Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242

Section 33-18-242 allows an independent private action for specified claims handling and settlement practices, but not for rate discrimination.

Fossen v. Caring for Montanans, Inc. · filed 2014-01-24(3)

The Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act provides an independent private right of action for claims handling and settlement disputes. § 33-18-242(3), MCA. Montana’s UTPA does not provide for any other independent private right of action.

Section 33-18-242(1) does not provide a private cause of action for violations of § 33-18-201(2), (3), or (14).

Woodman v. Standard Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-11(1)

However, three of Woodman’s allegations are based on non-actionable subsections of § 33-18-201. Specifically, Woodman’s allegations at paragraph 29 (B), (C), and (H), correspond with § 33-18-201(2), (3), and (14). These subsections do not fall within the UTPA’s limited right of action. Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1).

Section 33-18-242(3) allows an insured to bring contract and fraud claims against an insurer but bars a bad faith action concerning claim handling.

Steinke v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America · filed 2003-07-09(3)

The MUTPA limits the claims an insured may bring against an insurer to breach of the insurance contract, fraud, and violations of the MUTPA itself. ... Plaintiff and Defendant are in agreement that these claims continue only as contract claims, rather than as tort claims. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this basis is moot.

Section 33-18-242(1) permits an insured to bring an independent claim only for violations of its enumerated § 33-18-201 subsections, which exclude subsection (7).

Fachner v. Safeco Insurance Company of America · filed 2025-07-21(1)

Quite simply, it is established law that an insured may only bring claims for violations of the enumerated sections found in Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1), and because 201(7) is not one of those enumerated sections, AEIC is entitled to summary judgment on subpart iii of paragraph 44 in Count III.

Section 33-18-242 makes an insured’s UCPA claim an independent cause of action and permits, but does not require, joining it with other claims against the insurer.

Fisher v. State Farm General Insurance · filed 1999-12-09(1), (6)(a)

Indeed, in the latter regard, § 33-18-242, MCA, expressly provides that an insured’s claim against an insurer under the UCPA is an independent cause of action and authorizes — but does not require — an insured to join a UCPA claim with other claims against the insurer.

Section 33-18-242 allows insureds and third-party claimants to sue insurers for actual damages from the listed violations of § 33-18-201, but does not authorize private claims for violations of §§ 33-18-208 or -212.

Mark Ibsen, Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc. · filed 2016-05-11(1)

Section 242 provides the narrow exception to the rule that it is the Commissioner who will enforce the UTPA. Thus, an interpretation allowing a private right of action for violation of Sections 208 and 212 is inconsistent with the statute as a whole.

An insured may pursue an independent claim under § 33-18-242 even when a third party filed the underlying insurance claim.

McVey v. USAA Casualty Insurance · filed 2013-11-13

The fact that Blough, rather than McVey, had filed the claim on July 27,2007, does not preclude McVey, the insured, from invoking the protections of §33-18-201(4) and -242, MCA.

Section 33-18-242(1) does not allow an independent cause of action for a violation of § 33-18-201(7).

Drange v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2020-07-31(1)

By not including (7) in the list of allowable claims, § 33-18-242(1) bars Plaintiffs from asserting it as an independent cause of action in the present matter.

Section 33-18-242 excludes third-party suits under § 33-18-201(2) and applies only to causes of action arising after July 1, 1987.

Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Julie Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insuran · filed 1992-11-09

That statute omits subdivision (2) from its enumeration of the subdivisions of § 33-18-201 under which a third party may bring suit. Section 33-18-242, however, only applies to causes of action arising after July 1, 1987.

For a third-party claimant, the one-year filing period begins when the parties make an enforceable settlement agreement, even if they sign the release later.

Carlson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1999-11-22(7)(b)

Bad faith claims by a third party claimant must be filed “within 1 year from the date of settlement of or the entry of judgment on the underlying claim.” M.C.A. § 33-18-242(7); ... I agree with Judge Cebull’s finding that a settlement had been reached on November 17, 1997. The release was not the settlement, but a term of the settlement. The oral agreement entered into by the parties on November 17, 1997 was an enforceable bilateral contract with executory duties on both sides.

Section 33-18-242(7)(b) requires a third-party claimant to sue within one year of settlement or entry of judgment on the underlying claim; entry of judgment means entry at the conclusion of the trial court proceedings.

Rocky Dietz v. Geico General Insurance Co. · filed 2018-05-11(7)(b)

The MUTPA provides that a third-party claimant must bring an action “within 1 year from the date of the settlement of or the entry of judgment on the underlying claim.” Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(7)(b). We reject Dietz’s argument that “entry of judgment” refers to anything other than the entry of judgment by the Clerk of Court or the district court at the conclusion of the trial court proceedings.

Section 33-18-242(4) does not bar third-party claimants from pursuing claims against non-insurers under § 33-18-201 or common law.

Couto v. CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc. · filed 2025-07-30(4)

Accordingly, § 33-18-242 as amended is not the exclusive remedy for a third-party claimant seeking redress against non-insurers because such claimants may still bring claims pursuant to § 33-18-201 or common law.

A person personally damaged by an insurer's violation of § 33-18-201(4) or (6) may sue as a third-party claimant under § 33-18-242.

O'FALLON v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2003-01-02

We conclude that where plaintiffs have alleged a violation of subsections (4) and (6) of § 33-18-201, MCA, and where they have further alleged that they were personally damaged as a result of those violations, they are third-party claimants within the meaning of § 33-18-242, MCA, and have properly set forth a claim for violation of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act.

A third-party claimant must bring a UTPA action within one year after settlement of the underlying claim.

Brilz v. Metlife Auto & Home · filed 2007-10-19(7)(b)

Though Brilz argues this agreement did not resolve her underlying claim, the district court properly held that the settlement started the clock for Brilz to file a claim under Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”). The UTPA mandates that an action by a third-party claimant must be commenced “with*460in 1 year from the date of the settlement of ... the underlying claim.” M.C.A. § 33-18-242(7)(b). When Brilz filed her third-party suit against Metlife on February 7, 2002, her allegations of violations of the UTPA were thus time barred.

Subsection (5) protects an insurer from UTPA liability when it had a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim, unless its position was wholly unreasonable.

Moe v. Geico Indemnity Co. · filed 2022-01-26(5)

Geico may not be held liable under the UTPA if it had a “reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim.” Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5). Geico is therefore protected under MCA § 33-18-242(5) unless its position is “wholly unreasonable.”

Section 33-18-242(6) protects an insurer from UTPA liability when it had a reasonable basis in law or fact to contest a claim or its amount.

Coleman v. National Indemnity Company · filed 2025-07-10(6)

Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(6) provides National cannot be held liable under the UTPA if it had “a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim(s) or the amount of the claim(s).”

Subsection (6) bars insurer bad faith liability when the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting the claim.

Coleman v. National Indemnity Company · filed 2026-06-24(6)

Because National’s coverage arguments were based on “debatable law” and “not wholly unreasonable,” Ellinghouse, 725 P.2d at 223, the district court did not err in concluding that National had a reasonable basis to contest coverage and ... dismissing Plaintiffs’ bad faith claims under common law and Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(6).

Section 33-18-242(5) bars liability when an insurer had a reasonable basis to contest a claim; whether that basis existed may require a jury to decide.

Bloxham v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1999-03-01(5)

However, under section 33-18-242(5), “An insurer may not be held liable [for an unreasonable investigation] if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” ... At this time the Court is prepared to find only that Mountain West has failed to show, as a matter of law, that it had a reasonable basis in law and fact to contest Bloxham’s claim.

Section 33-18-242(5) limits an insurer’s reasonable basis defense to facts it knew and law that existed when it denied the claim, but permits legal theories formulated later.

Eott Energy Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London · filed 1999-08-10(5)

In sum, to show that they had a reasonable basis for denying Plaintiffs claim, Defendants may use only those facts known to them at the time of their denial, but they may apply those facts to legal theories formulated after their denial. However, only legal theories based upon the law in existence at the time of the denial may be utilized.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars insurer liability when the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting the claim or its amount.

Madden v. Attorneys Liability Protection Society, Inc. · filed 2003-01-31(5)

Section 242(5) provides that “[a]n insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” ... On the contrary, ALPS had a reasonable basis in fact to contest Madden’s claim.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars insurer liability when the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting the claim or its amount.

Redding v. ProSight Specialty Management Co. · filed 2015-02-27(5)

The Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act provides that an “insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5). Because under Montana law insurers are not found to be in bad faith if they have a reasonable basis for contesting a claim, NYM did not commit bad faith by. declining to settle with Redding in February and March, 2011.

An insurer is not liable under the section if it had a reasonable basis in law or fact to contest a claim or its amount; disputed reasonableness is for the jury.

Hart v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2019-12-20(5)

However, an insurer is not liable if it “had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5). ... Whether that review was reasonable is a fact question for the jury.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars UTPA liability when an insurer has a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim; the absence of a demand supplied that basis for withholding advance medical payments.

Brodowy v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company · filed 2023-09-01(5)

An insurer may not be held liable under the UTPA if it “had a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” Mont. Code Ann. §§ 33-18-242(5). ... Because the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the Brodowys did not make a Ridley demand, Progressive had a reasonable basis in law and fact for not making advance payment of James’s medical expenses or otherwise addressing its Ridley obligations.

Section 33-18-242(5) makes a reasonable legal basis for contesting the amount of a claim an absolute defense to bad faith liability from the time the claimant presents that amount.

Cranska v. UMIA Insurance, Inc. · filed 2024-01-02(5)

The Court concludes, based on the plain language of § 25-9-411(1)(a) and the undisputed facts in this case that Defendants collectively had a reasonably basis in law for contesting the amount of damages presented in Cranska’s April 17, 2020, demand letter. This serves as an absolute defense to Cranska’s bad faith claims. However, this defense is only applicable to the time after the April 17 demand letter because, prior to that date, Cranska had not presented a dollar figure on damages.

Section 33-18-242(5)’s reasonable basis defense is a jury question when it turns on disputed facts about coverage or damages.

UMIA Insurance, Inc. v. Arguelles · filed 2025-01-21(5)

Thus, whether UMIA had a reasonable basis in fact to contest the claim or amount of the claim, is an assessment for the jury.

Section 33-18-242(6) gives an insurer a reasonable basis defense, but disputed facts about that defense must be resolved by the factfinder.

Fryer v. UMIA · filed 2025-03-03(6)

An insurer may not be held liable under Montana’s UTPA if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is at issue. ... As Judge Cavan correctly found, a reasonable basis in fact determination is inappropriate for summary judgment.

Section 33-18-242(5) shields an insurer from liability when it has a reasonable basis for contesting a claim, but the insurer must establish that defense to obtain summary judgment.

UMIA Insurance, Inc. v. Arguelles · filed 2022-03-18(5)

But an insurer may not be liable under § 33-18-242 “if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is at issue.” Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5). ... But UMIA provides no further argument as to its reasonable basis defense, nor does it provide any factual support for its motion. ... Accordingly, summary judgment as to Counterclaims Two and Three must be denied.

Section 33-18-242(5) makes an insurer’s reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim or its amount determinative to liability for refusing to pay without a reasonable investigation.

Ray v. Washington National Insurance · filed 1999-04-21(5)

The determinative issue regarding a claim under subsection (4) is whether the insurer “had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, which ever is in issue.” See, Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5). In the present case, the court can conclude, as matter of law, that Washington National did not have a reasonable basis in law or fact for rejecting a number of the claims it received with respect to Morgan’s medical care.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars liability when an insurer has a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim or its amount.

Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Ace American Insurance · filed 2013-03-26(5)

Since ACE didn’t breach the contractual provisions at issue, ACE can’t be liable under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. See Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5) (“An insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.”).

Section 33-18-242(5) bars insurer liability when the insurer has a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim or its amount.

American Economy Insurance Co. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2017-05-26(5)

Aspen Way’s counterclaims against Liberty Mutual were therefore properly dismissed. See Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5) (“An insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.”).

Section 33-18-242(5) bars insurer liability when the insurer has a reasonable basis in law or fact to contest a claim or its amount.

Oltz v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. · filed 2018-02-05(5)

However, where an insurer has "a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting a claim or the amount of a claim, whichever is at issue," the insurer is not liable under the Act. § 33-18-242(5). Safeco had a reasonable basis, factually and legally, to contest the Oltzes' claim.

Section 33-18-242(6) protects an insurer from liability when it has a reasonable legal or factual basis to dispute the amount of a claim, including a damages demand above the statutory cap.

Cranska v. Umia Insurance, Inc. · filed 2025-04-14(6)

Elsewhere, Montana law provides that “[a]n insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” Id. § 33-18-242(6) (emphasis added); see also Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 901 (Mont. 1993). These laws created a reasonable basis for the insurance companies to dispute the amount of damages that Cranska sought.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars an unfair trade practices claim when the insurer has a reasonable basis in fact and law to deny coverage.

Ward v. Safeco Insurance Company of America · filed 2021-08-09(5)

Here, the Court has determined that the Earth Movement exclusion applies to the loss in this case. Therefore, Safeco had a reasonable basis, in fact and law, to deny coverage and consequently summary judgment is appropriate on Ward’s UTPA claim.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars UTPA liability when an insurer has a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim.

Moe v. Geico Indemnity Co. · filed 2021-09-15(5)

An insurer may not be held liable under the UTPA if it “had a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(5). ... Therefore, GEICO is entitled to summary judgment on Moe’s remaining UTPA claims for the additional reason that it had a reasonable basis in law and fact for not making advance payments.

Section 33-18-242(5) makes an insurer’s reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim a defense to liability, with the existence of that basis decided by the trier of fact.

Dean v. Austin Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-02-15(5)

Rather, whether an insurer has a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting a claim or the amount of a claim is to be determined as any other disputed issue of fact based upon the evidence and circumstances of each case.

Section 33-18-242(5) shields an insurer from liability when it had a reasonable basis in law for contesting a claim; a court may decide that defense on summary judgment when the facts are undisputed.

Watters v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 2000-06-06(5)

Thus, the “trier of fact” rule set forth in Dean is not necessary in a summary judgment proceeding where the underlying “basis in law” is grounded on a legal conclusion, and no issues of fact remain in dispute. ... We must therefore conclude that a plain reading of the available case law at the time gave Guaranty a reasonable basis in law upon which it could deny payment of policy limits.

Section 33-18-242(5)’s reasonable-basis defense does not govern an insurer’s fiduciary duty to its agent.

Marie Deonier & Associates v. Paul Revere Life Insurance · filed 2000-08-31(5)

The District Court’s apparent application of § 33-18-242(5), MCA, is misplaced.

Section 33-18-242 bars insurer liability when the insurer has a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim; disputed evidence about that basis can prevent summary judgment.

Dees v. American National Fire Insurance · filed 1993-09-14(5)

An insurer, however, may not be held liable under § 33-18-242, MCA, if it had “a reasonable basis in law or in fact” for contesting the plaintiff’s claim. ... Here, conflicting evidence was presented as to whether American National reasonably denied Dees’ claim. ... We hold that Dees met his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether American National had denied his claim without reasonable investigation, and that American National was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of unfair trade practices.

Section 33-18-242 provides no independent cause of action when the insurer has a reasonable basis to contest the claim.

DeBruycker v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 1994-09-12

Guaranty and Crop Hail correctly allege that if they had a “reasonable basis” to contest the claim, then the De-Bruyckers had no independent cause of action for punitive damages under § 33-18-242, MCA.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars an unfair trade practices claim when the insurer had a reasonable basis to contest the claim or its amount.

Bartlett v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1996-12-10(5)

Section 33-18-242(5 ) , MCA, states that an insurer may not be held liable for unfair trade practices if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law, 33< in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is at issue. Here, we have affirmed the District Court's determination that Bartlett did not have an insurable interest in the property and, on that basis, Allstate clearly had a reasonable basis for not paying Bartlett's claim for insurance proceeds.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars liability when an insurer has a reasonable basis in law or fact to contest a claim or its amount; existing federal decisions can provide that legal basis even if they are incorrect.

Ridley v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 1997-12-24(5)

Because of these decisions, Ridley correctly points out that even if he incurred medical expenses due to the negligence of Guaranty National’s insured, and even if its insured’s liability for those damages is reasonably clear and Guaranty National still refuses to pay for those expenses, he cannot enforce his rights to compensation pursuant to § 33-18-242, MCA, because of the following provision in subparagraph (5) of that statute: “An insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” Section 33-18-242(5), MCA. In other words, based on the federal decisions, even if they are incorrect, Ridley’s rights under the Act are unenforceable.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars liability when an insurer has a reasonable legal basis to contest a claim, even if the decisions supporting that basis are incorrect.

Ridley v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. · filed 1998-01-30(5)

Because of these decisions, Ridley correctly points out that even if he incurred medical expenses due to the negligence of Guaranty National's insured, and even if its insured's liability for those damages is reasonably clear and Guaranty National still refuses to pay for those expenses, he cannot enforce his rights to compensation pursuant to § 33-18-242, MCA, because of the following provision in subparagraph (5) of that statute: "An insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue." Section 33-18-242(5), MCA. In other words, based on the federal decisions, even if they are incorrect, Ridley's rights under the Act are unenforceable.

Subsection (5) shields an insurer from liability when existing law gave it a reasonable basis to condition payment of policy limits on a release.

Shilhanek v. D-2 Trucking, Inc. · filed 2003-04-29(5)

In this case, Canal made its offer of settlement to the Shilhaneks over two years before Watters was decided. Consequently, like the insurer in Watters, Canal had an arguably reasonable basis in law for asserting that it was entitled to condition its payment of policy limits on the Shilhaneks providing it with a release of all claims against its insureds. Therefore, pursuant to § 33-18-242(5), MCA (1997), we conclude that Canal cannot be held liable for acting in bad faith in violation of § 33-18-201(6), MCA (1997).

Section 33-18-242(5) shields an insurer from liability when it had a reasonable basis in law for contesting a claim.

Shilhanek v. D-2 Trucking, Inc. · filed 2003-06-10(5)

Consequently, like the insurer in Watters, Canal had an arguably reasonable basis in law for asserting that it was entitled to condition its payment of policy limits on the Shilhaneks providing it with a release of all claims against its insureds. Therefore, pursuant to § 33-18-242(5), MCA (1997), we conclude that Canal cannot be held liable for acting in bad faith in violation of § 33-18-201(6), MCA (1997).

A defense verdict in the underlying negligence suit does not establish a reasonable basis defense to a UTPA claim as a matter of law.

Graf v. Continental Western Insurance · filed 2004-04-20(5)

Accordingly, a jury verdict for the defense in the underlying suit does not, as a matter of law, establish a “reasonable basis” defense under § 33-18-242(5), MCA.

Section 33-18-242(5) protects an insurer that reasonably contests a claim under the law existing at the time, even if a later decision casts doubt on its defense.

Redies v. Attorneys Liability Protection Society · filed 2007-01-17(5)

Given that we had signaled in Rhode that the Trask multi-factor balancing test may be effective for ascertaining the existence and scope of the duty owed by an attorney to nonclients in nonadversarial contexts, it was reasonable for ALPS to apply this test to the factual scenario at hand. Accordingly, we conclude that ALPS had “a reasonable basis in law” under § 33-18-242(5), MCA, for contesting Redies’ claims against Addy.

Section 33-18-242(5) bars liability under the Unfair Trade Practices Act when an insurer had a reasonable basis in law for contesting the claim.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Freyer · filed 2013-10-15(5)

Based on the plain language of § 33-18-242(5), MCA, State Farm cannot be held liable for violating the UTPA if it had a “reasonable basis in law” for contesting the claim.

An insurer’s reasonable basis in law can bar liability under the UTPA, but reasonableness generally presents a factual question that cannot be resolved while material facts remain disputed.

Marshall v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. · filed 2018-03-13(5)

Section 33-18-242(5), MCA, provides that an insurer may not be held liable for violating the UTPA if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law for their actions. Questions of reasonableness are generally factual matters properly answered by the finder of fact. ... Here, it was improper for the District Court to determine whether the Defendants acted reasonably absent a determination the Defendants reasonable basis was solely grounded on a legal conclusion and no issues of fact remained in dispute.

Section 33-18-242(5) shields an insurer from liability when it has a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting a claim or its amount; evidence that the insurer withheld even its own minimum valuation can create a factual dispute about that defense.

Shelton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. · filed 2007-06-05(5)

Section 33-18-242(5), MCA, provides that “[a]n insurer may not be held liable under this section if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim, whichever is in issue.” ... State Farm makes no showing that this issue of fact is either absent or irrelevant to its defense.

Whether an insurer had a reasonable basis in law or fact to contest a claim or its amount is generally a question of fact.

Draggin' Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. · filed 2019-10-11(5)

Whether NYM committed these violations depends in part on whether NYM “had a reasonable basis in law or fact for contesting the claim or the amount of the claim.” MCA § 33-18-242(5). Under Montana law, this determination remains “generally a question of fact.” Draggin’ Y, 439 P.3d at 942.

An insurer is not liable under § 33-18-242 if it has a reasonable basis in law for denying coverage.

Landa v. Assurance Co. of America · filed 2013-08-06(5)

Having also concluded that Alsup’s claims did not allege an “occurrence,” we similarly find that Assurance is not liable under the UTPA pursuant to § 33-18-242(5), MCA.

Section 33-18-242 provides a separate claim for unfair settlement practices; when the insurer provides a defense, the insured must prove damages, and a stipulated settlement is not presumed reasonable against the insurer.

Draggin' Y Cattle Co. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. · filed 2019-04-24

Accepting this would supplant both the insured's common-law contractual remedy and the legislative remedy afforded for an insurer's unfair practices under § 33-18-242, MCA. ... In such cases, the insured must pursue its separate breach of contract or UTPA claims against the insurer and will bear the burden of proving all elements of those claims, including damages.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b) does not bar a declaratory judgment claim for advance payment of medical expenses when liability is reasonably clear, even before the underlying claim is resolved.

DuBray v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2001-12-06(6)(b)

However, Safeco specifically held that declaratory judgment proceedings to determine liability for payment of those damages, such as medical expenses, about which liability is reasonably clear are not barred by § 33-18-242 (6)(b), MCA. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred when it dismissed that part of DuBray's claim that sought payment of medical expenses.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b) does not bar a third-party claimant’s declaratory judgment action for advance medical expenses when the claim does not seek bad faith damages under the UTPA.

Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court · filed 2000-06-08(6)(b)

We therefore affirm the District Court's conclusion that because Hill's declaratory judgment claim did not directly seek bad faith damages for a violation of the UTPA, there was no statutory bar under § 33-18-242(6)(b), MCA.

Section 33-18-242(4) permits exemplary damages but does not require them whenever an insurer violates § 33-18-201.

Burgett v. Safeco National Insurance · filed 2003-08-15(4)

The use of the permissive “may” language makes it clear that a violation of § 33-18-201 does not require that punitive damages be automatically awarded in all cases where a violation is established.

Section 33-18-242(4) permits punitive damages in a UTPA action.

Reilly v. AmTrust North America, Inc. · filed 2021-12-06(4)

Reilly brings his claims under the Montana UTPA, which permits recovery of punitive damages. ... Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(4). Accordingly, Reilly’s request for punitive damages may be considered in determining the amount in controversy.

Section 33-18-242 provides money damages, but not equitable relief, for actionable third-party UTPA claims.

Bateman v. Federal Insurance Company · filed 2011-03-24(1), (4)

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendant violated the UTPA, a statute that provides relief only in the form of money damages. See Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1), (4).

Section 33-18-242(4) permits damages only when the MUTPA violation proximately caused them.

Byorth v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2019-09-03(4)

Damages are only awarded under the MUTPA where the claimant’s damages were proximately caused by the MUTPA violation.

Section 33-18-242 does not allow an insured to seek declaratory or injunctive relief for a UTPA violation.

Byorth v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2019-12-10(1), (3)

The UTPA, however, neither creates a right of action for declaratory judgment, nor does it allow for declaratory or injunctive relief. See, Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1), (3).

Section 33-18-242 does not allow declaratory or injunctive relief under the UTPA.

Moe v. Geico Indemnity Co. · filed 2020-06-19(1), (3)

The Court agrees with Judge DeSoto that any surviving aspect of Moe’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief would fail because the plain language of the UTPA precludes that type of relief. Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1), (3).

Section 33-18-242(1) provides actual damages as a remedy for UTPA violations but does not authorize declaratory relief.

Cooper v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2024-01-29(1)

This Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that the UTPA neither creates a right of action for declaratory relief, nor does it allow declaratory relief.

Section 33-18-242 does not allow third-party claimants to recover attorney fees as damages for an insurer’s unfair claim settlement practices.

Sampson v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. · filed 2006-09-26(1), (4)

The Legislature did not construct the UTPA to provide for the recovery of attorney fees and therefore we cannot construe it to do so.

Section 33-18-242(4) allows punitive damages for unfair insurance practices when actual fraud or actual malice is established; individual awards also require actual damages.

Jacobsen v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2013-08-29(4)

Further, instead of considering class-wide punitive damages, the class trial will determine whether Allstate’s implementation of the CCPR involved either actual fraud or actual malice pursuant to §27-1-221, MCA. See §33-18-242(4), MCA; Lorang v. Fortis Ins. Co., 2008 MT 252, ¶ 91, 345 Mont. 12, 192 P.3d 186. ... If so, the trier of fact in the later individual cases may determine the amount of individual punitive damages to be awarded if individual actual damages are also established.

Section 33-18-242 permits damages from a breach of an insurance contract to serve as compensatory damages for a UTPA violation, allowing the jury to consider punitive damages if the insurer acted with malice.

Estate of Gleason v. Central United Life Insurance · filed 2015-05-20(4)

Section 33-18-242, MCA, expressly provides for an award of punitive damages in cases of certain UTPA violations. It does not condition the award of punitive damages on a showing of compensatory damages beyond the damages arising out of the breach of the insurance contract which gave rise to the UTPA action.

Section 33-18-242’s remedy for additional damages, including punitive damages, is preempted when used to seek damages for processing an ERISA benefit claim.

Stephanie Elliot, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant · filed 2003-08-01

Unlike the not preempted independent review mechanism of Rush Prudential, Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242 provides damages above and beyond those provided in ERISA, including punitive damages. Because the present case “involve[s] the sort of additional claim or remedy exemplified in Pilot Life,” Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 380, it falls within § 1132 preemption.

A claim under § 33-18-242(1) for misrepresentations in processing ERISA plan benefits is completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a) when it rests on no independent legal duty.

Kenyon v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. · filed 2025-07-18(1)

Here, in considering the above cases and the statutes at issue, the Court finds that Kenyon’s claim for alleged violations of UTPA § 201(1) could have been brought under ERISA. ... Accordingly, having already concluded that Kenyon’s claims satisfy the requirements of the first prong of the Davila test, and determining here that they also fall squarely within the second, the Court concludes that Kenyon’s state-law causes of action are completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a).

Section 33-18-242 allows a bad faith claims-handling action against a self-insured railroad that FELA does not categorically preempt; the court left advance-payment claims unresolved.

Dannels v. BNSF · filed 2021-03-23(1)

Section 33-18-242(1), MCA, of the UTPA authorizes an insured or a third-party claimant to pursue “an independent cause of action against an insurer for actual damages caused by the insurer’s violation of subsection (1), (4), (5), (6), (9), or (13) of [§] 33-18-201[, MCA].” ... We reaffirm our conclusion in Reidelbach that the FELA does not occupy the entirety of the field of recovery for injured railroad employees so as to preempt State bad faith law claims premised on a self-insured railroad’s claims-handling conduct.

Section 33-18-242(3) preempts an insured’s assigned first-party claims for bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and deceit arising from an insurer’s handling of a claim.

Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2004-06-22(3)

We agree and affirm the district court’s ruling that Burton’s assigned first-party causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and deceit are preempted by the UTPA, and that the UTPA does not violate the equal protection clause of Montana’s Constitution in this case.

Section 33-18-242(3) precludes a separate breach of fiduciary duty claim against an insurer.

Davis v. Progressive Casualty Insurance · filed 2007-02-16(3)

An instruction on fiduciary duty would have been legal error because Davis did not plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and was precluded from doing so by UTPA. Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242(3); see also Thomas v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 292 Mont. 357, 973 P.2d 804, 809 (1998).

Section 33-18-242(3) bars claims against an insurer for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Peterson v. Time Insurance Company · filed 2014-03-13(3)

With respect to Time Insurance Company, Assurant Health and John Alden Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Assurant”), the district court correctly held that Peterson’s claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(3).

Section 33-18-242(3) does not preclude a contract claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Burnett v. PacificSource Health Plans · filed 2020-02-19(3)

Pending before the Court is Defendant PacificSource Health Plans’ Motion to Dismiss Common Law Tort Claim of Bad Faith! under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by which Defendant contends Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, specifically Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(3), precludes Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’ Plaintiffs respond that Montana law provides for breach of the implied covenant as a contract action.’ Plaintiffs are correct.

Section 33-18-242(3) preempts a conversion claim based on wrongful subrogation that arises from the handling of an insured’s claim.

James Lee Construction, Inc. v. Government Employees Insurance Company · filed 2020-08-11(3)

Ultimately, that the same conduct underlies both claims underscores that the Unfair Trade Practices Act preempts the conversion claim.

Section 33-18-242(3) preempts an insured’s negligence claim for damages arising from the handling of an insurance claim.

Horne v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2026-01-29(3)

Plaintiff’s proposed negligence cause of action in the SAC is based on a claim for damages as a result of the handling of an insurance claim, and therefore is preempted by the UTPA.

Section 33-18-242(3) does not bar common law bad faith or breach of fiduciary duty claims based on conduct before the insurer handled the claim.

Lenihan v. Trustage Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2024-07-09(3)

Based upon the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(3) does not bar Martha’s claims of bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 33-18-242(3) bars an insured’s implied covenant claim based on the handling of an insurance claim.

King v. Health Care Services Corp. · filed 2024-07-15(3)

King’s assertion relates to the handling of an insurance claim of the type barred by Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(3).

Section 33-18-242(3) bars implied covenant claims that disguise insurance bad faith claims about claim handling, but permits claims challenging the reasonableness of a settlement offer.

Lohrke · filed 2025-10-15(3)

Section § 33-18-242(3) bars a covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim that is just “an insurance bad faith claim in disguise.” Id. citing DuBray v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 36 P.3d 897, 899 (Mont. 2001). ... In particular, King creates a clear distinction between the reasonableness of a settlement offer from the insurer and the reasonableness of the insurer’s processing of the claim. King, at *3. The Court will not ignore its previous holdings. The Court declines to dismiss Lohrke’s claim that Connect breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing at summary judgment.

Section 33-18-242(3) does not bar common law claims based on an insurer’s conduct during policy renewal rather than its handling of an insurance claim.

Thomas v. Northwestern National Insurance · filed 1998-12-31(3)

Therefore, we hold that § 33-18-242(3), MCA, does not bar appellants’ common law causes of action.

Section 33-18-242(3) does not bar a third-party claimant from bringing a common law bad faith claim.

Brewington v. Employers Fire Insurance · filed 1999-12-13(3)

We cannot insert the term “third-party claimant” into § 33-18-242(3), MCA. Therefore, we conclude that § 33-18- 242, MCA does not prohibit a third-party claimant from bringing an action for common law bad faith.

Section 33-18-242(3) does not bar a bad faith claim based on an insurer’s conduct before the insurance application process.

Williams v. Union Fidelity Life Insurance · filed 2005-11-01(3)

Hence, she contends that § 33-18-242(3), MCA, which refers to the handling of an insurance claim, does not bar her bad faith claim. We agree. ... Finally, we hold that § 33-18-242(3), MCA, does not bar Barbara from bringing her bad faith claim on retrial.

Section 33-18-242(3) does not bar an insured’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract.

Kombol v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2020-09-30(3)

Therefore, the UTPA does not preclude parties from pursuing claims for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and Allstate Vehicle’s argument to dismiss part of Kombol’s Count I is denied.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b) requires a third-party claimant to have an underlying claim against a first-party insured and to wait until that claim is settled or resolved by a judgment in the claimant’s favor before suing the insurer.

Hart v. PacificSource Health Plans · filed 2019-07-19(6)(b)

Unlike the parties in O’Fallon, David has not filed a claim against a first-party insured. The UTPA remains clear that “[a] third-party may not file an action under this section until after the underlying claim has been settled or a judgment entered in favor of the claimant on the underlying claim.” Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(6)(b). David does not possess a third-party claim against a first-party insured under the Policy.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b) makes settlement or judgment of the underlying claim a jurisdictional prerequisite to a third-party UTPA action, and the complaint must allege facts showing it was satisfied.

Hayashi v. File · filed 2021-11-30(6)(b)

The Montana Supreme Court has held that the statutory requirement of settlement or judgment under Section 33-18-242(6)(b) is jurisdictional. ... Hayashi has thus not alleged any facts to show that the jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the UTPA has been satisfied.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b) requires a third-party claimant to show that the underlying claim was settled or that a judgment was entered before bringing a UTPA claim.

Hayashi v. File · filed 2022-08-18(6)(b)

As the plain language of § 33-18-242(6)(b) provides, a third-party claimant may not do so until the underlying claim is settled, or a judgment entered.

Section 33-18-242(7)(b)’s settlement-or-judgment prerequisite applies to claims brought under section 33-18-242, not to a separate declaratory judgment claim.

Satterwhite v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. · filed 2024-08-14(7)(b)

However, because Plaintiffs have not brought a claim pursuant to § 33-18-242, subsection (7)(b) does not apply.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b) requires settlement or judgment on the underlying claim before a bad faith action, but does not require the insured’s liability to be established first.

Lough v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1990-03-23(6)(b)

Section 33-18-242 (6)(b), MCA, requires settlement or entry of judgment on the underlying claim prior to instigation of the bad faith claim. That section does not require that liability of the insured be established as a condition precedent to the bad faith litigation.

A third-party claimant may file an independent action only after the underlying claim is settled or judgment is entered in the claimant's favor.

Grenz v. Orion Group, Inc. · filed 1990-07-12(6)(b)

As stated in Visue and Hayes an independent action may lie after the underlying claim has been settled or a judgment entered in Mr. Grenzl favor.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b) permits an unfair trade practices action concerning settled portions of an underlying claim, but requires unresolved benefits to be settled or adjudicated before an action concerning them may proceed.

Poteat v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. · filed 1996-06-25(6)(b)

Since an underlying settlement is in place as mandated by 5 33-18-242(6)(b), MCA, Poteat may legitimately pursue a UTPA claim in the District Court regarding pre-settlement unfair trade practices.

A third-party claimant seeking residual diminished value damages under the UTPA must wait until the underlying claim is settled or judgment is entered, even if the claimant seeks declaratory relief.

Hop v. SAFECO INS. CO. OF ILLINOIS · filed 2011-08-30(6)(b)

This being so, Ridley and DuBray do not support Hop’s contention that he may seek RDV under the UDJA without first meeting the requirements of § 33-18-242(6)(b), MCA. Therefore, Hop’s UTPA claim against Safeco for RDV is not ripe for adjudication.

Section 33-18-242 requires an individual to participate in claim settlement before the individual can be liable for unfair claim settlement practices.

Fortner Honey, Inc. v. Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company · filed 2022-09-29

But the plain language of the MUTPA does not extend liability indefinitely—to engage in unfair claim settlement practices, an individual must be participating in claim settlement.

An insured’s statutory bad faith claim may proceed against a defendant plausibly alleged to be an insurer, even when its insurer status remains disputed at the pleading stage.

Billings Clinic v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2024-11-27

Next, Billings Clinic alleges that Defendants engaged in five separate prohibited unfair claim settlement practices under Montana’s UTPA. ... However, as discussed above, Billings Clinic noted numerous pages in the Policy and the Binder to show Zurich’s identification as a contracting party and insurer. ... Consequently, in construing the factual allegations in a light most favorable to Billings Clinic, the Court finds that Billings Clinic’s allegations are sufficient to withstand Zurich’s motion to dismiss.

Section 33-18-242 limits its statutory cause of action and proof standard to claims against insurers.

O'Fallon v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1993-08-30

However, the statutory cause of action provided for in § 33-18-242, MCA, and the different standard of proof which that statute provides for, apply only to insurers as defined in F, 33-1-201(6), MCA.

Section 33-18-242(4)’s restrictions on third-party claimants do not apply to conduct and injuries that occurred before the provision took effect in 2023.

Dzintars v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company · filed 2024-09-30(4)

Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by § 33-18-242(4) because the alleged conduct and injuries occurred in 2022.

The 1987 amendment to § 33-18-242 applies only to causes of action arising after July 1, 1987.

United States v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. · filed 1997-06-27

This amended section became effective July 1, 1987. The enabling legislation for the amendment provides: "This Act applies to causes of action arising after the effective date of this act." According to his complaint, which was filed in October 1986, Baltrusch's cause of action arose no later than July 28, 1986, when it last performed services on the contract. Amended section 33-18-242, MCA, therefore, did not apply to Baltrusch's cause of action, and it would have been futile to permit an amendment to the complaint to rely on the amended statute.

An insured may bring a claim under § 33-18-242 before the underlying claim is settled or adjudicated.

Peris v. Safeco Insurance · filed 1996-05-17(6)(a)

We conclude that under the plain language of 5 33-18-242, MCA, it is not necessary that settlement be approved by the insurer or judgment be rendered before an insured may file a cause of action against his or her insurer alleging violation of the Act.

Section 33-18-242(6)(a) permits bifurcation of claims for trial but does not specify when bifurcation is proper or whether separate juries may hear the claims.

Malta Public School District A & 14 v. Montana Seventeenth Judicial District Court · filed 1997-06-02(6)(a)

While § 33-18-242(6)(a), MCA, authorizes bifurcation of actions for trial, it provides no guidance as to when bifurcation is proper, nor does the statute address the issue here — i.e. if the actions are bifurcated, should or may the cases be tried to different juries.

Section 33-18-242(6)(a) permits bifurcation of an insured's claims but does not specify when bifurcation is proper or whether separate juries may hear the claims.

School Dist. v. Seventeenth Jud. Dist. · filed 1997-06-02(6)(a)

While 33-18-242(6)(a), MCA, authorizes bifurcation of actions for trial, it provides no guidance as to when bifurcation is proper, nor does the statute address the issue here--i.e. if the actions are bifurcated, should or may the cases be tried to different juries.

Section 33-18-242 permits an unfair claim settlement action based on an insurer’s continuing bad faith, including conduct after the insured files suit.

Federated Mutual Insurance v. Anderson · filed 1999-11-23

A violation of this provision gives rise to an independent cause of action pursuant to § 33-18-242, MCA. ... Therefore, the continuing duty of good faith can be breached by an insurer’s postfiling conduct. ... We conclude that Conifer was entitled to present proof to the jury that John Deere’s bad faith was a continuing course of conduct, and that its postjudgment conduct is admissible to prove malice.

An unfair claim settlement practices suit must be brought within two years of the violation.

Webster v. Geico Ins. Co. · filed 2000-07-06(7)(a)

The statute of limitations for bringing an unfair claim settlement practices suit is two years from the date of the violation. Section 33-18-242(7)(a), MCA.

A third-party UTPA claim must be brought within one year of the underlying settlement, which occurs when the parties make a binding agreement to dispose of the case.

Draggin' Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. · filed 2020-01-13(7)(b)

The Court rejects NYM’s argument that the statute of limitations for common law and UTPA bad faith claims bars Draggin’ Y and the Peterses’ claims. Draggin’ Y and the Peterses must bring their UTPA claim “[w]ithin 1 year from the date of the settlement of . . . the underlying claim.” MCA § 33-18-242(7)(b). ... The parties did not have a binding contractual agreement until the Montana district court approved the stipulated judgment as fair and reasonable.

A third-party bad faith claim arising from a disputed workers’ compensation benefit accrues when that particular dispute is resolved, even if other issues in the compensation case remain unresolved; the claimant then has one year to sue.

O'Connor v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2004-03-23(6)(b), (7)(b)

A third-party claimant may not bring an action pursuant to the MUTPA “until after the underlying claim has been settled or a judgment entered in favor of the claimant on the underlying claim.” Section 33-18-242(6)(b), MCA. Furthermore, the statute of limitations for an action brought by a third-party claimant pursuant to the MUTPA is “within 1 year from the date of the settlement of or the entry of judgment on the underlying claim.” Section 33-18-242(7)(b), MCA. ... In other words, we determine the accrual date of a bad faith claim arising out of a separate and independent disputed issue by determining whether that particular issue has been ultimately resolved, regardless of the existence or absence of a resolution of other issues within the workers’ compensation case.

Section 33-18-242(6)(b)’s claim processing restrictions do not change when an alleged statutory bad faith injury occurs: the injury occurs when a claim is allegedly handled and rejected unreasonably.

Boettcher v. Montana Guaranty Fund · filed 2007-03-13(6)(b)

Any claim processing restrictions imposed under § 33-18-242(6)(b), MCA, do not alter the fact that the Boettchers’ alleged injuries in this case occurred when MIGA, Western Guaranty, and Reed handled and allegedly unreasonably rejected the Boettchers’ demands for payment.