Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-703

Section 27-1-703 permits contribution in comparative negligence cases only among defendants against whom the plaintiff has recovered judgment.

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Osier · filed 1979-10-12

We further hold that even in comparative negligence cases, the right of contribution granted in section 27-1-703, MCA, applies only to defendants against whom judgment has been recovered by the plaintiff.

Section 27-1-703 allows contribution in comparative negligence cases only among defendants against whom the plaintiff has recovered judgment.

Cordier v. Stetson-Ross, Inc. · filed 1979-11-28

Section 27-1-703, MCA, provides a right of contribution only as to defendants against whom judgment has been recovered by a plaintiff in a comparative negligence case.

Section 27-1-703 permits joinder of another potentially negligent person only when the original defendant’s negligence is at issue.

Fredenberg v. Superior Bus Co. · filed 1986-02-24(2)

The effect of the statutory amendment was to permit joinder of those persons whose negligence may have contributed, along with the original defendant’s negligence, as a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The statute, however, speaks only to cases in which the negligence of the original defendant is at issue.

Section 27-1-703 bars a defendant’s claim for contribution or indemnity against a co-defendant who is not liable to the plaintiff.

Harrington v. LaBelle's of Colorado, Inc. · filed 1988-12-06

Montana law does not allow a claim for contribution or indemnity to be asserted by a defendant against a co-defendant who is not liable to the plaintiff. Section 27-1-703, MCA. ... Since we have affirmed the District Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Service, it follows that LaBelle's claim for contribution or indemnity must fail.

An uninsured employer cannot use the section’s comparative negligence allocation and contribution rules to recover from a third party after settling with an injured employee.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC · filed 2009-10-21(4)

Moreover, if the Legislature intended to allow uninsured employers to take advantage of comparative negligence and the associated right of contribution, it would have to amend § 27-1-703(4), MCA, to instruct the trier of fact how to deal with one defendant who has no right to plead comparative negligence versus everyone else to whom the trier of fact is charged with allocating percentages of negligence.

Section 27-1-703(1) apportions damages for an indivisible injury caused by two tortfeasors according to their respective degrees of negligence.

Kalland v. North American Van Lines · filed 1983-09-01(1)

The Montana law provides that where two tortfeasors have jointly produced an indivisible injury the damages are to be apportioned among them according to their respective degrees of negligence. Sec. 27-1-703(1) MCA.

Section 27-1-703 requires comparison of the negligence of all persons who proximately caused the plaintiff's damage in a comparative negligence case.

Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., Inc. · filed 1988-01-19

First, 5 27-1-703, MCA, requires that the negligence of all persons proximately causing damage to the plaintiff is to be compared in a comparative negligence case.

Section 27-1-703(4) reserves apportionment of liability to the jury, which may assign 100% to one party.

Burk Ranches, Inc. v. State · filed 1990-03-09(4)

The jury's apportionment of 100% of the damages to the State and 0% to the other parties is not an error per se. The apportion- ment of liability is a duty reserved solely for the jury. Section 27-1-703(4), MCA.

Section 27-1-703 reduces a plaintiff’s damages in proportion to the negligence attributed to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s agent.

Dennis v. Brown · filed 2005-04-05

Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, the damages, if any, that the Dennises recover against Cates will be diminished in the proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to the Dennises and their agents. Section 27-1-703, MCA (1999). If the Dennises’ damages are diminished in proportion to Blakley’s negligence, Cates will have no grounds for seeking contribution from Blakley.

Section 27-1-703 does not permit a nonsettling joint tortfeasor to seek contribution from a joint tortfeasor who settled with the claimant before judgment.

State Ex Rel. Deere & Co. v. District Court of the Fifth Judicial District · filed 1986-12-19

The principal issue we decide here is that a joint tortfeasor who settles with the claimant before judgment on the claim is entered in a district court is not subject to claims for contribution or indemnity from the nonsettling joint tortfeasors.

Section 27-1-703(1) gives a settling tortfeasor no right of contribution from another tortfeasor when the settlement fully releases the plaintiff’s claims against that person.

Sprinkle v. Burlington Northern Railroad · filed 1989-03-07(1)

The plaintiff's case has ended and the nonsettling tortfeasor is not one "against whom recovery is allowed." As we said in Deere, supra, that statutory language excludes from any duty of contribution a party against whom recovery is not allowed.

A settling defendant cannot obtain contribution from a released tortfeasor who is no longer a party against whom recovery is allowed.

Holmberg v. Strong · filed 1995-08-03(1)

As we said in Deere, supra, that statutory language excludes from any duty of contribution a party against whom recovery is not allowed. ... As in Sprinkle, Crown Parts obtained a general release of all claims, including claims against Strong's. ... We conclude that the rule set forth in Sprinkle applies to the facts of this case.

Section 27-1-703 requires an underlying negligence lawsuit for contribution and permits a later contribution action only when liability for contribution has already been determined.

Metro Aviation, Inc. v. United States · filed 2013-07-16

There having been no action to which Metro was a party, Metro may not now seek contribution against the United States under § 27-1-703, MCA. ... The sole circumstance under which a subsequent action for contribution is permitted is that set forth in § 27-1-703(5), MCA. This section of the statute permits a subsequent action for contribution from the noncontributing party only where “for any reason all or part of the contribution from a party liable for contribution cannot be obtained.” Clearly, this provision assumes that liability for contribution has already been determined in the preceding single action referenced in § 27-1-703(4), MCA.

For injuries occurring before the 1997 amendments, § 27-1-703(4) bars contribution claims against a tortfeasor released through settlement.

Anderson v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1998-12-30(4)

According to 1997 Mont. Law, Ch. 429, the legislature did not intend to apply the 1997 amendments to § 27-1-703, MCA, retroactively. Thus, because the accident in the instant case occurred before the 1997 amendments went into effect, Deere is the applicable law. Because Plumb reaffirmed the Deere rule that settling tort-feasors are not subject to contribution, we hold that the District Court correctly interpreted Plumb and did not err in dismissing Werner/Freeman's cross-claim against Bennett on the basis of Plumb.

Section 27-1-703 governs legal contribution actions but does not bar insurers from agreeing to settle a claim and later apportion liability through arbitration or mediation.

Cranska v. UMIA Insurance, Inc. · filed 2024-01-10

However, Metro Aviation’s holding is limited to legal actions pursuant to § 27-1-703 and does not prohibit insurers from entering into an agreement to settle a claim while reserving the right, between one another, to determine how their respective liability should be apportioned through other means such as arbitration or mediation.

A jury should be instructed about how joint and several liability affects its verdict.

Decelles v. STATE THROUGH DEPT. OF HWYS. · filed 1990-07-11

Following our reasoning in Martel, we therefore now adopt the reasoning of this line of cases and conclude that a jury should be instructed about the consequences of its verdict with respect to joint and several liability.

When joint and several liability applies, the jury should be instructed about how its fault findings may affect each defendant’s liability.

DeCelles v. State ex rel. Department of Highways · filed 1990-07-11

Following our reasoning in Martel, we therefore now adopt the reasoning of this line of cases and conclude that a jury should be instructed about the consequences of its verdict with respect to joint and several liability.

Section 27-1-703 requires a jointly liable tortfeasor's judgment to be reduced by the dollar amount paid by a settling tortfeasor, rather than by the settling tortfeasor's percentage of fault.

Whiting v. State · filed 1991-04-30

We therefore hold that the judgment of the non-contributorily negligent Pradas against the State is to be reduced by a dollar credit in the amount of $300,000 which was paid by Whiting, the settling tortfeasor, and not by $705,600 which equals the 42% of the Prada judgment.

Section 27-1-703(6)(c) prohibits assigning fault to an unjoined person who has not settled with or been released by the claimant.

Estate of Daniel Keith Ross v. Gallatin County · filed 2026-01-06(6)(c)

Defendants may not argue, suggest or present evidence suggesting that Ross’s death was caused by Poucher, Ross’s mother, or the treating hospital.

Section 27-1-703(4) permits a defendant to join a potentially negligent person to apportion fault even if that person is unlikely to pay contribution.

Azure v. United States Health & Human Services · filed 1991-01-31(4)

The court accepts Azure’s representations regarding the indigency of Bull Child. Nonetheless, the court is unpersuaded that the Government should not be allowed to implead Bull Child for the purpose of obtaining an apportionment of liability among every actor whose negligence may have contributed as a proximate cause to the injury sustained by Azure. Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-703(4) (1987).

A jury’s failure to assign each defendant a percentage of negligence does not require a new trial when it finds the plaintiff more than 50 percent at fault and the plaintiff shows no prejudice.

Payne v. Knutson · filed 2004-09-28(4)

Because speculation is all that Payne can offer regarding prejudice, we conclude that the District Court was within its discretion in instructing the jury not to proceed with apportioning the defendants’ percentages of negligence.

Section 27-1-703(b) does not call for a nonparty negligence instruction when neither party asserts that a nonparty was negligent.

Luke v. Randall S. Fowler, M.D. · filed 1997-07-17(b)

She also asserts that Montana's nonparty negligence law is unconstitutional. See Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-703(b). These arguments are meritless because neither party asserted that some doctor other than Fowler was negligent. Fowler specifically argued that no one was negligent, and Luke argued that the fault was all Fowler's. Thus, the constitutionality of Montana's nonparty law is outside the point, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to instruct on nonparty theory.

Section 27-1-703(6)(c) prohibits comparing fault with an unjoined third party, but does not bar evidence that merely describes that person’s role in a transaction.

Byers v. Cummings · filed 2004-03-23(6)(c)

Here, the record is replete with testimony regarding information provided to Cummings by non-parties. However, we are not persuaded by the Byers that such evidence exemplified implication of fault of another. It merely reflected other parties’ participation in the transaction. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 27-1-703 is limited to negligence actions and does not directly apply to strict liability claims.

Durden v. Hydro Flame Corp. · filed 1999-08-03

Section 27-1-703, MCA, is by it its terms limited to negligence actions and does not mention actions in strict liability.

Section 27-1-703(6)(d) cannot reduce an undivided damages award by a settling party’s percentage of fault when the award may include strict products liability damages.

Hulstine v. Lennox · filed 2010-08-17(6)(d)

The jury was not instructed to award damages separately for negligence and for strict liability. Therefore, we cannot discern which portion of the amount, if any, was awarded for negligence and which portion was awarded for strict liability. Consequently, a percentage reduction of a verdict award for negligence pursuant to § 27-1-703(6)(d), MCA, is impossible.

Section 27-1-703(6)(a) permits apportionment of liability to settled third parties for causes of action arising after April 18, 1997, if its procedural requirements are met.

Faulconbridge v. State · filed 2006-08-22(6)(a)

We also note initially that § 27-1-703(6)(a) (2002), MCA, the statute in effect at the time of trial and today, which allows the defendant to apportion liability to settled third parties provided that procedural mandates are met, was not the law in effect at the time of the accident. See commission comments to § 27-1-703, MCA, providing that the statute applies to causes of action that arise after April 18, 1997. As this accident occurred in 1992, this statute does not apply in the present case.

Section 27-1-703(6) allows a negligence defendant to assert that a person who settled with the claimant caused some or all of the damages; a settlement requires a meeting of the minds.

BNSF v. Asbestos Court · filed 2020-03-11(6)

Therefore, Grace has not yet “settled” with Plaintiffs, and is not a settled party for purposes of § 27-1-703, MCA.

Section 27-1-703(6)(e) requires a defendant asserting a settled party’s fault to prove that party’s negligence, applicable standard of care, and causal contribution with competent evidence.

Wells v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2023-08-09(6)(e)

The Court determines that Plaintiffs’ legal conclusions relating the Robinson defendants’ and the State of Montana’s negligence and causation do not represent “facts” to be considered as competent evidence that could prove the required elements of BNSF’s settled nonparty affirmative defenses. BNSF must provide other competent evidence to carry its burden under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-703(6)(e).

Section 27-1-703(2) excludes a settling party from contribution, but its negligence may be submitted to the jury when it settles after the jury has heard evidence about its fault.

Kuhnke v. Fisher · filed 1987-05-20(2)

The general rule is that a settling party does not fall under "parties against whom recovery is allowed," as once a party settles with a plaintiff, he is no longer required to contribute. ... Under the unique and complex facts of this case, we find no abuse of discretion or error and affirm the decision of the District Court to submit the hospital's negligence to the jury.

Section 27-1-703 governs fault apportionment and, as applied here, barred apportionment to a nonsettled nonparty and the settled parties.

Moe v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2023-11-27

Per the Court’s previous Order addressing the parties’ motions for summary judgment (Doc. 98): Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-703 is enforceable and applicable in this matter; BNSF may not apportion fault to non-settled, non-party W.R. Grace, nor the settled parties Robinson Insulation or the State of Montana; and BNSF may not argue that W.R. Grace or any unnamed third-party acted as a superseding intervening cause of the alleged injuries.

A stipulated dismissal with prejudice releases the dismissed party for purposes of fault comparison under § 27-1-703(6)(c), even without consideration.

Good v. Skifstad · filed 2019-06-12(6)(c)

Good’s Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice as to MDT constituted a release pursuant to Section 27-1-703.