Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for an action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.

Karl v. Quality Loan Service Corp. · filed 2010-12-13(3)(a)

Furthermore, this statutory cause of action is time-barred, because the present action was filed on May 24, 2010, more than three years after the loan was made on November 3, 2006. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(3)(a).

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on liabilities created by statute.

Wensley v. First National Bank of Nevada · filed 2012-05-31(3)(a)

Plaintiffs third cause of action for unfair lending practices in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598D is time-barred. The statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute” is three years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(a). Plaintiff obtained the loan at issue in July 2005, and filed this action more than six years later in September 2011. Plaintiffs claim for unfair lending practices is therefore untimely and must be dismissed without leave to amend.

Section 11.190(4)(b) imposes a two-year limitations period on an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, including private TCPA claims arising in Nevada.

Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Restaurant · filed 2006-03-30(4)(b)

One such procedural law, NRS 11.190, provides that an action on “a statute for a penalty or forfeiture” must be commenced within two years. Since the TCPA imposes statutory penalties for injuries caused by its violation, NRS 11.190 imparts a two-year limitation period that displaces the residual four-year, federal statutory period. Accordingly, we evaluate the timeliness of Edwards’ TCPA claim by examining whether he brought it within two years of accrual. Here, the parties do not dispute that, on September 28, 2004, Edwards filed the underlying action for the first time. Nor do they dispute that the single advertisement transmitted by Cenicola-Helvin to Edwards was sent on August 6, 2002, more than two years before Edwards filed his action. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting Cenicola-Helvin’s motion to dismiss Edwards’ complaint based on NRS 11.190(4)(b)’s two-year limitation period.

Section 11.190(3)(a) gives three years for liabilities created by statute other than a penalty or forfeiture, subsection (3)(d) gives three years for fraud, and subsection (4)(b) gives two years for actions upon a statute for a penalty.

Torrealba v. Kesmetis · filed 2008-03-06(3)(a), (3)(d), (4)(b)

Although respondents argue that the Torrealbas’ claims are “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty” and therefore subject to NRS 11.190(4)(b)’s two-year statute of limitations, we disagree. For statute-of-limitations purposes, in determining whether an action is based upon a statute for a penalty or based upon a liability created by statute, a penalty has been described as a ‘ ‘punishment for an offense against the public . . . not incident to the redress of a private wrong.” ... Here, the Torrealbas are suing for losses resulting from alleged notary misconduct, as authorized by statute. As such, their action is properly characterized as one upon a liability created by statute. ... Because the nature of the Torrealbas’ claim is one for fraud, we conclude that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to common-law fraud actions under NRS 11.190(3)(d) applies here. Therefore, the district court erred by applying NRS 11.190(4)(b)’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for an action based on liability created by statute, subject to applicable tolling.

Lee v. Enterprise Leasing Co.-West, LLC · filed 2014-06-25(3)(a)

The Court finds that a three-year statute of limitations applies to this action. See NRS 11.190(3)(a) (establishing a three-year limitations period for an action on liability created by statute). Defendants do not appear to challenge Plaintiffs’ June 3, 2004 start date for their proposed class of Enterprise renters. See Doc. # 82, p. 16. Because the three-year statute of limitations was tolled for three years pursuant to a tolling agreement between Lee and Enteiprise, the Court finds appropriate Plaintiffs’ June 3, 2004 start date for their proposed class of Enterprise renters.

Section 11.190(3)(d) supplies a three-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, while § 11.190(2)(c) supplies a four-year period for wrongful-interference and unjust-enrichment claims.

Glenbrook Capital Ltd. Partnership v. Dodds · filed 2011-05-12(3)(d), (2)(c)

Appellants’ initial two causes of action alleged a breach of the fiduciary duty. A breach of fiduciary duty is analogous to fraud, and thus, Nevada applies the three-year statute of limitation set forth in NRS 11.190(3)(d). ... Appellants’ claim for wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See NRS 11.190(2)(c); Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 781 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Nevada law and concluding that a claim for “intentional interference with prospective business relations [is] subject to Nevada’s four-year limitations period”). The statute of limitation for an unjust enrichment claim is four years. NRS 11.190(2)(c).

Section 11.190(3)(a) applies only when the referenced statute creates a liability; it does not govern claims based on statutory provisions that create no liability.

Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. LN Mgmt. LLC · filed 2019-03-11(3)(a)

So NRS 11.190(3)(a) does not supply the statute of limitations for these claims.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on a statutory cause of action when no more specific limitations period applies.

Sheffer v. US Airways, Inc. · filed 2015-06-01(3)(a)

NRS 11.190 provides that “actions other than those for the recovery of real property, unless further limited by specific statute, may only be commenced as' follows.” See id. § 11.190. The statute on its face governs any and all actions under state law, subject only to the exceptions listed therein, neither of which apply to Section 16. Finally, Section 16’s silence on a limitations period does not make NRS 11.190’s generally applicable limitations periods “irreconcilably repugnant” to Section 16. See Thomas, 327 P.3d at 521. The Court therefore rules that the three-year limitations period under NRS 11.190(3)(a) applies to the Section 16 claim. Only damages incurred within the limitations period are recoverable.

Subsection (3)(a) provides a three-year statute of limitations for actions based on liability created by statute.

Mann v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC · filed 2016-01-28(3)(a)

The district court properly dismissed Mann’s claims under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598D.100 because Mann failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(a) (three-year statute of limitations for actions based on liability created by statute).

Section 11.190(3)(c) requires conversion claims to be brought within three years.

Las Vegas Development Group, LLC v. Yfantis · filed 2016-03-24(3)(c)

A claim for conversion must be brought within three years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(c).

Section 11.190(3)(c) subjects actions for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for its specific recovery, to a three-year statute of limitations.

Charles v. City of Henderson · filed 2016-05-10(3)(c)

Having reviewed the parties' briefs and appendices, we perceive no error in the district court's order dismissing appellant's complaint on the basis that it is barred by the three-year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(3)(c).

The three-year limitations period in § 11.190(3)(a) applies to actions imposing liability created by statute, not equitable quiet-title actions that determine adverse interests in property.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC · filed 2019-08-26(3)(a)

Ocwen’s claim, however, is not an action upon a liability created by statute; it is an equitable action to determine adverse interests in real property, as codified in NRS 40.010.

Section 11.190(3)(a)'s three-year period does not apply to an equitable quiet-title action under NRS 40.010 because that statute creates no liability.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Sunrise Ridge Master Homeowners Association · filed 2019-09-04(3)(a)

But the bank’s claim is not an action upon a liability created by statute; it is an equitable action to determine adverse interests in real property, as codified in NRS 40.010.

Section 11.190(3)(a) supplies a three-year limitations period for a claim based on liability created by statute.

Bank of New York Mellon v. Imagination North Landscape Maintenance Association · filed 2019-09-24(3)(a)

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Borrower’s claim for violation of NRS Chapter 205 as time-barred.

Section 11.190(3)(a)'s three-year period does not apply to a quiet-title claim that does not challenge the authority behind the foreclosure.

Bank of New York Mellon v. Green Valley South Owners Association No. 1 · filed 2019-09-13(3)(a)

Therefore, its claim is not subject to § 11.190(3)(a)’s three-year statute of limitations.

An action on a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture, must be commenced within 3 years.

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Woodcrest Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2019-03-30(3)(a)

When premised upon statutory violations, a three-year limitations period applies. See NRS 11.190(3)(a) ("An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture" may only be commenced "[w]ithin 3 years."); see Bank of New York Mellon v. Hillcrest at Summit Hills Homeowners Ass'n , No. 2:16-cv-02295-GMN-PAL, 2019 WL 415324, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2019).

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions upon a liability created by statute.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Ruddell · filed 2019-03-31(3)(a)

Insofar as BNY's claims relates to any right protected by NRS 116.3116 and the violation of that right, the claims carry a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190(3)(a), which applies to actions upon *1100a liability created by statute.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions upon a liability created by statute.

Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Tapestry At Town Ctr. Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2019-03-31(3)(a)

The Court finds that, to the extent Carrington's pleading relates to any alleged violation of a right protected by statute, Carrington's claims carry a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190(3)(a), which applies to actions upon a liability created by statute. Therefore, Carrington's second cause of action for breach of NRS 116.1113 is entirely foreclosed, and its remaining causes of action for quiet title/declaratory relief, wrongful foreclosure, and injunctive relief are foreclosed only to the extent violations of NRS 116.1113 are alleged. However, to the extent Carrington seeks relief based on alleged unconstitutionality or on equitable grounds, Carrington's claims fall within the four-year catch-all provision at NRS 11.220 and are therefore timely.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on a liability created by statute.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Hidden Canyon Owners Association · filed 2019-07-26(3)(a)

Actions upon a liability created by statute carry a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190(3)(a).

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims alleging liability derived from statute.

The Bank Of New York Mellon v. SBH 2 Homeowners' Association · filed 2019-12-26(3)(a)

BNYM's claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(3)(a), to the extent they are allegations of liability derived from statute.

Section 11.190(4)(b) provides a two-year period for actions upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, but it does not limit foreclosure of a perpetual garbage lien under NRS 444.520.

WASTE MGMT. OF NEVADA, INC. VS. WEST TAYLOR ST., LLC · filed 2019-06-27(4)(b)

NRS 11.190(4)(b) provides two years for bringing actions "upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to a person or the State, or both, except when the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation." ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly concluded that garbage liens are perpetual but erred in applying both the lien perfection requirements set forth in NRS 108.226 and the two-year statute of limitations set forth in NRS 11.190(4)(b) to the foreclosure of those liens under NRS 444.520. Since a garbage lien is perpetual, it is not subject to a statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions founded upon a statute.

Bank Of New York Mellon v. Willow Creek Community Association · filed 2019-09-25(3)

Ickworth argues that BNY’s claims are time-barred pursuant to the statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(3), which provides a three-year statute of limitations for actions founded upon a statute. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3). The Court agrees that BNY’s claims are time-barred by NRS 11.190(3), but only to the extent that BNY’s claims relate to a right protected by NRS 116.3116 and the violation of that right. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Tapestry at Town Ctr. Homeowners Ass’n, 381 F.Supp.3d 1289, 1293 (D. Nev. 2019).

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for actions upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture, but does not govern equitable quiet-title actions determining adverse interests in real property.

Wilmington Trust, National Association v. Saticoy Bay LLC · filed 2019-09-26(3)(a)

Wilmington’s quiet-title claims are not governed by NRS 11.190(3). That statute governs actions “upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.”

Subsection (3)(a)’s three-year limitations period for liabilities created by statute does not apply to a quiet-title claim when the liability is not based on a statute.

Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Thunder Properties, Inc. · filed 2019-12-06(3)(a)

Defendant argues that NRS 11.190(3)(a), which provides a three-year statute of limitation for liabilities created by statute, is the applicable provision as Plaintiffs’ claims are premised upon federal statute. The Court finds Defendant’s argument to be unpersuasive. ... Accordingly, NRS 11.090(3)(a) is inapposite, because liability is not based on statute.

Section 11.190(3) provides a three-year limitations period for actions founded upon a statute, including claims concerning rights protected by NRS 116.3116 and violations of those rights.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Star Hill Homeowners Association · filed 2020-03-31(3)

SFR argues that BNYM’s claims are time-barred pursuant to the statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(3), which provides a three-year statute of limitations for actions founded upon a statute. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3). The Court agrees that BNYM’s claims are time-barred by NRS 11.190(3), but only to the extent that BNYM’s claims relate to a right protected by NRS 116.3116 and the violation of that right.

Subsection 11.190(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions founded upon a statute, including claims concerning a right protected by NRS 116.3116 and its violation.

U.S. Bank, National Association v. Warm Springs Reserve Owners Association · filed 2020-03-31(3)

The Court agrees that U.S. Bank’s claims are time-barred by NRS 11.190(3), but only to the extent that U.S. Bank’s claims relate to a right protected by NRS 116.3116 and the violation of that right.

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for claims asserted in violation of a statute.

Bank of New York Mellon v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC · filed 2020-03-16(3)(a)

This Court has previously found (and continues to find) that claims asserted in violation of a statute are subject to the three-year limitations period of NRS 11.190(3)(a), but that equitable claims fall within the four-year catchall provision of NRS 11.220.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims derived from liability created by statute.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. SFR Investments Pool I, LLC · filed 2020-03-31(3)(a)

This Court has addressed the statute of limitations question many times and has repeatedly concluded that claims derived from liability created by statute are subject to the three-year limitations period of NRS 11.190(3)(a) while relief based on equitable grounds are subject to the four-year limitation period of NRS 11.220.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on wrongful-foreclosure and statutory good-faith claims as actions upon liabilities created by statute.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Shenandoah Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2020-09-09(3)(a)

The wrongful-foreclosure claim is thus an “action upon a liability created by statute,” it is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in NRS 11.190(3)(a), and it is time barred because it was not filed within three years of the foreclosure sale.

Section 11.190(4)(e) supplies the limitation period for personal-injury actions caused by another's wrongful act or neglect, even when the plaintiff characterizes related duties as contractual obligations under subsection (2)(c).

Walz v. Hood · filed 1971-06-28(4)(e), (2)(c)

Appellant Walz, who allegedly sustained personal injuries *320while a passenger for hire in taxicab owned by respondent Union Cab Company and negligently operated by respondent Hood, has appealed from a Judgment on the Pleadings determining that NRS 11.190(4) (e), which allows only two years to commence “[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another,” bars the three “claims” stated in appellant’s Second Amended Complaint. We affirm the judgment, deciding that although the second and third “claims” allude to duties legally implied from her relationship with respondents, appellant’s claims are not within NRS 11.190 (2)(c), which allows four years to commence “[a]n action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing.”

Subsection 4(e) requires an action for death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another to be commenced within two years.

Garvey v. Clark County · filed 1975-02-27(4)(e)

However, appellants concede that they consciously elected not to name the State as a party defendant when they commenced the action. Consequently, the State in the instant case was not substituted, but rather was added, as a party defendant. The appellants' claim is barred by the 2-year statute, and the order of dismissal must be affirmed.

Section 11.190(1)(b) sets the limitations period for claims on promissory notes from default, while § 11.190(3)(d) sets the limitations period for fraud claims from discovery.

Carson Meadows Incorporated v. Pease · filed 1975-03-27(1)(b), (3)(d)

Default did not occur on any of the promissory notes mem-tioned in footnote 1 until May 1966. Consequently, the bar of limitations would not arise until May 1972. NRS 11.190(1) (b). With respect to the claims resting upon fraud, the record may be read to support the finding below that fraud was not discovered until 1969. The bar of limitations applicable to those claims would not arise until 1972. NRS 11.190(3) (d).

The six-year limitation period runs separately from the date each installment becomes due, rather than from the date of the divorce decree.

Bongiovi v. Bongiovi · filed 1978-06-14

The six-year period prescribed by that statute commenced to run against each installment as it became due, not from the date of the divorce decree.

Section 11.190(4)(e)'s two-year limitations bar was not tolled by an amendment substituting a defendant who had not been adequately identified in the original pleadings.

Lunn v. American Maintenance Corp. · filed 1978-04-28(4)(e)

The trial court acted properly in determining that appellant’s prior pleadings did not toll the statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(4)(e)'s accrual question may turn on when the claimant discovered or should have discovered the injury, and disputed facts about that issue require trial rather than summary judgment.

Prescott v. United States · filed 1982-01-28(4)(e)

Therefore, REECo’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations must be and hereby is denied without prejudice.

Section 11.190 sets a six-year limitation period for contract actions and a two-year limitation period for tort actions.

Woods v. Label Investment Corp. · filed 1991-06-06

NRS 11.190 provides a six year limitation period for contract actions and a two year limitation on tort actions. Therefore, if Woods had notice prior to May 3, 1979, her complaint would be barred.

Section 11.190 provides a three-year limitations period for fraud claims and a six-year period for claims based on a written contract; the court held that either period remained open here.

MacKintosh v. CALIFORNIA SAV. FED. · filed 1997-03-27(1)(b), (3)(d)

In the instant case, the statute of limitations on the Mackintoshes' action accrued in the spring of 1988, and the statute of limitations was either three years if the action was based on fraud or six years if the action was one based on a written contract. NRS 11.190(1)(b); NRS 11.190(3)(d). In either case, the statute of limitations had not expired when the Mackintoshes filed their complaint.

Section 11.190(1)(b) sets a three-year limitations period for fraud actions, and § 11.190(3)(d) sets a six-year period for actions based on written contracts.

Mackintosh v. California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1997-03-27(l)(b); (3)(d)

In the instant case, the statute of limitations on the Mackintoshes’ action accrued in the spring of 1988, and the statute of limitations was either three years if the action was based on fraud or six years if the action was one based on a written contract. NRS 11.190(l)(b); NRS 11.190(3)(d). In either case, the statute of limitations had not expired when the Mackintoshes filed their complaint.

Subsections (1)(b) and (3)(c) provide six- and three-year limitation periods for contract and conversion claims, respectively, and when silent on accrual, those periods are governed by the discovery rule.

Bemis v. Estate of Bemis · filed 1998-11-25(1)(b), (3)(c)

NRS 11.190(l)(b) provides a six year limitation period for contract actions, but is silent as to when such a cause of action accrues. ... The three year limitations period provided in NRS 11.190(3)(c), which governs Kevin and Scott’s conversion claim, is also silent as to time of accrual. ... Today, we conclude that the statute of limitations for conversion is discovery based.

Section 11.190(3)(d) supplies a three-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, while § 11.190(2)(c) supplies a four-year period for wrongful-interference and unjust-enrichment claims; accrual based on when the claimant knew or should have known the facts is a fact question.

In Re Amerco Derivative Litigation · filed 2011-05-12(3)(d), (2)(c)

Appellants' initial two causes of action alleged a breach of the fiduciary duty. A breach of fiduciary duty is analogous to fraud, and thus, Nevada applies the three-year statute of limitation set forth in NRS 11.190(3)(d). ... Appellants' claim for wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See NRS 11.190(2)(c); ... The statute of limitation for an unjust enrichment claim is four years. NRS 11.190(2)(c). ... Because, here, the pleadings are sufficient to create a question of fact regarding whether the statute of limitations had run, and the district court never reached this issue, we conclude that the question of whether the statute of limitations has run against all of appellants' viable claims must be considered on remand.

For breach-of-fiduciary-duty, fraud, and negligent-misrepresentation claims, § 11.190(3)(d)'s limitations period begins when the facts constituting the breach or fraud are discovered.

Kancilia v. Claymore and Dirk Ltd. P'ship. · filed 2014-07-24(3)(c)-(d), (4)(e)

The causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation are deemed to begin to accrue on the discovery of the facts constituting the breach or fraud. NRS 11.190(3)(d).

Section 11.190(3)(a)'s limitations period cannot bar a relocation claim that remains unresolved because an administrative appeal is pending.

Fq Men's Club, Inc. v. City of Reno · filed 2017-06-14(3)(a)

Because that claim has not been resolved, it necessarily cannot be time-barred by NRS 11.190(3)(a) or any other applicable limitations period. ... We disagree with respondent's argument that NRS 11.190(3)(a) was triggered 30 days after receipt of the administrative appeal request or at some point thereafter simply by virtue of the fact that respondent never resolved the appeal.

Section 11.190(1)(b) imposes a six-year limitations period on judicial actions on written contracts, but it does not bar a nonjudicial foreclosure because that foreclosure is not a judicial action.

Piazza v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n · filed 2017-09-11(1)(b)

Because NRS 11.190(1)(b) applies to judicial actions and a non-judicial foreclosure is not a judicial action, we conclude that the district court properly denied Piazza's motions for summary judgment and dismissed his complaint. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Section 11.190(1)(b) bars judicial actions on written contracts after six years but does not apply to nonjudicial foreclosures.

FACKLAM VS. HSBC BANK USA · filed 2017-09-14(1)(b)

We conclude that NRS 11.190(1)(b) does not apply to nonjudicial foreclosures because nonjudicial foreclosures are not judicial actions and NRS 11.190 applies only to judicial actions.

The six-year limitations period for a written-contract claim begins when the cause of action accrues; for these title-policy claims, accrual occurred when the insurer denied the claims.

Pennymac Holdings, LLC v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co. · filed 2018-07-30(1)(b)

1n its motion to dismiss, Fidelity also argued that PennyMac's claims for breach of the title policy and CPL were time barred by the six year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(1)(b). ... We conclude that PennyMac could not sue Fidelity for breach of the title policy or CPL until Fidelity denied PennyMac's claims in 2014. Thus, these claims were timely.

Section 11.190 sets four-year, three-year, and six-year limitation periods for bad-faith claims, claims for violations of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 686A.310, and general breach-of-contract actions, respectively.

Williams v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins Co · filed 2018-10-17(2)(c), (3)(a), (1)(b)

In Nevada, a claim for bad faith must be filed within four years of the triggering event. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(2)(c). A claim based on violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 686A.310 must be filed within three years of the triggering event. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(a). ... Nevada has a six-year limitation period for general breach of contract actions. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190 applies three years to fiduciary-duty and misrepresentation claims, while written-contract and indemnity claims receive the applicable six- or four-year period.

Job's Peak Ranch v. Douglas Co. · filed 2015-08-25(1)(b), (3)(d), (2)(c)

Thus, we conclude that the district court correctly concluded that the Association's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation, filed on October 5, 2009, were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for those causes of action, which expired on July 22, 2009, and March 3, 2009, respectively.

The applicable Nevada limitations provisions, including § 11.190(1)(b), (3)(d), and (4)(b), bar untimely fraud, contract, and statutory-penalty claims.

Alphonso Mason v. Wells Fargo Bank, Na · filed 2016-12-23(1)(b)

The district court properly dismissed the Masons’ claims of predatory lending practices under Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598D.100 and 598D.110, and their claims of fraud and deceit, misrepresentation, and unconscionability, because the Masons failed to file their action within the applicable statutes of limitations.

A personal-injury claim may be subject to both § 11.190(4)(e)'s limitations period and a separate statute of repose, and satisfying the limitations period does not defeat the repose defense.

Donnelly v. Anthony & Sylvan Pools Corp. · filed 2018-12-21(4)(e)

Appellant argues that only NRS 11.190's two-year limitation governs his claim but we have recognized a cause of action may be subject to both a limitations and repose provisions.

Section 11.190(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions upon liabilities created by statute; for a Nevada anti-SLAPP claim, accrual occurs only after all appeals are exhausted.

National Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson · filed 2019-09-30(3)

Nevada law establishes a three-year statute of limitations period for any “action upon a liability created by statute.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3). ... Plaintiffs’ claims are timely. A claim under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, like a claim for malicious prosecution, accrues only after all appeals are exhausted.

The three-year period in § 11.190(3) does not govern an equitable quiet-title claim, which is subject instead to Nevada's four-year catch-all period.

Wilmington Trust, National Association v. Hidden Crest/Parkhurst Community Association · filed 2019-09-04(3)

As I have held in countless of these HOA-foreclosure cases, such a quiet-title claim is subject to the four-year limitations period in NRS 11.220.

Section 11.190(4)(c)'s two-year limitations period for battery and assault is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled.

Johnson v. HILV Fee LLC · filed 2019-09-06(4)(c)

Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, battery and assault, each also carry a two-year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190(4)(c). ... However, upon review of the supplemental briefing, the Court finds that equitable tolling applies to excuse the one-day delay. ... The statutes of limitations set by NRS 11.190 are not jurisdictional, and the Nevada Supreme Court has conducted equitable tolling analyses for limitations pursuant to this code section.

Section 11.190's three-year statute of limitations does not apply to nonjudicial foreclosure actions because they are not judicial actions.

HSBC Bank USA, National Association v. Saticoy Bay, LLC Series 9538 Diamond Bridge · filed 2019-09-30

While the Association’s superpriority lien was established by NRS Chapter 116, the three-year statute of limitations imposed by NRS 11.190 does not apply.

Section 11.190 bars judicial actions but does not apply to nonjudicial foreclosures.

Bank of New York Mellon v. Wales · filed 2020-01-07

NRS 11.190 serves only to bar judicial actions; thus, [it is] inapplicable to nonjudicial foreclosures.

Section 11.190 imposes a three-year, discovery-based limitations period for fraud; a three-year period for injury to personal property, including tortious interference with contractual relations; and a four-year period for unjust enrichment.

Forman v. United Health Products, Inc. · filed 2020-03-19(3)(d), (3)(c), and (2)(c)

The statute of limitations for Claim Five (fraud) and Claim Six (tortious interference with contract) is three years subject to the discovery rule. See Ades v. Citi Mortg., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-02104-GMN, 2011 WL 4402754, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2011) (“Claims for fraud have a three-year statute of limitations that runs from the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.” (citing NRS 11.190(3)(d)); Stalk v. Mushkin, 199 P.3d 838, 841 (Nev. 2009) (“Claims for intentional interference with prospective business advantage and intentional interference with contractual relations are claims for injury to personal property and are therefore subject to the three-year statute of limitations in NRS 11.190(3)(c).”); see also Daly v. Pearl Spirits, Inc., 438 F. App’x 644, 645 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The discovery rule applies to the running of the statute of limitations for a claim of concealment as well.”). ... The statute of limitations for Claim Seven (unjust enrichment) is four years. See In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 703 (Nev. 2011) (“The statute of limitation for an unjust enrichment claim is four years.” (citing NRS 11.190(2)(c)).

Section 11.190(1)(b) imposes a six-year limitations period on claims founded upon written contracts.

Walker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-04-01(1)(b)

Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, and the Court agrees. The course of events for which Plaintiffs seek relief involve consumer credit transactions. The last of these transactions was the disbursement of the funds from the second HELOC, which occurred in July 20051. As Plaintiffs have now filed their complaint over thirteen years after the second HELOC’s funds were disbursed, all of their claims are time-barred. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(1)(b) (six year limitations period for contracts in writing); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(d)(three-year limitations period for fraud); Nev. Rev. Stat. §11.190 (4)(e) (two-year limitations period for negligence); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (one-year limitations period for HOEPA violations).

Section 11.190(1)(b) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions founded upon a contract in writing, and a writing need only fairly import the obligation to pay.

Counter Wraps International v. Diageo North America, Inc. · filed 2020-07-02(1)(b)

Under Nevada law, “a strict construction should not be applied by the court in determining what does and what does not constitute a ‘contract in writing’” under Section 11.190(1)(b). ... “[A]ll that is required is that there be a writing which fairly imports the obligation to pay.” ... Here, while the parties dispute which emails and documents controlled their agreement, the evidence produced at summary judgment makes clear that the parties’ agreement was based on written emails and documents containing prices, amounts, and terms. ... Regardless of whether the Nuvo Agreement controls (as CWI argues) or the PO terms control (as Diageo argues) or the parties’ contract was modified by subsequent correspondence (as Diageo also argues), the evidence shows that one or more writings existed that governed various terms of the parties’ agreement, and CWI’s breach of contract claim is therefore not time-barred under Nevada Revised Statute § 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(1)(b) provides a six-year limitations period for an action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument, measured from when the cause of action accrues.

First Foundation Bank v. Matsumura · filed 2020-08-25(1)(b)

As an initial matter, the Court addresses Defendant’s claim that the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Defendant argues that the breach of contract claim is barred by the six-years statute of limitations provided in NRS 11.190(1). “Except as otherwise provided in N.R.S. 40.4639, 125B.050 and 217.007, actions other than those for the recovery of real property, unless further limited by specific statute, may only be commenced as follows: 1. Within 6 years: (a) ... (b) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter.” N.R.S. 11.190(1)(b). For statute of limitations calculations, time is computed from the day the cause of action accrued. Clark v. Robison, 944 P.2d 788, 789 (Nev. 1997). The cause of action accrued in this action on July 15, 2014, and this case was removed to federal court on December 12, 2018, well within six years of the date the cause of action accrued. Defendant’s statute of limitations defense is therefore meritless.

Section 11.190(1)(b) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions in Nevada, which federal courts apply to ERISA claims.

Board of Trustees of the Painters and Floorcoverers Joint Committee v. Super Structures Inc. · filed 2020-11-30(1)(b)

Specifically, courts apply the state statute of limitations for bringing contract actions, which in Nevada, is six years.

Section 11.190(1)(b) requires an action based on a written contract to be brought within six years.

Wells v. Guzman · filed 2021-09-28(1)(b)

Under Nevada law, an action based upon a written contract must be brought within six years. See NRS § 11.190(1)(b).

Subsection (1)(b) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions based on written contracts.

Adamian v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada · filed 2022-09-29(1)(b)

In Nevada, a breach-of-written-contract claim is subject to a six-year limitation period. See NRS § 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(1)(b) is the six-year limitations provision potentially applicable to an action upon a contract.

Todd v. United States Liability Insurance Company · filed 2023-06-07(1)(b)

Nevada’s near-comprehensive statute of limitations includes filing-time requirements for “action[s] upon a contract.” ... I find that there is at least a possibility that a Nevada court would apply the six-year statute of limitations to the Todds’ contract claim.

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for actions on liabilities created by statute, excluding penalties or forfeitures.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC · filed 2020-04-07(3)(a)

Even if I interpret the bank’s quiet-title action as aclaim underNRS 116.3116, it still doesnot seek to impose liability under that statute. So NRS 11.090(3)(a) does not apply.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions based on a liability created by statute.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. The Legacy Estates Property Owners Association · filed 2020-09-29(3)(a)

The Court finds that, to the extent Nationstar’s pleading relates to any alleged violation of a right protected by statute, Nationstar’s claims carry a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190(3)(a), which applies to actions upon a liability created by statute.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on liability created by statute, excluding penalties or forfeitures, but it does not apply to quiet-title actions that exist independently of statute.

Bank of New York Mellon v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC · filed 2021-02-25(3)(a)

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that NRS 11.190(3)(a) controls. That statute provides a three-year limitations period for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” See NRS 11.190(3)(a). Despite bringing the claim under, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and NRS 40.010, (see Compl. ¶ 46), BNYM’s plea to quiet title does not constitute liability created by statute. See Torrealba v. Kesmetis, 178 P.3d 716, 722 (Nev. 2008) (“The phrase ‘liability created by statute’ means a liability which would not exist but for the statute.”) (quoting Gonzalez v. Pac. Fruit Exp. Co., 99 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (D. Nev. 1951)). BNYM seeks a declaration concerning the viability of its DOT by invoking the court’s long-standing “inherent equitable powers” to settle title disputes. Shadow Wood HOA v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., 366 P.3d 1105, 1111 (Nev. 2016) (reaffirming that NRS 40.010 “essentially codified the court’s existing equity jurisprudence”) (citing Clay v. Scheeline Banking & Tr. Co., 159 P. 1081, 1082 (Nev. 1916) (“[T]here is practically no difference in the nature of the action under our statute and as it exists independent of statute.”)). Because actions to quiet title exist independent of statute under a court’s inherent equitable jurisdiction, NRS 11.190(3)(a) does not apply.

Section 11.190 provides three-year limitation periods for claims based on liabilities created by statute and for negligent misrepresentation, a four-year period for unjust enrichment, and a six-year period for claims based on written instruments.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. BFP Investment 5, LLC · filed 2020-04-14(3)(a) (3)(d) (2)(c) (1)(b)

The most restrictive limitations period relevant to Plaintiff’s proposed claims is three years. Plaintiff’s quiet title, declaratory relief, wrongful/statutorily defective foreclosure, and breach of statutory duty causes of action are all based upon a liability created by Nevada’s HOA lien statute and, therefore, carry a three-year limitations period. NRS 11.190(3)(a). Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim also has a three year limitations period. NRS 11.190(3)(d). However, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is not based upon a liability created by statute and, consequently, carries a four-year statute of limitations. NRS 11.190(2)(c). Plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are based on the Prescott Park HOA’s Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions, an instrument in writing, and carry a six-year statute of limitations. NRS 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims seeking to hold a party liable for violating statutory provisions.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. Vs. Sfr Inv.'S Pool 1, Llc · filed 2020-04-16(3)(a)

Conversely, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that appellant's claims for wrongful foreclosure and breach of statutory duty against Arbor Park are subject to NRS 11.190(3)(a)'s 3-year limitations period, as the allegations in those claims sought to hold Arbor Park liable for violating various provisions of NRS Chapter 116 during the foreclosure process.

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for actions based on liabilities created by statute, but it does not apply to an action whose basis exists independently of statute.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Green Valley Pecos Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2021-03-19(3)(a)

NRS 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” See NRS 11.190(3)(a). Because actions to quiet title exist independent of statute under this court’s inherent equitable jurisdiction, the three-year limitations period does not apply.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions upon a liability created by statute, but it does not govern a quiet-title action seeking to determine the validity of a nonpossessory lien rather than to impose liability.

U.S. BANK N.A. v. THUNDER PROPERTIES, INC. (NRAP 5) · filed 2022-02-03(3)(a)

The bank argues that there is no clearly applicable statute of limitations, while Thunder Properties and arnicus curiae SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, argue that the bank is suing upon a liability created by statute" and is thus subject to NRS 11.190(3)(a). ... The bank's action has not sought to hold Thunder Properties liable, but rather to determine the viability of the bank's interest. We agree with the bank and conclude that no statute of limitations specifically addresses a quiet title action involving a nonpossessory lien.

Section 11.190(3)(a)'s three-year limitations period does not govern an equitable quiet-title action, while § 11.190(2)(d) provides a four-year limitations period for an action alleging a deceptive trade practice under NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999.

Bank Of New York Mellon v. Sunrise Ridge Master Homeowners Association · filed 2020-04-28(3)(a); (2)(d)

The HOA opens its motion for summary judgment with the sweeping argument that all of the bank’s claims are “time-barred by [the] three-year statute of limitations” in NRS 11.190(3). ... That statute governs actions “upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” ... But the bank’s claim is not an action upon a liability created by statute; it is an equitable action to determine adverse interests in real property, as codified in NRS 40.010. ... So NRS 11.090(3)(a) does not govern the bank’s quiet-title claim. ... As I have held in numerous cases and here again, the statute of limitations for equitable quiet-title claims like the bank’s is four years. ... To the extent that the HOA argues that this claim is barred by the three-year limitations period in NRS 11.190(3), the HOA is wrong. A deceptive-trade-practices claim is clearly governed by the four-year limitations period in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(2)(d) (which applies to “[a]n action against a person alleged to have committed a deceptive trade practice in violation of NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999, inclusive . . .”).

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims arising from statutory duties, including claims for breach of NRS 116.1113 and wrongful foreclosure.

Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC v. Montecito Village Community Associatin · filed 2020-07-13(3)(a)

The parties do not contest this court’s prior order as it pertains to Carrington’s remaining claims. Carrington’s second claim, breach of NRS 116.1113, and third claim, wrongful foreclosure, both arise from alleged breaches of statutory duties imposed by NRS 116.1113. (See generally ECF No. 1). Thus, those claims must have been brought within three years. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(a).

Section 11.190(4)(e) supplies a two-year limitations period that is tolled while a prisoner completes mandatory grievance exhaustion.

Randolph v. Nevada Department of Corrections · filed 2020-09-02(4)(e)

Judge Baldwin recommends dismissing Count I as barred under the two-year statute of limitations because the allegations concern events that occurred between August 20, 2013 through July 8, 2015. ... See Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989); NRS § 11.190(4)(e).3 Plaintiff argues that he filed an informal grievance on August 10, 2015 and did not receive a response until August 10, 2017, tolling the statute of limitations throughout that time. ... The Court agrees and will sustain the Objection. The Court thus rejects the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss Count I.

The three-year limitation in subsection (3)(a) does not bar raising tender as an affirmative defense because statutes of limitation do not run against defenses.

Sfr Inv.'S Pool 1, Llc Vs. The Bank Of New York Mellon · filed 2020-09-18(3)(a)

On appeal, appellant challenges the timeliness of respondent's assertion of tender and argues that the district court should have found the claim untimely under NRS 11.190(3)(a)'s three-year statute of limitations for claims made "upon a liability created by statute." ... We conclude that the district court properly rejected this argument because respondent raised tender as an affirmative defense and affirmative defenses are not subject to statutes of limitation.

Section 11.190 does not require dismissal at the pleading stage when the limitations period may be tolled under the discovery rule.

Razaghi v. Razaghi Development Company, LLC · filed 2020-09-30

For the same reasons discussed regarding the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement’s release, the Court finds dismissal on the statute of limitations inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings because the limitations period may be tolled under the discovery rule. See NRS § 11.190.

NRS 11.190 provides a three-year limitations period, but it does not govern the plaintiff’s quiet-title claim, which is subject to NRS 11.070’s five-year period.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC · filed 2020-05-11

The Court first addresses SFR’s statute of limitations argument, because, if it is correct that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred by the three-year limitations period under NRS 11.190 or four-year limitations period under NRS 11.220, the Court need not proceed. The Court, having previously addressed this issue in similar matters, concludes that Plaintiff’s quiet title claim is not time-barred. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s quiet title claim is governed by the five-year limitations period set forth in NRS 11.070, which applies to a “cause of action or defense to an action, founded upon title to real property.” Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.070.

Section 11.190(1)(b) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on contracts, but that period does not govern enforcement of a municipality’s regulatory obligation that does not arise from contract.

First American Title Insurance Company v. Commerce Associates, LLC · filed 2020-06-08(1)(b)

The statute of limitations for an action upon a contract is six years. NRS 11.190(1)(b). ... Defendants’ focus on the statute of limitations related to a contract action is misplaced and irrelevant.

Section 11.190(3)(a) does not govern a lienholder’s quiet-title claim seeking a determination of property rights; the claim is subject to the four-year period in § 11.220.

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Copper Sands Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2020-09-24(3)(a)

these quiet-title actions are not governed by NRS 11.190(3)(a) because such a claim “does not seek to hold anyone liable, but instead simply seeks a determination regarding the parties’ respective rights with regard to the subject property.”

Section 11.190(3)(a) does not govern a quiet-title claim seeking only a determination of property rights; such claims instead receive Nevada’s four-year catch-all period.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Antigua Maintenance Corporation · filed 2021-02-19(3)(a)

East Cactus’s argument still fails because the bank does not seek to impose liability by its claim here—it seeks to settle adverse interests. So NRS 11.190(3)(a)’s three-year bar ... does not apply.

Section 11.190 imposes a three-year limitations period on fraud actions, and the period runs from discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.

Birnberg v. Rancho La Costa, Inc. (In Re Reach McClinton & Co.) · filed 1986-07-22

The Nevada statute of limitations would place a three year limit on fraud actions. ... In each of the statutes however, the limitations run from the date that the fraud was discovered. The affidavits of the Plaintiff make it clear the discovery was not made until after the petition in this Court was filed (1982). Thus, under any determination, the application by the Defendants to dismiss the Complaint for violation of Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b) which incorporates Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is at the very least, premature.

Section 11.190(3)(a)’s three-year limit for statutory liabilities does not govern a deed-of-trust holder’s quiet-title counterclaim following an HOA foreclosure sale.

NV West Servicing, LLC Trustee of Copper Pine Trust 12 v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2023-07-13(3)(a)

That statute governs actions “upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” NRS § 11.190(3)(a). In a recent case, U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Props., Inc., 503 P.3d 299 (Nev. 2022),7 the Nevada Supreme Court held that the four-year statute of limitations in NRS § 11.220 applied to foreclosure actions but held that “an HOA foreclosure sale—standing alone—does not sufficiently call the bank’s deed of trust into question to trigger the statute of limitations.” Id. at 307. ... Here, the “notice of disturbed possession” did not occur until November 2018 when NV West filed its quiet-title action in state court. Thus, BANA’s counterclaim, which was brought in February of 2019, falls well within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(2)(d) supplies a four-year limitation period for claims treated as analogous to Nevada deceptive-trade-practices claims.

Sears v. Russell Road Food And Beverage, LLC · filed 2020-05-14(2)(d)

The NDTPA has a four-year limitation period. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(2)(d). The plaintiffs filed suit on June 24, 2019. ECF No. 1. So the plaintiffs’ claims are timely for any image uploaded within four years of that date.

A judgment expires after six years unless it is renewed or an action upon the judgment is brought; an action upon a judgment is a distinct common-law cause of action.

Nalder v. United Automobile Insurance Co · filed 2020-06-04(1)(a)

The Nevada Supreme Court, answering a certified question from our court, held that Nalder and Lewis’s federal action against UAIC for “breach of its duty to defend is not an action upon Nalder’s state court judgment against Lewis.” Nalder v. United Auto. Ins. Co., No. 70504, 2019 WL 5260073, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 20, 2019). As the court explained, “[a]n ‘action upon a judgment’ as referenced in [Nev. Rev. Stat. §] 11.190(1)(a) is a distinct cause of action under the common law.” Id. Because Nalder and Lewis’s suit against UAIC is not such an action, it does not renew Nalder’s default judgment against Lewis under § 11.190(1)(a).

Section 11.190(1)(a) makes a judgment valid for six years, with the six-year limitations period restarting upon each renewal.

Miller v. Crisis Collection Management, LLC · filed 2022-10-27(1)(a)

A judgment is valid for six years before it must be renewed. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.190(1)(a); 17.150(2). Based on those statutes, there is ninety-day window every six years in which a creditor may renew a judgment. The six-year limitations period begins after the last “evidence of indebtedness” as to the debt itself. See Davidson v. Davidson, 382 P.3d 880, 885 (Nev. 2016). Thus, each time the judgment is renewed—giving evidence of indebtedness—the six-year clock restarts, and the judgment is valid for six years from the date of that renewal. Put another way, each time a creditor renews a judgment, a clock starts, and that creditor must renew the judgment sometime between day 2100 and day 2190 following each renewal.

Subsection (1)(b) does not permit a plaintiff to refile identical claims merely because the first action has not resulted in a judgment on the merits.

Centennial Gateway, Llc Vs. Home Consignment Ctr. C/W 78492/79018 · filed 2020-06-24(1)(b)

We also reject Centenniars argument that NRS 11.190(1)(b) allowed it to refile its claims against respondents because the first action had not resulted in a judgment on the merits.

Section 11.190(1)(a)'s six-year limitations period does not apply to actions for recovery of real property.

KUPTZ-BLINKINSOP VS. BLINKINSOP · filed 2020-07-09(1)(a)

NRS 11.190 unambiguously excludes actions for recovery of real property. It provides that "actions other than those for the recovery of real property, unless further limited by specific statute, may only be commenced as follows."

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for an alleged breach of statutory duty, including the bad-faith claim under § 116.1113.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Auburn and Bradford at Providence Homeowners' Association · filed 2020-08-10(3)(a)

Each of Bank of America’s claims is governed by a limitation period of four years or less. See Bank of New York for Certificateholders of CWALT, Inc. v. S. Highlands Cmty. Ass’n, 329 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1219 (D. Nev. 2018) (three or four years for wrongful foreclosure depending on whether it is based on statutory violations or a tort); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Country Garden Owners Ass’n, No. 2:17-cv-01850-APG-CWH, 2018 WL 1336721, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2018) (four-year catchall for the declaratory relief claim); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(a) (three years for alleged breach of statutory duty for bad faith claim under Nevada Revised Statutes § 116.1113).1 The HOA sale took place on September 7, 2012, and the deed upon sale was recorded on September 12, 2012. ECF No. 32-9. Bank of America filed suit more than four years later on December 2, 2016. ECF No. 1. Thus, Bank of America’s claims are time-barred.

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year limitations period for statutorily created causes of action, but it did not govern these wage claims because the court applied a two-year period under analogous limitations.

Martel v. HG Staffing, LLC · filed 2022-08-11(3)(a)

Thus, they argue that NRS 11.190(3)(a)’s three-year limitations period for statutorily created causes of action applies. ... Having considered the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the district court properly applied the doctrine of analogous limitations and that a two-year limitations period apples to the Martel employees’ statutory claims.

Section 11.190(3)(a)'s three-year period does not govern these wage claims because the court applied a two-year analogous limitations period.

Martel v. HG Staffing, LLC · filed 2022-09-08(3)(a)

Thus, they argue that NRS 11.190(3)(a)'s three-year limitations period for statutorily created causes of action applies. ... We agree with HG Staffing. ... We now clarify that the Martel employees' claims under these statutes are governed by a two-year limitations period under the doctrine of analogous limitations, which provides that "when a statute lacks an express limitations period, courts look to analogous causes of action for which an express limitations period is available either by statute or by case law."

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions.

Armentrout Vs. Washoe Cty. Health Dist. · filed 2020-09-18(4)(e)

And because appellants claim against WCHD would not relate back to the original complaint against the current owners of the property the septic system serves,2 see Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 99 Nev. 548, 556, 665 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1983) ("[W]here an amendment states a new cause of action that describes a new and entirely different source of damages, the amendment does not relate back."), the district court did not err by dismissing the action based on the statute of limitations, see NRS 11.190(4)(e) (providing a two-year statute of limitations period for negligence actions).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury claims.

ONeil v. Pasco County Sheriff · filed 2020-10-20(4)(e)

Nevada’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years.

Subsection (4)(e) requires personal injury claims to be brought within two years, and the court applied that limitations period to the claim at issue.

Schwartz-Tallard v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n · filed 2021-07-02(4)(e)

Wells Fargo’s violation of the bankruptcy stay in 2009 and Defendants’ attempts to evict Schwartz-Tallard in 2013 and 2014 cannot support her claim because each of these events occurred more than two years before Schwartz-Tallard filed her complaint. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e) (personal injury claims must be brought within two years).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for personal injury caused by another’s wrongful act or neglect.

Love v. LVMPD · filed 2021-07-30(4)(e)

Plaintiff’s claim is also likely futile because the statute of limitations for a Fourth Amendment violation is two years (based on the State of Nevada’s two year limitation on personal injury suit). Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–250 (1989); NRS 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) requires an action seeking damages for personal injuries caused by another's wrongful act or neglect to be commenced within two years.

Espinosa v. CoreCivic, Inc. · filed 2022-03-23(4)(e)

Under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), an “action to recover damages for injuries to a person…caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” must be commenced within two years.

Section 11.190(4) imposes a two-year limitation period on personal injury lawsuits.

Bouari v. United States of America · filed 2022-10-03(4)

The relevant Nevada statute imposes a two-year limitation period on personal injury lawsuits.

Section 11.190(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Nevada through the state’s personal-injury limitations period.

Bayless v. Board of Education of the Clark County School District · filed 2022-10-04(4)

Federal courts apply the forum state’s personal-injury statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. In Nevada, that applicable statute of limitations is two years.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions to recover damages for injuries to a person, including abuse-of-process claims treated as personal-injury claims.

McCart-Pollak v. On Demand Direct Response LLC · filed 2022-10-06(4)(e)

Under Nevada law, an abuse of process claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitation. See, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Camacho, 296 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims are properly treated as claims for injuries to the person”); NRS § 11.190(4)(e) (“an action to recover damages for injuries to a person” is subject to a two year period of limitations); Tsambis v. Irvine, No. 2:17-cv-2482, 2018 WL 3186940, at *10 (D. Nev. June 28, 2018) (writing that abuse of process claims “are subject to a two year statute of limitations”).

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Nevada.

Franklin v. State of Nevada · filed 2023-01-09(4)(e)

Therefore, in Nevada, the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is two years. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); see Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014).

Section 11.190(4)(2) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims in Nevada.

Blandino v. Las Vegas Metro Police Department · filed 2023-08-15(4)(2)

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants all arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are thus governed by Nevada’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... NRS 11.190(4)(2) (imposing two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions). ... Because the continuing violation doctrine is necessarily limited, and the facts giving rise to Blandino’s claim appear to be discrete acts, the Court finds that any claims arising out of incidents that occurred prior to April 4, 2020, are barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (4)(c) sets a two-year limitations period for damages for injuries caused by another’s wrongful act or neglect.

Bowman v. LV Metropolitan Police Dept. · filed 2023-10-25(4)(c)

Nevada law establishes a two-year statute of limitations period for claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or damages for injuries caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. NRS 11.190(4)(c), (e).

It sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions and supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims in Nevada.

Perez v. Daniels · filed 2024-03-31(4)(e)

Nevada provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions seeking damages for personal injuries or death caused by another’s wrongful act or neglect.

Anderson v. Department of Corrections · filed 2024-03-31(4)(e)

NRS 11.190(4)(e) is the applicable statute for a Section 1983 suit based on personal injury in Nevada, and thus it applies here. ... The Nevada personal injury statute of limitation is two years. ... NRS 11.190(4)(e) maintains a two-year limitations period for “an action to recover damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.” NRS 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) requires an action for damages for personal injuries or death caused by another’s wrongful act or neglect to be brought within two years.

Posey v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2024-04-03(4)(e)

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Nevada is found in NRS 11.190(4)(e) which states in pertinent part that a claim must be brought “[w]ithin 2 years [for] an action to recover damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another . . . .”

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies as the forum-state limitations period for this Bivens claim.

Montgomery v. West · filed 2024-06-05(4)(e)

Here, the operative events occurred in March 2006 at the Montgomerys’ property in Nevada. Nevada’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014). The statute of limitations began accruing in March 2006 when the agents raided the Montgomerys’ property, so the statute expired in March 2008.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitation period for personal injury actions.

Doe v. State of Nevada, Ex. Rel., Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. Div. of Child and Family Servs. · filed 2024-09-18(4)(e)

In Nevada, the limitation period for a personal injury action is two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 11.190(4)(e). ... Consequently, K.Y., L.O., and P.K.’s claims are time-barred under NRS § 11.190(4)(e) unless (1) the limitation periods were tolled under NRS § 11.250 after the plaintiffs reached the age of majority, or (2) equitable tolling applies.

Subsection (4)(e) sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, applicable here to the federal civil-rights claims.

Mwithiga v. Office J Pierce · filed 2024-12-05(4)(e)

These claims have a two-year statute of limitations. See Bonelli v. Grand Canyon Univ., 28 F.4th 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2022) (stating that the statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims under sections 1981 and 1983 is governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations of personal injury actions); see also NRS 11.190(4)(e). ... Plaintiff’s federal claims against Officer Pierce are thus untimely and dismissed with prejudice.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for personal injuries caused by another's wrongful act or neglect.

Posey v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2024-12-13(4)(e)

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Nevada is found in NRS 11.190(4)(e) which states in pertinent part that a claim must be brought “[w]ithin 2 years [for] an action to recover damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another . . . .” Id. ... Thus, Plaintiffs claim for false arrest began to run on January 4, 2022 (see Wallace, infra), and he had two years to file his claim under NRS 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) sets a two-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for personal injuries caused by another's wrongful act or neglect.

C. v. Rashid · filed 2024-12-20(4)(e)

Likewise, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations because NRS § 11.190(4)(e) establishes a two-year limitations period for “[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to a person . . . caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.” Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations began to run in 2017 and concluded in 2019. Thus, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is time-barred.

Subsection (4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period for an action involving injury to a person caused by another's neglect.

Sedgh v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2025-06-09(4)(e)

Under NRS 11.190(4)(e), there is a two-year statute of limitations for commencing an action involving injury to a person caused by neglect of another. Because the events at issue took place on September 22, 2023, Docket No. 20 at 2, the statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiff from filing suit in state court.

Subsection (4)(e) requires personal-injury claims to be brought within two years of the injury.

Ingram v. McMahill · filed 2025-07-29(4)(e)

The Nevada statute of limitations for personal injury actions states that any claims must be brought within two years of the injury. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e). Therefore, § 1983 claims must also be brought within two years.

For a § 1983 personal-injury claim, subsection (4)(e) supplies a two-year limitations period, subject to equitable tolling when diligence and extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing.

Swallow · filed 2025-09-29(4)(e)

Federal courts apply state statutes of limitations to § 1983 claims, Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2020), and Nevada’s statute of limitations for claims such as Mr. Swallow’s is two years. NRS 11.190(4)(e); see also Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (“in the absence of a federal provision for § 1983 actions, the analogous [Nevada] state statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies.”); Perrez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1989). Mr. Swallow’s alleged injury occurred on March 12, 2020. Accounting for the fact that March 12, 2022 fell on a Saturday, NRS 11.190(4)(e) bars any claim brought on or after March 14, 2022. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Since Mr. Swallow filed his complaint with this court on May 30, 2023, his claim was 443 days late. It will only survive dismissal if tolling applies. ... To equitably toll the statute of limitations in NRS 11.190(4)(e), plaintiffs must demonstrate that, despite their diligence, extraordinary circumstances beyond their control prevented them from filing within the limitations period.

Subsection 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which governs the timeliness of § 1983 claims.

Patel · filed 2025-11-13(4)(e)

The limitation period for personal injury actions in Nevada is two years. Id.; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) bars claims subject to its two-year limitations period when filed more than two years after they accrue.

Grandon v. State · filed 2016-01-14(4)(e)

As appellant did not file his complaint until May 29, 2012, more than two years after the statute of limitations commenced for his claims, the district court correctly determined that ... appellant's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. NRS 11.190(4)(e); see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (holding that a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations).

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for these civil rights claims, with the period tolled while an inmate grievance is pending.

Carley v. Gentry · filed 2021-09-21(4)(e)

The statute of limitations was tolled until its resolution on February 4, 2015. (Id.) Carley therefore hand until February 4, 2017, to file a lawsuit based on this grievance and failed to do so. Claims based on the First Correspondence Grievance are therefore barred.

Section 11.190(4)(b)'s limitations period for statutory actions begins when the plaintiff knows or should know facts supporting a cause of action.

Bliss v. Corecivic, Inc. · filed 2020-10-27(4)(b)

The parties agree that the conclusion we reach should apply equally to Bliss’s federal and state-law claims. Although the global statute of limitations governing statutory actions under Nevada law does not use the term “the violation,” see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(b), the remainder of our analysis applies with equal force to that provision. Nevada’s limitations period, like the federal Act’s, begins to run when the plaintiff “knows or should know of facts” supporting a cause of action.

Section 11.190 imposes a two-year limitations period on libel and slander claims.

Flowers v. Carville · filed 2000-08-24

Nevada’s statute of limitations for libel and slander is two years. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11 .190 (1998). ... .Flowers’ defamation claim based upon Defendant Carville’s book, All’s Fair: Love, War and Running for President, which was published in 1994, is clearly barred by Nevada’s statute of limitations as well as those of the other states referenced by the parties.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on defamation and false-light claims, measured from the date of publication.

Sobocienski v. Haeker · filed 2020-10-28(4)(e)

The defendant the Nugget published the article in question over four years ago but there is a two-year statute of limitations for defamation and false light claims measured from the publication date.

Section 11.190 provides three-year limitations periods for actions based on statutory liability and fraud or mistake, and a four-year period for the deceptive-trade-practices claim covered by subsection (2)(d).

Chavez v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. · filed 2021-02-17(3)(d), (2)(d)

The applicable time bar for plaintiffs’ NRS 119A.710 claim and fraud claim is three years. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(d) (stating that “an action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” has a three-year statute of limitation); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(d) (stating that the statute of limitation for “an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” is three years). The applicable time bar for plaintiffs’ NRS 598.0915 claim is four years. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(2)(d).

Section 11.190(4)(e)'s two-year limitations period for personal-injury or wrongful-death actions may be equitably tolled when the plaintiff diligently pursues the claim and extraordinary circumstances prevent timely filing.

FAUSTO VS. SANCHEZ-FLORES · filed 2021-03-11(4)(e)

We hold that the doctrine of equitable tolling may apply to NRS 11.190(4)(e) where the plaintiff demonstrates diligence in pursuing his or her claims and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented the plaintiff from bringing a timely action.

Section 11.190(4)(e)'s limitations period may be equitably tolled only when the claimant acted diligently and extraordinary circumstances beyond the claimant's control caused the late filing.

Drye v. Glatfelter Claims Management, Inc. · filed 2024-03-27(4)(e)

“When a plaintiff seeks to equitably toll the limitations period in NRS 11.190(4)(e), the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she acted diligently in pursuing his or her claim and that extraordinary circumstances beyond his or her control caused his or her claim to be filed outside the limitations period.”

Section 11.190(4)(e)’s two-year limitations period may be equitably tolled when the plaintiff acted diligently and extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control caused the late filing.

Wong v. Las Vegas Sands Corp. · filed 2025-03-31(4)(e)

The two-year limitations period under NRS 11.190(4)(e) is subject to equitable tolling. Fausto v. Sanchez-Flores, 482 P.3d 677, 679 (Nev. 2021). “[E]quitable tolling is a nonstatutory remedy that permits a court to suspend a limitations period and allow an otherwise untimely action to proceed when justice requires it.” Id. at 680. To equitably toll the two-year limitations period in NRS 11.190(4)(e), a plaintiff must show (1) diligent action in pursuing the claim, and (2) that “extraordinary circumstances” beyond the plaintiff’s control caused the claim to be filed outside the limitations period. Id. at 682.

Section 11.190(3)(a) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on a liability created by statute.

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association v. Villa Sedona Community Organization · filed 2021-03-30(3)(a)

The Court finds that, to the extent Wells Fargo’s pleading relates to any alleged violation of a right protected by statute, Wells Fargo’s claims carry a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190(3)(a), which applies to actions upon a liability created by statute.

Subsections (3)(c) and (d) impose a three-year statute of limitations on claims for intentional interference with contractual relations, negligence, gross negligence, and fraud.

Pelletier v. Bottari · filed 2021-12-21(3)(c)-(d)

In Nevada, claims for intentional interference with contractual relations, negligence, gross negligence, and fraud are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See NRS §§ 11.190(3)(c)-(d); see also Job’s Peak Ranch Community Ass’n, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty., 131 Nev. 1304 (2015) (applying a three-year limitations period for negligent misrepresentation) (unpublished decision); Stalk v. Mushkin, 199 P.3d 838, 839 (Nev. 2009) (holding intentional interference with a contract subject to three-year limitations period); Siragusa v. Brown, 971 P.2d 801, 806 (Nev. 1998) (reasoning three-year limitations period for fraud claims “accrues ‘upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud’” (quoting NRS § 11.190(3)(d)).

Section 11.190(3)(d) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Berroteran · filed 2026-01-07(3)(d)

Fourth and finally, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking to bring a claim based on fraud, which he mentions on page 9 of his Complaint (ECF No. 1-1 at 9), the statute of limitations is three years under NRS 11.190(3)(d), which also renders this claim time barred.

Section 11.190 provides a six-year limitations period for written-contract claims and four-year limitations periods for claims on open accounts for goods sold and delivered and for articles charged to a store account.

ANTONIA ANDRADE-GARCIA · filed 2021-03-31(1)(b), (2)(a), (2)(b)

More particularly, NRS 11.190(1)(b) is a Nevada statute which sets the limitations period for commencing claims based upon written contracts generally at six years. NRS 11.190(2)(a) and (b) are Nevada statutes of limitations which set the limitations period for commencing claims based upon either “an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered” or “for any article charged on an account in a store” at four years.

Subsection 11.190(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on trespass and actions based on liability created by statute, without an exception for continuing claims.

Kaplan Vs. County Of Washoe · filed 2020-05-29(3)

NRS 11.190(3) provides a three-year statute of limitations for trespass and actions based on liability created by statute (e.g., nuisance under NRS 41.140).

Section 11.190(2)(c) applies its four-year period to an oral-contract claim, with accrual when the plaintiff knows or should know facts constituting the breach.

Fine Vs. Fine · filed 2020-07-01(2)(c)

Respondent did not learn that appellants had breached the oral agreement until 2017, the same year he filed the underlying action.

Section 11.190(2)(c) imposes a four-year limitations period on contracts not founded upon an instrument in writing, including the oral contract at issue.

In Re: Estate Of Schwartz C/W 79464 · filed 2022-03-30(2)(c)

Thus, the district court properly concluded the statute of limitations barred the Estate's breach of contract claim.

Section 11.190(2)(d) provides a four-year limitations period for deceptive-trade-practice claims under NRS chapter 598.

Cantlon Vs. Wells Fargo & Company (Nrap 5) · filed 2020-11-20(2)(d)

Deceptive trade practice claims under NRS chapter 598 are generally subject to a four-year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(2)(d).

Section 11.190(2)(d) sets a four-year limitation period for Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims.

U.S. Bank National Association v. Ou · filed 2020-01-09(2)(d)

Claims for breach of Nevada Revised Statutes § 116.1113, wrongful foreclosure, and violations of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA) are governed by limitation periods of four years or less. ... Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(2)(d) (four years for NDTPA).

The statute sets a four-year limitations period for unwritten contract obligations, a three-year period for fraud claims running from discovery, and a two-year period for slander-of-title claims.

Song v. Wells Fargo · filed 2021-04-23(2)(c), (3)(d), (4)(c)

In sum, an “action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing” must be brought within four years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(2)(c). ... The statute of limitations for fraud is three years and a fraud claim accrues “upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(d). ... And finally, the statute of limitations for slander of title is two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(c).

Section 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year statute of limitations, which the court applied as one of the potentially applicable limitations periods for the plaintiff’s claim.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC · filed 2021-09-13(3)(a)

Plaintiff’s claim is untimely regardless of which statute of limitations applies—namely, the three-year limitation under NRS 11.190(3)(a), the four-year limitation under NRS 11.220, or the five-year limitation under NRS 11.070.

NRS § 11.190 provides a two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims and remains validly codified despite the codified text not displaying the enacting clause.

Kemp v. Aranas · filed 2021-11-30

The Court finds that Kemp’s statute of limitations arguments are without merit. Kemp essentially objects to applying the relevant state statute of limitation, NRS § 11.190, to § 1983 claims for two reasons. ... The Court rejects both arguments. ... Accordingly, it is appropriate to apply Nevada’s statute of limitation to Kemp’s § 1983 claim. ... The legislature has passed valid legislation, which is accurately codified in the Nevada Revised Statutes. Judge Cobb properly applied the two-year statute of limitations, as initially referenced in S.B. 235 which re-enacted NRS § 11.190 and in the text of the Nevada Revised Statutes.

Subsection (3)(a) imposes a three-year limitation on an action upon a liability created by statute, while subsection (4)(c) imposes a two-year limitation on actions for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction.

Hanna v. K-Kel, Inc. · filed 2022-01-20(3)(a) and (4)(c)

NRS 11.190(3)(a), however, provides a three-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” The phrase “liability created by statute” means a liability that would not exist but for the statute or a cause of action that is created by statute. ... Accordingly, NRS 11.190(3)(a) provides a three-year statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claim under NRS 41.690. The Court disagrees with K-Kel’s argument that a two-year statute of limitations applies under NRS 11.190(4)(c), (e). ... Subsection (c) provides a two-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction.” ... Plaintiff’s claim, however, is not an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction.

The three-year limitations period in § 11.190(3)(a) does not govern this quiet-title action; the action is subject to § 11.220's four-year catch-all limitations period.

Bank of New York Mellon, FKA The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of the CWALK, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OA6 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OA6 v. Foothills at Southern Highlands Homeowners Association et · filed 2022-03-27(3)(a)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is time barred subject to the three-year statute of limitations under NRS § 11.190(3)(a). ... Pursuant to its previous ruling in Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Tapestry at Town Ctr., 381 F.Supp.3d 1289, 1293 – 94 (D. Nev. 2019), the Court finds that this action is subject to a four-year limitations period. (“to the extent Carrington seeks relief based on alleged unconstitutionality or on equitable grounds, Carrington's claims fall within the four-year catch-all provision at NRS 11.220 and are therefore timely.”) The Property in this case was foreclosed upon on July 23, 2013. Accordingly, Plaintiff had until July 24, 2017 to file a complaint. Plaintiff filed their complaint on July 13, 2017, before the four-year limitations period elapsed. As a result, this suit is timely.

The statute supplies four-year and three-year limitation periods that the court applied to unjust-enrichment, conversion, and aiding-and-abetting fiduciary-duty claims, with accrual subject to Nevada’s discovery rule.

Miyayama v. Hosoda · filed 2022-05-25(2)(c) (3)(c)

The statute of limitations for unjust enrichment claims in Nevada is four years. ... The statutes of limitations for conversion and for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty are three years. ... Under the discovery rule, the statutory period of limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action. ... The Nevada Supreme Court has followed the discovery rule for conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty claims. ... Determining when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to a claim is generally a question of fact. ... The Court does not find Plaintiff’s claims to be time-barred.

Section 11.190(1)(b) gives a six-year limitations period to an action upon a contract, including a covenant claim.

Chicago Title Of Nev., Inc. Vs. Chtd. Holdings, Inc. C/W 80116 · filed 2021-05-24(1)(b)

The relevant facts in the covenant claims are uncontroverted, and a covenant claim is "[a]n action upon a contract," so it expires in six years. NRS 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(1)(b) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on contract actions, with accrual governed by Nevada’s discovery rule.

Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. United Construction Co. · filed 2021-11-12(1)(b)

Nevada law imposes a six-year statute of limitations for contract actions. See NRS 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(1)(b) imposes a six-year limitations period on contract actions, calculated from accrual, with accrual governed by Nevada's discovery rule.

Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. United Construction Co. · filed 2021-11-16(1)(b)

Nevada law imposes a six-year statute of limitations for contract actions. See NRS 11.190(1)(b). Limitations periods are computed “from the day the cause of action accrued.” Clark v. Robison, 944 P.2d 788, 789 (Nev. 1997). “A cause of action ‘accrues’ when a suit may be maintained thereon.” Id. ... “Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is only appropriate ‘when uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates plaintiff discovered or should have discovered’ the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. at 441.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which the court applied to the plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) claim and found untimely.

Manansingh v. United States of America · filed 2021-05-24(4)(e)

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Nevada Revised Code § 11.190(4)(e). ... As a result, Plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) claim is also untimely.

Subsections (5)(a) and (3)(c) impose one-year and three-year limitations periods, respectively, for claims involving unlawful seizure or taking, detention, or injury of personal property.

Vonseydewitz Vs. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep'T · filed 2021-09-16(5)(a), (3)(c)

In particular, NRS 11.190(5)(a) allows one year to bring any claim alleging unlawful seizure of personal property by police officers and NRS 11.190(3)(c) allows three years to bring "[An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof." Under either of those limitations periods, appellant's claim—filed more than 11 years after the seizures and 10 years after his convictions—is time-barred.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, which federal courts apply to § 1983 actions arising in Nevada.

Love v. State of Nevada · filed 2021-10-22(4)(e)

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations; instead, federal courts borrow from the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims in the forum state. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-280, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254. In Nevada, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and therefore § 1983 actions, is two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); see also Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989).

Section 11.190(4)(e) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims in Nevada, which federal courts borrow for § 1983 actions.

Love v. State of Nevada · filed 2022-02-07(4)(e)

In Nevada, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and therefore § 1983 actions, is two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); see also Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989). ... Plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred 25 years ago, long outside the 2-year statute of limitations.

Subsection (4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury damages actions, while subsection (4)(c) imposes a two-year period for slander, assault, and battery actions, subject to Nevada’s discovery rule.

Saxena v. Saxena · filed 2022-07-01(4)(e), (4)(c)

Under NRS 11.190(4)(e), actions to recover damages for personal injuries to a person have a two-year statute of limitations. Under NRS 11.190(4)(c), actions for slander, assault, and battery also have a two-year statute of limitations. Nevada recognizes the “discovery rule” of accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations purposes, meaning that the statute of limitations is tolled until the injured person discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action. Bemis v. Estate of Bemis, 114 Nev. 1021, 1024, 967 P.2d 437, 440 (1998). ... Here, Plaintiff’s claims for violation of NRS 41.1359 and battery are time barred and Plaintiff’s claim for defamation is too conclusory. First, Plaintiff’s claims arising under NRS 41.1395 arise from his allegations that Defendant attacked him in 2010. Plaintiff successfully alleges that he is a vulnerable person under the statute because he alleges that he is paraplegic and has a pre-existing traumatic brain injury. However, the abuse he describes occurred over ten years before Plaintiff brought his claim. This is well beyond the two-year statute of limitations applicable to this claim.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for Nevada personal-injury claims, which federal courts borrow for § 1983 claims.

Lewis v. Dzurenda · filed 2022-09-22(4)(e)

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Nevada is two years. NRS 11.190(4)(e). ... Lewis first filed a grievance against C/O Mesa on March 20, 2015. (#1-2, at 25). This is the first day he knew of his alleged injury. Lewis filed the present suit on October 3, 2019, which is over three years between the time the tolling period ended and the present case began. (#1). Therefore, Lewis has failed to file § 1983 in a timely manner. Thus, if the Court was not dismissing Plaintiff’s action for failing to raise genuine issues of material fact, it would dismiss his claims pursuant to the statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(1)(b)’s six-year limit applies to judicial foreclosure; when a payment is made after the debt matures, the period runs from the last payment under § 11.200.

Colpo Caldo LLC v. Trunk · filed 2021-09-15(1)(b)

Second, the Court finds that the FSA’s statute of limitations defense is meritless. NRS § 11.200 provides how the Court is to calculate time when considering the statute of limitations: ... The time in NRS 11.190 shall be deemed to date from the last transaction or the last item charged or last credit given; and whenever any payment on principal ... or interest has been or shall be made upon an existing contract, whether it be a bill of exchange, promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness if such payment be ... made after the same shall have become due, the limitation shall commence from the time the last payment was made. ... Trunk continued to make payments that were deposited until June 2013, and continued to make reduced payments through May 20, 2013, even though those payments were not cashed. ... Colpo Caldo’s verified complaint was filed May 3, 2018.