Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-201

Section 33-18-201(6) allows a third-party bad faith claim against an insurer to be established without a determination that the insured was negligent.

Bailey v. Scholler · filed 1986-03-19(6)

Bad faith may be established even in the absence of a determination thát Scholler was negligent.

Section 33-18-201 does not support a claim by a person who is neither an insured nor a third-party claimant asserting a claim against an insured under the policy.

Neumann v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans · filed 1991-09-17(6)

Because Helmut is neither an insured under the policy nor a “third-party” asserting a claim for relief against an insured covered by the terms of the policy, he may not assert a claim against AAL which is based upon the obligations imposed upon AAL by Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-201 (1987).

Violations of subsections (2), (3), (7), and (14) of § 33-18-201 do not give rise to a private right of action under Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Peterson v. Time Insurance Company · filed 2014-03-13(2), (3), (7), (14)

The district court correctly held that Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”) does not create a private right of action for violations of subsections (2), (3), (7) or (14) of Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-201.

An insured may bring a private UTPA action for violations of § 33-18-201(1), (4)–(6), (9), and (13), but not for violations of its other subsections.

Avenue C Apartments, LLC v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company · filed 2019-12-03

An insured may only bring a cause of action against an insurer under the UTPA for violations of § 33-18-201(1), (4)-(6), (9), and (13).

A claim against an individual under § 33-18-201 requires facts showing that the individual committed an unfair trade practice frequently enough to indicate a general business practice.

Burnett v. PacificSource Health Plans · filed 2019-08-26

Claims against individuals require, however, that the named defendant commit the unfair trade practice “with such frequency as to ... indicate a general business practice.”

An insured’s bankruptcy stay does not relieve an insurer of the requirements of § 33-18-201.

Crum v. Tomlinson (In Re Hettick) · filed 2009-02-25

While that may have been a practical effect of the stay, EMC was not the debtor and the stay did not relieve it of its duty to defend under the CGL policy or the requirements of § 33-18-201.

Subsection (7) does not provide an insured with an independent UTPA cause of action.

Fachner v. Safeco Insurance Company of America · filed 2025-07-21(7)

However, that particular subsection of § 33-18-201 cannot provide the basis for an independent UTPA claim.

Section 33-18-201(2), (3), and (14) do not support an independent damages claim under § 33-18-242(1); a plaintiff must identify another legal basis for those claims or remove them.

Horne v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2026-01-29(2), (3), (14)

Plaintiff’s claims under subsections (2), (3), and (14) appear to be expressly barred by the UTPA. Under Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1), “[a]n insured or a third-party claimant has an independent cause of action against an insurer for actual damages caused by the insurer's violation of 33-18-201(1), (4), (5), (6), (9), or (13).” ... Plaintiff must amend her complaint to either explain a legal basis for her claims under subsections (2), (3), and (14) or remove those claims.

Section 33-18-201 unfair claim settlement practices claims may be brought only against insurance companies.

Sharity Ministries, Inc. · filed 2025-07-24

Montana law requires that such claims may be brought only against insurance companies, and, given that Aliera and Sharity have both been dismissed from the suit and the Individual Defendants are natural persons, this claim is effectively dismissed.

Section 33-18-201 allows unfair claim settlement practice claims only against insurance companies.

The Aliera Companies Inc. · filed 2025-07-24

Montana law requires that such claims may be brought only against insurance companies, and, given that Aliera and Sharity have both been dismissed from the suit and the Individual Defendants are natural persons, this claim is effectively dismissed.

Section 33-18-201 provides an implied private cause of action against persons, including non-insurers, for prohibited claim-settlement practices, and the 2023 amendment to § 33-18-242 does not make the latter section an exclusive remedy for third-party claimants.

Couto v. CorVel Enterprise Comp., Inc. · filed 2025-07-30

Under the plain meaning of these two sections, § 33-18-201 and § 33-18-242 provide two distinct causes of action: the former against a “person,” the latter against an “insurer.” This indicates that § 33-18-242 is not the exclusive remedy available to Plaintiffs here.

Section 33-18-201(6) creates an obligation from an insurer to a claimant, and breach of that obligation supports a civil action.

Klaudt v. Flink · filed 1983-01-28(6)

We therefore hold that section 33-18-201(6), MCA, does create an obligation running from the insurer to the claimant. When such an obligation is breached the claimant has the basis for a civil action.

Subsection (7) protects insureds, not third party claimants, from substantially low settlement offers that compel litigation.

Hart-Anderson v. Hauck · filed 1988-01-08(7)

Using the analysis for statutory construction cited by this Court in Klaudt v. Flink (1983), 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065, 1067, 40 St.Rep. 64, 66, we find that Subsection (7) of the Act does not protect third party claimants.

Section 33-18-201 prohibits individuals and insurers from engaging in specified unfair trade practices, and a claimant harmed by an individual's violation may bring a common law action.

O'Fallon v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1993-08-30

Based on the foregoing history, we conclude that individuals, as well as insurers, are prohibited from engaging in the unfair trade practices set forth in 5 33-18-201, MCA, and that when an individual breaches the obligations imposed by that statute, the claimant who is damaged by that breach has a common law cause of action against that individual.

Section 33-18-201 prohibits insurers and claims adjusters from engaging in its listed unfair trade practices.

DeBruycker v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 1994-09-12

It is clear from the language of § 33-18-201, MCA, that not just insurers, but also claims adjusters, are prohibited from engaging in acts that are prohibited [by this statute].

Section 33-18-201(1) applies to coverage misrepresentations made by an insurance agent through an insurance agency.

Fillinger v. Northwestern Agency, Inc. · filed 1997-06-03(1)

The misrepresentations as to the extent of coverage under the Fillingers' policy, made by the individual insurance agent, Jenkins, through the insurance agency, Northwestern, are trade practices which are prohibited under 33-18-201, and -202, MCA.

Section 33-18-201 prohibits individuals, including claims adjusters, from unfair claim settlement practices and permits a harmed claimant to bring a common law claim against an individual who violates it.

O'FALLON v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2003-01-02

Based on the foregoing history, we conclude that individuals, as well as insurers, are prohibited from engaging in the unfair trade practices set forth in § 33-18-201, MCA, and that when an individual breaches the obligations imposed by that statute, the claimant who is damaged by that breach has a common law cause of action against that individual.

Section 33-18-201(2) and (14) have no remedy under Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Samson v. Cincinnati Insurance (In Re Blixseth) · filed 2012-03-12(2), (14)

Furthermore, Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act provides no remedy for violations of § 33-18-201(2) and (14).

Section 33-18-201 does not provide a claim against the Montana State Fund because the Insurance Code does not apply to it.

White v. State Fund · filed 2013-07-12

The District Court correctly concluded that White’s complaint failed to state a claim because there are no facts that White could prove in support of his complaint against the State Fund that would entitle him to relief under §33-18-201, MCA.

An insured may invoke § 33-18-201(4) even when someone else filed the claim that triggered the insurer’s investigation.

McVey v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co. · filed 2013-11-14(4)

The fact that Blough, rather than McVey, had filed the claim on July 27, 2007, does not preclude McVey, the insured, from invoking the protections of §§ 33-18-201(4) and -242, MCA.

A private action for a violation of § 33-18-201 is available only for the subsections specified in § 33-18-242(1).

Mark Ibsen, Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc. · filed 2016-05-11

Second, Section 242 expressly grants insureds and third-party claimants, “an independent cause of action against an insurer” for the insurer’s violation of discrete provisions of § 33-18-201, MCA. Section 242 provides the narrow exception to the rule that it is the Commissioner who will enforce the UTPA.

A violation of § 33-18-201(7) cannot support an independent cause of action because § 33-18-242(1) does not include it among the violations for which an insured may sue.

Drange v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2020-07-31(7)

By not including (7) in the list of allowable claims, § 33-18-242(1) bars Plaintiffs from asserting it as an independent cause of action in the present matter. Count I of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is therefore dismissed to the extent it seeks to assert a violation of § 33-18-201(7).

Section 33-18-201(6) creates a duty to settle that third-party claimants may enforce in a private tort action against an insurer.

Marzolf v. Hoover · filed 1984-07-31(6)

The Klaudt decision recognized the right of third-party claimants to maintain a private civil cause of action against an insurer for breach of the duty to settle, an obligation created by § 33-18-201(6), M.C.A. (1979).

Subsections (2) and (3) do not make a prompt, good faith coverage decision following a reasonable factual investigation actionable merely because the insurer refuses to advance defense costs amid a split in legal authority.

American Casualty Co. of Reading v. Bank of Montana System · filed 1987-12-10(2), (3)

Given the split in authority on whether American had a duty to advance defense costs the Court finds that American’s failure to advance those costs was not prompted by bad faith. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes defendants’ allegations are simply not actionable under Mont.Code Ann. §§ 33-18-201(2), (3).

Section 33-18-201(4) allows an insurer to satisfy its investigation duty through competent defense counsel’s investigation unless an event alerts the insurer that the investigation is insufficient.

Madden v. Attorneys Liability Protection Society, Inc. · filed 2003-01-31(4)

On the contrary, in the absence of some event that would put the insurer on notice of an insufficiency in the investigation conducted by the competent counsel it retained to defend its insured, that investigation is attributable to the insurer and fulfills its obligation under Montana law.

A claimant under the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act must establish that the insurer lacked reasonable justification for refusing payment of an insurance claim.

Dion v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-02-09

In order to prevail upon her claim under the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act, Dion must establish Nationwide lacked reasonable justification for refusing payment of her claim for underinsured motorist benefits. See, Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-201 (1995).

An insurer violates subsection (1) by misstating a newborn’s coverage start date and subsection (4) by rejecting covered claims without a reasonable investigation that would reveal the insured’s timely notice.

Ray v. Washington National Insurance · filed 1999-04-21(1), (4)

Subsection (1) of § 33-18-201 prohibits an insurer from misrepresenting insurance policy provisions. ... The coverage commencement date described in the first Change Amendment is clearly contrary to the prescriptions of Part 7, Section B of the Washington National policy, which provides that coverage for newborn children automatically commences on the date the child was born. ... Subsection (4) of § 33-18-201 prohibits an insurer from refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information. ... A reasonable investigation would have revealed these facts. Washington National has failed to present a persuasive argument to the contrary. Accordingly, Ray’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted.

Section 33-18-201 requires a prompt, reasonable investigation based on available information; an insurer need not investigate further when its prior investigation and the later complaint reveal no basis for coverage.

Troutt v. Colorado Western Insurance · filed 2001-04-02(4)

Insurers have the duty to investigate claims and coverage in a prompt fashion. See Tynes v. Bankers Life Co., 224 Mont. 350, 730 P.2d 1115, 1124 (1986); see also Mont.Code. Ann. § 33-18-201 (1999) (an insurer may not “refuse to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information ... ”). ... Regardless of the reasons why the Engstrands’ complaint was never amended, after having already conducted a three-month investigation, and armed with a complaint that only confirmed the findings of that investigation, CWIC was reasonable in its determination that no further investigation was needed.

Section 33-18-201(4) requires a reasonable claim investigation; an insurer may rely on a reasonable investigation by its insured’s lawyer, but whether that reliance was reasonable can be a triable fact question.

Bateman v. Federal Insurance Company · filed 2011-03-24(4)

The district court correctly held that, in general, an insurance company may rely on a reasonable investigation conducted by the insured’s lawyer. ... In this case, however, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant was on notice that counsel’s investigation was unreasonable.

Section 33-18-201(4) requires a reasonable investigation based on available information, but does not require an insurer to investigate a claim in the same way as the claimant.

Redding v. ProSight Specialty Management Co. · filed 2015-02-27(4)

A claim that an insurer has failed to conduct “a reasonable investigation based upon all available information” before refusing to pay an insurance claim is premised upon Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-201(4). ... Redding’s assertion that NYM did not investigate the claim in the same way that she investigated and prepared her claim for litigation is not the correct test for a reasonable investigation by an insurer under Montana law.

Whether an insurer reasonably investigated a claim under subsection (4) is a jury question when the evidence disputes the adequacy of its review of available information.

Hart v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2019-12-20(4)

Whether that review was reasonable is a fact question for the jury.

A claim under § 33-18-201(6) for unfair claim settlement practices fails when the policy provides no coverage.

Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Grieshop · filed 2021-03-31(6)

Because the Court has found there is no coverage for Grieshop under the Policies, Grieshop’s UTPA and bad faith claims necessarily fail.

Subsection (4) requires a reasonable investigation when an insurer refuses to pay a claim; the requirement does not apply when the insurer agrees to pay benefits.

Bentle v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2022-12-19(4)

The UTPA requires insurers to conduct a reasonable investigation only where they refuse to pay a claim. Mont. Code Ann § 33-18-201(4). The reasonableness of the investigation does not apply where an insurer has agreed to pay benefits.

Section 33-18-201(4) requires an initial refusal to pay before an unreasonable-investigation claim can succeed.

Bentle v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2023-11-14(4)

Still, there must be an initial refusal for a § 33-18-201(4) claim to survive.

Subsection (4) requires an initial refusal to pay a claim; an insurer that never refuses the claim does not violate this provision.

Cranska v. UMIA Insurance, Inc. · filed 2024-01-02(4)

The Court agrees that because Defendants did not “refuse” to pay Cranska’s claim, there was no violation of § 33-18-201(4).

A claim under § 33-18-201 generally turns on how the insurer acted given the information available to it, making the claimant’s underlying attorney file generally undiscoverable unless the claimant’s conduct delayed or impaired settlement.

Fryer v. UMIA · filed 2024-03-26

Further, the Court finds evidence of Plaintiffs’ evaluation of their cases, their expert evaluations, and any evidence Plaintiffs possessed regarding fraud, are not relevant to the issues in this action. The essence of a claim under the MUTPA, “is that an insurer, given information available to it, has acted unreasonably in adjusting a claim, perhaps by failing to investigate, failing to communicate or failing to negotiate in good faith.”

Section 33-18-201(4) allows an insurer to rely on a well-qualified attorney’s investigation of an insured’s claim unless the insurer has notice that the investigation is insufficient.

Lawson v. Federated Rural Electric Insurance Exchange · filed 2024-10-07(4)

A well-qualified attorney the insurer retains to represent an insured can act on the insurer’s behalf to fulfill the investigation obligations Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18- 201(4) imposes on the insurer and an insurer is entitled to rely on the investigation unless the insurer has notice the investigation is insufficient.

Under § 33-18-201(4), whether and when an insurer told medical providers that it needed a missing MRI can be material to whether the insurer conducted a reasonable investigation before refusing to pay a claim.

Rutherford · filed 2025-12-19(4)

Whether and when HCSC notified Rutherford’s providers that they needed to provide an MRI involves a material fact. The uncertainty in the record and disagreement between the parties demonstrate that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts. The Court determines that summary judgment would be improper on this issue given the dispute underlying the factual record. The Court denies Rutherford’s motion for partial summary judgment on his UTPA claim (Doc. 106).

In a claim under subsection (6), later-acquired expert testimony may address the insurer’s conduct if it analyzes only the facts and law known to the insurer when it handled the underlying claim.

Fryer v. UMIA · filed 2025-04-03(6)

The key to abiding by Montana’s “after-acquired” evidence rule is to restrict expert testimony to an analysis of the facts and law known to the insurance company at the time of the Underlying Claims.

Subsection (1) permits a finding of misrepresentation when an insurer gives inconsistent statements about coverage or includes an erroneous anti-stacking provision in its policy.

Lohrke · filed 2026-03-25(1)

The Court determines that a legally sufficient basis existed for a reasonable jury to determine that Connect had misrepresented pertinent facts or policy provisions to Lohrke pursuant to § 33-18-201(1) both to Connect’s inconsistent communications over MedPay, and to Connect’s erroneous anti-stacking policy for uninsured motorist coverage.

Section 33-18-201 requires insurers to investigate claims and coverage promptly, including claims that may not be covered.

Daly Ditches Irrigation District v. National Surety Corp. · filed 1988-11-29

Daly also argues that the duty to investigate under 5 33-18-201, MCA, mandated greater action on the part of Surety. ... Thus, we do not agree that an insurer has only the duty to investigate covered claims.

These provisions require insurers to respond promptly to claim communications, adopt reasonable standards for investigating claims, and investigate claims reasonably before refusing payment.

Walker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 1990-02-05(2), (3), and (4)

Paragraph (2) of that Section refers to the failure of an insurance company to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims. Walker contends that St. Paul’s failure to respond to letters addressed to it and the failure to investigate following the receipt of such letters constitutes a violation of the Act. Walker also contends that there was a failure to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims as required under paragraph (3) of that Section. Various facts are set forth by Walker which could be construed as sufficient to establish such a failure. Walker also claims that there was a refusal to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation as required under paragraph (4) of that Section. Sufficient facts are set ... forth to establish an issue as to whether or not a reasonable investigation had been made as so required.

Section 33-18-201(4) requires an insurer to conduct a reasonable investigation based on all available information before refusing to pay a claim.

Dees v. American National Fire Insurance · filed 1993-09-14(4)

We hold that Dees met his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether American National had denied his claim without reasonable investigation, and that American National was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of unfair trade practices.

Section 33-18-201(5) requires an insurer to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time after a claim is presented; it does not govern conduct during policy renewal.

Thomas v. Northwestern National Insurance · filed 1998-12-31(5)

Under § 33-18-201(5), MCA, relied on by the District Court, an insurer is required to either affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time after a claim is presented. The appellants’ causes of action focus on Northwestern’s conduct during the renewal of the policy, not on the improper handling of the claim or on dilatory claims processing, which § 33-18-201(5), MCA, prohibits.

Section 33-18-201 imposes no obligation to settle a claim or institute litigation when the title insurance policy does not cover the claim.

Yellowstone II Development Group, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance · filed 2001-03-06

In concluding that First American did not breach its policy agreement with Yellowstone II-i.e., there was no claim to settle-it is therefore clear, as a matter of law, it had no obligation to settle a claim or institute litigation.

An insurer that promptly seeks replacement-cost bids after the insured rejects an appraisal does not violate subsections (4) and (6) when the insurer causes little or none of the resulting delay.

Nelson v. Farmers Union Mutual Insurance · filed 2003-04-24(4), (6)

Therefore, based on the evidence, we conclude the District Court did not err in concluding that there was a failure of proof for Nelsons' claims under §§ 33-18-201 (4) and (6), MCA.

Section 33-18-201(4) prohibits refusing to pay a claim without a reasonable investigation; a claimant need not show that the insured’s liability was reasonably clear.

Graf v. Continental Western Insurance · filed 2004-04-20(4)

Unlike subsections (6) and (13), subsection (4) is not linked to a showing of “reasonably clear liability” in the underlying suit. Since liability (whether reasonably clear or not) is not a factor in subsection (4), one does not have to “re-litigate” the question of liability in pursuing the UTPA claim.

A subsection (4) claim for refusing payment without a reasonable investigation is resolved by an insurer’s reasonable basis in law defense when the investigation and settlement claims are intertwined.

Redies v. Attorneys Liability Protection Society · filed 2007-01-17(4)

Thus, the question of whether ALPS conducted a reasonable investigation before refusing to pay Redies’ claims is resolved by ALPS’s “reasonable basis in law” defense under § 33-18-242(5), MCA.

Section 33-18-201(1) does not require an insurer to inform a workers’ compensation claimant of the 60-month limit on medical benefits when the insurer has not misrepresented or concealed it.

Wiard v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. · filed 2003-10-29(1)

The Unfair Trade Practices Act prohibits an insurance company from misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to coverage. ... The Workers’ Compensation Court concluded this testimony was insufficient to sustain an allegation of concealment of the rule by Hartman, and we agree. ... The rights and duties of the parties are imposed by the Act, and the insurer had no affirmative duty thereunder to inform Wiard of the 60-month limitation on the duration of his medical benefits.

Section 33-18-201(4) requires an insurer to reasonably investigate a claim before refusing payment; conducting that investigation does not itself admit that an insurance contract exists.

Smith v. Farmers Union Mutual Insurance · filed 2011-08-30(4)

FUMIC is statutorily required to conduct “a reasonable investigation based upon all available information” before refusing to pay an insurance claim. Section 33-18-201(4), MCA. Barely a week had passed before FUMIC issued the letter denying liability. FUMIC merely complied with its statutory duties, and the argument by the Smiths that such compliance constituted an admission by FUMIC is misplaced.

Factual disputes about an insurer’s reasonable investigation under subsection (4) or good faith settlement efforts under subsection (6) can preclude summary judgment.

Shelton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. · filed 2007-06-05(4), (6)

State Farm has failed to establish an absence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether State Farm “reasonably investigated” her claim pursuant to § 33-18-201(4), MCA. ... State Farm offers some conflicting evidence, but fails to establish the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact regarding Shelton’s claim under § 33-18-201(6), MCA.

Section 33-18-201(4) requires an insurer to promptly investigate a claim based on available information; when the complaint clearly shows no coverage, reading it satisfies that duty.

Farmers Union Mutual Insurance v. Rumph · filed 2007-10-02(4)

Appellants correctly argue that an insurer must conduct a reasonable investigation into claims based on all available information, § 33-18-201(4), MCA, and that such investigation must be “prompt.” ... However, where the complaint clearly demonstrates that no coverage exists, an insurance company fulfills its duty to investigate by reading the complaint.

Section 33-18-201 generally evaluates an insurer’s claim handling based on the information available to it when it adjusted the claim.

Peterson v. Doctors' Co. · filed 2007-10-22

Section 33-18-201, MCA, seeks to protect parties from such acts, and the relevant issue is almost universally how the insurer acted given the information available to it.

Section 33-18-201(1) prohibits misrepresenting pertinent facts about insurance claims, including facts beyond coverage.

Jacobsen v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2009-07-23(1)

Since the submission and processing of insurance claims is a more fact-driven process than the issue of insurance coverage, we conclude that the court did not err in including “claims” within the purview of the statutory prohibition.

Section 33-18-201(1) prohibits misrepresenting policy provisions about coverage, but an insurer with a reasonable basis in law for contesting the claim is not liable for that violation.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Freyer · filed 2013-10-15(1)

Subsection (1) of §33-18-201, MCA, makes it illegal for an insurer to “misrepresent ... insurance policy provisions relating to coverages at issue[.]” ... Based on the plain language of § 33-18-242(5), MCA, State Farm cannot be held liable for violating the UTPA if it had a “reasonable basis in law” for contesting the claim.

An insurer’s eventual payment does not preclude potential liability under § 33-18-201(4) for an earlier refusal to pay without a reasonable investigation.

McVey v. USAA Casualty Insurance · filed 2013-11-13(4)

USAA’s eventual payment to McVey of the policy limit under her UM/UIM coverage does not shield USAA from potential liability under § 33-18-201(4), MCA. USAA effectively denied McVey’s UM/UIM claim on September 12, 2007, when it determined McVey to be the majority at fault. USAA’s eventual payment of the claim proves insufficient to preclude application of § 33-18-201(4), MCA.

A refusal to pay the full claimed coverage can constitute an effective denial under § 33-18-201(4), even if the insurer has made partial payments.

Lohrke · filed 2025-10-15(4)

Connect has made some initial payments and offered a settlement to Lohrke but has refused to pay Lohrke the full coverage he asserts he is entitled under his numerous policies. These denials, though not amounting to a total denial of coverage, constitute an effective denial for the purposes of § 33-18-201(4).

Section 33-18-201 requires a claimant to show that the insurer engaged in prohibited conduct as a general business practice before liability may be imposed.

Baker v. CNA Insurance · filed 1988-07-15

Information regarding a particular insurance company’s settlement practices is relevant to an action prosecuted under Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-201 (1987), since liability under the act may only be imposed upon a showing by the claimant that the insurer engages in prohibited conduct as a “general business practice”.

Section 33-18-201 requires a claimant to show that the insurer’s unfair claims practices were a general business practice before an action under the section can succeed.

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. McAllister · filed 1990-02-06

Pursuant to Mont.Code Ann., Section 33-18-201, the initial requirement of showing the lack of good faith in trade practices to be general business practices of that particular company, must first be met before an action may be successfully maintained.

The section requires proscribed insurer conduct to be a general business practice; a reasonably clear liability showing applies to violations of subsections 6 and 13, and proceedings are suspended until underlying liability is determined.

Fode v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1986-04-24(6) and (13)

Section 33-18-201, MCA, is limited to situations where the insurer engages in the proscribed conduct as a “general business practice”. ... The “reasonably clear” requirement is necessary to show a violation of Subsections 6 and 13 of the statute, but other provisions may also be violated and give rise to a cause of action in tort. ... For the foregoing reasons we hold that all proceedings in a bad faith case, alleging violations of the code which require a showing that liability be reasonably clear, are suspended until the liability issues of the underlying case have been determined either by settlement or judgment.

Section 33-18-201(13) prohibits an insurer from delaying payment of a reasonably clear claim under one part of a policy to influence settlement of another part as a general business practice.

Harris v. AMERICAN GEN. LIFE INS. CO. OF DEL. · filed 1983-02-09(13)

Section 33-18-201(13), MCA, of the Montana Insurance Code provides: “Unfair claim settlement practices prohibited. No person may, with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, do any of the following: “(13) fail to promptly settle claims, if liability has become reasonably clear, under one portion of the insurance policy *399coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage;” As indicated by the facts above, appellant violated this statute.

Section 33-18-201(6) requires insurers to attempt prompt, fair, and equitable settlements in good faith when liability is reasonably clear as part of a general business practice.

Kyriss v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. · filed 1986-01-09(6)

The statute speaks generally in terms of “claims,” but does not indicate that “claim” is to be given anything but its ordinary meaning, which includes “cause of action.” ... Section 33-18-201 would be stripped of its effectiveness if it did not allow the court to consider all stages of the negotiation and litigation process. Appeal is but one part of that process.

Section 33-18-201 applies to sureties conducting insurance business, and claimants may recover tort damages for violations.

K-W Industries v. National Surety C · filed 1987-05-03

It follows therefore that if a surety, transacting the business of insurance, violates the provisions of fj 33-18-201, MCA, the claimant, in addition to his or her contract remedies, may be compensated under tort law. Klaudt v. Flink, supra.

Section 33-18-201 permits a claimant to recover in tort, in addition to contract remedies, when a surety transacting insurance violates its provisions.

K-W Industries v. National Surety Corp. · filed 1988-05-03

It follows therefore that if a surety, transacting the business of insurance, violates the provisions of Section 33-18-201, MCA, the claimant, in addition to his or her contract remedies, may be compensated under tort law.

Subsection 4 requires a reasonable investigation of claims, while subsection 6 requires good-faith efforts to make prompt, fair, and equitable settlements when liability is reasonably clear.

Lough v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1990-03-23(4), (6)

Appellant in this case alleges violations of subsection 4, which requires no showing of reasonably clear liability, and subsection 6, which does.

Section 33-18-201 governs unfair claim settlement practices when claims have been made to insurance companies.

McNeil v. Currie · filed 1992-04-09

Section 33-18-201, MCA, titled “Unfair claim settlement and practices prohibited”, governs situations in which claims have been made to insurance companies. Under the facts of this case, McNeil never submitted a claim to TIE. Accordingly, we hold that § 33-18-201, MCA, is not applicable.

Section 33-18-201 bars insurers from using one policy coverage to influence another and requires good faith efforts toward prompt, fair, and equitable settlements when liability is reasonably clear.

Juedeman v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. · filed 1992-06-23(13), (6)

Leveraging under § 33-18-201(13), MCA, requires an insurer’s manipulation of two coverages. The insurer must withhold prompt settlement of a reasonably clear liability claim under one coverage, in order to influence a claim arising out of another coverage. ... Thus, we hold the court properly found that Farmers Union did not violate § 33-18-201(13), MCA, and properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ... We hold Farmers Union did not violate § 33-18-201(6), MCA, and the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 33-18-201 prohibits insurers from misrepresenting policy provisions, refusing to pay claims without a reasonable investigation, and failing in good faith to settle claims promptly, fairly, and equitably when liability is reasonably clear.

Rodkey v. Capitol American Life Insurance Co. · filed 1994-12-07(1), (4), (6)

The district court also granted summary judgment for Capitol on Rodkey's claim that Capitol violated subsections (1), (4) and (6) of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act ("Act"), Sec. 33-18-201, MCA. ... Based on this fact and the discussion above regarding Rodkey's breach of contract claim, no material issue of fact is raised by Rodkey's allegation that the term "definitive cancer treatment" is ambiguous. ... Summary judgment was also proper regarding Rodkey's allegation that Capitol violated subsection (4) of Sec. 33-18-201 which prohibits insurers from "refus[ing] to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information." ... The district court also acted correctly when it granted summary judgment as to Rodkey's third and last alleged violation of the Act which involves subsection (6). ... Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

A reasonable basis in law and fact for contesting a claim provides a complete defense to a claim under Section 33-18-201.

Watts v. Westland Farm Mutual Insurance · filed 1995-05-23

Because there was no policy insuring the cantaloupe in effect at the time of the July 18, 1993 hailstorm, we conclude as a matter of law that Westland and Seitz had a reasonable basis in law and in fact for contesting Watts's claim which acts as a complete defense to a claim under 5 33-18-201, MCA.

Section 33-18-201 identifies unfair insurance claim settlement practices, and the court held that twelve listed practices were applicable to the jury's consideration.

Britton v. Farmers Insurance Group · filed 1986-04-17

There was at least an arguable basis for the submission to the jury for the determination of issues under the following unfair claims settlement practices contained in Section 33-18-201, MCA: (1) misrepresenting insurance policy provisions relating to coverages at issue; (2) failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims; (3) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims; (4) refusal to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon available information; (5) failing to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed; (6) neglecting in good faith to effectuate settlements in which liability had become reasonably clear; (7) compelling the insureds to institute litigation to recover the amounts due by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered; (8) attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable man would be entitled to by reference to advertising material or an application; (9) making claims payments to insureds and beneficiaries not accompanied by statements setting forth the coverage under which the payments were made; (10) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured to submit preliminary claim reports and subsequent formal proof of loss which contains substantially the same information; (11) failure to promptly settle a claim if liability has become reasonably clear; and (12) failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis for denial of a claim.

Section 33-18-201 applies to sureties on Miller Act bonds because the Miller Act does not preempt Montana’s unfair insurance claims practices law.

K-W Industries, a Division of Associates Technologies, Ltd., a Corporation v. National Surety Corporation · filed 1988-08-29

In conclusion, we hold that application of Montana’s unfair insurance claims practices law to Miller Act sureties is not preempted by the Miller Act.

Section 33-18-201(1) is completely preempted by FEHBA when a claim under it seeks reimbursement of disputed FEHBA plan benefits.

Botsford v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, Inc. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association · filed 2002-12-23(1)

Thus, we conclude that federal remedies under FEHBA displace state remedies under Montana Code Section 33-18-201(1). Accordingly, Botsford’s claim meets both requirements for complete preemption: it conflicts with federal law, and it seeks remedies that are displaced by federal remedies.

A claim under § 33-18-201(1) based on an insurer’s representations about benefits due under an ERISA plan is completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a).

Kenyon v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. · filed 2025-07-18(1)

Here, in considering the above cases and the statutes at issue, the Court finds that Kenyon’s claim for alleged violations of UTPA § 201(1) could have been brought under ERISA. ... Accordingly, having already concluded that Kenyon’s claims satisfy the requirements of the first prong of the Davila test, and determining here that they also fall squarely within the second, the Court concludes that Kenyon’s state-law causes of action are completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a).

FELA does not generally preempt claims based on a railroad’s unfair settlement practices under § 33-18-201; the court left advance-payment claims unresolved.

Dannels v. BNSF · filed 2021-03-23

Regarding BNSF’s argument that the FELA preempts a railroad workers’ right to seek redress for all bad faith conduct in the adjustment of a claim, we affirm the District Court’s holding that it does not.

Section 33-18-201 allows liability for negligent violations of its claims settlement duties; proof of an intentional violation is not required.

General American Life Insurance Company, a Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Ofner · filed 1992-08-07

We cannot say that Montana would only recognize intentional violations of GALI's duties under the UCSPA. ... The instruction imposed a burden on Ofner that he was not obligated to meet.

Section 33-18-201(13) prohibits an insurer from withholding payment on an undisputed claim to influence settlement of a disputed claim.

Mears v. Safeco Insurance · filed 2012-08-29(13)

Nor has Mears shown that Safeco failed to pay for one type of damages for which liability had become reasonably clear in order to influence the settlement of disputed claims.

Subsection (6) requires an insurer to settle a claim promptly once liability becomes reasonably clear.

Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Julie Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 1992-11-09(6)

Section 33-18-201(6) provides that an insurer’s obligation to settle a claim promptly arises when liability has become reasonably clear.

Section 33-18-201(6) requires an insurer to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims when liability is reasonably clear.

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company v. Great Falls Rescue Mission · filed 2021-07-12(6)

And here PIIC undoubtedly owed the Great Falls Rescue Mission a duty under the UTPA to “effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.” Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-201(6)). The Court agrees with PIIC that it would have been legally perilous to disregard this clear statutory mandate in order to fulfill a duty to persons who had not even yet submitted claims.

Section 33-18-201 does not require an insurer to acknowledge whether liability is reasonably clear.

Satterwhite v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. · filed 2024-08-14

The UTPA imposes certain requirements on insurers to settle claims when liability has become reasonably clear; however, the UTPA does not impose an affirmative obligation on insurers to acknowledge that liability is or is not reasonably clear.

Subsections (6) and (13) require an insurer to advance payment for a third party’s accident-related medical expenses before final settlement when liability and the causal link to those expenses are reasonably clear.

Etter v. SAFECO INS. CO. OF ILLINOIS · filed 2002-03-22(6), (13)

Thus, the law at the time obligated Safeco to pay Etter’s medical expenses before final settlement, so long as liability was reasonably clear and it was reasonably clear Etter’s medical expenses were causally related to the accident.

Subsections (6) and (13) permit a claim against an insurer that conditions payment of undisputed medical expenses on a signed advance pay agreement; a jury decides whether the insurer had a reasonable basis for doing so.

Burgett v. Safeco National Insurance · filed 2003-08-15(6), (13)

We find that there is sufficient evidence to maintain a cause of action for a violation of § 33-18-201(6), or § 33-18-201(13) against Safeco, and remand the case to the district court for a jury trial to determine whether Safeco had a reasonable basis for attempting to obtain a signed advance pay agreement from Burgett.

Section 33-18-201 requires a third-party claimant to request or demand advance payment of medical expenses or lost wages before the insurer’s duties under subsections (4), (6), and (13) arise.

Moe v. Geico Indemnity Co. · filed 2021-09-15

Consistent with these general principles, and for the reasons discussed above, the Court agrees with GEICO and concludes that a claimant must communicate a request or demand for advance payments to the insurer in order to make a “claim” for Ridley damages under the UTPA.

Subsections (6) and (13) require a third-party claimant to request or demand advance payment of medical expenses before the insurer’s advance-payment duty arises.

Brodowy v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company · filed 2023-09-01(6), (13)

Because the Brodowys did not demand or request that Progressive pay James’s medical bills as they were incurred, they did not make a Ridley demand as required to trigger Progressive’s advance pay obligations under subsections (6) and (13) of § 33-18-201.

Section 33-18-201 requires a claim for Ridley advance payment of medical expenses; asking whether a hospital may bill the insurer directly is insufficient.

Brodowy v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company · filed 2024-07-18(2), (4), (6), (13)

Progressive was told by a hospital representative that Margaret was “wondering” if the hospital could bill Progressive directly. This was insufficient to constitute a claim for Ridley advance payments.

Section 33-18-201 does not make an insurer’s consideration of Montana’s collateral source statute during settlement negotiations actionable absent facts suggesting bad faith.

Winstead v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 2016-10-25

State Farm’s consideration of the collateral source statute during settlement negotiations is not actionable under the UTPA. ... Because Winstead does not allege any facts suggesting that State Farm acted in bad faith in considering the collateral source statute, she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 33-18-201 permits an insurer to negotiate a release for its insured after paying undisputed damages.

High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Cas. Co. · filed 2019-02-04(6)

Neither Watters nor Ridley would be violated if United Fire had negotiated for a release after paying the undisputed damages in this case.

Section 33-18-201(6) requires facts showing that the insurer’s liability to settle was reasonably clear; FDA approval of a procedure alone does not establish coverage under the policy.

King v. Health Care Services Corp. · filed 2024-11-15(6)

King fails to allege where the policy makes reasonably clear that HCSC should have paid for the surgery and Equipment based on the FDA’s approval.

Section 33-18-201(6) requires a determination whether liability was reasonably clear before an insurer must attempt a prompt, fair settlement; disputed facts leave that determination to the jury.

Fryer v. UMIA · filed 2025-03-03(6)

Here, the Court agrees with Judge Cavan’s finding that determining whether liability was reasonably clear is a question for the jury.

When an insurer invokes a reasonable factual basis for contesting a claim under subsection (6), disputed facts about coverage and damages leave that defense for the jury.

UMIA Insurance, Inc. v. Arguelles · filed 2025-01-21(6)

Here, unlike in Freyer, UMIA’s reasonable basis defense is not grounded on its interpretation of legal precedent in its coverage determination. Rather, UMIA’s reasonable basis defense turns entirely on competing facts concerning coverage and damages, as discussed above. Thus, whether UMIA had a reasonable basis in fact to contest the claim or amount of the claim, is an assessment for the jury.

Section 33-18-201(6) does not require an insurer to attempt settlement while it is legitimately pursuing coverage defenses, even if the insured’s liability is reasonably clear.

Coleman v. National Indemnity Company · filed 2025-07-10(6)

The Court determines that even taking Plaintiffs’ allegation that the State’s liability was reasonably clear as true, National’s duty to attempt to effectuate settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims did not yet arise during the legal landscape that existed between 2015 and 2019, when National was legitimately pursuing its coverage defenses.

Section 33-18-201 requires an insurer to pay an injured third party’s medical expenses before final settlement when liability for those expenses is reasonably clear.

Ridley v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 1997-12-24(6), (13)

We hold that the District Court erred when it concluded that the statute in question does not require an insurer to pay an injured third party’s medical expenses until final settlement, even when liability is reasonably clear. We conclude that both subsections (6) and (13) of § 33-18-201, MCA, by their terms, impose such an obligation. This does not mean that an insurer is responsible for all medical expenses submitted by an injured plaintiff. Liability must be reasonably clear for the expense that is submitted. That is, even though liability for the accident may be reasonably clear, an insurer may still dispute a medical expense if it is not reasonably clear that the expense is causally related to the accident in question.

Subsections (6) and (13) require an insurer to pay an injured third party's medical expenses before final settlement when liability for those expenses is reasonably clear. The insurer may dispute an expense whose causal connection to the accident is unclear.

Ridley v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. · filed 1998-01-30(6), (13)

We conclude that both subsections (6) and (13) of § 33-18-201, MCA, by their terms, impose such an obligation. This does not mean that an insurer is responsible for all medical expenses submitted by an injured plaintiff. Liability must be reasonably clear for the expense that is submitted. That is, even though liability for the accident may be reasonably clear, an insurer may still dispute a medical expense if it is not reasonably clear that the expense is causally related to the accident in question.

When liability is reasonably clear, subsections (6) and (13) require an insurer to pay an injured third party’s medical expenses before final settlement; disputing an expense requires a factual basis.

Renville v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2003-04-24(6), (13)

Farmers correctly contends that an insurer may dispute its obligation to pay a medical expense. However, it may not do so without any factual basis. ... Therefore, because Farmers failed to present facts to controvert deposition testimony which established that Renville’s ongoing medical expenses are causally related to the collision, Farmers is required to pay Renville’s ongoing medical expenses pursuant to our holding in Ridley.

When liability is reasonably clear and a third party’s damages exceed mandatory auto policy limits, subsection (6) prohibits an insurer from withholding those limits based on a speculative bad faith or contract claim by its insured.

Watters v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 2000-06-06(6)

In summary, we hold that where liability resulting from an automobile accident is reasonably clear, and a third-party claimant’s damages undisputedly exceed mandatory minimum policy limits pursuant to § 61-6-103, MCA, the prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of such claims cannot be forestalled by an insurer based on an illusory bad faith or breach of contract claim that its insured may bring. To refuse payment based on such unfounded potential liability is, in and of itself, a deceptive practice within the meaning of § 33-18-201(6), MCA.

Section 33-18-201(6) and (13) require an insurer to pay an injured third party’s covered medical expenses before settlement or judgment when liability is reasonably clear.

Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court · filed 2000-06-08(6), (13)

In every respect, the court narrowly tailored its declaratory judgment to those medical expenses that, under Ridley, a third-party claimant is unequivocally entitled to prior to settlement or entry of judgment.

Subsections (6) and (13) do not require a general release of the insured or insurer as a condition of settlement.

Shilhanek v. D-2 Trucking, Inc. · filed 2003-04-29(6), (13)

We further hold that nothing in the UTPA requires a general release of the insured or the insurer as a condition to a § 33-18-201(6) or (13), MCA, settlement.

Subsections (6) and (13) do not require a general release of the insured or insurer as a condition of settlement.

Shilhanek v. D-2 Trucking, Inc. · filed 2003-06-10(6), (13)

We further hold that nothing in the UTPA requires a general release of the insured or the insurer as a condition to a § 33-18-201(6) or (13), MCA, settlement.

Liability is reasonably clear under subsection (6) when an informed reasonable person would conclude, for good reason, that the defendant is liable.

Peterson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 2010-08-24(6)

Accordingly, we hold that liability is “reasonably clear” when a reasonable person, with knowledge of the relevant facts and law, would conclude, for good reason, that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff.

Section 33-18-201 may support an unfair claim settlement claim even when the insurer ultimately pays the benefits owed under the policy.

Byorth v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2016-11-22

The fact that Byorth eventually received what he was owed under the contract does not absolve USAA of the alleged UTPA violations.

Section 33-18-201 governs insurers’ settlement practices, and courts may adjudicate claims that those practices violate it.

Marshall v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. · filed 2018-03-13

However, a UTPA violation under § 33-18-201, MCA, is a claim against an insurer’s settlement practices. To hold courts cannot adjudicate an insurer’s settlement practices is contrary to the UTPA and our case law.

Section 33-18-201 entitles an injured third party to advance payment of medical expenses when the insured’s liability is reasonably clear.

Uhlig v. Allied · filed 2020-10-06

In the present case, Hildebrand’s liability for the accident was reasonably clear and has never been in dispute. As an injured third party, Uhlig was entitled to have her medical expenses advance-paid by Allied pursuant to Ridley and the UTPA. The District Court correctly reached this determination in its Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

Section 33-18-201(6) prohibits an insurer from neglecting to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements when liability has become reasonably clear, and it does not support a bad faith action based on post-judgment conduct.

Joan Chubbuck, AKA Joan McWilliams v. Industrial Indemnity, a California Corporation · filed 1992-01-28(6)

We conclude the Montana Supreme Court would hold, as did the district court, that a bad faith action against an insurer cannot be premised on post-judgment conduct.

Section 33-18-201(6)’s good faith settlement duty continues after suit is filed, and an insurer’s postjudgment conduct may be admitted to prove malice.

Federated Mutual Insurance v. Anderson · filed 1999-11-23(6)

The MUTPA requires insurers to "attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear." Section 33-18-201(6), MCA. ... The commencement of a lawsuit by the insured does not end an insurer’s duties to the insured. ... Therefore, the continuing duty of good faith can be breached by an insurer’s postfiling conduct. ... We conclude that Conifer was entitled to present proof to the jury that John Deere’s bad faith was a continuing course of conduct, and that its postjudgment conduct is admissible to prove malice.

Section 33-18-201(14) requires an insurer to promptly give a specific legal and factual explanation for denying a claim.

Ensey v. Colorado Casualty · filed 2001-08-09(14)

Colorado Casualty informed Ensey of the legal basis for its denial, namely that liability was not reasonably clear. It also provided Ensey with the factual basis for its conclusion that liability was not reasonably clear, informing Ensey that its investigation had revealed that other appropriate devices were available to safely perform the work at hand but that Ensey chose not to use them. This is not a general denial. Colorado Casualty promptly informed Ensey that it was denying his claim and provided the specific reason for its denial. Section 33-18-201(14), MCA, requires nothing more.

Section 33-18-201(14) requires an insurer to promptly explain the policy basis for denying a claim in relation to the facts or applicable law.

Safeco Insurance v. Ellinghouse · filed 1986-09-17(14)

Further, the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act requires that the insurer “. . . promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim . . . “ Section 33-18-201 (14), MCA.

An insurer must promptly explain the policy basis for denying a claim, but it does not waive an unreserved policy defense when the insured suffers no prejudice.

Portal Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Insurance · filed 1993-01-14(14)

It is well established in Montana that an insurer has an obligation to inform the insured of all policy defenses it intends to rely upon. Section 33-18-201(14), MCA, of the Unfair Trade Practices Act provides that an insurer may not: ... Portal was not prejudiced by First State's reliance on the different exclusions. We hold that First State did not waive its policy defenses and is not estopped from asserting those defenses.

Equitable tolling may allow claims under subsections (5) and (6) to proceed when the insurer is not prejudiced, but it does not save a subsection (4) claim when the insurer would be prejudiced.

Draggin' Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. · filed 2020-01-13

In sum, the Court will allow the UTPA claim in part to move forward because the doctrine of equitable tolling counsels in favor of letting the claims proceed. JCCS’s claim may proceed on the grounds that NYM violated MCA § 33-18-201(5) and (6). JCCS’s claim is dismissed to the extent it alleges a violation of MCA § 33-18-201(4).