Statute Annotations › North Carolina › N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82

General venue when no specific statute applies: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
North Carolina
Case notes
49
Cited in passing
27
Citing cases indexed
81
Case dates
1949–2026
Screened through
2026-01-21
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

76 citing cases reviewed of 81 in the citation index: 49 interpreted the section (annotated below), 27 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-01-21 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Default venue and residence-based venue

Section 1-82 supplies the default venue rule, requiring an action to be tried in a county where a plaintiff or defendant resides when no specific venue statute governs.

Locklear v. Nixon · filed 1998-03-17

Except in cases in which venue is governed by some other specific statute, N.C.G.S. § 1-82 provides that “an action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (1996). Because the plaintiff-collector in this case resided in Guilford County, N.C.G.S. § 1-82 permitted her to bring this wrongful death action in that county.
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Section 1-82 provides the default venue for an action in the county where a plaintiff or defendant resides, so a domestic business may sue in the county of its principal place of business when no statute requires otherwise.

Wellons Construction, Inc. v. Landsouth Properties, LLC · filed 2005-02-01

North Carolina General Statute section 1-82 directs that an action must be tried: ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2003) (emphasis added). A domestic business resides where its principal place of business is located. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-79 (2003). Here, Wellons Construction, a domestic business, has its principal place of business in Harnett County. Venue in Harnett County would therefore appear to be proper.
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Section 1-82 requires civil actions not otherwise covered by the specified venue provisions to be tried in the county where a plaintiff or defendant resides when the action begins.

LaVALLEY v. LaVALLEY · filed 2009-12-22

North Carolina General Statutes, section 1-82 "requires that venue in civil actions not specifically provided for in G.S. 1-76 through G.S. 1-81 must be in the county where either plaintiff or defendant resides at the commencement of the suit."
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Section 1-82 makes venue proper in the county where any plaintiff or defendant resides when the action begins.

Hawley v. Hobgood · filed 2005-11-15

Section 1-82 of the North Carolina General Statutes sets out the method of determining the proper venue, stating in pertinent part, “the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2004). Ms. Hawley declared in the Complaint that she was a resident of Vance County, North Carolina, and that Mr. Hobgood was a resident of Granville County, North Carolina. Therefore, Wake County was not the proper venue.
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Section 1-82 generally makes venue proper in the county where either the plaintiff or defendant resides.

Davis v. Hall · filed 2012-10-16

In North Carolina, venue is proper where either party resides. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2011). ... Here, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant resides in Guilford County; both are residents of Rowan County, North Carolina. There is no evidence that any of the claims arose in Guilford County. Thus, absent an agreement to the contrary, Guilford County is not a proper venue to hear this case.
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Section 1-82 makes the county where a plaintiff or defendant resides at commencement the default place of trial, subject to a contractual forum-selection clause.

Lendingtree, LLC v. Anderson · filed 2013-08-06

Under North Carolina’s General Statutes, actions “must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2011). This is a default provision which is applied when the parties have provided no pre-dispute agreement for the place of a trial. However, a contractual forum selection clause can modify this default venue rule.
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Section 1-82 is the general venue rule when no more specific venue provision applies, and venue is proper in any county where a plaintiff or defendant resides at the action’s commencement.

Wright v. Wood · filed 2024-07-16

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 is the general venue statute which governs in cases where no other specific statutory venue provision applies. That statute provides: “In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement[.]” ... Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82, so long as any plaintiff or defendant resides in a county at the outset of an action, venue is proper in that county.
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Section 1-82 generally makes venue proper in any county where a party resided when the action commenced, unless a specific venue statute applies.

Caldwell v. Smith · filed 2010-05-04

Generally, absent an applicable specific statutory provision, venue is proper in the county in which any party is a resident at the commencement of the action. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2009).
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Section 1-82 requires an action to be tried in the county where one or more parties resides at the action’s commencement, subject to statutory venue-change provisions.

Kiker v. Winfield · filed 2014-06-17

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 provides that, in cases such as this: ... the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement, or if none of the defendants reside in the State, then in the county in which the plaintiffs, or any of them, reside; ... Where venue is improper, the trial court must grant a motion for change of venue.
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Section 1-82 requires an action to be tried in the county where any plaintiff or defendant resides when the action commences.

Barrier Geotechnical Contractors, Inc. v. Radford Quarries of Boone, Inc. · filed 2007-07-17

Per N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-82 (2005), "the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement[.]" Id. In its complaint, plaintiff states that its principal place of business is in Mecklenburg County. Per statute, the residence of a domestic business for purposes of suing or being sued is the location of its principal place of business. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-79(a)(1) (2005). As such, Mecklenburg County was a proper venue, and the trial court's denial of the motion to change venue was not error.
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Section 1-82 makes venue proper in the county where any plaintiff or defendant resides when the action commences; an amended complaint adding similarly situated resident plaintiffs may relate back for venue purposes.

Baldwin v. Wilkie · filed 2006-09-19

Under Section 1-82 of the North Carolina General Statutes, an "action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants . . . reside at its commencement[.]"1 Here, Defendants argue that venue in Wake County was improper because none of the original parties to the action were residents of Wake County. Because the action was amended as a matter of right2 adding Plaintiffs who are residents of Wake County, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to change venue.
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Section 1-82 permits an action to be instituted in the county where the parties reside.

Austin v. Austin · filed 1971-09-15

In this case the parties were admittedly residents of Anson County. In the pleadings there is no allegation that the children were not residents of Anson County; in fact, there is an inference in paragraph 8 of the complaint that the children were living in Anson County with the mother. Therefore, this action for alimony, child support and child custody was properly instituted and pending in Anson County. G.S. 1-82; G.S. 7A-244; G.S. 50-13.5 (c) (f) ; and G.S. 50-16.8.
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Section 1-82 permits venue in the county where the plaintiff resided when the action was filed.

Clarke v. Clarke · filed 1972-08-02

The findings made by the trial judge in this case are supported by the evidence and support his conclusion that plaintiff was a resident of Buncombe County when she filed this action. Upon this determination, Buncombe County is a proper venue for trial of the case. G.S. 1-82.
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Section 1-82 makes the county where either party resides a proper place for trial.

Holland v. Gryder · filed 1981-11-03

According to G.S. 1-82, the county in which either party resides is a proper place for the trial to occur. Since plaintiff resides in Wilkes County, G.S. 1-83(1) is inapplicable.
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Section 1-82 permits a plaintiff to maintain an action in the county where the plaintiff resides unless venue is lawfully changed.

Vinson v. Wallace · filed 1989-11-21

Unless or until the venue is changed for some lawful reason plaintiff, a resident of Hertford County, has a right to maintain his action against defendant Wallace in that county. G.S. 1-82.
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Under G.S. 1-82, a county where neither party resides is not a proper venue for trial.

Doss v. Nowell · filed 1966-10-12

The finding of the trial judge that neither party is a resident of Catawba County is supported by the evidence and is, therefore, binding upon this Court. Upon that finding, Catawba County is not a proper venue for the trial of this action. G.S. 1-82.
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Section 1-82 requires a case to be tried in a county where a plaintiff or defendant resided when the case began.

Alexander v. Daimlerchrysler Corp. · filed 2004-01-30

N.C.G.S. § 1-82 provides that a case must be tried in a county in which the plaintiffs or defendants reside at the commencement of the case.
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Section 1-82 determines the proper county for trial of an action.

Barker v. Hicks · filed 1971-09-15

Chatham County is the proper county for the trial of this action. G.S. 1-82.
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Section 1-82 can make the plaintiff’s chosen county a proper place of trial.

Poteat v. Southern Railway Co. · filed 1977-05-04

Indeed, on the record before us, Guilford County is a proper place of trial whether venue is determined under G.S. 1-81 or G.S. 1-82.
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Section 1-82 makes the plaintiff’s county of residence a proper venue when the action begins, even if only the defendant’s counterclaim remains for trial.

Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co. · filed 1979-12-18

We turn, then, to an examination of the pertinent sections of our venue statute and find that, at the outset, G.S. § 1-82 is applicable to this action. ... Clearly, Bertie County, the home of the plaintiff Harrington, is proper for venue, and defedant Powell frankly admits that fact.
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When no specific venue provision applies, a nonresident plaintiff may sue resident defendants in any county where a defendant resides when the action begins.

Stewart v. Southeastern Regional Medical Center · filed 2001-03-20

Thus, in a civil action in this state where venue is not specifically designated by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-76 through 1-81, where the plaintiff is a nonresident and the defendants are ... residents, the proper venue for the action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 is any county in which defendants reside at the commencement of the action.
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Section 1-82 permits a civil action to be tried in a county where a defendant resided when the action began.

CAROLINA FOREST ASS'N, INC. v. White · filed 2009-07-07

We first address whether the filing of this action in Mecklenburg County contravened the venue rules set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82. ... Thus, the trial court had ample justification for finding venue in Mecklenburg County to have been proper.
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Residence at commencement of action

Section 1-82 requires cases not governed by a more specific venue statute to be tried in the county where any plaintiff or defendant resides when the action begins.

Semelka v. The Univ. of NC · filed 2020-12-31

Under the specific facts of this case, we hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 controls. This statute provides that cases not covered by more specific venue statutes “must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at [the] commencement[]” of the action. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2019).
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Section 1-82 generally requires an action to be tried in a county where any plaintiff or defendant resides when the action commences; for an unemancipated infant, the infant’s residence is the residence of the parents.

Jenkins v. Hearn Vascular Surgery, P.A. · filed 2011-11-15

Generally, absent an applicable specific statutory provision, venue is proper in the county in which any party is a resident at the commencement of the action. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2009) (providing, “[i]n all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement”).
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When no other venue rule mandates a different county, the action must be tried in a county where a plaintiff or defendant resided when the action began.

Reynolds v. Burks · filed 2024-09-03

Thus, on this Record, there is no basis to determine venue is mandated by application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-77. Therefore, venue was not improper in Pender County where Plaintiff resides. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2023) (“In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement”). Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Defendants’ Motions to Change Venue based on the materials presented to the trial court.
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Section 1-82 permits an action to be brought in a county where any plaintiff or defendant resided when summons was issued.

Brendle ex rel. Brendle v. Stafford · filed 1957-05-08

An action such as this may be brought in the county where the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any one of them, had residence at the time summons was issued.
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Section 1-82 requires a civil action not covered by G.S. 1-76 through G.S. 1-81 to be brought in the county where either party resides when the suit begins.

Little v. Little · filed 1971-09-15

Thus plaintiff’s complaint did not comply with the provisions of G.S. 1-82 which requires that venue in civil actions not specifically provided for in G.S. 1-76 through G.S. 1-81 must be in the county where either plaintiff or defendant resides at the commencement of the suit.
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Section 1-82 permits trial in a county where any defendant resides when the action begins.

Shaw v. Stiles · filed 1971-12-15

Suffice to say, since defendants Canady and Anderson were residents of Onslow County at the time the action was commenced, and before the time for answering expired no motion was made by any defendant that the trial be conducted in another county, and no question of improper venue or division was asserted in any answer, appellants are not entitled as a matter of right to have the case removed to their home county.
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Section 1-82 permits venue where any defendant resides at the action’s commencement, including a defendant added by an amendment that relates back to that time.

Oak Manor, Inc. v. Neil Realty Co. · filed 1988-01-05

Thus, since Britthaven, Inc. is *404a resident of Wake County for venue purposes because it has a place of business there and is deemed to have been a defendant in the action at its commencement by operation of Rule 15(c), though not added until later, the venue there is not improper.
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Section 1-82 requires an action to be tried in a county where the plaintiff or defendant resided when the action commenced.

Burrell v. Burrell · filed 1955-11-02

At the time of the hearing below, she may have moved to her father’s home and consummated her *28intent to establish her residence in Madison County, but the statute, G.S. 1-82, requires that such an action as this must be tried in the county in which the plaintiff or the defendant resided at its commencement.
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Section 1-82 permits venue in the county where either party resides when the action begins; a plaintiff’s later move does not defeat venue.

Juarez-Martinez v. Deans · filed 1993-01-05

Under G.S. 1-82, venue is proper in the county in which either the plaintiff or the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the suit. ... This evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that at the time the action was filed, plaintiff was a resident of Wake County.
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Under § 1-82, a guardian ad litem’s county of residence alone does not establish venue for a minor’s action.

Roberts Ex Rel. Perry v. Adventure Holdings, LLC · filed 2010-12-21

Based upon our own precedent, in addition to the persuasive reasoning of Blackwell, we now hold that a GAL’s county of residence is insufficient, standing alone, to establish venue.
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Venue when plaintiff is a nonresident

When no more specific venue statute applies and no defendant resides in North Carolina, § 1-82 permits an action in a county where any plaintiff resides at commencement.

Wall v. AutoMoney · filed 2022-07-19

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to a venue statute of more specific application, and thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 applies. Under this statute—contrary to Defendant’s contention—only one of the Plaintiffs was required to reside in Richmond County on 4 June 2020 when the Complaint was filed because Defendant is not a resident of North Carolina, and all the Plaintiffs reside in North Carolina.
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Section 1-82 places venue for an action by a nonresident plaintiff against North Carolina residents in a county where at least one defendant resided when the action began.

Chow v. Crowell · filed 1972-08-23

Plaintiff being a nonresident and defendants being residents of North Carolina, the proper venue for trial of this action is a county in this State in which “the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement.” G.S. 1-82. None of the defendants resided in Buncombe County, in which this action was commenced.
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Section 1-82 makes the defendant’s county of residence the proper venue when the plaintiff is a nonresident.

Hill v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. · filed 1949-01-07

Since the plaintiff is a nonresident and the defendant, for the purposes of this action, is a resident of Forsyth County, G.S. 1-82 is controlling and Forsyth County is the proper venue for the trial of this cause.
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Section 1-82 makes a county where a defendant resides at the start of the action a proper venue when a nonresident plaintiff sues resident defendants and no specific venue statute applies.

TD Bank, N.A. v. Crown Leasing Partners, LLC · filed 2012-12-31

Because Plaintiff is a foreign corporation, and because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-80 does not control in cases brought by a foreign corporation, we believe the following rule of law applies: “[I]n a civil action in this state where venue is not specifically designated by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-76 through 1-81, where the plaintiff is a nonresident and the defendants are residents, the proper venue for the action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 is any county in which defendants reside at the commencement of the action.”
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Venue for actions by executors and administrators

Section 1-82 generally makes venue proper in a county where any plaintiff or defendant resides; for a receiver, the receiver's personal residence controls absent a contrary statute.

Integon Indem. Corp. v. Eagles · filed 2026-01-21

Thus, an action is properly brought by a receiver in the county in which the receiver resides where there is no statute providing otherwise. ... Accordingly, we conclude that, under § 1-82 and our well-settled precedent, the counties of residence of the Receivers are legally proper venues for the Nash County Action.
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Section 1-82 makes a county where any plaintiff or defendant resides at commencement a proper venue, including the receiver’s county of residence when no statute provides otherwise.

Eagles v. Integon Indem. Corp. · filed 2026-01-21

Section 1-82 provides, in pertinent part, that “the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement.” Id. § 1-82. ... Thus, an action is properly brought by a receiver in the county in which the receiver resides where there is no statute providing otherwise. ... Accordingly, we conclude that, under § 1-82 and our well-settled precedent, the counties of residence of the Receivers are legally proper venues for the Nash County Action.
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Section 1-82 allows an executor or administrator bringing an action to use the county where the fiduciary or defendant resides, even if neither resides in the county where the fiduciary qualified.

Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Finch · filed 1950-10-11

While an executor or administrator must be sued in his official capacity in the county where he qualified, Wiggins, Admr., v. Trust Co., ante, 391, he may bring an action in the county where he resides, or in the county where the defendant resides, although neither may reside in the county in which he qualified.
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Section 1-82 requires a transitory action to be tried in a county where at least one party resided when the action began.

Thompson v. Horrell · filed 1968-01-12

The cause which plaintiff has stated was properly brought in Wake, the county of his residence, and defendant cannot force its removal to Carteret County as a matter of right.
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Section 1-82 permits a transitory action to be brought in the county where either the plaintiff or defendant resides.

First Union National Bank of North Carolina v. Northwestern Bank · filed 1973-04-25

The present action being transitory, either the county of residence of the plaintiff or defendant is the proper venue. Thompson v. Harrell, 272 N.C. 503, 158 S.E. 2d 633 (1968); G.S. 1-82.
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Section 1-82 permits an administrator to bring an action in the county where the administrator resides, rather than where the decedent lived or the administrator qualified.

Klass v. Hayes · filed 1976-06-16

Under this statute an action by an administrator is properly brought in the county where the administrator resides rather than in the county where the decedent lived or in which the administrator qualified.
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Venue of domesticated foreign corporations

Section 1-82 requires a civil action involving North Carolina-resident parties to be tried in a county where any plaintiff or defendant resides when the action begins.

Capital Bank, N.A. v. Cameron · filed 2013-12-17

In civil actions where both the plaintiff and the defendant are North Carolina residents, our venue statute provides that the action “must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2011). The unchallenged findings of fact before this Court establish that Plaintiff has a registered office and maintains its principal place of business in Wake County and that Defendants are residents of Carteret County. Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a resident of Wake County pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-79(a) (2011), venue is proper in Wake County under our default venue rule.
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Section 1-82 does not entitle a domesticated foreign insurer to transfer an action to a county where it is not a resident for venue purposes.

Crain and Denbo, Inc. v. Harris & Harris Const. Co. · filed 1959-04-15

This finding of fact, not excepted to by the Aetna Insurance Company and supported by competent evidence, shows that the Aetna Insurance Company, for purposes of venue, is not a resi-deht of Wake County, within the purview of N. C. G. S. 1-82.
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Section 1-82 places venue for an action brought by a domesticated foreign corporation in the county where it maintains its principal place of business.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Petroleum Transit Co. · filed 1966-03-23

The proper venue for an action instituted by a foreign corporation domesticated in this state is in the county in which it maintains its principal place of business. G.S. 1-82; Crain & Denbo v. Construction Co., 250 N.C. 106 (112), 108 S.E. 2d 122.
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Section 1-82 does not govern venue for a domesticated foreign corporation with a registered office in North Carolina; section 1-79 applies.

Moore Golf, Inc. v. Shambley Wrecking Contractors, Inc. · filed 1974-07-17

Therefore, since the plaintiff in the instant case is a foreign domesticated corporation with its registered office in Durham County, G.S. 1-79, supra, applies; and Guilford County, where the plaintiff has its principal place of business, is not the proper venue.
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Venue for contract actions against the State

Section 1-82 governs venue for contract actions against the State when no specific venue statute applies, allowing suit in the plaintiff’s county of residence.

Smith v. State · filed 1976-03-02

As to suits on contracts generally there is no venue statute specifically applicable to the State. This case, therefore, is governed by G.S. 1-82 (1969), which provides in pertinent part: “In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement. . . .” Thus, plaintiff, as a resident of Burke County, was entitled to institute this action there.
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Venue for transitory actions

Section 1-82 governs venue for a lease dispute whose principal object is interpreting and enforcing the lease, even when the complaint seeks termination as alternative relief.

Kirkland's Stores, Inc. v. Cleveland Gastonia, LLC · filed 2012-10-16

We now determine whether the addition of this alternative claim seeking termination of the Lease results in local venue for Plaintiffs entire suit. We conclude that because the principal object of Plaintiffs action involves interpretation and enforcement of the Lease, rather than termination of the Lease, the case is transitory for venue purposes.
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Section 1-82 governs venue when an action principally seeks monetary recovery, even if it incidentally concerns land.

I.B.S.A., Inc. v. Builder's Supply Inc. · filed 2014-01-07

Under these facts, we hold the action is transitory in nature and not local.
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27 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Centura Bank v. Miller, the court merely recited § 1-82’s residual venue rule. Its holding that Guilford County was a proper venue turned on the construction and application of § 1-79(a)(2), which determined that the corporate plaintiff resided where it maintained a place of business. opinion →
ITS Leasing, Inc. v. Ram Dog Enterprises, LLC, the opinion quotes § 1-82 while reporting the plaintiff’s argument that it had a right to venue in Mecklenburg County, but it does not construe or apply the statute. The decision instead addresses the premature discretionary venue motion under § 1-83(2) and whether the contract created an exclusive forum-selection right. opinion →
Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, the court decided the mandatory removal rule under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-3. Section 1-82 was mentioned only as one of the general venue statutes and in a quoted secondary-authority statement; the court did not construe or apply § 1-82. opinion →
Heustess v. Bladenboro Emergency Servs., Inc., the court reported defendants' contention that § 1-82 governed venue, but decided the venue issue under § 1-77(2) and did not construe or apply § 1-82. opinion →
Terry v. Cheesecake Factory Rests., Inc., the court mentioned § 1-82 while characterizing the defendant’s improper-venue argument and reciting the general residence rule, but the decision did not construe or independently apply § 1-82; the holding that Durham County was a proper venue rested on § 1-79 and § 1-83(1). opinion →
Soma Tech., Inc. v. Dalamagas, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify defendants’ alternative venue motion; the court later denied that motion as moot and did not construe or apply § 1-82. opinion →
Bartels Ex Rel. Bartels v. Saber Healthcare Group, LLC, the concurrence cites § 1-82 parenthetically as an example of North Carolina's county-based venue terminology while interpreting a contractual forum-selection clause. It does not construe the statute or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Stokes v. Stokes, the court quoted § 1-82 as background while analyzing venue under § 1-83; it did not construe or decide what § 1-82 requires. The discussion of § 1-82 appears only in the statutory overview and in reporting the trial court’s finding. opinion →
Osborne v. Redwood Mountain, section 1-82 is mentioned only as part of a string citation supporting a general proposition about venue statutes. The court actually decided the case under the specific venue provision in § 1-76(1), without construing or applying § 1-82. opinion →
Hill v. Campus Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the court cited § 1-82 only in a footnote to identify the general venue rule after dismissing for lack of federal jurisdiction. It did not construe or apply the statute to decide a venue issue. opinion →
Jarman v. Twiddy & Co. of Duck, the statute is mentioned only to report the trial court's venue conclusion; the Court of Appeals neither interprets nor applies N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82. opinion →
State v. Goldberg, the statute appears only in the petitioner’s argument. The Court decided venue and jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.12A and did not interpret or apply § 1-82. opinion →
Braswell v. Braswell, the court recited § 1-82's general venue rule while addressing appellate jurisdiction and the defendant's waiver of venue under § 1-83; it did not construe or independently apply § 1-82. opinion →
Valleygate Dental Surgery of Charlotte, LLC v. Farrell, the court quoted the statute's general venue language while describing the governing law, but it resolved the motion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83(1) and (2). It did not interpret or apply § 1-82. opinion →
Grant v. High Point Regional Health System, the court quotes § 1-82 only to distinguish county venue from the proper place of trial within a county; it does not construe or apply the statute beyond that background distinction. opinion →
Lee v. Poston, the § 1-82 proposition is the plaintiff’s assertion. The court decides that § 1-77 does not fix venue, without stating a rule for § 1-82. opinion →
Coats v. Sampson County Memorial Hospital, Inc., the reference to § 1-82 states the plaintiffs’ argument; the court decided venue under § 1-77. opinion →
Swift and Company v. Dan-Cleve Corp., the court remanded for a determination under § 1-82 but did not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Gardner v. Gardner, the court decided whether the later amendment to G.S. 50-3 could disturb a final venue judgment; it did not decide a rule of G.S. 1-82. opinion →
Brown v. Kindred Nursing Centers East, L.L.C., the court decides Rule 9(j)'s extension requirements. Section 1-82 appears only as a venue cross-reference in the quoted rule; the court does not decide its requirements. opinion →
Barringer v. FORSYTH COUNTY WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY BAPTIST MEDICAL CTR, section 1-82 appears only as a venue reference in the quoted text of Rule 9(j); the court does not decide any rule of Section 1-82. opinion →
Carlton v. Melvin, the court decides the filing deadline under Rule 9(j). Section 1-82 appears only in Rule 9(j)’s quoted venue language; the court does not decide a rule under section 1-82. opinion →
Estate of Wooden ex rel. Jones v. Hillcrest Convalescent Center, Inc., the court quotes Rule 9(j)’s reference to § 1-82 but does not decide § 1-82’s venue rules. opinion →
Braden v. Lowe, the court decided Rule 9(j) expert certification. Section 1-82 appears only as a venue cross-reference in the quoted text of Rule 9(j); the court did not decide its venue rule. opinion →
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lilley, the court decides whether denying a discretionary venue change was an abuse of discretion, not a rule under § 1-82. The section appears only in the quoted trial court order. opinion →
Locklear v. Cummings, the only mention of § 1-82 appears in statutory text quoted by the dissent, not in the court's decision about that section. opinion →
Stokes v. Stokes, the court states § 1-82’s general venue rule as background, but decides when a discretionary venue change may be ordered under § 1-83(2) and whether that order is immediately appealable. opinion →

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