N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

On a CPLR 3212 motion, a court may consider an opponent’s unsworn letter when counsel’s failure to respond explains the lack of sworn evidence and the letter raises factual disputes.

Executive Nurses Home Care, Inc. v. DeMarco · filed 2003-10-07

Nevertheless, in view of defendant’s assertion that he has been unable to contact his retained counsel, and that the same has been unresponsive to his telephone calls and correspondence — and in view of counsel’s failure to communicate with, or attend and appear in, this court in response to the notice calendaring this motion — the defendant will be considered pro se for purposes of this motion. In light of the facts asserted in defendant’s letter — and in light of the fact that plaintiffs moving affidavit itself contains only hearsay assertions with respect to the actual rendering of the services (allegedly performed by plaintiff’s affiant’s “staff”) — the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 3212(a) permits a court to set a summary judgment motion deadline no earlier than 30 days after the note of issue is filed, but the parties may waive that timing protection by stipulation.

Burnell v. Huneau · filed 2003-11-06(a)

We note that CPLR 3212 (a) provides that “the court may set a date after which no . . . motion [for summary judgment] may be made, such date being no earlier than [30] days after the filing of the note of issue.” The parties’ stipulation, however, acted as a waiver of this statutory right (see generally Trump v Trump, 179 AD2d 201, 204 [1992], appeal dismissed 80 NY2d 892 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 760 [1992]).

Section 3212(a) makes a summary judgment motion premature when issue has not been joined.

Scantron Corp. v. New York City Board of Education · filed 2004-04-21(a)

First, Scantron’s cross motion must be denied. “[The] motion was premature since issue had not been joined.”

Section 3212(a) permits summary judgment only after issue has been joined, so a motion on an amended complaint is premature before the defendant answers it.

Gold Medal Packing, Inc. v. Rubin · filed 2004-04-30(a)

Summary judgment is appropriate only after issue has been joined (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and it is undisputed that defendant had not yet answered the amended complaint, inasmuch as leave to amend was simultaneously granted.

Section 3212(a) requires good cause to consider a summary judgment motion made after a court-set deadline; the motion's merits do not excuse the delay.

Powers v. Solomon · filed 2004-07-13(a)

The motions are denied as untimely pursuant to CPLR § 3212(a). ... As in Brill , the defendants in this action have provided no excuse for their delay and, in view of the Brill opinion's admonition regarding "the goals of orderliness and efficiency in State court practice," this court lacks discretion to consider the late motions, whether meritorious or not.

A plaintiff’s signed written confession can support a summary judgment motion that complies with CPLR 3212(b).

Moore v. County of Suffolk · filed 2004-10-18(b)

The defendants made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, inter aha, a copy of the plaintiffs written confession. ... Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the defendants’ motion complied with CPLR 3212 (b).

Section 3212(b) permits a court to grant summary judgment to a party without a cross motion when judgment is required as a matter of law.

Wende C. v. United Methodist Church · filed 2005-02-22(b)

It is well settled that Supreme Court may grant a party summary judgment absent a cross motion for such relief where judgment is required as a matter of law ( see CPLR 3212 [b]).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by an affidavit from someone with knowledge of the facts that sets forth all material facts.

Vista Surgical Supplies, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-03-10(b)

The motion must be supported by an affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts, setting forth all material facts.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by an affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts and other admissible evidence.

JMD Holding Corp. v. Congress Financial Corp. · filed 2005-03-31(b)

In this regard, CPLR 3212 (b) provides that a summary judgment motion “shall be supported by affidavit” of a person “having knowledge of the facts” as well as other admissible evidence (see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967 [1985]).

Section 3212(a) makes a motion for summary judgment premature before the defendant answers the complaint.

Logan v. Salvation Army · filed 2005-11-16(a)

It is undisputed that the motion was made before defendant answered the complaint, and defendant specifies that the motion is preanswer. Thus, the portion of the motion seeking summary judgment is premature (CPLR 3212 [a]; City of Rochester v Chiarella, 65 NY2d 92, 101 [1985]; Sonny Boy Realty, Inc. v City of New York, 8 AD3d 171, 172 [1st Dept 2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) governs the timeliness of a summary judgment motion.

Tietjem v. Cha · filed 2005-11-21(a)

We further note that, under the circumstances of this case, that branch of Centurion’s motion which sought summary judgment was not untimely pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a).

Section 3212(b) permits sworn but unacknowledged affidavits to support a summary judgment motion.

Doyle v. Hafner · filed 2006-01-26(b)

nor is the court impressed with the argument that ... the sworn but unacknowledged affidavits submitted by Doyle are legally insufficient to carry his burden of proof (see CPLR 3212 [b]).

Section 3212(b) requires evidence sufficient to establish entitlement to summary judgment; an attorney’s affirmation without personal knowledge has no evidentiary value.

Pappalardo v. Long Island Railroad · filed 2006-02-09(b)

However, in a CPLR 3212 motion for summary judgment, an affirmation by an attorney who has no personal knowledge of the facts has no evidentiary value.

Section 3212(a) makes a summary judgment motion premature before issue is joined.

Manhattan Real Estate Equities Group LLC v. Pine Equity NY, Inc. · filed 2006-03-21(a)

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was premature, since issue had not yet been joined (CPLR 3212 [a]; Costalas v Amalfitano, 305 AD2d 202, 204 [2003]).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by an affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts, the pleadings, and available proof showing that a cause of action has no merit.

LaRusso v. Katz · filed 2006-06-15(b)

A motion for summary judgment must be supported by an affidavit from a person having knowledge of the facts, as well as the pleadings and other available proof demonstrating that a cause of action has no merit (CPLR 3212 [b]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when a party needs discovery relevant to the motion.

J.C. v. Rose · filed 2006-11-17(f)

We agree with plaintiffs that the motion was premature and that Supreme Court therefore erred in granting it.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a court may reject an objection that a summary judgment motion is premature.

Vergara v. A & S Twins Construction Corp. · filed 2007-06-12(f)

The plaintiffs’ contention that the motion was premature is without merit (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212 permits an attorney’s affirmation without personal knowledge to submit documentary evidence in support of a summary judgment motion.

State v. Grecco · filed 2007-08-07

The Supreme Court improperly denied the motion by the Toussie defendants on the procedural ground that they did not submit an affidavit from a person with first-hand knowledge of the facts (see CPLR 3212).

A summary judgment movant must submit admissible evidence sufficient to warrant judgment as a matter of law.

LCO Building LCC v. Michaux · filed 2008-07-03(b)

Petitioner submitted no appraisal or other expert proof of the market value of its property in support of its motion for summary judgment and thus “failed to tender evidence in admissible form ‘sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment’ in [its] favor” (id., quoting CPLR 3212 [b]; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

Section 3212(f) does not make a motion for summary judgment on liability premature solely because discovery remains incomplete.

Garner v. Chevalier Transportation Corp. · filed 2009-01-27(f)

On June 23, 2004, the plaintiff’s vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle owned by the defendant Chevalier Transportation Corp. and operated by the defendant Jeffery Martin. On his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting an affidavit in which he stated that his vehicle was stopped when it was struck in the rear. A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence against the driver and owner of the moving vehicle, and imposes a duty of explanation on its driver (see Johnston v Spoto, 47 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]). In opposition, the defendants failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Myrie v Atehortua, 275 AD2d 699 [2000]). Furthermore, contrary to the contention of the defendants, the plaintiffs motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Kimya-garov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs motion for summaiy judgment on the issue of liability. Spolzino, J.E, Covello, McCarthy and Belen, JJ., concur.

Section 3212(b) requires a physician seeking summary judgment to support the physician’s affidavit with medical records or other factual evidence.

Assenza v. Horowitz · filed 2009-10-09(b)

However, in the Appellate Division, Second Department, a proper motion for summary judgment made by a physician must include the physician’s affidavit and must be supported by the medical record, or at the least some other factual support.

Section 3212(f) allows a court to deny or defer summary judgment when a party needs discovery to obtain facts within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge.

Stockwell v. Town of New Berlin · filed 2010-01-28(f)

Inasmuch as defendants’ motion was brought before plaintiff and the Town had an opportunity to conduct such discovery, the motion should have been denied or held in abeyance (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

A summary judgment motion on one claim or defense does not permit a court to grant judgment on an unrelated defense that the opposing party had no opportunity to address.

Quizhpe v. Luvin Construction · filed 2010-02-16

The Supreme Court “erred in essentially searching the record and [granting relief] based upon arguments that were not raised” (Matter of Ek v Travis, 20 AD3d 667, 668 [2005]). ... Since Sanchez and Luvin did not seek summary judgment based on the Workers’ Compensation statutes, the plaintiff had “no opportunity for opposition” (Lanoce v Anderson, Banks, Curran & Donoghue, 259 AD2d 965, 965 [1999]).

Section 3212(b) permits a summary judgment motion to rely on a deposition transcript as other available proof when the transcript was properly prepared and submitted to the witness.

Pargament v. Oaks at Latourette Condo · filed 2010-10-28(b)

CPLR 3212 (b) provides that a motion for summary judgment can be supported by other available proof, such as a deposition transcript (Dorsainvil v Parker, 28 Misc 3d 1225[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51493[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]). A deposition transcript which has not been executed by the deponent can be used in support of a motion for summary judgment if it has been properly prepared and has been submitted to the witness (Thomas v Hampton Express, 208 AD2d 824 [2d Dept 1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 803 [1995]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when limited discovery has been conducted.

CONIBER, JEFF v. CENTER POINT TRANSFER STATION, INC. · filed 2011-03-25(f)

Supreme Court properly concluded that it was premature to grant defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint at this stage of the litigation, in view of the limited discovery that has been conducted (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Sportiello v City of New York, 6 AD3d 421).

Section 3212(b) permits an attorney’s affidavit with attached exhibits to support a summary judgment motion.

RUPERT, JR., PHILIP D. v. GATES & ADAMS, P.C. · filed 2011-04-01(b)

There is no merit to plaintiff’s further contention that the affidavit submitted by the attorney for defendants, to which various exhibits were attached, was insufficient to support the motion (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Rivas v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 203 AD2d 349, 350).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by an affidavit, the pleadings, and other available proof.

Araujo v. Mercer Square Owners Corp. · filed 2011-09-01(b)

Under CPLR 3212 (b), the motion must “be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions.”

Section 3212(b) requires a party seeking summary judgment to submit proof sufficient to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Town of Oyster Bay Housing Authority v. Wilicki · filed 2012-07-31(b)

The petitioner has not submitted any affidavit corroborating petitioner’s version of events. Petitioner’s evidence is insufficient to meet its burden.

CPLR 3212 does not permit a court to deny summary judgment based on unsupported conjecture.

Godoy v. Central Islip Union Free School District · filed 2012-09-06

A motion for summary judgment cannot be denied on the basis of wholly unsupported conjecture.

Section 3212(b) allows a summary judgment motion to be supported by an affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts; the absence of such an affidavit is not necessarily fatal when the movant submits other proof.

Vetrano v. J. Kokolakis Contracting, Inc. · filed 2012-11-28(b)

Contrary to Kokolakis’s contention, the plaintiffs’ original motion was sufficiently supported by the affidavit of the injured plaintiff’s coworker, who had personal knowledge of the facts (see Federal Fin. Co. v Levine, 281 AD2d 454, 455 [2001]; CPLR 3212 [b]). In any event, the failure to submit an affidavit by a person with knowledge of the facts is not necessarily fatal to a motion where, as here, the moving party submits other proof, such as deposition testimony with an attorney’s affirmation (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; O;an v Farrell Lines, 64 NY2d 1092, 1093 [1985]; Moragos v Sakurai, 92 AD3d 922, 923 [2012]; Finnegan v Staten Is. R.T. Operating Auth., 251 AD2d 539, 540 [1998]; Woods v Zik Realty Corp., 172 AD2d 606, 606 [1991]).

CPLR 3212(b) permits summary judgment on a claim for excess economic loss when the claimant produces no admissible evidence supporting it.

WILSON, HAROLD v. COLOSIMO, CHRISTOPHER · filed 2012-12-28(b)

Finally, we conclude that the court properly denied plaintiffs’ cross motion and granted defendants summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) on plaintiffs’ claim for economic loss in excess of basic economic loss. Although a claim for economic loss does not require the plaintiff to have sustained a serious injury (see generally Montgomery, 38 NY2d at 47-48; Colvin, 15 AD3d at 900; Barnes v Kociszewski, 4 AD3d 824, 825), plaintiffs here “failed to produce any evidence in admissible form which supports such a claim” (Watford v Boolukos, 5 AD3d 475, 476; see Insurance Law §§ 5102 [a] [1] - [3]; 5104 [a]).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit admissible evidence sufficient to warrant judgment as a matter of law.

In re the Rehabilitation of Financial Guaranty Insurance · filed 2013-01-24(b)

The movant must tender evidence, by proof in admissible form, to establish the cause of action “sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment.” ... Here, no affirmations/affidavits have been supplied which raise any material issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing as to the proposed plan.

Section 3212(b) permits an employee’s affidavit based on a review of the lender’s books and account records to support summary judgment.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Shapiro · filed 2013-03-05(b)

Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of an employee who identified herself as having personal knowledge of, inter alia, plaintiffs status as successor-in-interest to WAMU and defendant Saadia Shapiro’s default. This was based upon her review of plaintiffs books and records and its account records regarding Shapiro’s delinquent account (see CPLR 3212 [b]). In opposition, Shapiro failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

A peer review report submitted on a summary judgment motion must be properly sworn or affirmed under CPLR 3212(b).

A-Quality Medical Supply v. GEICO General Insurance · filed 2013-03-18(b)

It is only when a peer review report is being submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion that it must be properly sworn or affirmed (see CPLR 3212 [b]; see e.g. BLR Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 141[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50882[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Points of Health Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 33 Misc 3d 127[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51843[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

CPLR 3212(b) allows a sworn hearing transcript to support a summary judgment motion when it is as reliable as an affidavit.

Drever v. State · filed 2014-03-14(b)

However, CPLR 3117 governs the use of depositions at trial and hearings, whereas CPLR 3212 (b) governs the types of proof allowable in support of a motion for summary judgment. The type of proof allowable in support of such summary judgment motions has been determined to include any item of proof as reliable as an affidavit (see State of New York v Metz, 241 AD2d 192, 200 [1st Dept 1998]). ... Accordingly, the court concludes that the transcript of claimant’s 50-h hearing constitutes supporting proof under CPLR 3212.

Section 3212 governs summary judgment motions; a request for documents about standing cannot be treated as such a motion.

Deer Park Associates v. Town of Babylon · filed 2014-10-08

Nor can the appellants’ request for the production of documents pertaining to the plaintiffs’ allegations of standing be construed as a motion to dismiss for lack of standing (see CPLR 3211 [a] [3]), or as a motion for summary judgment on that ground (see CPLR 3212).

CPLR 3212(b) permits a court to consider answers submitted in reply to cure a deficiency in summary judgment motion papers.

Ramade v. C.B. Contracting Corp. · filed 2015-04-23(b)

The motion court did not abuse its discretion by considering the answers of codefendants Emcor and C.B. Contracting, since SEW cured the deficiency in its motion papers by submitting the answers in its reply papers (see Pandian v New York Health & Hosps. Corp., 54 AD3d 590, 591 [1st Dept 2008]; CPLR 3212 [b]).

Section 3212(b) permits counsel’s affirmation to submit admissible evidence on a summary judgment motion without an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge.

Aur v. Manhattan Greenpoint Ltd. · filed 2015-10-29(b)

The court erred in denying the Fernandez defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that they failed to submit an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge of the facts underlying the motion (CPLR 3212 [b]). Their counsel’s affirmation properly served as a vehicle for the submission of evidentiary proof in admissible form, such as plaintiff’s deposition testimony (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980]).

A party seeking summary judgment must provide the documents needed to establish entitlement to judgment.

Cohen v. CASSM Realty Corp. · filed 2016-03-14(b)

Therefore, insofar as defendants rely on a proprietary lease, bylaws, or a certificate of occupancy to establish that defendants are not responsible for or that plaintiff is not entitled to ownership and occupancy of the fourth floor unit by a family with an artist, defendants’ failure to support their summary judgment motion with those documents requires denial of their motion.

Summary judgment may be granted when a sworn peer review report establishes a lack of medical necessity and the opposing affidavit fails to rebut its conclusions.

Ther-Ox Home Care, Inc. v. Praetorian Ins. Co. · filed 2016-06-03

In support of its motion, defendant submitted a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the peer reviewer's determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the supplies at issue. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a doctor which failed to meaningfully refer to, let alone sufficiently rebut, the conclusions set forth in the peer review report ( see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co. , 24 Misc 3d 136 [A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Section 3212(b) permits a person with knowledge of the facts to submit an affidavit supporting a summary judgment motion.

Benitez v. United Homes of New York, LLC · filed 2016-09-27(b)

The bank’s closer, who was responsible for ensuring that the closing documents were in order, clearly had “knowledge of the facts” and therefore was qualified to submit an affidavit in support of the bank’s summary judgment motion (CPLR 3212 [b]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but remain within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control.

Stern v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2016-10-06(f)

Insofar as the precise interrelationship among the various entities involved here and their responsibilities to the hotel have not yet been the subject of defendant’s deposition, and knowledge about the relationship and responsibilities between the various corporate entities is solely within the control of defendant, not of plaintiff, the motion is premature, as plaintiff contends. “Where essential facts to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment might exist, but cannot be stated because they are in the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control, summary judgment must be denied. (CPLR 3212 [f].)” (Ciaffaglione v Rabiner, 202 AD2d 373, 373 [1st Dept 1994].) Thus, the motion should be denied on that basis because discovery is not complete, particularly the deposition of defendant by plaintiff.

Under CPLR 3212(f), an opposing party must establish that a summary judgment motion is premature; the absence of discovery alone did not prevent judgment here.

Al-Mamar v. Terrones · filed 2017-01-11(f)

The unnotarized affidavits of Luis A. Aquino, as translator, were not in admissible form (see CPLR 2101 [b]; Raza v Gunik, 129 AD3d 700, 700-701 [2015]; Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp., 83 AD3d 47, 54 [2011]), and, in any event, Terrones and Diaz failed to offer a nonnegligent explanation for the accident, raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Olga was comparatively negligent, or establish that the motion was premature (see Binkowitz v Kolb, 135 AD3d 884, 885 [2016]; see also CPLR 3212 [f]).

A summary judgment motion served within 120 days of the filing of the notice of trial is not untimely because identical papers are later filed to correct the court's address.

Healthy Way Acupuncture, P.C. v. 21st Century Indem. Ins. Co. · filed 2017-02-08(a)

It is uncontroverted that defendant served plaintiff with its original motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on April 14, 2014, which was within 120 days of the filing of the notice of trial on December 13, 2013. However, the Clerk of the Kings County Civil Court did not accept the filing of the motion because the notice of motion contained an incorrect address for the court. Thereafter, in May 2014, defendant filed a second, otherwise identical, motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, which set forth the correct address for the Civil Court. ... Consequently, we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in determining that defendant's second motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was not untimely.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by admissible evidence pertinent to the issue being decided.

Zhubrak v. Petro · filed 2017-03-01(b)

Under these circumstances, the motion was procedurally defective (see CPLR 3212 [b]) and, in any event, the plaintiffs failed to meet their “burden of establishing, prima facie, not only that the defendant was negligent, but that [they were] free from comparative fault” (Ramos v Bartis, 112 AD3d 804, 804 [2013]; see France Herly Bien-Aime v Clare, 124 AD3d 814, 814 [2015]; Brown v Mackiewicz, 120 AD3d 1172, 1173 [2014]).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit admissible evidence sufficient to support the motion.

Berr v. Grant · filed 2017-04-18(b)

However, the certificate of occupancy does not mention any hot tub, and defendants did not submit an affidavit of any person with knowledge explaining the significance of these documents (see CPLR 3212 [b]).

Section 3212 requires a summary judgment movant to present admissible evidence establishing that no triable issue of fact remains.

In re Donnisha S. · filed 2017-04-19(b)

While it appears that Mr. S. disputes the merits of the allegations against him, as he claims that his conduct failed to fall below a minimum standard of care, no admissible evidence was presented upon which the court could reasonably conclude that there are no triable issues of fact.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by an affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts; an attorney’s affirmation without that knowledge lacks probative value.

Regency Vil. Mgt. v. Morris · filed 2017-08-10(b)

Landlord's motion for summary judgment should have been denied since landlord failed to submit an affidavit by a person with the requisite knowledge of the facts; the attorney's affirmation which landlord submitted lacks probative value ( see CPLR 3212 [b]; Sydney Realty, LLC v Desiderio , 17 Misc 3d 137 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52302[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]).

CPLR 3212(b) does not require a court to search the record and grant summary judgment to a party that did not cross-move when factual issues remain.

GMMM Westover LLC v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. · filed 2017-11-02(b)

Nor do we find that Supreme Court erred in not searching the record and granting defendant summary judgment with respect to the existence of easements to the reserved parcels despite defendant’s failure to cross-move for such relief (see CPLR 3212 [b]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny a premature summary judgment motion with leave to renew after discovery is complete.

Guerrero v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2019-11-06(f)

Under the circumstances, we agree with the determination of the Supreme Court denying the NYCTA defendants' motion for summary judgment with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery ( see CPLR 3212[f]).

CPLR 3212(a) imposes a timeliness requirement on summary judgment motions.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.. v. Jones · filed 2021-05-11(a)

As for defendant's motion for summary judgment, we find that it was untimely ( see CPLR 3212[a]).

Section 3212(f) permits a party to oppose summary judgment as premature when facts essential to its opposition are within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge.

Greca v. Choice Assoc. LLC · filed 2021-12-02(f)

We reject Choice's argument that plaintiffs' motion was premature (CPLR 3212[f]). Choice failed to establish that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were within plaintiffs' exclusive knowledge ( see Voluto Ventures, LLC v Jenkens & Gilchrist Parker Chapin LLP , 44 AD3d 557, 557 [1st Dept 2007]).

Section 3212 permits summary judgment when the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant owed a duty of care.

Bodaness v. Staten Island Aid, Inc. · filed 1989-07-10

The plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that Staten Island Aid, Inc. owed a duty of care to third parties makes summary judgment an appropriate remedy.

Under Section 3212(f), a party’s request for summary judgment can show that further disclosure is unnecessary to decide the motion.

Commack Roller Rink, Inc. v. Commack Arena Marketing, Inc. · filed 1989-10-02(f)

Finally, the plaintiff’s motion to compel disclosure, which the plaintiff, by requesting summary judgment, effectively conceded was not essential (cf., CPLR 3212 [f]), was rendered academic by the determination made on the cross motion and was, therefore, properly denied.

Section 3212 permits summary judgment despite pending discovery when the opposing party identifies no information it hopes to obtain that would raise a triable issue of fact.

Midtown Candy Co. v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. · filed 1990-04-17(f)

There was no need to withhold summary judgment pending discovery. Plaintiff has not shown that any discovery was requested and has not identified even one item of information it hopes to obtain that would raise a triable issue of fact.

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify further disclosure based on vague allegations of wrongdoing and bad faith.

Summer v. Edward R. Pressman Production, Inc. · filed 1993-02-23(f)

Nor can it be said that defendant violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to submit plaintiff’s resume or arrange an interview with the third party (see, Wood v Laughlin, 103 AD2d 881), and plaintiff’s otherwise vague allegations of wrongdoing and bad faith do not justify further disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see, Pitter & Co. v Segal, 173 AD2d 159, 160, mod on other grounds 174 AD2d 439).

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment for disclosure when the facts sought would not justify opposition to the motion.

City of New York v. Gesuale · filed 1994-05-17(f)

In view of the foregoing, the facts defendant wants to explore in disclosure would not "justify opposition” to the motion, and there was no need to deny the motion to obtain disclosure (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Administrative Code of City of NY § 16-129; Modell & Co. v City of New York, 159 AD2d 354, appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 845, supra).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party needs disclosure of evidence relevant to its claim.

Volgstadt v. Jamestown Scrap Corp. · filed 1994-09-30(f)

Because plaintiff must prove malice, he is entitled to disclosure of evidence of defendants’ knowledge and motivation at the time the alleged defamatory statements were made (see, Mansour v Abrams, 144 AD2d 905; see generally, Freeman v Johnston, 84 NY2d 52; Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429). The court also properly denied defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Blue Bird Coach Lines v 107 Delaware Ave., 125 AD2d 971; see also, Mansour v Abrams, supra).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice pending discovery of relevant information in the moving party’s exclusive control.

Daly v. City of New York · filed 1995-03-28(f)

It is this court’s determination that the NYCHA’s motion be denied without prejudice pending the completion of outstanding discovery including examinations before trial. (CPLR 3212 [f].) It is apparent that certain information as to the knowledge of the NYCHA as to criminal activity on its property by persons residing there is in its exclusive control.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or postpone summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party may exist but cannot yet be stated without disclosure.

Urcan v. Cocarelli · filed 1996-12-23(f)

When it appears that facts supporting the position of the party opposing summary judgment exist but cannot be stated, the court may deny the motion or order a continuance to permit disclosure to be had (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when outstanding discovery may reveal facts needed to oppose the motion.

Cossu v. JWP Inc. · filed 1997-06-30(f)

While plaintiffs will have the burden of demonstrating that Welsbach had exclusive management and control of this particular streetlamp during the relevant time period and that plaintiffs relied on Welsbach’s performance of its contractual obligations to their detriment, these are outstanding questions of fact which the parties should have an opportunity to explore during discovery, which has been stayed during the pendency of this motion. Accordingly, defendant Welsbach’s motion for summary judgment must be denied at this time.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when disclosure has not occurred.

AIT International, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2000-12-26(f)

Moreover, due to the lack of disclosure, it would be premature to grant summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Lantigua v Mallick, 263 AD2d 467).

Section 3212(f) permits further disclosure before summary judgment is granted when relevant facts remain unresolved.

Berg v. Repap Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-05-29(f)

Summary judgment in favor of either party is precluded by issues of fact, including whether defendant’s approval of the subject contract was fraudulently induced by plaintiff’s misrepresentations that the contract was prepared by counsel he had retained on behalf of defendant’s Board rather than himself, and reviewed by a compensation expert who was independent of such counsel. At the least, there should be disclosure from such counsel (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not warrant disclosure before summary judgment when the opposing party has access to its records and does not show that essential facts may be exclusively in the movant’s knowledge.

Stainless Corp. v. Middlesex (U.S.A.) Inc. · filed 2001-06-07(f)

Inasmuch as defendant had full access to its records at the time of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, yet failed to submit the records that it asserts gave it cause for terminating the agreement after it had already purported to terminate the agreement without cause, it does not appear likely that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but are exclusively in plaintiffs knowledge.

Section 3212(f) does not warrant delaying summary judgment for further disclosure based on speculation that evidence may emerge.

Thomas v. Board of Education · filed 2002-02-21(f)

Plaintiff’s speculation that the school district deviated from its own policy concerning the placement of security personnel or that further discovery may disclose such a deviation neither raised a triable question of fact nor warranted the denial of the motion pending further disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when relevant facts may exist and the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

Bustillo v. Tuckahoe Development, LLC · filed 2002-12-02(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, after the plaintiff made out a prima facie case for summary judgment, Tuckahoe Development, LLC, sufficiently established that facts may exist that would demonstrate that the plaintiffs own actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries, but that it had not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Weininger v Hagedorn & Co., 91 NY2d 958; Heffernan v Bais Corp., 294 AD2d 401; Allen v Village of Farmingdale, 282 AD2d 485). Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion should have been denied as premature.

Section 3212(f) supports denying summary judgment before full disclosure when the plaintiff’s proof depends on evidence exclusively controlled by the defendants.

J & A Vending, Inc. v. J.A.M. Vending, Inc. · filed 2003-03-03(f)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying summary judgment to Answer Vending, Inc., Thomas Murn, Sr., and Thomas Murn, Jr., some of the defendants in Action No. 5. The defendants failed to comply with discovery demands and, as a result, there had been no disclosure in that action. An action should not ordinarily be dismissed on a motion for summary judgment prior to full disclosure where proof of the plaintiffs case depends on evidence within the exclusive control of the defendants (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Yu v Forero, 184 AD2d 506, 507 [1992]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment so opposing parties can obtain facts within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Ludwig v. Welsbach Electric Corp. · filed 2003-05-01(f)

Plaintiff and the City should be given an opportunity to explore that issue given appellant’s exclusive knowledge of the nature, extent and time of the repair and maintenance work it performed on the subject traffic light (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when essential facts remain unavailable pending discovery.

Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. North Fork Bank · filed 2005-03-14(f)

As these essential issues of fact cannot be determined on this record and remain within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff, the motion should have been denied as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; 181 S. Franklin Assoc. v Y & R Assoc., 6 AD3d 594 [2004]; Morris v Hochman, 296 AD2d 481 [2002]).

Section 3212(f) permits summary judgment to be deferred for depositions when discovery may reveal facts bearing on liability.

Binyan Shel Chessed, Inc. v. Goldberger Insurance Brokerage, Inc. · filed 2005-05-16(f)

Under the particular facts of this case, summary judgment to Goldberger at this juncture would be premature. ... Depositions should therefore be held.

Section 3212(f) does not warrant further disclosure before summary judgment when the disclosure would not contradict the movant’s proof and concerns only a severed counterclaim.

George S. May International Co. v. Thirsty Moose, Inc. · filed 2005-06-02(f)

Defendant’s argument regarding the need for further disclosure (see CPLR 3212 [f]) is unpersuasive, as such disclosure would not contradict plaintiffs proof and is only relevant to defendant’s .counterclaim, which was severed and is still progressing.

CPLR 3212(f) gives courts discretion to allow further disclosure when the party seeking it shows that discovery may reveal material facts; speculation alone is insufficient.

Svoboda v. Our Lady of Lourdes Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2005-07-21(f)

Supreme Court is afforded discretion when presented with a request for further disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) and our review is guided by whether the court abused its discretion (see Pank v Village of Canajoharie, 275 AD2d 508, 509 [2000]). The party seeking such relief must “demonstrate how further discovery might reveal material facts . . . [and] mere speculation will be insufficient” (Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll, in Town of Schenectady, 267 AD2d 651, 652 [1999]). ... In light of such explanation and particularly because of the strong demonstration of the existence of potentially relevant evidence, together with the short time frame and restriction on further disclosure crafted in Supreme Court’s order, we are unpersuaded that the court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity to discover facts within the moving party’s knowledge.

Colombini v. Westchester County Healthcare Corp. · filed 2005-12-27(f)

Summary judgment should be denied as premature where, as here, the party opposing the motion has not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery into issues within the knowledge of the moving party (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506 [1993]; OK Petroleum Distrib. Corp. v Nassau/Suffolk Fuel Oil Corp., 17 AD3d 551 [2005]; Mazzola v Kelly, 291 AD2d 535 [2002]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment to show why pending discovery warrants denying the motion.

Abramov v. Visan Fuel Oil Co. · filed 2006-03-07(f)

Further, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the motion should have been denied pending discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Neryaev v Solon, supra).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion made before disclosure, without prejudice to renewal after disclosure.

Gao v. City of New York · filed 2006-05-23(f)

The motion was made before any disclosure had been conducted and was properly denied in the circumstances presented (see CPLR 3212 [f]; McGlynn v Palace Co., 262 AD2d 116 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer or deny summary judgment without prejudice when further discovery may produce material evidence.

Mead v. Pentair Pump Group, Inc. · filed 2006-06-15(f)

We cannot agree, however, that Supreme Court also abused its discretion under CPLR 3212 (f) in holding GE’s motion for summary judgment in abeyance, and later denying it without prejudice, pending the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when outstanding discovery is needed to resolve material issues of fact.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 2007-03-13(f)

The resolution of those issues must, at minimum, await completion of discovery (see Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636 [2006]; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537 [1996]; CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to stay a summary judgment motion pending discovery when facts needed to oppose it may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Cassevah v. Mack · filed 2008-05-01(f)

A court is authorized to deny a summary judgment motion or grant a continuance thereof pending discovery when “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 163-164 [1980]). ... Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and motion for summary judgment stayed pending plaintiffs completion of discovery pursuant to Supreme Court’s order of open commission for depositions.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when discovery has not occurred and needed facts are within the defendants’ exclusive knowledge.

Barrios v. Boston Properties LLC · filed 2008-10-07(f)

That part of the motion that sought dismissal of the Labor Law § 200 claim was premature, since, as a result of the failure of all defendants to engage in discovery, the identity of the defendant that supervised and controlled the freight elevator into which plaintiff was loading door bucks was within defendants’ exclusive knowledge (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when relevant discovery remains outstanding.

30 CPS, LLC v. Board of Managers of Central Park South Medical Condominium · filed 2009-03-02(f)

The computer files are in the process of being analyzed. Hence, it would be premature to grant summary judgment to defendants. (CPLR 3212 [f].)

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery to show that facts essential to opposing summary judgment exist but cannot then be stated.

Urstadt Biddle Properties, Inc. v. Excelsior Realty Corp. · filed 2009-09-15(f)

Furthermore, the cross motion to compel discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) was properly denied. As relevant here, in order to obtain that relief, Yewdell was required to show that facts essential to his claim of fraudulent inducement existed but could not then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]). He failed to make that showing.

Section 3212(f) does not warrant additional disclosure when the opponent fails to show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated and the record shows further discovery would raise no factual issue.

Harlem Real Estate LLC v. New York City Economic Development Corp. · filed 2011-03-17(f)

In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiffs failed to show that “facts essential to justify opposition may [have] exist[ed] but [could not] then be stated” so as to warrant the additional disclosure they sought (CPLR 3212 [f]). In light of the existing record, it is clear that further discovery would reveal no evidence that would raise an issue of fact as to the validity of the conditions subsequent in the Harlem property contract and deed.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment pending discovery when the opposing party shows that further discovery would yield relevant evidence.

Wood v. Capital One Financial Corp. · filed 2011-03-29(f)

Moreover, the defendants failed to establish that the motion should have been denied pending discovery. The defendants failed to demonstrate that further discovery would ... lead to additional relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Lambert v Bracco, 18 AD3d 619, 620 [2005]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to delay summary judgment pending discovery to establish grounds for doing so.

Yemini v. Goldberg · filed 2011-10-04(f)

Moreover, Yemini failed to establish that the defendants’ motion should have been denied pending discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Lambert v Bracco, 18 AD3d 619, 620 [2005]).

A party seeking discovery to resist summary judgment must show how further discovery might reveal relevant facts within the opposing party’s exclusive knowledge or that it lacked an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.

Titan Communications, Inc. v. Diamond Phone Card, Inc. · filed 2012-04-03(f)

The Supreme Court also providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s cross motion to compel certain discovery, as the defendant failed to demonstrate how further discovery might reveal the existence of facts currently within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff which would warrant ... the denial of summary judgment, ... and did not make any showing that it had an inadequate opportunity to conduct discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; ...).

Section 3212 permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after discovery when the parties’ affidavits conflict about how an accident occurred.

Quezada v. Topside Systems Inc. · filed 2014-09-23(f)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered December 16, 2013, which denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, without prejudice to renewal following discovery, unanimously affirmed, without costs. No discovery has been conducted, and the parties’ affidavits are inconsistent as to how the accident occurred (see generally Licurgo-Cruz v Ahmed, 118 AD3d 420 [1st Dept 2014]; CPLR 3212 [c], [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when further discovery may yield relevant evidence or facts essential to opposition are within the other party’s exclusive knowledge and control.

South Shore Neurologic Associates, P.C. v. Mobile Health Management Services, Inc. · filed 2014-10-15(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the appellants’ contention, the referee’s determination was not premature, as they failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that further discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to oppose summary judgment were exclusively within the knowledge and control of South Shore (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Suero-Sosa v Cardona, 112 AD3d 706, 708 [2013]; Buchinger v Jazz Leasing Corp., 95 AD3d 1053 [2012]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to show that the discovery could produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion; speculation is insufficient.

TOWN BOARD OF TOWN OF BRIGHTON v. WEST BRIGHTON FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC. · filed 2015-03-27(f)

Contrary to the WBFD’s further contention, the Town’s motion was not premature on the ground that further discovery was necessary. In opposing a summary judgment motion as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), “ ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting [the conclusion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, and] mere speculation or conjecture [is] insufficient’ ” (Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169).

CPLR 3212(f) cannot be used to seek discovery merely to explore whether a viable cause of action can be fashioned.

Markov v. Spectrum Group International Inc. · filed 2016-02-02(f)

Plaintiff’s invocation of CPLR 3212 (f) is unavailing, because that provision may not be used as a means to embark upon a “fishing expedition” to explore the possibility of fashioning a viable cause of action against the corporate defendants (see Citibank, N.A. v Furlong, 81 AD2d 803, 804 [1st Dept 1981] [internal quotations marks omitted]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when the opposing party provides an evidentiary basis to believe discovery may yield relevant evidence; mere speculation is insufficient.

Dyer Trust 2012-1 v. Global World Realty, Inc. · filed 2016-06-08(f)

While the “court may deny a motion for summary judgment if ‘it appear [s] from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated!,]’ [i]t is incumbent upon the opposing party to provide an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence” (Suero-Sosa v Cardona, 112 AD3d 706, 707-708 [2013], quoting CPLR 3212 [f]; see Lauriello v Gallotta, 59 AD3d 497, 498-499 [2009]; Brewster v Five Towns Health Care Realty Corp., 59 AD3d 483, 484 [2009]). Here, the Global defendants and Oxygen failed to set forth such a basis, and the mere “ ‘hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is an insufficient basis for denying the motion’ ” (Suero-Sosa v Cardona, 112 AD3d at 708, quoting Savage v Quinn, 91 AD3d 748, 750 [2012]).

Subdivision (f) permits disclosure when facts essential to oppose summary judgment cannot yet be stated because they are exclusively within the opposing party’s knowledge and possession.

M&T BANK v. BENJAMIN, RONALD R. · filed 2016-12-23(f)

We further note that, in opposition to the motion and in support of that part of the cross motion seeking disclosure, defendant did not demonstrate that “facts essential to justify opposition” existed but could not then be stated because they were within the exclusive knowledge and possession of plaintiff (CPLR 3212 [f]; see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Prime, L.L.C., 125 AD3d 1307, 1308).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when material discovery remains outstanding, with leave to renew after discovery.

Marrone v. Miloscio · filed 2016-12-28(f)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied, as premature, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant driver, with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery, and should have granted the plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to amend his complaint.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party claiming summary judgment is premature must show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Tone v. Studin · filed 2017-03-29(f)

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of Sanofi (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 119 AD3d 768, 770 [2014]; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703, 704 [2012]).

A request for discovery under CPLR 3212(f) may be denied as academic when summary judgment dismissing the claims is warranted.

Milione v. City University of New York · filed 2017-08-23(f)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action at issue on this appeal, and denied, as academic, the plaintiff’s cross motion for discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when outstanding depositions may reveal evidence about a contested issue.

Schwengber v. Hultenius · filed 2018-04-05(f)

Inasmuch as the requested depositions may reveal information concerning the contested element of hostility, summary judgment was premature ( see CPLR 3212 [f]; Mayo v Grotthenthaler , 25 AD3d 998, 999 [2006]; Metichecchia v Palmeri , 23 AD3d 894, 895 [2005]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but are unavailable pending discovery.

Jackson v. Hunter Roberts Constr. Group, LLC · filed 2018-05-29(f)

The motion court properly denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims as premature. Regardless of whether the court misinterpreted defendants' October 11, 2016 letter as seeking further discovery, the record indicates that "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated" (CPLR 3212[f]). As no representatives from defendants have been deposed, and the record suggests that crucial facts may be within defendants' knowledge, additional discovery is necessary ( see Baghban v City of New York , 140 AD3d 586 [1st Dept 2016]; Figueroa v City of New York , 126 AD3d 438, 439 [1st Dept 2015]).

Section 3212(a) permits a party to move for summary judgment after issue is joined; incomplete discovery alone does not make the motion premature.

Mogul v. Baptiste · filed 2018-05-09(a)

The Supreme Court should not have denied the plaintiff's motion as premature. "Any party may move for summary judgment in any action, after issue has been joined" (CPLR 3212[a]). A grant of summary judgment is not premature merely because discovery has not been completed ( see Haidhaqi v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 153 AD3d 1328, 1329; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Armijos, 151 AD3d 943, 944; Lamore v Panapoulos, 121 AD3d 863, 864).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when further discovery may yield relevant evidence or essential facts are exclusively within the moving party's knowledge or control.

Liu v. Liu · filed 2018-07-05(f)

Further, the plaintiff's contention that the defendants' motion should have been denied as premature is unpersuasive, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the defendants' knowledge or control ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Diaz v Mai Jin Yang , 148 AD3d 672, 674; Williams v Spencer-Hall , 113 AD3d 759, 760).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when discovery may yield relevant evidence or facts essential to opposition are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge or control.

Tsyganash v. Auto Mall Fleet Mgt., Inc. · filed 2018-07-25(f)

Furthermore, the contention of Auto Mall and Edri that the plaintiff's motion was premature pursuant to CPLR 3212(f) is unpersuasive. Auto Mall and Edri failed to demonstrate how discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the plaintiff's knowledge or control ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Diaz v Mai Jin Yang , 148 AD3d 672, 674; see also Williams v Spencer-Hall , 113 AD3d 759, 760).

Section 3212(f) requires an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may reveal relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing summary judgment are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Lazarre v. Gragston · filed 2018-08-08(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's contention, the plaintiff's motion was not premature, as the defendant failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Niyazov v Hunter EMS, Inc ., 154 AD3d [*2]at 955; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp ., 45 AD3d at 737).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment for incomplete discovery when the opposing party shows that critical facts remain unavailable despite reasonable efforts to obtain them.

Williams v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2018-09-12(f)

At the outset, we reject plaintiff's argument that defendant's motion should be denied as premature on the ground that discovery was not yet complete ( see CPLR 3212 [f]), and that plaintiff should be allowed to depose defendant's employee and obtain certain documents. ... Plaintiff did not schedule the deposition or obtain the documents in question in the three years that the action had been pending before defendant made the summary judgment motion.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a premature summary judgment motion when further discovery may clarify material issues.

Anderson & Anderson LLP-Guangzhou v. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. · filed 2018-10-18(f)

The court correctly denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment both as premature ( see CPLR 3212[f]) and because issues of fact existed as to what was required by the contingency fee agreements to trigger defendant's payment obligation, whether plaintiffs met those requirements, whether the agreements automatically terminated on December 31, 2009, and whether plaintiffs were entitled to payment even if the agreements terminated on that date. Further discovery could prove illuminating on these issues - particularly expert discovery on the correct interpretation of these agreements under Chinese law ( see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Motorola, Inc. , 47 AD3d 293, 305 [1st Dept 2007]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when outstanding discovery is material to opposing the motion.

Portillo v. Carlson · filed 2018-12-12(f)

It was, therefore, premature to grant that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon his submission of evidence showing that Diane was the owner of the vehicle and the plaintiff's failure to rebut that evidence ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Marrone v Miloscio , 145 AD3d 996, 998; Knapp v Town of Hempstead , 130 AD3d at 580; Buto v Town of Smithtown , 121 AD3d 829, 830).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before summary judgment to show that facts essential to opposing the motion exist but cannot yet be stated.

Nationstar Mtge. LLC v. Islam · filed 2019-01-24(f)

Although Prime further asserted that it was entitled to discovery concerning plaintiff's possession of the note and the underlying assignments, it did not show that facts essential to justify opposition exist but could not be stated, such that plaintiff would not be entitled to summary judgment (CPLR 3212[f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking further disclosure to show that it would reveal facts capable of raising a triable issue.

Rivera v. City of New York · filed 2019-04-10(f)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact or show that disclosure would have revealed the existence of such facts ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Lopez v Dobbins , 164 AD3d 776).

CPLR 3212(f) does not require denying summary judgment as premature when discovery could not uncover facts warranting denial.

Bernstein v. Dubrovsky · filed 2019-02-05(f)

Moreover, Supreme Court correctly refused to deny the motion as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212(f); because the affirmative defenses are precluded, no discovery could lead to facts that would warrant the denial of plaintiff's summary judgment motion.

Outstanding discovery does not make a summary judgment motion premature when the opposing driver knows how the accident occurred and shows no need for discovery on liability.

Estate of Bachman v. Hong · filed 2019-02-07(f)

Although discovery had not yet been taken, the motion was not premature as to liability because defendant, as the driver, has knowledge of how the accident occurred and did not show any need for discovery on that issue ( see Delgado v Martinez Family Auto , 113 AD3d 426, 427 [1st Dept 2014]; Johnson v Phillips , 261 AD2d 269, 270, 272 [1st Dept 1999]; CPLR 3212[f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when relevant discovery remains outstanding.

Paramount Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. · filed 2019-03-07(f)

However, the determination that defendant's policy is primary to the policy that Paramount issued to David Ellis was premature, as discovery concerning policies issued to other parties to the underlying litigation, including Union Square Café, was still outstanding (CPLR 3212[f]), and such policies were not submitted for Supreme Court's consideration.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment for outstanding discovery when the opponent shows that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Noel v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. · filed 2019-03-27(f)

The plaintiff failed to establish that discovery might lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendant ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Portalatin v City of New York , 165 AD3d 1302; Williams v Spencer-Hall , 113 AD3d 759, 760; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium , 96 AD3d 703, 704).

Section 3212(f) does not make summary judgment on liability premature when outstanding discovery would concern only the plaintiff's comparative fault.

Francois v. Tang · filed 2019-04-24(f)

Contrary to the defendants' contention, summary judgment was not premature due to outstanding discovery ( see CPLR 3212[f]). The outstanding discovery identified by the defendants allegedly would lead only to evidence of the plaintiff's comparative fault. A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault in order to establish a prima facie case of the defendants' liability ( see Rodriguez v City of New York , 31 NY3d 312).

Incomplete discovery does not warrant denying summary judgment when the opposing party has received ample discovery and identifies no material information still missing.

Abe v. New York Univ. · filed 2019-02-07(f)

As the voluminous record shows, plaintiff received ample discovery, and he fails to cite any missing information that is material to his case, or explain why he did not seek certain information prior to issuance of the note of issue, six years after commencement of the 2010 action ( see Alvarez v Feola , 140 AD3d 596, 597 [1st Dept 2016]; Rosenberg & Estis, P.C. v Bergos , 18 AD3d 218 [1st Dept 2005]). For the same reasons, denial of summary judgment was not warranted on the basis that discovery was not complete (CPLR 3212[f]; Frierson v Concourse Plaza Assoc. , 189 AD2d 609, 610 [1st Dept 1993]; see Fulton v Allstate Ins. Co. , 14 AD3d 380, 381 [1st Dept 2005]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when necessary discovery has not yet occurred.

Guzman v. City of New York · filed 2019-04-30(f)

The summary judgment motion was properly denied as premature. No discovery had been conducted before Bronx Parking moved for summary judgment, thereby depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to depose the parties who would have knowledge concerning the relevant issues in this action including the negligence if any, of Bronx Parking ( see Rodriguez v Architron Envtl. Servs., Inc. , 166 AD3d 505 [1st Dept 2018]; Marabyan v 511 W. 179 Realty Corp. , 165 AD3d 581 [1st Dept 2018]; CPLR 3212[f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when outstanding discovery may clarify a defendant’s role in the case.

S.V.L. v. PBM, LLC · filed 2021-02-18(f)

In reinstating the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, we decline to affirm its dismissal as against defendants 345 Park Avenue South Partnerships, Aby Rosen, and Michael Fuchs. The record is unclear as to these defendants" role in owning and managing the premises, and Rosen and Fuchs"s depositions were stayed pending the parties" summary judgment motions, making summary judgment premature ( see generally CPLR 3212[f]; Lyons v New York City Economic Dev. Corp. , 182 AD3d 499, 499-500 [1st Dept 2020]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Laura Andrew, Inc. v. Holub Enters., Inc. · filed 2021-03-24(f)

"CPLR 3212(f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated" ( TD Bank, N.A. v 126 Spruce St., LLC , 117 AD3d 716, 716-717 [internal quotation marks omitted]). ... Here, DLRA sufficiently demonstrated that facts may exist, but have not yet been disclosed, to support its defense that the plaintiff encumbered the property with fraudulent mortgages, without seeking to foreclose until after DLRA purchased the property, so as to conceal the Holub defendants' assets from creditors. Thus, it would be premature to award summary judgment to the plaintiff prior to any discovery ( see Vukel v Joan DiGirolomo Irrevocable Tr. , 172 AD3d 951, 953; TD Bank, N.A. v 126 Spruce St., LLC , 117 AD3d 716, 717).

Once a summary judgment movant meets its initial burden, CPLR 3212(b) requires the opponent to show facts sufficient to require a trial of a factual issue.

Kurth v. Lawlor · filed 1992-05-14(b)

To the extent that the movant’s proof meets this standard, the burden shifts to the opponent to "show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact” (CPLR 3212 [b]).

Once a summary judgment movant establishes entitlement to judgment, the opposing party must present admissible evidence of a triable issue of fact.

Whalen v. Gerzof · filed 1989-10-26(b)

Lorber and Pearcove sufficiently established these facts to entitle them to judgment in their favor (see, CPLR 3212 [b]). The burden then shifted to plaintiff to demonstrate, by evidence in admissible form, triable issues of fact (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557; Cusano v General Elec. Co., 111 AD2d 557, affd 66 NY2d 844).

Section 3212(b) permits summary judgment when the moving party establishes entitlement to judgment and the opposing party fails to show a triable issue of fact.

Di Nuzzo v. Gardner · filed 1990-02-01(b)

The facts on the motions establishing that defendants had undertaken no duty to test or inspect the soil sufficiently entitled these parties to judgment in their favor (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853). The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to come forward with proof in evidentiary form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to establish its entitlement to judgment; the opposing party must then rebut that showing with proof in admissible form.

Potaczala v. Fitzsimmons · filed 1991-03-08(b)

Otis had the burden of establishing that it had not undertaken to maintain, service or repair the gates and locking devices of the subject elevator (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Iselin & Co. v Mann Judd Landau, 71 NY2d 420, 425; Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067-1068). Otis has satisfied that burden by showing that it never agreed to undertake nor undertook such responsibilities.

Under CPLR 3212(b), once a summary judgment movant establishes entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must show a triable issue of fact with admissible proof.

Batinkoff v. Batinkoff · filed 1991-05-02(b)

It is settled law that when a party moving for summary judgment sets forth evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle that party to judgment as a matter of law, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate by admissible proof the existence of a triable issue of fact (CPLR 3212 [b]; see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). The initial burden will be met when, as here, the movant produces proof of the promissory notes in question and the nonpayment of such notes according to their terms (see, Fidelity N. Y. v Hanover Cos., 148 AD2d 577). This caused the burden to shift to defendants, and we conclude that Supreme Court correctly found that defendants did not meet that burden.

Under CPLR 3212(b), the moving party must establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law before the opposing party must show a triable issue of fact with admissible proof.

Gardner v. Ethier · filed 1991-05-09(b)

Only when that initial requirement is met does the burden then shift to the opposing party to demonstrate, by admissible proof, the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Once the movant makes the initial showing required for summary judgment, § 3212(b) requires the opponent to offer admissible proof of facts requiring a trial.

Cheeseman v. Inserra Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 1991-06-27(b)

Only then does the burden shift to the party opposing the motion "to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form to establish the existence of such facts which require a trial of the action” (Du Pont v Town of Horseheads, 163 AD2d 643, 644).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to establish its entitlement to judgment with admissible proof; the opposing party must then offer admissible proof raising a factual issue for trial.

Joines v. Karika · filed 1992-06-18(b)

Defendants met their initial burden of a summary judgment motion (CPLR 3212 [b]; see, Wilder v Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 175 AD2d 534) by, inter alia, producing ... proof in admissible form that they were not negligent with respect to the sidewalk in question. ... The burden then shifted to plaintiff to come forward with proof, in admissible form, raising an issue of fact as to defendants’ negligence necessitating a trial of the issue (see, supra, at 535; see also, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Section 3212 shifts the burden to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence raising a material issue of fact once the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Friesch-Groningsche Hypotheekbank Realty Credit Corp. v. 123 West 88th Associates · filed 1993-02-02

We agree with the IAS Court that third-party defendant’s submission made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate that its appraisal was based on an inspection of the building in question and relevant market conditions. The burden thus shifted to third-party plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise material issues of fact bearing on whether the appraisal was negligently or fraudulently prepared.

Under CPLR 3212(b), the moving party must establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the opposing party must show facts requiring a trial.

Kuzyns v. City of New York · filed 1993-03-02(b)

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, it is well settled that the moving party must establish his defense " ' "sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment” in his favor’ ” (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562, quoting Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067, quoting CPLR 3212 [b]), and that to defeat a summary judgment motion, " 'the opposing party must "show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact” ’ ” (supra, at 562).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to establish entitlement to judgment with admissible evidence; the opponent must show a triable issue of fact.

In re the Estate of Sackler · filed 1993-04-05(b)

"To obtain summary judgment it is necessary that the movant establish his [or her] cause of action or defense 'sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment’ in his favor (CPLR 3212, subd [b]), and he [or she] must do so by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form. ... Here, the appellant has demonstrated her entitlement to summary judgment in that she has presented a promissory note signed by the decedent.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit admissible evidence sufficient to justify judgment in its favor.

Hackstadt v. Hackstadt · filed 1993-06-10(b)

To prevail on a summary judgment motion, it is incumbent upon the moving party to tender evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to justify the direction of summary judgment in his or her favor (CPLR 3212 [b]).

On a motion for partial summary judgment, once the movant meets its initial burden, the opposing party must establish a genuine defense.

DH Cattle Holdings Co. v. Reno · filed 1993-08-12(e)

We therefore conclude that plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden on the motion for summary judgment and, accordingly, the burden shifts to defendants to establish a genuine defense (see, First Intl. Bank v Blankstein & Son, supra).

Under CPLR 3212(b), a movant who presents sufficient evidence for judgment as a matter of law shifts the burden to the opponent to offer admissible proof of a triable issue of fact.

Forbes v. Plume · filed 1994-03-17(b)

Under the circumstances here, we find that plaintiff set forth sufficient evidentiary facts through her ... sworn affidavit, the police accident report and the motor vehicle accident report filed by defendant to entitle her to judgment as a matter of law (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; see also, Whitely v Lobue, 24 NY2d 896; Gardner v Ethier, 173 AD2d 1002) .

Once a summary judgment movant supports the motion with admissible evidence, the opposing party must demonstrate a triable issue of fact; an unsubstantiated claim is insufficient.

Fleet Credit Corp. v. Harvey Hutter & Co. · filed 1994-08-08(b)

The burden thus shifted to the defendants to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact warranting denial of the motion (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067; Lennox Indus. v Bier & Assocs., 201 AD2d 539), and the defendants’ unsubstantiated claim that the leased computers and software equipment, which the corporate defendant had retained for nearly four years, did not function as expected, was insufficient to preclude summary judgment (see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320; Grimm Bldg. Material Co. v Freeman Excavating, supra; Toth v Carver St. Assocs., 191 AD2d 631).

Section 3212 requires the moving party to eliminate material factual issues; the opposing party must produce admissible evidence of an issue requiring trial.

Greenebaum v. Barthman · filed 1994-12-22

The record reveals that defendant established entitlement to judgment in his favor, as a matter of law, by tendering sufficient evidence, including the agreed order, to eliminate any material issue of fact from the case (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853), and that the plaintiff failed to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form, including the purported promissory note, sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact requiring a trial with respect to whether the parties intended their release to encompass the decedent’s obligation on the promissory note (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Under section 3212(b), once the movant establishes prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must raise a triable issue of fact.

Charos v. Esseks, Hefter & Angel · filed 1995-06-26(b)

With respect to the second cause of action to recover damages for breach of a fiduciary duty, the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence to raise a triable issue of fact after the defendants had established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see, CPLR 3212 [b]).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to make a prima facie case and the opposing party to raise a triable issue of fact.

Salenius v. Lisbon · filed 1995-07-31(b)

The internal accident report submitted by the plaintiff, in which the operator of the offending vehicle admitted that he had "run” a red light, made out a prima facie case that the defendants were solely liable for the accident (see, CPLR 3212 [b]). The only evidence submitted by the defendants in opposition to the motion was the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, which failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she had been contributorily negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care in entering the intersection or in avoiding the collision (see, CPLR 3212 [b]).

Section 3212(b) places an initial burden of proof on a summary judgment movant, and the opposing party can defeat the motion by raising a factual question.

Richards v. Toomey · filed 1995-11-09(b)

While it is true that, in support of his motion, defendant submitted sufficient proof to sustain his initial burden on a motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [b]), we nevertheless agree with Supreme Court that plaintiff in turn submitted sufficient medical evidence to raise a factual question as to whether she was unable to perform her usual and customary daily activities for more than 90 of the first 180 days immediately following the accident (see, Van De Bogart v Vanderpool, 215 AD2d 915, 915-916).

Section 3212(b) requires the party opposing a supported summary judgment motion to produce admissible evidence sufficient to defeat it.

Villager Construction, Inc. v. J. Kozel & Son, Inc. · filed 1995-12-22(b)

The burden then shifted to plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to defeat the cross motion (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit admissible proof warranting judgment; once that burden is met, the opposing party must submit admissible proof raising a factual question for trial.

Vielhauer v. Dick Corp. · filed 1996-02-08(b)

To prevail on a summary judgment motion, it is incumbent upon the moving party to tender evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to warrant the direction of summary judgment in his or her favor (see, CPLR 3212 [b]). Once this requirement is satisfied, the opposing party must then submit proof in admissible form sufficient to create an arguable question of fact requiring a trial (ibid.; see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; Heffernan v Colonie Country Club, 160 AD2d 1062).

Once a movant shows entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must present admissible evidence of a triable issue of fact.

Sciacca v. Mandel · filed 1996-04-22(b)

The plaintiff made a sufficient showing to entitle her to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of foreclosure. The burden therefore shifted to the appellant to show, by way of admissible evidence, the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the underlying mortgage was a fraudulent conveyance. The appellant having failed to do so, the court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273-276; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557).

CPLR 3212 permits summary judgment when the movant establishes its entitlement to judgment and the opponent fails to present evidence raising a triable question of fact.

Vermont Federal Bank v. Chase · filed 1996-04-25

There are no questions of fact requiring a trial and plaintiff established its entitlement to summary judgment while defendant failed to submit evidence creating any question of fact for trial (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; see also, CPLR 3212).

CPLR 3212(b) permits summary judgment when the movant establishes entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and the opponent fails to present admissible evidence of a material factual dispute.

O'Donnell v. Cullen · filed 1996-07-01(b)

The court properly granted summary judgment since the plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and the defendants failed to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form establishing the existence of material questions of fact (see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320; CPLR 3212 [b]).

Under CPLR 3212(b), a showing of entitlement to summary judgment shifts the burden to the opposing party to overcome that showing.

Masone v. Westchester County · filed 1996-07-03(b)

Initially, we conclude that defendants’ submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment, including a transcript of Kirschner’s EBT, established their entitlement to summary judgment, thus shifting the burden to plaintiff to overcome said entitlement (see, Vielhauer v Dick Corp., 224 AD2d 792; see also, CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Section 3212 permits summary judgment when the movant makes a prima facie showing and the opponent fails to raise a triable issue of fact with admissible evidence.

Sapiro v. Pyon · filed 1996-04-29

The appellant made a prima facie showing that repair of the lights was outside the scope of its work under the contract, and that it fulfilled its contractual obligations with the City. In opposition, the City failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact by submission of evidentiary proof in admissible form. Accordingly, the appellant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaints (see, CPLR 3212; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Bretsky v. Northville, Industries Corp. · filed 1996-07-08(b)

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324; Carcione v County of Suffolk, 225 AD2d 575).

Once a summary judgment movant makes a prima facie case, the opposing party must raise a triable issue of fact.

Locasio v. Astoria Bus Co. · filed 1997-02-10(b)

After the defendants made out a prima facie case for summary judgment, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (CPLR 3212 [b]) as to whether the plaintiff Vincent Locasio sustained a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

A summary judgment movant's prima facie showing can warrant judgment when the opposing expert's assertions are vague and refuted by the records.

Gehres v. Central General Hospital · filed 1997-02-24

The affidavit sworn to November 15, 1995, by Dr. Julius H. Jacobson II made out a prima facie case that the appellant had not departed from good and accepted standards of medical practice in treating the plaintiff Albert Gehres during his admission at the appellant hospital. ... However, the plaintiffs’ expert’s vague assertions are refuted by the doctor’s order sheets and the medication record, which indicate that the antibiotic Keffin was prescribed and administered to Mr. Gehres every six hours from November 11, 1986, through November 17, 1986.

CPLR 3212(b) permits summary judgment when the movant makes a prima facie showing and the opposing evidence fails to raise a triable issue of fact.

Nicosia v. Straberg · filed 1997-02-24(b)

The affirmation submitted by Dr. Michael V. Marrone made out a prima facie case (see, CPLR 3212 [b]) that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The evidence submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion, consisting of, among other documents, his affidavit and the affirmation prepared by his treating physician, Dr. Jeffrey Gross, failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see, CPLR 3212 [b]).

After the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must show facts sufficient to require a trial of a factual issue.

Allocca v. Shop Rite Hardware, Inc. · filed 1997-03-03(b)

Once the movant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, it is incumbent upon the party opposing the motion to "show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact” (CPLR 3212 [b]; see also, Frank Corp. v Federal Ins. Co., 70 NY2d 966; Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067).

Section 3212(b) permits summary judgment when the movant shows entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and the opposing parties fail to show a triable issue of fact.

Wallace v. City of New York · filed 1997-03-31(b)

We have reviewed the record and find that the appellant demonstrated its entitlement to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, supra). In response, neither the plaintiffs nor the remaining defendants offered any evidence to show the existence of triable issues of fact as to the liability of the appellant. Under the circumstances, summary judgment must be granted in its favor.

Section 3212(b) requires a party opposing a sufficient motion for summary judgment to present admissible evidence of a material factual issue.

Rescigno v. Key Bank · filed 1997-09-22(b)

The defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the plaintiffs failed to refute that showing with evidence in admissible form demonstrating the existence of a material issue of fact (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Frank Corp. v Federal Ins. Co., 70 NY2d 966; Scheer v City of New York, 211 AD2d 778; Johnson v Lutz, 253 NY 124; People v Brown, 80 NY2d 729; see generally, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557).

Section 3212(b) permits summary judgment when the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement and no triable issue of fact is raised.

Mattarelliano v. Moish Gas Stations, Inc. · filed 1997-09-29(b)

The defendant Chuck Realty Corp. (hereinafter Chuck) made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment and, contrary to the conclusion reached by the court, no triable issue of fact was raised that Chuck held any interest in the premises such as would render it liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff Joseph Mattarelliano (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562-563; CPLR 3212 [b]).

Under CPLR 3212(b), a movant who demonstrates entitlement to judgment as a matter of law is entitled to summary judgment when the opposing party fails to produce evidence of a triable issue of fact.

Romana v. NYRAC, Inc. · filed 1997-12-22(b)

We have reviewed the record and find that, under the circumstances of this case, NYRAC has demonstrated its entitlement to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, supra). In response, the plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence to show the existence of triable issues of fact.

CPLR 3212 permits summary judgment when the movant makes a prima facie showing and the opposing party fails to raise a triable issue of fact.

Zuckerman v. Karagjozi · filed 1998-02-17

The medical evidence which the defendant submitted in support of the motion made out a prima facie case that neither plaintiff had sustained a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d).