Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102

An action commences when the complaint is filed; granting a new trial does not commence a new action.

Town Pump Inc. v. District Court · filed 1979-02-14

Under the provisions of section 93-2701, R.C.M. 1947, now section 27-2-102 MCA, an action is commenced when the complaint is filed.

Section 27-2-102(1)(b) provides that filing a complaint commences an action and tolls the applicable limitation and repose periods.

Webb v. T.D. · filed 1996-02-20(1)(b)

We hold that the statute of limitations and the statute of repose are tolled by the commencement of an action, and that an action is commenced when a complaint is filed. Section 27-2-102(l) (b), MCA.

For statute-of-limitations purposes, an action begins when the complaint is filed.

Gulf Insurance Co. v. Clark · filed 2001-03-20(1)(b)

First, all that is required to toll the statute of limitations is the filing of a complaint. That, then, affords the creditor, pending the outcome of the underlying claim, a potential three-year leeway period under Rule 41(e), M.R.Civ.P. See § 27-2-102(1)(b), MCA (providing that for the purposes of statutes of limitations, an action is commenced when the complaint is filed).

An action commences when a complaint is filed; a letter seeking repayment does not commence an action.

Independence Medical v. DPHHS · filed 2018-03-27(1)(b)

Because DPHHS never filed a complaint, it did not commence an action within the meaning of § 27-2-102(1)(b), MCA, and M. R. Civ. P. 3.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist and the right to bring an action is complete.

Knight v. City of Missoula · filed 1992-03-10(1)(a)

Section 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, provides that a claim or a cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim is complete and a court is authorized to accept jurisdiction. ... We agree with the District Court that the action against the City accrued at the time the City annexed the road.

A tort action accrues when the plaintiff knows the facts essential to the claim; the plaintiff need not know every fact or the full extent of the damages.

Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Company · filed 1993-05-10

Therefore, the critical determination of when an action accrues is knowledge of the facts essential to the cause of action.

An insured's claim accrues when the insured loss gives rise to a right to sue; the insured need not first file a claim and receive a denial.

Pet. Tank Rel. Comp. Bd. v. Fed. Serv. Ins. Co. · filed 2008-06-03(1)(a)

That is to say, once the loss occurred, § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, did not prohibit the insured facility owners from filing suit for payment under their insurance contracts.

Section 27-2-102(1)(a) does not require an insured to submit a claim and receive a denial before the insured loss gives rise to a right to sue.

Mt Petroleum v. Federated Service · filed 2008-06-03(1)(a)

That is to say, once the loss occurred, § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, did not prohibit the insured facility owners from filing suit for payment under their insurance contracts.

A claim does not accrue until a court has authority to hear it.

Brewington v. Employers Fire Insurance · filed 1999-12-13(1)(a)

Therefore, no court had authority to accept a complaint based on that claim and it did not accrue pursuant to § 27-2-102, MCA until February 22, 1996.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist and the right to bring an action is complete.

Spolar v. Datsopoulos · filed 2003-03-25(1)(a)

Under § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, “[a] claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” ... Spolar’s cause of action against Datsopoulos accrued when Judge Purcell issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 9, 1996. On that date, Spolar’s damages occurred and all the elements of his claim against Datsopoulos existed.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist, the right to sue is complete, and a court or agency can accept jurisdiction.

Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2004-06-22(1)(a)

Under Montana law, for purposes of the statute of limitations, “a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(l)(a). ... Here, State Farm’s refusal to settle Burton’s demand for $100,000 — exposing Padgett to a judgment in excess of policy limits — occurred in March 1994, more than six years before this suit was filed.

A claim accrues when all its elements have occurred, the right to sue is complete, and a court or agency can accept jurisdiction.

Lucas v. Stevenson · filed 2013-01-29(1)(a)

The Lucases’ civil claims were an asset of the bankruptcy estate because the claims accrued before the Lucases filed for bankruptcy. See § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA (“[A] claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.”).

A claim accrues when all its elements exist, the right to sue is complete, and a court may accept jurisdiction.

Croteau v. National Better Living Ass'n · filed 2013-05-30(1)(a)

Plaintiff Moore’s fraud and constructive fraud claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. “A claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause of action exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court ... is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-102(l)(a). As with Plaintiff Croteau, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Moore, his awareness of the injury giving rise to the claim is not challenged in fact by Defendant ACS’s Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Defendant ACS’s Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff Moore’s fraud and constructive fraud claims.

A claim accrues when all its elements occur, regardless of when it is submitted to an insurer; a medical-benefit claim accrues when treatment occurs and its costs are incurred.

Estate of Gleason v. Central United Life Insurance · filed 2015-05-20(1)(a)

Rather, a claim accrues when all elements of that claim have occurred. Section 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA; Capitol Indemnity, ¶ 18; Empire Fire, ¶¶ 20, 24. In this case, a claim accrued for each medical treatment when the treatment occurred and Judith incurred the costs associated with that treatment.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist or have occurred.

Huckins v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 2017-06-13(1)(a)

“[A] claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred.” Section 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA; accord O’Connor v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2004 MT 65, ¶ 12, 320 Mont. 301, 87 P.3d 454. Huckins’ claims against Van Sickle all accrued after the Pre-2014 Policy had expired, and after the 2014 Policy went into effect, on January 4, 2014.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist, the right to sue is complete, and a court can hear the action.

Draggin' Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. · filed 2020-01-13(1)(a)

A claim or cause of action accrues “when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court . . . is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” MCA § 27-2-102(1)(a). ... Accepting all allegations as true, the Peterses claim did not accrue until June 17, 2019.

A claim accrues when the last fact essential to it occurs, even if the damages are not yet complete.

Moe v. Geico Indemnity Co. · filed 2022-01-26(2)

When a cause of action “accrues,” meaning “the last fact essential to the cause of action occurs, regardless of whether the damages are complete,” the statute of limitations begins to run. MCA § 27-2-102(2); Nelson, at *3. ... At the time of filing, over three and a half years after the “accrual” point when Moe received notice that Geico refused to pay his medical bills, the statute of limitations had expired.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist or have occurred.

Deschamps v. Treasure State Trailer Court, Ltd. · filed 2010-04-13

A claim accrues when all the elements of the claim exist or have occurred. Section 27-2-102, MCA. ... Upon realizing just six months after closing that the Park was not enjoying a consistent 94% occupancy rate as Deschamps claims Rasmussen alleged, Deschamps’ claim for fraud accrued.

A claim accrues when all its elements have occurred.

Passmore v. Watson · filed 2014-10-28(1)(a)

A cause accrues when all elements of the claim have occurred. Section 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA. ... The time for Passmore to file his legal malpractice claim began, at the latest, on April 4, 2008, and ran until April 4, 2011.

A claim accrues when all its elements have occurred, the right to sue is complete, and a court or agency can hear the action.

Cole v. Montana University System · filed 2023-05-04(a)

“A claim or cause of action accrues” under Montana law “when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(a). ... The most generous view of the chronology would place any alleged breach by Defendants and the resulting damages as late as 2013 for Hedtke and 2015 for John.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist, the right to sue is complete, and a court or agency can accept jurisdiction.

Moe v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2023-11-27(a)

“[A] claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(a) (2023); see also O’Connor v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 87 P.3d 454, 456 (Mont. 2004) (same). Ms. Moe was diagnosed with mesothelioma in September 2020, and at that time her claims for negligence and strict liability against BNSF under Montana tort law accrued.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist, the right to bring it is complete, and a court or agency can accept jurisdiction.

Williams v. Tullius · filed 2024-12-11(1)(a)

Under Montana law, “a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(1)(a). Under the UTPA, a third-party claimant may not file an action under Section 33-18-242 “until after the underlying claim has been settled or a judgment entered in favor of the claimant on the underlying claim.” Id. § 33-18-242(7)(b). Since the underlying claim in this action has not been settled or judgment entered in William’s favor, any claim Williams may ultimately have under the Montana UTPA has not accrued.

Section 27-2-102 provides that a claim accrues when all its elements exist, starting the limitations period.

Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1992-10-15(1)(a)

Thus, as the statutory language indicates, the limitations period will begin to run when all the elements of a cause of action are in existence. ... Assuming a bad faith claim may be maintained against Fidelity pursuant to its conduct under the general indemnity agreement entered into, it is apparent from Weissman's own allegations that the bad faith tort claim against Fidelity was in existence no later than 1976; yet he did not file the complaint until 1988, well outside the three year limitations period for such actions.

Section 27-2-102 starts the limitations period when all elements of a claim exist or have occurred, even if the claimant does not know of the claim.

Yarbro, Ltd. v. Missoula Federal Credit Union · filed 2002-07-03(1)(a), (2)

Becausc the elements of conLetsron for all transactions existed or occurred by then, the three-year siatute of limitations for all claims bcgan to run, at thc latcst, on J L I I 8~1096.

Section 27-2-102 starts the limitations period when a claim accrues, after all elements of the claim exist and a court or agency can hear it.

Palmer v. Quinn · filed 2013-12-31(1)(a), (2)

A statute of limitations begins to run “when the claim or cause of action accrues.” Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. A claim accrues “when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Section 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA. ... Because no applicable statute of limitations is longer than eight years, we conclude that the claims in Palmer’s December 2009 complaint against the C&H and AFM Defendants are time-barred.

Section 27-2-102(2) starts the limitations period when all elements of a claim exist, even if the claimant does not know of the claim or its accrual.

Grizzly Security Armored Express, Inc. v. Bancard Services, Inc. · filed 2016-11-14(2)

Further, “[l]ack of knowledge of the claim or cause of action, or of its accrual, by the party to whom it has accrued does not postpone the beginning of the period of limitation.” Section 27-2-102(2), MCA.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist and the right to sue is complete; the limitations period begins then.

Belanus v. Potter · filed 2017-04-26(1)(a)

A statute of limitations begins to run “when the claim or cause of action accrues.” Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. A claim accrues “when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Section 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA. ... The recording of the telephone conversation at the center of this case was admitted into evidence during Belanus’s criminal trial on June 12, 2009; as such, his tort claim accrued on that day.

The limitations period begins when a claim accrues.

Wolfe v. Flathead Elec. Coop., Inc. · filed 2018-11-20(2)

"[T]he period of limitation begins when the claim or cause of action accrues." Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. Plaintiffs filed their complaint September 1, 2016, so any claim or cause of action accruing more than eight years earlier (before September 1, 2008) is barred.

A claim generally accrues, and the limitation period begins, when all elements of the claim exist or have occurred.

Marble v. King · filed 2023-07-18

“Generally, a claim accrues and the limitation period begins to run when all elements of the claim ‘exist or have occurred.’” Estate of Woody v. Big Horn Cty., 2016 MT 180, ¶ 9, 384 Mont. 185, 376 P.3d 127 (citing § 27-2-102, MCA). ... The affidavit establishes that Elda was unaware she was without access until December 2012. It was at this point that a conversion claim started to accrue on this sum.

A claim accrues, starting the limitations period, when all elements of the claim exist or have occurred.

Overstreet v. Fetterhoff · filed 2024-12-10(1)(a), (2)

The statute of limitations begins to run when the claim accrues, which means all elements of the claim exist or have occurred.

Lack of knowledge of a claim or its accrual does not postpone the beginning of the limitations period.

Samson v. State · filed 1997-11-04(2)

Section 27-2-102(2), MCA, expressly provides that "[l]ack of knowledge of the claim or cause of action, or of its accrual, by the party to whom it has accrued does not postpone the beginning of the period of limitation." Even were this Court to determine that the Taxpayers' claims in the present case accrued as late as 1993 following our decisions in Barron, Sheehy, and Woith, the ninety-day limitations period codified at õ 15-1-406, MCA, would present a clear bar to the present action.

A malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying proceeding ends in the claimant’s favor.

Rouse v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County · filed 1991-09-11

Assuming Rouse's allegations are true, his cause of action for malicious prosecution did not accrue until the acquittal.

A claim accrues only when all its elements exist; a wrongful death claim therefore accrues when the injured person dies.

Carroll v. W. R. Grace & Co. · filed 1992-01-14(1)(a)

To summarize, no claim exists until all elements of a cause of action occur pursuant to 5 27-2-102(1) (a), MCA, and death is an element of a wrongful death claim under 5 27-1-513, MCA, Montana's wrongful death statute. Therefore, we hold that a wrongful death action in Montana accrues at the time of decedent's death.

A deceit claim accrues when all its elements exist and the right to bring the action is complete.

Barrett v. Holland & Hart · filed 1992-12-29(1)(a)

We agree with the conclusion of the District Court that the cause of action for deceit on the part of Mr. Barrett accrued on October 11, 1988, as all of the elements of his claim then existed or had occurred, and his right to maintain an action on the claim was complete.

The limitations period begins on the date of injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff knows of the claim or its accrual.

Frank Boring Fitzgerald v. Montana Department of Family Services · filed 1993-08-30(2)

In Montana, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of injury--regardless of whether the plaintiff knew of the cause-of-action or its accrual. Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-102(2); Bennett v. Dow Chemical Co., 713 P.2d 992, 994 (Mont.1986).

A negligence claim accrues when all its elements exist, including provable damage; a latent injury must become manifest before damage can be proven.

Orr v. State · filed 2004-12-14(1)(a)

A cause of action accrues “when all elements of the claim... exist or have occurred.” Section 27-2-102(l)(a), MCA. The causes of action of the surviving Miners did not accrue until damage could be proven.

Section 27-2-102 starts the limitations period when a claim accrues; Freed's bad faith claim accrued when he could sue after D.A. Davidson refused to surrender the bonds.

State Ex Rel. Egeland v. City Council · filed 1990-12-11(1)(a)

After D.A. Davidson refused to surrender the bonds to Freed, Freed could have filed a claim, whether or not D.A. Davidson believed that it had a right to hold the bonds. ... We uphold the District Court's determination that December 21, 1983 was the date when Freed's bad faith claim accrued.

Section 27-2-102 delays accrual of a legal malpractice claim until all elements, including actual damages, have occurred.

Estate of Watkins v. Hedman, Hileman & Lacosta · filed 2004-06-08(1)(a), (2)

We have held that this “accrual rule” applies to legal malpractice actions and that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until all elements of a claim, including damages, have occurred.

A limitations period begins when the claim accrues; a legal malpractice claim does not accrue until the client has suffered damage.

Uhler v. Doak · filed 1994-12-13(1)(a), (2)

For these reasons, we conclude that Uhler's cause of action against Doak did not accrue until June 16, 1989, at the earliest. This is the date on which Uhler first acted on Doak's advice to his alleged detriment, and prior to this date, he had no cause of action as a matter of law. Therefore, we conclude that June 16, 1989, is the earliest date from which the statute of limitation pertaining to Uhler's claim could begin pursuant to § 27-2-102(2), MCA.

A common law bad faith claim arising from a disputed workers’ compensation benefit accrues when that particular dispute is resolved, even if other issues in the compensation case remain open.

O'Connor v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2004-03-23(1)(a)

In other words, we determine the accrual date of a bad faith claim arising out of a separate and independent disputed issue by determining whether that particular issue has been ultimately resolved, regardless of the existence or absence of a resolution of other issues within the workers’ compensation case.

Section 27-2-102 requires all elements of a legal malpractice claim, including damages, to have occurred before the limitations period begins.

Stanley L. and Carolyn M. Watkins Trust v. Lacosta · filed 2004-06-08(1)(a), (2)

The “accrual rule” provides that the statute of limitations begins when all elements of a claim, including damages, have occurred. Uhler, 268 Mont. at 195-200, 885 P.2d at 1300-03 (adopting “accrual rule” pursuant to §§ 27-2-102(1)(a) and (2), MCA).

A conversion claim accrues when its elements are present, including the owner’s right to the property, wrongful dominion over it, and damages.

Kingman v. Weightman · filed 2017-09-12(1)(a)

Under § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, a claim accrues “when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action . . . .” ... We conclude that Kingman’s claim accrued, at the latest, six months after the completion of Kingman’s case, or May 1, 2012, because all three elements of conversion were then present.

A claim can accrue when an asbestos disease diagnosis causes a present, cognizable injury, even without physical symptoms or impairment.

In re Asbestos Litigation Cases · filed 2021-06-09(1)(a)

Having received the ARD diagnosis though, these Plaintiffs have attendant fear, worry and anxiety, even if the ARD has not manifested into any physical symptoms or impairment. For this reason, the Plaintiffs have alleged a present injury which is cognizable under Montana law.

An asbestos-related disease diagnosis without further medical findings or symptoms does not start the limitations period for a later, distinct diagnosis.

In re Asbestos Litigation Cases · filed 2021-06-09

The Court accepts Plaintiffs’ counsel offer at oral argument to make a declaratory ruling that a diagnosis of an ARD from the CARD Clinic, without further medical findings or symptoms, is insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations for any future diagnoses. This finding comports with existing Montana law. See Mont. Code Ann. §27-2-102; Uhler v. Doak, 268 Mont. 191, 885 P.2d 1297 (1994); Massee v. Thompson, 2004 MT 121, 321 Mont. 210, 90 P.3d 394; Hendricksen v. State, 2000 MT 20, 319 Mont. 307, 84 P.3d 38.

A malicious prosecution claim accrues under § 27-2-102(2) only when all its elements exist, including favorable termination of the underlying proceeding.

McAtee v. Morrison & Frampton · filed 2021-09-07(2)

All six elements must exist for the claim to accrue. Plouffe, ¶ 16; Belanus v. Potter, 2017 MT 95, ¶ 17, 387 Mont. 298, 394 P.3d 906 (quoting § 27-2-102(2), MCA) (“A claim accrues ‘when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.’”). ... Considering that “the element of termination in [a] plaintiff’s favor is of paramount importance to a malicious prosecution claim, and the claim would not exist without this primary predicate,” Johnson, *20, McAtee’s malicious prosecution claim, as premised on the civil fraud action, had not yet accrued at the time she filed her bankruptcy petition and cannot be deemed rooted in her pre-bankruptcy conduct.

A common law bad faith insurance claim outside workers’ compensation does not accrue solely when the underlying claim is settled or reduced to judgment.

Nelson v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest · filed 2014-04-21(1)(a), (2)

We conclude that under Montana law a common law action for bad faith insurance practices that does not involve workers’ compensation does not accrue for statute of limitations purposes solely upon judgment in or settlement of an underlying claim against a defendant insurance company’s insured.

A common law bad faith claim accrues when all its elements have occurred, the right to sue is complete, and a court or agency may accept jurisdiction.

Hayashi v. File · filed 2021-11-30(1)(a)

Instead, “[a] common law bad faith claim accrues ‘when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.’” O’Connor v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 87 P.3d 454, 456 (Mont. 2004) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(1)(a)).

A conversion claim accrues when the claimant knows or reasonably should know facts showing unauthorized control of the property inconsistent with the claimant’s rights.

Drescher v. Malee · filed 2022-10-18(1)

By application of the statutory rule for claims accrual to the essential elements of the claim, a conversion-based claim for possession of personal property against an alleged tortfeasor accrues when the claimant is aware, or reasonably should be, of facts sufficient to establish that the alleged tortfeasor was exercising or exerting unauthorized dominion or control over the property in a manner inconsistent with the claimant’s property rights.

A negligence claim accrues when all its elements exist, including damages.

Stevenson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company · filed 2025-08-13(1)(a)

In Montana, “a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(1)(a). ... Here, Plaintiffs did not suffer damages until 2023. (See Doc. 103 ¶¶ 206–10, 234.) Because Plaintiffs filed this action within the three-year limitation set out by Montana statute, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are not time barred.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist and the right to sue is complete; continuing effects of an earlier injury do not delay accrual.

McGowen Precision Barrels, LLC v. Proof Research, Inc. · filed 2022-10-28(1)(a)

Under Montana law, “a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(1)(a). ... While the effects of Proof’s approach to enforcing its trademark arguably continued to harm McGowen past the date it was initially injured, this does not change the fact that McGowen’s tortious interference claim had accrued, and the statute of limitations period on the claim had commenced.

Section 27-2-102(4) excludes medical malpractice actions from the general tort discovery rule in subsection (3).

Wilson v. Brandt and Flathead Valle · filed 2017-11-28(4)

The plain language of § 27-2-205, MCA, does not call for a separate determination that an injury be “self-concealing” or that the defendant took “action which prevents the injured party from discovering the injury or its cause” in order to toll the statute of limitations. The express exclusion of medical malpractice from the general discovery statute, § 27-2-102(4), MCA, reinforces this.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist, including injury when injury is an element of the claim.

Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank · filed 1990-03-20(1)(a)

As the language of this statute makes clear, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until all elements of a cause of action are in existence.

A limitations period begins when the claim accrues; for this insurance claim, that was when the insured had all the elements needed to file a claim with its insurer.

Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board v. Capitol Indemnity Co. · filed 2006-06-13(2)

A period of limitations begins to run from the time the claim for relief accrues. Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. ... We conclude that the limitations period began to run when all the elements accrued for Community Mutual to file a claim with Capitol. This was sometime in 1989.

Section 27-2-102(1)(a) allows an insured’s claim to accrue when the insured loss occurs; filing an insurance claim and receiving a denial are not prerequisites.

Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board v. Federated Service Insurance · filed 2008-06-03(1)(a)

Contrary to what the Board suggests, the filing and denial of an insurance claim is not a statutory prerequisite to filing suit to recover for an insured loss that has occurred. That is to say, once the loss occurred, § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, did not prohibit the insured facility owners from filing suit for payment under their insurance contracts.

Section 27-2-102(1)(a) supplies the general accrual rule for a claim based on a statutory liability unless a specific accrual provision applies.

Marx v. Belgrade Volunteer Firefighters Relief Ass'n · filed 2008-12-09(1)(a)

However, nothing in § 27-2-211(1), MCA, indicates that an action upon a liability created by statute is “subject to” the specific accrual provisions in §§ 27-2-301 to -304, MCA, as opposed to the general accrual provision in § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA.

A claim for an unpaid monthly maintenance installment accrues when that installment becomes due.

Fulton v. Fulton · filed 2004-08-31(1)(a)

Pursuant to § 27-2-102(1), MCA, a claim does not accrue until all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred. Any claim for William’s nonpayment of maintenance could not have accrued until each individual payment was due.

A claim based on a loan agreement accrues when signing it establishes the damages element, even if funds are disbursed later.

Pederson v. ROCKY MOUNTAIN BANK · filed 2012-03-06(1)(a)

When the Pedersons signed the loan agreements, the Bank was obligated to provide funds once certain conditions were met and the Pedersons were required to pay back the funds once they were distributed. Thus, we find the element of damages existed at the time the Pedersons signed the loan agreement, March 10, 2008, and not upon the disbursement of funds.

An unjust enrichment claim involving a constructive trust and a relationship of trust and confidence accrues when the trustee acts adversely to the beneficiary and the beneficiary receives notice of that adverse interest.

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church · filed 2013-02-05(1)(a)

An unjust enrichment claim in the context of a constructive trust created through the existence of a “relationship of trust and confidence” accrues only when an entity in a position of trust acts adversely to the interest of the beneficiary and “the beneficiary has received notice of the assertion of an adverse interest.” Opp, 121 Mont. at 139, 193 P.2d at 384; see § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA.

A claim to enforce an option to purchase accrues when the option holder exercises it by demanding performance.

Ming Da Situ v. Smole · filed 2013-02-12(1)(a)

Relying on §§ 27-2-102(1)(a) and -301, MCA, and the nature of the option to purchase, we conclude that the statute of limitations began to run on Situs’ claims at the time they exercised the option by demanding performance.

A contract claim accrues when an actionable breach completes the cause of action; a missed performance date does not start the limitations period when the parties continue to act consistently with the agreement.

Miller v. Kleppen · filed 2019-04-09(1)(a)

"Generally, 'a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.' " Ming Da Situ , ¶ 22 (quoting § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA ). ... Therefore, the District Court correctly determined the cause of action accrued on May 8, 2016, and was timely prosecuted by Miller under § 27-2-202(1), MCA.

The limitations period for injury to person or property begins when the claimant discovers the facts constituting the claim.

Knight v. City of Missoula · filed 1992-04-02(3)

Section 27-2-102(3), MCA, states: The period of limitation does not begin on any claim or cause of action for an injury to person or property until the facts constituting the claim have been discovered. ... Affidavits submitted by Knight indicate the Takima residents were aware of the creation of the road even as the bulldozer was at work. We agree with the District Court that the action against the City accrued at the time the City annexed the road.

For an injury to property, the limitation period begins when the facts constituting the claim are discovered, even if the claimant does not realize those facts support a claim.

Carl v. Chilcote · filed 1992-12-17(2), (3)

In this case, the facts constituting the claim had clearly been discovered by Carls. The statute of limitations began to run at that time, notwithstanding the fact that Carls may not have realized they had a possible claim against the City.

A claim accrues when the plaintiff has the right to sue, even if she doubts the claim will succeed; fraudulent concealment tolls the limitation period when the defendant prevents discovery of the injury or its cause.

Rucinsky v. Hentchel · filed 1994-09-15(1)(a), (3)

We conclude that Rucinsky had the "right to maintain her actionw in 1988 when she was put on notice that Hentchel taped her conversations. The right to the cause of action began regardless of whether she was convinced of the success of such an action. ... Section 27-2-102(3), MCA, is essentially a codification of the common law doctrine of fraudulent concealment as it applies to the tolling of the statutory period: ... Hentchel did not conceal the tapes; he maintained their control. His actions do not support concealment as Rucinsky argues.

Section 27-2-102(3)(a) delays the limitations period when facts constituting a claim are self-concealing, until the claimant discovers or should discover them through due diligence.

McCormick v. Brevig · filed 1999-04-27(3)(a)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the facts constituting Clark's claim for negligence against Malnaa with regard to the existence of the trust were self- concealing as contemplated by the tolling provision of § 27-2-102(3)(a), MCA.

Section 27-2-102(2) starts the limitation period when a claim accrues; ignorance of the claim does not delay it unless the injury is affirmatively concealed or inherently self-concealing.

Webster v. Geico Ins. Co. · filed 2000-07-06(2)

Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time that the cause of action accrues. Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. Ignorance of a legal claim or its accrual does not toll the beginning of the period of limitation unless there is either some ... affirmative concealment of the injury or the injury is by its nature self-concealing.

Section 27-2-102(3)(a) delays the start of the limitations period when the facts underlying an injury claim are concealed by their nature; an unconcealed fraud claim accrues when the fraud occurs.

Hawkins v. Harney · filed 2003-03-27(3)(a)

This Court has interpreted the above two statutes to conclude that: “The statute of limitations for an action based on fraud begins when the fraud occurs unless the facts which form the basis for the allegation are, by their nature, concealed.” Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur. (1996), 276 Mont. 1, 14, 914 P.2d 976, 985. Here, Hawkins alleges that the Respondents were fraudulent in their treatment of Laddie in June of 1993. Hawkins presents no evidence to indicate that the facts which formed the basis for her fraud claim were concealed. As such, the two-year statute of limitations on Hawkins’ fraud claim began to run in June of 1993.

Section 27-2-102(3) delays the limitations period when facts are self-concealing or actively concealed, until the claimant discovers them or should discover them through due diligence.

Plouffe v. STATE, DEPT. OF LABOR · filed 2009-03-18(3)

When the facts are “self-concealing” or affirmative action was taken to prevent a party from discovering the facts that give rise to the cause of action, the limitation period begins when the facts have been discovered, or with the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered. Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 914 P.2d 976 (1996); Section 27-2-102(3), MCA.

A claim accrues when all its elements exist, though the limitations period may begin later when the injured party discovers the facts constituting the claim.

Raugust v. Abbey · filed 2020-07-08(1)(a)

Under Montana law, “the limitations period begins to run ‘when all elements of the claim or cause exist.’”” Norbeck v. Flathead County, 438 P.3d 811, 817 | 18 (Mont. 2019)(quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(1)(a)). ... Given Plaintiffs admission that by August of 2013, he had learned that “Defendants” failed to provide certain information to his defense counsel before his criminal trial, the Court has determined that the latest date on which the statute of limitations began running on Raugust’s state law claims was August 31, 2013.

Section 27-2-102(3)’s discovery rule does not bar a property contamination claim while a reasonably abatable injury remains subject to continuing tort tolling.

Burley v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 2012-02-07(3)

We likewise do not deem the discovery rule dispositive in this case due to the potential application of the continuing tort exception. As discussed further below, the discovery rule definitively would bar a property contamination tort action at the expiration of the limitations period only where the injury had become permanent in the sense that the injury no longer reasonably could be abated, or had abated to a point where permanent damages could be ascertained.

Section 27-2-102(3) delays the limitations period when the facts of a claim are concealed by a complex injury or the defendant’s actions, until the claimant discovers or reasonably should discover them.

Draggin' Y Cattle Co. v. Addink · filed 2013-10-29(3)

The injury was thus concealing in nature by its complexity. Assuming the damages to the Peters accrued in January 2007, nonetheless the limitations period did not begin to run until the discovery rule was also satisfied. ... However, Addink again took action to “prevent[ ] the injured party from discovering the injury,” § 27-2-102(3)(b), MCA, by reassuring the Peters that he had researched the problem raised by Hansen and confirming to them that the exchange transaction would qualify.

The discovery rule does not delay accrual when a plaintiff has enough information to prompt a reasonable inquiry into a possible claim.

Christian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 2015-09-01(3)

Here, the record shows that Appellants had far more than “mere suspicion” that their properties were contaminated, and should reasonably have been prompted to further inquiry or action.

For a self-concealing injury, the limitations period begins when the injured person discovers or should discover the facts constituting the claim.

Siebken v. Voderberg · filed 2012-12-18(3)

As provided in § 27-2-102(3), MCA, the period of limitation does not begin on any cause of action for an injury to a person until the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or should have been discovered by the injured person if the facts constituting the claim are concealed or self-concealing. It was agreed by the parties in this case that Siebken’s injury was, by its nature, self-concealing for a period of time. Therefore, the District Court was required to determine when Siebken discovered that his injury was caused by Voderberg.

Section 27-2-102(3) delays the start of the limitations period when the facts constituting a claim are concealed by their nature or the defendant prevents discovery of the injury or its cause.

Anderson v. Boyne USA, Inc. · filed 2023-02-22(3)

The limitations period does not begin to run on any cause of action when the facts constituting a claim are by their nature concealed or self-concealing, or before, during, or after causing the injury, a defendant has taken an action that prevents an injured party from discovering the injury or its cause. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(3).

Section 27-2-102(3) does not delay the limitations period merely because a claimant obtained records years after a transaction, when the claim was not inherently concealed and the defendants did not prevent discovery.

Flynn v. Christian · filed 2023-12-22(3)

Flynn fails to prove that the relevant statutes of limitations were tolled until 2020 or 2021 based on his failure to fulfill the requirements of Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(3).

Section 27-2-102(3)(b) postpones the limitations period when a defendant’s actions conceal a claim, and the period resumes when the injured party is again on notice.

Shupak v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1991-03-05(3)(b)

These affirmative statements, one of which was made by Schwan, went to the heart of the cause of action for negligence resulting from Schwan’s failure to pay up the policy, and would conceal the existence of the cause of action from plaintiffs, thereby tolling the running of the statute of limitation at that time. Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-102(3)(b).

For a self-concealing injury, the limitations period begins when the claimant discovers or with due diligence should discover the facts of the claim; knowledge held by the claimant's attorney is imputed to the claimant.

Kaeding v. WR Grace & Co.-Conn. · filed 1998-06-23(3)

Under § 27- 2-102(3), MCA, the proper inquiry is when the claimant discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the elements of the claim or cause of action. The District Court correctly imputed knowledge of the medical opinions contained in Dr. Whitehouse's letter to Kaeding.

For a latent injury or disease caused by chemical exposure, the discovery rule starts the limitations period when the injured person knew or should have known the facts constituting the claim; continued exposure does not delay accrual until the last exposure.

Gomez v. State · filed 1999-04-01(3)(a)

In light of these policy considerations and the dearth of authority supporting Gomez's arguments, we decline to adopt a continuing tort theory to determine the accrual date of Gomez's causes of action under the facts of this case. Consequently, we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that, under the three-year tort statute of limitations and the discovery rule, Gomez's complaint was not timely filed and in granting summary judgment to the State on the basis that Gomez's causes of action were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

When facts establishing the cause of an injury are self-concealing, the limitations period begins when the injured person discovers them or should discover them through due diligence.

Nelson v. Nelson · filed 2002-07-02(3)(a)

Addressing this so-called "discovery rule," we have held that "when the facts constituting a claim or cause of action for personal injury are, by their nature, concealed or self-concealing," the period of limitations does not begin to run "until the injured party has discovered the facts constituting the claim or, with due diligence, should have discovered those facts." ... Therefore we conclude as a matter of law that Elizabeth's complaint was timely filed.

Section 27-2-102(3) delays the start of a limitations period for a concealed claim only until the injured party discovers, or with due diligence should discover, its facts.

Rodgers v. Mony Life Insurance · filed 2005-11-15(3)

We agree with the District Court that by no later than 1991, Rodgers should reasonably have noticed that he was not receiving COLA benefits, regardless of any alleged forgery. By the time Rodgers filed his claim in 2002, the period of limitations for each of his claims had expired.

Section 27-2-102(3)(a) may delay the limitations period for a negligence claim when the facts constituting the claim are self-concealing and the plaintiff could not have discovered them through due diligence.

Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women's Clinic · filed 1997-12-11(3)(a)

As noted above, õ 27-2-102(3)(a), MCA, may toll the statute of limitations in a negligence case where the facts constituting the claim are self-concealing, thereby preventing their discovery by the plaintiff. ... We hold that the facts constituting Blackburn's claims of negligence were self-concealing to the extent that Blackburn alleges clinic counselor Jane Doe failed to disclose the risks of abortion and failed to reveal the truth about the transmission of HIV.

Section 27-2-102(3) does not delay the limitation period until professional confirmation when a plaintiff already knows the injury and the acts that may have caused it.

Lundgren v. Eastern Mt. Community M · filed 1998-04-23(3)

Even assuming it was not until 1993 that Lundgren received professional confirmation that he had not sexually abused his children, it was in early 1991 that Lundgren first learned of Bruno's actions, questioned his conduct and the results contained in the psychosexual evaluation, and thereby learned of the "facts constituting his claim." For the statute of limitations to begin, it is sufficient that a plaintiff know his or her injuries were caused by acts which may have been wrongful.

When facts constituting a claim are concealed, the three-year limitations period begins when they are discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Strom v. Logan · filed 2001-02-15(3)(a)

Where the facts constituting a claim are by their nature concealed, or where the defendant has taken action which prevents the injured party from discovering the injury or its cause, the three-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts constituting the claim either were discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence. Section 27-2-102(3)(a), MCA. In the case sub judice, the fire damage was concealed behind new sheetrock. Furthermore, as noted above, due diligence did not require the Stroms to cut holes in the walls and ceilings.

Section 27-2-102(3)(a) does not toll the limitation period merely because a claimant does not know the potential extent of her injuries.

Hartford v. General Motors · filed 2003-06-03(3)(a)

Section 27-2-102(3)(a), MCA, provides that the statutory period can be tolled for a latent injury if “the facts constituting the claim are by their nature concealed or self-concealing . . . .” A claimant’s lack of knowledge about “the potential extent” of her injuries, or damages, does not conceal the “facts constituting the claim.”

Section 27-2-102(3) delays accrual of an injury claim when its facts are concealed until the injured party discovers them or should discover them through due diligence.

Blixseth v. Kirschner (In Re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) · filed 2010-08-16(3)

Pursuant to Montana’s codified discovery rule, a “cause of action for an injury to person or property [does not commence] until the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered by the injured party if: (a) the facts constituting the claim are by their nature concealed or self-concealing; or (b) before, during or after the act causing the injury, the defendant has taken action which prevents the injured party from discovering the injury or its cause.” MCA § 27-2-102(3). Blixseth’s actions that form the basis of the claim are by their nature concealed.

Subsection (3)’s discovery rule starts the limitations period when a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the act, with concealment affecting that determination.

Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland · filed 2012-10-02(3)

Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the negligent act. Section 27-2-102(3), MCA. Whether a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the act depends on whether the defect is concealed. Section 27-2-102(3), MCA. Because we just determined Johnson failed to show any concealment on Ethel’s behalf, we reject this argument for the same reasons as we reject the equitable estoppel claim.

When a defendant prevents discovery of an injury or its cause, the limitations period begins when the claim’s facts are discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence; the defendant’s knowledge of self-dealing is not attributed to the injured company.

Blixseth v. Glasser (In Re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) · filed 2016-07-22(3)

In Montana, a limitations period “does not begin on any claim . . . until the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered” if “before, during, or after the act causing the injury, the defendant has taken action which prevents the injured party from discovering the injury or its cause.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(3). Blixseth’s knowledge of his own self-dealing cannot be attributed to the Club.

Section 27-2-102(3) delays the limitations period for concealed claims until the claimant discovers the facts or reasonable diligence would reveal them; notice of a possible claim requires reasonable inquiry.

Norbeck v. Flathead Cnty. · filed 2019-04-09(3)

Under the discovery rule, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the injured party discovers the facts constituting the claim or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the facts constituting the claim if the facts constituting the claim are by their nature concealed or self-concealing or a defendant has taken action preventing plaintiff from discovering the facts. ... Norbecks had sufficient actual and constructive notice of the issues with the Subdivision water system in early 2010 to trigger their duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry.

Section 27-2-102(3) delays the limitations period when the cause of an injury is concealed and could not be discovered through due diligence; factual disputes about discovery are for the trier of fact.

Devera v. Exxon Mobil Corporation · filed 2019-09-13(3)

Therefore, whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations in this case must be resolved by the trier of fact.

Section 27-2-102(3) does not delay the limitations period when the facts constituting a claim are publicly available and should have been discovered through due diligence.

Margitan v. McAfee · filed 2020-12-22(3)

The facts constituting Margitan’s claim against Moran and McAfee were publicly available in Montana no later than October 2004 and should have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence. See § 27-2-102(3), MCA. Margitan’s lack of further personal knowledge did not delay the commencement of the periods of limitation beyond October 2004, at the latest.

Subsection (3) tolls the limitations period until a claimant discovers, or with due diligence should discover, the facts constituting a concealed claim.

Gee v. Lockton, Inc. · filed 2021-04-20(3)

Because Gee did not realize an injury stemming from the Disability Plan, and Lockton’s alleged misrepresentations, until Sun Life asserted the offset policy as an affirmative defense on May 14, 2019, Gee did not discover the facts constituting his claim for negligent misrepresentation and UTPA violation until that date and the statute of limitations must be tolled. Gee’s complaint, filed on November 4, 2020, is timely.

For a self-concealing injury, the limitations period begins when the claimant discovers or, with due diligence, should discover the causal connection; a formal diagnosis is not required.

Chriske v. State Ex Rel. Department of Corrections & Institutions · filed 2010-07-13(3)

However, when the facts constituting the claim are by their nature concealed or self-concealing, the period of limitations does not commence “until the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered by the injured party . . . .” Section 27-1-102(3), MCA. ... The District Court did not err when it concluded that Chriske had discovered or should have discovered that her smoking caused her lung disease prior to August 2, 2001.

Section 27-2-102(3) tolls the limitations period for a fraud claim until the claimant discovers, or through due diligence could have discovered, the cause of action.

Kananen v. South · filed 2013-08-20(3)

The doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which was essentially codified in § 27-2-102(3), MCA, tolls the statute of limitations until the cause of action is discovered or could have been discovered through due diligence.

When facts constituting a claim could have been discovered through due diligence, lack of knowledge of a claim against an additional defendant does not delay accrual after the injury is known.

Thieltges v. Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. · filed 2014-09-16(3)

The facts constituting Appellants’ claims against Royal Alliance could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence. See § 27-2-102(3), MCA. Appellants’ lack of knowledge of their claims against Royal Alliance did not delay the running of the limitations period, which began when Appellants discovered their injuries in October 2008. See § 27-2-102, MCA.

Section 27-2-102(3)(b) does not toll the limitations period when the injured party fails to exercise due diligence to discover the cause of an injury.

Hein v. Sott Homes · filed 2015-07-14(3)(b)

Accordingly, Hein did not exercise due diligence to discover the cause of his injury, and the two-year statute of limitations under § 27-2-211(1)(c), MCA, was not tolled by § 27-2-102(3)(b), MCA.

Section 27-2-102(3) does not toll the limitations period under the discovery or fraudulent concealment doctrine when the injured party could have discovered the facts constituting the claim through due diligence.

Humphrey v. Remington Arms Co. · filed 2015-02-10(3)

Appellants failed to exercise due diligence. ... Therefore, neither the discovery doctrine nor the fraudulent concealment doctrine tolls Appellants’ claims.

Section 27-2-102(3) delays accrual until the injured party discovers the facts constituting the claim or should discover them through due diligence.

Platt v. Held · filed 2018-03-13(3)

The period of limitation does not begin until “the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered by the injured party. . . .” Section 27-2-102(3), MCA. ... While the grounds and reasoning cited by the District Court may not have been individually sufficient to satisfy the obligation of ordinary diligence, when the circumstances are considered as a whole, we conclude the court did not err in concluding that the claims could not have been discovered thus accrual could not have occurred until this instant lawsuit, rendering the mutual mistake claim timely filed.

Section 27-2-102(3) starts the limitations clock when the injured party discovers, or through due diligence should discover, the facts constituting the claim.

Hill v. Wendt · filed 2024-10-01(3)

In Montana, the statutory clock does not begin to run until “the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered by the injured party.” § 27-2-102(3). ... Hill therefore learned of these statements on April 20, 2020, when the search warrant was executed. (Doc. 55-1 at 24, 38-40.) Thus, this is the date his defamation claim accrued.

The limitations period for an injury claim begins when the injured person discovers, or with due diligence should discover, the facts constituting the claim.

Dalbotten v. C R Bard Incorporated · filed 2022-07-28(3)

“The period of limitation does not begin on any claim or cause of action for an injury to person or property until the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered by the injured party.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(3). ... However, Defendants present no legal authority demonstrating how the actions Dalbotten took in 2008 and 2009 did not constitute reasonable due diligence. ... Therefore, in the absence of a question of material fact, the Court finds summary judgment on Defendants’ statute of limitations defense appropriate in Dalbotten’s favor.

Section 27-2-102(3)’s discovery rule tolls the limitations period for a self-concealing defect that an ordinary consumer could not discover through reasonable diligence.

Nelson v. Forest River · filed 2026-04-13(3)

The law further would not compel the class members to conduct an electric audit of their RVs to satisfy the “due diligence” requirement of the discovery rule. The discovery rule tolls Nelson’s MCPA claim. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(3).

Section 27-2-102(3)(b)'s fraudulent concealment tolling rule does not apply to legal malpractice actions.

Joyce v. Garnaas · filed 1999-07-15(3)(b)

However, § 27-2-102(3)(b), MCA, does not apply to legal malpractice actions. Actions for legal malpractice are covered in part two of the statute of limitations chapter of the Montana Code Annotated, and are governed by § 27-2-206, MCA.

Section 27-2-102(3)'s discovery rule for limitations periods does not determine where a cause of action arose for personal jurisdiction.

Bird v. Hiller · filed 1995-04-11(3)

While in some cases it may be true that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the injured party knows or should have known of the injury, § 27-2-102(3), MCA, this principle is not applicable in resolving the question of where the cause of action arose for purposes of jurisdiction.

Section 27-2-102(3)'s discovery rule does not apply to unregistered-securities claims that must be brought within two years after the violation.

Mosley v. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. · filed 2010-04-13(3)

Under these circumstances, we will not apply § 27-2-102(3), MCA, to 30-10-202 claims.

Section 27-2-102(3) does not govern Montana Securities Act claims covered by the Act’s specific limitations statute.

Garza v. Forquest Ventures, Inc. · filed 2015-09-29(3)

The general limitations statute, § 27-2-102(3), MCA, does not control Montana Securities Act claims governed by the limitations statute specific to such claims, § 30-10-307(5), MCA.