N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349

A deceptive practice affecting the public at large remains consumer-oriented under § 349, and business members are not barred from suing merely because they are businesses.

Dupler v. Costco Wholesale Corp. · filed 2008-01-31(a)

Here, the alleged deceptive practice affects hundreds of thousands of consumers and is not limited to one individual transaction between Costco and a private business unit. Thus, Costco business members are not precluded from such a lawsuit under Section 349.

Section 349 does not categorically exclude a business purchaser; a small business may state a claim by alleging widespread sales and a uniform deceptive practice affecting consumers.

Statler v. Dell, Inc. · filed 2011-03-30§ 349(a), (h)

As to the first ground, the court rejects the argument that Plaintiffs status as a small business owner, standing alone, precludes him from satisfying the “consumer oriented,” prong of a Section 349 cause of action. Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges widespread sale of Optiplex computers with capacitor defects, and a uniform pattern of deceptive conduct. This pleading is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 349 requires consumer-oriented deceptive conduct that materially misleads consumers and causes injury.

Grgurev v. Licul · filed 2017-01-26

Competitors, as well as consumers, have standing to sue under § 349.

Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes plaintiff injury, and a corporate competitor may sue if some harm to the public at large is at issue.

Wolo Mfg. Corp. v. ABC Corp. · filed 2018-11-07

"To state a claim for a § 349 violation, 'a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.' "

Section 349(a) applies only to deceptive business practices occurring in New York and does not protect out-of-state consumers from out-of-state conduct.

Alicea v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. · filed 2008-02-08(a)

Hence, section 349 does not protect out-of-state consumers from out-of-state deceptive business practices, and plaintiff could not have sought a nationwide class action against an out-of-state corporation based on New York law.

A § 349 claim requires the consumer transaction in which the deception occurred to take place in New York; the statute does not cover an out-of-state transaction merely because the scheme was organized in New York.

Gavin v. AT&T CORP. · filed 2008-02-12§ 349

the transaction in which the consumer is deceived must occur in New York.

Section 349 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of 3 NYCRR 419.4(d) when that regulation has no implied private right of action and no independent deceptive act is alleged.

Bloom v. Nationstar Mtge., LLC · filed 2026-05-13

In support of its motion, the defendant established that there is no implied private right of action under 3 NYCRR 419.4(d) (see 1077 Madison St., LLC v Smith, 2015 WL 5793427, *16, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 134173 [ED NY], affd 670 Fed Appx 745 [2d Cir]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Vanderkamp, 45 Misc 3d 1213[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51557[U], *5 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County]), and therefore, the cause of action alleging a violation of General Business Law § 349, which does not allege any deceptive act independent of a violation of 3 NYCRR 419.4(d), could not be maintained (see generally Seller v Citimortgage, Inc., 118 AD3d 511, 512).

Section 349 reaches consumer-oriented pricing practices that materially mislead reasonable consumers and cause actual injury, and it permits a competitor to sue when the conduct harms consumers or the public.

UPS Store, Inc. v. Hagan · filed 2015-03-24(a) (h)

Such practices are the kind prohibited by Section 349 because they serve to “undermine a consumer’s ability to evaluate his or her market options and to make a free and intelligent choice.”

Section 349 requires proof that defendants engaged in deceptive acts and practices; the court held the claim failed because the plaintiff produced no such evidence.

Ritchie v. Taylor · filed 2017-07-12

That claim was properly dismissed because Ritchie failed to adduce evidence that the defendants engaged in “deceptive acts and practices” as the statute requires.

Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented act that is materially misleading and causes injury, and a standard or routine practice potentially affecting similarly situated consumers qualifies as consumer-oriented conduct.

Porsch v. LLR, Inc. · filed 2019-04-30a

To state a claim for deceptive practices under Section 349, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) the defendant engaged in a consumer-oriented act, (2) the consumer-oriented act was misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff consequently suffered injury.

Section 349(a) prohibits deceptive business practices and subsection (h) permits recovery of actual damages or $50, whichever is greater.

Kurtz v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation · filed 2019-10-25(a) (h)

New York General Business Law Section 349 prohibits deceptive acts in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce.

To state a claim under section 349, a plaintiff must show that the challenged practice was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused injury.

Ferragamo S.P.A. v. Does 1-56 · filed 2020-02-18§ 349

To state a claim under either section 349 or section 350, Plaintiff must show (1) “that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented,” (2) “that it was misleading in a material way,” and (3) “that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”

Section 349(a) makes deceptive acts or practices in conducting any business, trade, commerce, or furnishing any service unlawful.

M.V.B. Collision Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2020-02-20(a)

Section 349 states that “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service are . . . unlawful.” N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a).

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) prohibits deceptive acts or practices in New York business, trade, commerce, or service activities.

Bibicheff v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2020-05-04(a)

New York General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349 prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service” in New York.

Section 349(a) prohibits deceptive acts or practices in business, trade, commerce, or furnishing services in New York.

Hicks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-06-15(a)

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges a violation of New York General Business Law § 349, which makes unlawful any “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state ... .”

The court held that the complaint plausibly stated a § 349 claim based on Equifax’s alleged failure to protect personal data and misleading representations about data security.

Weiss v. Equifax, Inc. · filed 2020-07-08§ 349(a)

On the other hand, plaintiff has stated a claim under N.Y. G.B.L. § 349 (Count VI) in relation to the data breach.

Section 349 broadly prohibits deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of business in New York, and selling counterfeit products qualifies.

Ideavillage Products Corp. v. OhmyGod 1 · filed 2020-11-17§ 349(a)

New York courts apply the General Business law broadly. See Karlin v. IVF Am., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 282, 290–91, 712 N.E.2d 662, 690 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1999). Defendants’ sale of counterfeit products undoubtedly qualifies as “[d]eceptive acts or practices” and “[f]alse advertising” in the conduct of business in New York State. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349, 350.

Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented deceptive practice that materially misleads and causes injury, and a trademark-based claim also requires a specific and substantial public injury beyond ordinary infringement.

Walker Wear LLC v. Off-White LLC · filed 2022-08-31(a)

To state a claim for a deceptive acts and practices violation under Section 349, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that: “(1) the act or practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was misleading in a material respect; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result.”

Section 349(a) prohibits consumer-oriented deceptive conduct in business or service transactions and requires a materially misleading act, consumer orientation, and resulting injury, with the deception occurring in New York.

Smallman v. MGM Resorts International · filed 2022-11-02(a)

Section § 349(a) of the GBL prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 349(a). To state a § GBL claim, the New York Plaintiff must allege (1) that defendant’s “act or practice was consumer-oriented,” (2) that the act or practice “was misleading in a material way,” and (3) that plaintiff “suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”

Section 349 prohibits consumer-oriented business conduct likely to mislead a reasonable consumer and causing injury.

McTyere v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2023-03-21none stated

“Deceptive acts’ are acts that are ‘likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.’”

Section 349(a) prohibits deceptive acts or practices in business, trade, commerce, or furnishing services, and claims are subject to a three-year limitations period running from injury.

Malek v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co. · filed 2023-03-29(a)

Section 349 makes unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a). Section 349 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Section 349 prohibits deceptive business practices and requires a plaintiff to plausibly show consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads consumers and causes injury.

Lumbra v. Suja Life, LLC · filed 2023-05-26§ 349

New York General Business Law Section 349 prohibits "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state." ... To state a claim under either section, a plaintiff must show "that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice."

Section 349 bars deceptive acts or practices in New York business or commerce, and a claim requires materially misleading conduct directed at consumers that caused injury.

Celestin v. Martelly · filed 2023-09-29§ 349

New York General Business Law (“GBL”) Section 349 prohibits “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service” in New York.

Under § 349(a), posted minimum prices that are impossible to attain and undisclosed charges can plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer in a materially deceptive way.

Watts v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc. · filed 2008-08-16(a)

In this case, the defendants are alleged to have misled customers by posting minimum fees that were not just unlikely, but impossible to attain during the peak season.

Under § 349(a), omitting a cigarette tax amount from an advertised price is not, by itself, likely to mislead a reasonable consumer when the vendor is not required to collect that tax, but an affirmative statement that no taxes are due can be actionable.

City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits. Com, Inc. · filed 2008-09-02(a)

But the omission of the tax amount from the price of the cigarettes, where the vendor is not required to collect that tax, is not, on its own, likely to mislead or assume significance in the deliberation of a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.

Section 349 applies to deceptive conduct in a landlord-tenant relationship, and a tenant may state a claim by pleading a consumer-oriented transaction, deceptive acts, and injury caused by those acts.

Buyers & Renters United to Save Harlem v. Pinnacle Group N.Y. LLC · filed 2008-09-05(a)

The NYCPA prohibits “[deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a). ... It sets out a 3-factor test for determining consumer fraud: (1) a consumer oriented transaction; (2) deceptive acts by the defendant; and (3) injury caused by such deceptive acts. ... Here, the Individual Plaintiffs plead the elements necessary to state a claim under GBL § 349. ... However, New York courts, interpreting consumer protection statutes, give tenants private rights of action against their landlords.

A § 349 claim requires a consumer-oriented transaction, deceptive acts, and injury, and landlord-tenant deception can qualify without a broad impact on consumers at large.

Sorrentino v. ASN Roosevelt Center, LLC · filed 2008-09-29

To successively state a claim pursuant to GBL § 349, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) a consumer oriented transaction; (2) deceptive acts by the defendant; and (3) injury caused by such deceptive acts. ... Importantly, New York courts and federal courts within this Circuit have applied GBL § 349 in the landlord-tenant context, where tenants allege harm caused by the deceptive acts of their landlords, without regard to a broad impact on consumers at large.

Section 349 does not cover a corporate competitor’s trade-dress claim unless the alleged conduct causes a specific and substantial injury to the public beyond ordinary infringement, such as a threat to public health or safety.

Do Denim, LLC v. Fried Denim, Inc. · filed 2009-06-17

This sort of “injury” to the public, however, is no different from the type of “injury” alleged in any garden variety trade dress infringement claim. Because nothing more is alleged, and no other sort of injury to public health or safety can reasonably be inferred from the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state a New York unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.

A § 349 claim requires materially misleading conduct directed at the public at large and injury; a private transaction without public ramifications is insufficient.

Gottlieb Development LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp. · filed 2008-12-29§ 349(a), (h)

To bring a claim under section 349, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant’s conduct was misleading in a material respect, and (2) the conduct was directed at the public at large, injuring the plaintiff thereby.

A § 349 claim fails when the complaint does not allege consumer harm or harm to the public interest beyond confusion.

Stadt v. Fox News Network LLC · filed 2010-06-22§ 349

Most importantly, the Complaint fails to allege that Fox’s actions harmed consumers or the public interest in any material respect.

A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads consumers and causes injury, and a trademark-based claim must show public harm beyond ordinary infringement or consumer confusion.

New World Solutions, Inc. v. NameMedia Inc. · filed 2015-12-15

Under New York law, claims involving trademark violations are not cognizable under N.Y. GBL §§ 349 or 350 unless ‘there is a specific.and substantial injury to the public interest over and above ordinary trademark infringement or dilution.’

Section 349 requires consumer harm; ordinary trademark confusion without public harm is insufficient.

A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Estate of Marilyn Monroe, LLC · filed 2017-03-13(a)

For this reason, Counterclaim Five fails to state a claim under Section 349.

A trademark-infringement claim under § 349(a) requires specific and substantial injury to the public beyond ordinary infringement or general consumer confusion.

Deep Foods Inc. v. Deep Foods Inc. · filed 2019-12-26(a)

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for default judgment with respect to its deceptive acts and practices claim under NY GBL § 349(a).

A Section 349 claim by a non-consumer plaintiff requires significant injury to the public interest beyond ordinary trademark infringement.

Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc. · filed 2020-03-30none

With respect to Chanel’s Section 349 and 350 claims, Chanel has not demonstrated that this dispute involves injury to the public interest over and above ordinary trademark infringement, which is fatal to Chanel’s complaint.

Section 349 does not support a trademark-infringement claim absent a specific and substantial injury to the public interest beyond ordinary infringement or dilution, and summary judgment was denied where Mattel offered no evidence of such additional injury.

Mattel, Inc. v. AnimeFun Store · filed 2021-02-26§ 349(a)

As for §§ 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law, however, “[i]t is well settled . . . that infringement claims are not cognizable under these statutes unless there is a specific and substantial injury to the public-interest over and above the ordinary trademark infringement or dilution.” ... Plaintiff points to no record evidence that would support a finding of an injury to the public beyond that attendant to run-of-the-mill trademark infringement. Accordingly, summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims arising out of New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 is denied.

A § 349 trademark claim requires a specific and substantial public injury beyond ordinary trademark infringement or dilution; absent that showing, the claim fails.

Mattel, Inc. v. AnimeFun Store · filed 2021-08-18(a)

As before, Mattel alleges no facts that would support a finding of a specific injury to the public beyond ordinary trademark infringement. ... Accordingly, Mattel’s motion for default judgment as to its claims arising out of New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 is denied.

Section 349 is not preempted when used to challenge deceptive practices incident to a contract breach, but it is preempted when used to impose extra-contractual requirements that more than incidentally affect lending operations.

McAnaney v. Astoria Financial Corp. · filed 2009-09-29§ 349

With that framework in mind, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ § 349 claim is not preempted, to the extent that plaintiffs seek relief for deceptive acts and practices incident to the alleged breach of the mortgage agreements with defendants.

A claim under § 349(a) challenging Part D marketing as deceptive is expressly preempted when it is inconsistent with CMS standards governing the review and approval of marketing materials.

Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc. · filed 2010-08-30(a)

Thus, allowing a suit to proceed based on a state statute such as New York’s consumer protection law risks the possibility that materials CMS has deemed not misleading—and therefore allowed to be distributed—will later be determined “likely to mislead” by a state court.

A claimant under § 349 must show that the alleged deceptive conduct injured consumers or the general public.

Insignia Systems, Inc. v. News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. · filed 2009-09-30(a)

To succeed under the New York statute, a claimant must show that an injury resulted to consumers or the general public.

Section 349 claims challenging FERC-regulated wholesale-electricity prices are preempted when they intrude on FERC's comprehensive regulation of that market.

Simon v. KEYSPAN CORP. · filed 2011-03-22§ 349(a)

Plaintiffs state law claims based on New York’s General Business Law ... plainly intrude on FERC’s comprehensive regulation of this wholesale market. ... Such claims are both field and conflict preempted as a matter of law and are therefore dismissed.

A § 349 claim challenging a federally certified organic label as false because of allegedly prohibited ingredients is preempted by the Organic Foods Production Act.

Marentette v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2016-08-23

Finding that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety.

Altering a vehicle odometer to deceive a customer is the kind of deceptive conduct prohibited by § 349, which provides a private right of action.

Mayline Enterprises, Inc. v. Milea Truck Sales Corp. · filed 2009-08-03§ 349(h)

Altering an odometer in order to deceive a customer is a paradigmatic example of the type of conduct that is barred by that statute.

At the pleading stage, allegations that standardized buydown agreements promised a lower initial interest rate but amortized loans at a higher rate plausibly pleaded materially misleading and consumer-oriented conduct under § 349.

Carrillo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-08-20

Specifically, plaintiff’s allegations, inter alia, that all members of the proposed class have been subjected to similar deceptive conduct in that they all have entered into standard-form buydown agreements in which defendant “promised a lower interest rate for an initial period followed by a higher interest rate for the remainder of the life of the loan; . . . but, during the initial period, amortized the loan at a rate higher than the lowest promised rate,” (Am. Compl., ¶ 50), are sufficient to state a plausible claim that defendant’s conduct was consumer-oriented.

For a § 349 claim, causation need only be shown as more likely than not, and disputed evidence that deceptive prices caused higher reimbursement limits and that state officials reasonably relied on them precludes summary judgment.

In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Ave. Wholesale Price · filed 2010-02-09

However, the law merely requires that the Plaintiffs prove that it is more likely than not that the Defendants' false prices caused CMS to set higher FULs.

Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads and causes injury, and causation may be established by showing it was more likely than not that the deceptive conduct caused the injury.

City of New York v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 2010-02-09

“A plaintiff under section 349 must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.” ... “However, the law merely requires that the Plaintiffs prove that it is more likely than not that the Defendants’ false prices caused CMS to set higher FULs.”

A § 349 claim is governed by a three-year limitations period, but an amendment asserting it may relate back when it arises from the same transaction as the original claims and the defendant had notice of the underlying conduct.

Thrane v. Franklin First Financial, Ltd. · filed 2010-03-12(a)

A claim under Section 349 is subject to the three-year statute of limitations found in N.Y. CPLR § 214(2). ... It is also clear that the proposed amended claim under Section 349 arises out of the same transaction that gave rise to the Plaintiffs’ existing claims; namely the refinancing that Franklin brokered. ... Under the circumstances, the proposed Section 349 cause of action does not alter the factual landscape of this case to the point where it can be said that Franklin did not have notice of the conduct that forms the basis for the claim. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs may amend the complaint to add their proposed Section 349 claim against Franklin.

Section 349 does not preclude a plaintiff from seeking equitable relief for alleged consumer protection injuries.

In Re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation · filed 2010-09-21(h)

First, the New York consumer protection statute does not, by its terms, preclude the IEU plaintiffs from seeking equitable relief.

Section 349(h) authorizes a plaintiff who successfully asserts a § 349 claim to seek injunctive relief and damages, while injunctive relief is a remedy rather than a separate cause of action.

Catalano v. BMW of North America, LLC · filed 2016-03-01(h)

If Catalano is able to successfully assert his claim for violation of N.Y. GBL § 349, pursuant to which he is entitled to seek injunctive relief and damages, N.Y. GBL § 349(h), then the Court will consider his request for injunctive relief at that juncture.

A private § 349 claim requires an injury beyond the deceptive act itself; speculative consequences do not satisfy that requirement.

Executive Risk Indemnity Inc. v. Icon Title Agency, LLC · filed 2010-08-03(a)

It is well established ... that the claimed deception cannot itself be the only injury.

A § 349 claim requires an injury independent of the loss from a breach-of-contract claim, so duplicative contract-based injury is insufficient.

Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Insurance · filed 2012-05-02

Thus, any loss alleged in connection with Count Three cannot be unique to Count Three, but rather must stem from the alleged breach of contract (Count One). Such a duplicative injury is insufficient to give rise to a § 349 claim.

A § 349 claim requires actual and individualized injury; intangible privacy allegations alone do not satisfy that requirement.

Williams v. Facebook, Inc. · filed 2018-12-18

Accordingly, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their CDAFA and GBL § 349 claims without a showing of an actual and individualized injury.

A plaintiff's fear of an uncertain future event, without harm flowing directly from the defendant's deceptive conduct, does not satisfy § 349's actual-injury requirement.

Seaman v. National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 · filed 2019-10-11(a)

The emotional harm in these cases, however, flows directly from the defendants” violative conduct, and not the risk of a speculative future event. Plaintiffs have identified no case — and the Court has found no case — in which the fear of an uncertain future occurrence is itself sufficient to satisfy the actual injury requirement.

Section 349 does not cover mere anticompetitive conduct without consumer deception and requires deceptive, consumer-oriented conduct.

In Re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litigation · filed 2011-03-11(a)

"indicates that anticompetitive conduct that is not premised on consumer deception is not within the ambit of the statute." ... "Absent something more, section 349 does not cover price fixing or other antitrust violations. Anti-competitive conduct alone does not constitute deceptive conduct under § 349." ... "for failure to allege deceptive, consumer-oriented conduct."

A § 349 claim based on an insurer’s failure to advise of a right to independent counsel fails when the insured had no such right at the insurer’s expense.

Sea Tow Services International, Inc. v. St. Paul & Fire Marine Insurance Co. · filed 2016-09-29

As this Court found above that STSI did not, in fact, have a right to independent counsel at St. Paul’s expense, this claim must fail.

To state a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, a plaintiff must allege consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and injury caused by the deceptive act or practice.

Stanley v. Direct Energy Services, LLC · filed 2020-06-12

To state a claim under NYGBL § 349, “a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.”

Section 349 reaches omissions when a business exclusively possesses material information relevant to consumers and fails to disclose it, because that can be a deceptive or misleading practice.

Woods v. Maytag Co. · filed 2011-08-31(a)

“when a defendant exclusively possesses information that a reasonable consumer would want to know and could not discover without difficulty, failure to disclose can constitute a deceptive or misleading practice.”

Under § 349, a seller’s material failure to disclose information it alone possessed can support a consumer claim, and an alleged price premium is a sufficient injury when the omission affected the purchase price.

Fusco v. General Motors LLC · filed 2019-09-27

A seller’s failure to disclose may form the basis of a § 349 claim.

A § 349 claim is preempted by HOLA when it is used to impose extra-contractual requirements governing federally chartered savings associations’ loan disclosures or processing.

Midouin v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 2011-09-28(a)

Because plaintiffs claims do not arise from a breach of contract, but rather attempt to “establish extra-contractual substantive requirements” for savings associations such as Downey, her claims seek an application of state law that would more than incidentally affect federal lending practices. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims under NYGBL § 349 are preempted by HOLA.

The court held that emotional harm can satisfy § 349’s injury requirement, dismissed the claim based on letters the plaintiff never received, and otherwise denied summary judgment because factual issues remained.

Douyon v. NY Medical Health Care, P.C. · filed 2012-09-28

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, emotional harm does satisfy the injury requirement for a claim under N.Y. GBL § 349. ... Material issues of fact preclude summary judgment on these claims.

A § 349 claim challenging a broader fraudulent scheme is not preempted by the FCRA’s narrower preemption of furnisher responsibilities.

Aghaeepour v. N. Leasing Systems, Inc. · filed 2019-05-08

Plaintiffs' claims under § 349 are broader than only asserting that Defendants violated their obligations to furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.

Section 349 does not cover sophisticated financial institutions alleging deception in business-only commercial services that are not consumer-oriented.

In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. · filed 2011-12-01(a)

Moreover, Heartland’s allegedly deceptive representations — whether made in S.E.C. filings, to acquiring banks, or to merchants — do not qualify as “consumer-oriented conduct,” as required to state a claim under § 349.

Section 349 does not cover a business-only shipping scheme that does not plausibly affect consumers purchasing services for personal, family, or household purposes.

U1IT4LESS, Inc. v. FedEx Corp. · filed 2012-09-25§ 349

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count V is granted.

Section 349 does not reach a private business dispute that affects only the parties rather than consumers at large.

Nike USA, Inc. v. Oberg · filed 2022-05-19(a)

Here, Defendants fail to state a plausible claim under Section 349. First, the conduct alleged, i.e., Nike’s pivot to a direct-to-consumer marketing strategy, while arguably harmful to Defendants’ business model, is not the type of consumer-oriented conduct at which Section 349 is aimed. ... The conduct alleged, even if considered to be true, negatively impacted only Defendants’ business, and not consumers at large. Accordingly, the motion to amend to add a counterclaim pursuant to Section 349 of the GBL is denied as futile.

Section 349 requires consumer-directed conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury, and the court held that allegations about slower speeds on only a narrow subset of applications did not plausibly show the advertisements were deceptive.

Fink v. Time Warner Cable · filed 2011-12-23

Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to make out a plausible claim for violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. Count III of the SAC will therefore be dismissed.

A § 349 claim requires consumer-directed deceptive acts that are materially misleading and cause injury, and the court dismissed this claim because the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege material deception.

Mendez v. Bank of America Home Loans Servicing, LP · filed 2012-01-14(a)

To make out a prima facie case under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.

A § 349 claim requires a label that is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material respect, even if the label is not literally false.

Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Incorporated · filed 2020-03-24§ 349(a)

A label is deceptive if it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material respect, even if it is not literally false.

New York’s consumer-protection statutes require proof that the challenged labels are likely to deceive reasonable consumers.

Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Incorporated · filed 2020-03-24§ 349

statutes all require plaintiffs to prove that the relevant labels are likely to deceive reasonable consumers.

The court held that New York's unfair-competition statute requires the challenged statement to be factual rather than an expression of opinion, so the claim failed because the statements were opinions.

Board of Forensic Document Examiners v. American Bar Association · filed 2018-02-22et seq.

But each unfair competition statute requires that the allegedly anti-competitive statement be a factual statement, not an expression of opinion.7 (Each state’s unfair-competition law has that same requirement, so no conflict of laws exists.) So, again, these claims (Counts 5 through 9) do not adequately state a claim because Vastrick’s statements are expressions of opinion, rather than fact.

The court held that Gibraltar could not prevail under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 because it failed to show that Rockingham engaged in a materially deceptive or misleading act, and it granted summary judgment to Rockingham on that claim.

Gibraltar Home Improvements, Inc. v. Rockingham Insurance Company · filed 2024-09-25(a)

Thus, Gibraltar has failed to produce evidence that Rockingham engaged in an “act or practice was deceptive or misleading in a material way.” Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP, 37 N.Y.3d at 176, 171 N.E.3d at 1197 (2021). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied as to that claim.

A § 349 claim challenging inactivity fees was not clearly futile, so the court allowed the plaintiffs to add it despite conflicting authority on securities-related claims.

Roling v. ETrade Securities LLC · filed 2012-01-24(a)

Given this split in authority, the Court cannot say that a § 349 claim would be futile so as to prohibit an amendment.

To obtain an injunction under G.B.L. § 349, private plaintiffs need only show that defendants engaged in deceptive acts or practices; the usual equitable requirement of irreparable harm does not apply.

Barkley v. United Homes, LLC · filed 2012-01-27(a)

To obtain an injunction under G.B.L. § 349, plaintiffs need only show that the defendants engaged in “deceptive acts or practices,” as defined under the statute.

The court held that § 349(h) does not clearly establish whether an individual may obtain broad injunctive relief for others without a class action, so the issue must be decided in arbitration.

Schatz v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2012-01-31(h)

Thus, the statute itself does not provide a clear answer to the question whether plaintiffs would be entitled to obtain their “general injunctive relief’ absent a class proceeding.

A § 349(a) claim requires consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act or statement, and damages, while full disclosure defeats the claim and puffery is not actionable.

Serrano v. Cablevision Systems Corp. · filed 2012-03-27(a)

To assert a viable claim under General Business Law § 349(a), a plaintiff must plead (1) that the challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, (2) that the conduct or statement was materially misleading, and (3) damages.

A § 349 deception claim based on a screen-size representation fails when the accompanying disclaimer defeats the alleged deception.

Sponchiado v. Apple Inc. · filed 2019-11-18

The Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ NY GBL (and New York common law fraud) claims based on the alleged misrepresentation of the screen size fail because of the disclaimer.

Section 349 applies to medical services and prohibits marketing that is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer; the court held that the record raised fact issues about whether defendants' claimed FSR success rates were materially deceptive and whether the deception caused legally cognizable injury.

Gotlin v. Lederman · filed 2012-05-01§ 349(a)

These provisions apply “to virtually all economic activity” that occurs in New York State, including the provision of medical services, in an effort to secure “an honest market place where trust, and not deception, prevails.”

The court held that New York General Business Law § 349 claims accrue upon the plaintiff's initial injury, without a delayed-discovery rule, and applied that rule to limit the certified class.

Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co. · filed 2012-06-12(h)

The same is true of New York’s consumer protection statute.

The standards under § 349 and § 350 are substantially the same as the Lanham Act § 43(a) standards, so failure under that framework defeats the state-law claims.

Naked Cowboy v. CBS · filed 2012-02-23§ 349

The standards under these provisions are substantially the same as those applied to claims brought under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

The court held that the New York plaintiffs stated a § 349 claim because they adequately alleged deceptive omission, causation, and the required geographic nexus.

In re Porsche Cars North America, Inc. · filed 2012-07-19(a), (h)

The Court finds that New York Plaintiffs state a claim for relief under Section 349. ... The Court rejects these arguments and finds that New York Plaintiffs may pursue a claim for relief under Section 349.

The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish a viable consumer-protection claim under § 349 and granted summary judgment dismissing it.

Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC · filed 2012-11-15(a)

Plaintiffs have not offered any factual or legal basis to oppose defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants’ motion will be granted and this claim will be dismissed.

The court held that General Business Law § 349 authorizes limited punitive damages in connection with a successful claim, while dismissing any punitive-damages claim not authorized by § 349.

Bristol Village, Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. · filed 2013-01-03(h)

Section 349 expressly allows for the recovery of limited punitive damages in connection with a successful claim.

The court held that Hall sufficiently pleaded a § 349(a) claim because the alleged misleading similarity and inferior quality could have injured his business.

Hall v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. · filed 2013-01-25(a)

We conclude that the count under New York GBL § 349(a) was not subject to dismissal on the pleadings.

The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged a consumer-oriented deceptive practice under § 349 because AHMSI allegedly used misleading servicing practices against a large class of similarly situated mortgage borrowers.

Kapsis v. American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc. · filed 2013-02-14(a)

The Court therefore concludes that, at this stage of the case, plaintiff has adequately alleged a consumer-oriented practice sufficient to state a claim under Section 349. Accordingly, AHMSI’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs Section 349 claim is denied.

The court held that disputed evidence about FCC’s failure to properly credit mortgage payments and the resulting $15,000 payment created triable issues on the deceptive-practice and injury elements of a § 349 claim, so it denied summary judgment.

Dolan v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. · filed 2013-03-13(a)

The Court disagrees. First, plaintiff has submitted evidence that he made monthly payments (of varying amounts) to FCC for almost the entire period between November 2000 and July 2001 pursuant to the August 2000 Forbearance Agreement.

Under § 349(a), an out-of-state consumer has statutory standing when the deceptive transaction has a sufficient New York connection, including when some part of the transaction occurred in New York.

Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC · filed 2013-06-19(a)

Although it is a somewhat close call, our reading of Goshen and the cases construing it leads us to conclude that a deceptive transaction in New York falls within the territorial reach of section 349 and suffices to give an out-of-state victim who engaged in the transaction statutory standing to sue under section 349.

The court held that a § 349 claim uses an objective reasonable-consumer standard and does not require reliance, so common questions predominated for class certification.

Tait v. BSH Home Appliances Corp. · filed 2012-12-20§ 349

Plaintiffs contend that their claims under both these statutes are susceptible to common proof because — -as with the previously-discussed California’s CLRA, Illinois ICPA, and Maryland MPCA — these two New York GBL statutes define a deceptive act or practice using an “objective definition,” whereby deceptive acts or practices, including omissions, are “limited to those likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.” ... The Court agrees, and notes that other courts have reached the same conclusion in certifying consumer class actions under the New York and California consumer protections statutes at issue here.

The court held that Casey plausibly stated a claim under N.Y. General Business Law § 349 by alleging that defendants misleadingly demanded excessive flood-insurance coverage and profited from undisclosed commissions or kickbacks, causing higher premiums.

Casey v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2013-01-02

At this stage of the litigation, Casey has sufficiently alleged that the defendants force-placed flood insurance that was both in excess of federal requirements and not contemplated by the mortgage agreement. ... This would likely mislead a reasonable consumer as to the amount of flood insurance he was required to maintain under the contract. ... Finally, Casey clearly alleges that he had to pay higher insurance premiums because defendants force-placed unnecessary and excessive flood insurance on his property.

The court held that the § 349 claim failed because the plaintiff did not adequately plead consumer-oriented conduct and material misleadingness, and dismissed the claim.

Gale v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. · filed 2013-02-13

Assuming plaintiffs sixth claim is not pre-empted, to state a claim under GBL § 349 he must plead “first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.” ... Hence, plaintiffs GBL § 349 claim is dismissed.

The court held that plaintiffs' N.Y. GBL § 349 claim was preempted by ERISA because it was substantively a claim for benefits under the ERISA plans.

Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., LLC · filed 2013-03-28

As to plaintiffs’ deceptive conduct under N.Y. GBL § 349 cause of action, the Court similarly concludes that the crux of this claim is one for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).

The court held that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 applies only to matters affecting the consumer public at large, so it did not apply to this dispute specific to the plaintiff's attorney-client relationship.

Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP · filed 2013-04-11

Since New York General Business Law § 349 only applies to matters affecting the consumer public at large and Pietrangelo’s claim is based on disputes specific to his particular attorney-client relationship, it would produce the identical result as D.C. law.

The court held that the plaintiffs’ § 349(a) claims failed because the alleged deceptive conduct was not consumer-oriented and dismissed those claims.

Silverman v. Household Finance Realty Corp. · filed 2013-08-05(a) (h)

The court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendants’ allegedly deceptive conduct is consumer-oriented as required under § 349(a).

The court held that plaintiffs plausibly stated a claim under N.Y. General Business Law § 349 based on allegedly false representations that the supplements would help rebuild cartilage, and denied dismissal of that claim.

Quinn v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2013-08-07

In sum, the Court finds plaintiffs have stated plausible claims under Section 349 and CUTPA, and the motion to dismiss those claims is denied.

The court held that although the alleged conduct could be consumer-oriented, plaintiffs could not establish a § 349 claim because they lacked proof of actual injury caused by the deceptive acts.

Sergeants Benevolent Ass'n Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP · filed 2014-05-12349(a), 349(h)

Nonetheless, this Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot make out a violation of § 349 because they lack the evidence to prove the third element: that they suffered injury as a result of Defendants deceptive acts.

The court held that Crawford's § 349 claims failed because she offered no evidence that the alleged acts affected consumers generally or anyone besides her.

Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp. · filed 2014-07-11(a)

To state a claim under GBL § 349, a plaintiff must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.

The court held that plaintiff’s § 349 claim was inadequately pleaded because it relied only on information-and-belief allegations without particularized facts, and dismissed the claim.

Haag v. Hyundai Motor America · filed 2013-09-10

Plaintiffs Section 349 claim is based solely upon “information and belief’ allegations concerning generalized statements which may or may not have been made by defendant’s agents, and which are unsupported by any particularized statements of fact. As such, that claim is insufficiently stated and is therefore dismissed.

The court held that individualized solicitation of BioScrip patients was not consumer-oriented conduct under § 349 and granted summary judgment against the counterclaim.

Poller v. BioScrip, Inc. · filed 2013-09-25§ 349(a)

Accordingly, this claim fails and Poller and AOM’s motion for summary judgment on the § 349 counterclaim is granted.

The court held that Asghari adequately stated a GBL § 349 claim because the alleged fraudulent omission was materially misleading and caused actual pecuniary harm.

Asghari v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. · filed 2013-11-04

The court finds these allegations of fraudulent omission and concealment sufficient to support Asghari’s GBL claim for the same reasons that it found them sufficient to support plaintiffs’ California consumer protection claims. ... The court concludes, therefore, that the complaint alleges injuries sufficient to support Asghari’s GBL claim.

The court held that the complaint adequately pleaded a § 349 claim because the defendant’s website allegedly made a consumer-directed, materially misleading statement about product authorization that could cause consumer harm, and federal-law compliance did not justify dismissal.

George Nelson Foundation v. Modernica, Inc. · filed 2014-03-12

This allegation supports a misrepresentation that Defendant’s products are associated with or approved by George Nelson’s successors in interest. ... This allegation supports a finding the misleading association is material because it could cause a reasonable consumer to decide to purchase the product, believing it was an authorized GEORGE NELSON lamp. ... Accordingly, the deceptive practices claim shall not be dismissed on that basis.

The court held that Quincy Mutual failed to prove a violation of New York General Business Law § 349 because the conduct was not shown to reflect a consumer-oriented, generally applicable policy or practice.

Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2014-03-31

At trial, Quincy Mutual did not satisfy its burden of proving that New York Central violated New York General Business Law § 349, and therefore is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees.

The court held that CitiMortgage did not violate § 349 because its notice of the QWR address was adequate.

Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc. · filed 2014-06-24

Roth argues that CitiMortgage violated § 349 by providing inadequate notice of its QWR address, but as discussed above, CitiMortgage’s QWR address notice was not inadequate. The district court thus did not err in dismissing Roth’s § 349 claim.

The court held that alleged deceptive drug warnings were not consumer-oriented under § 349(a) because the manufacturer’s duty to warn runs to the prescribing doctor, not the patient, and dismissed the claim.

Amos ex rel. Estate of Amos v. Biogen Idec Inc. · filed 2014-06-25(a)

I find, however, that because a drug manufacturer’s' duty to warn of a drug’s side effects runs to the doctor prescribing the drug, and not to the user of the drug, the issuance of drug warnings, for purposes of Section 349, is not an act directed at consumers, and therefore any alleged deceptive act related to the issuance of those warnings is not a “consumer oriented” act actionable under Section 349 of the New York General Business Law.

The court held that the complaint adequately pleaded a § 349 claim based on allegedly misleading hard-drive packaging, including consumer-oriented deception, causation, and injury through payment of a premium.

Dash v. Seagate Technology (U.S.) Holdings, Inc. · filed 2014-06-30(a)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint adequately states a claim under Sections 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law.

The court held that plaintiff adequately stated a § 349 claim because the standard payment booklet could materially mislead reasonable consumers about late fees and plaintiff alleged injury.

Friedman v. Maspeth Federal Loan & Savings Ass'n · filed 2014-07-14

Plaintiff states a valid claim for relief under New York General Business Law § 349.

The court held that § 349 requires consumer-oriented deceptive conduct and dismissed the claim because plaintiffs and their business entities were not consumers buying goods, services, or property for personal use.

Naples v. Stefanelli · filed 2013-09-18(a)

A threshold issue in every § 349 case is whether the defendants’ conduct was “consumer-oriented.” ... Thus, Plaintiffs and their companies — which are not engaged in buying goods, services, or property for personal use — are not the type of consumer that Section 349 was designed to protect.

The court held that NYSPA’s § 349 claims could not be proven in a group context because showing United’s actual practices required individualized evidence about particular patients’ coverage and appeals.

New York State Psychiatric Ass'n v. Unitedhealth Group · filed 2013-10-31§ 349

Fifth, the claims under the New York Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.Y. G.B.L. § 349, cannot be proven in a group context. ... Demonstrating United’s actual practices will require individualized proof of how it operates with respect to particular patients’ coverage and appeals.

The court held that a § 349 plaintiff must allege actual harm caused by a materially deceptive act, even without proving reliance, and found the alleged privacy loss and purchases insufficient.

In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation · filed 2014-01-21(h)

a plaintiff must still allege “that the defendant engaged in a material deceptive act or practice that caused actual, although not necessarily pecuniary harm.”

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately stated a § 349 claim because the mortgage language was ambiguous and the alleged undisclosed kickbacks could mislead a reasonable consumer, so it denied dismissal.

Hoover v. HSBC Mortgage Corp. · filed 2014-03-27(a)

The allegedly deceptive act is objectively defined as an act “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.” ... Thus, it cannot be said at this stage of the litigation that, as a matter of law, HSBC’s practices were authorized and therefore not misleading. ... Thus, the conduct alleged by Plaintiffs is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer as to the amounts of flood insurance coverage required, as well as the appropriateness of the HSBC Defendants’ process of selecting and exchanging financial benefits with a force-placed insurance provider. ... Accordingly, the HSBC Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

Section 349 does not require intent to defraud or scienter to establish liability; scienter is relevant only to treble damages under subsection (h).

Dremak v. Iovate Health Sciences Group, Inc. · filed 2014-01-27(h)

Under New York and Florida law, knowledge is only necessary to obtain specific types of relief. The weight of New York law is that proof of scienter is only necessary for treble damages. Intent to defraud is not an element of a statutory claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349.

The court held that out-of-state plaintiffs plausibly stated a GBL § 349 claim because the allegedly deceptive transactions could have occurred in New York, while the untimely plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

Ward v. TheLadders.com, Inc. · filed 2014-03-12(a)

Accordingly, the out-of-state plaintiffs have stated a claim under GBL § 349, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied with respect to these plaintiffs, but granted with respect to plaintiff Lynn.

The court held that plaintiffs failed to plead a § 349 claim because the alleged conduct was not consumer-oriented and did not affect consumers at large.

Angermeir v. Cohen · filed 2014-03-27(a)

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a claim under New York’s General Business Law § 349, and it grants Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss that claim.

The court held that the evidence supported the jury’s finding of a consumer-oriented deceptive practice and its $24,000 award of additional statutory damages under § 349.

Koch v. Greenberg · filed 2014-03-31349(h)

Accordingly, the jury’s award of additional statutory damages of $24,000 under § 349 was permissible in light of the record.

The court held that § 349 does not apply to commodities investments because they are not consumer activity, and it dismissed the claim.

DeAngelis v. Corzine · filed 2014-04-16(a)

But § 349 does not cover all widespread harms. The statute offers redress only for those public harms suffered in connection with consumer activity. The Court is not persuaded that commodities investments constitute consumer activity as described in § 349.

The court held that a private insurance contract dispute did not establish deceptive conduct raising public, consumer-oriented concerns under § 349, so dismissal of the claim was affirmed.

Euchner-USA, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance · filed 2014-06-10

Euchner has not shown that Hartford is engaged in a deceptive practice raising pubbc, consumer-oriented concerns. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Euchner’s § 349 claim.

The court held that a § 349 claim for a defective product accrues when the product is purchased, delivered, and installed—not when the defect is discovered—so the claim expired three years later.

Bristol Village, Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. · filed 2016-03-21(a)

In other words, the TrimBoard was defective when it was purchased, delivered, and installed in 2003, and Plaintiff was injured at that time. Accordingly, Plaintiffs GBL § 349 claim expired sometime in 2006, well before Plaintiff filed its complaint on March 30,2012.

Section 349 claims must be brought within three years of the injury caused by the deceptive practice, and the discovery rule does not extend that limitations period.

Koenigsberg v. The Board of Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York · filed 2024-03-22

Actions brought pursuant to [GBL] Section 349 [or Section 350] must be commenced within three years of the date of accrual, which occurs when plaintiff is injured by the deceptive act or practice that violated the statute. ... Accrual is not dependent upon any later date when discovery of the alleged deceptive practice is said to occur.

A § 349 failure-to-disclose claim is not extended by continuing effects when the alleged omission occurred at the time of rate conversion or payment.

300 West End Ave Associates Corp v Plymouth Rock Energy LLC · filed 2024-04-15

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ §349 claims must fail.

A § 349 claim has a three-year statute of limitations, and a bank’s insistence that a borrower attend a loan closing, without more, is not a materially misleading deceptive act.

Hutter v. Countrywide Bank, N.A. · filed 2014-08-22

GBL § 349 is actually governed by a three-year statute of limitations ... It is untenable to assert that a bank’s insistence on the borrower attending the loan closing constitutes a misleading action.

Under Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute, the shorter three-year New York limitations period governs a § 349 claim, so the claim was timely.

Arndt v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2014-12-17

Given this, Mr. Arndt’s NYCPA claim under § 349 is not time barred and will not be dismissed.

Claims under § 349 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, accruing when the plaintiff is injured by the deceptive act or practice.

Martin Hilti Family Trust v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC · filed 2015-09-30

Claims brought under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2).

Claims under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 are subject to a three-year limitations period, accrue when the defective product is purchased, and are time-barred when brought more than three years later.

Fullerton v. Corelle Brands, LLC · filed 2019-09-30

“Claims brought under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.” ... The cause of action begins to accrue at the time Plaintiffs purchased the inherently defective Products.

A claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 is subject to a three-year statute of limitations and accrues when the plaintiff purchases the inherently defective product.

Schutte v. Corelle Brands Holdings Inc. · filed 2019-09-30

Claims brought under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... The cause of action begins to accrue at the time Plaintiffs purchased the inherently defective Products.

Section 349(a) prohibits materially deceptive consumer practices, including a business’s failure to disclose material cost information known only to it when that omission could mislead a reasonable consumer and cause actual harm; a voluntary agreement to pay does not defeat the claim.

Spiro ex rel. Estate of Torres v. Healthport Technologies, LLC · filed 2014-08-29(a) and (h)

To state a claim under Section 349(a), plaintiffs must allege that the defendants’ acts are (1) directed to consumers and (2) deceptive or misleading in a material way, and that (3) plaintiffs have been “injured by reason thereof.” ... That defendants disclosed in advance their intention to charge $0.75 per page, or that plaintiffs “voluntarily agreed” to pay this figure, does not preclude a claim under Section 349(a), where defendants allegedly failed to disclose that their actual costs were below that figure.

Section 349(d) provides a complete defense when the challenged act or practice complies with Federal Trade Commission rules and regulations.

Wang v. Verizon Communications, Inc. · filed 2023-01-19(d)

However, the conduct at issue—i.e., a creditor selling, re-purchasing, or attempting to collect on a debt—is not unlawful. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 3 (“Nothing in this chapter shall apply to transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws . . . of the commonwealth or of the United States”); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(d) (“it shall be a complete defense that the act or practice . . . complies with the rules and regulations of . . . the federal trade commission”). Because Wang’s remaining allegations regarding the defendants’ debt collection practices do not permit us to “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing his state law claims.

Section 349(d)’s safe harbor does not bar claims when the federally approved label information is not visible to consumers at purchase and the alleged deception arises from other packaging or representations.

Marty v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC · filed 2014-09-05(d)

For this reason, the Court finds that the defendant has not shown that the TTB’s approval of the labels on Beck’s triggers the safe harbor provisions of the relevant state law consumer protection statutes.

Section 349(d)'s safe harbor requires a defendant to identify a rule or regulation with which the challenged act or practice complied, and an FDA letter does not qualify on this record without support that it is a rule or regulation.

Greene v. Gerber Products Co. · filed 2017-08-02(d)

Both safe harbor provisions require Defendant to identify a “rule" or “regulation” with which it has complied. ... the- Court is not convinced that it does.

Section 349(d)'s safe harbor does not bar relief when the asserted compliance is based on a Consent Order or an agreement not to enforce a federal statute, because those do not qualify as a rule or regulation or as conduct required for the safe harbor.

In re Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. Mktg. & Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. · filed 2017-12-21

The Court concludes that, if confronted with the issue, the Court of Appeals of New York would adopt the reasoning of those federal courts and rule that the Consent Order is not a rule or regulation, or that an agreement not to enforce a federal statute does not meet the conduct required for the safe harbor.

Section 349(d)’s safe harbor fails when federal law does not authorize the challenged use of a labeling term.

Geffner v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 2018-10-31

Accordingly, the safe harbor defense fails.

Section 349(d)'s safe-harbor provision does not apply when the challenged conduct is not permitted by applicable laws and regulations.

Porter v. NBTY, Inc. · filed 2019-11-04(d)

Because the challenged conduct is not permitted by applicable laws and regulations, the safe harbor provisions under Illinois and New York law do not apply.

Section 349(d)’s safe harbor does not apply to approvals by state agencies.

Patane v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc. · filed 2020-08-12(d)

Moreover, GBL § 349’s safe harbor provision does not apply to approvals by state agencies at all.

Section 349(a) broadly covers consumer-oriented deceptive conduct, requiring consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and resulting injury; anticompetitive conduct is actionable when based on consumer deception, and no fiduciary-duty allegation is required.

United States v. Merck & Co. · filed 2014-09-05(a)

The scope of this consumer protection statute “is intentionally broad, applying ‘to virtually all economic activity.’” ... To plead a claim under the NYDAPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: the defendant has (1) engaged in consumer oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and (3) the plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice. ... There is simply no requirement in the NYDAPA that Plaintiffs plead a fiduciary duty.

A § 349 claim requires deceptive consumer-oriented conduct that causes the plaintiff’s actual harm; overpayment caused by price-fixing rather than the alleged misrepresentations is not actionable, and the plaintiffs’ failure to see the misrepresentations independently defeats causation.

Fenerjian v. Nongshim Co. · filed 2014-11-04

However, the purported harm suffered by plaintiffs— paying extra for price-fixed Kox-ean Noodles — was caused by the alleged price-fixing, not by the alleged misrepresentations that defendants made to media outlets, and is therefore not actionable under Section 349.

Section 349 prohibits deceptive business practices and permits a private claim when consumer-directed deception is materially misleading and causes injury, with damages and attorneys’ fees available under subsection (h).

Seifts v. Consumer Health Solutions LLC · filed 2014-11-21(a) (h)

New York General Businéss Law § 349 makes unlawful “[deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state,” and provides for a private right of action to be brought by “any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of this section.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349(a), (h). To state a claim under N.Y. GBL § 349, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at ■ consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.”

Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented, materially misleading act and injury caused by that deception; without plausibly pleading causation, a plaintiff cannot state a claim.

Wilson v. Eyerbank, N.A. · filed 2015-01-06(a)

The causation element is essential: The plaintiff must show that the defendant’s material deceptive act caused the injury. ... Without plausibly alleging the requisite causation, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the NYDPA.

A § 349 claim requires pleading that the plaintiff saw the misleading statements before acquiring the product, as part of causation.

In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation · filed 2018-03-05

Without more, it is not plausible that Plaintiff Davydov saw every relevant misrepresentation made by Google.

Section 349 prohibits deceptive business practices and requires a plaintiff to show consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and injury caused by the deceptive act; it also provides injunctive and damages remedies.

In re FCA US LLC Monostable Electronic Gearshift Litigation · filed 2017-11-15(h)

“A plaintiff under section 349 must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”

Section 349 provides a private action for consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads consumers and causes injury; reliance and scienter are not required, but the conduct must be capable of misleading a reasonable consumer.

In re Conagra Foods, Inc. · filed 2015-02-23

New York General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349 creates a private cause of action for any person injured by “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service” in New York. ... To state a claim under § 349, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was misleading in a material respect; and (3) plaintiff was injured as a result. ... proof of reliance and scienter are not elements of a GBL claim. ... each [GBL] claim includes the requirement that a reasonable consumer could have been misled by defendants’ conduct.

Section 349 is a consumer-protection law requiring a plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct has a broader impact on consumers at large; a private contract dispute unique to the parties does not qualify.

Ranieri v. Adirondack Dev. Group, LLC · filed 2016-02-22(a)

“a plaintiff proceeding under section 349 ‘must demonstrate that the acts or practices [complained of] have a broader impact on consumers at large.’”

The court held that § 349 does not cover the alleged Last Look practice because electronic FX trading between sophisticated market participants is not consumer-oriented conduct.

Axiom Investment Advisors, LLC ex rel. Gildor Management, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG · filed 2017-02-13

Electronic FX trading is not consumer-oriented conduct.

Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and resulting injury.

Haag v. Hyundai Motor America · filed 2018-03-26

I find that multiple questions of material fact preclude summary judgment on plaintiff's consumer protection claim.

Section 349 provides a state-law remedy for false or misleading advertising and unfair or deceptive business practices.

Diaz v. Ancient Brands, LLC · filed 2023-09-15§ 349

These causes of action provide a remedy for false or misleading advertising and unfair or deceptive business practices.

A § 349 claim based only on alleged unfair insurance settlement practices is precluded by Insurance Law § 2601; the court also found no materially false or deceptive business practice on the record.

Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2015-03-31(a)

As such, in the alternative, the Court finds that Plaintiffs GBL § 349 claim is precluded by N.Y. Insurance Law § 2601.

A deceptive-practices claim under GBL § 349 may proceed against an insurer even when the same conduct is also covered by Insurance Law § 2601, so long as the plaintiff alleges inherently deceptive conduct.

Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2017-11-08(a)

These precedents do not help Insurer. Garage’s plausible evidence that Insurer engaged in inherently deceptive conduct relating to labor -rates supports a .viable claim of .violation of GBL § .349, regardless of whether the .conduct also violated § 2601 of the N.Y. Ins. Law.

A private § 349 plaintiff must show consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads a reasonable consumer and causes injury; reliance is not required, although compensatory damages require actual harm.

Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC · filed 2015-11-18(a)

“A private plaintiff suing under § 349 ‘must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading, and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.’”

To state a § 349 claim, a plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused injury.

Bautista v. Cytosport, Inc. · filed 2016-12-12(d)

To state a claim for a violation of New York’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, Plaintiff must show, “first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”

To state a § 349 claim, a plaintiff must allege consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads the plaintiff and causes injury.

Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc. · filed 2017-02-22(a)

To successfully assert a GBL § 349 claim, “‘a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.’”

Section 349 requires a plaintiff to allege consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and resulting injury.

Millennium Health, LLC v. EmblemHealth, Inc. · filed 2017-03-09

“To state a claim under § 349, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the act or practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was misleading in a material respect; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result.”

A § 349 claim is subject to Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading standard rather than Rule 9(b).

Argabright v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. · filed 2016-08-15

Claims under N.Y. GBL § 349, however, are examined under the more liberal pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Section 349 prohibits consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury; an effective, proximate disclaimer can defeat deception where the challenged representation is ambiguous.

Henry v. Nissin Foods (USA) Co., Inc. · filed 2023-03-17(a)

Section 349 prohibits “[d]eceptive acts and practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a).

Section 349(a) requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury, and a representation is materially misleading when it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.

Smith v. Adidas America, Inc. · filed 2023-09-01(a)

Section 349 of the New York General Business Law declares unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a). ... To state a claim under either section, “a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.” ... To plead deceptive or materially misleading acts or practices, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a defendant’s act or conduct was “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.”

Section 349 requires facts showing that alleged deceptive credit reporting was false or misleading; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Ross v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC · filed 2023-10-26

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that Cavalry’s communications to the Credit Reporting Agencies were false or misleading other than conclusory statements; consequently her N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claim is dismissed.

As pleaded, merely presenting two products with the same ingredients and amounts but different colors and prices, when the ingredients and amounts are listed on the packages, does not state a claim under New York's deceptive acts and practices law.

Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2016-04-25(a)

The fatal flaw in all of Boris’ claims is his assertion that the mere fact of the proximate presentation of the two products with their different colors and prices is sufficient to run afoul of those laws, even though the ingredients and their amounts are listed on the packages.