N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

CPLR 3211(c) requires the court to notify the parties before treating a pre-answer motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.

Krusen v. Moss · filed 2019-07-18(c)

Furthermore, although a court may treat a pre-answer motion as one seeking summary judgment, it must notify the parties that it is doing so ( see CPLR 3211 [c]).

Section 3211(c) permits a court to convert a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion after adequate notice, with notice dispensable when the parties fully argue a purely legal issue.

Frank v. Metalico Rochester, Inc. · filed 2019-07-31(c)

Contrary to defendant's initial contention, the court did not err in converting that part of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the first cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 into a motion for summary judgment on that cause of action. The statute provides that, "[w]hether or not issue has been joined, the court, after adequate notice to the parties, may treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment" (CPLR 3211 [c]). Additionally, although the court is normally required to give notice to the parties before converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment ( see Carcone v D'Angelo Ins. Agency , 302 AD2d 963, 963 [4th Dept 2003]), the court properly dispensed with the statutory notice here inasmuch as the issue presented "rested entirely upon the construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contractual provision . . . [that] exclusively involve[d] issues of law which were fully appreciated and argued by the parties' " ( F & T Mgt. & Parking Corp. v Flushing Plumbing Supply Co., Inc. , 68 AD3d 920, 923 [2d Dept 2009], lv denied 15 NY3d 702 [2010]; see Hendrickson v Philbor Motors, Inc. , 102 AD3d 251, 258 [2d Dept 2012]; see generally Mihlovan v Grozavu , 72 NY2d 506, 508 [1988]).

Section 3211 provides a motion to dismiss whose standards differ from those governing a summary judgment motion.

Bullard v. Sheffer · filed 2022-06-16

Preliminarily, we reject respondent's contention, that the Surrogate's earlier, not appealed , order denying petitioner's CPLR 3211 motion, is law of the case. First, the standards on a CPLR 3211 motion and a summary judgment motion differ. Second, law of the case applies only to courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and an appellate court is not a coordinate tribunal ( see Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165 [1975]).

Denial of a preanswer motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a) does not prevent a later summary judgment motion on the same ground.

Levin v. Brust · filed 2023-09-26(a)

Civil Court should not have treated tenant's cross motion for summary judgment as a motion for leave to reargue a prior order denying tenant's preanswer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a). "[T]here is nothing which prevents a motion for summary judgment from being made on the same ground which had earlier been advanced in a motion to dismiss" ( Tapps of Nassau Supermarkets v Linden Blvd. , 269 AD2d 306, 307 [2000]; see Ancrum v St. Barnabas Hosp ., 301 AD2d 474, 475 [2003]).

Section 3211(c) allows a court to treat a motion and cross-motion as seeking summary judgment before an answer is filed when the motion expressly seeks that treatment and the opposing party has raised no defenses it could have asserted.

1995 Cam LLC v. West Side Advisors, LLC · filed 2023-11-09(c)

The motion court providently exercised its discretion to treat the motion and cross-motion as seeking summary judgment under CPLR 3211(c), and upon so doing, properly granted plaintiff's cross-motion on its first claim for pre-vacatur rents, even though defendants had not yet filed an answer.

Section 3211 governs motions to dismiss, but a motion made after joinder of issue and a trial readiness order is treated as one for summary judgment under section 3212.

Board of Mgrs. of the Colony at Hartsdale Condominium v. C.M.V. Co., Inc. · filed 2024-08-01

As a threshold matter, although the defendants' motion was denominated, in part, as one to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211, it was made after joinder of issue and after the Court issued a trial readiness order, and therefore, was actually one for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 ( see CPLR § 3212[a]; Brewi-Bijoux v City of New York , 73 AD3d 1112, 1113 [2d Dept. 2010]).

CPLR 3211(e) permits a defendant to seek summary judgment dismissing a complaint after a CPLR 3211(a) motion has been denied.

Barbiere v. 175 W. 12th St. Condominium · filed 2025-01-16(e)

Contrary to plaintiffs' position otherwise, CPLR 3211(e) does not preclude a defendant from moving for summary judgment dismissing the complaint after denial of a motion under CPLR 3211(a) ( see e.g. Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan v Capri Jewelry, Inc. , 128 AD2d 467, 469 [1st Dept 1987]).

CPLR 3211(c) permits a court to award summary judgment on a motion to dismiss when the notice of motion expressly seeks that relief.

Ostrager v. Chafetz · filed 2025-02-18(c)

Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendants buyers were entitled under CPLR 3211(c) to an award of summary judgment, releasing the down payment to them, as they expressly sought this relief in their notice of motion ( see 1995 CAM LLC v West Side Advisors, LLC , 221 AD3d 420, 420 [1st Dept 2023]).

CPLR 3211 (c) permits a court to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment without court notice when both parties clearly present their proof for summary judgment.

Sherman v. Hallmark · filed 1999-08-23(c)

No notice from the court is required, however, where “both sides make it unequivocally clear that they are laying bare their proof and deliberately charting a summary judgment course [citations omitted].” ... The court ñnds that the parties have indeed charted such a course, with each laying bare its proofs and offering a comprehensive, sworn account of the events that culminated in this action, and that the proofs submitted do not reveal any disputed issue of material fact. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.

A party seeking summary judgment under Section 3211(c) must make a prima facie showing of entitlement; if it fails, the court need not consider the opposing papers.

Carter v. Nouveau Indus., Inc. · filed 2020-10-07(c)

The order and the amended order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the third third-party defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the third third-party complaint and pursuant to CPLR 3211(c) for summary judgment dismissing the third third-party complaint. ... Additionally, as Nouveau correctly contends, Velis did not demonstrate, prima facie, that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the third third-party complaint, and therefore, we need not consider Nouveau's opposition papers with respect to that branch of Velis's motion ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr. , 64 NY2d 851, 853).

A court should not decide a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion on the bare pleadings when an unappealed ruling has already addressed the claims’ sufficiency using materials outside the current record.

Ennis v. Board of Education of Somers Central School District · filed 1998-03-30(a)(7)

Since the Supreme Court previously ruled on the sufficiency of the second, third, and fourth causes of action, based upon papers submitted on the motion for summary judgment which are dehors this record, and from which the defendants did not appeal, it would be inappropriate to rule on the sufficiency of those causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211, based upon the bare pleadings alone (see, Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633). Accordingly, we decline to disturb the denial of relief pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) with respect to these causes of action.

A ruling sustaining a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) establishes facial validity, not factual merit.

Jaffe v. Carol Management Corp. · filed 2000-01-13(a)(7)

Plaintiffs sole submission on the merits was a written decision of the Supreme Court, New York County, which permitted plaintiff to serve an amended complaint adding causes of action (CPLR 3025 [b]), and dismissed some causes of action, while sustaining others (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). ... The decision upon which plaintiff relies decided no more ... than that the causes of action sustained were facially valid. It did not determine factual merit.

Section 3211(g) requires a claim involving public petition or participation to have a substantial basis in law to survive dismissal.

161 Ludlow Food, LLC v. L.E.S. Dwellers, Inc. · filed 2019-10-03(g)

Dismissal of plaintiff's claim for slander per se was warranted because the individual defendant's alleged false statements were made at a Community Board meeting, and the claim lacked a substantial basis in law, as required to survive dismissal (CPLR 3211[g]; 600 W. 115th St. Corp v Von Gutfeld , 80 NY2d 130 [1992], cert denied 508 US 910 [1993]).

Section 3211(g) applies to actions involving public petition and participation; testimony given in a criminal prosecution in exchange for immunity does not qualify.

OSJ, Inc. v. Work · filed 1999-04-12(g)

In light of this definition of “an action involving public petition and participation” and the specific character of lawsuits which these subdivisions aim to avoid, when juxtaposed with the character of the case at bar, the conclusion is compelled that this case does not fall into the category of cases which may be deemed a SLAPP suit according to the parameters of CPLR 3211 (g) and 3212 (h).

Section 3211(g) requires dismissal of a SLAPP suit when the moving party establishes that it is a SLAPP suit and the responding party fails to show a substantial basis in law for its claim.

Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. v. National Mobilization Against Sweatshops · filed 1999-10-08(g)

Defendant AALDEF has demonstrated that the complaint against it should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (g). That statute provides that a motion made to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action in which the moving party has demonstrated that the action is a SLAPP suit, “shall be granted unless the party responding to the motion demonstrates that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law” (CPLR 3211 [g]).

When an action involves public petition and participation, CPLR 3211(g) requires the plaintiff opposing dismissal to demonstrate that the action has a substantial basis in law.

Lavine v. Glavin · filed 2023-08-11(g)

There is no dispute that defendant established on her motion that the action involves "public petition and participation" (CPLR 3211 [g]; see Civil Rights Law § 76-a [1] [a] [2]), and we conclude that plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, failed to demonstrate that the action has a substantial basis in law inasmuch as defendant's statements in question constitute nonactionable expressions of opinion ( see CPLR 3211 [g]; see generally Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 269-270 [2014]).

A party waives a challenge to an immediate trial under CPLR 3211(c) by participating without objection.

Matter of Manahata Med. Servs. P.C. v. Kohli · filed 2026-05-14(c)

Initially, petitioners waived any challenge to the immediate trial held by Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c) to address the limited factual issue of whether respondent had knowledge of petitioners' agreements to use the property.

A pre-answer motion to dismiss does not resolve a disputed tenant-versus-licensee status when the movant relies on that status to establish its defense.

City of New York v. Ralph K. Jackson, M.D., P.C. · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1), (a)(7)

Although it appears from the documents that the office was, at best, a month-to-month sublicensee, a final determination on this point is premature before issue is joined. As defendant relies on its position that it was a tenant rather than a licensee, it has not satisfied its burden.

CPLR 3211 dismissal is unsuitable when allegations of material breach require a fact-intensive determination.

Intrepid Invs., LLC v. Selling Source, LLC · filed 2024-12-03

Defendants fail to address this point; in addition, these allegations are very fact-intensive, rendering them unsuitable for dismissal on a CPLR 3211 motion.

CPLR 3211(c) requires a trial on a motion to dismiss when factual issues must be resolved to determine whether a claim is time-barred.

Knoll v. Datek Securities Corp. · filed 2003-12-15(c)

A trial is required to ascertain the defendants’ intent in listing a balance on the commission analysis statements and whether the commission analysis documents constitute written acknowledgments of a debt sufficient to take the action outside the statute of limitations (see General Obligations Law § 17-101; CPLR 3211 [c]).

Section 3211(c) allows an immediate trial to resolve disputed facts raised on a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the motion should be denied.

Colao v. Mills · filed 2004-01-15(c)

Here, given the marked discrepancies between the deputies’ and plaintiff’s versions of the “consent,” Supreme Court should have denied the motion or conducted an immediate trial pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c) in order to resolve those issues.

Section 3211(c) permits an immediate trial of a factual issue raised on a motion to dismiss when resolving it may expedite disposition of the action.

Vaynman v. Maimonides Medical Center · filed 2004-02-09(c)

Because resolution of this issue may permit an expeditious disposition of the action insofar as asserted against the appellants, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court for an immediate trial of the issue (see Art Stone Theat. Corp. v Technical Programming & Sys. Support of Long Is., 157 AD2d 689 [1990]; Mass v Great Am. Ins. Co., 28 AD2d 897 [1967]; CPLR 3211 [c]).

When a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion relies on factual material beyond the complaint, the court considers whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and whether an alleged material fact is conclusively disproved.

Hoyte v. Epstein · filed 2004-11-15(a)(7)

Although the motion at bar was denominated by the defendants as one to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the arguments made were premised upon factual averments beyond those in the complaint. ... Alternatively, the submission and consideration of the factual material on the motion to dismiss required the court to determine whether the plaintiff had a cause of action, not just whether she stated one; that is, whether a material fact alleged by the plaintiff “is not a fact at all” and “no significant dispute exists regarding it” ... Here, regardless of which standard is applied, the motion to dismiss the complaint should not have been granted.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), disputed factual issues cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

State v. Grecco · filed 2005-08-08(a)(7)

As noted, supra, these disputed factual issues are not properly raised and resolved on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

CPLR 3211 (a) (7) does not permit a court to resolve potential factual issues on a pre-answer motion to dismiss.

City Line Auto Mall, Inc. v. Citicorp Leasing, Inc. · filed 2007-11-20(a)(7)

Citicorp’s claim that the plaintiff was “obviously aware” of the prohibition against resale, and its claim that it did not possess the vehicle and therefore could do nothing to “facilitate” the redemption, present potential factual issues which should not be determined on a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Section 3211 does not permit a court to resolve factual disputes about the merits when deciding a motion to dismiss.

T. Lemme Mechanical, Inc. v. Schalmont Central School District · filed 2008-06-12

On a CPLR 3211 motion, a court should not resolve the merits of a claim by making factual determinations (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635 [1976]; Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v State of New York, 300 AD2d 949, 952 [2002]).

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the court cannot resolve the disputed meaning of documents or whether they gave plaintiffs constructive notice.

Roni LLC v. Arfa · filed 2010-06-03(a)(7)

The import of these documents and the question whether they put plaintiffs on constructive notice cannot be resolved on a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Braddock v Braddock, 60 AD3d 84, 88 [2009]).

CPLR 3211 does not permit a court to decide on a motion to dismiss whether a party breached an agreement when that issue requires a factual determination.

Meghan Beard, Inc. v. Fadina · filed 2011-03-24

Whether plaintiff can demonstrate Fadina breached that booking agreement is a factual determination that can not be made on a CPLR 3211 motion.

Section 3211(c) calls for an immediate trial of a disputed statute of limitations issue when that trial would expedite resolution of a motion to dismiss.

Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center v. Daines · filed 2012-12-20(c)

The record did not conclusively establish when petitioner received the determination letter, as there are factual questions on this issue (compare Westchester Med. Ctr. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 40 AD3d 981, 982-983 [2007]). Thus, Supreme Court should not have decided the motion on the papers submitted, but instead should have ordered an immediate trial on the statute of limitations issue, as such a limited trial would have been “appropriate for the expeditious disposition of the controversy” on this procedural ground (CPLR 3211 [c]; see CPLR 2218; Matter of Meinhardt v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 151 AD2d 802, 803-804 [1989]; see also R. Bernstein Co. v Popolizio, 97 AD2d 735, 735 [1983]).

CPLR 3211(c) permits an immediate trial of a statute of limitations issue when disputed facts prevent resolution of a dismissal motion on the papers.

Richmond Medical Center v. Daines · filed 2012-12-20(c)

Because they did not meet that burden as a matter of law, and questions of fact exist, Supreme Court should have held a trial on that narrow issue.

CPLR 3211(c) permits an immediate trial of a statute of limitations issue when factual questions prevent deciding the motion on the papers and a trial would expedite disposition.

Richmond Medical Center v. Daines · filed 2012-12-20(c)

Thus, Supreme Court should not have decided the motion on the papers submitted, but instead should have ordered an immediate trial on the statute of limitations issue, as such a limited ... trial would have been “appropriate for the expeditious disposition of the controversy” on this procedural ground (CPLR 3211 [c]; see CPLR 2218; Matter of Meinhardt v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 151 AD2d 802, 803-804 [1989]; see also R. Bernstein Co. v Popolizio, 97 AD2d 735, 735 [1983]).

CPLR 3211 does not permit a court to resolve a factual question about the reasonableness of reliance on a motion to dismiss.

Loreley Financing (Jersey) No. 28, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. · filed 2014-05-08

Whether it was reasonable for plaintiff to rely on the representation in the offering circular that 250 Capital ... would select Auriga’s collateral is a factual matter that cannot be determined on a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss (see e.g. Skillgames, LLC v Brody, 1 AD3d 247, 251 [1st Dept 2003]; Swersky v Dreyer & Traub, 219 AD2d 321, 328 [1st Dept 1996]).

A CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion fails when the defendant does not establish that the plaintiff’s factual allegation is “not a fact at all.”

Gaetano Development Corp. v. Lee · filed 2014-10-15(a)(7)

Nor did Lee establish that the plaintiffs allegation that he entered into the contract in his individual capacity was “not a fact at all” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 does not resolve factual questions about whether a party diligently performed its contractual obligations.

RAD & D'Aprile Inc. v. Arnell Construction Corp. · filed 2015-06-05

Whether defendant diligently performed its obligation to plaintiff in presenting its claims to the City raises questions of fact which are not appropriately determined upon this motion to dismiss.

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, a court may decide a purely legal issue on the merits when factual issues cannot affect the answer.

Gessin v. Throne-Holst · filed 2015-09-23(a)

This is a pure legal issue calling for statutory interpretation; factual issues will not have an impact upon the powers and duties of the Trust. Accordingly, a determination of this issue may be made on the merits at this stage of the action (see 401 W. 14th St. Fee LLC v Mer Du Nord Noordzee, LLC, 34 AD3d 294, 295 [2006]; Washington County Sewer Dist. No. 2 v White, 177 AD2d 204, 206 [1992]; see also North Oyster Bay Baymen’s Assn. v Town of Oyster Bay, 130 AD3d 885 [2015]; Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d 520, 524 [2013]).

A factual dispute over whether a plaintiff satisfied a condition precedent to coverage cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss under Section 3211(a)(7).

High Definition MRI, P.C. v. Travelers Companies, Inc. · filed 2016-03-22(a)(7)

Defendant insurance companies’ further contention that plaintiff failed to appear for examinations under oath, which is a condition precedent to coverage (Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2015]), presents a factual issue not amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal when a material issue of fact cannot be resolved on the motion.

Canon Financial Services, Inc. v. Meyers Associates, LP · filed 2016-05-24(a)(7)

Whether and when Canon knew that certain individuals were secretly affiliated with EZ Docs is an issue of fact not appropriate for resolution on this motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit a court to resolve disputed factual issues about the merits on a motion to dismiss.

Von Maack v. Wyckoff Heights Medical Center · filed 2016-06-22(a)(7)

To the extent that the plaintiff raises contentions regarding the merits of her cause of action, these contentions involve disputed factual issues that are not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

A factual question about whether a contract covers off-site facilities cannot be resolved on a prediscovery motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211.

Gerrish v. 56 Leonard LLC · filed 2017-02-16

However, this is merely speculation; whether the Temporary Facilities clause is limited to on-site facilities or is inclusive of off-site facilities is clearly a question of fact that cannot be determined on this prediscovery motion to dismiss.

Section 3211(a) does not permit factual issues that are not amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss to be resolved on that motion.

New York Univ. v. Turner Constr. Co. · filed 2018-07-03(a)

Defendant's contention that they should be treated as a single entity is a factual issue not amenable to resolution on this motion to dismiss.

CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (5) do not permit dismissal based on a release when a disputed fact bearing on its enforceability remains unresolved.

Marc v. Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2020-07-01(a)(1) and (5)

However, this merely raised an issue of fact which cannot be resolved at this stage of the proceeding ( see generally Sacchetti-Virga v Bonilla , 158 AD3d at 784). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (5) to dismiss the amended complaint.

CPLR 3211 does not permit resolution of whether documentation was sufficient to make numerous contractual indemnification claims timely.

Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Generation Mtge. Co. · filed 2021-02-16

Whether plaintiff provided defendants with sufficient documentation to render each of the claims for the numerous loans timely is not a matter to be resolved on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211.

On a motion to dismiss, a factual dispute over whether alleged advice was given in an attorney capacity cannot be resolved on the pleadings.

Boesky v. Levine · filed 2021-04-01(a)(7)

Whether the advice Levine allegedly dispensed with regard to the audits and litigation was provided solely in his capacity as tax matters partner for one of the limited liability companies in which plaintiffs invested, and not as their attorney, is an issue of fact that cannot be resolved on the pleadings.

A CPLR 3211 motion cannot resolve the effect of a disputed conflict between contractual obligations and governing rules on an insufficiently developed record.

Nostalgic Partners, LLC v. New York Yankees Partnership · filed 2022-05-03

Whether there is a conflict between the Yankees' covenant in the 2011 Letter Agreement [*2]Amendment and the Major League Rules cited by the Yankees, and the effect (if any) of any such conflict, are matters that cannot be resolved on this CPLR 3211 motion.

A court may decide the enforceability of a restrictive covenant on a motion to dismiss.

My Goals Solutions, Inc. v. Ansari · filed 2025-06-10(a)(7)

But the enforceability of a restrictive covenant is an appropriate analysis on a motion to dismiss.

A CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss does not resolve factual issues concerning standing or the effect of underlying injunctions.

Yes I Can Licensed Behavior Analyst PLLC v. Green Tree Capital, LLC. · filed 2026-03-16

Defendant's remaining arguments regarding standing and the effect of the underlying injunctions either misconstrue the nature of the claims asserted or raise factual issues that are not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss .

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not permit a court to resolve factual disputes on a motion to dismiss.

Gusel v. King · filed 2026-05-19(a)(7)

Although plaintiffs invoke that provision, its interaction with Inwood Tower's relevant by-laws is dependent on factual issues that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Section 3211(c) permits an immediate trial of a factual issue that determines whether dismissal is warranted.

Downey v. Swan · filed 1982-10-12(c)

Order reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements, and the matter is remitted to Special Term for an immediate trial pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd [c]) in accordance herewith.

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, CPLR 3211(d) requires the plaintiff to show only that jurisdictional facts may exist, without making a prima facie showing.

Dumigan v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. · filed 2025-05-25(d)

However, courts do not require the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, but only to demonstrate that facts "may exist" to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant (see CPLR 3211 [d]; American BankNote Corp. v. Daniele, 45 AD3d 338, 340 [I st Dept 2007]).

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction before discovery is complete, a plaintiff who makes a sufficient start may obtain jurisdictional discovery without making a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.

Boris v. Bock Water Heaters, Inc. · filed 2004-03-04(a)(8)

A prima facie showing of jurisdiction is not even required, particularly for one seeking to confer jurisdiction under the long-arm statute (see, Peterson, supra at 467). All that is required is that the opposing party “made a sufficient start” (id.; see also, Cordero v City of New York, 236 AD2d 577 [1997]; Cosmos Mason Supplies v Lido Beach Assoc., 95 AD2d 818 [1983]). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction with leave to Perfection to renew its motion to dismiss upon completion of discovery (see, Napolitano, supra at 462; see also, Amigo Foods Corp. v Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 39 NY2d 391 [1976]).

Section 3211(d) allows a court to deny jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff did not request it in opposition to dismissal and offered no sufficient start toward showing jurisdiction.

SNS Bank v. Citibank · filed 2004-05-13(d)

The IAS court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs request for jurisdictional discovery. ... (see CPLR 3211 [d]), and plaintiff failed to offer “some tangible evidence which would constitute a ‘sufficient start’ in showing that jurisdiction could exist, thereby demonstrating that its assertion that a jurisdictional predicate exists is not frivolous” (Mandel v Busch Entertainment Corp., 215 AD2d 455, 455 [1995]).

Section 3211(d) permits a court to deny jurisdictional disclosure when the plaintiff makes no preliminary showing that facts supporting jurisdiction may exist and disclosure is unlikely to uncover them.

Spencer Laminating Corp. v. Denby · filed 2004-05-17(d)

However, looking for them would be a “fishing expedition.” Participating in this disclosure would be burdensome and expensive for defendant, and would, in part, contravene the purpose of rules limiting extraterritorial personal jurisdiction. The lack of any preliminary showing, and the unlikelihood of success, convince this court that defendant need not go through the process.

Section 3211(d) permits denial or continuance of a dismissal motion to allow discovery when essential facts may exist but are unavailable.

NYC Medical & Neurodiagnostic, P.C. v. Republic Western Insurance · filed 2004-12-22(d)

Indeed, CPLR 3211 (d) permits a court to deny a motion to dismiss made under CPLR 3211 (a) or to order a continuance to enable a plaintiff to secure additional proof or to conduct further discovery, where “facts essential to justify opposition may exist” but are not available to it.

CPLR 3211(d) permits the court to grant jurisdictional disclosure when plaintiffs show that facts supporting personal jurisdiction may exist.

Chen v. Lei Shi · filed 2005-06-06(d)

The plaintiffs established that facts “may exist” to exercise personal jurisdiction over Ly and have made a “sufficient start” to warrant further discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction over him (Peterson v Spartan Indus., supra; see Longview Fibre Co. v Triple R Indus., 188 AD2d 983, 984 [1992]), which, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (d), is within the court’s discretion to grant.

Section 3211(d) requires a party seeking jurisdictional discovery to show that essential jurisdictional facts may exist but are not yet known.

Copp v. Ramirez · filed 2009-02-24(d)

In order to obtain jurisdictional discovery pursuant to CPLR 3211 (d), plaintiffs must demonstrate the possible existence of essential jurisdictional facts that are not yet known (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 466 [1974]).

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when facts essential to oppose dismissal may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Gary Null & Associates, Inc. v. Phillips · filed 2010-06-28(d)

Finally, plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing to be entitled to jurisdictional discovery pursuant to CPLR 3211 (d). While plaintiff asserts that there are “essential jurisdictional facts that are not yet known,” it does not appear from the complaint or plaintiffs opposition papers that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist, but cannot now be stated.”

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when a plaintiff shows a sufficient start toward establishing jurisdiction and a position that is not frivolous; a prima facie showing is unnecessary.

Benefits By Design Corp. v. Contractor Management Services, LLC · filed 2010-07-08(d)

Although a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction is not required, to obtain such relief plaintiffs are required to demonstrate that they “have made a sufficient start, and shown their position not to be frivolous” (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]).We find that plaintiffs failed to make this demonstration.

A plaintiff who makes a sufficient start showing that facts supporting personal jurisdiction may exist can obtain discovery before a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is decided.

Lettieri v. Cushing · filed 2011-01-11(a)(8)

Here, in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiff established that facts “may exist” to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant Jumpking, Inc. (hereinafter Jumpking), and made a “sufficient start” to warrant further disclosure on the issue of whether personal jurisdiction may be established over that defendant (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d at 467; see Castillo v Star Leasing Co., 69 AD3d at 552). Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Jumpking.

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when facts needed to oppose a motion to dismiss may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Deer Consumer Products, Inc. v. Little · filed 2012-01-27(d)

Moreover, a holding at this stage that personal jurisdiction is lacking would be premature in light of Deer’s showing that facts essential to justify its opposition to this motion exist but cannot be stated at this time (CPLR 3211 [d]).

Section 3211(d) permits a court to deny a motion to dismiss when facts needed to oppose it may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Lemle v. Lemle · filed 2012-02-14(d)

CPLR 3211 (d) provides a court with discretion to deny a motion to dismiss if it appears that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3211 [d]; see Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]).

A party seeking to defer dismissal under CPLR 3211(d) must assert that facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Eighth Avenue Garage Corp. v. Kaye Scholer LLP · filed 2012-03-29(d)

Accordingly, it is of no moment that discovery has not been conducted. In addition, plaintiffs have not asserted that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may have existed but could not be stated (see CPLR 3211 [d]).

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff seeking jurisdictional discovery need only make a sufficient start showing that facts supporting jurisdiction may exist.

WILLIAMS, DANIEL v. BEEMILLER, INC. · filed 2012-10-05(a)(8)

“However, in opposing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) on the ground that discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction is necessary, plaintiffs need not make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, but instead must only set forth[] a sufficient start, and show[ ] their position not to be frivolous” (Lettieri v Cushing, 80 AD3d 574, 575 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467; Gold Bullion Intl. v General Mills, 53 AD2d 1045, 1045).

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff seeking jurisdictional discovery need only make a sufficient start and show that the claim of jurisdiction is not frivolous.

Williams v. Beemiller, Inc. · filed 2012-10-05(a)(8)

“However, in opposing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) on the ground that discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction is necessary, plaintiffs need not make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, but instead must only set forth! ] a sufficient start, and show[ ] their position not to be frivolous” (Lettieri v Cushing, 80 AD3d 574, 575 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]; Gold Bullion Intl. v General Mills, 53 AD2d 1045, 1045 [1976]).

Section 3211(d) permits a court to postpone deciding a personal jurisdiction dismissal motion when essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Goel v. Ramachandran · filed 2013-11-20(d)

If “it appear[s] from affidavits submitted in opposition to [the] motion . . . that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated,” a court may, in the exercise of its discretion, postpone resolution of the issue of personal jurisdiction (CPLR 3211 [d]).

CPLR 3211(d) requires a party seeking jurisdictional discovery to show that discovery would uncover facts supporting jurisdiction.

Hardwick v. Auriemma · filed 2014-04-08(d)

Finally, leave for jurisdictional discovery was properly denied. Plaintiff failed to show that discovery would uncover facts establishing that the impact of the alleged discrimination was felt in New York (see CPLR 3211 [d]).

A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction may be granted without jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff fails to show that facts supporting jurisdiction may exist.

Stern v. Four Points by Sheraton Ann Arbor Hotel · filed 2015-11-19(a)(8)

Since plaintiff has not shown that facts may exist to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over ZLC with respect to her claim arising from a trip-and-fall accident in Michigan, ZLC’s motion to dismiss was properly granted without providing plaintiff an opportunity to engage in jurisdictional discovery (see Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]; Mejia-Haffner v Killington, Ltd., 119 AD3d at 915).

CPLR 3211(d) permits denial of jurisdictional discovery when plaintiffs fail to submit affidavits identifying facts that may exist but cannot yet be stated and would support personal jurisdiction.

McBride v. KPMG International · filed 2016-01-19(d)

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery since plaintiffs failed to submit affidavits specifying facts that might exist but could not then be stated that would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over KPMG UK (CPLR 3211 [d]; see de Capriles v Lugo, 293 AD2d 405, 406 [1st Dept 2002], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 98 NY2d 717 [2002]).

CPLR 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when a plaintiff makes a sufficient start toward showing that the defendant has jurisdictional contacts with New York.

Venegas v. Capric Clinic · filed 2017-02-07(d)

... plaintiff made a “sufficient start” to warrant discovery concerning whether the doctor has jurisdictional contacts with the State of New York sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]; American BankNote Corp. v Daniele, 45 AD3d 338, 340 [1st Dept 2007]; CPLR 3211 [d]).

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when a plaintiff makes a sufficient start in demonstrating personal jurisdiction.

PD Cargo, CA v. Paten International SA · filed 2017-04-13(d)

Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to jurisdictional discovery (see Licci v Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327 [2012]; American BankNote Corp. v Daniele, 45 AD3d 338, 340 [1st Dept 2007]; see also CPLR 3211 [d]).

Section 3211(d) permits a court to hold a personal jurisdiction dismissal motion in abeyance for discovery when the plaintiffs sufficiently show that facts supporting jurisdiction may exist.

Santiago v. Highway Freight Carriers, Inc. · filed 2017-08-16(d)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, they failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant holding the defendants’ motion in abeyance while discovery is conducted on the issue of jurisdiction (see Mejia-Haffner v Killington, Ltd., 119 AD3d at 915), and the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

CPLR 3211 permits jurisdictional discovery when a plaintiff shows that facts supporting jurisdiction may exist but are within the defendants’ control.

Universal Investment Advisory SA v. Bakrie Telecom Pte., Ltd. · filed 2017-08-29

We now reverse as to B&B and the individual defendants and find that the motion to dismiss the third, fifth and seventh causes of action should have been denied without prejudice and the parties permitted to conduct jurisdictional discovery because plaintiffs “have demonstrated that facts ‘may exist’ in opposition to the motion to dismiss and are therefore entitled to the disclosure expressly sanctioned by CPLR 3211” (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]).

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when essential jurisdictional facts needed to oppose a motion to dismiss are not yet known.

Davis v. Scottish Re Group Ltd. · filed 2018-03-20(d)

Plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery pursuant to CPLR 3211(d) as to certain director and investor defendants is denied. ... Additionally, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate "the possible existence of essential jurisdictional facts that are not yet known" which would warrant jurisdictional discovery ( Copp v Ramirez , 62 AD3d 23, 31 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 711 [2009]).

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff makes a nonfrivolous showing that facts may exist to support personal jurisdiction.

Glazer v. Socata, S.A.S. · filed 2019-03-22(d)

We reject that contention inasmuch as plaintiff has not made a nonfrivolous showing "that facts may exist to exercise personal jurisdiction" over Aerospace ( Williams v Beemiller, Inc. , 100 AD3d 143, 153 [4th Dept 2012], amended on rearg 103 AD3d 1191 [4th Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3211 [d]; Peterson v Spartan Indus. , 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]).

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff makes a sufficient start by showing that essential jurisdictional facts might exist.

Nica Acupuncture, P.C. v. American Ind. Ins. Co. · filed 2019-10-18(d)

Thus, plaintiffs did not make a "sufficient start" ( id .) by showing that essential jurisdictional facts might exist to warrant discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction over defendant.

Section 3211(d) permits jurisdictional discovery when a party makes a sufficient start showing that essential jurisdictional facts are unknown and within the moving party’s exclusive control.

Cruz v. City of New York · filed 2022-11-17(d)

Furthermore, defendants, plaintiff and the HydraForce parties are not entitled to jurisdictional discovery from the Miller parties, as they did not make "a sufficient start" to show that "essential jurisdictional facts are not presently known . . . [and] within the exclusive control of the moving party" ( Peterson v Spartan Indus. , 33 NY2d 463, 466-467 [1974]; see CPLR 3211 [d]).

A party seeking jurisdictional discovery under CPLR 3211(d) must offer a sufficient basis to justify it.

Matter of New York Asbestos Litig. · filed 2023-01-31(d)

Defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and plaintiff cross-moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211(d), for jurisdictional discovery. ... Similarly, the court should have denied the cross motion because plaintiff did not offer a sufficient basis to justify jurisdictional discovery ( see Latimore v Fuller , 127 AD3d 521, 522 [1st Dept 2015]; cf. Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]).

Section 3211(d) permits a court to defer a personal jurisdiction dismissal for discovery when the plaintiff shows that facts supporting jurisdiction may exist.

Serota v. Cooper · filed 2023-05-17(d)

Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that facts may exist on the issue of personal jurisdiction so as to warrant holding the defendant's motion in abeyance while discovery is conducted ( see CPLR 3211[d]; Fanelli v Latman , 202 AD3d 758, 761; Abad v Lorenzo , 163 AD3d 903, 904).

Section 3211(d) allows a party opposing a jurisdictional motion to show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated, supported by tangible evidence that jurisdiction could exist.

Behre Piano Assoc., Inc. v. Suchomel · filed 2024-10-28(d)

CPLR §3211 (d) protects a party opposing a motion to dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional grounds by providing that such motion may be defeated by merely showing "that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated".

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff who makes a sufficient start toward showing jurisdiction may obtain jurisdictional discovery before the court decides the motion.

Katusha v. Mizrahi · filed 2024-12-31(a)(8)

Since Plaintiff’s assertion regarding defendants’ New York contacts constitute a sufficient start, the issue of jurisdiction should not be decided based on the current record before the Court.

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff who makes a sufficient start toward showing jurisdiction is entitled to jurisdictional discovery before dismissal is determined.

Hoover v. Cloud 9 Smokes & Vapors · filed 2025-07-25(a)(8)

We reverse the order insofar as appealed from inasmuch as we agree with plaintiff that he is entitled to jurisdictional discovery before it can be determinated whether dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is warranted ( see Williams v Beemiller, Inc. , 100 AD3d 143, 152 [4th Dept 2012], amended on rearg 103 AD3d 1191 [4th Dept 2013]).

Section 3211(g)(1) shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show a substantial basis in law once the defendant establishes that the claim concerns lawful conduct furthering free speech on a matter of public interest.

M.V. v. Bravo Media LLC · filed 2026-02-27(g)(1)

Reading these two provisions together, once the defendant has established that the subject of the action is both (1) based on lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the right to free speech and (2) concerns the public interest, then the Court must switch the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the claim has a substantial basis in the law.

Section 3211(g) applies to an action arising from a Facebook post concerning an issue of public interest.

Rubin v. Kahlon · filed 2026-02-24(g)

The instant action falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute (CPLR 3211[g] and Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a). The Facebook post concerned an issue of public interest ( see Carey v Carey , 74 Misc 3d 1214[A], *5 [Sup Ct, NY County 2022], affd 220 AD3d 477 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 3211(g)(1) requires dismissal of an anti-SLAPP suit unless the plaintiff shows that the action has a substantial basis in law.

USL Mar., LLC v. Adirondack Wild: Friends of the Forest Preserve · filed 2026-02-19(g)(1)

If that burden is met, the motion to dismiss must be granted unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that its action has "a substantial basis in law, which requires such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( Smartmatic USA Corp. v Fox Corp. , 213 AD3d 512, 512 [1st Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see CPLR 3211 [g] [1]; Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd ., 232 AD3d at 18-19).

Section 3211(g) applies the expanded anti-SLAPP definition of public petition and participation to actions continued after the 2020 amendments took effect.

Isaly v. Garde · filed 2025-09-11(g)

Applying these principles to the anti-SLAPP statutes, it is clear that since the 2020 amendments relate to the same subject matter and were adopted together, and that CPLR 3211 (g) and Civil Rights Law § 70-a both refer to Civil Rights § 76-a for the definition of public petition and participation, the legislature's intent was that they should be construed together. ... We find that plaintiff's August 22, 2022 motion to reargue was a continuation of this lawsuit, for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statutes, beyond the effective date of the 2020 amendments (Civil Rights Law § 70-a [1] [a]; Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2020, ch 250 at 5), and that Supreme Court correctly applied the amended definition of an action "involving public petition and participation" in dismissing this action as against Burke ( see Reeves , 232 AD3d at 19; Swiezy v Investigative Post, Inc ., 228 AD3d 1266, 1270-1271 [4th Dept 2024] ["Although this lawsuit did not fall within the definition of an 'action involving public petition and participation' until the 2020 amendments to the statute . . . and 'the intended application of the amendments to the statute allowing a counterclaim for costs and attorney's fees is prospective,' . . . 'there is no retroactive effect when those amendments are applied, according to their terms, to the continuation of an action beyond the effective date of the amendments'"] [internal citations and brackets omitted]).

Under CPLR § 3211(g), a claim subject to dismissal under § 3211(a) fails the stricter substantial basis standard.

Avanza Group, LLC v. Golenbock Eiseman Assor Bell & Peskoe LLP · filed 2025-06-13(g)

Because the tortious interference cause of action is subject to dismissal under CPLR § 3211(a), it necessarily then fails to meet the stricter substantial basis standard under CPLR § 3211(g).

Section 3211(g)'s heightened dismissal standard applies to a defamation claim about a company's business and fundraising practices when those practices are matters of public concern.

Inkmango, Inc. v. Warren · filed 2024-11-08(g)

Here, the business and fundraising practices of plaintiff are well within the scope of public concern and ... accordingly, the anti-SLAPP statute and heightened pleading standard apply.

When the Anti-SLAPP Law applies, the plaintiff must show a substantial basis in fact and law for its claims to avoid dismissal under Section 3211(g)(1).

Exceptional Media Ltd. v. Chainalysis, Inc. · filed 2024-10-21(g)(1)

As addressed above, here Exceptional bears the burden of showing that their claims have a substantial basis in fact and law, and they have not met that burden.

Section 3211(g) requires a plaintiff to show that claims arising from communications on an issue of public interest have a substantial basis in law, but does not require clear and convincing proof on a pre-answer motion to dismiss.

Zeitlin v. Cohan · filed 2023-10-31(g)

We do not adopt the motion court's finding that a "clear and convincing" standard is appropriate in assessing the adequacy of plaintiff's pleading on a pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see Smartmatic USA Corp. v Fox Corp., 213 AD3d 512, 512 [1st Dept 2023]). Nevertheless, we affirm on the grounds that plaintiff failed to show in opposition to defendant's motion that his claims had a substantial basis in law (CPLR 3211[g]; see Smartmatic USA Corp., 213 AD3d at 512).

Section 3211(g)(3) permits specified discovery during a motion to dismiss only when the nonmovant states under oath, for specified reasons, that it cannot present facts essential to its opposition.

Carey v. Carey · filed 2023-10-12(g)(3)

CPLR 3211(g)(3) allows for discovery in connection with [*2]a motion to dismiss only if, "for specified reasons," the nonmovant states, under oath, that "it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition," in which case the court "may order that specified discovery be conducted" notwithstanding the general stay of discovery otherwise effected by CPLR 3211(g).

On a motion to dismiss a SLAPP action under CPLR 3211(g), the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that its claim has a substantial basis in fact and law.

Duane Reade, Inc. v. Clark · filed 2004-03-31(g)

However, CPLR 3211 (g) amends prior law so that on a motion to dismiss a "SLAPP" action, the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish that its claim has the requisite "substantial basis." In order to avoid dismissal of its SLAPP suit complaint, plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence a "substantial basis" in fact and law for its claim.

Section 3211(g) requires dismissal of a SLAPP suit unless the responding party shows that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law.

Related Properties, Inc. v. Town Board of Harrison · filed 2005-10-11(g)

Where a moving party demonstrates that an action is a SLAPP suit, a motion to dismiss on this basis “shall be granted unless the party responding to the motion demonstrates that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law” (CPLR 3211 [g]). ... Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioners’ cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract lacks a substantial basis in law. Accordingly, dismissal of this cause of action was not warranted pursuant to CPLR 3211 (g).

CPLR 3211(g) subjects an action involving public petition and participation to a heightened standard of proof to avoid dismissal.

NATIONAL FUEL GAS DISTRIBUTION v. PUSH BUFFALO · filed 2013-03-22(g)

Thus, plaintiff’s action against PUSH was subject to “a heightened standard of proof” to avoid dismissal (Guerrero v Carva, 10 AD3d 105, 116; see CPLR 3211 [g]; 3212 [h]).

Section 3211(g) subjects an action involving public petition and participation to a heightened standard of proof to avoid dismissal.

National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp. v. PUSH Buffalo · filed 2013-03-22(g)

Thus, plaintiffs action against PUSH was subject to “a heightened standard of proof’ to avoid dismissal (Guerrero v Carva, 10 AD3d 105, 116 [2004]; see CPLR 3211 [g]; 3212 [h]).

Section 3211(g) requires dismissal of an anti-SLAPP claim unless the plaintiff shows a substantial basis in law, but that pleading standard conflicts with the Federal Rules and does not apply in federal court.

The National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, Inc. v. Multimedia System Design, Inc. · filed 2021-07-30(g)

Applying the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Reid, the Court concludes that the “substantial basis” standard articulated in New York’s anti-SLAPP law similarly conflicts with the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56. As noted supra, under New York’s law, a motion to dismiss must be granted unless, at the pleading stage, the plaintiff can “demonstrate[ ] that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” CPLR 3211(g).

The amended anti-SLAPP dismissal burden under CPLR 3211(g) does not apply retroactively.

Trinh v. Nguyen · filed 2022-12-23(g)

Therefore, we conclude that "the presumption of prospective application of the [anti-SLAPP] amendments has not been defeated" ( Gottwald , 203 AD3d at 489).

CPLR 3211(g)(1) requires claims subject to an Anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss to have a substantial basis in law, supported by relevant proof adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact.

Smartmatic USA Corp. v. Fox Corp. · filed 2023-02-14(g)(1)

Under New York's Anti-SLAPP statute (Civil Rights Law §§ 76-a[1][a], [2]), to withstand dismissal under CPLR 3211(g)(1), the claims pleaded must have "a substantial basis in law," which requires "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( Golby v N & P Engrs. & Land Surveyor, PLLC , 185 AD3d 792, 793-794 [2d Dept 2020]). The meticulously detailed complaint satisfied the requirements of CPLR 3211(g)(1).

On an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, a conclusory affidavit denying the defendant’s statements does not suffice when the defendant submits corroborating evidence.

Gillespie v. Kling · filed 2023-06-22(g)(2)

While Kling submitted affidavits from witnesses and other evidence corroborating her accounts of Gillespie's abusive conduct, Gillespie proffered only a conclusory and self-serving affidavit denying Kling's statements ( see CPLR 3211 [g] [2]).

Section 3211(g) permits courts to consider supporting and opposing affidavits on anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss, a procedure that conflicts with Federal Rule 12 in federal court.

LoanStreet Inc. v. Troia · filed 2023-09-08(g)

Moreover, as noted by Judge Kaplan in Carroll v. Trump, the revised anti-SLAPP cause of action contradicts the Federal Rules because “CPLR 3211(g), . . . as amended by the anti-SLAPP law, provides that a motion to dismiss made under the anti-SLAPP law shall be decided on the basis not only of the pleadings, but also of ‘supporting and opposing ... affidavits.’”

Section 3211(g)(1)'s substantial-basis standard for anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss does not apply in federal court because it conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

Watson v. NY Doe 1 · filed 2023-10-06(g)(1)

Here, the “substantial basis” standard in New York’s anti-SLAPP law conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Because Rule 12 complies with the Rules Enabling Act, the “substantial basis” standard in the New York anti-SLAPP law is inapplicable in federal court.

Section 3211(g)’s expanded anti-SLAPP dismissal standard does not apply to a complaint filed before the 2020 amendments merely because the dismissal motion was filed afterward.

VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v. Sproule · filed 2024-01-17(g)

Thus, to decide whether the standards under CPLR 3211(g) and Civil Rights Law § 76-a(2) apply, we must address whether the 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute apply retroactively or prospectively. ... We hold that the presumption of prospective application has not been overcome here. ... It is of no moment that the Sproules' dismissal motion was filed after the anti-SLAPP amendments had gone into effect. The dismissal motion, filed in lieu of an answer, is addressed to a complaint that precedes the November 10, 2020 effective date of the anti-SLAPP amendments.

CPLR 3211(g)(1) requires dismissal of a qualifying public participation claim unless the opposing party demonstrates a substantial basis in law or a substantial argument for changing existing law.

Karl Reeves, C.E.I.N.Y. Corp. v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd. · filed 2024-04-09(g)(1)

We hold, based on our reading of CPLR 3211(g) and (h), that "substantial basis" under the anti-SLAPP law means "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( Smartmatic USA Corp. v Fox Corp. , 213 AD3d 512, 512 [1st Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]), a phrase drawn from the relevant legislative history.

Section 3211(g) provides for dismissal of an action involving public petition and participation unless the party bringing it shows a substantial basis for the action.

Lanasa v. Stiene · filed 2024-04-17(g)

The Court declines to apply New York’s anti-SLAPP law to dismiss this action or to award costs or attorney fees. First, the Stienes have not “maintain[ed] an action, claim, [crossclaim,] or counterclaim” against LaNasa, which is necessary to obtain a costs or fee award under the statute. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 70-a(1). Second, even if the Court were to construe the Stienes’ motion to dismiss as a “claim” under the anti-SLAPP law, the Court agrees with the emerging consensus in this circuit that a federal court may not dismiss an action under New York’s anti-SLAPP law because the “substantial basis” standard in its dismissal provision conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56.

For an anti-SLAPP motion, CPLR 3211(a)(7) and (g) require dismissal unless the opposing party shows a substantial legal basis or a substantial argument to change existing law.

Acosta v. Vann · filed 2024-06-17(a)(7) and (g)

A motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and (g) to dismiss cases involving public petition and participation "shall be granted unless the party responding to the motion demonstrates that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" ( VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule , 224 AD3d 78, 85 [2d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3211(g) requires dismissal of an action involving public petition and participation unless the responding party shows the claim has a substantial basis in law or a substantial argument for changing existing law.

Nelson v. Ardrey · filed 2024-08-07(g)

The Legislature also added a subdivision to CPLR 3211 such that where the defendant demonstrates that the action is an action involving public petition and participation, dismissal shall be granted unless the party responding to the motion demonstrates that the claim "has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" ( id. § 3211[g]; see VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule , 224 AD3d at 83; Mable Assets, LLC v Rachmanov , 192 AD3d 998, 1000).

Section 3211(g)(1) requires a plaintiff facing an anti-SLAPP motion to support its claim with relevant proof adequate for a reasonable mind to accept its conclusion.

Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd. · filed 2024-08-22(g)(1)

We hold, based on our reading of CPLR 3211(g) and (h), that "substantial basis" under the anti-SLAPP law means "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( Smartmatic USA Corp. v Fox Corp. , 213 AD3d 512, 512 [1st Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]), a phrase drawn from the relevant legislative history.

Section 3211(g)(1) requires a defendant seeking anti-SLAPP dismissal to first show that the action or claim is a SLAPP suit.

Black v. Ganieva · filed 2024-09-20(g)(1)

On such a motion, the defendant has the initial burden to show that the action or claim is a SLAPP suit, as defined by CPLR 3211(g)(1). ... Here, the initial burden of establishing that an action is a SLAPP suit is borne by defendants, and as observed by plaintiff, defendants cite no caselaw establishing that a malicious prosecution claim constitutes a SLAPP claim, and research discloses none.

CPLR 3211(g)'s anti-SLAPP dismissal rule does not support dismissal when the challenged social media posts concern a purely private matter.

M.V. v. J.T. · filed 2024-10-08(g)

Under these circumstances, and guided by Nelson , it is this Court's determination that J.T.'s social media posts are "not within the sphere of public interest" ( id. at *4). Accordingly, those branches of J.T.'s motion which are pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and (g) to dismiss the first and second causes of action, alleging defamation per se, defamation, libel per se, and libel (first cause of action) and defamation per se, defamation, slander per se, and slander (second cause of action) must be denied.

Section 3211(g)(1)'s heightened Anti-SLAPP dismissal standard does not apply when the claims concern allegedly fraudulent conduct rather than public participation.

Estate of Abzug v. Lieberman · filed 2024-10-29(g)(1)

Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be analyzed under the CPLR § 3211 standard ofreview and not the heightened Anti-SLAPP standard ofreview.

Section 3211(g)(1) requires a plaintiff to show a substantial basis in law for a claim subject to an Anti-SLAPP dismissal motion.

Kohler v. West End 84 Units LLC · filed 2024-11-26(g)(1)

They have adequately made out a showing of substantial basis for their defamation claims, and therefore these causes of action are not dismissible under the Anti- SLAPP law even if it would apply in this case.

Section 3211(g) shifts the burden to the party opposing dismissal to show a substantial basis in law only after the moving party demonstrates that the claim is an action involving public petition and participation.

Matter of Biggest Fish Westchester LLC v. Village of Tuckahoe · filed 2024-12-13(g)

Under these circumstances, FWH failed to meet its initial burden of demonstrating that this proceeding is a SLAPP suit. Thus, the burden does not shift to Biggest Fish to demonstrate that that the "claim" has a "substantial basis in law" (Civil Rights Law § 3211[g]).

On an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must submit evidence showing a substantial basis for the claim; allegations in the complaint alone are insufficient.

Black v. Ganieva · filed 2025-03-06(g)(1)

Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim is properly dismissed under CPLR 3211(g)(1), as his opposition failed to show that the claim has a "substantial basis" ( see Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd. , 232 AD3d 10 [1st Dept 2024]). "Substantial basis" under the anti-SLAPP law means "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( id. at 22 [internal quotation marks omitted]), which is the same "substantial evidence" standard that "has been equated with the ordinary summary judgment standard" ( id. at 23), and it requires the submission of evidence such as an affidavit rather than reliance on the mere allegations in the complaint ( id . at 24-25).

Under CPLR 3211(g)(1), once the defendant establishes that the action concerns communications in a public forum on a matter of public interest, the plaintiff must show a substantial basis in law for the claim.

Cross Riv. Bank v. Korangy Publ. Inc. · filed 2025-04-30(g)(1)

Reading CPLR 3211 (g) (1) and § 76-a together, once the defendant has established that the subject of the action is both (1) based on communications in a public forum, and (2) concerns the public interest, the Court must then switch the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate that their claim has a substantial basis in the law.

Section 3211(g)(1) shifts the burden to the plaintiff once the defendant establishes that the claim involves public petition.

Honig v. Buhl · filed 2025-05-02(g)(1)

As these articles and statements involve the alleged manipulation of publicly traded stock prices and were made in a public forum, defendant has established this is an "action involving public petition" under CPLR § 3211 (g)(l ). Therefore, the anti-SLAPP defense raised by defendant applies to these claims, despite plaintiff's conclusory parenthetical that it does not. The burden now shifts to plaintiff.

On a motion to dismiss an action involving public petition and participation, once the defendant establishes that the action qualifies, CPLR 3211(g) requires the plaintiff to show that its claims have a substantial basis in law.

Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v. Chan · filed 2025-06-25(g)

Since the defendant established that this action constitutes an action involving public petition and participation, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the causes of action had a substantial basis in law ( see id. at 12, 18-19).

When a defendant establishes that an action involves public petition and participation, CPLR 3211(g) shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show a substantial basis in law for the claims.

Stiloski v. Wingate · filed 2025-08-27(g)

Thus, the defendant established that this was, indeed, an action involving public petition and participation, and the burden then shifted to the plaintiffs to establish that their claims had a "substantial basis in law" (CPLR 3211[g]; see Nelson v Ardrey , 231 AD3d at 182).

Section 3211(g) requires a party opposing dismissal in an action involving public participation to show that the claim has a substantial basis in law, and directs the court to consider the pleadings and supporting affidavits.

Michalczyk v. Vesey · filed 2025-10-14(g)

CPLR §3211(g) states that "the party responding to the motion must demonstrate that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law" and directs at (g)(2) that the "Court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the action or defense is based." ... The Court having found that CPLR §3211(g) dismissal is warranted, defendants are entitled to costs and fees ( see Golan v Daily News , 77 Misc 3d 258 [NY Sup. Ct. 2022]; Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, P.C. v Silva , 206 AD3d 26 [1st Dept 2022]).

Section 3211(g) requires a plaintiff whose defamation claim involves public petition and participation to show that the claim has a substantial basis in law.

InkMango, Inc. v. Warren · filed 2025-11-18(g)

Supreme Court properly found that plaintiff's defamation claims involve "public petition and participation" so as to fall within the anti-SLAPP law (Civil Rights Law § 76-a[1]), triggering the "substantial basis" standard for dismissal under CPLR 3211(g). This standard requires plaintiff to sustain a heightened burden of demonstrating that its defamation claims have a substantial basis in law ( see Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd. , 232 AD3d 10, 19 [1st Dept 2024], lv dismissed 44 NY3d 990 [2025]).

On a CPLR 3211(g) motion, a court may consider evidence that is not admissible at trial together with admissible evidence.

Irizarry v. Zelaya · filed 2025-12-18(g)

Although the uncertified police report and "transcript" (unaccompanied by the audio recording itself) may not be admissible at trial, they may be considered, together with the admissible evidence, in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(g) ( cf. Black , 236 AD3d at 428; Reeves , 232 AD3d at 23-24 [equating substantial basis standard with summary judgment standard]; Kovach v PJA, LLC , 128 AD3d 445, 446 [1st Dept 2015] [allowing consideration of evidence not in admissible form, including uncertified police report, in opposition to motion for summary judgment, so long as it is not the only evidence submitted]).

Section 3211(g) requires dismissal of a claim involving public petition and participation when the plaintiff fails to show a substantial basis in law or a substantial argument for changing existing law.

Danko v. WNYT-TV, LLC. · filed 2026-01-05(g)

It is the determination of the Court that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden to show that his cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Thus, dismissal under CPLR 3211 (g) is warranted.

Section 3211(g) does not require dismissal when adequately alleged facts establish a substantial basis in law for the claims.

Kuvshynov v. Fox News Network, LLC · filed 2025-12-29(g)

To the extent the Kuvshynovs' claims can even be considered a SLAPP lawsuit, the Court finds dismissal under CPLR 3211(g) at this juncture unavailing, as the Kuvshynovs have alleged adequate facts for this Court to find there is a substantial basis in law for their claims as against Hall ( see Smartmatic USA Corp. v Fox Corporation , 213 AD3d 512 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 3211(g)(1) requires a substantial basis in law for claims subject to anti-SLAPP dismissal; pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits may establish that basis.

Daniel Szalkiewicz & Assoc., P.C. v. Liu · filed 2025-12-30(g)(1)

For the same reason, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a "substantial basis in law" for the claims (CPLR 3211[g][1]; see Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd. , 232 AD3d 10, 12 [1st Dept 2024], lv dismissed 44 NY3d 990 [2025], quoting Smartmatic USA Corp. v Fox Corp. , 213 AD3d 512, 512 [1st Dept 2023]). However, plaintiffs' pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits sufficiently demonstrate a substantial basis in law as to the two federal statutes.

Section 3211(g) requires dismissal of a claim involving public petition and participation when the plaintiff fails to show a substantial basis in law for the claim.

A.R.P. v. City of New York · filed 2026-02-04(g)

In turn, plaintiffs fail to establish a substantial basis in law to sustain the defamation claims (see CPLR 3211[g]). Accordingly, NYP's motion to dismiss will be granted.

On a motion to dismiss an action involving public petition and participation, the plaintiff need only show that the claim has a substantial basis in law or a substantial argument for changing existing law.

Reeves v. Found. for the Child Victims of the Family Cts. · filed 2026-02-17(g)(1)

On a motion to dismiss in an action involving public petition and participation, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the claim "has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" ( see CPLR 3211[g][1]).

Section 3211(g) applies a heightened substantial-basis standard to a motion to dismiss claims targeting public speech on an issue of public interest.

Hafez v. Accuracy in Media, Inc. · filed 2026-03-05(g)

Therefore, the targeted speech is within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP law. The heightened CPLR 3211(g) standard, which requires that Plaintiffs' claims have a substantial basis in law, applies.

Under CPLR 3211(g), a plaintiff opposing an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss must show that the claims have a substantial basis in law.

Talbert v. Tynes · filed 2026-03-17(g)

Although Supreme Court properly found that the anti-SLAPP statute applies, it should also have granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff failed to show in opposition that his claims had a substantial basis in law (Civil Rights Law §§ 70—a, 76—a; CPLR 3211[g]; Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd. , 232 AD3d 10, 12 [1st Dept 2024], lv dismissed , 44 NY3d 990 [2025]; Smartmatic USA Corp. v Fox Corp. , 213 AD3d 512, 512 [1st Dept 2023]).

Subsection (g) requires dismissal when the movant shows the action targets speech involving public petition and participation, unless the opposing party shows the action has a substantial basis.

Abello v. NYP Holdings, Inc. · filed 2026-03-17(g)

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(g) shall be granted when the movant shows the action targets speech involving public petition and participation, as defined in Civil Rights Law§ 76-a, unless the opposing party shows the action has a substantial basis (see Gillespie v Kling, 217 AD3d 566, 567 [1st Dept 2023]).

On a § 3211(g) anti-SLAPP motion challenging a defamation claim, the plaintiff must show substantial evidence of actual malice.

Abitbol v. Rice · filed 2024-07-08(g)

To the extent Defendant's inquiry via e-mail to the New York Post can even be considered defamatory, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to show substantial evidence of actual malice to ... survive Defendant's CPLR 321 l(g) motion to dismiss.

CPLR 3211(a)(1) permits dismissal when documentary evidence conclusively establishes a defense, while CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires accepting pleaded facts as true and giving favorable inferences to determine whether the claim can succeed on any reasonable view of the facts.

City Line Rent a Car, Inc. v. Alfess Realty, LLC · filed 2006-10-24(a)(1) and (7)

“Under CPLR 3211 (a) (1), a dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]). “[0]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the [pleading] and according the [nonmoving party] the benefits of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the [proponent of the pleading] can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated” (Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561, 562 [2001]).

Section 3211(a)(5) permits dismissal of claims that are time-barred.

Gigante v. Arbucci · filed 2006-11-08(a)(5)

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion which was, in effect, to dismiss the causes of action to recover damages for slander as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion to the extent of dismissing those causes of action with respect to statements uttered prior to January 19, 2004; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a claim.

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. FUBU Records, LLC · filed 2006-11-14(a)(7)

In this action for breach of a joint venture agreement to produce music videos, the motion court applied the correct standard of review in determining that plaintiff’s “piercing the corporate veil” allegations of domination and control were conclusory (see Leder v Spiegel, 31 AD3d 266 [2006]) and unaccompanied by allegations of consequent wrongs (see TNS Holdings v MKI Sec. Corp., 92 NY2d 335, 339-340 [1998]; Sheridan Broadcasting Corp. v Small, 19 AD3d 331, 332 [2005]), and were thus insufficient to state a claim against defendants GTFM, Inc. and GTFM, LLC for breach of the agreement signed only by plaintiff and FUBU Records.

Section 3211(b) governs a motion to dismiss an affirmative defense.

Munter v. Hubert · filed 2006-11-14(b)

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the defendants’ second and third affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence is denied.

CPLR 3211(b) places the burden on the movant to show that affirmative defenses are without merit as a matter of law.

Vita v. New York Waste Services, LLC · filed 2006-11-14(b)

On their motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the sixth, seventh, eighth, and eleventh affirmative defenses, the plaintiffs bore the burden of demonstrating that those defenses were without merit as a matter of law (see Santilli v Allstate Ins. Co., 19 AD3d 1031, 1032 [2005]; Town of Hempstead v Lizza Indus., 293 AD2d 739, 740 [2002]).

Section 3211(a)(5) permits dismissal for failure to timely commence an action, and section 3211(d) does not require additional discovery when the plaintiff already has sufficient timely knowledge of the claim.

Putter v. North Shore University Hospital · filed 2006-11-16(a)(5), (d)

As a result, additional discovery is not required under CPLR 3211 (d). ... Since Putter had sufficient timely knowledge of the facts, was aware of the basis of a cause of action within the applicable statute of limitations and failed to bring a timely suit, further discovery is not necessary.

Section 3211(a)(8) requires a defendant to raise lack of personal jurisdiction by motion or in the answer, or the objection is waived.

Ohio Savings Bank v. Munsey · filed 2006-11-21(a)(8), (e)

The appellant neither moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction nor asserted lack of personal jurisdiction in his answer (see CPLR 3211 [a] [8]; [e]). Accordingly, the appellant waived any claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him in this foreclosure action (see Matter of Woicik v Town of E. Hampton, 207 AD2d 356 [1994]).

Section 3211(g) places a high burden of proof on plaintiffs seeking to avoid dismissal.

Harris v. Town of Fort Ann · filed 2006-12-07(g)

Plaintiffs had a high burden of proof to avoid dismissal (see CPLR 3211 [g]), and they failed to meet that burden.

Section 3211(a) requires a complaint to be construed liberally when deciding a motion to dismiss.

Alexander v. Geico Insurance · filed 2006-12-14(a)

Construing the complaint in the liberal light to which it is entitled on a motion to dismiss (see CPLR 3211 [a]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we nevertheless conclude that the causes of action sounding in tort and bad faith were not properly stated.

Section 3211(c) permits a motion to dismiss to be treated as a motion for summary judgment, but this action was not appropriate for pre-answer summary judgment.

Barrett v. Toroyan · filed 2006-12-19(c)

The action is not appropriate for pre-answer summary judgment.

CPLR 3211(e), as amended in 2005, does not require an affidavit of merit to support a motion to amend a complaint.

Hickey v. Steven E. Kaufman, P.C. · filed 2017-12-07(e)

Given the Legislature’s 2005 amendment of CPLR 3211 (e) (see Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 228-229 [2d Dept 2008], appeal withdrawn 12 NY3d 813 [2009]), plaintiff was not required to support his motion to amend the complaint with an affidavit of merit (MBIA Ins. Corp. v Grey stone & Co., Inc., 74 AD3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2010]).

Section 3211(e) allows the court to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.

Advanced Global Technology LLC v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc. · filed 2007-03-08(e)

AGT’s informal request for leave to amend, without either a formal notice of cross motion or an affidavit of merit or a proposed amended complaint is denied as amendment would be futile. (CPLR 3211 [e].)

Section 3211(h) requires a substantial basis in law for believing that a licensed professional's conduct was negligent and proximately caused the property damage.

In Re September 11 Property Damage · filed 2007-03-09(h)

Silverstein's third-party complaint is legally deficient because he fails to establish that a "substantial basis in law exists to believe that the performance, conduct or omission complained of . . . was negligent and that such performance, conduct or omission was a proximate cause of [the] . . . property damage complained of." McKinney's CPLR Rule 3211(h).

Section 3211(h) requires a substantial basis to believe that a design professional’s negligence caused the claimed damage before the claim may proceed.

Castle Village Owners Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance · filed 2008-12-02(h)

The allegations of the complaint and the expert affidavit provide a “substantial basis” to believe that MRCE was negligent in the performance of its professional design duties and that the negligence was a proximate cause of the damage. Thus, Langan demonstrated that its claim has sufficient merit to allow it to proceed, and the court properly denied MRCE’s motion to dismiss.

CPLR 3211(h) requires relevant proof of a substantial basis for a claim against an engineer in opposition to a motion to dismiss.

Kenny v. Turner Construction Co. · filed 2013-06-04(h)

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, The Corporate Source did not meet the heightened standard imposed by CPLR 3211 (h) and failed to establish, via relevant proof, that a substantial basis for its claim against MRCE exists.

CPLR 3211(h) requires a party opposing dismissal of a covered architect negligence claim to provide relevant proof showing a substantial basis for negligence and proximate cause.

Schmitt v. Spector · filed 2015-06-24(h)

In opposition to those branches of the Hollenbeck defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (h), the heightened standard imposed by CPLR 3211 (h) was met with relevant proof, including the affidavit of the plaintiff’s expert architect, demonstrating that a substantial basis for the claims of common-law negligence against the Hollenbeck defendants exists and that the Hollenbeck defendants’ alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Castle Vil. Owners Corp. v Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 58 AD3d at 184; cf. Kenny v Turner Constr. Co., 107 AD3d 412 [2013]).

Section 3211(h) applies to third-party claims.

Aegis Insurance Services, Inc. v. Seven World Trade Center Co. · filed 2007-03-09(h)

But a third-party complaint is an “action” containing “claims,” and N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3011, in enumerating the kinds of pleadings that the C.P.L.R. governs, mentions third-party complaints as a “complaint ... against any other person not already a party .... ” And section 214-d(5), in specifying the preconditions of time and notice that are required before suits can be brought against licensed architects and engineers, applies equally to third-party claims as to all others. Thus § 3211(h) applies to third-party claims.

CPLR 3211(e) does not apply to tax certiorari proceedings because RPTL 712(1) deems petition allegations denied without an answer.

Landesman v. Whitton · filed 2007-12-18(e)

Since RPTL 712 (1) states that if no answer is served, “all allegations of the petition shall be deemed denied,” no answer was required. Therefore, CPLR 3211 (e) does not apply to a tax certiorari proceeding (see Matter of Village Sq. of Penna v Semon, 290 AD2d 184, 186 [2002]).

A nonparty must seek leave to intervene before it can obtain dismissal for failure to join a necessary party under CPLR 3211(a)(10).

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moore · filed 2024-02-14(a)(10)

In February 2022, prior to the foreclosure sale of the subject property, Sprint moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) and (4) to vacate the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale, and pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the complaint for failure to join it as a necessary party in the action. ... Contrary to Sprint's contention, it was not entitled to the relief sought because it never moved for leave to intervene in this action ( see U.S. Bank, N.A. v Qurachi , 163 AD3d 888, 889; NYCTL 1996-1 Trust v King , 304 AD2d 629, 631).

CPLR 3211 permits a motion to dismiss a cause of action or defense, but not another motion.

Burnham v. Brenna · filed 2011-07-05(a), (b)

The Family Court properly denied the father’s motion, because a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 may be directed only against a cause of action or a defense, not a motion (see CPLR 3211 [a], [b]).

CPLR 3211(a)(1) permits dismissal when an enforceable forum selection clause precludes bringing the action in New York.

Creative Mobile Technologies, LLC v. Smart Modular Technologies, Inc. · filed 2012-07-11(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) on the basis that the forum selection clause precluded commencement of the action in New York (see Lischinskaya v Carnival Corp., 56 AD3d 116, 123 [2008]).