N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not require a counterclaim to allege specific damages when its pleaded facts permit damages to be inferred.

Fiondella v. 345 W. 70th Tenants Corp. · filed 2026-03-19(a)(7)

Supreme Court also properly denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim under CPLR 3211(a)(7) based on the lack of allegations of specific damages. At the pleadings stage, it is enough for a counterclaim to allege facts from which "damages may be inferred" ( Harmit Realties LLC v 835 Ave. of Ams., L.P. , 128 AD3d 460, 461 [1st Dept 2015]).

Under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), bare legal conclusions and vague assertions without factual specificity are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Dorfman v. SkinnyBond Inc. · filed 2026-03-10(a)(7)

While notice pleading is liberal, bare legal conclusions and vague, boilerplate assertions without factual specificity are always insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 3211(a)(7) does not require a prior finding of negligence before a contractual indemnification claim may be pleaded in a third-party complaint.

Trinity Bldrs. of N.Y., Inc. v. Titanium Constr. Servs., Inc. · filed 2026-02-20(a)(7)

The cases they cite to in support of this proposition, however, are cases involving summary judgment, not a pre-answer motion to dismiss. ... Owner is not seeking to enforce the cause of action at this time, they have merely pled the claim. ... Therefore, the first cause of action in this third-party complaint is timely.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts construe the complaint liberally and accept its allegations as true, but bare legal conclusions and claims contradicted by documentary evidence or inherently incredible do not suffice.

Xu v. Garry · filed 2026-01-23(a)(7)

"When considering whether to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to [*3]be true and the plaintiff is to be afforded every favorable inference" ( Sandman v City of Ithaca , 237 AD3d 1392, 1392-1393 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted]). Nevertheless, this "liberal standard will not save allegations that consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence or are inherently incredible" ( id. at 1393 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). ... Here, in contrast, there is no specific negligence or error [*4]alleged in the complaint. Rather, Shirley He merely disagrees with the determination that she needed to file proof of service on her adversary. ... As such, the claims asserted in the complaint must be dismissed.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts construe the pleadings liberally, accept the alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Georgiou v. Sacred Patriarchal & Stravropegial Orthodox Monastery of St. Irene Chrysovalantou · filed 2025-10-15(a)(7)

"In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleadings are afforded a liberal construction, the facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, and the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference" (Mera v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 220 AD3d 668, 668-669; see Mikoma Elec., LLC v Otek Bldrs., LLC, 233 AD3d 856, 858).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Jimenez v. 241 B LLC · filed 2025-05-19(a)(7)

When determining a CPLR § 3211 [a] [7] motion, the Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and “accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

A CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss is premature when tenants adequately allege that improper apartment improvement rent increases led to unlawful deregulation.

Cox v. 36 S Oxford St, LLC · filed 2025-04-24

The motion court's dismissal of the entirety of plaintiffs' putative class-action complaint under CPLR 3211 was premature. ... As the Court of Appeals reasoned with respect to similar class allegations in Maddicks v Big City Props., LLC (34 NY3d 116 [2019]), the assertion that the apartments were improperly deregulated on this specific basis adequately states a claim ( id. at 127).

On a motion to dismiss, a complaint survives when its allegations, assumed true, set forth plausible claims for relief.

Lash v. TDR Capital LLP · filed 2025-04-30

In any event, this Court has again considered the submissions made by the parties on this Motion, and again finds that, assuming the truth of its allegations, the Amended Complaint sets forth plausible claims for relief.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, draw reasonable inferences for the pleader, and ask whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Banasik v. Mount Sinai Health Sys. · filed 2025-04-11(a)(7)

In addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction and the court should accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord the pleading the benefit of every reasonable inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

A CPLR § 3211 motion requires an argument about the sufficiency of the pleadings; arguments based on deposition evidence belong under CPLR § 3212.

Wright v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-09

Initially, the court denies the portion of defendants’ motion that relies on CPLR § 3211. Although the notice of motion includes CPLR § 3211 as one of the bases of the current motion and defendants cite to the legal standard in their affirmation in support (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 46, ¶¶ 31-32), they do not raise any arguments as to the sufficiency of the pleadings. Instead, their arguments relate to the purported evidentiary bases for dismissal, including documents such as deposition transcripts, which are properly considered under CPLR § 3212.

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), bare legal conclusions need not be accepted as true.

Nunez-Unda v. Adrien · filed 2024-11-04(a)(7)

Bare legal conclusions are not accorded favorable inferences, however, and need not be accepted as true (Biondi v Beekman Hill House Apt. Corp., 257 AD2d 76, 81 [1st Dept 1999]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a contribution claim to proceed when the complaint, read liberally with its allegations accepted as true, states a cause of action.

Braig v. Baker · filed 2024-10-22(a)(7)

Here, construing the third-party complaint liberally, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according third-party plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, Baker has stated a cause of action to recover for contribution.

On a section 3211(a)(7) motion, a complaint may be amplified by supporting evidence and survives when, with favorable inferences, it states a claim.

Lopez v. Quincy 314 LLC · filed 2024-10-07(a)(7)

However,. affording Plaintiffs every favorable inference, the Amended Complaint, as amplified by PlaintiffLopez's affirmation and the professional reports and other evidence annexed thereto, state claims sufficient to survive the Quincy I>efendants' motion.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, a court need not accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts.

Brand Squared LLC v. Ryse Up Sports Nutrition, LLC · filed 2024-03-25(a)(7)

However, the court need not accept "conclusory allegations of fact or law not supported by allegations of specific fact" ( Wilson v Tully, 243 AD2d 229, 234 [1st Dept 1998]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court gives the pleading a liberal construction.

Tax Equity Now NY v. City of New York · filed 2024-03-19(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the Court affords the pleading “a liberal construction” (Leon, 84 NY2d at 87).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint’s legal conclusions receive no favorable inference.

Rock-Park 94 LLC v. Camba, Inc. · filed 2024-02-27(a)(7)

The legal conclusion that plaintiff asserts is not entitled to any favorable inference under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true when deciding whether it states a claim.

Delaney v. Syracuse Univ. · filed 2024-02-09(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true, as we must ( see Pottorff v Centra Fin. Group , Inc. , 192 AD3d 1552, 1553 [4th Dept 2021]), we conclude that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the sidewalk at issue was not appropriate for public use in pursuing the recreational activity of bike riding.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Success Academy Charter Schs., Inc. v. Liberty Sq. Realty Corp. · filed 2024-01-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory." (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88[1994] [citation omitted].)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Waterbury v. New York City Ballet, Inc. · filed 2022-04-28(a)(7)

We must construe the pleadings liberally, take the complaint's allegations as true, and give Waterbury the benefit of every possible inference ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11 , 19 [2005]). Applying this well-settled standard, we find that Waterbury sufficiently pleaded a claim against Finlay for the unlawful disclosure of an intimate image, in violation of Administrative Code § 10-180.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a breach of contract complaint survives dismissal when its allegations sufficiently state the elements of the claim.

Ripa v. Petrosyants · filed 2022-03-02(a)(7)

Under the aforesaid principles, the complaint sufficiently alleges the elements of a breach of contract cause of action necessary to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see Friends of Wickers Cr. Archeological Site, Inc. v Landing on the Water at Dobbs Ferry Homeowners Assn., Inc. , 198 AD3d 726).

A civil management petition with sufficient factual allegations withstands a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Matter of State of New York v. Christian R. · filed 2021-12-29(a)(7)

As the allegations in the amended petition were sufficient, the court also properly denied the appellant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see Matter of State of New York v Richard L. , 143 AD3d 519; Matter of State of New York v Armstrong , 119 AD3d 1431, 1432).

On a motion to dismiss under section 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true.

Stolper v. Burbacki · filed 2021-12-07(a)(7)

Accepting plaintiff's allegations that defendant acted as her personal attorney as true, as is required on a motion to dismiss , the Court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint based upon a mutual release .

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the court must assume the complaint’s factual allegations are true.

Bavers v. Shepherd · filed 2020-12-22

Assuming the allegations to be true as is required on a motion to dismiss ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83 [1994]), the remaining claims challenged on this appeal are properly asserted.

Under CPLR 3211(a), a complaint alleging indemnification survives dismissal when its allegations manifest a cause of action for indemnification.

Lexington Ins. Co. v. Public Adm'r of N.Y. County · filed 2020-12-15(a)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul A. Goetz, J.), entered on or about April 10, 2020, which denied defendant's CPLR 3211(a) motion to dismiss plaintiff insurer's complaint for indemnification, unanimously affirmed, without costs. ... Based on the four corners of plaintiff's complaint, the allegations manifest a cause of action for indemnification to which the limitations of General Obligations Law § 15-108 are not applicable.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint and opposition submissions as true and gives plaintiffs every possible favorable inference.

Pavich v. Pavich · filed 2020-12-15(a)(7)

Accepting the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion and according plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp. , 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), plaintiffs had a longstanding business relationship with WCI, entailing media installation projects at area hotels.

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, a failure-to-promote claim can survive when the complaint names a specific comparator whose details can be verified in discovery, even if it omits some details about that person.

Pelepelin v. City of New York · filed 2020-12-03(a)

While plaintiff does not in the complaint flesh out some details which will be material — such as the precise age of the detectives promoted ahead of him — that does not vitiate his pleading. Plaintiff has amply met his pleading burden by naming as a comparator a specific individual whose details can be particularly verified during discovery.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the complaint's allegations as true.

Shear Enters., LLC v. Cohen · filed 2020-12-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint, we must accept plaintiff's allegations as true ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a discrimination complaint need not allege more favorable treatment of similarly situated people, but it must allege facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent.

Brown v. City of New York · filed 2020-11-17(a)(7)

Plaintiff was not, as the motion court's order suggests, required to plead this last fact to state a claim of discrimination; however, the complaint does not allege any other facts that establish circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent, and thus, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) was proper.

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a), the plaintiff's allegations must be assumed true.

Campbell v. Horowitz · filed 2020-10-28(a)

Contrary to the contention of Horowitz and the Planet Waste defendants, the plaintiff's allegations—which, for purposes of their pre-answer motions, must be assumed to be true ( see Cohn v Lionel Corp. , 21 NY2d 559, 562)—are sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege ( see Trump Vil. Section 4, Inc. v Bezvoleva , 161 AD3d 916, 918; Shaw v Club Mgrs. Assn. of Am., Inc. , 84 AD3d 928, 930-931).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint's allegations as amplified by the notice of claim.

Corcoran v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-29(a)(7)

The allegations in the complaint, as amplified by the notice of claim, which must be liberally construed when determining a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion ( see Scollar v City of New York , 160 AD3d 140, 144 [1 st Dept 2018]), sufficiently set forth a claim for assault and battery.

A complaint that sufficiently pleads unconscionability can withstand a CPLR 3211(a) motion to dismiss a claim to reform a settlement agreement.

Ritornato v. Ritornato · filed 2020-09-16(a)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging unconscionability. ... Here, the allegations in the complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action to reform the settlement agreement on the ground of unconscionability ( see Shah v Mitra , 171 AD3d at 978).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, a plaintiff need not provide evidentiary facts supporting allegations of actual malice; the motion tests the adequacy of the pleadings.

Crime Victims Ctr., Inc. v. Logue · filed 2020-03-04(a)(7)

"[A] plaintiff has no obligation to show evidentiary facts to support [his or her] allegations of malice on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)" ( Shaw v Club Mgrs. Assn. of Am., Inc. , 84 AD3d 928, 931 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1182), which merely tests the adequacy of the pleadings ( see Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d at 268).

On a motion to dismiss an employment discrimination complaint, the court credits the allegations, and fair notice of the claims and their grounds is enough to survive the pleading stage.

Petit v. Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y. · filed 2019-11-07(a)(7)

Crediting plaintiff's allegations for the purpose of this pre-answer, pre-discovery motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7), we find that the complaint states a causes of action for discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment in violation of the New York State and New York City Human Rights laws. ... Fair notice is all that is required to survive at the pleading stage.

CPLR 3211(a)(5) requires courts deciding a motion to dismiss to accept the complaint's allegations as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Grella · filed 2019-10-16(a)(5)

In resolving a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 224).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference to determine whether it states a cognizable claim.

Van Wie Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors, LLC · filed 2016-10-07(a)(7)

The court dismissed the causes of action for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and equitable estoppel upon GM’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7). On such a motion, “plaintiff’s complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, . . . the facts alleged therein are accepted as true, and . . . plaintiff is to be afforded every possible favorable inference in order to determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Gilewicz v Buffalo Gen. Psychiatric Unit, 118 AD3d 1298, 1299 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Berland v. Chi · filed 2016-09-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Dorfman v. Reffkin · filed 2016-09-22(a)(7)

“Inasmuch as this appeal had its genesis in a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we are bound to, inter alia, ‘accept the facts as alleged in the [amended] complaint as true’ ”

On a motion to dismiss, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Kaplan v. Valley Natl. Bank · filed 2016-07-20(a)(7)

Liberally construing the complaint, accepting the alleged facts as true, and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), the court finds that the plaintiff's allegations do not support an inference that the Bodian defendants acted in bad faith, committed fraud, or acted in an otherwise tortious or malicious way.

On appeal from a ruling on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual allegations are assumed to be true.

Receivers of Sabena SA v. Deutsche Bank A.G. · filed 2016-07-14(a)(7)

We now turn to the factual allegations of the complaint, which, on this appeal from an order determining a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, are assumed to be true [FN4] .

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, gives the nonmoving party every possible inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

NYAHSA Services, Inc., Self-Insurance Trust v. Recco Home Care Services, Inc. · filed 2016-07-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a claim, "we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, confer on the [nonmoving party] the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Torok v Moore's Flatwork & Founds., LLC, 106 AD3d 1421, 1421 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Sim v Farley Equip. Co. LLC, 138 AD3d 1228, 1228 [2016]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, gives the nonmoving party every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

NYAHSA Services, Inc., Self-Insurance Trust v. People Care Incorporated · filed 2016-07-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a claim, "we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, confer on the [nonmoving party] the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Torok v Moore's Flatwork & Founds., LLC, 106 AD3d 1421, 1421 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Tenney v Hodgson Russ, LLP, 97 AD3d 1089, 1090 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations and reasonable inferences as true.

CeltixConnect Equity Invs. LLC v. Sea Fibre Network Ltd · filed 2016-07-19(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that may be gleaned from those facts.

On a motion to dismiss a family offense petition under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the petition, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Matter of Ring v. Ring · filed 2016-06-22(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a family offense petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “ ‘the petition must be liberally construed, the facts alleged in the petition must be accepted as true, and the petitioner must be granted the benefit of every favorable inference’ ” (Matter of Xin Li v Ramos, 125 AD3d 681, 682 [2015], quoting Matter of Arnold v Arnold, 119 AD3d 938, 939 [2014]; see Matter of Smith v Howard, 113 AD3d 781, 782 [2014]; Matter of Clark v Ormiston, 101 AD3d 870, 871 [2012]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true.

Fay Da Realty Corp. v. Peerless Insurance · filed 2016-06-15(a)(7)

Here, the facts alleged in the complaint — which, for purpose of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) must be deemed to be true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]) — state that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the underlying action, or the resulting default judgment, until November 7, 2014.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), bare legal conclusions are not presumed true.

Cahill v. State of New York Stony Brook University Hospital · filed 2016-05-11(a)(7)

However, “ ‘bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true’ ” (Barker v Amorini, 121 AD3d 823, 824 [2014], quoting Khan v MMCA Lease, Ltd., 100 AD3d 833, 833 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the claim liberally, accepts its facts as true, and gives the claimant every favorable inference.

Law Offs. of Thomas F. Liotti, LLC v. State of New York · filed 2016-05-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the claim must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts therein must be accepted as true, and the claimant must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, courts construe the pleadings liberally to determine whether they state a cognizable claim.

Kerzhner v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc. · filed 2016-04-21

However, when construing the pleadings liberally, as we ... must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we find that the complaint sufficiently states a cognizable claim that the employer defendants were negligent in hiring, training and supervising their employees, including defendant Ray (see Pickering v State of New York, 30 AD3d 393, 394 [2d Dept 2006]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true.

Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. · filed 2016-03-31

The facts are taken from the complaint, which must be accepted as true for the purposes of the CPLR 3211 motion.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations and the inferences drawn from them as true.

BMW Group, LLC v. Castle Oil Corp. · filed 2016-03-15(a)(7)

In these two appeals, we reinstate the complaints, holding that when the proper standard of review for a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion is applied, and the complaints’ factual assertions, along with any inferences that can be drawn from them, are accepted as true, the complaints’ allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action.

On a CPLR 3211 motion, liberal pleading standards permit an unjust enrichment claim to proceed when the complaint incorporates facts supporting the claim, even if it does not expressly advance that theory.

Castellotti v. Free · filed 2016-03-08

Although the unjust enrichment cause of action in the complaint does not expressly advance this theory, it does “repeat! ] and reallege! ]” all allegations set forth previously, including those showing that Peter made the tax payment even though he was not a beneficiary of the will. Given the liberal pleading standards and standard of review on a CPLR 3211 motion (see Leon, 84 NY2d at 87-88), Peter should be permitted to pursue this cause of action.

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true when assessing whether they support the claim.

Loskot-D'Souza v. Town of Babylon · filed 2016-03-02(a)

Moreover, under the circumstances, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true (see generally Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]), they do not demonstrate that it would have been futile for the plaintiffs to continue the application process (see Dick’s Quarry v Town of Warwick, 293 AD2d 445 [2002]; see also Matter of Brunjes v Nocella, 40 AD3d 1088 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), pleaded facts receive favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and inherently incredible allegations do not.

Mamoon v. Dot Net Inc. · filed 2016-01-28(a)(7)

It is true that “in considering a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must presume the facts pleaded to be true and must accord them every favorable inference” (Leder, 31 AD3d at 267). However, “factual allegations . . . that consist of bare legal conclusions, or that are inherently incredible . . . , are not entitled to such consideration” (id.). Plaintiff makes only conclusory, incredible allegations that the Moss defendants converted her money and were unjustly enriched.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court reads the petition liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Romena Q. v. Edwin Q. · filed 2015-11-25

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 “ ‘the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction. We accept the facts as alleged in the [petition] as true, accord [the petitioner] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable theory’ ” (Matter of McBride v Springsteen-El, 106 AD3d 1402, 1402 [2013], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

A breach of contract claim can survive dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when the complaint pleads all required elements, even if it does not specify how the parties would divide their assets when their relationship ends.

Dee v. Rakower · filed 2013-11-13(a)(7)

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination and the opinion of our dissenting colleague, the plaintiff’s failure to specifically allege that there was a “meeting of the minds” as to how the assets would be distributed upon the termination of the parties’ relationship does not compel the conclusion that the complaint fails to state a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract. There is no requirement that a breach of contract cause of action include such an allegation in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) where the complaint sets forth all of the elements necessary to plead a breach of contract cause of action.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether the allegations state a cognizable cause of action.

Ambac Assurance UK Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Investment Management, Inc. · filed 2011-07-14(a)(7)

We find that, at this stage of the pleadings the motion ... court should have accepted the plaintiffs allegations as true, given the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and simply ascertained whether plaintiffs allegations evidenced a cognizable cause of action.

On a CPLR 3211 motion, facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true unless documentary evidence contradicts them.

MBIA Insurance v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2011-06-30

The facts set forth here are from the amended complaint which, unless contradicted by documentary evidence, must be accepted as true for purposes of this CPLR 3211 motion.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and determines whether the complaint states a viable cause of action.

Delos Insurance v. Smith & Laquercia · filed 2011-05-26(a)(7)

The complaint should be reinstated as to plaintiff Delos/Sirius because, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and affording plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, it sufficiently asserts viable causes of action for malpractice (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts deciding a motion to dismiss a counterclaim to construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the pleader every favorable inference.

J & D Evans Construction Corp. v. Iannucci · filed 2011-05-24(a)(7)

“In determining a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CFLR 3211 (a) (7), or, as in this case, a counterclaim, the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are accepted as true, and the proponent of the pleading is accorded the benefit of every favorable inference”

On a motion to dismiss an article 78 petition, the court treats the allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Tooker v. New York State Crime Victims Board-Executive Department · filed 2011-03-29(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss an article 78 petition, the court must deem the allegations in the petition to be true and afford them “the benefit of every favorable inference.”

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court limits its review to the allegations and does not dismiss a viable claim.

County of Nassau v. Nassau County Interim Finance Authority · filed 2011-03-11(a)(7)

That claim is not subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), nor is it subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) as the allegations, to which this court’s review is limited on such an application, advance a viable claim.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a legal malpractice complaint need only allege facts permitting a reasonable inference that counsel’s negligence caused the client’s loss; it need not show a likelihood of success at the pleading stage.

Garnett v. Fox, Horan & Camerini, LLP · filed 2011-03-03(a)(7)

These allegations are sufficient to withstand a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion. At this stage, plaintiff does not have to show a “likelihood of success,” as the motion court found, but is required only to plead facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that defendant’s negligence caused Boylan’s loss (see InKine Pharm. Co. v Coleman, 305 AD2d 151 [2003]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court accepts the alleged facts and opposing submissions as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Violet Realty, Inc. · filed 2011-02-10

When reviewing “a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, courts liberally construe the complaint, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein · filed 2011-02-10

In the context of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the pleadings are “to be afforded a liberal construction. [The Court must] accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, [and] accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994] [citation omitted]; see also Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]). Even affording Mandarin all favorable inferences, the complaint fails to sufficiently plead its claims, and we now affirm.

On a motion to dismiss, the court considers the complaint’s allegations as a whole and gives the plaintiff all reasonable inferences.

Global Reinsurance Corporation-U.S. Branch v. Equitas Ltd. · filed 2011-01-18(a)(7)

But the allegations must be viewed as a whole, and plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss, courts construe the complaint liberally, give plaintiffs favorable inferences, and decide whether it states a cause of action without deciding whether the allegations can ultimately be proved.

Hussein v. State · filed 2011-01-13

Construing the allegations liberally and “according] plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn from their pleading, without expressing our opinion as to whether they can ultimately establish the truth of their allegations before the trier of fact” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d at 318), we also conclude that the complaint states a cause of action sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the claim is liberally construed, its allegations are assumed true, and the claimant receives every favorable inference.

Trump On Ocean, LLC v. State · filed 2010-12-09(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the claim is liberally construed, claimant’s allegations are assumed to be true and claimant is afforded every favorable inference (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; Bordeleau v State of New York, 74 AD3d 1688, 1688 [2010]; IMS Engrs.-Architects, P.C. v State of New York, 51 AD3d 1355,1356 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 706 [2008]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, courts construe pleadings liberally and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

CMMF, LLC v. J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. · filed 2010-11-23

It is well settled that “[i]n the context of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the pleadings are necessarily afforded a liberal construction” (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]) and the plaintiff will be accorded “the benefit of every possible favorable inference” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Introna v. Huntington Learning Centers, Inc. · filed 2010-11-16(a)(7)

When determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]). The facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, with the plaintiff accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Assured Guaranty (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. · filed 2010-11-23(a)(7)

Moreover, “when deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, [a court] must take the allegations asserted within a plaintiff s complaint as true and accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (see Sarmiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70, 79 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Posner v. Lewis · filed 2010-12-09(a)(7)

Accepting these allegations as true, and according them the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must do on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), both the majority and dissent agree that plaintiff states causes of action to recover damages under the theories of prima facie tort and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s allegations.

Cohen v. Cohen-Fisher · filed 2010-11-03(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, as required on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180 [2010]), the plaintiff stated a cognizable cause of action sounding in fraud.

On a CPLR 3211 motion, dismissal is unwarranted when the defendants’ submissions fail to conclusively refute a material allegation or otherwise establish grounds for dismissal.

Kings Medical Management, Inc. v. Baker, Sanders, Barshay, Grossman, Fass, Muhlstock & Neuwirth, P.C. · filed 2010-10-05

Since the defendants’ submissions failed to conclusively refute this allegation and to demonstrate that dismissal of the complaint was warranted at this stage of the proceedings, their motion should have been denied.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the court reads the complaint in the plaintiff's favor when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Forman v. Guardian Life Ins. · filed 2010-09-21

Reading the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the cause of action for promissory estoppel was correctly sustained.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211 requires liberal construction of the complaint.

New York Racing Ass'n v. Nassau Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. · filed 2010-07-29(a)(7)

When deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court is required to afford the pleading “a liberal construction.”

On a pre-answer motion under CPLR 3211(a), the court accepts the petition’s allegations as true and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Syracuse Industrial Development Agency v. Gamage · filed 2010-10-01(a)

It is well settled that the allegations in the petitions must be accepted as true in the context of these pre-answer motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a), and petitioner must be afforded every favorable inference that may be drawn therefrom (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Sus, Inc. v. St. Paul Travelers Group · filed 2010-07-01(a)(7)

At this procedural point in the litigation, we afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true and give plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Lazic v Currier, 69 AD3d 1213, 1213-1214 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint and gives the plaintiff favorable inferences when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Nationwide Insulation & Sales, Inc. v. Nova Casualty Co. · filed 2010-06-29(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, and according the plaintiff every favorable inference, the plaintiff has set forth causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract and for a judgment declaring that the defendant was obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in the underlying action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendant’s motion which were to dismiss those causes of action.

An ambiguous contract cannot be construed as a matter of law, so dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) is inappropriate.

Telerep, LLC v. U.S. International Media, LLC · filed 2010-06-01(a)(7)

If the court concludes that a contract is ambiguous, it cannot be construed as a matter of law, and dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is not appropriate (see Hamhrecht & Quist Guar. Fin., LLC v El Coronado Holdings, LLC, 27 AD3d 204 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the court treats the petition’s allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Miller v. Mulligan · filed 2010-05-04(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 7804 (f), all of the allegations of the petition are deemed true and afforded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Matter of Bloodgood v Town of Huntington, 58 AD3d 619, 621 [2009]; Matter of Long Is. Contractors’ Assn. v Town of Riverhead, 17 AD3d 590, 594 [2005]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7), a legal malpractice claim survives dismissal when its allegations adequately state a claim and the documentary evidence fails to establish a defense as a matter of law.

Financial Services Vehicle Trust v. Saad · filed 2010-04-27(a)(1), (7)

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of their motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the first cause of action and so much of the ninth cause of action of the third-party complaint alleging legal malpractice insofar as asserted against them.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

State v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. · filed 2010-04-26(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction. We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) is properly denied when the complaint states a cause of action.

Bailey v. Ossi Sport Club, Inc. · filed 2010-03-30(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint, as the complaint states a cause of action, and the defendant’s evidentiary submissions failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of fact (see e.g. Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 [1986]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), pleaded facts receive a presumption of truth and favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by the record do not.

Garner v. China Natural Gas, Inc. · filed 2010-03-16(a)(7)

In assessing a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are accorded every favorable inference (see Riback v Margulis, 43 AD3d 1023 [2007]). However, bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record, are not entitled to any such consideration (id.).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the petition’s factual allegations are true.

Rudd v. Sharff · filed 2010-03-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, this court must assume as true that petitioners intend to use the apartments for the purposes stated in the notice. (E.g. Matter of Foxell v New York City Human Resources Admin., 167 AD2d 126, 127 [1st Dept 1990 mem] [noting that court must accept petition’s factual allegations as true on CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss].)

Section 3211 requires courts deciding a motion addressed to the pleadings to construe pleadings liberally, accept complaint allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every possible inference.

DePetris & Bachrach, LLP v. Srour · filed 2010-03-09

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss which is addressed to the pleadings, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff with the benefit of every possible inference.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court construes the pleading liberally.

Nelson v. Roth · filed 2010-01-26(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction” (Kempf v Magida, 37 AD3d 763, 764 [2007]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a breach-of-contract complaint sufficiently states a claim when it alleges a contract, the plaintiff’s performance, the defendant’s breach, and resulting damages.

Chase v. J.H. Electric of New York, Inc. · filed 2010-01-19(a)(7)

Accordingly, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cognizable claim.

Tsutsui v. Barasch · filed 2009-11-17(a)(7)

In reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations of insider trading under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we “give the pleading a liberal construction, accept all of the facts alleged in the pleading to be true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference in determining whether the allegations fit under any cognizable legal theory” (Zane v Minion, 63 AD3d 1151, 1152 [2009]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

CPLR 3211 applies a liberal standard under which sufficient allegations survive a motion to dismiss.

Fingar v. Martin · filed 2009-12-18

Petitioners have set forth sufficient allegations to avoid dismissal under the liberal standard applicable to CPLR 3211 motions (see generally Kovach v Hinchey, 276 AD2d 942, 943 [2000]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, courts accept the complaint’s facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and ask whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Meliso v. Pinter · filed 2001-12-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, a court must accept as true the facts as alleged within the four corners of the complaint and accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference to determine whether the allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the court presumes the complaint’s factual allegations to be true.

Lennon v. Philip Morris Companies · filed 2001-10-09(a)(7)

The facts alleged in the complaint are unchallenged by defendants, and therefore, are presumed to be true, as this court must for the purpose of these motions (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994] [concluding that allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true and the complaint is to be construed in the nonmoving party’s favor when deciding a motion under CPLR 3211]; Matter of Colt Indus. Shareholder Litig., 155 AD2d 154 [1st Dept 1990] [finding that any error, if there is to be one, should be made in favor of allowing class action treatment]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court construes the complaint’s allegations liberally to determine whether they satisfy the claim’s requirements.

Lasalle National Bank v. Ernst & Young L. L. P. · filed 2001-08-09

Since we review a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss on the pleadings, rather than, as in Parrott, in a summary judgment context, the standard guiding us is whether the allegations in the complaint, construed liberally, satisfy each of these three requirements.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court accepts the pleaded factual allegations as true.

Schultz Construction, Inc. v. Franbilt, Inc. · filed 2001-07-26

Accepting as true defendant’s allegation that the work was not completed until September 24, 1998, as is required on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366, supra), we agree with Supreme Court that this claim is not time barred.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and determines whether they sufficiently plead a claim.

Levin v. Yeshiva University · filed 2001-07-02(a)(7)

The complaint alleges the following facts, which we must accept as true for present purposes: Yeshiva maintains a number of different sized apartments near AECOM for the housing of medical students.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Rall v. Hellman · filed 2001-06-05(a)(7)

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff for purposes of CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the e-mail made plaintiff appear as a rude, petty, self-absorbed writer/cartoonist, who sought to insult and attack New York City’s established cartooning industry.

Under § 3211, a complaint sufficiently alleging an assignment of rights survives a motion to dismiss based on a claimed failure to plead ownership.

Kerr v. Brown · filed 2001-05-29

The IAS court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Kerr had failed to allege the existence of an agreement granting the right to ownership of Brown, Gist and Criss’s musical compositions.

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), dismissal fails if the pleading’s factual allegations together state any legally cognizable cause of action.

Citipostal, Inc. v. Unistar Leasing · filed 2001-05-02(a)(7)

Nevertheless, in deciding a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Grossman v Pharmhouse Corp., 234 AD2d 918, 919). Applying that criterion, we agree with plaintiff that the allegations of the amended complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action for money had and received, or quasi-contract.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal is appropriate when the alleged facts, even if true, conclusively establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Anonymous v. CVS Corp. · filed 2001-03-01(a)(7)

Dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is appropriate where the facts alleged, even if accepted as true, “establish conclusively that [the] plaintiff has no cause of action.”

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual allegations are deemed true.

Commissioner of the Department of Social Services v. Fishman · filed 2001-02-22

Since this is a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the factual allegations of the complaint are deemed true.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true.

Pepe v. Tannenbaum · filed 2001-01-29(a)(7)

Accepting the plaintiffs allegations as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), we agree with the Supreme Court that the complaint stated a cause of action to recover for the work allegedly performed based on a theory of quantum meruit (see, Frank v Feiss, 266 AD2d 825; William Conover, Inc. v *621 Waldorf, 251 AD2d 727; Mindich Developers v Milstein, 227 AD2d 536).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the petition’s material allegations and reasonable inferences are true when deciding whether it states a claim.

Y & O Holdings (NY), Inc. v. Board of Managers of Executive Plaza Condominium · filed 2000-12-28(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the petition’s material allegations and the reasonable inferences therefrom, as we must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... the petition adequately alleges that each individual respondent acted in bad faith by undertaking, in the absence of opposed board members, an expedited vote in favor of a resolution (Rule) broadly prohibiting occupancy by transients, which rule harmed petitioner’s interests since petitioner had acquired its 40-plus units in the condominium for the purpose of renting them to short-term tenants.

A complaint with sufficient allegations withstands a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(5).

O'Keeffe v. Fava · filed 2000-12-18(a)(5)

The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Horn v. New York Times · filed 2000-12-11(a)(7)

In deciding a motion directed to the pleadings, a court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, courts construe pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, and give plaintiffs every favorable inference unless the allegations are bare or conclusory.

Lakeville Pace Mechanical, Inc. v. Elmar Realty Corp. · filed 2000-10-23

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleadings are to be afforded liberal construction, the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, and the plaintiffs are accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, so long as the allegations are not bare or conclusory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 274-275; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634; Kantrowitz & Goldhamer v Geller, 265 AD2d 529).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual allegations are deemed true.

Commissioner of the Department of Social Services v. Fishman · filed 2000-09-07

Since this is a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the factual allegations of the complaint are deemed true.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. v. Tim's Amusements, Inc. · filed 2000-08-17

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court’s task is to determine only whether the facts as alleged, accepting them as true and according plaintiff every possible favorable inference, fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the complaint is liberally construed in the plaintiffs’ favor, but it must allege a cognizable cause of action.

Ciasullo v. Town of Greenville · filed 2000-08-14

The complaint, liberally construed in favor of the plaintiffs (see, e.g., Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), failed to allege a breach of duty by the Town defendants giving rise to a cognizable cause of action to recover damages (cf., Stiuso v City of New York, 87 NY2d 889, 891).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true and gives them every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states legally cognizable claims.

Gross v. Stern · filed 2000-10-16(a)(7)

Accepting all of the facts alleged by the plaintiff to be true, and according the allegations the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83), we agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiff has alleged legally-cognizable claims against the appellants for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty (see, Zanoni v 855 Holding Co., 96 AD2d 860, affd 63 NY2d 771; Reynolds v Snow, 10 AD2d 101, affd 8 NY2d 899) and an accounting. ... Therefore, the appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [5], [7]) was properly denied.

On a motion under section 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the alleged falsity of a defendant’s statement when assessing whether the complaint states a claim.

320 Realty Management Co. v. 320 West 76 Corp. · filed 1995-11-09(a)(7)

Assuming the falsity of the statement concerning the intended purchase by the tenant, as we must on this CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, plaintiff was unjustified in relying upon representations concerning the future intent to act by third parties, i.e., possible purchases by other tenants of .the building.

Section 3211 requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss to assume the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.

Annenberg v. Environmental Control Board · filed 1995-10-23

Assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations as we must on a motion to dismiss (see, Grand Realty Co. v City of White Plains, 125 AD2d 639), we agree that the alleged failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements constitutes a substantive error which, as the Supreme Court found, may not be challenged in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see, e.g., Matter of Schilling v Dunne, 119 AD2d 179; Matter of Gardiner v Lo Grande, 92 AD2d 611).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), conclusory allegations without factual support are insufficient to state a cause of action.

M.J. & K. Co. v. Matthew Bender & Co. · filed 1995-10-10(a)(7)

In this case, the plaintiffs’ cause of action in this regard was similarly defective because their conclusory allegations without factual support are insufficient to state a cause of action (John R. Loftus, Inc. v White, supra; see, Fitzpatrick Constr. Corp. v County of Suffolk, supra).

A court may dismiss under subsection (a)(7) only when it has been conclusively demonstrated that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Grossman v. Pharmhouse Corp. · filed 1995-09-25(a)(7)

In arriving at this conclusion, this court is mindful that a dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is not granted unless it has been conclusively demonstrated that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Gabriel v. Therapists Unlimited · filed 1995-08-31(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to he afforded a liberal construction (see, CPLR 3026). We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory [citations omitted].” Measured by this far from rigorous test, we think both plaintiffs’ first cause of action sounding in fraud, and their second cause of action upon a written offer of employment, pass muster, and the IAS Court erred in its dismissal of the complaint.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and denies dismissal if the allegations disclose a cause of action.

Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Van De Wetering · filed 1995-07-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is obliged, inter alia, to accept each of the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, to make all reasonable inferences therefrom and not evaluate the ultimate merits of the case, to construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, and to deny dismissal if a cause of action is at all discernable from the factual allegations of the complaint (McGill v Parker, 179 AD2d 98, 105).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a construction contract claim survives dismissal when the complaint alleges work that, if proven, could be found unskillful or unworkmanlike.

Lino Del Zotto & Son Builders, Inc. v. Colombe · filed 1995-06-22(a)(7)

Supreme Court’s refusal to dismiss the breach of contract claim was proper, however, for the allegations in the complaint, if proven, could support a finding that the taping work was not performed in a skillful and workmanlike manner, an implied requirement in a construction contract such as the one at issue (see, e.g., Fairbairn Lbr. Corp. v Telian, 92 AD2d 683, 684).

A CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss a strict products liability claim may be denied when the complaint alleges that an air gun was defective because its loaded status could not be determined.

Earsing v. Nelson · filed 1995-06-09

The court also properly denied Service’s motion to dismiss the strict products liability cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 based upon plaintiffs’ allegation that the air gun was defective because it was impossible to tell if it was loaded (see, Radford v Sheridan Prods., 181 AD2d 667).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court views the complaint liberally and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Goldberg v. Lee Express Cab Corp. · filed 1995-05-23

It is well settled that in determining a motion to dismiss, a court must view the complaint "liberally and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff”.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the complaint’s factual allegations as true and denies dismissal when they are sufficient to state a claim.

Plaza v. Estate of Wisser · filed 1995-04-25(a)(7)

Such allegations, which, on a motion to dismiss, must be taken as true, are sufficient to withstand the dismissal motion.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, pleaded facts receive favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims that are inherently incredible or contradicted by documentary evidence do not.

Quatrochi v. Citibank, N. A. · filed 1994-12-08(a)(7)

Although on a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference, nevertheless, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims either inherently incredible or contradicted by documentary evidence, are not entitled, to such consideration (Mark Hampton, Inc. v Bergreen, 173 AD2d 220).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a), the court may assess the pleadings together with evidence proffered by the plaintiff when deciding whether a claim is adequately alleged.

New York University v. Continental Insurance · filed 1994-11-10(a)

The pleadings supplemented by evidence proffered by plaintiff adequately allege, for purposes of the instant motion, that defendants also engaged in egregious tortious misconduct directed at plaintiff and at the public in general.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the complaint’s allegations are assumed to be true, even if issue has been joined.

Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. · filed 1994-10-03

We note that this appeal is from an order granting a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, although issue had been joined when the motion was made. The allegations of the complaint are therefore assumed to be true.

A complaint may be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when its factual claims are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence.

O'Riley v. Unique Vacations, Inc. · filed 1994-05-23(a)(7)

A complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) when the pleading is comprised of little more than factual claims which are either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence (see, Lovisa Constr. Co. v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 198 AD2d 333).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), pleaded facts are presumed true and accorded every favorable inference.

Franklin v. Winard · filed 1993-12-30(a)(7)

On a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference.

CPLR 3211 dismissal is inappropriate when the circumstances raise a factual question about whether the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary.

Town of Moriah v. Cole-Layer-Trumble Co. · filed 1994-01-20

These particulars at least raise a question of fact as to whether plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the contract between CLT and the County, rendering dismissal of the complaint against CLT at this stage inappropriate (see, MK W. St. Co. v Meridien Hotels, 184 AD2d 312, 313; Facilities Dev. Corp. v Miletta, 180 AD2d 97, 100-101).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleadings are construed liberally, and third-party complaints receive an especially liberal reading.

Harrison v. Golden Tree Homes Inc. · filed 1993-12-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, "all pleadings shall be liberally construed and policy considerations against dismissing third-party actions require that such complaints be entitled to a more liberal reading than others” (Taft v Shaffer Trucking, 52 AD2d 255, 257).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), sufficiently pleaded factual allegations of aiding and abetting liability survive a motion to dismiss.

Joel v. Weber · filed 1993-10-12(a)(7)

Upon examination of the record, we find that the plaintiffs, under the pleading standards applicable to a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss and CPLR 3016 (b), have sufficiently pleaded their causes of action for aiding and abetting liability under the Debtor and Creditor Law as against MYB.

A complaint that sets forth the essential facts and requests an adjudication can withstand a motion to dismiss even when it does not expressly plead the legal theory supporting relief.

Conti v. Citrin · filed 1985-08-08(a)

There appears to be a misimpression on the part of Citrin’s attorney that the question of illusory tenancy and its legal effects cannot be appropriately considered by the court because it is not raised under the original pleadings. ... The complaint sets forth all the essential facts, and the demand of the Contis for the entirety of Penthouse B, and asks for an adjudication to that effect. The court is thereupon obligated to declare the respective rights of the parties.

On a motion to dismiss under subdivision (a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and sustains a claim that adequately states a cause of action.

Callahan v. Callahan · filed 1987-04-23(a)(7)

Accepting these allegations as true (see, Kahn v Crames, 92 AD2d 634, 635), we find that the fifth cause of action adequately states a cause of action to recover for fraud.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a cause of action pleaded in the alternative cannot stand if one alternative fails to state a cause of action.

A A Tube Testing Co. v. Sohne · filed 1964-01-06(a)(7)

A cause of action so pleaded cannot stand if, as here, one of the alternatives does not state a cause of action (Pilinko v. Merlau, 7 A D 2d 617; Potter v. Gilbert, 130 App. Div. 632, affd, 196 N. Y. 576).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts deciding whether a pleading states a cause of action to examine its substance rather than its form.

Foley v. D'Agostino · filed 1964-03-17(a)(7)

Upon a 3211 (subd. [a], par. 7) motion to dismiss a cause of action, however, we look to the substance rather than to the form.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action generally cannot resolve a defense that presents factual questions.

Platt Corp. v. Platt · filed 1964-04-21(a)(7)

In any event, the applicability of said section 275 would be a matter of defense and involves questions of fact not generally determinable upon a motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency.

Section 3211(e) permits a defendant to plead failure to state a cause of action in an answer, although pleading it is unnecessary to preserve the objection.

Prompt Electrical Supply Co. v. W. E. Tatem, Inc. · filed 1964-05-15(e)

The defense under review is one provided for by paragraph 7 of subdivision (a) of 3211. ... The motion to strike the defense is denied even though the pleading thereof is unnecessary. ... It is merely decided that a defendant may in his answer as a matter of pleading aver that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a written agreement attached to the complaint controls over conflicting allegations, including allegations that its execution was wrongfully induced.

300 Broadway Realty Corp. v. Kommit · filed 1964-06-01(a)(7)

The well-settled rule that a written agreement annexed to and made a part of a complaint must prevail over its pleaded version where there is a variance (Dorn v. Dorn, 282 App. Div. 597) applies with equal force to a writing where, as here, its wrongfully induced execution is the gravamen of the pleading.

A complaint is subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when it fails to plead a statutory condition precedent essential to the claim.

Littlefield-Alger Signal Co. v. County of Nassau · filed 1964-06-03(a)(7)

Since there can be no contractual liability in the absence of a contract so executed, it is essential to the statement of a valid cause of action in contract that the plaintiff allege compliance with the statute. This it has not done. The failure to plead the condition precedent as to which plaintiff has the burden of both pleading and proof is fatal.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

Nemenyi v. Raymond International, Inc. · filed 1964-10-20(a)(7)

However, the defects in the pleading are not merely formal but amount to a failure to state any cause of action. ... Failure adequately to plead the contract, to plead the facts showing defendants’ alleged misconduct, and to plead the facts showing damage to plaintiffs as a consequence of defendants’ alleged conduct makes the complaint fatally defective.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action may be denied when the materiality of a contract's time provision requires factual development at trial.

Frederick v. Douglas Mobile Corp. · filed 1964-12-14(a)(7)

The individual defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term denying their motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the pleading fails to state a cause of action. (CPLR 3211, subd. [a], par. 7.) ... Since time is not stated to be of the essence, we think that the motion was properly denied to permit the development at the trial of the circumstances bearing upon the materiality which the parties intended to accord the time provision of the contract.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a fraudulent misrepresentation complaint that does not allege the plaintiffs relied on the misrepresentation.

Brickner v. Linden City Realty, Inc. · filed 1965-02-01(a)(7)

Order reversed on the law, with $10 costs and disbursements; defendant Agusta’s motion to dismiss the complaint as to him granted; and complaint dismissed as to the defendant Agusta, with leave to plaintiffs, if so advised, to serve an amended complaint within 30 days after entry of the order hereon. The present complaint is deficient in that it contains no allegation that any fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendant Agusta was relied upon by the plaintiffs.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is considered as a whole to determine whether it states a claim.

Holzer v. Feinstein · filed 1965-04-12(a)(7)

In an action to recover damages on grounds hereafter set forth, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered April 7, 1964, which granted defendant’s motion, made pursuant to statute (CPLR 3211, subd. [a], par. 7), to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion denied. ... we find that this complaint, considered as a whole, states a cause of action under section 853 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law.

Section 3211 requires denial of a motion to dismiss a cause of action if the pleaded facts could support recovery.

Carnival Co. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. · filed 1965-04-15(a)(7)

If upon any aspect of the facts stated in the various causes, plaintiffs would be entitled to recovery, the motion should be denied as to that cause (Howard Stores Corp. v. Pope, 1 N Y 2d 110).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations sufficiently stating the claimed grievance can withstand a motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency.

Loudin v. Mohawk Airlines, Inc. · filed 1964-12-18(a)(7)

Sufficient is set forth to inform the defendants of the claimed grievance of conspiracy to achieve the purpose of depriving plaintiff of employment in the industry by wrongful means.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, allegations can sustain a fraud cause of action even if they do not specifically allege fraud.

Cecala v. Title Guarantee Co. · filed 1965-04-19

Although the first two causes of action do not specifically allege fraud as such, the allegations do state in substance a cause of action to sustain an inference of fraud.

Section 3211 permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, but dismissal is denied when the pleadings sufficiently allege one.

Finley v. New York Central Railroad · filed 1965-07-12

The third-party complaint and the amended complaint both state causes of action against the power company as charging negligence in the maintenance of its service wires and of the pole from which the plaintiff allegedly fell and sustained injuries. Motion to dismiss denied, without costs.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true, draws fair inferences in its favor, and does not decide the merits.

Tongue v. White · filed 1965-07-13(a)(7)

The motion is to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 7), upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The action is for the recovery of real estate commissions. Upon such a motion, only the complaint is before the court. The merits of the action.cannot be passed upon and speculation may not be indulged as to what the proof may show on the trial. The allegations of the complaint must be taken at face value and every intendment and fair inference must be in favor of the pleading.

Under CPLR 3211(a), a complaint may survive a motion to dismiss when its causes of action are identifiable and sufficiently stated despite inartful drafting.

American Cement Corp. v. Dunetz Bros. · filed 1965-09-20(a)

Although possibly somewhat inartfully drawn, this court finds no difficulty in distinguishing and identifying the claim underlying each. ... The court finds these causes sufficiently stated.

A complaint that shows some cause of action survives a CPLR 3211 motion for insufficiency even if it is poorly drawn.

Pearlberg v. Lacks · filed 1965-05-18

Unquestionably, the amended complaint is poorly drawn but is sufficient to show some cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be liberally construed.

Napolitano v. Town of Chili · filed 1965-05-22(a)(7)

The complaint, herein, must be liberally construed.

On a motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency, allegations repeated in a third-party complaint must be accepted as true.

Earle v. City of New York · filed 1965-06-14(a)(7)

The allegations of the main complaint, which the third-party complaint repeats verbatim and which for present purposes must be accepted as true, are of obvious or patent defects.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Statman v. Kelly · filed 1965-07-08(a)(7)

For the purposes of the motion, the court accepts the truth of the allegations of the complaint, viz., the plaintiffs were arrested and falsely imprisoned.

Section 3211(a) does not require dismissal on the pleadings when unresolved legal and factual questions require a trial record.

Farragher v. Ide · filed 1965-06-22(a)

In the light of this uncertainty and the absence of any facts to establish the time required to install automatic sprinklers, none of the questions should be resolved on the pleadings alone ... without a trial record.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, but assumptions, opinions, speculation, and legal conclusions are not.

Spock v. Pocket Books, Inc. · filed 1965-12-15(a)(7)

In proceeding pursuant to CPLE 3211 (subd. [a], par. 7) defendant concedes, for the purposes of the motion, the truth of plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual assertions. Defendant does not concede, as contended by plaintiff, assumptions, opinions, speculations and/or conclusions of law pleaded in the complaint, i.e., the above-enumerated bases for plaintiff’s public policy argument.