N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

Section 3211(a)(4) gives courts discretion to dismiss an action when another pending action involves substantially the same parties, claims, and relief; different wrongs and damages can support denial of dismissal.

Brestin v. LaBianca · filed 2016-11-09(a)(4)

“ ‘Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same’ ” ... Here, although the instant action relates to the same properties as the prior, pending action, the plaintiff’s allegations in the instant action relate to different wrongs, including wrongs of a different nature and wrongs committed at different times, and different damages.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(4), different legal theories or claims do not prevent dismissal when another action between the same parties involves the same cause of action.

Stewart Title Insurance Co. v. Wingate, Kearney & Cullen · filed 2016-12-06(a)(4)

Since in determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), “it is inconsequential that different legal theories or claims were set forth in the two actions” (Shah v RBC Capital Mkts. LLC, 115 AD3d 444, 444-445 [1st Dept 2014]), the motion court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the instant action.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal based on another pending action when the parties and relief substantially overlap.

Swartz v. Swartz · filed 2016-12-14(a)(4)

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the Swartz defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against the Swartz daughters. ... Here, the relief sought in this action is not substantially the same as the relief sought in the matrimonial action, and there is not a substantial identity of the parties because the 36 additional parties in this action are alleged to have engaged in tortious conduct (see Wharry v Lindenhurst Union Free School Dist., 65 AD3d 1035, 1036 [2009]; Pagoulatou v Kourkoumelis, 14 Misc 3d 1222[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50125 [U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2007]; cf. Rossignol v Rossignol, 82 AD3d 1335 [2011]; Liebert v TIAA-CREF, 34 AD3d 756 [2006]; Raik v Clindent Devs., 282 AD2d 513 [2001]; St. John v St. John, 201 AD2d 552 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal of a New York action in favor of an action pending in another state.

Prospect Funding Holdings L.L.C. v. Maslowski · filed 2017-01-12(a)(4)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barry R. Ostrager, J.), entered November 13, 2015, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants’ motion insofar as they sought to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 327 (a) and 3211 (a) (4) as against defendant Pamela Maslowski, unanimously reversed, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the motion granted.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal of a claim for a money judgment when another pending action seeks the same money judgment.

Heywood Condominium Ex Rel. Board of Managers v. Wozencraft · filed 2017-01-12(a)(4)

However, we dismiss the second cause of action for money damages. While section 5.9 (c) of the bylaws and Real Property Law § 339-aa permit plaintiff to proceed with both the 2011 action to recover a money judgment and the instant foreclosure action, plaintiff may not seek a money judgment in this foreclosure action while also seeking a money judgment in the pending 2011 action. Accordingly, dismissal of the second cause of action, seeking a money judgment, is warranted (see CPLR 3211 [a] [4]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action between the same parties for the same cause is pending; the court may condition dismissal on consolidation with that action.

Quatro Consulting Group, LLC v. Buffalo Hotel Supply Co. · filed 2017-01-12(a)(4)

Here, BHS commenced its action by filing the summons with notice in Erie County at least six days prior to Quatro commencing its action in Monroe County. ... Accordingly, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) this matter is dismissed upon successful consolidation with the Erie County action.

Section 3211(a)(4) gives courts broad discretion to deny dismissal based on another pending action when the relief sought is not substantially the same and the parties differ.

Wimbledon Financing Master Fund, Ltd. v. Bergstein · filed 2017-02-23(a)(4)

Supreme Court providently exercised its “broad discretion” under CPLR 3211 (a) (4) ... to deny appellants’ motion to dismiss this turnover proceeding under CPLR article 52 based on the pendency of a prior plenary action. While there is some overlap between the parties and claims in this proceeding and the earlier-filed plenary action, the nature of the relief sought is not “substantially the same” ... and the respondents named herein are not identical to the defendants sued in the plenary action.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not permit dismissal in favor of a pending out-of-state proceeding when that dismissal would reward a party’s breach of a mandatory New York forum selection clause, absent the other party’s consent.

Carlyle CIM Agent, L.L.C. v. Trey Resources I, LLC · filed 2017-03-23(a)(4)

Thus, absent plaintiff’s consent, it is therefore improper to dismiss the New York actions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) so as to consolidate them with the Oklahoma proceeding (see Boss v American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 15 AD3d 306, 307 [1st Dept 2005], affd 6 NY3d 242, 247 [2006] [well-settled policy to enforce contractual forum selection clauses]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending between substantially identical parties for the same cause of action.

Sprecher v. Thibodeau · filed 2017-03-30(a)(4)

Dismissal is also not warranted on the ground that the tor-tious interference claim is duplicative of a claim brought against defendant in a related litigation by two corporate entities indirectly owned by plaintiff. CPLR 3211 (a) (4) authorizes dismissal where “there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.”

Section 3211(a)(4) permits discretionary dismissal when another pending action concerning the same dispute will resolve the claims and avoid duplicative litigation.

IRX Therapeutics, Inc. v. Landry · filed 2017-05-09(a)(4)

Nevertheless, the motion court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing this action based on the pendency of an action in federal court in Texas concerning the same alleged contract (see Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]; see also CPLR 3211 [a] [4]).

Section 3211(a)(4) allows a court to dismiss when another action between the same parties concerns the same cause of action, or to make another order as justice requires.

RCI Plumbing Corp. v. Turner Towers Tenant Corp. · filed 2017-07-14(a)(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), a defendant may move to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that “there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States; the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires” (CPLR 3211 [a] [4]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending for substantially the same relief.

Dec v. BFM Realty, LLC · filed 2017-08-02(a)(4)

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the first cause of action alleging fraud on the ground that there was another action pending for substantially the same relief.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to stay claims concerning property when a parallel action in another state offers more effective relief and is likely to reach trial first.

JSC VTB Bank v. Mavlyanov · filed 2017-10-19(a)(4)

Even if a New York court could attach real estate located in California, we would stay all claims related to the California properties, because, only about a month after plaintiff sued here, it brought an action in that state against many of the same defendants as in the case at bar, alleging fraudulent conveyance with respect to the California properties. The California action “offers more” than the case at bar (see Continental Ins. Co. v Polaris Indus. Partners, 199 AD2d 222, 223 [1st Dept 1993]), because, as plaintiff admits, a notice of pendency against the California properties can be filed only in that state, not here. It also appears that the California action will go to trial before the case at bar (see e.g. Belopolsky v Renew Data Corp., 41 AD3d 322, 323 [1st Dept 2007]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another pending action involves substantially the same parties, arises from the same alleged wrongs, and seeks the same relief for the same injuries.

Brook v. Zuckerman · filed 2017-11-02(a)(4)

The court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the above-cited claims on the grounds of another action pending between the same parties (CPLR 3211 [a] [4]; see Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731 [1982]). Both this action and a prior action commenced by plaintiffs in 2012 arose out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs (see PK Rest., LLC v Lifshutz, 138 AD3d 434 [1st Dept 2016]), i.e., defendants’ response to a 2009 surgical incident involving plaintiff Adam Brook, M.D., including their peer review and internal investigation and their filing of an Adverse Action Report and maintenance of that report with the National Physicians Database. Both actions seek the same relief for the same alleged injuries. While plaintiff Brook Cardiothoracic Surgery, L.L.C., and defendant George Keckeisen, M.D., are not parties to the 2012 action, there is still substantial identity of the parties in the two actions, which is sufficient (see id. at 436).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another pending action involves the same parties and arises from the same subject matter and alleged wrongs.

Stevens v. Law Office of Blank & Star, PLLC · filed 2017-11-15(a)(4)

This action and the first action, which was pending at the time the order appealed from was issued, arose from the same subject matter and alleged wrongs, and involved the same parties. Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) (see Matter of Willnus, 101 AD3d 1036, 1037 [2012]; DAIJ, Inc. v Roth, 85 AD3d at 960; Cherico, Cherico & Assoc. v Midollo, 67 AD3d at 623).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal of claims that duplicate claims against the same defendants in a related pending action.

Jacobs v. Westchester Industrial Complex, LLC · filed 2017-12-06(a)(4)

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting those branches of the defendants’ motion which were to dismiss the fourth and fifth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), as those causes of action were duplicative of causes of action brought against the same defendants in the related action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [4]; Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]; Dec v BFM Realty, LLC, 153 AD3d 497 [2017]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to deny dismissal without prejudice and stay a related action pending another action when doing so preserves potential recovery and limits duplicative litigation.

Rothschild v. Braselmann · filed 2018-01-04(a)(4)

Here, however, the totality of the circumstances mitigate in favor of denying the motion to dismiss with respect to Lieb, Angell and their respective medical groups, but without prejudice, and otherwise staying the Supreme Court action, pending the outcome of the Court of Claims action ( see CPLR 3211 [a] [4]; Flintkote Co. v American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. , 103 AD2d 501, 507-508 [1984], appeal dismissed in part 64 NY2d 882 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 857 [1986]; Siegel, NY Prac § 262 at 459-460 [5th ed 2011]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending on the same claim for the same relief.

Ember v. Denizard · filed 2018-04-19(a)(4)

Nor is dismissal of the lung injury claim under CPLR 3211(a)(4) appropriate as there is no prior action pending on the same claim for the same relief ( see Kent Dev. Co. v Liccione , 37 NY2d 899, 901 [1975]; Montgomery Ward & Co. v Othmer , 127 AD2d 913 [3d Dept 1987]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another pending action involves substantially the same parties, subject matter, and relief.

Matter of Pryce v. Pryce · filed 2018-04-25(a)(4)

"Where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same, a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) on the ground that there is another action pending" ( Scottsdale Ins. Co v Indemnity Ins. Corp. RRG , 110 AD3d 783, 784; see Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732).

Section 3211(a)(4) allows a court to dismiss an action when another sufficiently similar action between substantially identical parties is pending, subject to the court's broad discretion.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Deshuk-Flores · filed 2018-07-05(a)(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same ( see Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731, 732; Dec v BFM Realty, LLC, 153 AD3d 497, 497; Swartz v Swartz, 145 AD3d 818, 822).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending and gives the court broad discretion to do so.

Matter of Sealand Waste LLC v. Town of Carroll · filed 2019-02-08(a)(4)

"[W]here, as here, there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same, a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) on the ground that there is another action pending' " ( Matter of Goodyear v New York State Dept. of Health , 163 AD3d 1427, 1430 [4th Dept 2018]; see CPLR 7804 [f]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when the same causes of action arising from the same subject matter or alleged wrongs are asserted by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants in another action.

JFK Family Ltd. Partnership v. Millbrae Natural Gas Dev. Fund 2005, L.P. · filed 2019-02-13(a)(4)

Moreover, dismissal of the first through fifth causes of action was warranted in Action No. 2 pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), because the same causes of action arising out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs are asserted by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants in Action No. 1 ( see PK Rest., LLC v Lifshutz , 138 AD3d 434).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits discretionary dismissal when another pending action substantially involves the same parties, subject matter, and relief.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Jewsbury · filed 2019-02-20(a)(4)

A court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity [*2]of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same ( see Cooper v Bao Thao , 162 AD3d 980, 981; DAIJ, Inc. v Roth , 85 AD3d 959, 959).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another pending action has substantially identical parties, sufficiently similar claims, and substantially the same relief.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Luxama · filed 2019-05-29(a)(4)

"Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same. It is not necessary that the precise legal theories presented in the first action also be presented in the second action [so] long as the relief . . . is the same or substantially the same"

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action between the same parties involving the same cause is pending, subject to the court's discretion as justice requires.

21st Mtge. Corp. v. Ahmed · filed 2019-06-19(a)(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that "there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States." However, "the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires" (CPLR 3211[a][4]). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of Kahn's cross motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him on this ground.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another similar action is pending but allows the court to order another just remedy, such as consolidation.

LaBuda v. LaBuda · filed 2019-07-03(a)(4)

CPLR 3211 (a) (4) does not require a trial court to dismiss an action upon the ground that another similar action is pending, instead allowing it to "make such order as justice requires" ( see Kent Dev. Co. v Liccione , 37 NY2d 899, 901 [1975]; Blank v Miller , 122 AD2d 356, 358-359 [1986]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal of claims whose factual allegations and recoverable damages are also at issue in a separate action.

Pixley Dev. Corp. v. Erie Ins. Co. · filed 2019-07-31(a)(4)

Contrary to Pixley's contention, we conclude that the court properly granted the cross motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint against the Café, i.e., the second and fourth causes of action, although for reasons different from those expressed by the court. Those causes of action are "predicated upon the same factual allegations as the [indemnification cross claims in the personal injury action], and seek[] damages which may be recovered" in that separate action ( Mecca v Shang , 258 AD2d 569, 570 [2d Dept 1999], lv dismissed 95 NY2d 791 [2000]; see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [4]; Bostany v Trump Org. LLC , 88 AD3d 553, 554 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.

Sokoloff v. Schor · filed 2019-08-21(a)(4)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants' respective motions to dismiss the 2015 action insofar as asserted against each of them. The complaint in the 2015 action is identical in all essential respects to the complaint in the 2016 action, the parties are identical, and the relief sought is the same ( see CPLR 3211[a][4]; Cooper v Thao , 162 AD3d 980; Mazzei v Kyriacou , 139 AD3d 823, 824; DAIJ, Inc. v Roth , 85 AD3d 959).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action between the same parties for the same cause is pending, while allowing the court to make whatever order justice requires.

Seagate Mini Mall, Inc. v. Khlebopros · filed 2019-10-09(a)(4)

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits the dismissal of a cause of action where "there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States; the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires."

Section 3211(a)(4) gives a court broad discretion to dismiss a proceeding when another proceeding between the same parties seeks the same relief.

Matter of Thelot v. Patterson · filed 2020-01-29(a)(4)

CPLR 3211(a)(4) "vests a court with broad discretion in considering whether to dismiss an action on the ground that another action is pending between the same parties on the same cause of action" ( Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732). Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the Family Court's determination to dismiss the proceeding pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to deny dismissal of a parallel action when both actions are before the same justice and there is no risk of conflicting rulings by courts of concurrent jurisdiction.

Punch Fashion, LLC v. Merchant Factors Corp. · filed 2020-02-18(a)(4)

The court providently exercised its discretion in sub silentio denying the cross motion to dismiss the action brought by Merchant Factors Corp. pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4). Since both cases were before the same Justice, "a major concern" underlying the statute — viz., "to avoid the potential for conflicts that might result from rulings issued by courts of concurrent jurisdiction" ( White Light Prods. v On the Scene Prods. , 231 AD2d 90, 93 [1st Dept 1997]) — is not present.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not support dismissal based on another pending action when the actions have different purposes and seek antagonistic and inconsistent relief.

Natixis Funding Corp. v. GenOn Mid-Atl., LLC · filed 2020-03-12(a)(4)

Dismissal of those actions would not have been proper under CPLR 3211(a)(4) insofar as the purposes of the Dickerson and Natixis Actions differed and the relief sought therein was " antagonistic and inconsistent'" ( see White Light Prods. v On the Scene Prods. , 231 AD2d 90, 94 [1st Dept 1997], quoting Arred Enters. Corp. v Indemnity Ins. Co. , 108 AD2d 624, 627 [1st Dept 1985]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to deny dismissal based on another pending action when the New York action was filed first and has a stronger connection to the dispute and broader scope.

XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co. · filed 2020-03-26(a)(4)

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) based on another action pending, or pursuant to CPLR 327 for forum non conveniens, or alternatively, to stay this action, which was filed a day before defendants-appellants commenced an action against plaintiffs in Delaware, seeking to litigate most, but not all, of the same issues. ... Nevertheless, here New York has a more substantial nexus to the parties and the dispute, and this action is more comprehensive than the Delaware action.

A court should deny dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(4) when two actions concern the same property but allege different wrongs committed at different times and different damages.

Feldman v. Harari · filed 2020-05-06(a)(4)

Accordingly, although the instant action relates to the same property as the 2013 action, the plaintiff's allegations in the instant action relate to different wrongs, including wrongs of a different nature and wrongs committed at different times, and different damages ( see Brestin v LaBianca , 144 AD3d 722, 723; Clark v Clark , 93 AD3d 812, 815; Zirmak Invs. v Miller , 290 AD2d 552, 553). Under the circumstances, the court should have denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) to dismiss the complaint.

A court has discretion to deny a CPLR 3211(a)(4) motion to dismiss on the ground that another action is pending.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Beymer · filed 2020-05-14(a)(4)

Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) on the ground that there is another action pending ( Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Reid , 132 AD3d 788, 788—789 [2d Dept 2015]; see also Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits a court to stay proceedings in a related action to avoid inconsistent results.

Board of Mgrs. of the 1835 E. 14th St. Condominium v. Singer · filed 2020-09-23(a)(4)

However, the interests of judicial economy and the desirability of avoiding inconsistent results may be furthered by staying further proceedings in this action, with the exception of any proceedings with respect to the receivership, without prior leave of court, pending the determination of the Singer action ( see CPLR 3211[a][4]; see also Lawler v TropWorld Casino & Entertainment Resort , 238 AD2d 383, 383-384).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) gives courts discretion to dismiss an action when another pending action involves substantially identical parties and issues.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Pena · filed 2020-10-07(a)(4)

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Luxama , 172 AD3d at 1341; Cooper v Thao , 162 AD3d at 981).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action between the same parties for the same cause is pending, but leaves the decision to the court’s discretion.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Porfert · filed 2020-10-28(a)(4)

However, "the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires" (CPLR 3211[a][4]). Under the circumstances of this case, where there had been no activity in the prior action since 2006, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's cross motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him on this ground ( see 21st Mtge. Corp. v Ahmed , 173 AD3d 951, 952-953).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits a court to dismiss a claim when a simultaneously pending action could produce conflicting rulings.

Eurotech Constr. Corp. v. Illinois Natl. Ins. Co. · filed 2020-10-29(a)(4)

The motion court providently exercised its broad discretion in dismissing the first cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( see Shah v RBC Capital Mkts. LLC , 115 AD3d 444, 444-445 [1st Dept 2014]). ... The court properly dismissed this cause of action to avoid the potential of conflicting rulings in the two simultaneously pending actions.

Section 3211(a)(4) gives a court discretion to deny dismissal when another action between the same parties for the same cause is pending.

US Bank v. Stern · filed 2020-12-16(a)(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that "there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States." However, "the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires" (CPLR 3211[a][4]). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them on this ground ( see 21st Mtge. Corp. v Ahmed , 173 AD3d 951, 952-953).

Section 3211(a)(4) gives a court discretion to deny a motion to dismiss based on another action pending.

El Toro Group, LLC v. Bareburger Group, LLC · filed 2021-01-14(a)(4)

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendants' motion to dismiss all claims related to the promissory note based on another action pending (CPLR 3211[a][4]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to deny a motion to dismiss based on another pending action when that action was discontinued before the motion was decided.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Karnaby · filed 2021-01-27(a)(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that "there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States." However, "the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires" (CPLR 3211[a][4]). Under the circumstances of this case, in which a prior foreclosure action commenced in 2010 (hereinafter the 2010 foreclosure action) was discontinued before the determination of the defendants' motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint in the instant action, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint on this ground.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits a court to stay an action while an earlier, related proceeding is resolved instead of dismissing it.

Zanani v. Sutton Apts. Corp. · filed 2021-04-15(a)(4)

While the motion court did not abuse its discretion in granting the cooperative's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( see Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]), it would have been preferable for the court to have granted the motion only to the extent of staying the instant action pending resolution of the Appellate Term appeal ( see AIG Fin. Prods. Corp. v Penncara Energy, LLC , 83 AD3d 495, 495 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to deny dismissal based on another pending action when that action no longer impedes the suit.

Zanani v. Sutton Apts. Corp. · filed 2021-04-15(a)(4)

For these reasons, the holdover proceeding no longer presents any impediment to proceeding with the instant action. Under the circumstances[*2], to the extent that the motion court's dismissal of the complaint here is premised on the existence of a "prior action pending" pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), we reverse, in the exercise of our discretion, to deny the motion to dismiss ( see L-3 Communications Corp. v SafeNet, Inc. , 45 AD3d 1, 8 [1st Dept 2007]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not warrant dismissal in favor of an earlier action when the two actions lack a substantial identity of claims.

Harvard Steel Sales, LLC v. Bain · filed 2021-05-04(a)(4)

The motion court improvidently dismissed this action under CPLR 3211(a)(4), in favor of a previously-filed federal action brought by defendant Daniel Bain's companies, Galvstar Holdings LLC and DSB Holdings LLC, against plaintiff Harvard Steel Sales, LLC (Harvard) and Harvard's owner, Jeremy Jacobs. There is not a substantial identity of claims between the two actions.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) gives courts broad discretion to dismiss an action when another pending action involves substantially identical parties, sufficiently similar claims, and substantially the same relief.

Akter v. Zara Realty Holding Corp. · filed 2022-03-09(a)(4)

"Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same" [*2]( DAIJ, Inc. v Roth , 85 AD3d 959, 959; see CPLR 3211[a][4]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Karnaby , 190 AD3d 1005).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when a pending action involves substantially similar claims and relief and substantially the same parties.

Nurlybayev v. SmileDirectClub, Inc. · filed 2022-05-05(a)(4)

Supreme Court properly dismissed this action under CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( see Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]). Plaintiff in this action and plaintiffs in the Tennessee actions assert substantially similar causes of action and seek substantially similar relief. Moreover, there is substantial identity of the parties in the two actions.

Section 3211(a)(4) does not warrant dismissal based on another pending action when the two actions involve different causes of action.

Singe v. Bates Troy, Inc. · filed 2022-06-30(a)(4)

Accordingly, as the claims in the amended complaint are not "the same cause of action," dismissal is unwarranted at this stage (CPLR 3211 [a] [4]; see Sprecher v Thibodeau , 148 AD3d 654, 656 [2017]; Blank v Schafrann , 167 AD2d 745, 746 [1990]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when a pending action concerning the same wrongs can provide complete relief.

Matter of Ryan · filed 2023-01-05(a)(4)

We find that Surrogate's Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the SCPA 1809 proceeding due to the pending Supreme Court action ( see Matter of Aaron , 232 AD2d 758, 759 [3d Dept 1996]; see also SCPA 102; CPLR 3211 [a] [4]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(4), which court first took jurisdiction is relevant to dismissal in favor of another pending action, but is not controlling by itself.

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Vale Can. Ltd. · filed 2023-01-17(a)(4)

The court properly denied the branches of the motions seeking dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4). This action was filed prior to the Ontario proceedings, and the New York court was the first to take jurisdiction ( see GE Oil & Gas, [*3]Inc. v Turbine Generation Servs., L.L.C. , 140 ad3D 582, 583 [1st Dept 2016]). While that fact alone is not controlling, we find no other basis warranting dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4).

Section 3211(a)(4) does not require dismissal of a timely commenced second action merely because appeals in the first action remain pending.

Concepcion v. Lessel Transp. Corp. · filed 2023-02-09(a)(4)

The court also properly declined to dismiss the complaint on the ground that appeals in the first action were pending (CPLR 3211[a][4]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending between substantially the same parties, involving sufficiently similar claims and substantially the same relief.

Haart v. Scaglia · filed 2023-02-27(a)(4)

Simply put, dismissal is not appropriate pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) based on the Delaware Lawsuit as to the claims not otherwise barred because the Delaware Lawsuit is no longer pending and these claims were never before the Delaware court.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when the same claims are being litigated in another pending action, avoiding duplicative litigation.

Resort Group, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgt., L.P. · filed 2023-02-28(a)(4)

We find that the motion court properly dismissed the third cause of action for breach of the Purchase Agreement and so much of the sixth cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Purchase Agreement on the ground of another action pending pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4). Those claims are being litigated in Delaware and were not dismissed by the Delaware court. Thus, it would not make sense to have duplicative litigation in New York, especially because the Purchase Agreement contains both a Delaware forum selection clause and a Delaware choice-of-law clause.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(4), the New York court's being first to take jurisdiction weighs against dismissal in favor of another action, but that fact alone is not controlling.

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Vale Can. Ltd. · filed 2023-04-18(a)(4)

The court properly denied the branches of the motions seeking dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4). This action was filed prior to the Ontario proceedings, and the New York court was the first to take jurisdiction ( see GE Oil & Gas [*3] , Inc. v Turbine Generation Servs., L.L.C. , 140 AD3d 582, 583 [1st Dept 2016]). While that fact alone is not controlling, we find no other basis warranting dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4).

A pending action arising from the same alleged wrongs does not warrant dismissal under subsection (a)(4) when the relief sought is not the same or substantially the same.

Brach v. Schwartz · filed 2023-04-26(a)(4)

Here, although the accounting proceedings commenced in Surrogate's Court arose out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs as in this action, the nature of the relief sought in the causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty and for a permanent injunction is not the same or substantially the same as the relief sought in the accounting proceedings ( see Kent Dev. Co. v Liccione , 37 NY2d 899, 901; City Line Auto Mall, Inc. v Citicorp Leasing, Inc. , 45 AD3d 717, 719; Zirmak Invs. v Miller , 290 AD2d 552, 553; Boyer v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn. , 120 AD2d 363, 363).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal based on another action only if that action was still pending when the later action commenced.

Hempstead Hous. Auth. v. Middle County Resources Mgt., Inc. · filed 2023-05-03(a)(4)

Here, the MCRM defendants failed to demonstrate that the prior action remained pending at the time the plaintiff commenced the instant action, and therefore the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the MCRM defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them on this ground.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) gives courts broad discretion to dismiss an action when another action between the same parties on the same cause of action is pending.

Alvarez & Marshal Valuation Servs., LLC v. Solar Eclipse Inv. Fund III, LLC · filed 2023-05-09(a)(4)

CPLR 3211(a)(4) vests a court with "broad discretion" in determining whether to "dismiss an action on the ground that another action is pending between the same parties on the same cause of action" ( Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]).

Dismissal based on another pending action is discretionary; the court considers whether the actions concern the same wrongs and whether there is good reason for both to proceed.

Matter of Witkowski v. HS 570, Inc. · filed 2023-07-28(a)(4)

In determining whether dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is warranted, "we consider (1) [whether] both suits arise out of the same actionable wrong or series of wrongs[ ] and (2) as a practical matter, [whether] there [is] any good reason for two actions rather than one being brought in seeking the remedy" ( Red Barn Country , LLC v Trombley , 120 AD3d 1537, 1538 [4th Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see LaBuda v LaBuda , 174 AD3d 1013, 1014 [3d Dept 2019]).

A prior action is not another action pending under CPLR 3211(a)(4) unless the complaint in that action was served.

Quinones v. Z & B Trucking, Inc. · filed 2023-10-18(a)(4)

However, a complaint must have been served in that other action, otherwise it is not "another action," or a "prior action pending" ( Graev v Graev , 219 AD2d 535, 535 [internal quotation marks omitted]) within the meaning of CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( see Wharton v Wharton , 244 AD2d 404, 404; Graev v Graev , 219 AD2d at 535; Sotirakis v United Servs. Auto. Assn. , 100 AD2d 931, 931).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action between the same parties is pending in court; a private arbitration does not qualify.

Matter of Living Real Estate Group, LLC v. Douglas Elliman, LLC · filed 2023-10-24(a)(4)

CPLR 3211(a)(4) provides that a party can seek dismissal of an action if another action is "pending [between the same parties] in a court of any state or the United States." At the time the court dismissed the declaratory judgment action, Living NY's motion for a stay of arbitration was no longer pending ( see e.g. Diaz v Philip Morris Cos., Inc. , 28 AD3d 703, 705 [2d Dept 2006]). Moreover, a private arbitration does not qualify as an action pending "in a court of a state" ( see Parkway Trading Group Corp. v Blesofsky , 35 Misc 3d 1216[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50722[U], *4 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2012]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.

Hunte v. Cubesmart Self Stor. · filed 2024-01-11(a)(4)

Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending "between the same parties for the same cause of action" (CPLR 3211[a][4]).

Section 3211(a)(4) does not support dismissal based on a prior action when the claim seeking the same relief was withdrawn before the later action began.

Ijezie v. Rozenberg · filed 2024-01-30(a)(4)

Inasmuch as the plaintiff amended her answer in the Civil Court action so as to withdraw her dental malpractice counterclaim several weeks before commencing this action, there was no longer an action pending in which the plaintiff was seeking the same relief at the time that she commenced the instant action.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not require dismissal based on another pending action when a later buyer for value is not a party to that action and is not substantially identical to its predecessor.

Where the Heart Is LLC v. Newrez LLC · filed 2024-02-02(a)(4)

Here, CPLR 3211 (a) (4) does not require dismissal. ... Defendants do not cite to any cases, and the court could locate none, where a subsequent buyer for value, without any connection to the previous owner, is treated as substantially identical to its predecessor-in-interest. ... Accordingly, to the extent that defendants seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), the motion is denied.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another substantially similar action between the same parties is pending, but leaves dismissal to the court's discretion.

J.S.S. v. H.S. · filed 2024-04-18(a)(4)

A court may dismiss an action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) where "there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States." Dismissal on this ground is proper "where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same" ( Jadron v 10 Leonard St., LLC , 124 AD3d 842, 843 [2d Dept 2015]; see Aurora Loan Services, LLC v Reid , 132 AD3d 788, 788-789 [2d Dept 2015]). However, dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(4) is not mandatory, and the court has broad discretion in determining whether dismissal should ensue on this ground ( Feldman v Harari , 183 AD3d 629, 629 [2d Dept 2020]).

Section 3211(a)(4) allows dismissal in favor of another pending action, but filing chronology alone does not require dismissal.

RDF Agent, LLC v. Electric Red Ventures, LLC · filed 2024-05-02(a)(4)

With respect to the July 2022 order, which is brought up for review upon the appeal from the judgment, we find that the court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendants' motion to dismiss this action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( see Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]). "Although [the Texas] action was filed first, chronology is not dispositive, particularly since both actions [we]re at the earliest stages of litigation" when defendants moved to dismiss the New York lawsuit ( IRX Therapeutics, Inc. v Landry, 150 AD3d 446, 447 [1st Dept 2017]; see also L-3 Communications Corp. v SafeNet, Inc., 45 AD3d 1, 9 [1st Dept 2007]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when a pending action between the same parties seeks essentially the same relief and concerns the same actionable wrong.

Zeidman v. Chen · filed 2024-06-04(a)(4)

A matter may be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) where “a pending action existed between the same parties for essentially the same relief and involving the same actionable wrong” (GSL Enterprises, Inc. v Citibank, N.A., 155 AD2d 247, 546 NYS2d 857 [1st Dept 1989] [internal quotations and citation omitted]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal based on a prior pending action only when the actions have substantially identical parties.

Resetarits Constr. Corp. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. · filed 2024-07-26(a)(4)

RCC is not a party in the federal action, and thus substantial identity of the parties is lacking.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal without prejudice when substantially similar claims arise from the same underlying facts as claims in a pending action, even if some allegations arose after the earlier pleading.

SD Second Ave. Member LLC v. SD Second Ave. Venture, LLC · filed 2024-09-03(a)(4)

However, these allegations still arise from same the underlying facts as the claims set forth in the Answer with Counterclaims. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that dismissing the first and second causes of action without prejudice to amending those causes of action in the Soifer Action to bring the allegations up to date is appropriate.

Section 3211(a)(4) requires evidence of substantial identity between the parties to support dismissal based on another pending action.

Concerned Citizens of Forest Hills Inc. v. West Side Tennis Club · filed 2024-08-13(a)(4)

Because defendant failed to provide evidence indicating the substantial identity of both parties is the same, the Court finds defendant's request for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) is unpersuasive and is denied.

Section 3211(a)(4) gives courts discretion to deny dismissal despite an earlier action elsewhere when the New York action is more comprehensive and the earlier action has been stayed.

Aerogen LLC v. Tapjets Holdings Inc. · filed 2024-09-27(a)(4)

Considering the relative comprehensiveness of the present matter in comparison to the Florida Action, the discretionary nature of CPLR § 3211(a)(4), and the stay enacted in the Florida Action pending the final resolution of the present matter, the Court declines to dismiss the present matter pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(4).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another pending action seeks substantially the same relief, even if one action seeks broader relief.

417 N Comanche St., LLC v. EMRES II Tex, LLC · filed 2024-10-07(a)(4)

Dismissal under CPLR § 3211(a)(4) is appropriate where the relief sought in both actions is substantially the same, even if one action seeks broader relief.

Section 3211(a)(4) requires substantial, but not complete, identity of parties when dismissal is sought because another action is pending.

Woodcock Capital LLC v. Schildr Inc. · filed 2024-10-23(a)(4)

But this is of no consequence because "substantial, not complete, identity of parties is all that is required to invoke CPLR 3211(a)(4)" (Syncora, 110 AD3d at 96).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits discretionary dismissal based on another pending action, but a person who is no longer a party to that action does not establish substantial identity of parties.

Vaster Sub II, LLC v. Safdieh · filed 2024-10-23(a)(4)

While defenda nt is correct that she was a defenda nt in the NJ Foreclos ure case when this case was first fi1ed, she is not a litigant there now. There is therefor e no "substan tial identity of the parties."

CPLR 3211(a)(4) gives courts broad discretion to dismiss an action when another action between the same parties on the same cause of action is pending.

63 Co., LLC v. 63rd & 3rd NYC LLC · filed 2024-12-17(a)(4)

In that regard, CPLR 3211(a)(4) provides the court with broad discretion to dismiss an action on the ground that “there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.”

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when a prior pending action involves substantially the same parties and subject matter.

Arlus Owner LLC v. Theodoropoulos · filed 2025-01-02(a)(4)

Therefore, the first and second causes of action are dismissed as against the Tenants pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), as there are prior actions pending involving substantially the same subject matter and parties.

Section 3211(a)(4) gives courts discretion to deny dismissal when a later action adds parties and allegations, even if a similar action is pending.

Pinks v. Mt. Sinai EMS · filed 2025-01-10(a)(4)

Although the allegations made by the plaintiff against Mt. Sinai EMS and Mount Sinai Hospital in the instant action are similar to those asserted in the related action, under the circumstances presented here, in which new parties and new allegations have been added, dismissal is not warranted.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to dismiss a later action when another pending action involves substantially the same parties, claims, and relief; dismissal is discretionary.

MGD-2 Doe v. Shorefront YM-YWHA of Brighton-Manhattan Beach, Inc. · filed 2025-01-10(a)(4)

Dismissal on this ground is proper “where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same” (Jadron v 10 Leonard St., LLC, 124 AD3d 842, 843 [2d Dept 2015]; see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Reid, 132 AD3d 788, 788-789 [2d Dept 2015]). ... In both actions, Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable for the same causes of action stemming from the same allegations of abuse. ... Accordingly, as to the UJA defendants, this action is dismissed against said defendants pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when parallel actions involve the same parties and causes of action and seek the same or substantially the same relief.

Finch Prop. Holdings I, LLP v. Blumenfeld · filed 2025-01-14(a)(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), an action should be dismissed "where an identity of parties and causes of action in two simultaneously pending actions raises the danger of conflicting rulings relating to the same matter" ( Diaz v Philip Morris Cos., Inc. , 28 AD3d 703, 705 [2d Dept 2006], citing White Light Prods. v On the Scene Prods. , 231 AD2d 90 [1st Dept 1997]). Moreover, "with respect to the subject of the actions, the relief sought must be the same or substantially the same" ( White Light Prods. , 231 AD2d at 94 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, even assuming that the matters in the Philadelphia action arose from the same transaction, "the relief sought in each action was quite different" ( Matter of Living Real Estate Group[*3], LLC v Douglas Elliman, LLC , 220 AD3d 573, 574 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal based on another pending action even when the parties in the two actions are not identical.

GMF 157 LP v. Inspirit Dev. & Constr., LLC · filed 2025-02-18(a)(4)

It is not necessary for the parties of the causes of action to be identical to invoke CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( see Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC , 110 AD3d 87, 96 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when a complaint duplicates an earlier pending action between the same parties arising from the same facts and asserting the same claims.

McQueen v. City of New York · filed 2025-02-20(a)(4)

Due to the duplicative nature of this action, the Complaint should be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(4).

Section 3211(a)(4) allows dismissal when another action involving substantially identical parties and causes of action is pending, but leaves the court discretion to deny dismissal.

H.I.G. Realty Fin. II, LLC v. Kuperwasser · filed 2025-03-21(a)(4)

Accordingly, there is not “another action pending between the same parties,” nor is there a “substantial identity” of the parties (see CPLR 3211[a][4]; White Light Prods., 231 AD2d at 94).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not require dismissal of substantively identical claims when the actions’ different procedural postures significantly affect their viability.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. · filed 2025-04-10(a)(4)

The 2019 Notice Claims (the sole remaining claims) in the 2019 action are not, however, properly dismissed as against DLJ (the sole remaining defendant) on the ground that they are duplicative of the corresponding claims in the 2015 action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4). Although these claims are substantively identical, the different procedural postures of the 2015 and 2019 actions have a significant impact on their viability, for the reasons explained above.

Section 3211(a)(4) relief for a prior action pending is unavailable when the prior proceeding was dismissed before the motion was made.

Hart Prop. Servs. LLC v. Jackhan · filed 2025-04-22(a)(4)

Finally, and most importantly, a decision on Respondent's motion for summary judgment was rendered and the prior proceeding was dismissed without prejudice before Respondent made the present motion. Accordingly, the relief Respondent seeks under CPLR §3211(a)(4) is no longer available.

A court may deny dismissal under § 3211(a)(4) when the pending action is not substantially similar and seeks different relief.

Gupta v. Ostad · filed 2025-05-01(a)(4)

Upon due deliberation, the court does not find that this summary holdover proceeding and the Supreme Court action are substantially similar or involve relief that is substantially the same. ... For each of these reasons, respondent has not set forth an adequate basis ... for dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(4) and the motion is denied in its entirety.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits discretionary dismissal when an earlier pending action encompasses broader parties and issues and is already progressing.

CSI IT, LLC v. Dungey · filed 2025-05-29(a)(4)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Andrea Masley, J.), entered on or about July 2, 2024, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), unanimously affirmed, with costs. Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground that there is a prior pending action in Florida which involves a broader set of parties and issues than the instant action, was commenced before the New York action, and has discovery already underway ( see Alvarez & Marshal Valuation Servs., LLC v Solar Eclipse Inv. Fund III, LLC , 216 AD3d 447, 448 [1st Dept 2023]; Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC , 110 AD3d 87, 96 [1st Dept 2013]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another pending action involves the same parties and seeks substantially the same relief.

Rios v. Samsoe · filed 2025-07-10(a)(4)

Here, the ejectment action and the instant summary proceeding involve the same parties and seek substantially the same relief ( see Melis v Blake Stone, LLC , 227 AD3d at 884-885; DAIJ, Inc. v Roth , 85 AD3d at 959). Under the circumstances presented, we find that Samsoe's motion for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the petition should have been granted ( see CPLR 3211 [a] [4]).

Section 3211(a)(4) does not warrant dismissal based on another action when the defendants are not substantially the same, even if the relief sought is the same.

TD Bank, N.A. v. Berkovits · filed 2025-07-11(a)(4)

Accordingly, this court finds that the defendant heirs in this matter are not substantially the same as in the 2023 Action and therefore dismissal is not warranted on the grounds that they had another action pending, even though the relief sought is the same.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal based on another pending action when the parties are substantially identical, the actions are sufficiently similar, and they seek substantially the same relief.

Busiello v. Whelan · filed 2025-07-23(a)(4)

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) on the ground that it raised issues duplicative of the Whelans' action, since the two actions were not sufficiently similar and sought distinct relief ( see Mazzei v Kyriacou , 139 AD3d 823, 824; DAIJ, Inc. v Roth , 85 AD3d at 959).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to dismiss an action when another pending action involves substantially identical parties and seeks to foreclose the same mortgage.

Shaw Funding, LP v. Bennett · filed 2025-09-24(a)(4)

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him. The defendant demonstrated that, at the time the plaintiff commenced this mortgage foreclosure action, there was another action pending to foreclose the same mortgage involving substantially identical parties ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Pena , 187 AD3d 724, 725; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Reid , 132 AD3d at 789).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not warrant dismissal when the other action is no longer pending.

Phillips v. Google Corp. · filed 2025-10-01(a)(4)

Dismissal of this action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is unwarranted because there is no longer "another action pending" between the parties for the same cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not support dismissal based on an earlier action that has already been dismissed and is no longer pending.

Locurto v. NYU Langone/Lutheran Hosp. · filed 2025-10-24(a)(4)

However, the duplicate action here is the federal case, which has already been dismissed and is not "pending" any decision which would potentially conflict with this matter. That ground for dismissal is therefore not applicable.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal despite additional defendants in one action when the parties are affiliated and the other requirements for dismissal based on another pending action are met.

417 N. Comanche St., LLC v. EMRES II Tex., LLC · filed 2025-11-13(a)(4)

The fact that there are additional defendants besides EMRES in this action does not preclude dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(4) where the parties are affiliated with each other and the other elements of CPLR 3211(a)(4) are present ( see Syncora , 110 AD3d at 96).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits, but does not require, dismissal when a pending action involves substantially the same parties and seeks substantially the same relief.

Soleil Chartered Bank v. Breton Equity Co. Corp. · filed 2025-11-17(a)(4)

Where two sufficiently similar actions are pending with substantial identity of the parties and seeking substantially the same relief, the action may be dismissed (CPLR 3211[a][4]; Swartz v Swartz, 145 AD3d 818 [2d Dept 2016]). ... Dismissal is not mandated, however, and the Court may issue such order as justice requires (CPLR § 3211[a][4]). ... Consequently, the complaint in this matter against Breton Equity is duplicative of the 2023 action, and Breton Equity’s motion to dismiss this action is granted on the merits and without opposition.

Under § 3211(a)(4), the first-in-time rule generally applies to actions pending in different jurisdictions unless special circumstances warrant a departure.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. BASF Corp. · filed 2025-11-18(a)(4)

The court properly denied BASF's motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) on the basis of another action pending in a different jurisdiction. Although New York Courts generally follow the first-in-time rule, BASF contends that plaintiffs filed this action nine days before it filed its own action in New Jersey strictly to gain a strategic advantage. However, the record does not establish that plaintiffs filed this action to obtain an inequitable advantage, or for some vexatious purpose, and there is a significant nexus between New York, the parties, and the matters at issue in the action ( see L-3 Communications Corp. v SafeNet, Inc. , 45 AD3d 1, 5 [1st Dept 2007]). Accordingly, the court correctly ruled that the first-in-time rule applied and providently exercised its discretion in determining that no "special circumstances" exist to warrant deviation from that rule ( id. ).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits a court to dismiss an action when another pending action involves substantially the same parties and relief.

Hillside Park 168 LLC v. Sattar · filed 2026-01-02(a)(4)

This Court, in its discretion, finds that this action and the Civil Court, Housing Part actions involve a substantial identity of parties, are sufficiently similar and the relief sought is substantially the same (JPMorgan Chase Bank,, N.A. v Luxama, 172 AD3d 1341 [2d Dept 2019]).

Section 3211(a)(4) leaves the court discretion to deny dismissal based on another pending action.

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenfield · filed 2026-02-11(a)(4)

Under these circumstances, Greenfield failed to demonstrate that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying his cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) to dismiss the complaint based on the pendency of the prior action ( see Quinones v Z & B Trucking, Inc. , 220 AD3d at 902; Hempstead Hous. Auth. v Middle County Resources Mgt., Inc. , 216 AD3d 621, 622).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits a court, in its broad discretion, to dismiss an action when another pending action involves the same parties and subject matter and seeks substantially the same relief.

Morrissey v. Morrissey · filed 2026-03-03(a)(4)

The husband demonstrated that the Queens County matrimonial action, which was pending at the time the wife commenced this matrimonial action, arose from the same subject matter, sought substantially the same relief, and involved the same parties. Accordingly, Supreme Court providently exercised its "broad discretion" in granting the husband's cross-motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) ( Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]; see Matter of Pryce v Pryce , 160 AD3d 965, 966 [2d Dept 2018]).

Section 3211(a)(4) gives courts broad discretion to dismiss a matter when another pending matter has substantially the same parties, subject matter, and requested relief.

Matter of Group BFSI, Inc. v. STP Brokerage, Inc. · filed 2026-03-04(a)(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a court has broad discretion in determining whether a matter should be dismissed on the ground that there is another matter pending "where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two [matters] are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same" ( DAIJ, Inc. v Roth , 85 AD3d 959, 959; see Whitney v Whitney , 57 NY2d 731, 732).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits discretionary dismissal when a prior action involves sufficiently similar parties and factual allegations.

Park v. Sekosan · filed 2026-03-26(a)(4)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered on or about December 30, 2025, which granted defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) to dismiss the complaint on the basis of another action pending between the same parties, unanimously affirmed, with costs. The court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the parties and the factual allegations in the two previously filed actions are sufficiently similar to those in this action ( see 417 N. Comanche St., LLC v EMRES II Tex., LLC , 243 AD3d 430, 432 [1st Dept 2025]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when claims in a separate action seek to relitigate or circumvent issues already raised in a pending matrimonial action.

Efran v. Efran · filed 2026-04-02(a)(4)

The court providently granted defendant's motion to dismiss this action under CPLR 3211(a)(4), as the corporate claims are merely an attempt to litigate, relitigate, or circumvent issues central to the matrimonial action (see Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284, 290 [1988]; Rossignol v Rossignol, 82 AD3d 1335, 1337 [3d Dept 2011]; cf. Kelley v Galina-Bouquet, Inc., 155 AD2d 96 [1st Dept 1990] [Court denied the defendant-husband's motion to dismiss his plaintiff-wife's separate breach of employment contract action against him and his corporation based on claims, in part, pre-dating the marriage as being unrelated to the issue of equitable distribution in the pending divorce action, which is not the case herein]).

Section 3211(a)(4) permits discretionary dismissal when another action is pending; a child support request that was not properly pending does not supply that ground.

Burstein v. Watson · filed 2026-04-07(a)(4)

Thus, despite defendant's contention that her child support request remained active, her claim was not properly pending before Supreme Court. Nor was there another action with which to consolidate the instant action.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits a court to stay an action pending resolution of a related action.

Heitman Credit Acquisition XXIII, LLC v. Meadow Partners LLC · filed 2026-05-12(a)(4)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melissa A. Crane, J.), entered October 28, 2025, which denied defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint's remaining cause of action alleging breach of contract predicated on an alter ego theory, or, in the alternative, for a stay of the action pursuant to CPLR 2201 and 3211 (a)(4), unanimously modified, to the extent of granting a stay of this action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) pending a resolution of the related action entitled Stier 109 LLC, et al. v 109 South 5 Property LLC, et al., index No. 653204/2022, pending before another Justice in Supreme Court, New York County, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Section 3211(a)(4) permits discretionary dismissal of a later proceeding when an earlier action between the parties addresses the same objections and includes a counterclaim for the requested relief.

Matter of Broadway PT 1710 LLC v. Kingdom Assoc., Inc. · filed 2026-06-09(a)(4)

As to respondent's cross-motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), we reverse in the exercise of our own discretion ( see SafeCard Servs. v American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. , 203 AD2d 65, 65-66 [1st Dept 1994]). Respondent commenced a lien foreclosure action against petitioner before petitioner brought this summary discharge proceeding. Petitioner raised the same objections in both proceedings, and petitioner has counterclaimed in the foreclosure action to void the lien, among other things ( see Matter of 29-32 LLC v Neptune Contr. & Envtl., Inc. , 72 AD3d 1106, 1106 [2d Dept 2010]).

CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal based on another pending action when the actions are sufficiently similar and seek the same or substantially the same relief.

Trinidad v. All Faiths Cemetery · filed 2026-06-24(a)(4)

Here, while there was a substantial identity of the parties, and this action and the 2022 [*2] proceeding arose from the same alleged wrong, this action and the 2022 proceeding were not sufficiently similar to warrant dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), and the relief sought was not the same or substantially the same ( see Busiello v Whelan , 240 AD3d at 737; Matter of Hirsch v Beda , 226 AD3d 899, 900).

Section 3211(a)(4) supports dismissal without prejudice when a pending action presents substantially the same issue, with renewal possible after the petitioner seeks relief in that action.

Mary Immaculate Hospital Division of The Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. v. Krauskopf · filed 1984-05-07(a)(4)

For that reason, the petition should be dismissed (cf. CPLR 3211, subd [a], par 4), without prejudice to renewal after determination of an application to be made by petitioners for intervention in the class action and for an injunction restraining the defendants in the class action from denying medical assistance to Maudlyn McDonald pending final judgment in that action.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not support dismissal based on a related proceeding after that proceeding becomes moot.

Cliff v. Russell · filed 2000-01-20(a)(4)

Consequently, the Attorney General has submitted a letter to this Court advising that this change of circumstances has rendered it impossible to defend the dismissal of this proceeding on the basis of CPLR 3211 (a) (4). Upon review of the record and the opposing arguments, we deem it appropriate to grant the Attorney General’s request to reinstate the petition and remit the matter to Supreme Court to afford respondents the opportunity to answer the petition on the merits.

Section 3211(a)(4) allows dismissal when another action between the parties involves the same cause of action, but federal abstention law governs whether a federal court defers to a pending state proceeding.

Faherty v. Fender · filed 1983-09-28(a)(4)

Fender bases his argument on N.Y. CPLR § 3211(a)(4), ... This rule is plainly inapplicable for two reasons. ... Second, and most important, it is the federal law of abstention, rather than the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, that determines whether this court will exercise its jurisdiction or stay its hand in deference to a state court proceeding.

Section 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal of an entire action when the court lacks jurisdiction over a necessary party whose absence prevents complete relief.

Safra v. SNBNY Holdings Ltd. · filed 2024-03-28(a)(10)

But because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over SNBNY dismissal of the entirety action under CPLR 3211(a)(10) is warranted.

Section 3211(a)(10) allows a party to move to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties without first moving for their joinder.

Challette, Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 1964-05-27(a)(10)

At the outset, the court rejects Challette’s contention as to the town’s manner of properly making its objection about parties, that is to move first for the joinder of the alleged indispensable parties (CPLR 1001, 1003, 3211, subd. [a], par. 10; Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 1003.05 ; vol. 4, par. 3211.45; Siegel, A Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 38 St. John’s L. Rev. 406, 447).

Section 3211(e) allows a nonjoinder objection to be raised in a responsive pleading rather than by motion.

Burke v. Suburban Mortgage Corp. · filed 1964-09-21(e)

The issue of nonjoinder may be raised in the responsive pleading rather than by motion. (See CPLB 3211, subd. [e]; 2 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prae., par. 1003.05.)

A motion to dismiss for nonjoinder under CPLR 3211(a)(10) need not be preceded by a separate motion to join the absent party.

Blumenthal v. Allen · filed 1965-04-28(a)(10)

Keeping this in mind, I am in agreement with the view that the dual motion envisaged in the Carruthcrs decision under the former statute is not now necessary. And, certainly, it is not a prerequisite in the circumstances presented in the case at bar. CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10) provides for judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that “ the court should not proceed in the absence of a person who -should be a party.”

A motion under section 3211 to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties lacks merit when all necessary parties are before the court in a class action.

Graham v. Board of Supervisors · filed 1966-03-31(a)(10)

There is presently pending before Special Term of Supreme Court, Brie County, a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to join necessary parties (CPLR 3211). We conclude that all necessary parties are before the court and such a motion is without merit. This is a class action.

Section 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal when a necessary party is absent, and the court may raise nonjoinder on its own even if no party moves.

Roe v. Roe · filed 1966-03-31(a)(10)

CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10) provides that a “ party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that * * * the court should not proceed in the absence of a person who should be a party ”. It is argued by the defendant that, since the plaintiff made no motion in respect of Doe as an absent and necessary party, the plaintiff has waived the point. Once again, I do not agree. The court, on its own, may raise the issue (Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 172 N. Y. 471).

Section 3211(a)(10) does not require dismissal for failure to join someone whose role is only that of a potential witness.

Puffer v. City of Binghamton · filed 1969-06-09(a)(10)

Defendant’s motion under CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10) asserts the court should not proceed, because Babcock was not made a party here but is a necessary party in this action. ... The basis of this asserted issue pertains solely to an evidentiary matter on which Babcock at best could be a mere witness. Babcock is not a necessary party to this action.

Section 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal when a person who should be joined under CPLR 1001(a) is absent.

Gage v. Rentze · filed 1969-04-18(a)(10)

In my judgment, assuming that plaintiff has standing to bring this action, the infant is a party who should have been joined, pursuant to CPLR 1001 (subd. [a]). ... Therefore, I am treating defendant’s cross motion as a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10).

Section 3211(a)(10) permits a motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party; whether the party is necessary depends on the cause of action.

Colonial Sand & Stone Co. v. Thomas J. Hughes Construction Co. · filed 1969-07-21(a)(10)

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated March 5, 1969, which denied a motion by appellants (1) to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint, under CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10) and section 44 of the Lien Law, or, (2) in the alternative, to stay all proceedings in the action, under CPLR 2201 and 3103; the ground of the motion was that plaintiff failed to bring in, as a necessary party to the action, Thomas J. Hughes Construction Co., Inc., which was named in the title of the action as a defendant. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. ... As to the second and third causes of action alleged in the complaint, said corporation is not a necessary party.

Section 3211(a)(10) allows a motion to dismiss when a party who should be joined is absent; the court may make dismissal conditional on joinder within a reasonable time.

Cichy v. Town of Cheektowaga · filed 1969-10-22(a)(10)

Under the new practice, a motion to dismiss for nonjoinder of an indispensable party should be made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10) which provides: “ A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that * * * the court should not proceed in the absence of a person who should be a party.” At this time the court may grant the dismissal without prejudice, on condition that the indispensable party is joined within a reasonable time, otherwise the dismissal shall become final, unless another order extends that time.

CPLR 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal when an absent party cannot be brought before the court and proceeding without that party would prevent an effective judgment and seriously prejudice the defendants.

Oliner v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. · filed 1970-06-09(a)(10)

Therefore, it is clear that this action should not proceed in the absence of the Custodian, because our courts cannot grant an effective judgment without his presence and it would necessarily result in serious prejudice to the defendants. This is so because, not only would the defendants be subjected to the danger of double financial liability, but also to possible criminal liability under Canadian law. Accordingly, the order appealed from should be reversed and the motion of the defendants to dismiss the action, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10) granted, without costs and without disbursements.

Section 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal for failure to join an indispensable person, but dismissal was unwarranted where the defendants had not shown that the person was beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

Forest Electric Corp. v. Century National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1970-11-25(a)(10)

Moreover although paragraph 10 of subdivision (a) of CPLR 3211 permits dismissal when it is shown that a person indispensable to the action has not been made a party, it has not been shown that Tishman is not subject to the jurisdiction of this court.

A county with only a maintenance interest in road land is not a necessary or indispensable party to an action determining ownership of that land.

Holland v. Superintendent of Highways · filed 1973-04-03(a)(10)

In this proceeding to determine ownership rights in the land, the county is not, therefore, a necessary or ... indispensable party, particularly where, upon abandonment declaration, and resulting ownership and use vesting in the adjoining owner, he would then assume use, control and maintenance of the land.

CPLR 3211(a)(10) does not require joining other assessing units or the State Board of Equalization and Assessment to decide whether a town complied with its own assessment duty.

Jardins v. Nieman · filed 1978-05-26(a)(10)

To order these units to be so joined would tend to create precisely the "disorder” and "confusion” that the Court of Appeals expressly cautioned against. The motion made by appellants under CPLR 3211 (subd [a], par 10) was properly denied.

Section 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal when necessary parties have not been joined.

Braman v. Troelstra · filed 1979-02-22(a)(10)

The record does not establish that there are any additional parties which are necessary for complete relief (CPLR 1001). Further, the complaint seeks to enjoin the defendant from altering the ditch from its pre-existing location and/or obstructing the water flow and, therefore, no third person would be inequitably affected by such an injunction. Accordingly, the court did not err in refusing to dismiss the complaint.

A motion under CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party is not waived merely because it is made on the eve of trial.

D. M. I. Painting, Inc. v. Eastern Long Island Hospital · filed 1980-03-10(a)(10), (e)

The failure of the appellant to move until the eve of trial is deplorable but does not constitute a waiver (see CPLR 3211, subd [a], par 10; subd [e]; cf. Matter of Fellner v McMurray, 41 AD2d 853).

Section 3211(a)(10) does not warrant dismissal for failure to join a necessary party when the absent person is subject to the court's jurisdiction; the remedy is to direct joinder.

Murer v. Butterfield · filed 1984-01-17(a)(10)

Further, although dismissal of this proceeding is sought upon the ground that the court should not proceed in the absence of a person who should be a party (see CPLR 3211, subd [a], par 10), dismissal is not the appropriate remedy if the nonjoined persons are subject to the court's jurisdiction. The remedy is merely to direct joinder of those parties.

Section 3211(a)(10) does not warrant dismissal of an action on a guarantee when the absent parties are unnecessary to determine the guarantor’s liability.

Congress Factors Corp. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. · filed 1985-07-17(a)(10)

Since the only issue is defendant’s liability under the guarantee, neither Rothman, Paul Rothman nor Grunner are necessary parties herein. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

CPLR 3211(a)(10) does not require dismissal for failure to join someone who may be a joint tort-feasor or contract coobligor.

Taran Furs, Inc. v. Champagne Bridals, Inc. · filed 1986-01-24(a)(10)

Special Term also properly rejected defendant’s claim that this action could not proceed without joinder of Coles as a necessary party. Plaintiff has made no allegations against Coles. At most, Coles may be a joint tort-feasor or coobligor of the sales contract, but would not be a necessary party in either event (see, Sarubbi v Rinaldo, 98 AD2d 837; Littanzi v State of New York, 54 AD2d 1043, 1044; cf. Lottes v Slater, 114 AD2d 580).

Section 3211(a)(10) does not warrant dismissal for failure to join a joint tortfeasor, who is not a necessary party.

Wolstencroft v. Sassower · filed 1986-11-03(a)(10)

The plaintiff’s failure to join subsequent counsel is not fatal ... to her action (cf. CPLR 3211 [a] [10]) because joint tort-feasors are not necessary parties (see, Hecht v City of New York, 60 NY2d 57, 62; Siskind v Levy, 13 AD2d 538, 539; CPLR 1001 [a]).

Section 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal for failure to join a necessary party, but joinder is preferred when possible.

Soling v. Little · filed 1987-06-11(a)(10)

CPLR 1001 (b) makes clear that joinder is at all times to be preferred to dismissal under 3211 (a) (10).

Failure to join a necessary party does not automatically require dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(10).

Allen Group, Inc. v. Adduci · filed 1988-01-14(a)(10)

Nor does the failure to join Hamilton as a necessary party necessitate the automatic dismissal of the petition (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [10]; 2 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac If 1003.05).

Section 3211(a)(10) permits joinder of co-owners of a disputed easement who may object to its reestablishment.

Mykoff v. Rubenfeld · filed 1989-04-17(a)(10)

Thus, the co-owners of the easement may object to its reestablishment as an easement and, accordingly, should be joined as parties.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(10), a Nassau County school district with no direct financial interest in a tax refund proceeding is not an indispensable party.

Bowery Savings Bank v. Board of Assessors · filed 1989-08-21(a)(10)

Inasmuch as school districts in Nassau County have no direct financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding in the form of potential liability to the appellant for a tax refund, they are not indispensable parties to the proceeding (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [10]; 1001 [b]).

CPLR 3211(a)(10) does not require a school district to be joined in a tax-refund proceeding when it has no direct financial interest in the outcome.

Jericho-Westbury Indoor Tennis, Inc. v. Board of Assessors · filed 1989-08-21(a)(10)

Inasmuch as school districts in Nassau County have no direct financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding in the form of potential liability to the appellant for a tax refund, they are not indispensable parties to the proceeding (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [10]; 1001 [b]).

A school district with no direct financial interest in a tax refund proceeding is not an indispensable party under CPLR 3211(a)(10).

Newbany Corp. v. Board of Assessors · filed 1989-08-21(a)(10)

Inasmuch as school districts in Nassau County have no direct financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding in the form of potential liability to the appellant for a tax refund, they are not indispensable parties to the proceedings (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [10]; 1001 [b]).

A school district with no direct financial interest in a tax refund proceeding is not an indispensable party under CPLR 3211(a)(10).

Phoenix Capital & Management Corp. v. Board of Assessors · filed 1989-08-21(a)(10)

Inasmuch as school districts in Nassau County have no direct financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding in the form of potential liability to the petitioner for a tax refund, they are not indispensable parties to the proceeding (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [10]; 1001 [b]).

CPLR 3211(a)(10) does not warrant dismissal for failure to join necessary parties when the plaintiff has named and served them.

Hansen v. Petrone · filed 1990-03-05(a)(10)

The Supreme Court acted properly in denying that branch of the defendant Petrone’s motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (10) based upon the plaintiff’s alleged failure to join his cotenants as necessary parties as required by this court’s prior ruling in this matter (see, Hansen v Petrone, 124 AD2d 782). The record clearly establishes that the plaintiff, in accordance with this court’s prior decision and order, named both of his cotenants and his landlord in the instant summons and complaint and served those parties forthwith.

A motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party may be denied when the plaintiffs can obtain complete relief without that party.

TK Marketing, Ltd. v. National Benefit Life Insurance · filed 1990-04-26(a)(10)

We find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion based on its finding that plaintiffs can obtain complete relief without the joinder of NCA, and thereby NCA is not an "indispensible party”.

Section 3211(a)(10) allows a court to give plaintiffs an opportunity to join a necessary party before dismissing their claims for nonjoinder.

Galbraith v. Guida · filed 1990-05-03(a)(10)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Tompkins, J.), entered July 5, 1989, which granted the motion of defendants Louis P. Guida and Morton Finder to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (10) only to the extent of dismissing the sixth cause of action, unanimously modified, on the law, to also grant the motion to dismiss the seventh and eighth causes of action, unless plaintiffs, within 30 days from the date of entry of this court’s order, join Saratoga Standardbreds, Inc. (Saratoga) as an additional party defendant, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. ... Rather than dismissing the seventh and eighth causes of action outright, however, plaintiffs should first be given an opportunity, if so advised, to join Saratoga as a party defendant to those causes.

CPLR 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal when a necessary and indispensable party has not been joined.

Miller v. Keeffe · filed 1990-08-27(a)(10)

Contrary to Miller’s contentions, the Supreme Court permissibly exercised its discretion insofar as it determined that Actuarial was a necessary and indispensable party, and that its nonjoinder warranted dismissal of the complaint.

CPLR 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal when a petitioner fails to name a necessary party whose property rights would be affected.

1515 Macombs Rd. Corp. v. Austin · filed 1990-12-14(a)(10)

The failure to name the estate of Irene Austin certainly constitutes a failure to name a necessary party to the proceeding. (See, CPLR 3211 [a] [10].)

A motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties fails when the movant does not show that the absent persons are needed for complete relief or would be inequitably affected by the judgment.

Tindell v. Koch · filed 1991-01-29(a)(10)

Finally, defendants’ argument that the action should be dismissed for failure to join the landlords affected by the SCRIE program because they are necessary parties is merit-less. ... Defendants have failed to show that the landlords affected by SCRIE are necessary for complete relief to be provided to the parties and have not shown how such landlords will be inequitably affected by any judgment in this action.

Section 3211(a)(10) did not require dismissal because other persons sought to be enjoined had not been joined.

People of State v. Maytag · filed 1991-04-04(a)(10)

Finally, Supreme Court properly denied respondents’ motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (10) for failure to join necessary parties.

When an indispensable party can be joined, the remedy for failure to join that party is an order directing joinder, not dismissal.

Brandt v. 47-49 Charles Street, Inc. · filed 1993-03-17(a)(10)

Initially, assuming that Brandt as the lessee is an indispensable party, it should be noted that the appropriate remedy for failing to add an indispensable party over whom jurisdiction can be obtained is not dismissal but an order directing the party to be joined.

Section 3211(a)(10) permits dismissal of claims for declaratory relief when necessary parties are absent.

Ullman v. Medical Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2018-03-16(a)(10)

With respect to the two causes of action seeking declarations, defendant contends that plaintiff cannot obtain that relief based on the absence of necessary parties ( see CPLR 3211 [10]; see also CPLR 1001), and we agree. ... In the absence of those necessary parties, we will not issue a declaration in favor of any party ( see Wood v City of Salamanca , 289 NY 279, 283 [1942]; White v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. , 228 AD2d 940, 941 [3d Dept 1996]). We therefore dismiss the two causes of action seeking a declaration.

Section 3211(a)(10) permits a dismissal motion for nonjoinder, but in a foreclosure action the proper remedy for a missing necessary defendant is joinder rather than dismissal.

United States v. Olstrom · filed 2024-03-29(a)(10)

Even if there are other necessary defendants, “the proper remedy for nonjoinder” is “to direct that the party be joined as a defendant, not ‘to dismiss the action upon the motion of the party who was properly named.’”

A defendant barred from including a nonjoinder defense in an untimely answer may still raise nonjoinder in a later motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(10).

Ellison v. Schulte · filed 2024-11-27(a)(10)

This determination is without prejudice to defendant's later assertion of nonjoinder in a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR 3211 (a) (10).

Section 3211(e) permits a defendant to raise the absence of a necessary party as an affirmative defense in its answer.

Dor Motors Ltd. v. Graphic Arts Mutual Insurance · filed 1983-10-17(e)

In its answer, the defendant raised the absence of “all necessary parties” as an affirmative defense (see CPLR 3211, subd [e]). Joinder of Royal Globe as subrogee of Cleartone is, therefore, appropriate.

Section 3211 permits a motion challenging a pleaded defense in a summary proceeding.

Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Carroll · filed 1964-05-28(b)

In the circumstances and irrespective of whether a motion for summary judgment does lie in a summary proceeding, the applicability of CPLR 3211 to summary proceedings cannot be questioned.

CPLR 3211 (f)'s automatic extension of time to answer does not apply in summary proceedings.

Chickery v. Prestige Catering, Inc. · filed 2021-04-23(f)

While respondents argue that CPLR 3211 (f) extended their time to answer, CPLR 3211 (f) "is inapplicable in a summary proceeding" ( Eklecco Newco, LLC v Chagit, Inc. , 12 Misc 3d 143[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51421[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006]; see CPLR 404 [a]; Matter of Dodge , 25 NY2d 273 [1969]).

Section 3211(a)(2) permits discretionary dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, with conditions protecting the plaintiff’s ability to sue in a more appropriate forum.

Michels v. McCrory Corp. · filed 1964-10-09(a)(2)

The motion to dismiss is granted pursuant to CPLB 3211 (subd. [a], par. 2), in the exercise of the court’s discretion, on condition that, on or before settlement of the order herein, defendant shall stipulate that in the event plaintiff infant commences a suit in the State or Federal courts of Massachusetts within six months after the determination of all appeals from the order or judgment to be entered herein or after the expiration of the time to appeal therefrom if no appeal be taken, defendant will waive any defense in such action of the Statute of Limitations and any defense based on the bringing and termination of the prior Massachusetts suit or this suit or both, and that in the event that within such period the infant plaintiff seeks to vacate the discontinuance of the Massachusetts action and reinstate it, defendant will consent thereto.

A court that dismisses an action on forum non conveniens grounds should not also dismiss it on the merits under CPLR 3211.

Troni v. Di Milano · filed 1987-04-16

The Supreme Court, however, should not have addressed the merits once it dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds. Having found New York to be an inappropriate forum, the merit or lack thereof of the action is best reserved for the courts of Italy. Accordingly, that portion of the Supreme Court’s decision which dismissed the action for failure to state a cause of action under New York law is deleted.