section 75-16 permits trebling only of damages proximately caused by a violation of the UDTPA, not damages awarded on separate contract claims.

Colonial Trading, LLC v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 2013-06-21

In Gray v. North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676, 684-85 (2000), the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed a similar argument that, in a case involving successful recovery for breach of contract and UDTPA claims, the court should treble the entire award. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court concluded that only “damages proximately caused by a violation of [the UDTPA] shall be trebled, not [] damages on every claim that happens to arise in a case involving a violation of [the UDTPA].” Id. Because the damages for breach of contract did not “aris[e] from a violation of [ ] § 75-1.1,” they could not be trebled. ... The North Carolina Supreme Court allowed trebling of only the latter, UDTPA damages. Colonial’s similarly structured verdict form — which required the jury first to determine contract damages, then to assess practices that could constitute violations of the UDTPA and determine related damages — supports our decision to affirm the district court’s decision to treble only the UDTPA damages, rather than the entire jury award.
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Section 75-16 requires damages to be trebled automatically when a Chapter 75 violation is found.

Laschkewitsch v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Distributors, Inc. · filed 2014-09-15

Chapter 75 provides for an automatic trebling of damages upon the finding of a violation of the Chapter, i.e., the finding of an unfair or deceptive trade or practice. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 requires the court to award three times the damages assessed by the jury when the jury finds that the defendant’s conduct was unfair or deceptive.

Hardy v. Toler · filed 1975-02-19

Had the jury determined that the false representations of defendants constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce, then the court should have rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for treble the amount of damages assessed by the jury.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages for injury caused by unfair or deceptive acts or practices that violate Section 75-1.1.

Hardy v. Toler · filed 1975-10-07

Based on these stipulated facts, we hold as a matter of law that the false representations made by defendants to plaintiff constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce contrary to the provisions of G.S. 75-1.1, and treble damages should have been awarded as provided by G.S. 75-16 in the amount of $1,800.
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Section 75-16 does not permit trebling the sales price recovered by a buyer who rescinds the sale and returns the property.

Taylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi, Inc. · filed 1975-12-17

He was not damaged, nor injured within the meaning of G.S. 75-16 so as to warrant treble damages, in the sum of $4,600.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages when conduct in residential rental housing constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce.

Love v. Pressley · filed 1977-12-07

We hold that defendant’s conduct constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce contrary to the provisions of G.S. 75-1.1 and affirm the award of treble damages to plaintiffs pursuant to G.S. 75-16.
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Section 75-16 does not treble damages arising solely from breach of implied or express warranties.

Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc. · filed 1978-07-11

Breach of such warranties alone does not constitute a “violation of the provisions” of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes. Hence, we conclude that it is inappropriate to treble damages resulting solely from breach of warranties.
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Before § 75-16.2 took effect, claims under § 75-16 had a three-year limitations period because its treble damages provision was not a penalty.

Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc. · filed 1979-10-16

With respect to unfair trade practices, such a “penalty” is expressly provided in G.S. 75-15.2; no penalty, however, is provided in G.S. 75-16, the treble damages provision. ... We find that, in contrast to the one-year rule, a three-year statute of limitations for G.S. 75-1.1 and 75-16 provides a reasonable period of time in which to ferret out and investigate unfair trade practices, especially where, as in the instant case, elements of deceit or misrepresentations by silence may have been involved.
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Law changed since The North Carolina Supreme Court in Marshall v. Miller (Apr. 7, 1981) expressly overruled any suggestion that bad faith or willful deception is required for § 75-16 treble damages.

Section 75-16 does not authorize treble damages for defects or unperformed services without a violation of § 75-1.1.

Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith · filed 1980-02-05

Nevertheless, under the evidence presented in this case, absent evidence of willful deception or bad faith, we cannot conclude that the existence of defects in the mobile home or Tunstall’s failure to perform the above stated services constitutes a violaton of G.S. 75-1.1 to warrant the award of treble damages under G.S. 75-16.
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Law changed since The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed this good-faith rule in Marshall v. Miller (Apr. 7, 1981); bad faith is not required for a private § 75-16 treble-damages claim.

Section 75-16 makes a defendant’s good faith relevant when a private plaintiff seeks treble damages.

Marshall v. Miller · filed 1980-07-15

Thus, although good faith may be irrelevant where injunctive relief is sought by the Attorney General under G.S. 75-14, it should be relevant where a private party seeks treble damages under G.S. 75-16.
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Section 75-16 allows a claim for treble damages to proceed when the evidence supports an unfair trade practices claim.

Kent v. Humphries · filed 1981-02-17

Plaintiff’s claim for treble damages under G.S. 75-16 for unfair trade practices should have survived defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
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Section 75-16 requires the trial court to treble damages assessed once a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 is shown.

Marshall v. Miller · filed 1981-04-07

Absent statutory language making trebling discretionary with the trial judge, we must conclude that the Legislature intended trebling of any damages assessed to be automatic once a violation is shown.
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In federal court, a plaintiff cannot first seek § 75-16 treble damages after the verdict when the lack of earlier notice prejudices the defendant.

Atlantic Purchasers, Inc., Stella Maris Inn, Ltd. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., Donald J. Anklin · filed 1983-04-14

Fundamental fairness requires in such a case, where the statutory remedy may increase greatly the defendant’s liability, that the opposing party be notified of the possibility of the unusual relief prior to the plaintiff’s tender of a proposed judgment on the verdict.
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Section 75-16 ordinarily provides treble damages for fraud that violates Section 75-1.1, but a party seeking that relief must give the opposing party fair notice before a post-verdict motion.

North Carolina National Bank v. Carter · filed 1984-11-06

Unquestionably, proof of fraud necessarily constitutes a violation of G.S. 75-1.1, and under ordinary circumstances defendants would be entitled automatically to treble the damages fixed by the jury. ... However, fundamental fairness and due process required that NCNB be “illuminate[d] as to the substantive theory under which [defendants were] proceeding and to the possibility of the extraordinary relief sought prior to defendant’s post-verdict motion for treble damages.”
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Section 75-16 requires the court to treble damages awarded for unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.

Kim v. Professional Business Brokers Ltd. · filed 1985-04-02

Thus, if unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce under G.S. 75-1.1 are found, the court must treble the damages awarded.
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Section 75-16 allows a private plaintiff to recover treble damages upon proving injury from a violation of § 75-1.1.

Bunting v. Perdue, Inc. · filed 1985-06-14

Conversely, however, N.C.G.S. 75-16 confers upon the plaintiff in a private action the right to recover treble damages, on proof that he has been damaged by a violation of G.S. 75-1.1.
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Section 75-16 automatically trebles damages for a section 75-1.1 violation and does not allow an additional punitive damages award.

Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, Inc. · filed 1986-02-04

North Carolina General Statute Sec. 75-16 establishes a private cause of action for any person injured by another’s violation of G.S. Sec. 75-1.1. And damages assessed pursuant to G.S. Sec. 75-1.1 are trebled automatically. ... Because an award of treble damages under Chapter 75 is bottomed upon “private enforcement” and “punitive measure” considerations, we believe an additional award of punitive damages would necessarily be duplicative, to the extent that the treble damage award consists of a punitive element.
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Section 75-16 treble damages may be awarded alongside punitive damages when separate conduct supports independent claims.

Medina v. Town and Country Ford, Inc. · filed 1987-05-19

In the instant case, separate conduct giving rise to independent claims provides the underlying basis for each type of damages. ... Likewise, defendant’s liability for treble damages under G.S. § 75-1.1 and G.S. § 75-16 is based on conduct, viz., defendant’s misrepresentations in connection with the sale of the Lincoln to plaintiff, which is wholly separate from the conduct underlying defendant’s liability for malicious prosecution and the punitive damages awarded in connection with that claim.
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Section 75-16 does not permit a plaintiff to recover both punitive damages and treble damages; electing treble damages requires the punitive damages award to be removed.

Jennings Glass Co., Inc. v. Brummer · filed 1987-12-15

... a plaintiff in a case such as this is not entitled to recover both punitive damages and treble damages under G.S. § 75-16. We treat plaintiffs appeal as an election to recover treble damages under a Chapter 75 claim. On remand, the judgment shall be amended to correctly reflect plaintiffs actual damages of $50,448.75. The award of punitive damages shall be stricken, and plaintiffs actual damages shall be trebled.
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Section 75-16 requires settlement payments from codefendants to be deducted after the jury’s damages award is trebled.

Seafare Corp. v. Trenor Corp. · filed 1988-01-19

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court in the present case erred by deducting the $137,000 before rather than after trebling the jury’s award of damages.
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Section 75-16 requires trebling damages for an unfair or deceptive practice, including recoverable financing costs.

Quate v. Caudle · filed 1989-08-15

Therefore, we hold that the “financing costs” ($6,144.17) should be combined with the loan principal ($15,727.11), for total damages of $21,871.28. This amount should be trebled accordingly under G.S. 75-16.
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Section 75-16 does not limit treble damages to cases involving small monetary losses.

Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd. · filed 1990-03-20

Contrary to defendants’ contentions, by that language the Marshall court did not restrict G.S. 75-16 to apply only to situations where small monetary damages were involved.
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Section 75-16 requires the court to treble the damages fixed by the verdict when the plaintiff establishes an unfair or deceptive act.

Bhatti v. Buckland · filed 1991-02-07

The cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Alamance County, for entry of a judgment for treble the amount of damages fixed by the verdict. N.C.G.S. § 75-16 (1988).
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A plaintiff may elect treble damages under § 75-16 or punitive damages on a common law claim arising from the same conduct, but may not recover both.

Ellis v. Northern Star Co. · filed 1990-02-07

Plaintiffs may in proper cases elect to recover either punitive damages under a common law claim or treble damages under N.C.G.S. § 75-16, but they may not recover both.
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Section 75-16 trebling is punitive when no further actual damages are alleged, but it can compensate a consumer for additional losses incurred in obtaining relief.

Tomlinson v. Camel City Motors, Inc. · filed 1991-10-03

In situations where the injured consumer has lost a great deal more than the initial damages by spending extra money and time to gain a modicum of satisfaction, the trebled portion of the award is seen as compensating the consumer for those losses rather than as punitive in nature. In that instance, trebling against the surety may be appropriate because the consumer would have “suffered” more than just the initial damages. Such is not the case here. The plaintiff has not alleged further actual damages that would transform the trebled portion of the award from a punitive to a compensatory award.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages to the injured party; an insurer pursuing common law subrogation may recover only the amount it paid.

Investors Title Insurance v. Herzig · filed 1992-01-27

In this way, the injured party, not the insurer, will receive trebled damages as contemplated by the Act.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages for a successful Chapter 75 claim; those damages are unavailable when the claim is dismissed.

Taylor v. Taylor Products Inc. · filed 1992-03-17

If successful, such a claim would have entitled plaintiff to treble damages. N.C.G.S. § 75-16 (1988). With our affirming of Judge Herring’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Chapter 75 claim, plaintiff is not now entitled to recover treble damages.
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Section 75-16 requires treble damages when a plaintiff proves a violation of § 75-1.1 and damages are assessed.

Standing v. Midgett · filed 1993-03-04

Once a violation of Section 75-1.1 is shown the automatic assessment of treble damages is mandated by this statute.
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Section 75-16 gives a successful unfair practices plaintiff a right to treble damages, which the plaintiff may waive to recover untrebled compensatory damages.

United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall · filed 1993-12-03

N.C.G.S. § 75-16 provides that if the plaintiff shows a violation of Chapter 75 “judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.” ... We see no reason why a plaintiff in an unfair practices claim may not waive the right to recover treble damages and elect instead, for reasons satisfactory to the plaintiff, to recover untrebled compensatory damages.
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Section 75-16 provides a private cause of action for injury from a Chapter 75 violation; a claim for treble damages fails without evidence of such a violation.

Malone v. Topsail Area Jaycees, Inc. · filed 1994-02-01

Section 75-16 provides a private cause of action for any person injured as a result of any violation of Chapter 75. N.C.G.S. § 75-16 (1988). It is clear that plaintiffs claim for treble damages under section 75-16 must fail, because plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence that defendants’ actions violated any section of Chapter 75.
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Section 75-16 permits a plaintiff to seek treble damages alongside punitive damages, but requires an election between them for actual recovery.

Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., NA · filed 1994-12-30

A plaintiff is not precluded from seeking both punitive and treble damages; only for purposes of an actual recovery must an election between the two be made.
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Section 75-16 provides a cause of action to a person injured by conduct prohibited by section 75-1.1 and requires damages to be trebled when assessed.

Kewaunee Scientific Corporation v. Pegram · filed 1998-08-18

We also hold that damages should be trebled based on the unfair and deceptive commercial conduct. ... Under G.S. 75-16, a person, firm, or corporation injured by the acts prohibited by G.S. 75-1.1. is granted a cause of action against the offender. “[I]f damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.”
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Section 75-16 automatically trebles damages proved under § 75-1.1; treble damages are unavailable when no unfair or deceptive trade practices violation is established.

Durling v. King · filed 2001-10-16

If a plaintiff proves damages arising under this statute, he or she is automatically entitled to treble damages pursuant to G.S. § 75-16, which states: ... We affirm the trial court’s ruling and its denial of treble damages.
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Section 75-16’s treble damages do not apply to debt-collection violations governed by Article 2 of Chapter 75.

Friday v. United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc. · filed 2003-01-21

However, a debt collector who violates a provision of Article 2 and thereby violates G.S. § 75-1.1, is only subject to the damages and penalty provided for in Article 2, § 75-56 and is not subject to the damages provisions in Article 1.
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Section 75-16 requires the court to treble actual damages caused by a Chapter 75 violation.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C. · filed 2003-05-02

The plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of five million dollars by the unfair trade practices of defendants. This is the amount to be trebled in this case; it is the amount the Court concludes represents the actual damages in this case directly flowing from the Chapter 75 violations, including the use of confidential business information.
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Section 75-16 permits treble damages only when the defendant’s unfair or deceptive conduct was in or affecting commerce.

White v. Thompson · filed 2010-04-15

Thus, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that a defendant’s unfair or deceptive action was “in or affecting commerce” before the plaintiff may be awarded treble damages under N.C.G.S. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 requires the trial court to award treble damages when a plaintiff elects that remedy and a violation is established.

MRD Motorsports, Inc. v. Trail Motorsports, LLC · filed 2010-06-15

As it was entitled to do, plaintiff elected to recover treble damages against defendant Trail and defendant Shelton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-16. Thus, the trial court was required to award treble damages as against those defendants.
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Section 75-16 makes trebling damages for unfair or deceptive trade practices automatic, without trial court discretion.

Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. C-S Aviation Services · filed 2012-09-18

The trebling of damages is automatic and is not in the discretion of the trial court.
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Section 75-16 requires courts to treble actual damages awarded for violations of the North Carolina Debt Collection Act; civil penalties are excepted from that requirement.

Creech v. Ormond Oil & Gas Co. (In re Creech) · filed 2014-06-20

Thus, under N.C.G.S. § 75-16, a court is required to treble damages when awarded upon violation of Chapter 75. ... Reading the current “notwithstanding” provision together with subparagraph (b), which separately delineates actual damages and civil penalties, the court concludes that only civil penalties are excepted from the trebling mandate.
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Section 75-16 trebles damages awarded for conduct found unfair or deceptive under section 75-1.1.

Denver Prop. Partners, LLC v. Sisson · filed 2020-04-23

In answer to Issue No. 36, the jury found that the amount of damages Plaintiff was entitled to recover from Sisson was one dollar ($1.00). Accordingly, the damages Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Sisson pursuant to section 75-16 is three dollars ($3.00).
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Section 75-16 trebles compensatory damages for conduct proscribed by Chapter 75.

Kbt Realty Servs., Inc. v. Appycity, LLC · filed 2021-08-09

The Court determines that KBT, MyRealty, and Headley are entitled to have their compensatory damages awards trebled, since the Court has determined that Defendants engaged in conduct proscribed by Chapter 75. See N.C.G.S. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 provides a treble-damages remedy only when the plaintiff proves unfair or deceptive conduct.

Perkins v. The New York Times Company · filed 2023-05-23

On its face, the text of section 75-16 would appear to broadly allow for an award of treble damages based on any violation of Chapter 75, but the courts of North Carolina award treble damages only where the plaintiff has proved unfair or deceptive conduct.
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Section 75-16 allows treble damages for a wrongful eviction when the landlord’s conduct also violates the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act.

Stanley v. Moore · filed 1995-03-03

We are convinced that the language of subsection (c) expressly preserves the rights of a tenant who is wrongfully evicted to pursue alternative common law and statutory claims for relief, including claims for treble damages and attorney’s fees under the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act, an Act which predated the enactment of the Ejectment of Residential Tenants Act.
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Who may sue

Section 75-16 gives a business injured by a violation of Chapter 75 a cause of action for treble damages; its protection and remedy are not limited to individual consumers.

Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc. · filed 1986-06-03

It is also clear that individual consumers are not the only ones protected and provided a remedy under G.S. §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16. ... We conclude that G.S. § 75-1.1 is applicable in the present case and that Ames has standing under G.S. § 75-16 to bring this action.
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Section 75-16 allows any person injured by a Chapter 75 violation to recover, including a person who did not purchase directly from the wrongdoer.

Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 2006-03-21

The statute covers “any person who suffers an injury under Chapter 75, regardless of whether that person purchased directly from the wrongdoer.” ... Thus, we conclude that the court did not err in ruling that plaintiff Staten may maintain a claim for recovery against defendants pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17-16.
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Section 75-16 lets the State bring a claim when it is a consumer victim of an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

F. Ray Moore Oil Co., Inc. v. State · filed 1986-04-01

There is no reason why the State as a con *143 sumer cannot take advantage of G.S. 75-16 if it is the victim of an unfair or deceptive trade practice.
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Section 75-16 allows an injured consumer to sue even when another person purchased the product for that consumer.

Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 2007-12-07

Therefore, as the person who selected the interior details for the home, who planned to live in the home, and who was going to make the monthly installment payments, Staten was a consumer of the mobile home supplied by defendant. When defendant supplied a defective home, Staten suffered a resulting injury. Accordingly, she has standing as a “person . . . injured” under N.C.G.S. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 gives anyone whose injury is proximately caused by an unfair or deceptive act standing to sue.

Aldridge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. · filed 2019-12-31

Thus, standing for a UDTP claim is broad and gives anyone whose injury is proximately caused by an unfair or deceptive act standing to sue.
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Accrual of cause of action

A cause of action under § 75-16 accrues when the unfair or deceptive trade-practice violation occurs.

Hinson v. United Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1996-08-06

Otherwise put, a cause of action pursuant to § 75-16 accrues when the violation occurs.
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Section 75-16 provides a private civil action for a person injured by a Chapter 75 violation, and a UDPA claim requires proximate causation of the injury.

Sparks v. Oxy-Health, LLC · filed 2015-09-15

Section 75-16 allows any individual “injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation” in violation of the UDPA to bring a civil action. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16.
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Mandatory trebling of damages

Section 75-16 limits trebling to the damages fixed by the verdict, so prejudgment interest is not included in the trebled award.

Johnson v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance · filed 2005-09-20

The amount to be trebled is “the amount fixed by the verdict.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2003).
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Section 75-16 requires treble damages once a plaintiff establishes a violation of § 75-1.1, and the actual damages must be trebled before any credit or offset is applied.

Peterson v. Bozzano (In Re Bozzano) · filed 1995-06-15

Once a Plaintiff has established the right to recover under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, the award of treble damages pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-16 is automatic and not discretionary. ... Under North Carolina law, the actual damages should be trebled before any credit or offset is applied.
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Section 75-16 trebles only the amount fixed by the jury’s verdict, not prejudgment interest.

MARKET AMERICA, INC. v. Rossi · filed 2000-05-12

Notwithstanding Defendants’ arguments, the Court finds that it is appropriate in consideration of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-16 to treble only the verdict awarded by the jury and not the prejudgment interest which is assessable pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 24-5(b).
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Section 75-16 permits damages measured by the injury caused by an unfair or deceptive practice, rather than limiting recovery to the fraudulent-inducement measure, and requires those damages to be trebled.

Bernard v. Central Carolina Truck Sales, Inc. · filed 1984-05-01

We do not believe, however, that the only available measure of damages is that for fraudulent inducement. ... Having properly concluded that defendant’s acts were unfair or deceptive, the court properly trebled the damages pursuant to G.S. 75-16.
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Section 75-16 trebles only damages proximately caused by a Chapter 75 violation, not separate breach-of-contract damages.

Gray v. North Carolina Insurance Underwriting · filed 2000-06-16

The trial court then trebled the jury award of $117,000 to $351,000 pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-16. Accordingly, the trial court correctly trebled only the damages found by the jury in Issue Six — those proximately caused by the violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.
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Section 75-16 potentially trebles damages for a deceptive practice involving fraudulent inducement; those damages are measured by the difference between the value received and the value promised.

Media Network, Inc. v. Mullen Adver., Inc. · filed 2007-01-19

According to our Supreme Court, “[t]he measure of damages for fraud in the inducement of a contract is the difference between the value of what was received and the value of what was promised, and is potentially trebled by N.C.G.S. § 75-16.” ... In this case, that measure of damages is the difference between Gateway’s expected profit had it been allowed to perform for the full year and the amount Gateway was actually paid before being terminated in February 2005, with any such award potentially trebled.
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Private right of action

Section 75-16 provides an injured person a private cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice, requiring an unfair or deceptive act affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, but it cannot create a private remedy for a separate statute that provides none.

Brinkman v. Barrett Kays & Associates, P.A. · filed 2003-01-21

North Carolina provides a private cause of action for persons injured by a violation of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2001). ... The elements of an Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim are: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.” ... We conclude that plaintiffs may not utilize Chapter 75 to create a private right of action where none existed and thereby circumvent the intent of the legislature to have the honesty requirement in the enforcement section of the Clean Water Act enforced as provided for in that section. We hold, with reference to this provision of the statute, that it was created to regulate, among other things, deceptive behavior in the permitting process, and provides the exclusive statutory remedy for violation thereof. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
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Section 75-16 creates a private cause of action for Chapter 75 injuries and provides that recovered damages are trebled.

Richardson v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2007-04-17

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2005) creates a cause of action to redress injuries resulting from violations of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes and provides that any damages recovered shall be trebled.
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Section 75-16 applies to an unfair-trade-practices claim when North Carolina has the most significant relationship to the dispute, including conduct occurring outside and after termination of a contract.

Edmondson v. American Motorcycle Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1999-02-10

The Court finds the North Carolina unfair trade practices statute should apply. ... Such is not the case at hand; the dispute is not centered in an interpretation of the joint venture agreement or the parties’ performance thereunder. ... These acts do not derive from and are not centered in the parties’ defunct contractual relationship. Moreover, the dispute between the parties is not simply one of contractual interpretation but involves conduct by AMA outside of and after the termination of the contract. Nor is it merely a dispute concerning the performance of the contract.
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Section 75-16 gives a person or business injured by another's Chapter 75 violation a private right of action for that injury.

Hedgepeth v. Lexington State Bank · filed 2013-06-18

The Hedgepeths fall within the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 and, therefore, we hold the trial court erred in concluding that the Hedgepeths lacked standing.
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Section 75-16 gives standing to any person injured by a Chapter 75 violation, requiring the alleged injury to result from conduct that constitutes such a violation.

Noble v. HOOTERS OF GREENVILLE (NC), LLC · filed 2009-08-18

Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 confers standing to bring a UDTPA claim on any person who is injured as a result of a violation of the provisions of Chapter 75.
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Section 75-16 gives an injured person or business a private right of action for a Chapter 75 violation, and UDTPA standing does not require an antitrust injury.

Mountaineer Motors of Lenoir, LLC v. Carvana, LLC · filed 2023-10-19

Although the statute may be modeled on the Sherman Act, there is no statutory requirement that a plaintiff allege an antitrust injury. Id. ... Thus, no allegation of antitrust injury is required to have standing under the UDTPA.
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Section 75-16 authorizes a private UDTPA action only for a party injured by reason of an act violating the statute.

Westchester Fire Insurance v. Johnson · filed 2002-06-27

Under the provision of UDT-PA that authorizes a private right to sue, the party bringing suit must “be injured ... by reason of any act or thing done” in violation of UDTPA. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-16. When a § 75-1.1 claim is based on a violation of § 58-63-15, the North Carolina courts have required that the plaintiff “suffer[ ] actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s deceptive statement or misrepresentation.”
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Section 75-16 gives any person injured by a violation of Chapter 75 a private right of action.

Walter v. Freeway Foods, Inc. (In Re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc.) · filed 2011-05-24

Section 75-16 provides a private right of action for “any person” injured “by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter.... ” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16; Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981).
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Treble damages for unfair and deceptive trade practices

Section 75-16 allows an award of treble damages for unfair and deceptive trade practices.

WMC, INC. v. Weaver · filed 2004-10-05

There is no dispute in this case that North Carolina law allows an award of treble damages in an unfair and deceptive trade practices case. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2003).
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Section 75-16 provides for trebling damages after the judge determines that the jury’s factual findings establish an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Ausley v. Bishop · filed 1999-05-18

If the judge determines that the facts found by the jury establish unfair and deceptive business practices, the damages are trebled.
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Section 75-16 requires damages assessed for an unfair and deceptive trade-practice violation to be trebled automatically.

Compton v. Kirby · filed 2003-04-01

Damages assessed for UDTP violations pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 are trebled automatically.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages as the remedy for a substantive unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Jones v. Harrelson and Smith Contractors, LLC · filed 2008-12-16

The court’s ruling appears to reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of a claim brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2007). A UDTP claim is a substantive claim, the remedy for which is treble damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2007). Chapter 75 is not a remedial scheme for other substantive claims.
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Section 75-16 gives a person standing to sue for a UDTP violation when an unfair or deceptive act proximately causes the person's injury, but the plaintiff must still show injury in fact.

Gateway Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Carrbridge Berkshire Grp., Inc. · filed 2018-05-09

Standing for redress of UDTP is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16, which provides: ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (emphasis added). Thus, standing for a UDTP claim is broad and gives anyone whose injury is proximately caused by an unfair or deceptive act standing to sue.
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A claim under § 75-16 accrues no later than the date an interim injunction effectively interrupts the defendant's performance and establishes at least a colorable superior right.

Rothmans Tobacco Company, Ltd. And Rothmans (New Zealand) Ltd. v. Liggett Group, Inc. · filed 1985-08-22

On comparable reasoning, we hold that any claim for fraud or unfair trade practices also accrued no later than the date of the interim injunction.
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Section 75-16 permits recovery under North Carolina's unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices law only when an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce proximately causes injury, with detrimental reliance and actual injury required for deception based on a statement or misrepresentation.

Burns v. First Bank (In Re Southeastern Materials, Inc.) · filed 2011-07-02

The Sixth Claim seeks recovery for unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16. A prima facie claim under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the “UDT-PA”) consists of three elements. First, the defendant must have committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Second, the action must have been in or affecting commerce. Third, the act must have proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. ... These allegations, even if true, do not establish any deceptive act or practice, nor do they establish any statement or misrepresentation on the part of First Bank upon which any party detrimentally relied. This claim is also not plausible. Therefore, the Motion is granted as to the Sixth Claim.
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Section 75-16 provides treble damages for an unfair trade practice, including a bad faith denial of a flood insurance claim.

Woodson v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 2016-05-03

The penalty for such a violation is treble damages. N.C.G.S. § 75-16. ... As held from the bench at the end of trial and reiterated herein, the Court is compelled to find that the denial of the Woodsons’ claim was, in fact, an act of bad faith and an unfair trade practice. As such, plaintiffs deserve treble damages.
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Indirect purchaser standing

Section 75-16 gives injured persons a treble-damages action for violations of North Carolina's antitrust chapter, including indirect-purchaser claims, but the claim must satisfy limits on remoteness, speculation, and duplicative recovery.

Teague v. Ag · filed 2007-05-07

The section of North Carolina’s General Statutes that gives rise to a number of indirect purchaser cases is 75-16, which states as follows: ... If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm, or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed, or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm, or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict. ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2005). In Hyde v. Abbot Laboratories, Inc., 123 N.C. App. 572, 473 S.E.2d 680 (1996), the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted section 75-16 to allow indirect purchasers to sue manufacturers for antitrust violations. ... Although Hyde established indirect purchaser standing in North Carolina, it did not delineate the scope and breadth of standing under the statute. ... Considering all factors, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue indirect purchaser claims. Due to this lack of standing, the law will not grant him relief.
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Section 75-16 gives indirect purchasers standing to sue for Chapter 75 antitrust violations, and the Crouch/AGC factors do not determine that standing.

Dicesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. · filed 2017-04-11

Standing for redress of Chapter 75 violations is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. ... In North Carolina, indirect purchasers have standing under section 75-16 to bring an action for violations of Chapter 75. ... The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and reads Teague as unequivocally stating that the factors articulated and applied by Judge Tennille in Crouch do not apply in determining indirect purchaser standing under North Carolina’s antitrust laws, and the Court is bound by, and adheres to, Hyde and Teague as applied and discussed above.
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Section 75-16 permits persons injured by antitrust violations to sue for damages, including suppliers such as Static Control under the standing analysis adopted here.

Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. · filed 2012-08-29

In deciding to reject the federal test for standing for indirect purchasers, the North Carolina Court of Appeals examined the standing landscape when the North Carolina statute governing standing, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-16, was most recently substantively amended in 1969. ... Because the amendments expanded the class of persons who could recover under the Act to all consumers, and indirect purchasers were frequently consumers, the court found it “unlikely” that the legislature intended to exclude indirect purchasers as a class. ... Applying the same considerations to the circumstances at hand, we believe North Carolina would grant standing to suppliers such as Static Control.
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Section 75-16 gives indirect purchasers standing to sue for Chapter 75 violations.

Hyde v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1996-08-20

Accordingly, we hold that indirect purchasers have standing under N.C.G.S. § 75-16 to sue for Chapter 75 violations.
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Section 75-16 gives indirect purchasers standing to sue for antitrust violations.

BRUGGERS v. EASTMAN KODAK CO. · filed 2000-03-17

In so holding, the Court determines as a matter of law that indirect purchasers have standing to sue under N.C.G.S. § 75-16.
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Section 75-16 permits indirect purchasers to sue for antitrust violations.

Adams v. Aventis, S.A. · filed 2003-08-26

The decision of the Court of Appeals in the Hyde case is controlling authority in this state on the question of indirect purchaser standing under N.C.G.S. § 75-16. This court is bound by that decision.
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Section 75-16 allows indirect purchasers to sue under North Carolina antitrust law, and the federal AGC factors do not determine which indirect purchasers have standing.

Teague v. Bayer AG Bayer Polymers, LLC · filed 2009-01-20

The issue of whether suit by an indirect purchaser is allowed in North Carolina was decided by our Court in Hyde v. Abbott Laboratories when we held that indirect purchasers have standing under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 to sue under the antitrust laws of North Carolina. ... As stated above, AGC is distinguishable from the present case and we hold the AGC factors do not apply in determining which indirect purchasers have standing to sue under the North Carolina antitrust statutes.
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Actual injury and proximate cause

Section 75-16 requires a plaintiff seeking damages for an unfair trade practice to prove actual injury proximately caused by the violation.

Walker v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. · filed 1999-06-15

As part of an unfair trade practice claim, a plaintiff must prove not only that defendants have violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 in some respect, but that plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants’ conduct.
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Section 75-16 creates private causes of action with treble damages, and North Carolina courts apply the proximate-cause standard used in federal antitrust cases.

Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 1989-08-25

Under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-16, which establishes private causes of action and provides for treble damages, the North Carolina courts apply the standard of proximate cause articulated in federal antitrust cases. ... Thus, plaintiff’s state law claims also should be dismissed for failure to prove antitrust injury.
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Section 75-16 recovery requires an unfair or deceptive act in commerce that proximately causes actual injury.

McLamb v. T.P., Inc. · filed 2005-10-04

Thus, “[Recovery according to [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 and 75-16] is limited to those situations when a plaintiff can show that plaintiff detrimentally relied upon a statement or misrepresentation and he or she ‘suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s deceptive statement or misrepresentation.’ ”
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Section 75-16 distinguishes statutory injury from damages, so actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss.

Williams v. HomEq Servicing Corp. · filed 2007-07-03

The statute thus distinguishes between “injury” and “damages.”
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Section 75-16 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's misconduct caused the claimed injury, specifically as the proximate cause of damages.

Clay v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1999-07-09

Bach of the six state statutes requires the plaintiff to show that the defendants’ misconduct caused the alleged harm.
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Section 75-16 creates a private cause of action for injury caused by conduct violating Chapter 75 and requires treble damages, but recovery requires proof of actual injury.

Grantham and Mann, Inc., D/B/A Grantham Safety Industries, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., Sam Evans, Richard J. Althoff and James Hunneke · filed 1987-09-30

Section 75-16 provides for a private cause of action if “the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm, or corporation in violation of the provision of this Chapter,” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-16 (1985), and mandates that the judgment treble the amount of damages assessed and fixed by the verdict finding a violation of the statute. ... An essential element of a plaintiffs cause of action under this statute, however, is proof that the plaintiff suffered actual injury as a result of the defendant’s unfair or deceptive conduct. ... Grantham’s failure to establish the existence of any damage in connection with its breach of contract claim, however, leads inexorably to the conclusion that Grantham would have failed in its proof of actual injury requisite for recovery under the N.C. Act, even if this latter claim had not been dismissed by the trial court.
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Section 75-16 requires a UDTPA claimant to show actual injury proximately caused by the unfair or deceptive act.

DirecTV, Inc. v. Cephas · filed 2003-12-02

Cephas must also establish that he “ ‘suffered actual injury as a proximate result of [DIRECTV’s] misrepresentations’ or unfair conduct.”
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Section 75-16 requires a private plaintiff seeking damages to prove actual injury caused by a Chapter 75 violation.

Mayton v. Hiatt's Used Cars, Inc. · filed 1980-02-19

Although the statute now provides a right of action for violations of individual consumer rights which were not contemplated at the time its predecessor was adopted in 1913, it is clear that the essential cause of action has remained unchanged. In the absence of any legislative indication that G.S. 75-16 is now intended to permit an individual to act in the role of a private attorney general rather than in that of an aggrieved party, we hold that in a private action to recover damages for a violation of G.S. 75-1.1, the plaintiff, in order to be the “prevailing party” within the meaning of G.S. 75-16.1, must prove not only a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 by the defendant, but also that plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a result of that violation.
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Section 75-16 requires a plaintiff to prove actual injury proximately caused by a Chapter 75 violation.

Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc. · filed 1980-08-05

As an essential element of plaintiffs cause of action, plaintiff must prove not only a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 by the defendants, but also that plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants’ misrepresentations.
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Section 75-16 requires proof of actual injury proximately caused by a violation of Section 75-1.1.

Bailey v. LeBeau · filed 1986-02-18

As an essential element of a cause of action under G.S. 75-16, plaintiff must prove not only that defendants violated G.S. 75-1.1, but also that plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants’ misrepresentations.
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Section 75-16 requires proof of a § 75-1.1 violation and actual injury proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct; evidence of additional housing expenses can support submission of the claim to a jury.

Allen v. Simmons · filed 1990-08-07

“As an essential element of a cause of action under G.S. 75-16, plaintiff must prove not only that defendants violated G.S. 75-1.1, but also that plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants’ misrepresentation.” ... As a result of the unfit conditions defendant suffered additional expenses associated with the house. We hold on this record that a jury could find that plaintiff committed an unfair trade practice and the trial court erred in not submitting the factual issues to the jury.
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Section 75-16 requires a private plaintiff to prove actual injury proximately caused by the deceptive act; actual causation requires detrimental reliance.

Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. · filed 1988-03-15

To prove actual causation, a plaintiff must prove that he or she detrimentally relied on the defendant’s deceptive statement or misrepresentation.
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Section 75-16 requires a plaintiff seeking recovery for a deceptive misrepresentation to show detrimental reliance and actual injury proximately caused by it.

Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc. · filed 1990-08-07

Recovery according to Chapter 75 is limited to those situations when a plaintiff can show that plaintiff detrimentally relied upon a statement or misrepresentation and he or she “suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s deceptive statement or misrepresentation.”
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Section 75-16 permits damages for an unfair or deceptive act when the plaintiff suffers actual injury proximately caused by that act.

Murray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-07-02

To recover, however, a plaintiff must have “suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s [unfair or deceptive act].” ... Thus, from the record before us, it is apparent plaintiff has forecast actual and proximate injury in his presentation of evidence.
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Section 75-16 treats lost sales, if proven, as a compensable injury.

Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. · filed 1992-01-27

Defendant’s final argument is that plaintiff has not shown a compensable injury and is therefore barred from recovery by N.C.G.S. § 75-16. According to defendant, plaintiff has not produced any evidence that he actually raised his prices for two-liters as a result of the alleged threats and supply restrictions. Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence is that, as a result of the supply restrictions, he did not have enough two-liters to satisfy walk-in customer demand. Lost sales, if proven at trial, would constitute a compensable injury.
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Section 75-16 requires a plaintiff claiming injury from a deceptive misrepresentation to show reliance on the misrepresentation to establish proximate cause.

Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va. · filed 2013-08-28

Section 75-16 allows any individual who has been “injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter” to bring a civil action. ... We agree with Community Bank that a claim under section 75-1.1 stemming from an alleged misrepresentation does indeed require a plaintiff to demonstrate reliance on the misrepresentation in order to show the necessary proximate cause.
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Section 75-16 requires a plaintiff whose claim rests solely on misrepresentations to show its own reliance to establish proximate cause; an independent unfair competition claim may proceed without that showing.

CPI Security Systems, Inc. v. Vivint Smart Home, Inc. · filed 2021-11-09

Instead, Plaintiff merely argues, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s claim for unfair competition under the Lanham Act may satisfy the first element of its UDTPA claim, “the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice”, such that it is not required to show Plaintiff’s reliance on Defendants’ misrepresentations to establish proximate cause.
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Section 75-16 requires actual injury proximately caused by an unfair or deceptive practice; presumed damages for libel per se do not suffice.

Software Automation Holdings, LLC v. Insurance Toolkits, LLC · filed 2024-07-03

In other words, libel per se fulfills just the first two elements of a plaintiff’s prima facie UDTPA claim. A plaintiff still must allege damages, and presumed damages do not suffice.
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Right of action and treble damages for Chapter 75 violations

Section 75-16 authorizes recovery of treble damages for injury caused by a violation of Chapter 75.

Cascade Capital, LLC v. DRS Processing LLC · filed 2019-10-24

Plaintiffs Cascade Capital, LLC and Cascade Capital, LLC-Series A have and recover Judgment against Defendant DRS Processing LLC d/b/a Miller Stark Klein & Associates in the amount of $2,500,000.00, that the damages be trebled pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-16, and that Plaintiffs be awarded their attorneys’ fees in the amount of $189,466.42 (“Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees”), and interest at the legal rate from the date of this judgment; ... 5. The Court maintains jurisdiction to consider the award of additional attorneys’ fees incurred by Plaintiffs since the filing of their Affidavit of Attorneys’ Fees on October 7, 2019.
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Knowledge of the unfair or deceptive act

In a housing-related Chapter 75 claim, liability under § 75-16 requires proof that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the alleged unfair or deceptive act.

Taylor v. Batts · filed 2010-01-05

It appears that in the context of housing, our courts have concluded that just as for a negligence claim, in order to be liable under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 of the North Carolina General Statutes, defendant must have known or at least have a reason to know of the alleged unfair and deceptive act.
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Who may be sued under the Act

Section 75-16 authorizes claims only against a person, firm, or corporation, so a government entity such as Canada is not subject to suit under the Act.

Cruise Connections Charter Management 1, Lp v. Attorney General of Canada · filed 2011-02-15

Moreover, Canada is not subject to suit under the N.C. Trade Practices Act because it is not a “person, firm or corporation” within the meaning of the Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (authorizing a civil action by a person or business “injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of” the Act).
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Section 75-16 authorizes Chapter 75 claims only against covered persons, firms, or corporations and does not permit such claims against quasi-municipal corporations.

Dicesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. · filed 2019-02-27

As such, the Court concludes that if Defendant is a quasi-municipal corporation, it is not subject to Chapter 75. ... Rea and Sperry, which the Badin Shores’ court cites to, were based on Section 75-16, the remedial section of Chapter 75 that equally applies to all provisions of Chapter 75.
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Notes 1–150 of 159, oldest cases first.

190 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

International Fidelity Insurance v. Wilson, the court mentions § 75-16 only in a footnote as an example of a state statute modeled on the Clayton Act; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Canady v. Mann, the court cited § 75-16 only in quoting Bernard to identify the treble-damages remedy while deciding what constitutes actual injury under § 75-1.1; it did not construe or decide anything about § 75-16. opinion →
Perry-Griffin Foundation v. Proctor, the court cited § 75-16 only by analogy to support its interpretation of the separate timber-damages statute, § 1-539.1; it did not decide an issue under § 75-16. opinion →
Tools USA and Equip v. Champ Frame Straight, the court mentions § 75-16 only in describing the parties' stipulation and the district court's calculation of the judgment; it does not interpret or decide what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Occiden v. Sanders, the opinion merely reports that the district court awarded treble damages under § 75-16. The appellate court addressed duplicative recovery and required an election between fraud damages and unfair-trade-practices damages; it did not construe or decide what § 75-16 means or requires. opinion →
High Country Arts v. Hartford Fire Insur, section 75-16 appears only in the citation identifying the Act and the treble-damages award. The court addressed whether an earlier interlocutory summary-judgment ruling barred the unfair-trade-practices claims, without construing or deciding what § 75-16 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., the court reports the district court's trebling of damages and cites § 75-16, but does not interpret the statute or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Philson v. Goldsboro Milling Co, the court merely reported the trial court's trebling of damages under § 75-16 while deciding the separate issue of Rule 68 costs; it did not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Von Pettis Realty, Inc. v. McKoy, the court merely reported the trial court’s award of treble damages under § 75-16. The appellate court did not construe or apply § 75-16; its holding addressed the proper measure of rent-abatement damages under the Residential Rental Agreements Act. opinion →
Stephenson v. Warren, the court cited § 75-16 only to identify the treble-damages remedy while deciding that plaintiff had no viable unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claim under § 75-1.1; it did not construe or independently apply § 75-16. opinion →
Lake Mary Ltd. Partnership v. Johnston, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the trial court’s calculation of trebled damages. The appellate court does not analyze, construe, or decide anything about § 75-16. opinion →
Keener Lumber Co., Inc. v. Perry, the statute appears only in the procedural history to report that the trial court trebled damages; the appellate court did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. opinion →
Aubin v. Susi, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for relief requested in the amended complaint; the court did not interpret or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Ausley v. Bishop, the statute is cited only in connection with reporting the defendant's election between punitive damages and treble damages, with a parenthetical description of its effect. The court does not interpret the statute, decide its requirements, or resolve a claim under it. opinion →
Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the opinion reports the trial court’s trebling of damages under § 75-16 as procedural history but does not construe or analyze that statute. Its substantive discussion of attorney’s fees concerns § 75-16.1 instead. opinion →
Anderson v. Lancaster Aviation, Inc., the court cited § 75-16 only while discussing the lack of a definition of injury under the UDTPA; its ruling addressed whether the plaintiff could assert a § 75-1.1 claim based on privity with the insurer, not the meaning or application of § 75-16. opinion →
Blankenship v. Town and Country Ford, Inc., the statute appears in the trial court’s damages award and in the plaintiff’s supporting argument. The appellate court did not decide whether § 75-16 authorized treble damages here; it remanded for findings on the underlying statutory violations and intent to defraud. opinion →
State Properties, LLC v. Ray, the opinion merely reports that the trial court trebled the fraud damages award under § 75-16 in the procedural history. The appellate court did not interpret or decide what § 75-16 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Plath v. Schonrock, the court cites § 75-16 only parenthetically to Pinehurst as an example of another state's mandatory treble-damages rule while construing Montana law; it does not interpret or apply the North Carolina statute. opinion →
Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, Ken and Baccus, Randy as Class Representatives, the statute appears only in a footnote string cite listing statutes that allow exemplary damages through multipliers; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. opinion →
Wilson v. Blue Ridge Electric Membership Corp., the statute is mentioned only as the basis for the plaintiff's requested treble damages. The court decided whether the allegations stated a claim under § 75-1.1 and did not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Insurance, the opinion reports that the trial court awarded treble damages under § 75-16, but the appellate court does not interpret or apply that statute. Its analysis concerns the elements of an unfair or deceptive practice under §§ 75-1.1 and 58-63-15(1), so the § 75-16 reference is incidental procedural context. opinion →
South Atlantic Ltd. Partnership of Tennessee v. Riese, the court cited § 75-16 in a footnote only to explain the trebling calculation relevant to allocating the UTPA award; it did not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Stetser v. Tap Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., the court merely recited the treble-damages consequence of § 75-16 while describing the consumer-protection claims in a class-certification appeal. It did not construe, apply, or decide any issue about § 75-16. opinion →
Eley v. Mid/East Acceptance Corp. of N.C., Inc., the court merely affirmed the arithmetic trebling of damages after upholding liability under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it did not interpret or otherwise decide what § 75-16 means or requires. opinion →
ABT Building Products Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance, the citation appears only in the dissent’s procedural account of the district court’s trebling of damages; the appellate court did not decide what § 75-16 means or how it applies. opinion →
Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc., the court recited § 75-16’s general function while describing the UDP claim, but did not construe or independently apply that statute; its ruling rested on collateral estoppel and the previously decided causation issue. opinion →
Medical Staffing Network, Inc. v. Ridgway, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting that the trial court trebled damages; the appellate court did not interpret or decide what § 75-16 requires, and its damages ruling concerned the measure of trade-secret damages. opinion →
Hendrix v. ADVANCED METAL CORP., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for plaintiffs’ requested treble damages; the court decided the compulsory-counterclaim issue under Rule 13(a) and did not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
White v. Thompson, the statute is cited only in the statement of the appellate issue concerning the trial court’s trebling of damages. The court’s actual analysis and holding concern whether the alleged conduct was “in or affecting commerce” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, without construing or independently applying § 75-16. opinion →
Bumpers v. COMMUNITY BANK OF N. VIRGINIA, the opinion only reports the trial court’s award of treble damages under § 75-16 as procedural history. The appellate court decided whether the order was immediately appealable under Rule 54(b), and did not construe or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-16. opinion →
Media Network, Inc. v. Long Haymes Carr, Inc., the statute appears in a quotation from Winston Realty used to explain why contributory negligence and commercial bribery are not defenses to a UDTP claim. The appellate court did not independently construe or apply § 75-16; the treble-damages award is only reported as part of the procedural history. opinion →
MANITIUS v. Guthrie, the statute is mentioned only in describing damages requested in the pleadings. The court decided the appeal on Rule 12(b)(6), conversion to summary judgment, and appellate-review grounds, without interpreting or applying § 75-16. opinion →
Decker v. Homes, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report that plaintiffs elected treble damages; the court does not interpret or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Maple v. Colonial Orthopaedics, Inc. (In Re Maple), section 75-16 appears only in a footnote as a citation supporting background about the North Carolina UDTPA while the court analyzed Virginia law; the court did not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Stunzi v. Medlin Motors, Inc., the opinion discusses the four-year limitations period in § 75-16.2, not § 75-16. Section 75-16 is not construed or applied. opinion →
Bumpers v. Community Bank, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report the trial court's damages award; the appellate court does not construe or otherwise decide what N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 means or requires. opinion →
In Re Fifth Third Bank, Nat. Ass'n, the statute is mentioned only in Plaintiffs’ argument describing the arbitrator’s damage calculation. The court did not interpret § 75-16, decide what it requires, or resolve any issue about its application. opinion →
In re Fifth Third Bank, the court cited § 75-16 only as authority for the general statement that treble damages are available under the UDTPA. It did not construe, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 75-16, and treble damages were not at issue in the appeal. opinion →
Carotek, Inc. v. Kobayashi Ventures, LLC, the opinion mentions § 75-16 only in a footnote to describe the statutory basis of the plaintiffs’ state claims and explain that the court will address related tort theories. It does not construe or apply § 75-16, and the parenthetical is incidental to the court’s analysis of other claims. opinion →
Suntrust Bank v. Bryant/Sutphin Properties, LLC, the appellate court only reports that the trial court trebled damages under § 75-16; it does not interpret or decide what § 75-16 means or requires. opinion →
Friends of Queen v. Hise, the court mentions § 75-16 only in a footnote as one of several statutes it considers analogous to the election-disclosure enforcement mechanism. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-16. opinion →
Brown v. Cavit Sciences, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to report the basis of the trial court’s default judgment. The appellate court expressly declined to review the underlying legal questions concerning treble damages, so it did not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Bruns v. N.C. Farm Brueau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., the opinion only reports that the trial court trebled damages under § 75-16 in the prior litigation. The Court of Appeals did not construe or apply § 75-16; it decided the appeal on res judicata and interlocutory-appeal grounds. opinion →
La Familia Cosmovision, Inc. v. the Inspiration Networks, the opinion identifies § 75-16 only in the procedural history as the statute cited for Plaintiff's Third Claim. In the court's analysis, it addresses the UDTPA under G.S. § 75-1.1 and dismisses the claim for failure to allege an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce; it does not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
USA Trouser, S.A. De C v. v. Williams, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report that a federal district court trebled damages under it; this court did not construe or independently apply § 75-16. opinion →
Alexander v. Alexander, the court did not construe or apply § 75-16; it cited the statute only for the general remedial consequence of a UDTPA violation. The decision instead turned on whether the conduct was “in or affecting commerce” under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Nash Hosps., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., the court merely applied the statute's treble-damages consequence to the damages award; it did not interpret, explain, or decide any disputed issue about what § 75-16 means or requires. opinion →
Post v. Avita Drugs, LLC, section 75-16 is cited only in passing to identify the treble-damages remedy supporting the court's discussion of why plaintiffs pair claims under section 75-1.1 with contract claims; the court does not decide anything about the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of section 75-16. opinion →
Bartels Ex Rel. Bartels v. Saber Healthcare Group, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in a jurisdictional footnote to describe the plaintiffs’ claimed treble-damages theory; the court did not construe or decide anything about § 75-16. opinion →
The Comm. To Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Political Action Comm., the dissent mentions § 75-16 only as a comparison in its standing analysis; the appeal concerns N.C.G.S. § 163-278.39A, and the court does not decide a claim under or otherwise construe § 75-16. opinion →
Supreme Auto Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 appears only in a footnote string cite listing state antitrust statutes; the court did not construe or specifically apply it. opinion →
Supreme Auto Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc., section 75-16 appears only in a footnote string citation listing state statutes that do not incorporate Illinois Brick’s direct-purchaser rule. The court does not separately interpret or apply North Carolina’s statute. opinion →
Long Bros. of Summerfield, Inc. v. Hilco Transp., the court cites § 75-16 only for the general proposition that a successful UDTP claim permits treble damages. The decision turns on the UDTP statute of limitations and equitable estoppel, not on interpreting or applying § 75-16. opinion →
Akshar Distribution Co. v. Smoky's Mart, section 75-16 appears in the description of the trial court’s treble-damage award and in defendants’ unpreserved argument. The Court of Appeals did not construe or decide anything about § 75-16. opinion →
Akshar Distribution Co. v. Smoky's Mart, the statute is mentioned in the procedural history to report that the trial court trebled damages, and in an appellate argument about the underlying § 75-1.1 claim that the Court does not reach. The Court makes no holding about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-16. opinion →
RICHARDS v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, the court cited § 75-16 only for the general proposition that a successful Chapter 75 plaintiff may recover treble damages; it did not decide any issue about the statute because the UDTPA claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. opinion →
SALAMI, PH.D., M.D. v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE, N.A., the statute is cited only in a footnote addressing a hypothetical damages issue and relying on other decisions; the court did not construe or apply § 75-16 to decide the case. opinion →
O'Shields v. Columbia Automotive, LLC, the court cited § 75-16 only to identify the treble-damages civil penalty as one of the comparable sanctions in its due-process review of a punitive-damages award; it did not construe or decide the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Schniper v. ServisFirst Bancshares, Inc., the court merely recounts that the complaint included an unfair-and-deceptive-commercial-practices claim under § 75-16. The order decides a motion to transfer and does not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Jasmen Corporation v. Edwards, the opinion addresses the four-year limitations period for unfair and deceptive trade practices and cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.2, not § 75-16. It does not construe or apply § 75-16 itself. opinion →
Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the court cites § 75-16 in a string citation to identify the private remedies for UDTPA and NCDCA, but it does not interpret or apply § 75-16; the analysis instead addresses the elements and sufficiency of the asserted claims. opinion →
Louis E. Robichaux, IV, as Liquidation Trustee of v. The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Operating Corp, the court cites § 75-16 only in a footnote to identify treble damages while analyzing whether the complaint stated a UDTPA claim; it does not construe, apply, or decide any issue about § 75-16 itself. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court mentions § 75-16 as the basis for the arbitrator’s treble-damages award, but it did not decide what the statute means or how it applies. It merely held that the defendant’s challenge to the arbitrator’s statutory interpretation did not satisfy the narrow standard for vacating an arbitration award. opinion →
NICHOLSON v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC., the court reported and reviewed a challenge to the arbitrator’s use of § 75-16, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute or its interplay with the CFA was correct; it confirmed the award under the deferential arbitration-review standard. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court reported that the arbitrator awarded treble damages under § 75-16, but it did not construe or apply the statute independently; it confirmed the award under the deferential arbitration-review standard and expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation was correct. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 and described the arbitrator’s trebling calculation only while reviewing whether the arbitration award could be vacated. It expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CFA and its interplay with the UDTPA was correct, so the statute was not construed or applied as the court’s holding. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the opinion quotes § 75-16 and describes the arbitrator’s trebling of damages, but expressly declines to decide whether that interpretation of the statute is correct; the court addresses only whether the alleged statutory error warrants vacating the arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 while describing the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted or applied the statute; it only held that any such mistake was not a basis to vacate the arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 and described the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CFA and UDTPA was correct. Its ruling concerned the limited standard for reviewing and confirming an arbitration award, so the statute reference was incidental rather than a holding about the statute. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court recited § 75-16 in describing the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted or applied the UDTPA; it only held that any statutory-interpretation error was not grounds to vacate the arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court recited § 75-16’s treble-damages language while reviewing an arbitration award, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the statute or its interplay with the CFA. The statute was therefore incidental to the confirmation ruling. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court cited § 75-16 to describe the damages framework while reviewing an arbitration award, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the statute or its interplay with the CFA. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 while recounting the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but it did not construe or decide the statute’s meaning or application; it expressly stated that it was not determining whether the arbitrator’s interpretation was correct. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 and recounted the arbitrator’s trebling calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the statute or its interplay with the CFA. The ruling concerned the deferential standard for reviewing and confirming an arbitration award, not the meaning or application of § 75-16. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court mentioned § 75-16 while describing the arbitrator’s treble-damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the statute was correctly interpreted or applied; the issue was only whether the arbitration award could be vacated. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court merely quoted § 75-16 and described the arbitrator’s damages calculation while reviewing an arbitration award. It expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute or its interplay with the CFA was correct, so the statute was not construed or applied in a holding of the court. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court merely recited § 75-16 while reviewing an arbitration award and expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the CFA/UDTPA interplay; it therefore did not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court cited § 75-16 to describe the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the statute or its interplay with the CFA. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court cited § 75-16 to describe the arbitrator’s damages framework but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted or applied the statute. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16’s treble-damages language only to describe the arbitrator’s damages calculation and held that any statutory-interpretation error was not grounds to vacate the arbitration award; it did not construe or decide what § 75-16 requires. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 while recounting the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the statute or its interplay with the CFA; it only held that any statutory mistake was not grounds to vacate the arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 while reviewing whether to vacate an arbitration award, but expressly declined to decide the correctness or meaning of the statute’s application; the reference was incidental to the deferential arbitration-review ruling. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 while describing the arbitrator’s trebling of damages, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the statute or its interaction with the CFA. The statute’s application was therefore reported as part of the arbitration award and was not a holding of this court. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court recited § 75-16’s treble-damages language and described the arbitrator’s use of it, but expressly declined to decide whether that interpretation was correct; the ruling instead applied the narrow standard for vacating an arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 in describing the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but it did not construe or decide the statute’s meaning or application; it expressly declined to determine whether the arbitrator’s interpretation was correct and only reviewed the award under the narrow arbitration standard. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 while describing the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the CFA/UDTPA interplay; the ruling concerned the narrow standard for vacating an arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quotes § 75-16 and describes the arbitrator’s trebling of damages, but it expressly declines to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute or its interplay with the CFA is correct; the ruling concerns the limited standard for reviewing an arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court merely recounted the arbitrator’s use of § 75-16 in calculating treble damages and reviewed the award under the deferential arbitration standard. It expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute was correct, so it did not construe or apply § 75-16 in its own holding. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court merely reviewed whether the arbitrator had a basis for calculating treble damages and expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted § 75-16 or its interplay with the CFA. Its ruling concerned the deferential standard for vacating an arbitration award, not the meaning or application of § 75-16. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 and described the arbitrator’s trebling of damages, but expressly declined to decide whether that interpretation or application of the statute was correct. The ruling addressed only whether the alleged statutory error warranted vacating the arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court quoted § 75-16 while reviewing whether the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded North Carolina law, but it expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator used the correct damages base or whether the award involved improper duplicative punitive damages. Thus, the statute was mentioned in explaining the arbitration award, not construed or independently applied by the court. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court recited § 75-16’s treble-damages language but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted or applied the statute; it only reviewed whether the arbitration award had a sufficient basis under the deferential standard. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court recited § 75-16 while describing the arbitrator’s damages calculation, but expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the statute or calculated treble damages; it only held that any error was not a basis to vacate the arbitration award. opinion →
GOINES v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC, the court merely quoted § 75-16 and described the arbitrator’s damages calculation while reviewing the arbitration award. It expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute and its interplay with the CFA was correct. opinion →
Zander v. Orange Cnty., section 75-16 appears only in a comparison explaining that § 160D-106 does not authorize treble damages. The court decides the scope of refunds under § 160D-106, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-16. opinion →
RestorePro Reconstruction, Inc. v. Simpson, Incidental: the court quoted § 75-16 in its general overview of the UDTPA, but its actual rulings addressed the UDTPA elements and the evidence supporting the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct, not the meaning or application of § 75-16. opinion →
Friedman v. Bank of Am., N.A., the opinion mentions § 75-16 only in a footnote describing Plaintiff’s theory that a § 75-54 violation entitled her to statutory relief. The court did not construe or apply § 75-16; it affirmed dismissal on collateral-estoppel and pleading-deficiency grounds. opinion →
Adelman's Truck Parts Corp. v. Jones Transport, the court cited § 75-16 only to note the treble damages Jones sought when calculating the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction; it did not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Martin v. Pilot Industries, the court mentions § 75-16 only as an analogy for interpreting the separate attorneys'-fees provision in the Business Opportunity Sales Act and reports the holdings of Hardy and Taylor; it does not decide what § 75-16 means or apply it to Martin's claim. opinion →
Martin v. Pilot Industries, the court mentioned § 75-16 only as analogous authority while deciding whether the plaintiff showed injury under the Business Opportunity Sales Act’s attorneys’-fees provision; it did not decide a claim under or independently construe § 75-16. opinion →
ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., the court mentions § 75-16 only in describing the Act's private remedy and treble-damages provisions as background. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 75-16. opinion →
General United Co. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., the court merely recited § 75-16's treble-damages remedy while deciding that the alleged conduct was not an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1; it did not construe or independently apply § 75-16. opinion →
New England Leather Company v. Feuer Leather Corporation, section 75-16 appears only in a background string citation describing Chapter 75's remedies. The court resolves which state's law governs the deceptive-trade-practice claim and does not construe or decide anything about § 75-16. opinion →
Ferris v. Haymore, the court decided the setoff issue under North Carolina's one-recovery rule and the state odometer statute. Section 75-16 was mentioned only to identify the unfair-trade statute involved in Seafare; the court did not construe or apply § 75-16 itself. opinion →
Ferris v. Haymore, the court cited § 75-16 only to identify the unfair-trade statute involved in Seafare. Its holding concerned the common-law one-recovery rule and setoff of a codefendant's settlement, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-16 itself. opinion →
Tools USA & Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equipment, Inc., the opinion mentions § 75-16 only in describing the parties' stipulation and parenthetically noting that it concerns treble damages; the court does not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Bebber v. J.M. Westall & Co. (In Re Bebber), the court merely recited the state-law requirements while discussing collateral estoppel and the nondischargeability issue; it did not independently construe or decide the application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. opinion →
Tools USA and Equipment Company v. Champ Frame Straightening Equipment, Incorporated, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to describe the parties’ stipulation and the district court’s damages calculation. The appellate court did not construe or decide any issue about § 75-16; it reviewed the trade-dress infringement verdict, and the defendant did not challenge the trebling. opinion →
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company, a California Corporation v. Launeil Sanders, the court merely reports that the district court awarded treble damages under § 75-16; it does not interpret or decide what the statute means or requires. Its holding concerns the inability to recover both fraud damages and unfair-trade-practices damages for the same conduct. opinion →
High Country Arts and Craft Guild v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, the opinion mentions § 75-16 only as the statutory basis for the plaintiff’s elected treble-damages remedy and in recounting the appellate argument. The court does not interpret or apply § 75-16’s meaning or requirements; it resolves the issue through the prior interlocutory ruling and the separate discussion of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., the opinion mentions § 75-16 only in describing the claim Ashley filed; the court does not interpret or apply that statute. Its later ruling discusses the Act generally and cites § 75-1.1, not § 75-16. opinion →
Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., the citation to § 75-16 appears only in the appellate court's procedural description of plaintiffs' election to seek treble damages instead of punitive damages; the court did not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Pickett v v. American Ordnance Preservation Ass'n, the opinion mentions § 75-16 only in a footnote to explain the uncontested calculation of damages awarded under the North Carolina Unfair Competition Law; the court did not construe or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Barker v. Altegra Credit Co. (In Re Barker), the court merely quoted § 75-16 while distinguishing the North Carolina decision Seafare in resolving damages under Pennsylvania's UDAP statute; it did not construe or apply § 75-16 as the governing law. opinion →
Bell v. E. Davis International, Inc., the court merely recited the actual-injury requirement and cited § 75-16 as supporting authority while deciding that the state-law claim was preempted by the Copyright Act; it did not interpret or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., section 75-16 is cited only as an example of another state's statute allowing an injured person to bring an antitrust action; the court construed Colorado law and did not decide what § 75-16 means or how it applies. opinion →
COUNTRY CLUB v. US Fidelity & Guar. Co., the opinion only reports the trial court's treble-damages award and does not construe or independently apply § 75-16. opinion →
Volumetrics Medical Imaging, Inc. v. ATL Ultrasound, Inc., the citation to § 75-16 appears only in the plaintiff’s pleaded request for treble damages and attorney’s fees. The court does not interpret or apply § 75-16; its statutory analysis concerns § 75-1.1. opinion →
Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, section 75-16 appears only in a footnote string cite listing examples of state statutes allowing exemplary damages; the court did not construe, apply, or otherwise decide anything about the statute. opinion →
South Atlantic Limited Partnership of Tennessee, LP v. Riese, the court cites § 75-16 in a footnote to explain the trebling calculation underlying the parties' allocation dispute; it decides the mandate-rule issue, not the statute's meaning or application. opinion →
Ladd v. Fortis Benefits Insurance, the court cites § 75-16 only as authority for the general statement that § 75-1.1 allows treble damages; it decides ERISA preemption issues and does not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Abt Building Products Corporation v. National Union Fire Insurance Company Of Pittsburgh, the citation to § 75-16 only reports the district court's trebling of damages in the procedural history; the appellate court did not decide what § 75-16 means or how it applies. opinion →
Gita Sports Ltd. v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co. KG, the statute appears only in reporting Plaintiff’s argument that treble damages would be unavailable in Germany. The court did not construe or apply § 75-16; it rejected the broader forum-selection argument based on the availability of some remedy. opinion →
Anderson v. Brokers, Inc. (In Re Brokers, Inc.), the court merely reports Brokers’ request for treble damages and expressly declines to address it after finding no successful UDTPA claim; it does not construe or apply § 75-16. opinion →
Drennen v. PNC Bank National Ass'n, the statute appears only in counsel’s argument that North Carolina claims were uniquely valuable. The court did not adopt or analyze that argument, and expressly stated that it expressed no opinion on the claims’ comparative value. opinion →
Hinson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Hinson), section 75-16 appears only in the description of the plaintiffs’ pleaded Count III remedy. The court ruled on whether the alleged conduct stated a claim under § 75-1.1, but did not construe or decide what § 75-16 means or requires. opinion →
Leeb v. Guy (In Re Guy), the opinion only quotes and summarizes In re James T. Wilson's treatment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 while reviewing authorities on the dischargeability of treble and punitive damages. It does not adopt that statement or decide what § 75-16 means or requires. opinion →
Diaz v. Diaz (In Re Diaz), the opinion merely reports and quotes In re Wilson's treatment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 in discussing whether treble damages are dischargeable under bankruptcy law. This court does not construe, apply, or adopt a holding about § 75-16; its own ruling concerns punitive damages under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). opinion →
Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corporation, the court decides whether the dealership agreement violates the restraint-of-trade provisions, but does not decide any rule of G.S. 75-16. opinion →
Ramsey v. Camp, this sentence reports a judgment in an earlier case; this court decides whether to credit a covenant-not-to-sue payment against the judgment. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Edmisten v. J. C. Penney Co., the court cited § 75-16 as context while deciding the scope of § 75-1.1; it did not decide a rule under § 75-16. opinion →
Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, the court decides the scope of G.S. 75-1.1; it mentions G.S. 75-16 only while describing the defendant’s requested remedy. opinion →
Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co., the court decided whether the advertisements violated G.S. 75-1.1; it mentioned treble damages under G.S. 75-16 only as a possibility and did not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the court denied treble damages because it found no violation of § 75-1.1; it did not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Hammers v. Lowe's Companies, Inc., the court did not decide an issue under § 75-16; it dismissed the claim because the alleged conduct did not violate § 75-1.1. opinion →
Taylor v. Hayes, the treble-damages ruling was the trial court’s; this court dismissed further review as improvidently granted without deciding § 75-16. opinion →
Gower v. Strout Realty, Inc., the court reports the plaintiffs’ request for treble damages but does not decide any rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Coble v. Richardson Corp. of Greensboro, the court decided whether the conduct was an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1; the reversal of treble damages followed from that decision without deciding a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, No. The citation reports the plaintiff’s request; the court does not decide a rule under § 75-16. opinion →
Ehlenbeck v. Patton (In Re Patton), the court reports another court’s ruling about § 75-16; its own decision concerns § 84-13 and bankruptcy discharge. opinion →
American Marble Corp. v. Crawford, the § 75-16 reference states defendant’s contention; the court’s own ruling addresses the scope of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd., the court decided whether to allow a pleading amendment under Rule 15(b), not any rule or remedy of § 75-16. opinion →
Ken-Mar Finance v. Harvey, the court mentions § 75-16 as background but decides whether the conduct violated other statutes, not a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Taylor v. Foy, this sentence reports the trial court’s trebling of damages; the appellate court’s decision concerns attorney’s fees under § 75-16.1. opinion →
Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the citation describes relief the plaintiff requested; the court did not decide a claim under this section. opinion →
Gordon Barnes Glenn Phelps, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated With Themselves v. Cargill, Incorporated, the only discussion of § 75-16 appears in Judge Wilkinson’s dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh, the court decides associational standing for damages claims; it mentions § 75-16 only as a possible source of treble damages. opinion →
American Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Pollard, the express reference to § 75-16 describes the award in Marshall, not this court’s decision about that section. opinion →
Bhatti v. Buckland, the court decided whether the conduct affected commerce under § 75-1.1, not a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., the court decided which state's law governed the § 75-1.1 claim. It mentioned § 75-16's remedy only as background in a footnote. opinion →
Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., the court decides whether the conduct falls within § 75-1.1, not a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Halprin v. Ford Motor Co., the citation appears in the plaintiff’s request for damages; the court did not decide a claim under § 75-16. opinion →
Taylor v. Volvo North America Corp., the court decides the damages calculation under the New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act and uses § 75-16 only as an analogy. opinion →
Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Department of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, the court recounts Holley's discussion of § 75-16 but decides the limitations issue for administrative civil penalties under another statute. opinion →
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Wake Stone Corp., the statement about § 75-16 reports the Supreme Court’s holding in Ellis; this court makes no decision about § 75-16. opinion →
Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance v. Spencer, the court decides whether the insurer’s conduct violates § 58-63-15(1), not a rule of § 75-16 itself. opinion →
Custom Molders, Inc. v. American Yard Products, Inc., the court decides the interest rule under § 24-5(b), not a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Peterson v. Bozzano (In Re Bozzano), the court assumed entitlement to treble damages under § 75-16 and decided only whether those damages were nondischargeable under federal bankruptcy law. opinion →
Jacobs v. Central Transport, Inc., the court mentions § 75-16 as background on available relief, but decides whether the conduct violates § 75-1.1, not a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Isenhour v. Universal Underwriters Insurance, the citation reports the plaintiffs’ allegation; the court does not decide a claim under § 75-16. opinion →
Custom Molders, Inc. v. American Yard Products, Inc., the court decides postjudgment interest under § 24-5; § 75-16 identifies the source of the treble damages but supplies no rule the court construes. opinion →
Estate of Wells Ex Rel. Morley v. Toms, the court decides whether a settlement is doubled under § 84-13. It cites § 75-16 only in a parenthetical describing another court’s decision. opinion →
Market America, Inc. v. Christman-Orth, the cited holding about § 75-16 is the Supreme Court’s decision in Ellis, which this court reports; this court does not make its own ruling about § 75-16. opinion →
Market America, Inc. v. Christman-Orth, the court mentions § 75-16 while recounting Ellis, but decides the defendant’s unfair or deceptive trade practice claim under § 75-1.1 without deciding a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, the § 75-16 citation reports the trial court’s award. This court decides the scope of § 75-1.1 and the effect of § 97-21, without stating a rule about § 75-16. opinion →
Reid v. Ayers, the court mentions § 75-16’s treble-damages remedy while deciding whether Article 2 claims must satisfy § 75-1.1; it does not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Support Services of Carolina, Inc., the court dismisses the state antitrust claim based on its Sherman Act analysis without deciding any rule of § 75-16 itself. opinion →
Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping, Inc. v. Smith, No. The citation reports the trial court’s trebling of damages; the appellate court does not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Godfrey v. Res-Care, Inc., the statement about § 75-16 is quoted from River Birch; this court decides whether the fraud damages instruction was proper without deciding a rule under § 75-16. opinion →
VT, INC. v. Dodge, the court decided whether denying leave to amend was an abuse of discretion; it did not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Simmons v. Kross Lieberman & Stone, Inc., the court decides the requirements for a civil penalty under § 58-70-130(b); it does not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Vollrath v. Corinthian Ophthalmic, Inc., the court cites § 75-16 for a general treble damages rule but decides the claim under § 75-1.1 without deciding whether § 75-16 provides a remedy here. opinion →
Elliott v. American States Insurance Co., this sentence reports Elliott’s assertion; the court does not decide a rule under § 75-16. opinion →
Window World of Baton Rouge, LLC v. Window World, Inc.; Window World of St. Louis, Inc. v. Window World, Inc., the reference to potential trebling is quoted from another decision; this court decides a discovery dispute without ruling on § 75-16. opinion →
Nfh, Inc. v. Troutman, the court decides whether the alleged conduct supports a claim under § 75-1.1; it does not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Nobel v. Foxmoor Grp., the court reversed the trebling because it found no violation under § 75-1.1; it did not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Nobel v. Foxmoor Grp., the court decided whether the conduct was in or affecting commerce under § 75-1.1. It reversed the trebling as a consequence, without deciding a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Comm. to Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Pol. Action Comm., the court uses § 75-16 and its earlier Bumpers decision to illustrate legislative authority to create causes of action; it does not decide a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Comm. to Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Pol. Action Comm., the court recounts its earlier decision in Bumpers; it does not decide a rule of § 75-16 in this case. opinion →
Avadim Health, Inc. v. Daybreak Cap. Partners, LLC, the court mentions § 75-16’s private right of action and treble damages, but decides whether the alleged conduct supports a UDTP Act claim, not a rule of § 75-16. opinion →
Kelly v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. The citation identifies a claim in the complaint; the opinion only reports that the UDTP claims were dismissed in an earlier decision. opinion →
Ivey v. Hall, this sentence reports the trial court’s pretrial allocation of issues. The appellate court does not decide a rule under § 75-16. opinion →
Conzelman, the citation reports the plaintiff’s request for treble damages, not the court’s own decision about § 75-16. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Jackson v. Mv Realty Pbc, LLC, the statement about § 75-16 is quoted from an earlier opinion; this court does not decide that section’s rules here. opinion →
Warren v. Cielo Ventures, Inc., the discussion of § 75-16 is in the dissent. The majority decides whether a contract can shorten the limitations period for UDTPA claims under § 75-16.2. opinion →
Coker v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the dissent cites the section in support of its proposed reversal of the dismissal of the unfair trade practices claim. opinion →
Smith v. King, the court denied treble damages under the section because the alleged conduct did not meet the separate insurance statute’s requirements. opinion →
Driskell v. Summit Contracting Group, Inc., the dissent quotes an earlier decision discussing § 75-16; the majority decides whether Driskell may recover punitive damages and attorney’s fees under REDA. opinion →
Brown v. Brown, the court cites § 75-16 for the damages business libel could support, then dismisses the unfair trade practices claim because the challenged statements were privileged. opinion →

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