Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141

Section 41.141 is not applied retroactively absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent for retroactive application.

Rice v. Wadkins · filed 1976-11-10

However, the statute was silent as to its retroactive effect and we have long held that courts will not give retrospective interpretation to statutes unless the legislative intent that they do so is clearly manifested in the statute.

Section 41.141 does not apply retrospectively to accidents occurring before it took effect.

Fennell v. Miller · filed 1978-08-09

The comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141, was not in effect when this accident happened, and does not have retrospective application.

Section 41.141 supplants joint and several liability in certain tort cases but does not apply to this unjust enrichment claim.

Orien v. Conway · filed 2019-05-15

The concept of joint and several liability is based in the common law, see Humphries v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 788, 794, 312 P.3d 484, 488 (2013), so for it not to apply under the circumstances of this case, the Legislature would need to enact a statute providing as much, cf. id. (observing that the Legislature's enactment of NRS 41.141 supplanted joint and several liability in certain tort scenarios).

Section 41.141 does not apply to this contract and unjust enrichment action, so it does not displace common-law joint and several liability here.

Orien v. Conway · filed 2019-05-15

We are not persuaded by appellant's suggestion that MRS 41.141 ... applies in this case.

Section 41.141 subjects gross negligence to comparison with the plaintiff's contributory negligence but leaves willful or wanton misconduct outside the comparative-negligence statute.

Davies v. Butler · filed 1979-11-13(1)

We agree with the appellants that, read in light of our previous decisions carefully delineating the concepts of willful and wanton misconduct, the legislature intended to leave such behavior outside the purview of the comparative negligence statute.

Section 41.141 allows recovery when the plaintiff’s decedent was no more negligent than the defendant, but requires damages to be reduced in proportion to the decedent’s negligence.

Moyer v. United States · filed 1984-08-06

The Court did err as a matter of law, in the above-quoted paragraph from its Order, where it concluded that the equal negligence of Mr. Moyer and Mr. Miller precluded recovery by Plaintiffs. Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.-141, specifically provides that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff’s decedent does not bar recovery “if that negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person ... against whom recovery is sought----” It then mandates that any damages allowed must be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff’s decedent.

Section 41.141(1) permits recovery when the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the defendant's, but requires the damages award to be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's share of negligence.

Arnold v. Mt. Wheeler Power Co. · filed 1985-10-22(1)

The district court, pursuant to NRS 41.141(1). reduced the damages to reflect the fifty percent negligence of each party. ... This court determined that the damages should be increased by $350,000.00, subject to the fifty percent reduction to reflect the negligence of each party. NRS 41.141(1), see above, footnote 1.

Section 41.141 subsumes implied assumption of risk into comparative negligence, but preserves express assumption of risk.

Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc. · filed 1987-05-29

The legislative history surrounding the advent of Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141, supplies no basis for divining legislative intent concerning the impact of the statute on the assumption of risk doctrine. ... We perceive as clear the purpose of the comparative negligence statute to eradicate the harsh effect of a plaintiff’s contributory negligence whenever such negligence is not greater than that of the source against which recovery is sought. ... We therefore hold that, with the single exception of an express assumption of risk, the assumption of risk doctrine has been subsumed by our comparative negligence statute. Hereafter, any reference to an assumption of risk defense in Nevada shall be so limited.

The statute permits recovery despite a plaintiff's comparative negligence when that negligence is not greater than the negligence of the parties against whom recovery is sought.

Joynt v. California Hotel & Casino · filed 1992-08-05

Third and finally, the casino’s assertion lacks merit because Nevada has adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence; thus, a plaintiff’s negligence does not automatically bar her or his negligence action. NRS 41.141 states that “[i]n any action to recover damages ... in which comparative negligence is asserted as a defense, the comparative negligence of the plaintiff . . . does not bar a recovery if that negligence was not greater than the negligence ... of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought.” In Young’s Machine Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 693, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984), we concluded that “Nevada’s comparative negligence statute is clearly intended to apply to negligence actions.” The comparative negligence statute eliminates “contributory negligence as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery, at least when negligence of a tortfeasor, or several tortfeasors combined, was as great as plaintiff’s or greater.”

Section 41.141 codifies Nevada’s comparative-negligence standard, so implied assumption of risk is not a separate bar to recovery and recreational-injury claims are evaluated under traditional negligence principles.

Auckenthaler v. Grundmeyer · filed 1994-07-07

Second, adopting a reduced standard of care is merely another way of recognizing implied assumption of risk through the back door or by way of duty/risk principles. As indicated in Mizushima, Nevada’s comparative negligence statute leaves no room for the continuation of the vexing defense of assumption of risk. Whether the court reduces the defendant’s duty or concludes that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury, the result is the same: sweeping denial of recovery based upon conduct that is best examined under a traditional negligence framework. ... Nevada’s comparative negligence standard is codified in NRS 41.141.

Section 41.141 allows recovery when a plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the defendant's and requires the judge to have the jury determine the parties' comparative negligence.

Anderson v. Baltrusaitis · filed 1997-08-28(1), (2)

NRS 41.141(1) provides that the comparative negligence of a plaintiff does not bar recovery if that negligence was not greater than the negligence of a defendant. ... NRS 41.141(2) (judge shall instruct jury to determine comparative negligence of the parties). Under the circumstances presented here, the district court erred in finding as a matter of law that appellant was more than fifty percent negligent.

Section 41.141 assigns fault between parties and bars a plaintiff’s recovery when the plaintiff is more than 50 percent responsible; accordingly, a casualty liability insurer must pay a judgment when its insured is 50 percent or more at fault.

State v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2000-03-09

NRS 41.141 relates to the assignment of fault between parties to a lawsuit and bars a plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff’s negligence is more than fifty percent responsible for a covered accident. Thus, under NRS 41.141, a casualty liability insurer is required to pay a judgment where its insured is determined to be fifty percent or more at fault in connection with an accident.

Section 41.141 permits recovery despite a plaintiff’s comparative negligence when it is not greater than the defendant’s and requires that comparative-negligence standard to govern the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

Woosley v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2001-03-06

To completely bar plaintiffs from the use of res ipsa loquitur in situations where comparative negligence applies contravenes the express language of NRS 41.141. Accordingly, we conclude that NRS 41.141 operates to subsume the third element of res ipsa loquitur. From this point forward, the third element of res ipsa loquitur is revised to provide that the doctrine may apply as long as the plaintiff’s negligence is not greater than that of the defendant.

Subsection (1) limits the comparative-negligence defense to actions for death or injury to persons or injury to property, so the defense does not directly extend to constructional-defect cases.

Skender v. Brunsonbuilt Const. · filed 2007-11-05(1)

While NRS 41.14's comparative negligence defense does not extend directly to constructional defect cases because it pertains to "damages for death or injury to persons or for injury to property," the language of NRS 40.640(1) clearly allows for an allocation to be made between homeowners and contractors who caused the constructional defect in question.

Section 41.141 permits a defendant to argue comparative negligence to reduce damages after liability is conclusively established under § 41.133.

Cromer v. Wilson · filed 2010-03-11

We conclude that the language of NRS 41.133 establishes a conclusive presumption of liability when an offender has been convicted of the crime that resulted in the injury to the victim. However, NRS 41.133 does not abrogate the law regarding comparative negligence or damages. Therefore, while NRS 41.133 establishes a conclusive presumption of liability, a defendant may argue comparative negligence pursuant to NRS 41.141 to reduce an award of damages at a trial as to damages only.

When a defendant raises comparative negligence, § 41.141(3) generally bars evidence or jury consideration of a settling defendant’s comparative negligence, but NRS 41A.045 displaces it in qualifying health-care-provider professional-negligence actions.

PIROOZI, M.D. VS. DIST. CT. (HURST) · filed 2015-12-31(3)

Consequently, NRS 41.141 and NRS 41A.045, when applied in cases where the comparative negligence defense is raised, conflict. NRS 41.141 precludes admitting a settling defendant's comparative negligence into evidence, whereas NRS 41A.045 presumes admission of evidence allocating damages based on proportionate liability. ... Because NRS 41A.045 is a special statute focusing specifically on professional negligence of a provider of health care, it governs here. 3 Thus, when applicable, NRS 41A.045 displaces NRS 41.141.

Section 41.141(5)(a) provides that comparative negligence is not a defense to a strict products liability claim.

Otto v. Refacciones Neumaticas La Paz, S.A., DE C.V. · filed 2020-02-25(5)(a)

Plaintiff also emphasizes in her opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment that comparative negligence is not a defense to a strict products liability claim under Nevada law. The Court agrees with Plaintiff on this point. See Resoso, 2018 WL 3822462, at *4 (“comparative negligence is not a defense to strict liability in Nevada”) (first citing NRS 41.141(5)(a), then citing Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 953 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev. 1998)).

Section 41.141(2)(a) requires the court to instruct the jury on comparative negligence when a defendant requests it and the evidence raises a bona fide issue supporting that defense.

COX v. MGM GRAND HOTEL, LLC · filed 2022-04-14(2)(a)

NRS 41.141 requires the district court to instruct the jury on comparative negligence on request of a defendant when the issue is raised as a bona fide defense: ... NRS 41.141(2)(a) (emphasis added). Comparative negligence is a "bona fide issue" when the evidence supports that it is a viable defense. ... Under NRS 41.141, the district court must deliver a comparative negligence instruction upon a party's request if a bona fide issue exists. ... Therefore, respondents produced enough evidence to raise a bona fide issue of Cox's comparative negligence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by delivering NRS 41.141s mandatory instruction.

Section 41.141 permits recovery when the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the defendant's and requires the jury to apportion the parties' percentages of negligence when the plaintiff is comparatively negligent.

Delta Saloon v. AmeriGas Propane, L.P. · filed 2024-03-28(1), (2)(b)(1)

AmeriGas’ motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part with respect to their affirmative defense of comparative negligence per se. The motion is granted with respect to the duty and breach elements of the affirmative defense of comparative negligence per se. The motion is denied as to the causation element of this affirmative defense. It will be up to the jury to determine whether the violation of the Storey County ordinances was a proximate cause of the explosion. Alternatively, AmeriGas may also present evidence that Delta Saloon was comparatively negligent under a theory of ordinary negligence. In either event, if the jury determines that Delta Saloon was comparatively negligent, it must apportion that negligence under NRS 41.141.

Subsection (1) makes a plaintiff’s comparative negligence a complete defense when the plaintiff’s negligence is greater than the defendant’s.

Brown v. United States · filed 2025-02-26(1)

In the Brown Parties’ case, Brown’s comparative negligence is a defense and provides a complete defense to the United States if Brown’s negligence was greater than Nicoll’s negligence. See NRS § 41.141(1).

Section 41.141(1) does not apply to strict products liability actions because the statute is limited to negligence actions in which contributory negligence may be asserted as a defense.

Young's MacHine Co. v. Long · filed 1984-12-07(1)

Appellant urges us to interpret this statute to include strict products liability in that class of actions in which contributory negligence may be asserted as a defense. This we refuse to do. ... As in Davies, we limit the statute to its clear language. ... Therefore, the legislature must not have intended to include strict products liability within the comparative negligence statute.

Section 41.141 permits recovery for negligently caused injuries only when the plaintiff’s negligence does not exceed the defendant’s; in bystander cases, the victim’s negligence can likewise bar the witness’s emotional-distress recovery.

State v. Eaton · filed 1985-12-10

Under Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141, a plaintiff may recover for negligently caused injuries only if his or her negligence does not exceed the negligence of the defendant. In the context of bystander recovery, if the victim’s negligence exceeds that of the defendant, then the victim cannot recover for his or her injuries and neither can the witness recover for the emotional distress caused by observing those injuries.

Section 41.141 permits liability without a reduction for comparative negligence when the plaintiff was not comparatively negligent.

Wilson v. United States of America · filed 2023-07-26

The court finds that Wilson was not comparatively negligent in the accidents. ... The United States is jointly liable for both car accidents on September 1, 2016. See NRS 41.141; Nev. J.I. 4.6.

Section 41.141 imposes several rather than joint and several liability when contributory negligence may properly be asserted, does not apply to claims by children who cannot be contributorily negligent, and amendments changing liability apply prospectively.

BUCK BY BUCK v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1989-11-27

However, the Nevada Legislature modified the common law rule in situations where the injured plaintiff was partly responsible for his own injuries. Under NRS 41.141 (1973 Nev. Stats., Ch. 787, p. 1722), actions involving injuries to persons or property “in which contributory negligence may be asserted as a defense” imposed several liability on defendants against whom judgments were entered. ... The statute must be read as applying to situations where a plaintiff’s contributory negligence may be properly asserted as a bona fide issue in the case. In the instant case, claims asserted on behalf of the three-year-old twins sleeping in the Bucks’ Mustang at the time of the collision would not, as a matter of law, be subject to the defense of contributory negligence. Therefore, the statute has no application to Tina and Heather and the judgments entered and to be entered in their favor are to be joint and several as to all defendants. ... Modifying the liability of multiple defendants from several to joint and several can hardly be described as a change in procedure or remedy. It may greatly increase the exposure of one or more defendants to satisfy an entire judgment as opposed to an aliquot share. ... We decline to give NRS 41.141 retrospective effect so as to adversely affect existing liabilities.

Section 41.141(5)(e) preserves joint and several liability between defendants when a person's injury results from a product manufactured, distributed, sold, or used in Nevada.

Willett v. Vitek, Inc. · filed 1992-04-09(5)(e)

Further, as plaintiff notes, Du Pont and Vitek are joint tortfeasors, if the facts support such a conclusion, pursuant to NRS 41.141(5)(e), which provides that joint and several liability still exists between defendants when an injury to a person results from a product which is manufactured, distributed, sold or used in Nevada.

A plaintiff's comparative negligence does not bar recovery when it is not greater than the defendant's negligence.

Harrington v. Syufy Enterprises · filed 1997-01-30(1)

NRS 41.141(1) provides that the comparative negligence of the plaintiff does not bar recovery if that negligence was not greater than the negligence of the defendant. Harrington contends that the obvious danger rule bars recovery to a negligent plaintiff regardless of her degree of comparative fault, in effect preserving the contributory negligence rule that NRS 41.141 was clearly intended to eliminate. We disagree. Recovery is barred when the danger is obvious, not because the negligence of the plaintiff is greater than that of the defendant, but because the defendant is not negligent at all. The defendant has no duty to warn against an obvious danger and cannot, therefore, be negligent in failing to give such a warning. Thus, the defendant in Gunlock did not escape liability for its negligence; the defendant escaped liability because it was not negligent at all. See Gunlock, 78 Nev. at 185-86, 370 P.2d at 684. Obviously, where there is no negligence on the part of the defendant, there can be no “comparative negligence.” See id. at 185-86, 370 P.2d at 684-85 (“In the absence of negligence on the part of [defendant], a determination of whether Mrs. Gunlock is chargeable with contributory negligence is unnecessary.”). We conclude, therefore, that the obvious danger rule survives the adoption of comparative negligence statutes.

Section 41.141 permits a plaintiff who is 50 percent at fault to recover reduced damages and makes a defendant who is 50 percent at fault liable for 50 percent of the plaintiff’s damages.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Commissioner of Insurance of Nevada · filed 1998-05-19

We conclude that, in the absence of a regulation to the contrary, State Farm reasonably construed the “at fault” provision in NRS 687B.385 consistently with NRS 41.141. It is clear that there is a direct doctrinal connection between the resolution of a claim under the liability coverage of an auto insurance policy and the determination of “fault” pursuant to the statutory doctrine governing tort liability. In the context of a claim against an insured based on the operation of an automobile, the insured’s liability or “fault” is determined by the laws of negligence. Under NRS 41.141, a defendant who is fifty percent at fault is legally liable to the plaintiff for fifty percent of the plaintiff’s damages.

Section 41.141(3) bars evidence and jury consideration of a settling defendant’s comparative negligence and settlement amount, but it does not bar a defendant from arguing that no negligence occurred or that nonparties bear full responsibility for the injury.

Banks Ex Rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp. · filed 2004-12-17(3)

We likewise reject Banks’s contentions that the jury reduced the verdict based upon alleged violations of NRS 41.141(3), which states that if a codefendant settles with the plaintiff in a case in which the remaining defendant asserts a comparative negligence defense, the jury may not consider the codefendant’s comparative negligence or the settlement amount.60 We conclude that NRS 41.141(3) has no bearing on the issues of whether Sunrise could argue a nonparty’s fault in this instance and whether such an argument per force leads to the conclusion that the jury reduced the award based upon the nonparty’s relative culpability. First, NRS 41.141 only prevents admission of evidence in support of a “com*845parative fault” or apportionment analysis of the case as to nonparties, and a jury may only “compare” the negligence as between parties and nonparties.61 Nothing in NRS 41.141 prohibits a party defendant from attempting to establish that either no negligence occurred or that the entire responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries rests with nonparties, including those who have separately settled their liabilities with the plaintiff. Second, the fact that Sunrise pleaded comparative negligence as an affirmative defense is not pertinent to whether Sunrise could argue its defense theory of third-party culpability. Third, the defense was abandoned.62 Fourth, neither party submitted a comparative negligence instruction nor requested special verdict forms delineating the comparative negligence of Sunrise and Dr. Kinsman. In light of the above, there is no indication that the jury accounted for Dr. Kinsman’s negligence in its award of damages. Accordingly, we conclude that this argument is without merit.

Section 41.141 does not bar recovery based on comparative negligence unless the plaintiff’s negligence is greater than the negligence of the parties against whom recovery is sought.

Taylor v. CoreCivic, Inc. · filed 2025-03-07

NRS 41.141 states that “[i]n any action to recover damages … in which comparative negligence is asserted as a defense, the comparative negligence of the plaintiff … does not bar a recovery if that negligence was not greater than the negligence … of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought.” ... The court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Patton was more negligent than defendant. Patton’s actions create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Section 41.141(3) bars apportioning comparative negligence to a settling party unless the parties agree.

Quintero v. McDonald · filed 2000-12-19(3)

NRS 41.141(3) prohibits apportionment of comparative negligence to settling parties. Thus, absent agreement by the parties, the issue of McKennery’s negligence should not have been submitted to the jury. This, however, does not affect the resolution of this matter on appeal.

Under § 41.141(5)(d), joint and several liability for concerted action requires an agreement to engage in inherently dangerous conduct posing a substantial risk of harm; mere joint negligence or an agreement to act jointly is insufficient, so the general rule in § 41.141(4) applies.

Ges, Inc. v. Corbitt · filed 2001-04-13(5)(d), (4)

To be jointly and severally liable under NRS 41.141(5)(d)’s concert of action exception, the defendants must have agreed to engage in conduct that is inherently dangerous or poses a substantial risk of harm to others. Thus, this requirement is met when the defendants agree to engage in an inherently dangerous activity, with a known risk of harm, that could lead to the commission of a tort. Mere joint negligence, or an agreement to act jointly, does not suffice; such a construction of NRS 41.141(5)(d) would render meaningless the general rule of several liability.

Subsection 4's several-liability rule apportions a negligent defendant's liability according to its percentage of fault, even when another defendant committed an intentional tort; subsection 5(b) leaves the intentional tortfeasor jointly and severally liable.

Café Moda, LLC v. Palma · filed 2012-03-01(4)

To do so, we construe subsection 4’s use of “negligence” to mean “fault.”

Section 41.141 permits recovery when the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the defendants' and requires a general damages verdict plus a special verdict assigning each party's percentage of negligence.

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. Yeghiazarian · filed 2013-11-07(1), (2)(b)(1), (2)

NRS 41.141(1) provides that a plaintiffs comparative negligence does not bar recovery so long as his or her negligence was not greater than the negligence of the defendants. The jury is required to return a general verdict with the total amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover without considering comparative negligence, plus a special verdict indicating the respective percentages of negligence attributable to each party. NRS 41.141(2)(b)(1), (2). ... The jury’s award in this case encompassed the amount of the general verdict minus the percentage of comparative negligence that the jury noted on its special verdict form—in this case the $2 million general verdict less Raymond’s 25-percent fault rendered a final jury award of $1.5 million. ... Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly applied comparative negligence and NRS 41.035(1).

Section 41.141(6)(a) excludes negligent acts by health care providers working together to treat a patient from “concerted acts,” so those claims remain governed by the general comparative-negligence rule in § 41.141(1).

O'Neil v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2023-04-26(6)(a), (1)

Wellpath also argues that this action is foreclosed by NRS 41.141(6)(a), which concerns the defense of comparative negligence. Specifically, the section provides a general rule that “the comparative negligence of the plaintiff […] does not bar a recovery if that negligence was not greater than the negligence or gross negligence of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought[.]” That section creates an exception from that general rule for “an action based upon[ t]he concerted acts of the defendants[,]” but then defines “Concerted acts of the defendants” to “not include negligent acts committed by providers of heath care while working together to provide treatment to a patient.” So, taken together, concerted acts of health care providers are the exception-to-the-exception and fall under the general rule of comparative negligence set forth in NRS 41.141(1). In any event, nothing in this section establishes that Wellpath cannot be sued for an allegation that sounds in conspiracy. Wellpath’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

Section 41.141(2)(a) requires the judge, upon a party's request, to instruct the jury on the statute's comparative-negligence rules, even in a bifurcated trial or when a special verdict is used.

Verner v. Nevada Power Co. · filed 1985-09-25(2)(a)

The language in NRS 41.141(2) is plain and unambiguous. ... The legislative directive is clear: the district court must, upon request, give such an instruction to the jury. ... The district court’s refusal to do so violated NRS 41.141(2) (a) and constitutes error. ... On remand, the district court is instructed to give to the jury, upon request, an instruction based upon NRS 41.141(2)(a).

Several liability applies when recovery is allowed against more than one defendant; when only one defendant is sued, fault cannot be apportioned to an absent tortfeasor and the sued defendant remains jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment.

Humphries v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark · filed 2013-11-07(1), (2)(a), (2)(b)(2), (4), and (5)

As currently enacted, NRS 41.141(1) and (2)(a) abolish contributory negligence and allow a plaintiff to recover damages if his comparative negligence is not greater than that of a defendant (if the plaintiff has sued only one defendant) or the combined negligence of multiple defendants (if the plaintiff has sued multiple defendants). NRS 41.141(4) alters joint and several liability by permitting apportionment of fault and providing for several liability amongst negligent defendants “[wjhere recovery is allowed against more than one defendant.” NRS 41.141(5) specifies certain theories under which defendants will remain jointly and severally liable. ... As the only “defendant” that Humphries and Rocha sued, New York-New York will be jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment, NRS 41.141(4), but it will be able to seek contribution from Ferrell for the portion of fault that the jury attributed to him.

Section 41.141(1) preserves recovery when the plaintiff’s negligence is not greater than the defendant’s, while § 41.141(2)(b)(1) requires general and special verdict forms identifying total damages and each side’s percentage of negligence.

Drowns v. GNLV, LLC · filed 2025-07-14(1), (2)(b)(1)

Nevada is a modified comparative negligence state: the comparative negligence of the plaintiff will not bar the plaintiff’s recovery if the plaintiff’s negligence was not greater than the negligence of the defendant. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(1). If a jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages (i.e., the plaintiff’s negligence was not greater than the defendant’s), then the jury shall return a general verdict form with the total amount of damages regardless of the plaintiff’s comparative negligence and a special verdict form that sets forth the percentage of negligence attributable to each side. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141(2)(b)(1)–(2). ... A finding as a matter of law that Drowns was comparatively negligent is inappropriate at this time. ... Therefore, I deny GNLV’s motion to the extent it seeks a finding as a matter of law that Drowns was comparatively negligent.

Section 41.141(3) requires a judge to deduct a settling defendant's settlement from the net compensatory damages otherwise recoverable under the general and special verdicts.

Coughlin v. Hilton Hotels Corp. · filed 1995-03-08(3)

Thus, according to the comparative negligence statute, the. amount of Tailhook’s settlement in this case is to be “deduct[ed] from the net sum otherwise recoverable by the plaintiff pursuant to the general and special verdicts.” ... Accordingly, after deducting the $400,000 settlement from this amount pursuant to Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.141(3), Plaintiff Coughlin is entitled to receive $1,295,000 from the Hilton Defendants in compensatory damages.