Statute Annotations › New York › N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349

Consumer protection from deceptive acts and practices: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
New York
Case notes
728
Cited in passing
291
Citing cases indexed
1,178
Case dates
1982–2026
Screened through
2026-06-24
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-02
Courts' treatment: preempted in at least one context
A reviewed case holds this section preempted in at least one context. Courts have held § 349 claims preempted in specific contexts, including airline advertising, credit reporting, securities transactions, and copyright-equivalent claims. This status reports confirmed court treatment, not the current state of the statute.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

1,019 citing cases reviewed of 1,178 in the citation index: 728 interpreted the section (annotated below), 291 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-24 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1984 Chapter 157 amended § 349(h), the private remedy provision; no note in this record states a displaced pre-amendment private-remedy rule. Source
  • 1995-09-07 Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, held that a corporate competitor may bring a § 349 claim when the alleged deception harms the New York public. Source
  • 2014 Chapter 55, part HH, § 6 added former § 349(j) concerning state recoveries; the 2025 act renumbered it as § 349(i). No note states a displaced rule about that provision. Source
  • 2025-12-19 (effective 2026-02-17): Chapter 708, the FAIR Business Practices Act, added unfair and abusive practices to § 349 and made Attorney General enforcement independent of consumer orientation; private actions under § 349(h) remain limited to deceptive practices. Source

Deceptive debt-collection demands

Section 349(a) operates independently of federal law and applies to deceptive creditor collection practices that misrepresent a consumer’s legal liability by seeking to enforce nonexistent payment rights.

Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. v. Scrimpsher (In Re Scrimpsher) · filed 1982-03-05§ 349(a)

The N.Y. General Business Law § 349 does operate independently from federal law. ... Sending this standard notice/demand is a deceptive act or practice which seeks to enforce nonexistent payment rights against a consumer. It appears violative of § 349(a) of the New York General Business Law.
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Likelihood of confusion not required

N.Y. General Business Law § 349 does not require a showing of likelihood of confusion.

Vision, Inc. v. Parks · filed 1985-06-06

As to its claims for injury to business reputation, dilution, and deceptive practice under N.Y. Gen.B.Law §§ 349 and 349, which do not require a showing of likelihood of confusion, Vision Inc. has similarly failed to present enough evidence to meet its burden of establishing the probability of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits.
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Reliance by the plaintiff or a third party is not an element of a claim under § 349.

Charron v. Pinnacle Group N.Y. LLC · filed 2010-04-27(a)

Further, it is well settled that reliance— whether by the plaintiff or by a third party— is not an element of a claim under § 349 of the NYCPA.
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A private § 349(a) claim does not require proof of actual reliance, so reliance does not defeat class certification under the predominance requirement.

Tershakovec v. Ford Motor Company, Inc. · filed 2023-07-07(a)

Again, dispositively, private actions brought under § 349 do “not require proof of actual reliance.”
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No punitive damages under § 349

Section 349 does not authorize recovery of punitive damages.

Hedaya Bros., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. · filed 1992-08-20

The court holds that it can only tie to the first cause of action for breach of contract because § 349 does not contain a provision for recovery of punitive damages.
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Section 349 does not require a plaintiff to show that its operation was unprofitable to prove damages; the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged deceptive practices caused injury to the plaintiff.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS INC. v. SAVE ON SP, LLC · filed 2024-02-06(h)

Based on the Court’s ruling, although public harm is one aspect of the GBL claim, the focus is also on Plaintiff’s injury as a result of the alleged deceptive practices of Defendant’s conduct, regardless of the purpose or motivation of Plaintiff’s assistance-programs. In other words, even if Plaintiff’s program is created for the purposes of promoting J&J’s drugs, Plaintiff may sustain its GBL Claim by proving that Defendant’s alleged conduct injured Plaintiff in some way. Moreover, as Plaintiff correctly argues, even if Plaintiff did not lose profits during the relevant time period, based on its theory of liability, which the Court found sufficient to state a claim, Plaintiff may still show that the CarePath funds would not have been improperly depleted in light of Defendant’s alleged conduct; indeed, contrary to Defendant’s argument, whether Plaintiff’s operation is ultimately profitable is not the relevant inquiry. There is no statutory requirement, nor did Defendant cite to any case law, that imposes a profitability litmus test in order for a plaintiff to prove damages under § 349.
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Coverage of garden-variety trademark claims

Section 349(a) does not provide a remedy for a garden-variety Lanham Act trademark or trade-dress claim that falls outside the statute’s ambit.

Jaret International, Inc. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc. · filed 1993-06-16(a)

Defendants therefore argue that this “garden variety” Lanham Act ease is outside the ambit of §§ 349-350. Def.Mem.L. at 32 n. 10. Plaintiffs do not oppose this characterization and neither does the Court. Accordingly, this claim must fail as a matter of law.
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Section 349 does not cover ordinary trademark disputes that pose no significant risk of harm to the public interest.

Kaplan, Inc. v. Yun · filed 2014-04-30§ 349

which are outside the scope of the statutes. Accordingly, the Section 349 and 350 claims fail as a matter of law, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim YII is granted.
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A § 349 claim cannot proceed when the alleged deceptive acts are precisely the acts constituting trademark infringement.

A.V.E.L.A., INC. v. Estate of Marilyn Monroe, LLC · filed 2015-09-18

The Movants’ alleged deceptive acts or practices, however, “are precisely the acts that constitute the alleged trademark infringement,” and therefore the § 349 claim fails as a matter of law.
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Trademark infringement is not cognizable under § 349 unless the plaintiff alleges specific and substantial injury to the public interest beyond the ordinary injury from trademark infringement; the court dismissed the claim because no such additional harm was pleaded.

Pulse Creations, Inc. v. Vesture Group, Inc. · filed 2015-12-30

The majority view, and the view that this Court adopts, is that “trademark infringement claims are not cognizable uiider ... § 349 unless there is specific' and substantial injury to the public interest' over and above the ordinary trademark infringement.”
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Deceptive conduct must occur in New York

Section 349(a) requires a plaintiff to allege deceptive acts or practices that occurred within New York State.

Weaver v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1997-03-27(a)

To state a claim under the Consumer Protection Act, Plaintiff must allege deceptive acts or practices that occurred within New York State.
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A § 349(a) deception claim requires the consumer deception to occur in New York.

Leone v. Cataldo · filed 2008-08-11(a)

“[To] qualify as a prohibited act under the statute, the deception of a consumer must occur in New York.”
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Section 349(a) reaches deceptive consumer conduct only when the deception occurs in New York, so it does not apply to alleged deception occurring in Italy.

Gotlin v. Lederman · filed 2009-05-21§ 349(a)

Moreover, §§ 349 and 350 only prohibit consumer deception or false advertising that occurs in New York state.
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The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a § 349(a) claim based on allegations that the insurer deceptively terminated their agency agreements, where the agreement expressly allowed termination without reason on 180 days’ notice.

Keeney v. Kemper National Insurance · filed 1997-04-23(a)

The Court finds, once again, that the allegations in Count IV are insufficient to state a claim. As mentioned earlier, by virtue of clause seven of the Agreement’s express and clear language, the defendants can terminate the Agreement by giving not less than 180 days notice without any reason at all. Also, in the Court’s view, the plaintiffs fail to allege a cause of action under New York General Business Law § 349 as a matter on law.
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Section 349(a) does not police out-of-state consumer transactions merely because a deceptive scheme originated in New York.

Thomas v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. · filed 2011-07-29§ 349(a)

The statute “was not intended to police the out-of-state transactions of New York companies.”
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Section 349(a) applies only when the consumer's deception occurs in New York, so an out-of-state transaction is not actionable merely because the scheme originated there.

Kaufman v. SIRIUS XM RADIO, INC. · filed 2010-11-10§ 349(a)

the deception of a consumer must occur in New York.
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Section 349 applies only to commercial misconduct occurring in New York, so a consumer deceived outside the state lacks standing under the statute.

Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC · filed 2012-02-29§ 349(a)

to qualify as a prohibited act under the statute, the deception of a consumer must occur in New York.
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Section 349(a) requires the alleged consumer deception to occur in New York; claims based on deception occurring outside New York are dismissed.

Simmtech Co. v. Barclays Bank PLC · filed 2015-01-28(a)

But “to qualify as a prohibited act under the statute, the deception of a consumer must occur in New York.”
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The court held that a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 requires the deceptive transaction to occur in New York and dismissed the claim because plaintiffs did not allege deception in New York.

Dorris v. Danone Waters of America · filed 2024-01-10(a)

Thus, to state a claim under either section, “the transaction in which the consumer is deceived must occur in New York.”
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The court held that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 applies only to transactions occurring in New York and dismissed the claim because plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts showing New York transactions.

Debt Cleanse Group Legal Services, LLC v. GoTo Technologies USA, Inc. · filed 2024-07-30

The ACFA, IDTPA, NYGBL, and OCPA cover only those transactions that occurred in their respective states.
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Section 349 requires the allegedly deceptive act or practice to occur in New York, so the court dismissed the claim because the alleged misrepresentations were not alleged to have happened there.

Five-Star Audiovisual, Inc. v. Unique Business Systems Corp. · filed 2025-03-03

That statute prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (emphasis added). Importantly, the allegedly deceptive act or practice “must [have] occur[red] in New York” to be prohibited by section 349. See Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 774 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (N.Y. 2002). Five-Star has not alleged that any of the misrepresentations happened in New York. So, Five-Star’s allegations do not state a claim under section 349. The Court dismisses Five-Star’s claim under section 349.
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Consumer-oriented conduct required

A private § 349 claim must allege consumer-oriented conduct causing injury to consumers or the public interest; allegations of injury only to businesses are insufficient.

Occidental Chemical Corp. v. OHM Remediation Services Corp. · filed 1997-04-28§ 349(h)

These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 349 of the General Business Law. The proposed claim does not allege any injury to consumers or to the public interest.
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Section 349(a) requires a plaintiff to show a materially deceptive or misleading act, injury caused by that act, and consumer-oriented conduct that potentially affects similarly situated consumers.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Mallela · filed 2001-09-20(a)

Section 349 makes unlawful “[deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.” N.Y.Gen.Bus.Law § 349. To state a claim under § 349, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the “defendant is engaging in an act or practice that is deceptive or misleading in a material way, ... that plaintiff has been injured by reason thereof, ... and that the acts [the plaintiff] complaints] of are consumer-oriented in the sense that they potentially affect similarly situated consumers.”
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A § 349(a) claim requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that the challenged conduct is consumer-oriented.

Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. v. Taca International Airlines. S.A. · filed 2002-09-26(a)

To establish a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a), a plaintiff must, at a minimum, plead and prove that the conduct at issue is consumer-oriented.
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Section 349 excludes a private policy-coverage dispute from its consumer-oriented public-impact requirement.

Paul Shapiro, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Berkshire Life Insurance Company, Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 2000-05-12§ 349(a)

a private contract dispute as to policy coverage” does not.
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Section 349 does not impose liability for deceptive conduct in a customized business-to-business transaction between sophisticated entities with equal bargaining power.

Exxonmobil Inter-America, Inc. v. Advanced Information Engineering Services, Inc. · filed 2004-07-22§ 349

Second, allegedly deceptive acts that occur between relatively sophisticated entities with equal bargaining power do not give rise to § 349 liability. Large businesses are not the small-time individual consumers § 349 was intended to protect.
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False drug-price reporting can be consumer-oriented under § 349 when consumers make payments based on the reported prices, and harm to government agencies can also affect the public interest.

County of Suffolk v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 2004-09-30(a)

The Court disagrees. The Defendants made the representations (the AWP’s) understanding that consumers would be making payments based on those representations. While government agencies also used the AWP’s as the basis for reimbursement, this does not change the fact that the Defendants’ conduct affected the public interest through harm to consumers. Additionally, harm to public agencies impacts the public interest.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct capable of misleading a reasonable consumer, rather than conduct confined to a private dispute.

Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc. · filed 2004-12-10

The conduct alleged in this case would have an impact on consumers at large if proved because contrasted to a private dispute, the contested practices were not limited so as only to affect plaintiffs and defendants or a small section of the public.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct with a broad impact on consumers at large, so an alleged violation of a private agreement with one insured does not state a claim.

Polidoro v. Chubb Corp. · filed 2005-01-20(h)

A claim under § 349 must charge conduct that is consumer oriented and have a broad impact on consumers at large.
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Section 349 requires consumer deception; anticompetitive conduct alone is not enough.

Leider v. Ralfe · filed 2005-01-25

Mere anticompetitive conduct alone will not suffice.
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Section 349(a) requires both consumer-oriented conduct and deceptive or misleading conduct beyond mere anticompetitive behavior.

In Re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation · filed 2007-05-08(a)

We are persuaded that § 349’s prohibition on “deceptive acts or practices” requires more than allegations of anticompetitive conduct and that, as a result, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim under the Act.
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Section 349(a) can apply to deceptive conduct with a broad public impact even when the dispute arises from a complex private contract involving sophisticated parties.

In Re Express Scripts, Inc., PBM Litigation · filed 2007-10-31(a)

However, the existence of complexity, and the experience and sophistication to handle the same, will not necessarily operate to preclude the application of Section 349.
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A § 349(a) claim requires deceptive conduct with a broader impact on consumers at large, and the consumer must be deceived in New York.

Siotkas v. LabOne, Inc. · filed 2009-01-06(a)

Thus, a plaintiff claiming a violation of Section 349 “must demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at large. Private contract disputes, unique to the parties, for example, would not fall within the ambit of the statute.”
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Section 349(a) requires a plaintiff to allege consumer-oriented conduct that is materially deceptive or misleading and caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Horowitz v. Stryker Corp. · filed 2009-02-20(a)

To establish a claim under § 349, the plaintiff must allege that “a defendant is engaging in consumer-oriented conduct which is deceptive or misleading in a material way, and that plaintiff has been injured because of it.”
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Section 349 requires deceptive conduct to occur in New York and be consumer-oriented; conduct directed at patent examiners or federal courts is not actionable.

Sheet Metal Workers Local 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC · filed 2009-11-02

Deceptive conduct must be consumer-oriented in order to be actionable under section 349. ... The deceptive conduct in this case — whether fraud on the patent examiners through misrepresentations or on the federal courts through sham litigation — was not directed at consumers. Accordingly, the section 349 claim will be dismissed.
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Section 349(a) does not cover a private contract dispute unique to the parties because the alleged deceptive practice is not consumer-oriented.

Ammirato v. Duraclean International, Inc. · filed 2010-02-08(a)

It is undisputed that the alleged deceptive practices involve the private transactions between the five plaintiffs and Diaz, and thus, the plaintiffs are precluded from a lawsuit under this section.
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Section 349 does not reach a private, highly negotiated insurance-coverage dispute between sophisticated business entities because the alleged conduct is not consumer oriented.

PB Americas Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. · filed 2010-02-09

Here, despite PB’s allegations that Defendants’ conduct was “deceptive and misleading to the public at large,” Defendants are not liable under § 349 because the alleged conduct was not “consumer oriented.”
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Section 349 requires proof that challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, meaning it affected consumers at large; conduct directed only at an individual’s family and friends is insufficient.

Sheehy v. New Century Mortgage Corp. · filed 2010-02-19

To show that the alleged conduct was consumer oriented, plaintiff “must demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broadf ] impact on consumers at large.”
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Section 349 permits a business to sue only when the challenged deceptive conduct is directed, at least in part, at non-business consumers.

Spirit Locker, Inc. v. Evo Direct, LLC · filed 2010-03-19(a), (h)

In short, though businesses may sometimes bring § 349 claims, they may do so only where the defendant’s deceptive conduct is, at least to some extent, directed at non-business consumers.
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Section 349 requires deceptive conduct to be consumer-oriented, with a broader impact on consumers at large; software marketed only to early-intervention agencies does not satisfy that requirement.

Shema Kolainu-Hear Our Voices v. Providersoft, LLC · filed 2010-05-21(a)

The threshold test developed by New York courts for applicability of section 349 is whether or not the conduct of which a plaintiff complains is “consumer oriented.”
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Section 349 permits a consumer claim when a business practice is materially misleading and causes injury, and retaining interest contrary to lease representations can support that claim.

Steinmetz v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. · filed 1997-05-05(a), (h)

The elements of a claim under section 349 are: (1) that the practice alleged was misleading in a material respect; and (2) that the plaintiff was injured. ... In the Courts view, if discovery should yield evidence that Toyota has kept interest which has accrued on the security deposits, despite its representations to the contrary in the Lease, such conduct would establish a claim for deceptive trade practices.
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Section 349 requires a deceptive or misleading act or practice that is materially misleading and causes injury; packaging that falsely suggests consumers are receiving more product can satisfy that pleading standard.

Waldman v. New Chapter, Inc. · filed 2010-05-19

To state a § 349 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has engaged “in an act or practice that is deceptive or misleading in a material way and that plaintiff has been injured by reason thereof.”
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to allege consumer-oriented conduct with a broader impact on consumers at large.

Allstate Insurance v. Bogoraz · filed 2011-06-10(a)

As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must allege “conduct of the defendant that is consumer-oriented.” ... a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate that acts of defendant have a “broader impact on consumers at large.”
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Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented misleading act causing injury, and private transactions between businesses generally do not qualify because the claim must involve consumer injury or harm to the public interest.

CRABHOUSE OF DOUGLASTON INC. v. Newsday, Inc. · filed 2011-07-13

To state such a claim, plaintiffs must allege: “(1) the act or practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was misleading in a material respect; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result.” ... “[T]he gravamen of the complaint must be consumer injury or harm to the public interest.” ... these forms of private transactions between businesses do not fall within the broad consumer protections and public harm considerations contemplated by the subject statute.
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused injury.

Doll v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2011-08-25

To state a claim for deceptive practices under this section, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the act, practice, or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice, or advertisement was misleading in a material respect; and (3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive act, practice, or advertisement.
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Section 349 requires conduct affecting the public interest, including consumer-oriented activity, and a plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that the defendant's scheme targeted the public generally or a broad group of people.

Marini v. Adamo · filed 2011-09-26(a)

Under this provision, “the gravamen of the complaint must be consumer injury or harm to the public interest,” and, as such, “[t]he critical question ... is whether the matter affects the public interest in New York, not whether the suit is brought by a consumer or a competitor.” ... In the absence of any allegations or factual proof that defendants’ engaged in consumer-oriented activity within the meaning of the statute, plaintiffs cannot survive defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, and a more-than-$10-million real-estate transaction negotiated by counsel was too unlike a typical consumer violation to fall within the statute.

904 Tower Apartment LLC v. Mark Hotel LLC · filed 2012-03-29

Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of New York’s Deceptive Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349, is dismissed because they do not adequately allege that defendants’ conduct was consumer oriented. ... A transaction over $10 million in real estate, about which the alleged deceptive practices sound primarily in breach of, and fraudulent inducement into, contracts negotiated by counsel, is too unlike a typical consumer violation to be covered under the statute.
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Section 349 requires consumer-directed deceptive conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Tasini v. AOL, Inc. · filed 2012-03-30(a)

To plead a prima facie claim under § 349, the plaintiffs must allege that: “(1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.”
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Section 349 reaches conduct that potentially affects similarly situated consumers, so a competitor may sue when an alleged scheme has a broad public impact.

Allstate Insurance. v. Lyons · filed 2012-02-16§ 349(a)

Although defendants’ argument has some traction, I conclude that the § 349 claims survive. A plaintiff establishes consumer-oriented conduct by showing that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at large ... I therefore conclude that Allstate’s claims for violations of § 349 are legally sufficient.
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Section 349 requires the challenged act or misrepresentation to be consumer-oriented and affecting consumers at large; a business dispute without that impact does not state a claim.

Bill's Birds Inc. v. Trademarketing Resources Inc. · filed 2013-01-31§ 349

the challenged act or misrepresentation be consumer-oriented ... therefore, this claim is also dismissed.
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Law changed since The FAIR Business Practices Act (Dec. 19, 2025; effective Feb. 17, 2026) added unfair and abusive practices and removed the consumer orientation requirement for Attorney General enforcement; this note’s limit remains relevant to private deception claims.

Section 349 applies only to deceptive acts or practices with a broader impact on consumers at large, so a private contract dispute unique to the parties is outside the statute.

United Teamster Fund v. MagnaCare Administrative Services, LLC · filed 2014-08-14(a)

Section 349 only applies to acts or practices that “have a broader impact on consumers at large. Private contract disputes, unique to the parties, for example, would not fall within the ambit of the statute.”
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Section 349 requires deceptive conduct that is consumer-oriented and injures the public generally, and it does not cover private, single-shot investment transactions involving goods or services not purchased for consumption or use.

Schwartzco Enterprises LLC v. TMH Management, LLC · filed 2014-11-17(a)

“[f]or a claim to classify as ‘consumer-oriented,’ a plaintiff must plead and prove injury to the public generally, rather than to himself alone.” ... “the transactions described in the proposed amended complaint, like securities transactions,- were undertaken as investments, not purchased as goods or services to be consumed or used, and so fall outside of the statute’s protection.”
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Under § 349, deceptive debt-collection communications can remain consumer-oriented and harmful to the public interest even when sent through a court or to an employer.

Mayfield v. Asta Funding, Inc. · filed 2015-03-31(a)

Passing fraudulent communications through the court en route to consumers does not cleanse Defendants of liability under § 349. ... Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged deceptive, . consumer-oriented conduct that harms Plaintiffs and the public interest in violation of the statute.
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Section 349 makes deceptive business practices unlawful and allows a private claim only when the conduct is consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and causes injury.

Nungesser v. Columbia University · filed 2016-03-11(a) (h)

New York General Business Law Section 349(a) “declares unlawful ‘[deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business].’ ” ... The statute also provides a private right of action to persons harmed by such conduct. ... “To successfully assert a section 349(h) claim, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.”
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Section 349 does not cover a private pension dispute affecting only one member and duplicating a contract claim because the conduct is not consumer-oriented and the loss is not independent of the contract loss.

King v. New York City Employees Retirement System · filed 2016-07-25

The claim is not consumer-oriented. ... Nor can plaintiff satisfy the requirement that this claim is distinct from his breach of contract claim.
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Section 349 targets deceptive conduct directed at consumers or affecting the public, and a prima facie claim requires material misleadingness and resulting injury.

National Convention Services, L.L.C. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. · filed 2017-03-09(a)

To plead a prima facie claim under § 349, the plaintiffs must allege that: “(1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.”
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct with a broad impact on consumers at large, rather than a deceptive practice limited to the parties.

Nungesser v. Columbia University · filed 2017-03-24(a) (h)

“In other words, the deceptive act or practice may not be limited to just the parties.”
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Section 349 does not reach private contract disputes unique to the parties and not directed toward consumers, absent facts showing harm to the public interest.

Safe Step Walk in Tub Co. v. CKH Industries, Inc. · filed 2017-03-17

these claims arise out of the parties’ contractual relationship and are not directed towards consumers. ... Therefore, these claims are outside the ambit of the statutes and must be dismissed.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct; a dispute directed only at a provider and based on the provider's internal business organization is outside the statute.

Precision Imaging of New York, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 2017-06-26(a)

“[Plaintiffs claiming the benefit of § 349 ,.. must charge conduct of the defendant that is consumer-oriented” and not merely a private dispute that does not implicate consumers, see id. (“Private contract disputes, unique to the parties, for example, would not fall within the ambit of the statute.”).
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A § 349 claim requires conduct that is both consumer-oriented and misleading; this claim failed because the complaint alleged neither.

Moss v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. · filed 2017-07-07

Thus, for these reasons, plaintiff has not stated a claim under Section 349 of the GBL because the SAC does not assert that defendant engaged in conduct that was consumer-oriented and misleading.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads consumers and causes injury, so a private dispute over a sophisticated insurance contract fails when the alleged deception is aimed only at the policyholder rather than the public.

Violet Realty, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co. · filed 2017-08-28(a)

To successfully assert a GBL § 349 claim, “ ‘a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff.suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.’” ... “Assuming Plaintiffs allegations to be true, the deception was aimed at Plaintiff. Defendant’s purported deceptive practices — refusing to pay damages covered under the contract— were not aimed at the public. Rather, Defendant’s actions had, at most, public effects.”
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented deceptive conduct, and a private placement offered only to selected investors is not sufficiently consumer-oriented to support a claim.

I.B. Trading, Inc. v. TriPoint Global Equities, LLC · filed 2017-11-15

The defendants’ alleged conduct was therefore not sufficiently “consumer oriented” to fall within the bounds of § 349.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, materially misleading conduct, and resulting injury; confusion that merely suggests a product is linked to another brand is not sufficiently consumer-oriented.

Can't Live Without it, LLC v. ETS Express, Inc. · filed 2018-01-15

To succeed under either section, a plaintiff must show "that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice." ... Such a consumer may think the Impact Bottle is somehow linked to S'well, but that consumer confusion is insufficiently consumer-oriented to state a claim under New York's deceptive practices and false advertising statutes.
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A § 349 claim requires the plaintiff to allege that the defendant engaged in a consumer-oriented act or practice.

Bhatia v. 3M Co. · filed 2018-03-01349

Claims under §§ 349 and 350 require a plaintiff to allege that the defendant engaged in a "consumer-oriented" act or practice.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury; a private, party-specific contract dispute is outside the statute's scope.

Plavin v. Grp. Health Inc. · filed 2018-06-22

Section 349 of the GBL prohibits "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state." ... In order to assert a claim under the GBL, " 'a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.' " ... "Private contract disputes, unique to the parties, for example, would not fall within the ambit of the statute."
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, and forex trading is not consumer-oriented, so the plaintiffs’ § 349 claim fails.

Nguyen v. FXCM Inc. · filed 2019-02-01

“[A]s a threshold matter, plaintiffs claiming the benefit of section 349-whether individuals or entities ...-must charge conduct of the defendant that is consumer-oriented.” ... Plaintiffs do not meet this threshold, as forex trading is not consumer-oriented conduct.
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Section 349 does not cover a private dispute between sophisticated parties when the alleged conduct lacks a broader impact on consumers at large.

P&L Dev., LLC v. Bionpharma, Inc. · filed 2019-02-14

In sum, Bion's alleged conduct does not have "a broader impact on consumers at large" and, is, thus, not consumer-oriented. Instead, this is essentially a private dispute between sophisticated parties that is not covered by the prohibitions of § 349.
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A § 349 claim requires deceptive practices causing harm to consumers as a whole or the public at large, and allegations of similar practices affecting customers nationwide satisfy the consumer-oriented requirement at the pleading stage.

Endemann v. Liberty Ins. Corp. · filed 2019-03-25

However, to sustain a GBL § 349 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate harms caused by deceptive practices directed at consumers as a whole or the public at large.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, and a uniquely tailored mortgage transaction does not satisfy that requirement when it is not plausibly recurring or capable of affecting similarly situated consumers.

Barker v. Rokosz · filed 2020-01-02

The court thus finds that plaintiff has not pleaded that defendants’ conduct was consumer-oriented, and accordingly, GRANTS the Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint’s Section 349 claim.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct with a broad impact on consumers, so a purely private injury falls outside the statute.

Blake Marine Group, LLC v. Frenkel & Company · filed 2020-02-11(a)

“At bottom, Plaintiff’s injury is private, and, as such, falls outside the ambit of NYGBL § 349.”
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A § 349 claim requires deceptive conduct directed at consumers at large, materially misleading conduct, and resulting injury; allegations concerning fees and escrow misclassification affecting only the plaintiff do not state a claim.

Krajeski v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2020-01-02

To state a prima facie case under GBL § 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.” ... The Complaint details conduct that affected Plaintiff alone. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant’s purported assessment of fees in violation of her Modified Loan Agreement and its misclassification of her escrow payments were actions directed at consumers at large. Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege a claim under GBL § 349.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct; in a business dispute, the conduct must have a broader impact on consumers at large by being directed to consumers or potentially affecting similarly situated consumers.

Orange Transportation Services, Inc. v. Volvo Group North America, LLC · filed 2020-03-31§ 349(a)

The threshold requirement of consumer-oriented conduct is met [in a dispute between businesses] by a showing that the acts or practices have a broader impact on the consumer at large in that they are directed to consumers or potentially affect similarly situated consumers.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct, and the challenged conduct must affect consumers rather than only business participants.

INV Accelerator, LLC v. Vested Interest Co. · filed 2020-02-24(a)

Though “[a] plaintiff need not be a consumer to bring a claim under § 349... the challenged conduct must affect consumers.”
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Section 349’s consumer-oriented requirement is satisfied only by conduct with a broader impact on consumers at large.

Scism v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2020-03-16(a)

Instead, a plaintiff must "demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at-large."
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A § 349 claim requires conduct with a broader impact on consumers at large; a private contract dispute unique to the parties does not qualify.

Witt v. Sollecito · filed 2020-10-28§ 349

Consequently, “a plaintiff proceeding under section 349 ‘must demonstrate that the acts or practices [complained of] have a broader impact on consumers at large.’”
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to allege consumer-oriented conduct, materially misleading conduct, and resulting injury.

Finch v. Slochowsky & Slochowsky LLP · filed 2020-09-30(a)

To state a claim under this provision, a plaintiff must allege that (i) that the defendant engaged in consumer-oriented conduct, (ii) the defendant’s conduct was materially misleading, and (iii) the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant’s conduct.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Sibrian v. Cento Fine Foods, Inc. · filed 2020-07-02§ 349

To assert a claim under either section, a plaintiff must establish that [1] the defendant engaged in consumer-oriented conduct, [2] that is materially misleading, and [3] plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive act or practice.
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The court held that § 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct and dismissed the claims because dissemination of the plaintiff's reports to banks did not satisfy that requirement.

Abdallah v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions FL Inc. · filed 2021-03-30

To state a claim under General Business Law § 349, “a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.” ... Abdallah cannot state a § 349 claim merely by extrapolating from his experiences disputing inaccurate reports of personal information in order to assert that LexisNexis’s alleged conduct actually had broader impact on consumers at large. ... this wide-spread practice has no clear relation to consumer purchases of goods or services; this arrangement between Chex and many major banks falls outside of the ambit of consumer-oriented practices governed by § 349.
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Section 349 requires deceptive practices to have a broader impact on consumers at large; a single disputed act against one consumer is insufficient.

Paraco Gas Corp. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America · filed 2014-09-30

Here, the FCBIS Defendants have only alleged misrepresentations by Travelers with respect to the Policy and have not asserted that Travelers’s actions were illustrative of a larger pattern of conduct that might cause “substantial injury to consumers” apart from Paraco.
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ADA preemption of § 349 airline-advertising claims

Section 349 cannot support a false advertising claim about flight times in a vacation package when the challenged restrictions directly and materially affect air fares, because the Airline Deregulation Act preempts the claim.

McLaughlin v. TWA Getaway Vacations, Inc. · filed 1997-05-28

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims of false and deceptive advertising under the various New York consumer protection laws are preempted by the ADA and cannot support his action here.
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Section 349 claims challenging an airline’s ticketing and boarding procedures are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act.

Dogbe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2013-08-27

There can be no question that plaintiffs challenge to Delta’s ticketing and boarding procedures- under New York consumer protection laws is preempted by the ADA. Indeed, at least one New York state court has held that New York’s consumer protection statutes, including General Business Law § 349, cannot be invoked against airlines due to federal preemption. See Stone v. Continental Airlines, 10 Misc.3d 811, 814, 804 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y.Civ.Ct.N.Y.Cnty.2005). Therefore, plaintiffs New York General Business Law claims are preempted by the ADA and are, therefore, dismissed.
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Consumer transaction and public impact requirement

Section 349 does not cover an arm’s-length business transaction for services unavailable to the general public when the plaintiff alleges only its own injury and no harm to the public at large.

Black Radio Network, Inc. v. Nynex Corp. · filed 1999-04-30(h)

Although plaintiffs claim that they were acting as consumers and thus should be protected by the statute, in fact this case involves businesses engaged in arm’s length transactions for services that are not available to the general public. Nor, of course, does the fact that consumers were the ultimate end-users convert the transaction into a consumer transaction. Further, plaintiffs’ amended complaints are devoid of any reference to harm to the public at large. Instead, plaintiffs focus exclusively on their own alleged injury.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented deceptive or misleading acts that cause injury, and alleged conduct with potential ramifications for the public at large may satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Allstate Insurance v. Rozenberg · filed 2008-12-29§ 349(a)

To state a claim pursuant to Section 349, a Plaintiff must show: (1) acts or practices that are ‘consumer oriented,’ (2) that such acts or practices are deceptive or misleading in a material way and (3) that plaintiff has been injured by reason of those acts. ... Here, the Defendants argue that the alleged deceptive practices were not consumer-oriented within the meaning of the statute. However, this is a close question and the Court declines to find, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs are unable to state a claim under Section 349. The fact that the Defendants’ alleged scheme would almost certainly result in higher premiums for insurance consumers is sufficient, at this stage, to show that the alleged fraud had “ramifications for the public at large”. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count V are denied.
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The court held that Richmond failed to state a claim under § 349 because she alleged conduct directed only at herself, not consumers generally or the public at large.

Richmond v. National Grid · filed 2014-01-30(a)

To establish a claim under these sections, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct affected consumers generally or the public at large. ... Richmond alleges, however, that National Grid acted improperly only with respect to Richmond. Accordingly, Richmond failed to plead a claim under sections 349 and 350.
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Elements of a § 349(a) claim

Section 349(a) requires a material deceptive act or practice directed at consumers that causes actual harm; a nondeceptive violation of § 601(6) alone does not suffice.

Conboy v. at & T Corp. · filed 2000-02-04(a)

To state a claim under Section 349(a), plaintiffs must allege a material deceptive act or practice directed to consumers that caused actual harm.
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Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented defendant act, a materially deceptive or misleading act, and injury caused by that act.

Altman v. Bayer Corp. · filed 2000-12-22

To state a claim under section 349, the complaint must plead that (1) the defendant’s conduct was consumer-oriented; (2) the defendant engaged in a materially deceptive and misleading act; and (3) plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s act.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act or omission, and resulting injury; an omission alone is insufficient without facts showing why it was deceptive.

Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2003-01-22§ 349(a)

To state a claim for deceptive practices under either section, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the act, practice or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and (3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive practice, act or advertisement.
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Section 349 does not reach private contract disputes unique to the parties.

Maurizio v. Olivia Goldsmith, AKA Justine Rendal, AKA Randi J. Goldfield · filed 2000-11-01§ 349

Private contract disputes, unique to the parties ... would not fall within the ambit of the statute.
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A § 349 claim requires deceptive and materially misleading conduct that is consumer-oriented and causes injury.

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp. · filed 2002-07-16§ 349(a)

In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains plaintiffs’ claim that Sethi violated Section 349 of New York General Business Law.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act or omission, and resulting injury.

Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2003-01-22§ 349(a)

To state a claim for deceptive practices under either section, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the act, practice or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and (3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive practice, act or advertisement.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Gray v. Seaboard Securities, Inc. · filed 2003-01-29§ 349

An allegation of fraud, in the form of a material misrepresentation, is thus an element of a cause of action under section 349.
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to allege that a consumer-oriented act, practice, or advertisement was materially deceptive and misleading and caused injury, and nonactionable puffery cannot support the claim.

Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc. · filed 2004-03-22

In order to state a claim under sections 349 and 350, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant’s act, practice or- advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) it was materially deceptive and misleading; and (3) that plaintiff was injured as a result.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct, material deception, and injury caused by the deceptive act.

In Re Pharm. Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation · filed 2004-09-30§ 349

must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-directed deceptive acts that are materially misleading and cause consumer injury.

Trikas v. Universal Card Services Corp. · filed 2005-01-03

Section 349 prohibits “[djeceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” “To prevail on a § 349 claim, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.’”
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act, practice, or advertisement, and resulting injury; reliance and scienter are not required.

Pelman Ex Rel. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2005-10-24

To state a claim for deceptive practices under section 349, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the act, practice, or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice, or advertisement was misleading in a material respect; and (3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive act, practice, or advertisement. ... Further, traditional showings of reliance and scienter are not required under GBL § 349.
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A § 349 plaintiff must prove consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act or practice, and injury caused by the deceptive act; the court held the claim failed because the evidence did not show harm to New York consumers or deception of the converters.

Fibermark, Inc. v. Brownville Specialty Paper Products, Inc. · filed 2005-12-09(a), private action under (h)

To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.
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A § 349 claim requires materially deceptive or misleading conduct, injury, and conduct directed at consumers.

Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc. · filed 2006-05-25§ 349

A prima facie case for recovery under section 349 of the statute for “deceptive acts or practices” requires a showing that defendant is engaging in an act or practice that is deceptive or misleading in a material way and that plaintiff has been injured by reason thereof.
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to show misleading conduct that caused injury and conduct affecting consumers broadly rather than only a private dispute.

Kuklachev v. Gelfman · filed 2009-02-26

“To prevail in a cause of action under General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made misrepresentations or omissions that were likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in the plaintiffs circumstances ... and that as a result the plaintiff suffered injury.” ... A plaintiff must charge conduct of the defendant that has a broad impact on consumers at large, rather than conduct that pertains to private disputes between the parties.
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Section 349 requires allegations that the challenged practice was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused the plaintiff injury.

Ramirez v. STi Prepaid LLC · filed 2009-03-18(a)

To state a claim under New York’s consumer protection statute, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. § 349, plaintiffs must allege “(1) the act or practice was consumer-oriented, (2) the act or practice was misleading in a material respect, and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result.”
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Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented deceptive act that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks · filed 2009-07-22(a)

Section 349 prohibits generally “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) (McKinney’s 2008). “A plaintiff under section 349 must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-directed, materially misleading conduct that causes injury.

Gorham-Dimaggio v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2008-12-17§ 349

a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.
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A § 349 claim requires a typical consumer transaction and conduct likely to mislead a reasonable consumer; justified reliance is not required.

Ellis v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP · filed 2010-03-26§ 349

While the plaintiff need not show “a repetition or pattern of deceptive behavior,” he must “demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at large,” and were not merely aimed at an individual private dispute.
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A plaintiff suing under § 349 must show a materially misleading misrepresentation or omission, that the plaintiff was deceived, and resulting injury.

Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2010-10-27(a)

To prevail on the elements of their cause of action under GBL § 349, Plaintiffs must prove that Defendant “[1] made misrepresentations or omissions that were likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in the plaintiffs circumstances, [2] that the plaintiff was deceived by those misrepresentations or omissions and [3] that as a result the plaintiff suffered injury.”
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Section 349(a) requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury, and its territorial reach is limited to deception occurring in New York.

Chiste v. Hotels.com L.P. · filed 2010-11-15(a)

To state a claim under G.B.L. § 349, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) defendant is engaging in an act or practice that is deceptive or misleading in a material way, and (2) plaintiff has been injured by reason thereof.” ... “The phrase ‘deceptive acts or practices’ under the statute is not the mere invention of a scheme or marketing strategy, but the actual misrepresentation or omission to a consumer. Thus, to qualify as a prohibited act under the statute, the deception of a consumer must occur in New York.”
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes actual injury.

Patchen v. Government Employers Insurance · filed 2011-01-07349

To prevail on a consumer protection law claim, a plaintiff must prove: “first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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A Section 349 plaintiff must prove consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and injury caused by the deceptive act, while private disputes unique to the parties fall outside the statute.

McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. · filed 2011-01-11

A plaintiff pursuing a claim under Section 349 must establish three elements: (1) “the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented”; (2) the act or practice “was misleading in a material way”; and (3) “the plaintiff suffered injury as result of the deceptive act.” ... With respect to the first element, plaintiff “must demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at large.” ... “Private ... disputes, unique to the parties, ... would not fall within the ambit of the statute.”
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A § 349 plaintiff must prove that the challenged act was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused injury.

Lane v. Fein, Such and Crane, LLP · filed 2011-03-03349

“[a] plaintiff under section 349 must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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Section 349 requires consumer-directed conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Eaves v. Designs for Finance, Inc. · filed 2011-03-30

The elements of a claim under Section 349 are as follows: “(1) the defendant’s challenged acts or practices must have been directed at consumers, (2) the acts or practices must have been misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff must have sustained injury as a result.”
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Section 349 requires consumer-directed deception that is materially misleading to a reasonable consumer and causes injury.

Weinstein v. Ebay, Inc. · filed 2011-06-27(a)

To make out a prima facie case under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented, materially misleading conduct causing injury, and a claim may proceed against a defendant whose alleged deceptive practices caused consumer losses, while failing against a defendant not tied to the alleged statements.

In re WellPoint, Inc. Out-of-Network UCR Rates Litigation · filed 2011-08-11§ 349

A plaintiff must prove three elements to recover under § 349: “first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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A private § 349 claim requires materially misleading conduct directed at consumers that causes injury, and allegations of deceptive subscription fees may survive a motion to dismiss.

Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc. · filed 2010-11-17§ 349(a)

For a private plaintiff to make out a ... case under § 349 requires a showing that (1) the defendant’s act was misleading in a material way; (2) the act was directed at consumers; and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury, and a premium refund for deceptive practices can qualify as injury distinct from breach-of-contract damages.

Servedio v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2011-09-19(h)

That injury is distinct from the damages he would recover in a breach of contract action and, therefore, suffices as a cognizable injury under section 349.
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The court held that the alleged deceptive fundraising practices stated a General Business Law § 349 claim and denied dismissal.

Alzheimer's Disease Resource Center, Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n · filed 2013-11-08(h)

As noted above, the Court has found that the ADRC pled that the Association’s trade practices were misleading in a material way and that it has been injured as a result. Accordingly, the Court denies that part of the Association’s motion to dismiss the complaint to the extent it asserts a claim under General Business Law § 349.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented deceptive conduct that materially misleads consumers and causes injury, and a private transaction without broader public impact does not qualify.

Long Beach Road Holdings, LLC v. Foremost Insurance · filed 2015-02-11

NYGBL § 349 makes unlawful “[deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (McKinney). “To make out a prima facie case under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.”
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to show consumer-oriented conduct, a material deception or misleading act, and injury caused by that conduct.

Andrichyn v. TD Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-03-20(a)

To state a claim under § 349 a Plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant’s conduct was consumer-oriented, (2) the defendant’s conduct was deceptive or misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff was injured by the conduct.
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Section 349(a) requires a plaintiff to show consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and caused injury.

Xiaolu "Peter" Yu v. Vassar College · filed 2015-03-31(a)

“To succeed on a claim under [New York General Business Law Section 349], plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant ‘has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.’ ”
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A § 349 claim requires a consumer-oriented act or practice that is materially misleading and causes the plaintiff injury.

Tomasino v. Estee Lauder Companies Inc. · filed 2014-08-26(a)

The second element requires, whether it is a representation or omission, that the defendant’s misleading or deceptive conduct is “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.”
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A § 349 plaintiff must be personally misled or deceived to establish injury caused by the deceptive act.

Gerstle v. National Credit Adjusters, LLC · filed 2015-01-06

As to the third element, a plaintiff must have been “personally misled or deceived” to suffer injury “as a result” of the defendant’s deception.
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Section 349 requires plausible allegations of consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and resulting injury; conduct limited to a single individual lawsuit affecting only the parties is not consumer-oriented.

Samms v. Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP · filed 2015-07-06

In order to state a claim under Section 349, a plaintiff must plausibly allege three elements: “first, that the challenged act or practice , was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-directed conduct, a materially misleading practice, and resulting injury; a practice is misleading when it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.

Ault v. J.M. Smucker Co. · filed 2015-08-06

A claim under § 349 “has three elements: (1) the defendant’s challenged acts or practices must have been directed at consumers, (2) the acts or practices must have been misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff must have sustained injury as a result.”
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Section 349 requires proof that the challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused injury; the court applied that rule and held the claim untimely and insufficiently pleaded because it did not allege an effect on consumers at large.

Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2016-01-18(a)

Under New York law, “[a] plaintiff under section 349 must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes the plaintiff injury; the court found those elements sufficiently pleaded here.

In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation · filed 2016-02-14(a)

To successfully assert a claim under this section, “a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.”
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Section 349 prohibits materially deceptive, consumer-oriented business practices that cause injury, and a violation of § 601 does not by itself bar an overlapping private § 349 claim.

Samms v. Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP · filed 2016-02-27

Section 349 bars “[deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” “To make out a prima facie case under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.” ... There is no basis for Abrams’s argument that § 601 bars overlapping § 349 claims.
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Section 349(a) does not require a plaintiff to establish the defendant’s intent to defraud or mislead.

McCracken v. Verisma Systems, Inc. · filed 2015-09-16(a) (h)

As a matter of New York law, Plaintiffs need not establish the defendant’s intent to defraud or mislead, ... in order to prevail under GBL § 349(a).
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Section 349 requires proof that the challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused the plaintiff injury; misleadingness is judged under an objective reasonable-consumer standard.

Goldemberg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. · filed 2016-10-04(h)

A plaintiff using that right of action must ultimately “prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury; intent to mislead and justifiable reliance are not required, and plaintiffs need not show that the defendant alone possessed the withheld information.

Johnson v. Nissan North America, Inc. · filed 2017-08-29

In order to state a claim under Section 349, a plaintiff must allege “(1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.”
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and injury; reliance is not required.

In re Amla Litig. · filed 2017-10-24(a), (h)

To state a claim under § 349, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the act or practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was misleading in a material respect; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result.
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Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented, materially misleading act or practice that caused injury, and the court held the alleged misleading illustrations and independent premium losses met that pleading standard.

In re Lincoln National Coi Litigation · filed 2017-09-11

To state a claim under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the act or practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was misleading in a material respect; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result.
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes the plaintiff injury.

Daniel v. Mondelez Int'l, Inc. · filed 2018-02-26

To assert a claim under either section, "a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) [the] plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice."
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To state a claim under § 349, a plaintiff must show consumer-oriented conduct, a material deception, and injury caused by the deceptive act.

In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig. · filed 2018-08-21

In order to state a claim under Section 349, the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) "the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented;" (2) "it was misleading in a material way;" and (3) "the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act."
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A § 349 claim requires consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act or practice, and injury caused by the deceptive act.

In re Effexor Antitrust Litig. · filed 2018-11-15

In order to state a claim under Section 349, the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) "the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented;" (2) "it was misleading in a material way;" and (3) "the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act."
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Section 349 requires proof that the challenged act was consumer-oriented, materially deceptive and misleading, and caused the plaintiff injury.

Danone, Us, LLC v. Chobani, LLC · filed 2019-01-23

A claim under § 349 requires a showing that (1) Chobani's act, practice, or advertisement was consumer oriented, (2) that it was materially deceptive and misleading, and (3) that Dannon was injured as a result.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and injury, but does not require reliance or intent to mislead.

O'Neill v. Standard Homeopathic Company · filed 2018-09-28

Additionally, neither Section 349 nor 350 require proof of reliance, ... nor proof that defendants intended to mislead consumers.
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A § 349 claim requires a materially deceptive or misleading act or practice and injury caused by that conduct; a deceptive act is one likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably.

Graham v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation · filed 2019-07-12(a)

To state a claim under § 349, “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has engaged in an act or practice that is deceptive or misleading in a material way and that plaintiff has been injured by reason thereof.” ... A “deceptive act or practice” is defined as a representation or omission “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.”
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To establish a claim under N.Y. GBL § 349, a plaintiff must prove that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused injury through the deceptive act.

Lin v. Grand Sichuan 74 st Inc. · filed 2019-07-29

To establish a claim under N.Y. GBL § 349, a plaintiff must prove “first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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Section 349 requires proof of a consumer-oriented act, material misleadingness, and injury.

Detroit Coffee Company, LLC v. Soup For You, LLC · filed 2019-08-21

Count VI, unfair business practices under N.Y. GEN. BUS. Law § 349 requires a showing that Defendants (1) conducted a consumer-oriented act, (2) the act was misleading in a material way, and (3) plaintiff was injured by the act.
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Section 349 requires proof that the challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, materially misleading, and caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Chemist Corner, Inc. v. Epic Pharmacy Network, Inc. · filed 2019-09-30(a)

to recover under section 349, a plaintiff must prove “first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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Section 349 requires a consumer-oriented act that is materially misleading and causes injury; conclusory trademark-use allegations do not satisfy those elements.

Now-Casting Economics, LTD. v. Economic Alchemy LLC · filed 2019-09-24

Economic Alchemy failed to plead facts that meet any of these elements and only made conclusory allegations regarding the Banks’ alleged use of the trademarks.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act or practice, and injury caused by the deceptive practice; the court dismissed the consumer-fraud claim because plaintiffs did not adequately support allegations that Defendant made deceptive or false representations.

Cosh v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2020-02-06(a)

To state a claim for deceptive practices under either section, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the act, practice or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and (3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive practice, act or advertisement.”
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Section 349 prohibits deceptive acts in business and requires a consumer-oriented, materially misleading act that injures the plaintiff; the court dismissed this claim because the alleged misrepresentations and resulting injury were not adequately supported.

Boris v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2020-02-06(a)

Section 349 of New York General Business Law makes unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.” ... To state a claim for deceptive practices under either section, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the act, practice or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and (3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive practice, act or advertisement.”
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to show consumer-oriented conduct, a materially misleading act or practice, and injury caused by that deceptive conduct.

Bustamante v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2020-02-06(a)

To state a claim for deceptive practices under either section, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the act, practice or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and (3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive practice, act or advertisement.”
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A § 349 claim requires a consumer-oriented practice that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Chubb INA Holdings Inc. v. Hole In Won LLC · filed 2020-02-18§ 349(a)

To state a claim under section 349, Plaintiff must show (1) “that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented,” (2) “that it was misleading in a material way,” and (3) “that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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Section 349(a) prohibits deceptive business practices and requires consumer-oriented conduct, material misleadingness, and injury; the deception must occur in New York.

Maldini v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2020-02-21(a)

Section 349(a) of the GBL prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 349(a). To state a § 349 GBL claim, plaintiff must allege (1) that defendant’s “act or practice was consumer-oriented,” (2) that the act or practice “was misleading in a material way,” and (3) that plaintiff “suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”
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Section 349 prohibits deceptive acts or practices in business, trade, commerce, or furnishing services in New York, and a private plaintiff must show consumer-oriented conduct, a deceptive act or practice, and injury.

Snyder v. Allen · filed 2020-03-13(a)

Section 349 of New York General Business Law makes unlawful “Tdleceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. § 349(a). “To maintain a cause of action under § 349, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant's conduct is ‘consumer-oriented’; (2) that the defendant is engaged in a ‘deceptive act or practice’; and (3) that the plaintiff was injured by this practice.”
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A § 349 claim requires deceptive acts directed at consumers, material misleadingness, and injury, and the deception must be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer or the public at large.

Dentsply International, Inc. V. Dental Brands for Less LLC · filed 2020-04-02§ 349(a)

A claim of deceptive trade practices under New York General Business Law § 349 requires that “(1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.” ... A plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s deceptive acts were likely to mislead a reasonable consumer or the public at large.
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that materially misleads consumers and causes injury.

North American Olive Oil Association v. D'Avolio Inc. · filed 2020-04-30(a)

Under these sections, “a plaintiff ‘must prove three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.’”
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to show consumer-directed deceptive acts that are materially misleading and cause injury.

Sabatano v. Iovate Health Sciences U.S.A. Inc. · filed 2020-06-22§ 349

To establish a prima facie case under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant’s deceptive acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result.”
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Bassaw v. United Industries Corporation · filed 2020-08-31(a)

To assert a claim under either Section, “a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) [the] plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.”
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Section 349 requires consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury, evaluated under the reasonable-consumer standard.

Parker v. United Industries Corporation · filed 2020-09-29§ 349(a)

To succeed on either claim, a plaintiff must prove that “a defendant (1) has engaged in consumer-oriented conduct, (2) that is materially misleading, and (3) that plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.” ... This Court analyzes whether a practice is deceptive or misleading through the “reasonable consumer” standard, i.e., by analyzing whether the practice would be “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.”
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Section 349 requires a plaintiff to allege consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading and causes injury.

Milligan v. Geico General Insurance Company · filed 2020-09-30(a)

To state a claim under Section 349, “a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.”
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Notes 1–150 of 728, oldest cases first.

291 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Yamagata v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, the opinion cites § 349 while identifying the New York cause of action in a discussion of the claims’ federal preemption and merits; it does not construe or apply § 349’s requirements. opinion →
Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, the court cites N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 and 350-c only as examples of similar consumer-fraud provisions from neighboring jurisdictions while explaining Vermont law; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
The Paddington Corporation v. Attiki Importers & Distributors, Inc., section 349 appears only in the procedural-history list of claims Paddington asserted; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or otherwise adopt a rule about § 349. opinion →
In re Painewebber Ltd. Partnership Litigation, the opinion only mentions that the proposed intervenors alleged a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as part of their argument for subclass creation; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., the opinion only identifies N.Y. General Business Law § 349 as the basis of Impressa’s fourth and sixth counterclaims. The court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself; it dismisses the state-law counterclaims on jurisdictional grounds and discusses federal trademark issues. opinion →
Harary v. Allstate Insurance, the opinion only mentions § 349 in describing the complaint, the prior motion-to-dismiss ruling, and the procedural options for plaintiff's remaining claims. It does not state what § 349 means or requires, apply the statute's elements to the facts, or adopt a substantive rule about the statute. opinion →
Stamm v. Barclays Bank of New York, the opinion only mentions Article 22-A and cites N.Y. General Business Law §§ 349 et seq. in describing the claims filed; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Soanes v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, section 349 appears only as a statement of plaintiffs' allegations in the procedural/background description; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute in its own opinion. opinion →
Clement v. American Honda Finance Corp., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h) only in a footnote listing other states' statutory minimum damages; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about § 349. opinion →
In Re Bruzzese, the opinion only identifies a possible § 349 issue as a preliminary issue-spotting exercise and expressly states that the court did not make definitive findings of fact or law on the state-law issues; thus it does not hold what § 349 means or how it applies. opinion →
Day v. AT & T CORP., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(d) only in a footnote as part of comparing New York’s statute with California’s statutes; the court does not interpret, apply, or hold anything about § 349 itself. opinion →
Sierra v. Foster & Garbus, the opinion only identifies New York General Business Law § 349 as one of the plaintiff's asserted causes of action and later dismisses the state-law claims for lack of pendent subject matter jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state a holding about § 349. opinion →
Eastern America Trio Products, Inc. v. Tang Electronic Corp., the staged passage contains only a footnote citing N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as an authority; it does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, or how it applies. opinion →
Bristol Technology, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349(a) and 349(h) only in footnotes listing other states' deceptive-practices statutes and remedies; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Greenpoint Financial Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., Inc., the opinion merely lists a claim under N.Y. GBL § 349 among the remaining state claims and disposes of it with a generalized statement that plaintiff failed to show likelihood of success; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., the opinion mentions § 349(a) only to identify and quote the statute as the basis of a pleaded claim; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., the opinion merely lists Count XIII as a claim under N.Y. General Business Law § 349 in the complaint; it does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, or how the court applies it. opinion →
Hsin Ten Enterprise USA, Inc. v. Clark Enterprises, the opinion only identifies § 349 as the statutory basis for one pleaded claim and later refers generally to the state-law claims in discussing pendent venue; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 et seq. only in a footnote listing unfair-business-practice statutes and expressly states that the appeal raises no issues concerning conduct prohibited by those statutes; the court adopts no interpretation or application of § 349. opinion →
New York Marine & General Insurance v. Tradeline (L.L.C.), the opinion mentions § 349 only in a footnote reporting that the district court dismissed Tradeline’s deceptive-acts claim and that Tradeline did not appeal; this court does not interpret, apply, or adopt any holding about § 349. opinion →
New York Marine & General Insurance Company v. Tradeline (L.L.C.), filed 2001-09-27 — The opinion mentions § 349 only in a footnote reporting that the district court dismissed Tradeline's deceptive-acts-and-practices claim and that Tradeline did not appeal. This court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Araujo v. John Hancock Life Insurance, the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only to identify one claim asserted in the complaint and then decides removal, SLUSA, amendment, and remand issues; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Michael Spielman, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Similarly Situated Persons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only to identify one of the state-law causes of action and to reproduce the statutory text in a footnote; the court decides federal removal, SLUSA preemption, and appellate jurisdiction, and does not interpret or apply § 349. opinion →
Stein v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, the court only identifies the § 349 claim as a state-law claim and dismisses it without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on the substance of § 349. opinion →
Pechinski v. Astoria Federal Savings And Loan Association, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 appears only in a footnote listing the plaintiffs' state-law claims over which the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction; this court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Pechinski v. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a footnote describing the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law deceptive-practices claim; this court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Boa (Uk) Limited v. Tv Products (Usa) Inc., the opinion only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of BOA's claims; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a list of New York statutes cited as supporting the Attorney General’s authority to represent consumers; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise adopt a holding about § 349 itself. opinion →
Ureneck v. Cui, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349-c only in a citation to State v. Leifer, describing a New York Supreme Court ruling; this court does not interpret, apply, or adopt a holding about § 349. opinion →
Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, the opinion mentions § 349 only as a claim under the New York Consumer Protection Act, states that the district court denied dismissal of the consumer-protection claims, and reports that a jury found no violation; the appellate court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise adopt a position about § 349. opinion →
Agency Development, Inc. v. Med America Insurance Co. of New York, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only to identify plaintiff's proposed unfair-competition claim and later dismisses the state-law claims after declining pendent jurisdiction; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Volunteer Firemen's Insurance Services, Inc. v. McNeil & Co., the opinion only identifies § 349(a) and (h), quotes their statutory text, and lists the statute among the asserted claims. The court's actual ruling concerns Rule 9(b) pleading requirements for a counterclaim sounding in fraud; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Speziale v. National Life Insurance, the opinion only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in the introduction as a claim previously dismissed by an earlier Decision & Order; this court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., the opinion reports the New York Court of Appeals' answer that the claims were too remote under § 349 and then adopts the resulting disposition by reversing and remanding; it does not itself explain what § 349 means or independently apply the statute's requirements beyond recounting the certified-question history. opinion →
Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., the opinion does not mention or interpret N.Y. General Business Law § 349. Its discussion concerns federal-question jurisdiction, removal, and preemption of state-law claims, so any connection to § 349 is incidental rather than a holding about the statute. opinion →
Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., the court mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349(h) only while listing the state consumer-protection statutes underlying the claims in its jurisdictional discussion. It does not adopt a holding interpreting, applying, or otherwise deciding what § 349 means or requires; the surrounding description instead cites § 350-a for the general elements. opinion →
In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products Liability Litigation, the opinion merely lists General Business Law § 349 among the New York plaintiffs' asserted claims and among the claims surviving dismissal; it does not explain what § 349 means, requires, or how its elements apply to the facts. opinion →
Dibbern v. Adelphia Communications Corp. (In Re Adelphia Communications Corp.), the opinion contains only footnote citations to N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 and to Goshen's statement about where the deceptive transaction must occur; it does not state or adopt this court's own holding about § 349. opinion →
In Re American Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litigation, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only to identify a deceptive-trade-practices claim in the procedural description; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide what § 349 means or requires. Its later references to deceptive trade practices concern ADA preemption and do not analyze § 349 itself. opinion →
Yaghobi v. Robinson, the opinion cites N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as one of the provisions invoked in the complaint and refers generally to a parallel state unfair debt collection claim; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
White v. First American Registry, the opinion merely identifies § 349 as one of the statutes invoked in the complaint and notes the requested statutory damages under § 349(h); it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, the staged passage only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) among statutes plaintiffs proposed for class certification and mentions defendants' standing argument under state consumer-protection statutes; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
In Re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, the staged passage only cites N.Y. General Business Law § 349(d) in a footnote and quotes/cites authorities describing the statute; it does not state or apply this court's own holding about § 349. The discussion of a union health plan's claim concerns a New Jersey trial-court ruling and is expressly identified as such, so it is procedural history rather than this court's holding. opinion →
In Re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, the staged passage merely cites N.Y. General Business Law § 349(d) and reproduces an explanation from other cases about the statute's purpose; it does not show this court stating, adopting, or applying a rule about § 349. opinion →
In Re Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Fee Litigation, the opinion only recounts the Court's prior dismissal of Count Six in procedural history; this opinion does not itself analyze or adopt a holding about what N.Y. General Business Law § 349 means or requires. opinion →
In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, the opinion merely lists N.Y. General Business Law § 349, et seq., among the state consumer-protection statutes under which a class is certified; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state a holding about § 349 itself. opinion →
Kirk v. Heppt, the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only to identify the cause of action Plaintiffs sought to vacate; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., section 349 is cited only in a list of state-law claims and in a footnote reciting another court's statement that federal false-advertising standards are substantially similar to §§ 349 and 350; this court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Lewis v. Nissan North America, Inc., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a list of claims plaintiff initially raised and then affirms the district court for the magistrate judge's reasons; it does not itself interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Union Cosmetic Castle, Inc. v. Amorepacific Cosmetics USA, Inc., the opinion only lists a § 349 claim in the complaint and notes that plaintiffs did not rely on it for the injunction motion; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
AMERICAN EAGLE OUTFITTERS v. Tala Bros. Corp., the opinion merely identifies N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 349 as the basis for claim seven while analyzing whether venue should be transferred; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Kanne v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., the Nebraska court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only while reporting and relying on New York decisions in its discussion of analogous consumer-protection claims; it does not itself interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 349. opinion →
Integrative Nutrition, Inc. v. Academy of Healing Nutrition, section 349 appears only in a parenthetical citation to Samara Bros. as an example from another case; this court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Anderson v. American International Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In Re Anderson), the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as one of the statutes invoked in the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Shaw v. Marriott International, Inc., the staged opinion concerns the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act and does not discuss or apply N.Y. General Business Law § 349; any inclusion in this statutory cluster is therefore incidental. opinion →
Western International Syndication Corp. v. Gulf Insurance, the opinion only cites N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 while recounting the District Court's ruling that the insurer had a duty to defend a deceptive acts and practices claim. This court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about § 349 itself. opinion →
Karvaly v. Ebay, Inc., the opinion only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 in describing the plaintiffs’ pleaded causes of action; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Cole v. Chevron USA, Inc., the court discusses N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only as comparative statutory background while deciding whether the Mississippi CPA permits a private action. It does not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 349; the statement that § 349 creates a private right of action generally and could be construed to cover emergency pricing is an incidental aside. opinion →
Davis v. Blige, the opinion merely recounts Davis's allegation that defendants violated N.Y. General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 and reproduces the statutory text in a footnote; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Davis v. Blige, the opinion only reports the plaintiff's allegation that defendants violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 and 350 and reproduces § 349(a)'s statutory text in a footnote; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Henry v. Westchester Foreign Autos, Inc., the opinion only lists N.Y. General Business Law § 349 as one of the plaintiff's claims in the procedural background; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Silberblatt v. Stanley, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349-a only as one of the claims in the case and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Beyers v. Richmond, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 appears only in a footnote listing consumer-protection statutes enacted by various states. The opinion decides the applicability of Pennsylvania's UTPCPL and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about § 349. opinion →
Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, the court mentions a § 349 claim only to state that the plaintiff waived any challenge to summary judgment by failing to address it; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on the meaning or requirements of § 349. opinion →
Yeiser v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only as one of the claims asserted and in defendants' description of their dismissal argument; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349(a) and § 349(h) only to identify the statutory basis of the plaintiffs' state-law claim and its procedural history; the court's holding interprets CAFA jurisdictional provisions, not § 349. opinion →
Dungan v. The Academy at Ivy Ridge, the district judge mentions § 349 as one of the pleaded claims and the magistrate judge's recommendation lists proposed § 349/§ 350 elements, but the operative opinion does not adopt or decide a § 349 legal meaning or application. The district judge's class-certification analysis expressly identifies reliance, causation, and damages as predominating for other listed claims and discusses fraud-based and negligent-misrepresentation claims, without resolving the § 349 claim itself; the magistrate recommendation is procedural history rather than this court's holding. opinion →
JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, the opinion lists and dismisses the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claims, but expressly declines further discussion because the existing contract and trademark conclusions make those claims academic; it does not interpret § 349 or apply its elements to the facts. opinion →
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) only in a comparative list describing the broader language of another state's consumer-protection statute; the court decides the New Jersey CFA claim and makes no holding about what § 349 means or how it applies. opinion →
Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, the staged passage contains only a footnote citing N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h), (a), plus authorities discussing the statute; it does not state this court's own holding about what § 349 means or how it applies. opinion →
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., the opinion only identifies §§ 349(a) and (h) as pleaded claims and recites, by quoting another case, that federal false-advertising standards are substantially similar to New York deceptive-trade-practices standards. It does not independently interpret, apply, or rule on § 349, and the preliminary-injunction ruling rests on irreparable-harm grounds. opinion →
New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4, the opinion mentions N.Y. General Obligations Law § 349 only while describing the procedural history and claims in Pew; this court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, the opinion cites N.Y. General Business Law § 349 in a list of statutes the parties appear to agree do not require individual reliance, and later reproduces subsection (a) in an appendix. Those are party agreement, statutory background, and class-certification listings, not an independent holding by this court about what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Orenbuch v. Leopold, Gross, & Sommers, P.C., the opinion merely identifies a state-law deceptive-business-practices claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 and dismisses it without prejudice after declining pendent jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Ventimiglia v. ARCHSTONE-SMITH, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as one of the plaintiffs' alleged claims when assessing the amount in controversy; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Ventimiglia v. Tishman Speyer Archstone-Smith Westbury, L.P., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as one of the plaintiffs’ alleged claims while assessing the amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Sorrentino v. ASN Roosevelt Center, LLC, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as a claim added in the pleadings and as one component of the alleged damages supporting the CAFA jurisdictional amount; it does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, or how the statute applies on the merits. opinion →
Thorpe v. ZIMMER, INC., the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only in describing the plaintiff's allegations and requested damages; the court decides a recusal motion and makes no holding about what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, or how it applies. opinion →
Kehr Ex Rel. Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, the opinion merely lists violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 as one of plaintiffs’ claims; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
In Re PepsiCo, Inc., Bottled Water Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, N.Y. General Business Law § 349 appears only in a footnote listing statutes cited by plaintiffs; the court does not analyze, interpret, or apply § 349 in its opinion. opinion →
In Re G-Fees Antitrust Litigation, the opinion discusses the New York Donnelly Act and other state consumer laws; it does not interpret or apply section 349. opinion →
ANIRUDH v. CitiMortgage, Inc., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only when listing plaintiffs' claims and does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute; the case is resolved on federal subject-matter jurisdiction under CAFA. opinion →
In Re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation, the opinion merely notes in a footnote that an IEU plaintiff advanced a § 349 claim and that the motion to dismiss did not affect it; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Verzani v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349(a) and § 349(d) only in describing Costco’s choice-of-law and complete-defense arguments, and reproduces subsection (d) in a footnote; the court transfers the Washington-law claims and does not adopt or decide any rule about § 349. opinion →
In Re September 11 Litigation, the opinion’s holding concerns CPLR § 4545 and the continued viability of insurers’ subrogation rights. The § 349 reference merely reports the Court of Appeals’ holding in Blue Cross that insurers lack standing to bring derivative § 349 claims; this court does not decide or apply § 349 itself. opinion →
Kuhne v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, the opinion mentions § 349 in the plaintiff's allegations and conditionally certifies to the New York Court of Appeals the unresolved question whether defendants violated it; this court does not decide or state what § 349 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., section 349(a) appears only in a footnote as a statutory comparison identifying it as New York's corollary to Maine's unfair-trade-practices statute and quoting its text; the court does not apply, interpret, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Cohen v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., the opinion mentions GBL § 349 in the complaint, settlement, class-certification commonality and typicality discussion, and a footnote quoting the statute, but it does not decide what § 349 requires or apply its elements to the fee; the references are procedural, statutory background, or descriptions of allegations. opinion →
Lucker v. Bayside Cemetery, the opinion only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in recounting one of plaintiffs' pleaded causes of action; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Ave. Wholesale Price, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as one of the state-law claims in the introduction and quotes its general relief language in a note; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Dipilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc., the opinion's merits discussion concerns other New York General Business Law provisions; section 349 appears only as a listed claim in a footnote and is not interpreted or applied. opinion →
In Re WellNx Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, N.Y. General Business Law § 349 appears only in a footnote listing the consumer-protection statutes asserted in the complaints. The court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349; its substantive discussion concerns other states' statutes. opinion →
Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only to identify a cause of action that was dismissed and whose dismissal was affirmed; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Rolls-Royce PLC v. Rolls-Royce USA, Inc., section 349 appears only in a footnote listing claims in the complaint; the magistrate judge expressly states that the report does not address those additional or alternative causes of action, and the district court adopts the report without analyzing § 349. opinion →
New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. U.S. Gas & Electric, Inc., the opinion only identifies § 349 as the statute underlying plaintiff's third claim and quotes its general prohibition in the statement of claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
In Re Bayer Corp. Combination Aspirin Products Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, the opinion mentions § 349(a) and § 349(h) only in a footnote as statutory background while describing similarities among state consumer-protection statutes; the court does not adjudicate a New York § 349 claim or adopt a holding about what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Dupler v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the opinion mentions § 349 in describing the claim and in assessing the settlement risk that a nationwide class could proceed to trial. The territorial limitation is discussed as procedural settlement context, not as this court's merits holding interpreting or applying § 349. opinion →
Romano v. Kazacos, the opinion only identifies violations of New York General Business Law § 349 as claims alleged in the complaints; the court makes no statement interpreting, applying, or ruling on § 349 itself. The decision addresses SLUSA preclusion and removal jurisdiction, so the § 349 references are procedural/background. opinion →
JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, the opinion's § 349 references concern procedural history and counterclaims resolved on contract and trademark grounds; the court does not independently interpret or apply § 349. opinion →
Duarte v. Holder, the opinion does not analyze N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349; it mentions N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 349(A) only in a footnote listing an example of an age-related statute. opinion →
Duarte v. Holder, the opinion cites N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 349(A), not N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, and uses it only as an example of an age-eligibility statute without analyzing the target provision. opinion →
Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, the opinion cites N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 390-c, not § 349, and the only § 349 citation is to N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 349(A), used as an age-related example without analyzing the statute at issue. opinion →
OZBAKIR v. Scotti, the opinion mentions § 349 and recites an applicability argument, but expressly says the Court need not address it and dismisses the state-law claims for pleading deficiencies instead. opinion →
Allstate Insurance v. Rozenberg, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 only as a claim asserted in the complaint and in procedural history; the court does not analyze what the statute means or requires, apply it to the facts, or rule on the § 349 claim. opinion →
Grimes v. Fremont General Corp., the opinion only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 among the state-law claims and does not analyze what the statute requires or how it applies; the disposition of the state-law claims is stated generally without § 349-specific reasoning. opinion →
Com. v. TAP PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, INC., the opinion cites N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a parenthetical describing another court's ruling and does not itself state, analyze, or apply what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Beautybank, Inc. v. Harvey Prince LLP, section 349 appears only in the procedural-history list of claims and the court does not analyze, interpret, or apply it. opinion →
Mazloum v. International Commerce Corp., the opinion merely identifies a pleaded violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of the claims; the court does not interpret or apply § 349. opinion →
In re Onstar Contract Litigation, the opinion only reports Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendants violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 and does not analyze or apply § 349. opinion →
Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co., the opinion mentions New York General Business Law § 349 only while describing the Second Circuit's decision in Pelman and discussing Rule 9(b); the court does not independently interpret or apply § 349. opinion →
BLT Restaurant Group LLC v. Tourondel, the opinion only reports that plaintiff asserted a § 349 claim and describes the alleged conduct; it contains no court analysis or application of § 349. opinion →
In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, & Products Liability Litigation, the opinion merely lists a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as part of the procedural allegations and does not state or apply what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another law. opinion →
Lipton v. New York University College of Dentistry, the opinion only reports that the complaint included a General Business Law § 349 claim and then declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims; the court does not analyze or apply § 349. opinion →
Charron v. Pinnacle Group N.Y. LLC, the opinion reports an earlier ruling that the allegations stated a NYCPA cause of action and later approves attorney fees under § 349, but it does not provide the court's own substantive interpretation or application of § 349. opinion →
Memorial Properties, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance, section 349 appears only in the passage's description of a New York complaint alleging a violation of the New York Consumer Protection Statute; the court does not interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Kahraman v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the court mentions the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claim only as a state-law claim and dismisses it without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Feldman v. Sanders Legal Group, the court merely dismissed the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claim without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction, without interpreting or applying § 349. opinion →
Allstate Insurance v. Elzanaty, the opinion only identifies § 349 as one of Allstate’s pleaded state-law claims; the court does not interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Allstate Insurance v. Elzanaty, the opinion only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as a state-law claim asserted in the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Ruotolo v. Mae, the court only identified § 349 as one of the state-law claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over it, without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
Derbaremdiker v. Applebee's International, Inc., section 349 appears only in a parenthetical description of a prior case's claim; this court does not itself interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Glynn v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., the opinion mentions the New York General Business Law § 349 claim only in the complaint's procedural history and states that the Court had granted summary judgment on those claims in a separate opinion; it does not itself interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Charron v. Wiener, the court mentions § 349(a) in describing the plaintiffs' allegations and refers to the NYCPA statute of limitations while assessing settlement strength, but it does not interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
In re Skelaxin (metaxalone) Antitrust Litigation, the opinion only lists the New York Consumer Protection Act and cites N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 et seq. among the claims proposed for class certification; the court does not interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litigation, the opinion does not itself interpret, apply, or rule on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349; it only cites a Second Circuit decision parenthetically as discussing § 349 while stating a generalized standard for the many consumer-protection statutes at issue. opinion →
Tech Data Corp. v. Hitachi, Ltd., N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 appears only as a background listing of Sharp's asserted New York UCL claim; the court does not interpret, apply, authorize, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Boykin ex rel. Estate of Phillips v. 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC, the staged passage does not analyze or apply section 349; it concerns other state claims and procedural history. opinion →
In re Conagra Foods, Inc., section 349 appears only in the list of claims plaintiffs pleaded; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise discuss the statute. opinion →
International Diamond Importers, Inc. v. Oriental Gemco (N.Y.), Inc., the opinion contains only a footnote citation to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h), (a), followed by citations and quotations from other cases; this court does not itself state or apply what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Sorenson v. Wolfson, the opinion merely lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 among claims in the original complaint and states that the deceptive trade practices claim was dismissed or withdrawn; it does not interpret or apply § 349. opinion →
Whitehaven S.F., LLC v. Spangler, the § 349(h) language appears only in Spangler’s argument, which the court rejects; the court does not itself interpret or apply § 349. opinion →
Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, section 349 appears only in the procedural history as one of the statutes cited in Madden’s complaint; the court does not itself explain, apply, limit, or otherwise hold what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
MAVL Capital, Inc. v. Marine Transport Logistics, Inc., the opinion merely lists a violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 among the state-law claims; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Berkson v. Gogo LLC, the opinion only recounts the plaintiff’s alleged § 349 claim and identifies it in the procedural history/cause of action; the court itself does not state what § 349 means, requires, permits, or holds. opinion →
Whitehaven S.F., LLC v. Spangler, section 349 is mentioned only as a citation identifying the statutory basis for the Attorney General’s Assurance of Discontinuance mechanism; the court does not interpret, apply, limit, or otherwise hold what § 349 means. opinion →
Lee v. the Rogers Agency, C. Michael Rogers & New York Life Ins. Co., the opinion is an appellee's brief, not the court's opinion. Its references to General Business Law § 349 merely recount claims asserted in the prior Willson action and do not state or adopt any holding about § 349. opinion →
Traxler v. PPG Industries, Inc., the opinion merely lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as Count XVI and then addresses the state statutory claims collectively under Rule 9(b), without stating what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, limits, or specifically holds as applied. opinion →
New York v. United Parcel Service, Inc., section 349 appears only in a citation describing the statutory basis of another court's prior § 63(12) action; the opinion contains no holding by this court about what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, applies, limits, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
Minnie Rose LLC v. Yu, the only reference to N.Y. General Business Law § 349 is a footnote stating that another case, Jordan, included a § 349 claim; this is a passing reference and does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, applies, or limits. opinion →
Innovative Biodefense, Inc. v. VSP Technologies, Inc., section 349 appears only in the procedural background as a listed counterclaim; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide the statute. opinion →
In re TD Bank, N.A., the § 349 language appears only in a footnote quoting Stutman while discussing another jurisdiction’s reliance rule; the court does not independently analyze or apply § 349. opinion →
Carter v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC, the opinion only recounts the complaint's allegation that defendants' conduct violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349(a) and (h); the court decides Article III standing and does not state or apply what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Sidney Hillman Health Center of Rochester v. Abbott Laboratories & AbbVie Inc., the court identifies the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claim but declines supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses the state-law claims without prejudice, deferring consideration; it does not decide what § 349 means, requires, or applies. opinion →
Carson Optical Inc. v. eBay Inc., the only reference to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 is in a footnote stating that any such claim was abandoned; it is procedural history and does not analyze or hold what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Kilpakis v. JPMorgan Chase Financial Co., the opinion only identifies the withdrawn NYFCRA claim as alleging a § 349 violation and grants the plaintiff's request to withdraw it; the court does not state what § 349 means, requires, or otherwise holds about the statute. opinion →
Sutton v. CitiMortgage, Inc., the court only describes the § 349 claim and declines supplemental jurisdiction over it; it makes no merits ruling or substantive analysis of what § 349 requires or prohibits. opinion →
Williams v. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 appears only in a footnote listing the statutes under which plaintiffs asserted claims; the court does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, applies, limits, or holds about it. opinion →
Bartolucci v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., the opinion only identifies the New York General Business Law § 349(a) claim as part of the Henry action and later refers generally to New York statutes in deciding venue transfer; it does not interpret, apply, define, limit, or otherwise hold anything about § 349. opinion →
Wai Hoe Liew v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, section 349 appears only in the list of claims alleged in the complaint and in a footnote describing additional state-law claims; the court does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, applies, or limits. opinion →
Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC, section 349 appears only as part of the complaint's list of asserted New York claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about § 349. opinion →
Applebaum v. LYFT, Inc., the opinion identifies a § 349 claim and later references state consumer-protection claims only in describing the arbitration clause; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 349 itself. opinion →
Kirchner v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, the opinion mentions the NYGBL claim only in the procedural history and groups it with other fraud-based claims; the court does not itself explain, apply, or decide what N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 means or requires. opinion →
HSBC Bank USA, National Ass'n v. Anderson, the opinion only reports that the District Court noted New York law prohibits deceptive acts or practices under § 349(a); the appellate court does not adopt or analyze that proposition and resolves the counterclaim on the ground that Anderson did not allege a violation of New York law. opinion →
Bd. of Forensic Document Exam'rs, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, the opinion only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 et seq. when describing Count 6 of the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Maspeth Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity Information Services, LLC, the court discusses § 349 only while classifying alleged damages for an indemnification dispute; it does not interpret or apply § 349’s elements or decide the § 349 claim itself. opinion →
Baranco v. Ford Motor Co., the opinion reports Ford's statute-of-limitations argument and Kubber's concession that the claim was time-barred, then dismisses the claim; it does not adopt or independently state what § 349 requires. opinion →
In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., the opinion is a comparative footnote listing authorities from several states; the New York entry merely cites Oswego and reports that court's statement about § 349, without adopting or holding that proposition itself. opinion →
Change Capital Partners Fund I, LLC v. Volt Electrical Systems, LLC, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in the procedural history, a list of the statutes pleaded, and the parties’ contentions, but the court does not interpret, apply, limit, or otherwise rule on § 349 itself; it dismisses the claims based on the Delaware choice-of-law provision. opinion →
Patane v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc., the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a list of state consumer statutes and while reporting the separate Verzani court's ruling; it does not itself interpret, apply, or independently hold that § 349 is preempted. opinion →
Colgate v. Juul Labs, Inc., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 appears only in a list of unidentified state consumer-protection statutes; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise make a holding about § 349 itself. opinion →
Mantikas ex rel. Situated v. Kellogg Co., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a footnote listing the claims plaintiffs asserted. The court's discussion addresses deceptive-business-practice standards generally under New York or California law without stating what § 349 itself means, requires, authorizes, applies, limits, or holds. opinion →
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. PLL, the opinion only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 among the state consumer-protection statutes in a footnote and does not analyze, interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
In re General Motors LLC, section 349 appears only in a footnote listing the statutes alleged in the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state a holding about § 349 itself. opinion →
Wright v. Capella Univ., Inc., the court only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in a footnote as one of several state laws that proscribe similar acts; it does not interpret, apply, or state a holding about § 349 itself. opinion →
Steven Madden, Ltd. v. Saint Laurent, the opinion merely identifies deceptive business practices under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of YSL’s state-law claims and later dismisses derivative state-law claims only insofar as they concern the unprotectable flat trade dress; it does not interpret, define, apply, or otherwise state a rule about § 349 itself. opinion →
Kroessler v. CVS Health Corp., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 appears only in a footnote listing other states' consumer fraud laws; the court does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, applies, limits, or holds about it. opinion →
Friend v. FGF Brands (USA), Inc., the opinion lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in a footnote and discusses consumer-fraud laws generically; it does not independently interpret, apply, or state a holding about § 349 itself. opinion →
Ventoso v. Shihara, the opinion merely identifies § 349 as one of the statutes under which the plaintiff brought claims; the court does not interpret, apply, limit, or otherwise rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., the opinion merely lists the damages available under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h); the court’s actual ruling concerns settlement-fund allocation and claim-form requirements, without interpreting or applying § 349 itself. opinion →
Fashion Group, LLC v. Johnny's Signature, Inc., the opinion only lists a § 349(h) cause of action among the claims in the amended complaint; the court does not state what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, limits, or holds about it. opinion →
Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc., the court merely cites N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h) as an example of a cause of action that may provide attorney's fees in discussing Rule 54(b) equities; it does not analyze or decide the meaning, requirements, application, or scope of § 349. opinion →
Peterson v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349-c through 350-f only when listing the plaintiffs’ pleaded deceptive-practices claim; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on § 349. opinion →
Marotto v. Kellogg Company, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 as one of the pleaded claims, but its ruling denies class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and discusses the surviving claims generally without stating a holding about what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. J.C. Clothing Drive, Inc., the opinion merely identifies the third claim as arising under N.Y. Bus. Corp. L. § 349 and expressly says the court need not consider the additional state-law claims because federal law provides full relief; it does not state or apply what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. J.C. Clothing Drive, Inc., the opinion merely identifies a state-law claim under N.Y. Bus. Corp. L. § 349 and expressly states that the court need not consider the additional state-law claims because federal law provides full relief; it does not interpret or apply § 349. opinion →
Western Union Holdings, Inc. v. Haideri Paan & Cigarettes Corp. opinion →
IN RE NAMENDA INDIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION opinion →
Ehlers v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc. opinion →
Packard v. Equifax Information Services, LLC opinion →
Hidalgo v. Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, Inc. opinion →
Hudock v. LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. opinion →
The Federation of Bangladeshi Associations in North America Inc v. Bangladeshi American Friendship Society of New York I opinion →
In Re: MacBook Keyboard Litigation opinion →
Santoro v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company opinion →
Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Pitsicalis, the opinion merely lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of the claims asserted in the underlying complaint; the court does not analyze, apply, or state any rule concerning § 349. opinion →
Marquess v. Cardflex, Inc., the opinion mentions § 349(h) only in the conclusion as a claim the plaintiffs conceded was time-barred; the court does not independently state or apply a rule about § 349. opinion →
Colpitts v. Blue Diamond Growers, the opinion is a scheduling/order directive identifying issues for oral argument, including the reasonable-consumer standard under §§ 349 and 350; it does not state or apply the court’s own rule or holding under § 349. opinion →
Bongiovanni v. PennyMac Corp., the court only lists the New York General Business Law § 349 claim among the state-law claims and declines supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims; it does not state or apply any rule about § 349. opinion →
Washington v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., the opinion only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h) in a footnote to state the statutory minimum damages used in a proposed expert calculation; the court does not interpret, apply, or adopt any rule about § 349. opinion →
EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY v. TRISTAR PRODUCTS, INC., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only while recounting the causes of action in the underlying complaint; this court does not analyze, interpret, or apply § 349. opinion →
Quintanilla v. WW International, Inc., the opinion does not decide a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. It mentions § 349 only while discussing other courts' decisions as an analogy and in a list of authorities; this court's own holding applies California consumer-protection statutes (the CLRA, UCL, and FAL), not § 349. opinion →
Robotic Parking Systems, Inc. v. Yale Industrial Products, Inc., the opinion merely identifies § 349 as one of the claims and reports/adopts a magistrate judge's recommendation dismissing Count Three; it does not state or apply the court's own rule about what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Curtis v. Greenberg, the court only lists § 349 among the state-law claims and then declines supplemental jurisdiction over all state-law claims; it does not state or apply a rule governing § 349. opinion →
Booker v. E.T. Browne Drug Co., Inc., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(d) only in a footnote reporting what the statute says and what another court observed; it expressly states that neither side raised the provision, and this court does not adopt or apply a rule under § 349. opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. Vyera Pharmaceuticals, LLC, section 349 appears only in a string citation to authorities and in defendants' argument relying on Goshen; the court's own holding concerns the New York Attorney General's authority under Executive Law § 63(12) to enforce the Donnelly Act and obtain disgorgement, and does not state or apply a rule governing § 349. opinion →
Golden Krust Franchising, Inc. v. Auctus Restaurant Group, Inc., the opinion mentions a NYDUTPA claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in the procedural history, then describes the respondents' switch to Florida law; the court never states or applies a rule about § 349. opinion →
Sessa v. Linear Motors, LLC, the opinion only mentions § 349 in recounting Plaintiff’s allegations that the lessor defendants violated it; the court does not state or apply any rule about § 349 and adjudicates TransUnion’s motion on other claims. opinion →
Rye Ridge Corp., Haromar Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., the opinion merely identifies deceptive-business-practices claims under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 et seq. in its description of the pleadings; the court’s actual analysis and holding concern insurance-policy coverage for direct physical loss and do not state or apply any rule about § 349. opinion →
Antetokounmpo v. Inverso, the opinion only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 in listing the plaintiff's asserted claims; the court does not state or apply any rule about § 349. opinion →
Thorne v. Square, Inc., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in describing the causes of action Plaintiffs asserted; the court decides the motion based on arbitration and does not state or apply any rule about § 349. opinion →
Hudson Neurosurgey, PLLC v. UMR, Inc., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in citations to other courts' decisions concerning duplicative unjust-enrichment claims; this court does not state or apply any rule about § 349. opinion →
Krezic v. Advanced Endodontics of Buffalo, PC, the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as one of Plaintiff's claims in the procedural and supplemental-jurisdiction analysis; it does not state or apply any rule about what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, or how it applies. opinion →
LIFEMD, INC v. LAMARCO, the court merely lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of several potentially conflicting statutes in its choice-of-law discussion, then defers the choice and examines the claim under Delaware law; it does not state or apply a rule about § 349. opinion →
Satan Wears Suspenders, Inc. v. Jaar, the opinion only identifies the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claim in the list of causes of action and in a procedural notice discussion; the court does not state or apply any rule about what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
CALLERY v. HOP ENERGY, LLC, the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h) only in a footnote listing New York’s statutory minimum damages for the CAFA amount-in-controversy calculation; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Woronko v. General Motors LLC, the court only identifies § 349 as the statutory basis for Count 15 in describing the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Keebaugh v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., the court merely lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 and 350 as causes of action alleged in the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
In Re: MacBook Keyboard Litigation, this is procedural background describing the claims in the complaint, not the court's own statement about what § 349 means or does. The order analyzes class certification and settlement fairness under Rule 23 and does not reach the merits of the § 349 claim. opinion →
In Re: MacBook Keyboard Litigation, this is procedural background describing a pleaded claim, not the court's holding about what § 349 means or does. opinion →
Forte v. Direct Energy Services, LLC, the court's holding concerns § 349-d(7), not § 349. The § 349 reference is a passing citation in a footnote and does not state what § 349 means or does. opinion →
MidCap Business Credit, LLC v. Midcap Financial Trust, section 349 appears only as a pleaded Claim III in the procedural background; the court expressly limits its remand analysis to Claims I and IV and makes no holding about § 349. opinion →
LeGrand v. Abbott Laboratories, the court dismissed Bates’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and expressly declined to address the New York causes of action, so it made no holding about N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. opinion →
Rosendale v. Mr. Cooper Group Inc., this is the court's procedural discussion of surviving claims, not a holding about what § 349 means, requires, authorizes, or how it applies. The statute is only cited in a list. opinion →
MidCap Business Credit, LLC v. Midcap Financial Trust, the sentence is the court's procedural description of the claims, and the court later states that on remand it reconsidered only trademark infringement and common-law unfair competition claims, not Claim III under § 349. opinion →
Livingston v. Trustco Bank, the court merely identifies the plaintiffs' § 349 claim in the background; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on N.Y. General Business Law § 349. opinion →
Weitlauf v. Hopkins, the discussion concerns jurisdiction and the defendants' request to dismiss the state-law claims after dismissal of federal claims. The court denies that request because federal claims remain against other defendants and does not decide whether the alleged conduct violates § 349. opinion →
Krandle v. Refuah Health Center, Inc., this sentence is procedural background describing claims filed in state court, not the court's own holding about § 349. opinion →
Williams v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, the sentence is the appellate court’s description of the complaint’s allegations, not a holding about what § 349 means or does. The court does not decide any § 349 issue. opinion →
LeGrand v. Abbott Laboratories, this is the court's background description of a claim originally pleaded, not a holding about what § 349 means or does. The court's ruling concerns standing and federal preemption of a labeling theory, without discussing § 349. opinion →
Jasper v. Danone North America Public Benefit Corporation, the Northern District of Illinois mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a comparison of consumer-fraud statutes while deciding a venue-transfer motion. It does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself, so the discussion is incidental. opinion →
Bryan v. Del Monte Foods, Inc., this is the court's description of the claims pleaded, within a discussion of standing for non-Oregon consumer-protection statutes. The court does not say what § 349 means or requires, apply it to the facts, or address its validity or treatment. opinion →
Anderson v. Tether Holdings Limited, this is a description of the plaintiffs' claims, not the court's holding about what § 349 means or does. The ruling rests on subject-matter jurisdiction and constitutional standing. opinion →
Espejo v. Cornell University, the court mentions § 349 only as part of the procedural history describing claims added to the complaint. It does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC, the opinion is procedural and background discussion of another case. The statements about § 349 are attributed to Mayes's plaintiffs, a magistrate judge, and the Mayes district court, not to the Hunter court as its own holding. opinion →
Atallah Group US Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., the court merely identifies a § 349 counterclaim in the procedural background; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Marlinspike Hall LLC v. Bar Lab Concepts LLC, the court only lists the § 349 claim in the procedural history and does not explain, apply, or rule on what § 349 means or does. opinion →
M.V.B. Collision Inc. v. Progressive Insurance Company, the court’s rulings concern claim preclusion, traceable injury, remand, and jurisdiction. It expressly does not reach the remaining dismissal arguments, so the opinion does not contain this court’s substantive holding about § 349(h). opinion →
JC Hospitality v. Hochberg, the opinion only lists the N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 claim among the state-law claims in the procedural description and does not analyze, interpret, or rule on that section. opinion →
Binder v. United States Polo Association, Inc., the court mentions N.Y. GBL § 349 only as one of the state-law claims and as part of a case involving multiple states; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Binder v. United States Polo Association, Inc., the court only identifies N.Y. GBL § 349 as one of the statutes pleaded; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on that section, so the citation is incidental to a venue-transfer decision. opinion →
Meehan v. VIPKid, the court only identifies N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 and 350 as claims alleged in the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349, so the citation is part of the case and procedural background rather than a holding. opinion →
Seidler v. JPMorgan Chase N.A., the opinion reports that a magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the § 349 claim and says the district court adopted the R&R, but the district court supplies no independent explanation of what § 349 means or how it applies; the statute reference is therefore procedural rather than a substantive holding. opinion →
In RE: Beyond Meat, Inc., Protein Content Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, the statute appears only in a footnote listing the state consumer-fraud statutes Plaintiffs allege they violated; the court does not explain, apply, or rule on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. opinion →
Hastings v. Nifty Gateway, LLC, the court only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of the plaintiff's causes of action and does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Keebaugh v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a list of causes of action alleged by plaintiffs and does not interpret, apply, or rule on that statute. opinion →
AG v. Kettenbach GMBH and CO KG, the court only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of the claims alleged in the complaint; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on the statute. opinion →
Gentile v. NCSPlus Incorporated, the court only identifies § 349 as a claim and recounts the defendants’ argument that it does not apply; it decides the motion under Rule 56(d) without interpreting or applying § 349. opinion →
Aghaeepour v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., the section appears only in a list of statutes under which plaintiffs allegedly brought claims; the court does not explain, apply, or rule on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. opinion →
PALMIERI v. INTERVET INC., the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only to identify Count Eight in the list of claims; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute, and the complaint was dismissed on pleading-amendment grounds. opinion →
Elseroad v. Boston Foundry, Inc., the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a footnote listing the statutes asserted and summarizing an authority's pleading elements; the court's collective deceptive-advertising ruling does not separately analyze or apply § 349. opinion →
Certicable Inc. v. Point 2 Point Communications Corporation, the court mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only while citing SpeedFit as an example of another court's preemption ruling; it does not interpret or apply § 349 itself. opinion →
Sirius XM Radio Inc v Aura Multimedia Corporation, the opinion only lists $50 in statutory damages under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in the judgment; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
General Petroleum GmbH v. Stanley Oil & Lubricants, Inc., the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a), (h) only in a list of claims in the procedural background and does not explain, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Brink's Global Services USA, Inc. v. Bonita Pearl, Inc., the section appears only in the background as one of the defendants' asserted counterclaims; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. opinion →
Mattel, Inc. v. AnimeFun Store, the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only as one of the claims asserted in the complaint and later notes that summary judgment was denied on that claim; it does not analyze, interpret, or apply § 349. opinion →
Holiday Park Drive LLC v. Newist Corp., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only to identify Count IV and reports the prior default-judgment recommendation and disposition; the court does not explain, apply, or interpret § 349 in its own reasoning. opinion →
Bold Broadcasting LLC v. Noogalights LLC, the court merely identifies an existing counterclaim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in the procedural history and does not analyze, interpret, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Mueller v. Puritan's Pride, Inc., the court only mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 in describing the claims originally pleaded and later dismissed; it does not explain, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
FRHUEB, Inc v. Sabino De Freitas Abdala, the court mentions N.Y. G.B.L. § 349 only in listing the parties' claims and counterclaims; it does not explain, apply, or rule on the meaning or requirements of that section. opinion →
Granite State Insurance Company v. Rainier Arms LLC, the opinion only lists § 349 as one of the claims asserted in the underlying complaints; the court makes no statement explaining, applying, or ruling on what § 349 means or requires. opinion →
Newton v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only to identify Plaintiffs’ claims and to adopt, without substantive analysis, the magistrate judge’s procedural class-certification recommendation; it does not explain or apply § 349 itself. opinion →
Hoar v. Launch Pad Payment Services Corporation, the court merely identifies N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 and 350 as statutes plaintiffs sued under; its decision addresses forum selection and jurisdictional discovery and does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
DeSimone v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc, the court merely lists the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claim in the procedural history and does not interpret or apply the section in this order. opinion →
DeSimone v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc, the court only lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of the claims alleged in the procedural history; it does not discuss, interpret, or apply the section. opinion →
Holiday Park Drive LLC v. Newist Corp., the court mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only to identify the statutory basis of a complaint count in the procedural history; it does not explain, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Johnson v. Nissan North America, Inc., the opinion only identifies the New York subclass as bringing claims under §§ 349 and 350; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, so the reference is incidental to the class-substitution ruling. opinion →
Medical Depot Inc v Med Way US Inc, the opinion identifies an unlawful-deceptive-acts claim among the asserted state-law claims but does not analyze or rule on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. opinion →
Murray v Newrez LLC, the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the § 349 claim after resolving the federal claims and does not interpret or apply the statute’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Harleysville Worcester Insurance Company v. Consigli & Associates, LLC, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in describing Consigli's stayed counterclaim, without deciding what § 349 means or applying it. opinion →
Buffalo Biodiesel, Inc. v. Lifecycle Renewables, Inc., the court mentions § 349 only as one of the pleaded claims and in discussing whether the claims could support venue or personal jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state a holding about § 349 itself. opinion →
Samtech LLC v. Brooklyn Armed Forces, LLC, the opinion mentions N.Y. General Business Law § 349 only in the procedural background as one of the claims asserted in the Third Amended Complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349. opinion →
Mosley v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP, the court only recounts that plaintiff pleaded a New York General Business Law § 349 claim and references that claim while deciding whether it may enjoin the state-court debt proceeding; it does not decide what § 349 requires or means, or resolve the merits of that claim. opinion →
Unknown case, filed 2025-09-15 — The court merely lists N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as one of Plaintiff's claims and does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Unknown case, Filed 2025-10-03 — the opinion is a pleading that cites § 349(a) and alleges a § 349 claim; it does not contain a holding by the court interpreting, applying, or ruling on the statute. opinion →
LaBella, the opinion identifies N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 as Count 19 in a table of New York claims, but the court does not analyze, interpret, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
SITTOL, the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a list identifying statutes asserted in the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on § 349 itself. opinion →
Granite State Insurance Co. v. Primary Arms, LLC, the court merely lists N.Y. General Business Law § 349 as a claim asserted in the underlying lawsuits; it does not interpret, apply, or adopt any legal proposition about § 349. opinion →
ZEIDERS, the Court expressly declined to review whether the complaint stated a claim under New York’s broader consumer-protection statute; § 349 appears only in the procedural description and a general list of consumer statutes. opinion →
GARRETT, the court lists the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claim among the proposed counts and later refers generally to statutory consumer-fraud claims, but it does not adopt or explain any legal proposition about § 349 itself. opinion →
Savin Corporation v. The Savin Group, Savin Engineers, P.C., Savin Consultants, Inc. D/B/A Savin Engineers, P.C., and Jm, section 349 appears only in a footnote listing a claim that the plaintiff abandoned; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
City of New York v. Abbott Laboratories, the opinion mentions § 349 only as one of the state-law claims alleged in the action and does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning the statute. opinion →
Commonwealth v. Tap Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., the opinion mentions N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 only in a string citation describing another court's decision in M & T Mortg. v. White; it does not construe or apply § 349. opinion →
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the retrieved opinion contains no § 349 citation; it addresses federal cigarette-labeling preemption rather than this section. opinion →
Winne v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, the court dismissed the § 349 claim because SLUSA preempted it. opinion →
In Re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litigation, the court distinguishes Section 349 from the Donnelly Act while dismissing a claim under the Donnelly Act. opinion →
In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products Liability Litigation, the court uses section 349 as an example of a claim while deciding whether lost profits are a separate claim or a measure of damages. opinion →
Kramer v. LOCKWOOD PENSION SERVICES, INC., the court dismisses the § 349 cross-claims, but the opinion gives no reason or statutory rule for the dismissals. opinion →
In Re: Light Cigarettes Marketing Sales Practices Litigation, the court cites § 349 as an example of a statute allowing both damages and an injunction while deciding whether to dismiss equitable claims generally. opinion →
Bullseye Rest., Inc. v. James River Ins. Co., the court cites § 349 as a claim in the underlying action while deciding the scope of an insurance policy exclusion. opinion →
Berni v. Barilla S.P.A. v. Schulman, the court mentions § 349(a) as a claim the purchasers brought, but decides whether they could be certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class. opinion →
SCHAFER v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, the court construed § 349-d(7) and dismissed a claim under that provision without deciding § 349. opinion →
Paushok v. Ganbold, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the § 349 claim and dismissed it without prejudice. opinion →
Rye Ridge Corp. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company, the court dismissed the deceptive business practices claim because the complaint did not adequately allege eligibility for insurance coverage, without deciding a rule of § 349. opinion →
Schafer. v. Direct Energy Services LLC., the court addressed a claim under § 349-d(7), a different provision from § 349. opinion →
Robinson v. General Motors LLC, the magistrate judge recommended dismissing the Section 349 claim after Howard failed to oppose GM’s statute of limitations argument. opinion →
Camara v. Alltran Financial LP, the court assessed the strength of a pending motion concerning Section 349 to decide whether to stay a deposition. opinion →
SCHAFER v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, the court decides whether the complaint states a claim under § 349-d(7), a different provision, and does not decide § 349. opinion →
SCHAFER v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, the court uses Section 349 as an analogy to decide a causation issue under Section 349-d. opinion →
Bryant v. Home Depot, the court assumed a possible § 349 violation and held that it could not support the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. opinion →
Kassel v. Moynihan, Jr., the court dismissed the Section 349 claim because the plaintiff did not respond to the argument for dismissal. opinion →
Bruce v. Solny, the court dismissed the appeal concerning the original § 349 claim as academic because an amended complaint superseded the original complaint. opinion →

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